•  
  •  

Home > Open Access Journals > JSS > Vol. 19 > No. 1 (2026)

 

Author Biography

Ghaleb Krame is a law enforcement and consultancy professional with over 20 years of experience. He has held various leadership positions in the state of Tamaulipas, Mexico, including Acting Under-Secretary of the Penal System, Chief of Staff, and Director of Police Strategy. During his tenure, he successfully led institutional reengineering, optimized resources, and significantly reduced crime rates. Dr Krame was also appointed Undersecretary of Crime Prevention, Secretary of Public Security of Colima, where he implemented prevention and citizen participation programs to rebuild social ties and repatriate the population who had fled due to drug cartel violence. Additionally, as Chief of Staff in Tamaulipas, he deactivated severe armed conflicts between rival drug cartels and played a key role in joint special operations with Federal Forces. Dr Krame’s contributions have earned him recognition as a highly skilled law enforcement expert and consultant. He has been an Assistant Professor at Rabdan Academy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

Dr. John P. Sullivan was a career police officer, now retired. Throughout his career he has specialized in emergency operations, terrorism, and intelligence. He is an Instructor in the Safe Communities Institute (SCI) at the University of Southern California, Senior El Centro Fellow at Small Wars Journal, and Contributing Editor at Homeland Security Today. He served as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, where he has served as a watch commander, operations lieutenant, headquarters operations lieutenant, service area lieutenant, tactical planning lieutenant, and in command and staff roles for several major national special security events and disasters. Sullivan received a lifetime achievement award from the National Fusion Center Association in November 2018 for his contributions to the national network of intelligence fusion centers. He has a PhD from the Open University of Catalonia, an MA in urban affairs and policy analysis from the New School for Social Research, and a BA in Government from the College of William & Mary.

Maria Magdalena Garcia Rodriguez (maria.g.mary@gmail.com, https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9172-1759) is a Ph.D. candidate in Public Policy at the Escuela de Gobierno y Transformacion Publica of Tecnologico de Monterrey. She holds a Master’s degree in Political Science and Public Administration. She currently serves as Head of Research and Graduate Studies at the University of Security and Justice of Tamaulipas, where she oversees graduate programs and research projects, and previously held the position of General Academic Coordinator at El Colegio de Tamaulipas, the state’s school of government. She is a graduate of the William J. Perry Center at the U.S. National Defense University, where she completed programs on the strategic implications of human rights and the rule of law, women, peace and security, and governance and strategy for security and defense. Her research focuses on public security, gender, and violence.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.19.1.2464

Subject Area Keywords

Gangs and criminal organizations, Mexico, Security policy, Terrorism / counterterrorism

Abstract

The US designation of six Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) marks a pivotal shift in bilateral security relations, compelling Mexico to navigate a complex strategic landscape. This study uses game-theoretic modeling, scenario analysis, and Nash equilibria to evaluate three possible responses by the administration of Claudia Sheinbaum: (1) Total Subordination—fully aligning with US counter-cartel efforts, (2) Covert Subordination—secretly integrating US support while maintaining a public stance of sovereignty, and (3) Strategic Resistance—rejecting US intervention in favor of an independent security approach.

New evidence on US-side border corruption and clearer definitions of key terms (joint cross-border operations, intelligence fusion centers) strengthen conceptual precision. Findings suggest that while Scenario 1 aligns with US priorities, it risks political destabilization in Mexico. Scenario 3, though preserving sovereignty, is the least stable unless supported by rapid enforcement capacity. Scenario 2 offers the most viable equilibrium, balancing effectiveness and political feasibility. A risk caveat notes conditions where US engagement may backfire, triggering cartel retaliation or production displacement.

The study provides actionable insights for policymakers navigating post-FTO dynamics, emphasizing the need for intelligence-driven cooperation that enhances security while preserving sovereignty.

Download

Share

COinS