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Otis R. Anthony African Americans in Florida Oral History Project
Oral History Program
Florida Studies Center
University of South Florida, Tampa Library

Digital Object Identifier: A31-00077
Interviewee: John Daniels (JD)
Interviewer: Otis Anthony (OA), Herbert Jones (HJ), Fred Beaton (FB)
Interview date: July 13, 1978
Interview location: Tampa, Florida
Transcribed by: Unknown
Transcription date: Unknown
Interview changes by: Mary Beth Isaacson
Interview changes date: December 1, 2008
Final Edit by: Maria Kreiser
Final Edit date: February 17, 2009

[Transcriber's Note: Interview starts in mid-sentence.]

John Daniels: —left St. Petersburg, I think at the age of four, and moved to Tampa. And at that particular time, my mother went to Philadelphia and I remained with my grandparents here in Tampa. Moved into a community where my grandmother lives now, on Banza Street, down the street from (inaudible). I think you're familiar with the area. And when we moved in that community—I think it was back in 1942, forty-three [1943], or forty-four [1944]—it was basically a Latin community.

Otis Anthony: Yeah.

JD: I think it was only about—when we moved there was only about two, maybe four, families in that entire street. But it gradually changed, you know; the Latins moved out and they went some place. I don't know specifically where they went. I guess since they became more affluent and assimilated into the Anglo community of Tampa, they dispersed and assimilated into their other community.

I was raised by my grandparents, who were migratory workers. This went on from the time that I was in elementary school all the way through eleventh grade and high school.

OA: Were they, like, seasonal workers that was traveling around?

JD: They were seasonal workers.

OA: Did they travel around?

JD: We worked the East Coast. We worked South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, New Jersey, all the way up into upstate New York, picking apples and working for Birds-Eye, picking corn and that kind of stuff. And that happened each year. I was put in school

late and taken out of school early, from first grade all the way through eleventh grade.

Eventually, I graduated. When I graduated from high school—that was in fifty-six [1956]—I had some weird ideas. I wanted to go to Philadelphia and become a tenant landlord. I wanted to buy a big apartment building (laughs) and uh—

OA: (laughs) What high school did you graduate from?

JD: Middleton [High School] in fifty-six [1956]. So I went to Philadelphia, and I stayed in Philadelphia for six months. I got a job at a belt factory. But I couldn't take the life in Philadelphia because people were very impersonal in that community, so I returned after six months. And when I got back here, my close friends who I had graduated with had gone off to school, and those ones that were coming out in fifty-seven [1957] were going off to school. So I said, "Well, damn, I ain't got nothing to do." And so I wrote my mother and said, "I want go to school." And she said, "I ain't got no money, I don't know what we are going to do, but we're going to do the best we can," and I was sent to school. And my mother sold Avon [cosmetics] to send me to school. I went to school off of Avon money.

Herbert Jones: Where did you go?

JD: A&M [Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University]. Majored in industrial education, came out in January of sixty-two [1962], and didn't find a job immediately. I don't know how long I stayed out of work, but I didn't go to work immediately, because I worked about six months at Davis Island Yacht and Country Club. And interestingly enough, I think school teachers were only making about \$350 a month, and working at the yacht club I was making anywhere from \$150 to \$200 a week. But still, you know, I wanted to get into the profession. And I wasn't able to go into industrial education, which was my major.

I started off working at Booker Washington [Middle School] as a math teacher in the middle of the year. I taught math, I think, and civic history, for approximately two or three years. After that, I went into work experience, started working as a work experience coordinator. And the purpose of this was to try and find jobs for potential junior high school dropouts who were having economic problems in hope that this would keep them in school. I think last year I worked as a work experience coordinator, and I also worked as a juvenile counselor with the juvenile domestic relations courts. And I was specifically concerned with those individuals who were placed at Booker Washington, providing monitoring and guidance for those individuals who were on probation.

I think in sixty-seven [1967], in February of sixty-seven [1967], Jim Hammond had convinced the powers that be that his staff needed enlarging. I think the only major project they had at that time was Head Start [education program]. And he was having a whole lot of problems in Head Start, because the school system was in the process of taking over Head Start. And he didn't want that; he wanted Head Start to remain an entity within itself under the [county] commission.

OA: Okay, he was working in what capacity?

JD: At that time, Hammond went with Community Relations in sixty-four [1964]; that's when they established the Office of Community Relations.

OA: Okay.

JD: And one of the first major projects that was implemented by the Office of Community Relations was Head Start, which was a multimillion dollar program that was being coordinated by Jim Hammond. He was controlling all the purse strings, calling the shots in term of what was happening with the University of South Florida, the school system, and several other major entities in the community. And there was a whole lot of conflict, because they wanted to do things one way and Hammond wanted to do things another way.

And a whole lot of controversy developed because of the Head Start Program, but in sixty-seven [1967], the City of Tampa decided to expand the Office of Community Relations. At that time I think he was authorized—I don't know; about four additional staff individuals. And I think the individuals who were identified at that particular time was Goosby [Jones] and myself. And so he convinced me to leave the school system, under the auspices that I was going to receive a salary of \$9,500 a year.

