Heidegger's Will to Power and the Problem of Nietzsche's Nihilism

Megan Flocken
University of South Florida

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Heidegger's Will to Power and the Problem of Nietzsche's Nihilism

by

Megan Flocken

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Lee Braver, Ph.D.
Charles Guignon, Ph.D.
Ofelia Schutte, Ph.D.
Iain Thomson, Ph.D.
Stephen Turner, Ph.D.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................. ii

CHAPTER ONE: HEIDEGGER’S WILL TO POWER AND THE PROBLEM OF NIETZSCHE’S NIHILISM INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER TWO: HEIDEGGER’S KNOWLEDGE AND NIHILISM ................................................................. 11

CHAPTER THREE: INTERMISSION TO NIETZSCHE .................................................................................. 61

CHAPTER FOUR: NIETZSCHE’S TURN ....................................................................................................... 63

CHAPTER FIVE: NIETZSCHE’S WILL TO POWER ..................................................................................... 109

CHAPTER SIX: PRÉCIS ............................................................................................................................... 132

CHAPTER SEVEN: INTERMISSION TO HEIDEGGER’S ART ................................................................. 137

CHAPTER EIGHT: HEIDEGGER’S ART ..................................................................................................... 145

CHAPTER NINE: HEIDEGGER’S WILL TO POWER AND THE PROBLEM OF NIETZSCHE’S NIHILISM CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 159

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................. 166
ABSTRACT

In his 1936-1940 *Nietzsche* lectures, Heidegger transitions from defining will to power as art to defining will to power as knowledge. While his transition serves to launch and fine-tune Heidegger's critique against nihilism and its handmaiden, technological thinking, it does a great disservice to Nietzsche's own philosophy, as Heidegger increasingly relies upon it as a target for his assault against the metaphysical tradition. I argue through the course of this work that Nietzsche's relationship with nihilism is misconstrued by Heidegger. In departure from Heidegger, I will show how Nietzsche's philosophical thinking could have aided Heidegger's attack on a prevailing contemporary technological thinking, or 'tool-mindedness', from a very similar angle rather than as a foil.
CHAPTER ONE:
HEIDEGGER’S WILL TO POWER AND THE PROBLEM OF NIETZSCHE’S NIHILISM
INTRODUCTION

“Nowhere does an absolute persistence exist, ..Rather, whenever a human being believes he recognizes any sort of persistence in living nature, it is due to our small standards.” - Nietzsche, on Heraclitus1

“Becoming cannot be conceived.” - Nietzsche, on Parmenides2

In his 1936-1940 Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger transitions from defining will to power as art to defining will to power as knowledge.3 While his transition serves to launch and fine-tune Heidegger's critique against nihilism and its handmaiden, technological thinking, it does a great disservice to Nietzsche's own philosophy, as Heidegger increasingly relies upon it as a target for his assault against the metaphysical tradition. Heidegger locates the 'essence' of Nietzsche's

1 Nietzsche, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, Translated by Greg Whitlock, “Heraclitus,” 60. Nietzsche adds to this a note on power, as the check on such 'small' ideas of persistence: “...because we always come in the final analysis to forces, whose effects simultaneously include a desire for power [Kraftverlust].” (I will address the difference between conceptions of power—perhaps easily classified by 'force' (Kraft) or 'power' (Macht)—in the last section of this paper.) Nietzsche goes on to pose a thought experiment very similar to the one which opens “Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” to prove that “whatever remains, the unmoving...[is] a complete illusion.” Arguing that human perception is what accounts for fixity and form, he says, “If we could conceive of human perception indefinitely increased according to the strength and power of the organs, there would conversely [to the perception limited by human intellect] exist no persistent thing...but rather only a Becoming.” (Ibid., 61-2). These lectures were delivered c. 1872. (See Whitlock's “Translator's Preface” on the difficulty of determining the date of their delivery).

