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Author Biography

I am an MD-cPhD at Claremont Graduate University. My areas of concentration are in International Relations and Quantitative Methods. My focus area is the evolution of terrorism. I can be contacted at: Giti.Zahedzadeh@cgu.edu.

DOI

http://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.2.1565

Subject Area Keywords

Asymmetric warfare, Counterterrorism, Security studies, Terrorism / counterterrorism

Abstract

The strategic interplay between counterterror measures and terror activity is complex. Herein, we propose a dynamic model to depict this interaction. The model generates stylized prognoses: (i) under conditions of inefficient counterterror measures, terror groups enjoy longer period of activity but only if recruitment into terror groups remains low; high recruitment shortens the period of terror activity (ii) highly efficient counterterror measures effectively contain terror activity, but only if recruitment remains low. Thus, highly efficient counterterror measures can effectively contain terrorism if recruitment remains restrained. We conclude that the trajectory of the dynamics between counterterror measures and terror activity is heavily altered by recruitment.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

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