Well, I resigned, and after I resigned and started to work with the Office of Community Relations, I found out that everything had not been cleared; even the positions hadn't been cleared. And so we were out there in limbo for almost a month. And eventually, I think the [Tampa] city council approved the budget. When they approved the budget, the salary was \$7,500, which was \$2,000 less than I left the school system for. So actually, I was leaving the school system because of the money, but after I got in there, the money was the same.

I started working there as a job developer, and during that time jobs were very difficult to come by. Because what we were doing—we were trying to break into nontraditional occupations for black folks. And we've had relatively—a pretty good success with General Telephone Company.

You can stop at any time.

OA: You were there in sixty-seven [1967]?

JD: Went there in February—Goosby and I went there in February sixty-seven [1967].

OA: So you were there during the time of the riots in Tampa?

JD: Yeah. I will lead up to that. We had been very successful working with General Telephone Company, because when we had conducted several workshops for General

Telephone. As a result of those workshops, we had gotten blacks into the operational phase of General Telephone. Prior to the workshops, you know, they were in service kinds of occupations—elevator operators, maids and janitors. Didn't have any operators, didn't have any installers, what have you. But as a result of the program, the training program that we conducted, they phased them in. I think we must have had—over a period of a year, we must have phased in anywhere from seventy-five to one hundred blacks in General Telephone in the operational areas.

OA: This was just done in—it was just a good faith effort on their part?

JD: Well—

OA: Do y'all have any kind of reports from that time?

JD: No, it was done through negotiation by Hammond with Fred Leary.

OA: Oh, okay.

JD: At that time, Fred Leary was president of General Telephone. And what they were telling us—they were telling us that “We can't identify any blacks.” The blacks that they were identifying couldn't pass the examination. So, they did a combination of things. I think they sent them in there and let them work during the day, and brought them back in the evenings into an academic kind of environment, and provided whatever training was necessary for the area that they were going into.

Going from there, I think we started doing some workshops with the Merchants Association, working with a guy—I think was Colby Armstrong.

OA: Was all of this new? Was it like a new concept (inaudible) in terms of—?

JD: Well, what we were doing—all this happened before the war of poverty began and money began coming in from the federal government. And we were trying to deal with all those social ills that existed in the community. We were dealing with police and community relations, we were dealing with—we were very heavy into that. Remind me to tell you about what happened in that area. That caused—well, back up. I want to tell you about the employment, then we'll get into that.

But we were doing all kinds of workshops, getting individuals employment, you know. We were talking to the president of Maas Brothers [Department Store]; we got the first blacks into Maas Brothers as salespersons, the first blacks into O. Falk's [Department Store]. We did the bottling companies, we did the grocery stores. Because of our involvement, we moved blacks into nontraditional occupations in a variety of businesses and industries throughout Hillsborough County. But only as a token kind of thing, you know; we just got them in the door. One or two, and that was it. And then a part of my responsibility as a job developer was to continue to try and develop jobs in order to phase other blacks into the same kinds of nontraditional occupations. But it became very

difficult once you got that one or two in.

Now, it changed. I think the riots must have occurred something like June twelfth [1967] or June thirteenth [1967], or what have you. I believe it was on a Sunday, because what happened, I had gone to Philadelphia to take a look at OIC [Opportunities of Industrialization Center]—Reverend [Leon] Sullivan's OIC program¹—because we were trying to get into the same kind of thing, training for employment and that kind of stuff. When I came back, I think I was at Buddy's Bar on Seventh Avenue, must have been about six or seven in the afternoon, and I decided to go over to the Zanzibar on Main Street. And when I went down Henderson [Avenue], I was going to cut through (laughs) Central [Avenue] and check it out and go on over and around.

Well, when I got there, cops were blocking Central right there at Henderson; you couldn't go down. And I had no idea what was going on. And I went to West Tampa, and during that time I was in West Tampa, I stopped by Goosby's house and asked Pat where was Goosby. He said, "Well, Goosby is down on Central. A riot has started." And so I went back into Central Avenue area; it was about dusk dawn then. They had a few police in the fringe areas, but nobody was inside. So that time we had cards—you know, Community Relations Representative or what have you. And I showed the cop the card, and I went in and met Goosby and Gerald.

And guys were just breaking out windows, looting stores. What we were telling them, you know, take it all—not to take it—take it and don't come back, because the people are coming. But those people didn't organize themselves until about—must have been about ten or eleven o'clock before they could organize well enough to come into the area. That whole time was just, you know, sat there. People did what they want to do.

OA: That's interesting. I never heard that before.

JD: After, they organized and came in, and forced everybody off of Central, back into the [housing] projects. They couldn't go into the project because they were scared. But we had to act as the liaison, and so we walked that project up and down, talking to people, trying to quiet people down, and what have you. And that went on until about four o'clock that morning.

About four o'clock that morning, [Claude] Kirk came in. Kirk was the governor at that time. I think [Nick] Nuccio was the mayor. Kirk, Nuccio, [Sheriff Malcolm] Beard, and I can't think who was the police chief at that particular time², met right there on the corner of Central and Cass [Street]. What was that little shoe store on the corner there?