2 Nietzsche, Ibid., “Parmenides and Xenophanes,” 87.

3 Heidegger, Nietzsche Vol 1: “The Will to Power as Art” [der Wille zur Macht als Kunst], trans. David Krell (subsequently N1, page number); Heidegger, Nietzsche Vol 3: “The Will to Power as Knowledge” [der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis], trans. David Krell (subsequently N3, page number.)
philosophy in the will to power.\(^4\) For Heidegger, will to power can be traced through four additional concepts—revaluation, eternal recurrence, overman, and nihilism, and the lot of them, for Heidegger, characterize Nietzsche's philosophical system. I will argue through the course of this work that Nietzsche's relationship with nihilism is misconstrued by Heidegger. In what follows, I will address Heidegger's misinterpretation of Nietzsche's will to power, the 'essence' of Nietzsche's philosophy, as that which, for Heidegger, is responsible for the technologization of Being in what Heidegger dubs the age of enframing [\textit{Gestell}]. In departure from Heidegger, I will show how Nietzsche's concept of will to power could have aided Heidegger's attack on a prevailing contemporary 'tool-mindedness' from a very similar angle rather than as a foil. Indeed, Heidegger in/famously notes in this very lecture course that "[A]ll great thinkers think the same"\(^5\); in this work I will stress the similarity of these two thinkers with respect to their understanding of the nature of existence, or at least what Heidegger is wont to call the Being of beings. I will also examine the framework and consequences of their respective but I argue similar, 'turns' which each thinker makes in his philosophy on this particular philosophical problem.

The will to power is a fulcrum of similarity between Nietzsche and Heidegger. Though other scholars from both Nietzsche and Heidegger camps disagree on this point, both Nietzsche and Heidegger themselves articulate the will to power as the fundamental operation of existence in Nietzsche's philosophy. In \textit{On the Genealogy of Morals}, Nietzsche writes that the will to power is “the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and

\(^4\) There is, of course, scholarly debate as to whether will to power does in fact constitute an essential point of Nietzsche's philosophy (cf. Dale Wilkerson, \textit{}). I will not be addressing this debate, but rather, the characterization which Heidegger makes of Nietzsche's concept of will to power.

\(^5\) Heidegger, \textit{Nietzsche Vol 1}, 36. He continues, “Yet this “same” is so essential and so rich that no single thinker exhausts it.” Directly prior to this assertion, Heidegger discusses the history of metaphysics and its conception of 'the will' as the “basic character of beings” and notes that “In philosophy the Being of beings is to be thought.” It is this commitment to the question of Being that joins all 'great thinkers' in kinship (Ibid. 35-6.)
directions" operating in all events." Heidegger, in his *Nietzsche Vol 4: Nihilism*, writes: “The phrase “will to power” tells *what* beings are in their “essence” (in their constitution).” He goes on to say in the same passage, “The phrase “eternal recurrence of the same” tells *how* beings of such an essence must as a whole be.” My work will be divided between exposition on Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's concept of will to power, especially as it relates to Heidegger's charge of nihilism, and, second, Nietzsche's own description of will to power. Lastly, I will return to Heidegger's writings on art to show how Nietzsche and Heidegger share common philosophical frames with respect to thinking existing. Heidegger's transitions from thinking the will to power as art to thinking it as knowledge [*Erkenntnis*], and I suggest in this work that his transition on this point is more responsible for Heidegger's critique against Nietzsche's philosophical entanglement with nihilism than Nietzsche's own use of the term will to power.

