Understanding Conflicting Interests of a Government and a Tobacco Manufacturer: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

11-2017

Keywords

farming, subsidy, food security, rice, tobacco, Nash equilibrium

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs10726-017-9534-x

Abstract

Rice is the staple food of nearly half of the population of the world, most of whom live in developing countries. Ensuring a domestic supply of rice from outside sources is difficult for developing countries as less than 5% of the total world’s production is available for international trade. Hence, in order to ensure domestic food security, e.g., food availability and access, governments provide subsidies in agriculture. In many occasions, public money used for the subsidy goes toward promoting undesirable crops like tobacco. Although the strategic interaction between governments and manufacturers is critical, it has not been studied in the literature. This study fills this gap by considering a game between a government (of a developing country) and a tobacco manufacturer in which the government decides on a mix of subsidies and the tobacco manufacturer decides on declaring a purchasing price of tobacco. We provide a numerical study to show that controlling the output harvest price is more effective in reaching the desired end result for both the government and the tobacco manufacturer. A subsidy in fertilizer results in the measurable increase in the government spending but does not have significant effect in reaching the production target. The fertilizer subsidy should be provided only when the output price is too high to be affordable for the population.

Was this content written or created while at USF?

Yes

Citation / Publisher Attribution

Group Decision and Negotiation, v. 26, issue 6, p. 1209-1230

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