OA: Central— Central—

JD: Right there on the corner, as you go into Central, that was a little shoe store. Well, we had Nuccio sitting out there on a chair right there on that corner. Well, when Kirk came

¹ Philadelphia Opportunities Industrialization Center, Inc.

² J.P. Mullins.

in, Kirk turned everything, took everything from under the auspices from the police department and made Beard the man. And at that particular time, Jim Hammond, Nick Nuccio, Beard, and Kirk, they went into a meeting to find out what they had to do in order to quell the situation.

I don't know what happened; some kind of way we got word they wanted to meet with all of the individuals who were basically the instigators. We had identified those individuals, and so our assignment was to pick those guys up and have those guys in our office the next morning at eight o'clock. Well, I picked the cats up like at five-thirty or six o'clock in the morning, rode them around until eight o'clock—

OA: (laughs)

JD: —and carried them to the office. Well, everybody was excited, you know, because they still wanted to do their thing. They were very angry.

Paul Antinori must have came in about—I don't know, maybe about eleven o'clock.

OA: He was in— He was the state attorney.

JD: He was the state attorney at that time. He came in and gave justifiable homicide. And everybody became very angry again, but didn't anybody leave and we kept them there. And so eventually they came up with the White Hat concept.

OA: Yeah, tell me how that developed.

JD: Well, that developed in a series of meetings that were taking place from four o'clock that morning up until about ten o'clock the next day. I really don't know specifically, but sometime by noon the next day the idea had materialized.

OA: Was that a brainchild of Mr. Hammond?

JD: I don't know; there's a whole lot of controversy around that. Some people say it was [Bob] Gilder's idea, some people say it was Dr. [James O.] Brookins' idea. I never knew, because I wasn't in on the meetings because I was in the street.

OA: Yeah, I see.

JD: And so Hammond say it was his idea, Brookins say it was his idea, Bob say it was his idea, so whose idea it really was, I can't say. But anyway, everything was organized in our office; we were located on Franklin Street at that time. And eventually we said we were going to do the White Hat patrol, and all the organization was put together right there in the conference room. We identified the lieutenants and they decided what black officer they wanted to work with in the community, and we sectioned them off into districts and went out.

OA: That was interesting, how—I couldn't imagine how they got them to agree to that, you know. I always wondered how they got them organized and how they got them to agree to it, and that type of thing.

JD: That was done through a long process of discussion, you know, as of what we going to do in order to save our community.

OA: So the purpose—

JD: And plus, I think there was another concession, is that they [law enforcement] would not come into that community, you know.

OA: Okay, that's the kind of thing we were talking about.

JD: They had to agree to pull them off the street and not to send them into that community. Because I think they had the National Guard here by that time, but they never did come out, and this was part of the agreement. If you could be successful in maintaining your community, we will not send the law enforcement officers in there. And this is what happened: as a result of these individuals going back to the community, over the next two days everything was calm. It just quieted down from there.

And so the next thing was putting these guys on the payroll. Oh, that was really a trip. But Hammond was—Hammond, you know, is a very persuasive individual.

OA: I believe that.

JD: He is a very, very, persuasive individual, and he worked day and night, you know, just twisting people arms and threatening them: if you don't do it, this is what's going to happen. And those individuals immediately went on payroll; we picked up four or five of them and put them on payroll. They were supposed to be community workers; I think [that] was their title. They were supposed to go out into the community and identify the ills and identify the concerns of the community, and bring those concerns back to our office. We would categorize them and send them into the administration and see what could be done about it.

OA: Do you remember any of the people that were hired?

JD: Yeah. Norris Morrow—

Fred Beaton: Robert Stoney?

JD: Stoney—I don't think he was hired at that particular time. It was Morrow, Arthur Roby, Carl Brazelton—

OA: [Johnny Lee] Carter, too.

JD: Yeah, Carter, and a couple of other individuals.

FB: Who's Carter?

OA: Uh—he's (inaudible).

JD: Yeah. Lived over in the West Tampa area. And those guys worked for us for—well, they could have probably been working for us now, but—

OA: (laughs)

JD: That's what the people predicted, you know; that's what happened. The first thing happened, that Roby killed a dude³, and after Roby killed somebody, I think Norris was picked up⁴. But Norris always worked his self out. And I think everybody got in trouble except Carl Brazelton and Carter, and eventually it was just too much heat on us to keep them. We just had to cut the entire program out. We'll go back to the police thing, you know, okay.

We were heavy into police and community relations. We were monitoring their activities; we were calling press conferences and everything. And eventually it got—well, Nuccio moved out and [Dick] Greco came in. And Greco did not like the fact that we were a city department and we were constantly criticizing the police department. And we had a series of confrontations, and as a result of those confrontations that we were having with the police department, I think it's basically one of the reasons they dissolved the commission as a department of city government. Very interesting.

FB: I never knew of this result.