My analysis is in four sections, whose major arguments are as follows: **1) Heidegger's Knowledge and Nihilism:** This section will set out Heidegger's vocabulary and arguments which show how knowledge and nihilism are related. I examine Heidegger's description of knowledge—that is, a knowing of permanence and purpose, and further, of Heidegger's titular phrase of his third series of *Nietzsche* lectures, 'knowledge as will to power'. I will later, in the subsequent sections, use Heidegger's own vocabulary to refute his claims about Nietzsche through a close examination of Nietzsche's writings. **2) Nietzsche's 'turn':** Nietzsche's early writings bear the trappings of Heidegger's diagnoses of knowledge and nihilism, but Nietzsche's thinking transforms (turns) by his middle works to dispose of such tendencies. I examine how

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Nietzsche's thinking on 'nature' and 'value' underwent transformation. This transformation, which I call a 'turn', is significant in that it concerns the very philosophical commitments on which Heidegger later mistakenly indicts Nietzsche as a nihilist, and Nietzsche's 'turn' may re-enact Heidegger's own infamous 'turn' (Kehre). 3) **Nietzsche's Will to power:** In Nietzsche's published texts, the will to power is not reducible to consciousness, or a knowing that knows permanence and purpose, and therefore Nietzsche is not a nihilist nor a proponent of nihilistic thinking by Heidegger's definition. In this section, I show how Nietzsche's post-turn writing specifically addresses and undermines any such commitment to knowing permanence and purpose, which is Heidegger's own definition of knowledge associated with nihilism. 4) **Heidegger's Art:** This section offers an example of how Heidegger's thinking during his own turn, or *Kehre*, is indebted to Nietzsche's post-turn writing about the will to power or the nature of existence as a truth which arrives in tension between different ways of thinking and existing. In Heidegger's texts written during his own turn, both in the first series of *Nietzsche* lectures and in his landmark essay “The Origin of the Work of Art,” the essence of existence (or the will to power) is art [*Kunst*], which is aptly described by Heidegger (and Nietzsche) as a strife between different aspects of existence that alternately engender and elude appearance or intelligibility. **In conclusion:** A philosophical system which privileges knowledge—as Heidegger describes the term, and not will to power *per se*, presupposes a nihilistic understanding of existence. Duly, I examine this term 'nihilism' in both Nietzsche's and Heidegger's work. In other words, Nietzsche's so-called nihilism is more the symptom of Heidegger's will to power than Nietzsche's.

Both Heidegger and Nietzsche have reputations for articulating their philosophy by use of an obscurant style: Heidegger, for his neologisms by which the long-forgotten questions of philosophy are reposed and the 'abstract' nature of everydayness is revealed, and Nietzsche, for his penchant for pithy and poetic turns of phrase which impart insight often by way of rhetorical
strategies more akin to literature than philosophy. Style aside, significant theoretical transitions in the work of both of these thinkers make any short analysis of their philosophy's conceptual overlap quite difficult—especially *qua* terminology, which can often evoke very different things at different times. Heidegger undergoes a turn [Kehre] after writing *Being and Time* (on many accounts, from Taylor Carmen to Daniel Dahlstrom, to Babette Babich and Iain Thomson, this turn is initiated during his *Nietzsche* lectures), and Nietzsche, by 1886, undertakes a 'convalescence' to overcome his early Schopenhaurian pessimism and Kantian metaphysical presuppositions.  

To complicate things further, both Nietzsche and Heidegger are philosophers whose primary project is to *re-envision the way that existence has been thought before them*. To aid them in their pursuits, they both often attempt to change the prevailing way in which words are understood; thus terms like 'appearance' and 'truth' come to mean very different things for Nietzsche and Heidegger than for the tradition of philosophy which precedes them. My argument heavily relies upon both Nietzsche's and Heidegger's use of 'knowledge' and 'art' to make sense of their thinking on and of will to power, and yet both thinkers develop very specific translations of these terms, which themselves undergo transitions throughout their lives' works. Since this inquiry is primarily concerned with Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's will to power in his *Nietzsche* lecture series and its consequences for Heidegger's growing critique against technology and nihilism, I will focus on the first, third, and fourth volumes of this *Nietzsche* course, as well as Heidegger's 1943 essay “The Word of Nietzsche: “God is Dead.”” The majority of my analysis of Nietzsche's own work will examine what I consider to be his mature texts from 1882 to 1888.

