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Avoiding omnidoxasticity in logics of belief: A reply to MacPherson.
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1995
ISSN
0029-4527
Abstract
In recent work MacPherson argues that the standard method of modeling belief logically, as a necessity operator in a modal logic, is doomed to fail. The problem with normal modal logics as logics of belief is that they treat believers as “ideal†in unrealistic ways (i.e., as omnidoxastic); however, similar problems re-emerge for candidate non-normal logics. The authors argue that logics used to model belief in artificial intelligence (AI) are also flawed in this way. But for AI systems, omnidoxasticity is impossible because of their finite nature, and this fact can be exploited to produce operational models of fallible belief. The relevance of this point to various philosophical views about belief is discussed.
Language
en_US
Publisher
Duke University Press
Recommended Citation
O'Hara, K., Reichgelt, H. & Shadbolt, N. (1995). Avoiding omnidoxasticity in logics of belief: A reply to MacPherson. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 36, 475-495. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1040149361
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
Comments
Citation only. Full-text article is available through licensed access provided by the publisher. Published in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 36, 475-495. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1040149361. Members of the USF System may access the full-text of the article through the authenticated link provided.