Online Aservice Pricing and an Option Contract
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2-2011
Keywords
online advertisements, option contract, nash bargaining, click-through rate, utility maximization
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2010.04.005
Abstract
For the Internet advertisement market, we consider a contract problem between advertisers and publishers. Among several ways of pricing online advertisements, the methods based on cost-per-impression (CPM) and cost-per-click (CPC) are the two most popular. The CPC fee is proportional to the click-through rate (CTR), which is uncertain and makes decisions of advertisers and publishers difficult. In this paper, we suggest a hybrid pricing scheme: advertisers pay the minimum of CPM and CPC fees by purchasing an option from publishers. To determine the option price, we consider a Nash bargaining game for negotiation between an advertiser and a publisher and provide the solution. Further, we show that such option contracts will help the advertiser avoid high cost and the publisher generate more revenue. The option contract will also improve the contract feasibility, compared to CPM and CPC.
Was this content written or created while at USF?
No
Citation / Publisher Attribution
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, v. 10, issue 1, p. 38-48
Scholar Commons Citation
Moon, Yongma and Kwon, Changhyun, "Online Aservice Pricing and an Option Contract" (2011). Industrial and Management Systems Engineering Faculty Publications. 21.
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/egs_facpub/21
