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Home > Open Access Journals > JSS > Vol. 18 > Afghanistan

 

Author Biography

Guido Rossi (B.A. University of Milan, 2014; M.A. University of Southern Mississippi, 2017; Ph.D. The Ohio State University, 2023) is currently a Research Fellow at the Global and National Security Institute, University of South Florida. He is a trained military historian with interest in US military history particularly in its intersection with social and cultural history, history of immigration, race, ethnicity, and sense of national identity. At GNSI, Guido Rossi researches Civil-Military Relations for the U.S. military and its personnel policy.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.18.2.2440

Subject Area Keywords

Afghanistan, Civil affairs, Civil war and internal conflict, Complex emergencies, Complex operations, Conflict studies, Counterinsurgency, Defense policy, Ethnic conflict, Europe and EU, Foreign policy, History, Humanitarian assistance, International relations, International security, Iraq, Irregular warfare, Military affairs, National security, Natural resources and security, Security policy, Security studies, Small wars and insurgencies, Social movements, Sociocultural dynamics in security, Strategy, War studies

Abstract

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 highlighted both American unpreparedness for evacuating large numbers of foreign civilians as well over-reliance on local contractors that made the evacuation a task of much greater proportions. As a result, the United States were forced to renege on its promises of protection to many Afghan collaborators who were left behind exposed to Taliban retribution. However, the U.S. could not only have handled the evacuation and resettlement operation of Afghan civilians much more effectively through better contingency planning, interagency communication, and coordination, but it could also have prevented massive reliance on local contractors through better utilization of the human skills already available in the United States. Even though all this could not have turned defeat into victory in Afghanistan, it could have prevented the situation from escalating to a humanitarian crisis. This way, the United States could have been able to evacuate smaller numbers of foreign civilians and uphold promises of protection that are the foundation of U.S. prestige abroad. These lessons need to be learned in case of necessary future involvements overseas that require some degree of reliance on local contractors and hold the potential of emergency evacuations.

Disclaimer

The intention of this paper is not to suggest that Afghan interpreters, translators, collaborators, their families, or any one of the foreign allies of the United States be neglected. Rather, its purpose is to highlight the implications of the U.S. policy of relying so much on local personnel and the cost borne by the American people or by the Afghan people itself whenever the United States prove unable to keep its promises. Finally, in the belief that this course of events was not unavoidable, this paper seeks to suggest how the issue could have been ameliorated or avoided altogether.

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