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Home > Open Access Journals > JSS > Vol. 10 > No. 1 (2017)

 

Author Biography

Tad Andrew Schnaufer II currently serves as a United States Army Infantry Officer. He has interned at the Office for Disarmament Affairs’ Strategic Planning Unit at the United Nations, where his research focused on nuclear proliferation, terrorism, urban combat, along with UN military operations. He has conducted research in conjunction with New York University and independently on unconventional warfare. His research has taken him to the war front in Ukraine, across Eastern Europe, and East Africa. He has earned a M.S. in Global Affairs from New York University and a B.A. with dual majors in Geography and History from the University of Florida. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, any other government agency, or the U.S. Government.

DOI

http://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.1.1538

Subject Area Keywords

Asymmetric warfare, China, Civil war and internal conflict, Counterinsurgency, Counterterrorism, Economics, Foreign policy, International security, Irregular warfare, Russia, Small wars and insurgencies, Strategy

Abstract

The term hybrid warfare fails to properly describe Russian operations in Ukraine and elsewhere. Russia has undertaken unconventional techniques to build its influence and test the boundaries of a shaken international system. Notably, Russia’s actions in Ukraine display an evolved style of warfare that goes beyond its initial label of hybrid warfare. The term non-linear war (NLW) will be defined in this article to encompass Russia’s actions and allow policymakers the correct framework to discuss and respond to Russia. NLW plays to the advantage of countries like Russia and constitute the future of warfare.

Acknowledgements

Acknowledgements to Mary Beth Altier and Mark Galeotti for the support leading up to this article

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