JD: And what happened at that particular time, the mayor didn't have primary control over the commission, because the commission was controlled by a board, a board of commissioners who were appointed by the administration. And our staff reported directly to the board. Now, the board was a very influential board. You had Colby Armstrong, who was president of the Merchants Association. At one time we had the guy who owned Port Sutton—what's his name? The guy walks with a cane; he's a philanthropist. He was on the board. Old dude now, who's chairman of the board of one of those banks downtown; he's a prominent lawyer—

OA: Cody Fowler.

JD: Cody Fowler. You had Andrews, C. Blythe [Senior] on there, Perry Harvey [Senior] on there.

So the board was very influential. Anything the board sanctioned, the board was too

³ Roby was convicted of second degree murder in the 1968 shooting of Frank Cutler.

⁴ Morrow was arrested and charged with assault with intent to murder and armed robbery. Editor was unable to confirm whether the case was ever tried. This incident actually took place before Cutler's death.

heavy for the administration to deal with. And some members on the board were concerned about our activities as it related to police and community relations and as it related to the school system, because we were getting into the school system at the same time, and we were annoying some people over there. And as a result of that, some board members got together and talked with the administration, and as a result of that, the commission was initially resolved as a department and placed under MDA. But that all occurred primarily because the mayor wanted direct control over that staff, or over that operation, and he didn't have it with the board there because the board served as a buffer between the administration and the staff.

OA: It's not under MDA now, right?

JD: It's still—

OA: It's still under there?

JD: It's still under there. It's not MDA anymore, but it still comes under what is called HICKS now. Housing, Inspections, Community Development, it still comes under that area.

OA: The Office of Community Relations.

JD: Right.

OA: I used to know it was under MDA, but I didn't it was still under there.

JD: It's still under MDA.

OA: Okay.

HJ: Mr. Daniels, were the riots just in the black areas?

JD: Yes, just in the—basically, all the activity occurred on Central Avenue.

HJ: Okay, why did they start rioting? What prompted the riots?

JD: Allegedly, [Martin] Chambers had stolen some camera equipment⁵ from down on Emma Street. Some police saw him walking in that vicinity, I don't know specifically where it was, and they asked him to stop. He didn't stop, and a chase developed. And he was shot in the back, you know. If you would see where he was shot—have you ever? Did you ever see that area?

OA: No.

JD: Okay. Well, you know it was right in the—there were some two-story buildings back

⁵ June 11, 1967, in Tampa, Florida.

up in there.

FB: In back of the shoe place right off Cass.

OA: Okay.

JD: You know where Johnnie Mandese [Auto Repair] is on Cass Street? There's a six-foot fence that runs all the way around there. Well, that fence, you know, came down like this wall here and went that way. Right in here, you had two- or three-story buildings that were in there. Well, he was shot in that corner, in the back.

FB: The top of (inaudible) comes over this way.

JD: There was no way he could get away, and they were pursuing him from both sides.

OA: Oh, I see. Okay.

JD: And there was really no reason for having to shoot him, because if they had continued to pursue him they could have caught him.

OA: The officer that shot him, was he black?

JD: No.

OA: He wasn't?

JD: No.

HJ: And so they took that over into Central and started—

JD: Well, it was right in the Central area; it's only about two blocks from Central.

FB: A block.

JD: A block from Central. It was right there in the projects.

HJ: Okay, they were destroying things that were black-owned or white-owned, or what?

JD: There were black-owned businesses and white-owned businesses, and they didn't care. All they wanted was merchandise. And they hit everything that was on Central. They burned that drugstore down.

FB: They burned the Palace Drugstore.

JD: They burned all that down. They burned the Village Bar down, the laundromat, and Palace Drugstore. And all of that was white-owned. The major stuff down there was

white-owned. What did they hit down there that was black down there?

FB: The only place that they hit that was black was the Greek Stand, and they didn't do nothing but knock the windows out of that.

JD: Because there wasn't anything out—

FB: They didn't insure the place.

JD: What did they do to the pawn shop?

FB: (inaudible)

JD: They cleaned out the pawn shop. There was a grocery store in there. Well, basically the losses that occurred were losses on the part of whites that owned stuff there in that community.

OA: Yeah, that's something that needs to be understood.

JD: Uh-huh.

HJ: Because I noticed that whenever there's a riot and blacks want to riot, they always riot within the black district.

OA: It's safer.

HJ: I oftentimes wonder why would blacks go into your area to riot. Why not go into the white area?

OA: There was some commotion between Twenty-Second [Street] and Main [Street], right?

JD: Yeah, there was some bottle throwing. (Intercom buzzes) As whites would pass through the community, they would throw bottles in the cars and that kind of stuff. That happened on Twenty-Second, and that did happen to an extent on Main.

FB: Okay, can you describe, say, historically, problems that have affected blacks as opposed to your unit—as opposed to the department which you worked in, some of the problems you had to attack during this time, other than like, employment?

JD: Well, there are three areas that we've looked at and been concerned about and that we feel that had fallacies in them and have dealt with, the same ones that we are facing with now: police, community relations, employment, and education. Those are things that we were fighting ten years ago. And the same problems we were having ten years ago in trying to get across to those individuals, I think we're having some of the same kinds of problems again. Now, the only time that I think we made any kind of inroads was

immediately after the riots, for about two or three years. And after that period, things went back to business as usual.

