Files

Download

Download Full Text (557 KB)

Description

The high risk, high reward possibilities of special operations forces (SOF) drone operations displayed itself in spectacular fashion on June 1, 2025, as SOF and conventional Ukrainian forces attacked four Russian air bases. Ukraine executed this unconventional operation deep in Russian territory with small, low altitude drones, hidden and launched remotely from trucks, causing an estimated $7 billion in damage and forcing Russia to retrograde high-value assets to more distant bases, changing the operational picture. The remainder of June and July saw the two nations exchanging more conventional drone attacks, some involving over 500 individual drones that were employed like cruise missiles, and showcasing the technology’s flexibility.

Twenty years of counterterrorism in permissive environments has spurred an untold billions of dollars of investment in U.S. SOF and in the systems used to execute the nation’s missions. This investment helped produce advanced drones and operators uniquely suited to target extremist groups in the Middle East and Africa, but not necessarily prepared for major combat operations. Now, in light of the effectiveness of small drones in state-on-state conflict, the United States must define or redefine USSOCOM’s goals, desired effects, organization, training, doctrine, force structure, and financial investment in small drones and their contribution to special operations success in major combat operations, or risk being left without these options in near-peer conflict. This brief seeks to describe and advocate for new research on special operations employment of all manner of drones, with a focus on small drones like those widely employed in Ukraine.

Publication Date

11-4-2025

DOI

https://doi.org/10.5038/HSEZ1670

In Search of the Future for Special Operations Drone Forces

Share

COinS