Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2019
Keywords
Hyletic phenomenology, Object-Oriented Ontology, Husserl, Hyperobjects, Timothy Morton, Clayton Crockett
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2019-0036
Abstract
In this paper, I attempt to argue alongside Clayton Crockett that Timothy Morton’s hyperobjects can be extended to encompass every object, not merely those that are large in comparison to human beings. However, unlike Crockett who uses the works of Derrida and Lacan to achieve this goal, I turn to Husserl’s underdeveloped theory of hyletic phenomenology and hyle. Despite Husserl’s articulation of hyletic phenomenology ending as quickly as it is announced, I argue that three lessons can be learned from what Husserl does have to say about hyle. Specifically, hyle is non-intentional, it is co-constitutive of intentionality, and hyle contains the possibility of broadening our traditional understanding of objects. Taken together, I suggest that Husserl’s understanding of hyle caries considerable overlap with both Crockett and Morton’s understanding of hyperobjects.
Rights Information
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Was this content written or created while at USF?
Yes
Citation / Publisher Attribution
Open Philosophy, v. 2, issue 1, p. 525-538
Scholar Commons Citation
Daves, Seth, "Hyletic Phenomenology and Hyperobjects" (2019). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 348.
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/phi_facpub/348
