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Home > Open Access Journals > JSS > Vol. 19 > No. 1 (2026)

 

Author Biography

Tad A. Schnaufer II (B.A. University of Florida, 2011; M.S. New York University, 2016; Ph.D. University of Central Florida, 2022) is currently the Strategy and Research Manager at the Global and National Security Institute (GNSI), University of South Florida. He oversees the planning and execution of GNSI conferences and events. Additionally, he manages the institute’s internal research and publication programs. He is the host of the “What’s Really Happening” Podcast and regularly hosts GNSI’s At the Boundary Podcast and its speaker series interviews. He has served over 18 years in the Army and currently serves in the Army Reserve as a historian. His research interests include alliance theory, NATO burden-sharing, hybrid warfare, and great power competition.

Guido Rossi (B.A. University of Milan, 2014; M.A. University of Southern Mississippi, 2017; Ph.D. The Ohio State University, 2023) is currently a Research Fellow at the Global and National Security Institute (GNSI), University of South Florida. A trained military historian with interest in modern U.S. military history particularly in its intersection with social and cultural history, at GNSI, he researches Civil-Military Relations for the U.S. military and its personnel policy.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.19.1.2570

Subject Area Keywords

Military affairs, National power, Russia, Security policy, Security studies, War studies

Abstract

The large-scale conventional conflict in Ukraine has absorbed hundreds of thousands of soldiers on both sides. Yet, domestic considerations have limited mobilization of citizens into the military at the devastating cost of prolonging the conflict. The 2022 Russian invasion force should have comprised far more personnel to ensure success at the outset. Russian leadership grossly underestimated the Ukrainian will to resist and vastly overestimated its own capabilities. Once the initial attack failed, both Russia and Ukraine only incrementally mobilized their populations, leaving neither side with overwhelming strength to create a breakthrough that would end the war. Hence, the ongoing slog along a 1000 km front continues to devour lives and resources with minimal advances. Russia has used extraordinary measures, from enlisting convicts to using private military companies, to put people in uniform while avoiding total mobilization with what are in fact ersatz soldiers. The outcome has proved unsatisfactory. The Russia-Ukraine war has shown that half measures only produce half outcomes. Large-scale combat operations (LSCO) still require the mass mobilization of people to fight. If war comes, a nation must commit fully from the start before the lines stagnate. This costly lesson will resonate with any power engaging in a future LSCO.

Disclaimer

The views expressed are our own and do not constitute endorsement by the Global and National Security Institute (GNSI), the University of South Florida (USF), the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Heather Ward and the reviewers for their insightful comments on the article.

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