OA: When you say inroads, you mean (inaudible)?

JD: Take for an example—before the riots I was telling you about the difficulties I was having developing jobs. After the riots, we didn't have to leave the office. The jobs just poured in on the telephone.

OA: Oh, wow.

JD: We were able to do some things with the school system in terms of cooperate efforts, in talking of bettering relationships in the school system. Never no positive input into the police department, other than developing a police community relations division within that department; that's the only inroad we made into that area.

OA: What about the war on poverty monies? When that come in? Was it a hassle getting them here? Did the city want them? What were some of the fears?

JD: Yeah, [Congressman Sam] Gibbons, I think, was primarily responsible for the influence of federal dollars into this community. And it had to do with a whole lot of politics that—

Interview paused

JD: The first federal money that was brought into the community to amount to anything was brought in by Jim Hammond with that preschool program, and that was the beginning. And then you had the war on poverty money that came in. That was basically controlled—let's see—I think Bob had a whole lot of input into that. We never did really get into that money too much, other than as a spinoff of the riots; we developed some programs to work with young adults, and we got some federal monies for that.

We brought individuals in who were between—I can't think of the age, but they were young adults—and we paid them and tried to provide some remedial training for them and place them in employment. Because we had a situation where—I think they would work half a day and they would come back into a training environment for half a day, and after X number of weeks, they would be placed on jobs. And that was very interesting thing, too, because we brought guys in who had [criminal] records and what have you. We had some guys who had records for shoplifting and that kind of stuff (intercom buzzes) that were ringing cash registers in the department stores.

But all of that happened immediately after the riots. So therefore, these things opened up then, and I do not feel that these things would have been available had it not been for the confrontation that existed here in the community. I can't perceive how many thousands of dollars we received from the federal government over a two or three year period following that time that was basically centered around doing stuff for the young adults.

OA: I would like for you to tell us about the transition from Hammond to the present director, Mr. Jones.

JD: I'm trying to think; how did that occur? Jim got a better offer; I guess that's what happened. I think he went with [A.L.] Nellum and Associates. Nellum made him an offer and made him vice president of the corporation. And because of the economics involved—

OA: (laughs) Of course.

JD: —he decided to leave. Plus another thing, I think it may be interesting to find out why Nellum wanted Hammond, because Hammond was doing some things that were very innovative in terms of developing employment programs.

One of the major programs that we had going at that time was called an accelerated clerical program. We would go out and contract with industry to provide X number of clerical persons for them, and we would provide the technical training and they would provide the on-the-job training, and after a certain period of time these individuals would be phased into the company. We would go out and develop this with a contact. And they would say, “Okay, we want one person; we want two persons,” what have you. So this was very successful. I don't know how many young women we cycled in the industry as a result of this program. And this is one of the programs Hammond tried to carry with him.

OA: Yeah, I remember.

JD: (laughs) When he left the commission—and I think there was some misunderstanding about that—and eventually after he went with Nellum, he used that prototype in order to do other things. And I think there were federal monies coming in for this training, so therefore, this is where Nellum made his money. The government, the Department of Labor, would give him X number of thousands of dollars to train so many people if he had commitments from industry. And this is how that came about. And then there was a conflict between Hammond and Nellum, eventually, and that split, and then Hammond went into—

OA: Where was Nellum from?

JD: Washington.

OA: Washington?

JD: Yeah, that's where it was based.

OA: Let's back up a little bit. Let's get a little more political. Do you remember when Hammond ran for office?

JD: Yeah, that was in 1962.

OA: Okay.

JD: He ran for election supervisor, I believe.

OA: Okay. I never knew what he ran for.

JD: I think it was election supervisor. I can recall working as a precinct worker out on Fiftieth Street, and the crackers jugged at me all day long. (OA laughs) I was actually afraid to go back out there after lunch. But what happened, I hooked up with some more people, and we went out there and we stayed until it was over with. But you know, all kinds of comments were made during the day. I was out on Fifty-Sixth Street and some place, I can't recall exactly where it was. That is about as much as I recall, you know.

FB: You can't remember nothing about the campaign as such. Did he really campaign in white communities? What type of platform did he have? Anything like that?

JD: No, I can't remember any specifics.

OA: That would be interesting to see how he ran his campaign. I think he was like the second black to run for political office, after [Francisco Junior] Rodriguez.

JD: I believe so.

HJ: Were you here during the—Reverend [A. Leon] Lowry, civil rights movement?

JD: I think I was in school, basically, at that time. What happened, I think when I came out of school, Hammond had the Progressive Young Adults⁶ working, and what we were doing at that time was trying to integrate the public accommodation facilities, the lunch counters, the theaters, and I can recall some incidents that we had with drive-ins.

FB: Yeah, okay. I heard about the Young Adults. That's what we want to talk to Hammond about.

