College
College of Arts and Sciences
Mentor Information
Allison Symulevich, JD, MLIS
Description
Ex parte Grossman (1925) was a landmark Supreme Court case regarding the presidential pardon power granted by the Pardon Clause in Article II of the United States Constitution and whether it extends to criminal contempt of court. The Court ruled that the Clause’s phrasing, “offenses against the United States…” does not ultimately exclude criminal contempt. Among several justifications, Chief Justice Taft included a historical overview and partially relied on English common-law history, as well as monarchical practice, to interpret the scope and help justify the use of the presidential pardon power. This partial analysis relies on the assumption that constitutional meaning here must be interpreted through Federalist-era English common-law concepts, because the Framers thought and wrote in those terms. Ultimately, the Court concluded the President’s pardoning power was originally intended to be as broad as the King’s own, except where the Constitution clearly limits it. This research challenges that assumption. Federal contempt statutes, coupled with early and modern precedent, relevant Federalist Papers, and the Constitution’s text and structural design, demonstrate that the Court could have justified this power without relying on a British monarchical analogy. Taft’s royal prerogative addendum served only as an unnecessary interpretation aimed at resolving a constitutional anxiety, rather than as a doctrinally necessary foundation to interpret the text’s scope in our own republican structure.
Spoken Presentation
Presidential Clemency, Criminal Contempt, and the Structural Limits of Judicial Authority: Reconsidering Ex parte Grossman in the Modern Separation-of-Powers Framework
Ex parte Grossman (1925) was a landmark Supreme Court case regarding the presidential pardon power granted by the Pardon Clause in Article II of the United States Constitution and whether it extends to criminal contempt of court. The Court ruled that the Clause’s phrasing, “offenses against the United States…” does not ultimately exclude criminal contempt. Among several justifications, Chief Justice Taft included a historical overview and partially relied on English common-law history, as well as monarchical practice, to interpret the scope and help justify the use of the presidential pardon power. This partial analysis relies on the assumption that constitutional meaning here must be interpreted through Federalist-era English common-law concepts, because the Framers thought and wrote in those terms. Ultimately, the Court concluded the President’s pardoning power was originally intended to be as broad as the King’s own, except where the Constitution clearly limits it. This research challenges that assumption. Federal contempt statutes, coupled with early and modern precedent, relevant Federalist Papers, and the Constitution’s text and structural design, demonstrate that the Court could have justified this power without relying on a British monarchical analogy. Taft’s royal prerogative addendum served only as an unnecessary interpretation aimed at resolving a constitutional anxiety, rather than as a doctrinally necessary foundation to interpret the text’s scope in our own republican structure.
