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Home > Open Access Journals > JSS > Vol. 18 > Lessons Learned from the War in Ukraine

 

Author Biography

Jithin Raveendran is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of International Relations and Politics at the Central University of Kerala, India. His ongoing research critically examines Russia’s counterterrorism efforts, both within its borders and in international contexts, focusing on their evolution, strategic implications, and global engagements. ORCID: 0009-0005-6887-8113

DOI

https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.18.4.2564

Subject Area Keywords

Asymmetric warfare, Conflict studies, Defense policy, Europe and EU, Military affairs, Regional conflict, Russia, Security studies, Special operations forces, Strategy, War studies

Abstract

This article examines Ukraine’s maritime campaign in the Black Sea as a contemporary case study in sea denial against a conventionally superior navy. Despite lacking a blue-water fleet, Ukraine effectively contested Russia’s naval dominance through an integrated use of land-based anti-ship missiles, unmanned surface vehicles, special operations, and real-time intelligence—including support from Western ISR assets. High-profile incidents such as the sinking of the Moskva and sustained strikes on Sevastopol illustrate how denial can be achieved without parity in platforms or tonnage, reaffirming and extending insights from theorists such as Milan Vego, Ian Speller, and Sam Tangredi. While Ukraine’s methods build on long-standing traditions of asymmetric and denial-based strategies, their multi-domain application—combining unmanned systems, distributed operations, and data-driven targeting—underscores the evolving character of maritime conflict in the twenty-first century. By situating Ukraine’s experience within the broader literature on sea denial and irregular maritime warfare, the article highlights both continuities and innovations, offering doctrinal lessons for modern navies. It argues that naval superiority alone is insufficient in contested littoral environments and concludes with recommendations emphasizing distributed lethality, infrastructure resilience, counter-drone defences, and training for degraded command-and-control conditions.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated institutions or organizations. This research is intended only for academic purposes.The author declares no conflict of interest in the publication of this article. There are no financial or personal relationships that could influence the research or its outcomes.

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