JD: The Young Adults were in the process of phasing out, I think, in sixty-two [1962] when I came out of school. Well, I think Hammond was actually—another interesting point—was actually selected for that job because of his activities with the Young Adults. So you see that—

OA: Yeah, I can see it. (inaudible)

JD: Nobody has really said that, but I am almost certain that's what it was.

OA: It's brilliant. Seems logical. Yeah, that's right.

⁶ Young Adults for Progressive Action.

JD: That's how he merged into that position, because of his activeness with the Young Adults, and basically dealing with the public accommodation things, and the voter things and that sort of stuff.

FB: Okay, we can sort of let you just bring us up to the present. There are some things that we definitely want to know about. We want to know about blacks' relationships to the city in terms of being workers, this type of thing.

JD: Oh—

FB: What is our situation presently? And we also want to talk with you about what you thought were the implication of the Barclay [*Barclay v. Florida*] decision, and that type of thing. You probably (inaudible).

JD: One of my first assignments when I came with the city was to conduct a survey of all those departments where you had a large number of blacks—the sanitation department, the parks department, the sanitary sewer department, and the water department—and to make recommendations for upgrading blacks that had been there over a period of years. I went through all the departments, and as we figured, they were on the bottom.

FB: This was under [William] Poe administration?

JD: This was under Nuccio administration.

FB: Okay.

JD: And after the survey was conducted, we recommended that certain classes of individuals be considered for promotions as promotions became available, because basically they were qualified because of their tenure and experience. We also recommended educational training for a certain group. We did a whole analysis of those departments.

OA: Do you think you can find that survey?

JD: I think Ms. Sweaten still has that information someplace.

OA: Those would be good historical documents. We could never get them from her, but if you could, that would (inaudible).

JD: I might be able to find them. I had about four or five departments that we did full reports on and made recommendation to Nuccio. But that was a transition. Nuccio went out and Greco came in, and Greco never did implement the studies. The same thing that the city got nailed with eventually, in terms of the conciliation agreement, were based on some of the things that I told them that we identified as being inequities in the system for blacks back in 1967. And those things finally caught up with them in seventy-six [1976],

in terms of identifiable discrimination by a regulatory agency.

During the time that we were working in employment and trying to phase blacks into nontraditional occupations with industry and business, we got a whole lot of flack from the business community, because they begin to say to us, “Why are you out here telling us what to do?” and, “You work for the city and you are not doing anything for the city; the city doesn’t have any blacks.”

And so with that input having to be addressed, we made a recommendation to the city council and to the mayor, who was Nuccio at that—who was Greco at that time—that we develop a training program for the city, and we did. On the same concept, you know: having a classroom session in the evening and then actually putting them in the jobs during the day, bypassing the civil service examination. And I don't know how many—there are records on that also. Now, we had—I don't know how many people came into the program, but they were hired at ten percent less than the normal salary would be for that slot that they were training in. They didn’t have to take a civil service examination.

After so many weeks, they were to be exposed to the civil service examination, and those individuals who passed the civil service examination were to be hired. I don't know what the percentage of those individuals were who passed, but we did have a number of individuals who failed the civil service examination. After those individuals failed the civil service examination, we challenged the examination as not being relevant, because we had weekly evaluations over a number of weeks where the supervisors had rated these individuals as excellent employees, was doing the job.

We tried to deal with the validity of examinations back in sixty-seven [1967] and sixty-eight [1968]. And there are all kinds of reports. We had some professors from the University of South Florida, who were helping us with the statistical analysis and making the recommendations saying that the test were not really relevant to the job because, you know, the people have actually performed the job. I don't know how many we hired, but ultimately what we did—there were some people that could not be hired. We went to industry, and I think industry helped us out in phasing those individuals who could not be hired in the city; we put them some place in industry.

Through this program was the first time we were able to place blacks in the fire department. Those blacks that went into the fire department—and I don't think those blacks passed that examination during that time, either.

OA: Tucker told us about that.

JD: Huh?

OA: Tucker told us about that.

JD: Because what happened—after they got into the department, they couldn't pass the examination, but they went through the firefighter training. They had excellent scores on

all the training programs that they went through within the fire department, but they couldn't pass the examination. And the same thing exists today with that examination.

OA: That's right.

(Intercom buzzes)

JD: I had thirty-one blacks to take the examination about two weeks ago—we scheduled it on a Saturday—and of that thirty-one, two passed.

OA: Ooh!

HJ: Ooh!

JD: And the examination was supposed to have been validated. And so this adds to it. I don't really concur with the validation study, but we can't get the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to make any comments on it. And so I did some things with the Urban League yesterday in reference to the test. (OA laughs) And so we are working on that.

But as a result of that training program, we got our token blacks into the various departments in the city government. There were many departments in city government that didn't have any blacks at all, but as a result of that program, the token blacks were placed into various departments.

FB: And Nuccio was still the mayor at this time?

JD: No, Greco was mayor during that time.

What was the other areas you said you were concerned about?

OA: Just let him—just bring it up the present in terms of similarity between now and then, just like you were doing.

JD: I'm trying to think, what else did we become involved in?

OA: For example, the latest conciliation agreement, the history of that and how it came about, that type of thing.

