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Home > Open Access Journals > JSS > Vol. 19 > No. 3 (2026)

 

Author Biography

Dr. Diane Zorri is the Academic Director of the Strategic Studies programs at Norwich University. She brings a unique blend of military service, academic scholarship, and defense industry expertise to her work, reflecting a career dedicated to advancing global security and strategic education. She has held academic positions at the National Defense College of the United Arab Emirates, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach, Florida, and John Cabot University in Rome, Italy. Before transitioning to academia, Dr. Zorri served as an officer in the United States Air Force. After her military service, she worked for an Italian-US defense conglomerate, managing projects in foreign military sales, integrated communications, and physical security. Dr. Zorri's educational background includes a degree from the United States Air Force Academy, a graduate degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.5038/1944.0472.19.3.2562

Subject Area Keywords

Defense policy, Economics, Europe and EU, Foreign policy, National security, Security studies

Abstract

Europe’s defense industrial base (DIB) weaknesses are commonly attributed to underinvestment, fragmented policies, or a lack of European cohesiveness. This article advances an alternative explanation: European defense industrial dependency has emerged through institutionalized alliance structures that systematically privileged US capabilities and incentives, becoming self-reinforcing and difficult for European actors to exit, even as their strategic preferences evolved. Drawing on dependency theory, path dependence, and theories of alliance politics, this article argues that transatlantic security arrangements established during the early Cold War, most notably NATO’s integrated command structures, defense procurement norms, and interoperability requirements, have generated long-lasting asymmetries in production, technology, and market access. Rather than framing dependency as the product of deliberate US design or European unwillingness, the analysis conceptualizes it as a structural outcome of mutually reinforcing choices made by both American and European actors. While US policies prioritized alliance cohesion, operational effectiveness, and interoperability, European states have consistently favored security guarantees and cost efficiency over long-term industrial autonomy. Over time, these rational choices produced technological lock-in, fragmented European production, and persistent reliance on US defense-industrial supply chains. The consequences of this arrangement have become particularly visible during the Russia-Ukraine War, which has exposed Europe’s limited capacity to generate sufficient stocks of ammunition and advanced systems at scale. Through a comparative analysis of US and European decision-making since World War II, the article demonstrates how institutional inertia and alliance incentives have constrained Europe’s defense-industrial development.

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