Graduation Year

2014

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree

Ph.D.

Degree Granting Department

Business Administration

Major Professor

Ninon Sutton, Ph.D

Co-Major Professor

Jianping Qi, Ph.D.

Committee Member

Daniel Bradley, Ph.D.

Committee Member

Christos Pantzalis, Ph.D.

Keywords

Contracting, Executive Compensation, Managerial Incentives, Networks, Sarbanes-Oxley Act

Abstract

This dissertation includes two essays that examine mergers and acquisitions. In the first essay we examine how pay-for-performance influences the quality of merger decisions before and after Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). Pay-for performance has a significant positive effect on acquirer returns of 0.9% pre-SOX and 1.1% post-SOX around the three day event window. Bidders with high pay-for-performance pay a 23.3% lower merger premium in listed target acquisitions. The positive effect of pay-for-performance is more important for public target acquisitions overall, for small acquirers pre-SOX, and for large acquirers post-SOX. In the long-run, bidders with high pre-merger pay-for-performance experience 27.6% higher returns after controlling for other merger characteristic.

In the second essay we investigate the value of customer/supplier relationships in mergers acquisitions. The findings show that targets (suppliers) with strong customer/supplier relationships obtain higher abnormal returns and higher merger premiums compared to targets with weak customer/supplier relationships. However, targets that have a strong connection with a customer have lower odds of being acquired. Acquirers that purchase targets with strong customer/supplier relationships have negative long-run abnormal returns, suggesting that the acquirers may have overpaid for such targets. Implications of customer/supplier relationships on customers, rivals and competing rivals are presented.

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