Author Biography

Dr. Russell W. Glenn spent sixteen years in the think tank community as a senior defense analyst after retiring from the US Army, later joining the faculty of Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University. His education includes a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and master’s degrees from the University of Southern California, Stanford University, and the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies. He earned his PhD in American history from the University of Kansas. He is the author of over fifty books or book-length reports on urban operations and other security-related topics. His latest nonfiction book, Come Hell or High Fever: Readying the World’s Megacities for Disaster, is available for free download at http://doi.org/10.22459/CHHF.2023. Both it and Gods’ War, his recently released American Civil War novel, are also available for purchase on Amazon and via other distributors worldwide.



Subject Area Keywords

Civil affairs, Complex operations, Conflict studies, Corruption, Defense policy, Europe and EU, Foreign policy, History, Humanitarian assistance, International security, Military affairs, National security, Russia, Security policy, Security studies, Stability operations


The US response to Iraq’s recovery in the aftermath of 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom suffered from an initial conclusion that it was the country’s petroleum infrastructure rather than its electrical networks that were in greater need of recovery resources. The resulting misallocation of resources delayed power restoration to much of the country and frustrated those in affected regions.

Whether the cause is war or a catastrophe sparked by Mother Nature, accurately identifying and correctly prioritizing post-disaster requirements is fundamental to an effective and efficient response. Ukraine has demonstrated a commendable ability to repair war damage even as conflict continues, but ground operations in Bakhmut, elsewhere, and continued aerial strikes nationwide mean much will remain to be done once hostilities cease. How best to accomplish that desirable response—one sure to involve hundreds of millions of donor dollars—will be a herculean task, a task greatly complicated by the number of donors, consequent challenges to their effective management, and—sadly—Ukraine’s legacy of corruption. History has much to offer in the way of how to address these challenges. Now is the time draw on its lessons and initiate the process of determining Ukrainian urban areas’ post-war needs.