•  
  •  

Home > Open Access Journals > JSS > Vol. 18 > Lessons Learned from the War in Ukraine

 

Author Biography

Chad M Briggs is Professor of Disaster Risk and Crisis Management at the Asian Institute of Management in the Philippines, Research Professor at the University of Alaska Anchorage, and principal advisor at GlobalINT LLC. He was formerly Minerva Chair and Professor of Energy and Environmental Security at Air University (USAF) and has focused much of his career on cyber/cognitive/hybrid warfare and post-conflict reconstruction. He has worked in Ukraine since 2011, including training on information warfare and postwar planning.

Anita Tusor is a PhD Student in International Relations at Charles University, Prague, specializing in security and strategic studies. She holds a Double Master’s Degree in Asian and European Affairs from King’s College London and Renmin University of China, as well as an MA in Applied Linguistics and a BA in Hungarian and Chinese Studies. Her professional experience includes research and policy work with NATO Allied Command Transformation, the Institute of International Relations in Prague, the European Center for Populism Studies, and the European Values Center for Security Policy. Her research interests focus on Chinese cognitive warfare, foreign malign influence operations, populist constitutionalism, and Asia-Pacific security.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.18.4.2587

Subject Area Keywords

Asymmetric warfare, China, Conflict studies, Europe and EU, Information operations, Russia, Security studies, Strategic communications, War studies

Abstract

Cognitive warfare (CW) has emerged as a decisive battlespace in modern conflict, shifting the focus from physical terrain to the perceptions and resilience of societies. This article analyzes the Russian Federation's application of CW in Ukraine since 2013, contrasting it with the strategic concepts developed by the People's Republic of China (PRC). Russia's approach, rooted in Soviet-era maskirovka and reflexive control, integrates cyber operations, disinformation, and the use of non-state proxies, including private military companies, organized crime, and the Russian Orthodox Church, to destabilize adversaries and manufacture uncertainty. In response, Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable resilience through a whole-of-society mobilization, effectively countering Russian narratives and leveraging a volunteer IT Army. China’s CW strategy emphasizes narrative dominance and systemic persuasion to achieve its goal of "winning without fighting". The article argues that while Russia’s brute-force methods have revealed strategic weaknesses, China is learning from these mistakes. By narrowly focusing on conventional warfighting, some Western governments risk being outmaneuvered in this critical domain, making the lessons from Ukraine essential for understanding the future of global security.

Disclaimer

The article is supported by Charles University‘s grant SVV-260842 (“Conflict, cooperation and power in a changing world order") and by Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences GAUK No. 114125.

Acknowledgements

Sincere thanks to MGEN Yuriy Danyk for his assistance.

Download

Share

COinS