Abstract
This paper attempts to unearth quality of corporate governance practices of Indian Banking sector and highlight whether the corporate governance practices of listed public and private sector banks are symmetric post subprime crisis. The study examines that whether the key corporate governance factors like capital adequacy ratio, board size, number of independent directors and CEO duality affects the performance of banks. In addition to this, the paper goes on to find the essence of shareholding by non-executive directors and the regularity of directors in attending the board meetings. Further, for the perusal of corporate governance practices followed in the Indian banking sector a corporate governance index has been compiled from the data of all listed Indian banks. Moreover, the paper endeavors to exhume any relationship between the educational qualification of directors and its contribution on the banks’ performance, if any. The results provides an insight of the corporate governance structure of Indian banking sector and exhibit that the public and private sector banks have asymmetric corporate governance practices post subprime crisis. The empirical results of multiple regression analysis demonstrate a positive impact of corporate governance factors on Indian bank’s performance.
Keywords
corporate governance, banks’ board, board size, board monitoring
Chinese Abstract
后次贷危机时期印度银行业的企业管制
本文试图剖析印度银行企业管制方式的质量问题，并着重分析上市公司和私营银行在后次贷危机时期的企业管制实践方面是否对称。本研究检测了影响银行绩效的重要企业管制因素，如资本充足率、董事会规模、独立董事人数及首席执行长(CEO)双重性。 除此之外，本文进一步探索了非执行董事持股的本质以及董事出席董事会会议的常规性。同时，为了了解印度银行遵循的企业管制惯例，本文根据印度所有上市银行的数据编写出企业管制指数。此外，本文亦试图探究董事的教育资格与其对银行绩效之间的关系（若有）。本文研究结果对印度银行企业管制结构提出了见解，并显示上市公司和私营银行在次贷危机发生后在企业管制实践方面是不对称的。 此外，多元回归分析的实证结果表明企业管制因素对印度银行的绩效具有正面影响。
关键词：企业管制， 银行董事会，董事会规模，董事会监督
DOI
10.5038/2640-6489.1.2.1007
Recommended Citation
Kanojia, S., & Priya, S. (2016). Corporate governance in Indian banks post subprime crisis. International Interdisciplinary Business-Economics Advancement Journal, 1(2), 50-62. https://www.doi.org/10.5038/2640-6489.1.2.1007
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