JD: Okay. When the amendment to Title 7 went into effect in seventy-two [1972], the Office of Community Relations was involved in affirmative action programs. We had a grant from (intercom buzzes) the Technical Assistance Division of the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission in order to provide technical assistance to businesses and industries that were identified jointly by the Commission, by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Office of Community Relations. We did this based on some statistics that were sent to us by the Equal Opportunity Commission.

(Intercom buzzes)

This is another interesting thing that happened, too. We had about thirty-five or forty companies that we were supposed to go into and assist these companies in developing affirmative action programs. And they ranged from the smaller companies all the way up to Jim Walters Corporation. Now the program operated for two years very successfully, but when we got to the [*Tampa*] *Tribune*, to the radio stations, and to Jim Walters Corporation, our contract was canceled.

(Intercom buzzes)

FB: (inaudible)

JD: No, the city refused to honor it any longer.

HJ: (to someone else) Black History.

OA: Same old, same old. (laughs)

JD: Going into—what was another area? Okay, I was telling you about when we had the contract and then that was canceled. I was telling you about the amendment of seventy-two [1972]. We were already involved, you know, in affirmative action working with private industry, but after seventy-two [1972] when they passed the amendment, that meant that political subdivisions in governments were then subject to the law. Well, at that particular time, Goosby wrote a letter to Greco and told Greco that we didn't think our house was in order, and we needed to start doing something in order to put it in shape.

There was a committee formed, and the committee really didn't do anything, because Marshall Jessee was on the committee. We were trying to make surveys and we couldn't get the information and all this here. So eventually, we said, "We'll tell what we will do. We know some people that are technical assistance people with the Equal Opportunity Commission, who will come in and do the survey for nothing. And if we have the people from the Equal Opportunity Commission come in and do the survey and tell us what's wrong, we will be in good shape."

Well, we sold them on that idea. We brought an individual by the name of June Thompson down from Washington. She was a very charming young lady. She talked with the civil service board, she talked with the city council, she talked with the mayor, and everybody agreed for her to come in, and she did. I think June came in seventy-three [1973]. She must have worked on that survey something like six months, and it must have been another six months before the survey was completed. And once the survey was completed and ready to be sent into the City of Tampa, because a part of agreement [was that] we would do the study, but we want voluntary compliance. Whatever we find wrong, you will voluntarily correct. That was the understanding, the agreement, between

the City of Tampa and the Technical Assistance Division of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

But when the survey was finally completed, we were in transitions in terms of mayors. Greco had resigned and [Richard] Cheney had come in and had died, [Lloyd] Copeland was setting in. They didn't want to bring that report in because it was a very sensitive report, and whenever they came in to present the report, they wanted to deal with a stable administration. Eventually Mayor Poe came in.

It was within that interim period—I think during that interim period—this is when the report was forced in, by basically the NOW [National Organization for Women] Organization. They were really putting pressure because by that time, between seventy-two [1972] and we were all the way up to sixty-five [1965]—we were all the way up—between seventy-two [1972] and seventy-five [1975], a number of complaints had generated. There had been a class action complaint filed by the National Organization of Women, there had been a series of individual charges filed by officers of the Police Department, there had been a class action suit filed by the NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People]. And EEOC had been in on a variety of those charges, and had found probable cause.

Now you got probable cause findings that are outstanding, and you have a technical assistance report that is very critical. All those things came together, and when those things came together, EEOC said, “You are going to do something, or we are going to turn you over to justice and we’re going to carry you to court.” And that’s when I became involved. I received a call and I was told that the mayor was getting ready to cut an executive order to make me the EEO Director. I said, “No way,” and they said, “What you mean?” I said, “Well, you all can't do that. I'm a civil service employee, you know, and you can't make me anything.”

FB: You were still at the Office of Community Relations?

JD: I was still with the Office of Community Relations.

FB: The mayor was still in his early part of just entering office.

JD: Yeah, still had to serve out Greco's term. I was going on vacation. I said—well, I wrote them a letter, and I told them in the letter I wasn't interested in the position. I had a number of friends who were in that position. It was very sensitive and they were very frustrated people, and I didn't want any part of it. I went on vacation, and when I got back from vacation, the same day that I returned, I was called to the mayor's office and there was another long discussion.

FB: Who was the mayor?

JD: Still Poe, serving out Greco's term. And so eventually they said, “What about just taking on a temporary basis so he can deal with the situation at hand?”

And I said, “Okay, I'll take it, but you know, it's still a heavy burden and I'm not going to take unless you pay me for it.

He said, “Okay, how much money do you want?”

I said, “I want \$22,000.” (OA laughs)

He paused, and he said, “Do you know that I have department heads who have three or four hundred people working for them that I don't pay that kind of money?”

I said, “Yes, I know that, but ain't nobody working for me. You are giving me this job, which is a very difficult job, that I'm going to have to handle by myself, and I think it merits that kind of money.”

And so he asked me how much I made, and I told him I made \$18,000 at that particular time. He said, “Well, okay,” and I think he went to the bathroom or someplace. He came back and he said, “I'll compromise with you. I'll give you \$20,000 now, and I'll give you another thousand within six months, and then another thousand.”