In general, I make my case using Nietzsche's published and popular works rather than his

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8 On Heidegger's *Kehre*, see section 4 on Heidegger's art below. On Nietzsche's 'turn', see section 2, “Nietzsche's Turn: Or, How to Overcome Kantianism,” below.
notes. In this, I depart from Heidegger's preference for reading Nietzsche's unpublished notes (Nachlass) and those unfinished writings that Nietzsche's sister published (and likely adulterated) posthumously as *The Will to Power*. I do this for various reasons, and the most important are twofold: 1) I wish to analyze Nietzsche as a philosopher and, more specifically, the way will to power operates in his philosophical system, above and beyond Nietzsche as a thinker and the certainly more transmutational place that the will to power factors into Nietzsche's philosophical note-taking. More simply, I wish to examine how will to power figures into Nietzsche's philosophy not his notes. Though when pushed, this distinction may not hold up for very long, especially when considering that Nietzsche himself may not be a particularly *systematic* philosopher⁹, though Heidegger thinks he is, I still maintain that the relative ease with which Nietzsche was able to publish means that there is little to be lost over privileging the work which he considered ripe for print and ready for distribution as more demonstrative of his philosophical commitments. This is not to suggest that Nietzsche's notes cannot be suffused with a bounty of interesting and important ideas of philosophical importance—especially if such ideas only appear in his notes. But the pervasive appearance of will to power in Nietzsche's published works leads me to conclude that Nietzsche placed ample emphasis and time on thinking through this concept and so I choose to examine his published works as testaments to his thorough if not altogether conclusive considerations of the concept. 2) In deference to Heidegger's charges against Nietzsche which, in part, highlight a general (mis)understanding of Being that leads to a *cultural epoch* of technological thinking for which Nietzsche's philosophy is to be held responsible, I

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⁹ Nietzsche famously writes, “The will to system is a lack of integrity” (*Twilight of the Idols*, VII, 64, cited in Heidegger, *Contributions*, #43, [87-88], p.70). In a passage where Nietzsche makes an appearance, Heidegger contends that Nietzsche is a thinker who challenges not only what 'integrity' might mean here, but also what system means, apart from a modern concept of system that bespeaks a “representedness of beings as anticipatory unification of the objectivity of the object.” (Ibid., p.71) Perhaps any order or clarity is the result of a system—which is not necessarily representedness but a 'here-ness', therefore intelligibility itself presupposes systematicity.
focus on that of Nietzsche's work which was most generally accessible. Though Nietzsche's published works were widely read in Germany and beyond by both academics and non-academics—even while he was alive, his unpublished notes and half-finished published notebooks are largely the fodder only for scholars of Nietzsche. I believe that in order to best assess the claim that Heidegger makes, which concerns a prevailing philosophical logic which impacts a culture at large (and not just scholars of Nietzsche and the continental philosophy tradition), it is better to rely upon Nietzsche's textual support for his philosophical concepts which were widely read by a diverse audience. This is not to suggest a causal link between Nietzsche's published philosophy and the cultural epoch of nihilism, it is simply to condition the generally accessible nature of Nietzsche's published works with contributing to and becoming part of a cultural (mis)understanding of Being which are unavailable to the private and unpublished, unshared and unacknowledged notes of a person, no matter how famous.

Another reason why I choose not to rely upon Nietzsche's notes is that they can—as demonstrated aptly by dissension in Nietzsche scholarship—provide the foundation for nearly any reading of Nietzsche's philosophy. Though Heidegger's re-examination of Nietzsche's notes plays a key role in the reclassification of Nietzsche's philosophy starting in the mid-20th century, it is largely by consulting these notes that Heidegger justifies his reading of Nietzsche—which I argue in this paper is a misreading.10 While keeping Jacques Derrida's Spars and Derrida's point on the indeterminability of texts in mind, I omit the notes not because I find Heidegger's reading to differ from mine, but due to the seemingly unlimited variability of accounts they can serve to substantiate. This is to say, that I, like Derrida, wish to make a 'conscientious interpretation' of

