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Author Biography

Michael G. Anderson is an U.S. Army infantry officer with four overseas deployments to the Middle East, Afghanistan, East and Central Africa. Past operational assignments include as rifle and scout platoon leader, infantry company commander, and executive officer for Special Operations Command Forward – Central Africa. He is a graduate of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College and a 2022 graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies. His civilian education includes a bachelors of art in history and political science from the University of Central Florida and a masters in art in military history from Norwich University. He has published over a dozen articles, including in the Journal of Advanced Military Studies, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, and Military Review. He is the author of Mustering for War (Army University Press), and currently an operational planner at the U.S. Army’s Forces Command.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.16.1.2062

Subject Area Keywords

Foreign internal defense, Military affairs, National security, Strategy

Abstract

United States professional military advisors play a critical role across the spectrum of conflict within the various services’ strategies in support of the overall National Defense Strategy. In an era of great power competition, the role of advisory forces within the shadow of large-scale conflict, provide a crucial edge for the US military services fulfilling their strategic role. Within each of the services’ unique strategies - the Army’s multidomain operations, the Marine Corps expeditionary advanced base operations nested within the Navy’s broader littoral operations in a contested environment, and the Air Force’s forward projecting agile basing concept - advisors from across the force support developing doctrines with conducting interoperability, providing access, and building relationships with allies and partners across key regions in great power competition. Even so, within each of these services, there is room for maximizing the utility of the advisory forces’ support to the service strategies.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Colonel Matthew Neumeyer, Dr. James Joyner Jr., and Captain Megan Wood for their comments, feedback, and support

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