Well, he called me back, must have been about six months later, and told me that he was—about three or four months later—and told me he was giving me the other thousand then, because he didn't know when he could give me the other thousand. And after that discussion, I said, “I can't work by myself. I got to have some staff.” I was stupid at that particular time. I asked for a secretary; that's all I asked for. (OA laughs) I said, “I need a secretary, and I need an office.”

He said, “Well, okay.” He sent me down to budget, to the controller. “Go down to the controller and tell him; go to Citizen Building and pick out what you want. Just tell them anything you want, just to give it to you.” And that's the way that started out.

OA: You the city's first EEO officer?

JD: Yeah.

OA: That's historically important.

JD: Well, immediately after that, we started negotiating with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. And the decision had been made that we did not want to go into court; we wanted to settle out of court. And so immediately, we began implementing changes in order to comply with some of the EEO regulations that we weren't complying with previously. We negotiated for about six months, and eventually we came up with the conciliation agreement, which was signed May 20, 1976. And it involved roughly a \$100,000 in back pay and preferences for promotions for about 250 people, of which 65 to 70 percent of those people have been promoted as of this day.

OA: Was NOW satisfied with the agreement?

JD: Yes, they were very satisfied, very pleased with it, but they still contend that the agreement is not being implemented properly or that we are violating the agreement. And there could be some violations, but if there are violations of the agreement, they are minor. But, you know, discrimination still goes on. And the agreement is not going to circumvent that; that's going to occur, and you just have to deal with it on a daily basis as it occurs. I think that they look at discrimination that is occurring and say, "We got an agreement violation," but I don't look at it per se. The agreement is a basic document that tells what you are going to do in terms of policies and procedures and that kind of thing. But the agreement will never control individual discrimination.

OA: Yeah, that's true. Do you think the average black that works for the city is aware of your office and aware of the purpose of affirmative action?

JD: They are aware of the office, but in terms of the intricacies of affirmative action, no. Because when you look at the black work force, we have—I think blacks constitute approximately 27 percent of our work force. But of that 27 percent, I would say 20 percent is basically in the low—in the laboring trade categories, and individuals don't have a great deal of formal education, but they're wizards. When you go out there, they can lay pipes and do all that other stuff (intercom buzzes) without any complications whatsoever. And this is one of the things that we were able to address in the agreement. We had individuals who were laying pipes and who were doing other kinds of laboring trade occupations at supervisory levels, but were never able to pass the foreman's test per se.

But what we did, we were able to go in, as a result of the conciliation agreement, and reclassify those individuals. You doing the job, we are going to reclassify you. So there is no examination really involved. And we picked up a number of individuals who we had identified in the 250 as individuals who had been potentially discriminated against. We looked at their educational level, and we noted that they had not progressed the same as their white counterparts who came to the system at the same time. So, based on that alone, we said, "There is a possibility that this individual has been discriminated against, so we are pulling him out and we are making him an effective class individual," which means that we would pay him so much money on the front end and then give him preference consideration as promotional opportunities occur.

But some of those individuals, we just went in and reclassified them, rather than waiting for a promotion to occur and then give them preferential consideration for such. We did a number of individuals like that in the laboring trade departments, basically the water department, sanitary sewer Department, and public works department.

OA: About city department heads and these people who are supervisors, who make decisions, what's their attitude in relationship to affirmative action overall? (laughs)

JD: White folks don't like affirmative action, white males particularly.

OA: (inaudible)

JD: You know, they don't tell me this, but I have sense enough to know. Because if I don't pressure them or monitor very closely, they won't do anything, and so in order for them to do anything I have to monitor them continuously and keep reminding them. "Look, I've got a black applicant. He looks real good to me; what do you think about him?" And the mere fact that I do that, you know, they say, "Well, if I don't consider this guy, it's a possibility Daniels might come back and say I discriminated."

OA: I see.

JD: What I do—especially for professional positions—what I do is try and keep an affirmative action file on people, of resumes. And when positions become available, you know, I drop the resume to the guy, say, "Take a look at this individual; he seems to look pretty good." In some cases it works out, and then I drop to where I say, "This guy can help you, because you really don't have any blacks in this area. This can help to improve your utilization."

And the way the system is developed, I can monitor that entire process. When the department head cuts the requisition, it's called a 409. When that comes into the office, I get a copy of it. It has to go to the budget to be approved, and once it's approved it goes into civil service. When civil service develops that eligibility list, that comes to me. It goes to the department for selection, and when he makes the selection it comes back in, and that comes to me, also. So I can look at that whole process and tell almost on a daily basis what department heads are doing in order to meet their affirmative obligation.

FB: What is the direction of your department in view of the Barclay decision?

JD: We are going to continue as we have. We don't feel the Barclay decision has any adverse effect on what we are doing. And the mayor has publicly made that statement.

FB: That's good.

JD: To all of the department heads.

FB: Okay, but in terms of the psychological implications, for example—just generalizing.

JD: What it's going to do is stimulate a whole lot of reverse discrimination suits.

End of interview