Graduation Year


Document Type




Degree Name

MS in Electrical Engineering (M.S.E.E.)

Degree Granting Department

Electrical Engineering

Major Professor

Selcuk Kose, Ph.D.

Committee Member

Gokhan Mumcu, Ph.D.

Committee Member

Mehran Mozaffari Kermani, Ph.D.


Hardware security, EM side channel attacks, distributed voltage regulation, Security Implications, power grid lines


Non-invasive side-channel attacks (SCAs) are potent attacks on a cryptographic circuit that can reveal its secret key without requiring lots of equipment. EM side-channel leakage is typically the derivative of the power consumption profile of a circuit. Since the fluctuations of the supply voltage strongly depend on the topology and features of the power distribution network (PDN), design of the PDN has a direct impact on EM side-channel leakage signature.

In this thesis, we explore the security implications of distributed on-chip voltage regulators against EM side-channel attacks. Extensive HFSS simulations have demonstrated that the maximum EM radiation can be reduced by 33 dB and 11 dB, respectively, at the top and bottom sides of an integrated circuit through distributed on-chip voltage regulation. The primary reason is that the power is delivered locally through partially shorter and thinner metal lines as compared to off-chip implementation.