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10 Cf. D'Alonzo, “Heidegger and the ‘last metaphysician of the West’,” on the political implications of Heidegger's initial attempt to salvage Nietzsche from the prevalent attitudes concerning his philosophy which largely referenced his notes to appropriate him for the Nazi cause.
Nietzsche's philosophy.\textsuperscript{11} Therefore, rather than read his notes as a marker of how seriously Nietzsche meant what he wrote in his published works, and instead of somewhat arbitrarily selecting one out of thousands of notations, I am building a case for my interpretation based on broad textual support from many of Nietzsche's published and popular works. This program will not consign me to talking past Heidegger, since it was Heidegger's \textit{Nietzsche} lectures wherein Heidegger sough to interpret Nietzsche's philosophy; I will directly disagree with Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy, I will simply use Nietzsche's published texts to do so.

My analysis demonstrates the similarity between Nietzsche and Heidegger, both in their concepts of truth and being, and in their respective 'turns' in their thinking, and it unfolds along the following course: We shall first see how Heidegger performs a very reductive reading by defining will to power as that which 'preserves and enhances'.\textsuperscript{12} I subsequently set forth how Nietzsche's will to power is the one force of life which amounts to \textit{the tension between different ways of thinking and existing}. We do disservice to Nietzsche's philosophy if we read will to power as resolving this tension, ascribing to this force a mode or content of homogeneity, like that which preservation and enhancement means in Heidegger's parlance from his \textit{Nietzsche} lectures.

Heidegger adopts this language of 'preservation and enhancement' from Nietzsche's own notes.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, part of my project takes the shape of an immanent critique of Nietzsche, providing textual support from his published and popular works to countermand his notes. Keep in mind my prefatory remarks on framing, as to the significance of note-taking and as to the use and

\textsuperscript{11} Derrida, \textit{Spurs}, 132. Derrida commits to this project of 'conscientious interpretation' despite his conclusion that texts exhibit an indeterminability. Yes, “I forgot my umbrella” from Nietzsche's notes \textit{could} apply to all he wrote, but I wish to argue through careful examination of Nietzsche's published works that it does not.
\textsuperscript{12} Heidegger, N3, p. 15.-18, NW, 74.
\textsuperscript{13} Heidegger cites note 12: "The Decline of Cosmological Values", from November 1887-March 1888', also cited as W II 3 [99], in N4, 14. The language of 'preservation and growth' also appears in Nietzsche's note cited as 'number 507, from Spring-Fall 1887', W II 1 [38], in N3, 33.
transmutation of words in Nietzsche's philosophy. Though Heidegger is unquestionably and profoundly influenced philosophically as a reader of Nietzsche, I argue that Heidegger interprets Nietzsche incorrectly—whether intentionally misreading him or not—and thereby casts Nietzsche as an epochal villain to then offer Heidegger's own philosophy as its antidote.

Beginning with Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power, I first pay special attention to how 'knowledge' (Erkenntnis) relates to will to power. My first section claims that Heidegger 'technologizes' will to power—by reducing it to a knowledge [Erkenntnis] which knows permanence and purpose. In this section, I also examine the term 'nihilism' in Heidegger's lexicon.

My second section examines what I am calling Nietzsche's 'turn' in his philosophical thinking on nature and value. This transformative 'turn', invoked by his writings after Thus Spoke Zarathustra, accounts for a transition, which Nietzsche dubs convalescence, from earlier and more Kantian/Schopenhauerian ontological and epistemological commitments, to a later development which Nietzsche will refer to as 'tragic' and 'Dionysian'. This section establishes the transition which Heidegger may ignore since his indictment of Nietzsche's thinking is for the very earlier commitments which Nietzsche himself overcomes.

My third section explains in Nietzsche's words how the will to power is not identical to purpose or permanence. Nietzsche's supposition that will to power is the force operating in all events is not a claim which entails permanence, but instead, transition. These second and third sections amount to the Nietzschean part of my work—on Nietzsche's own writings on the will to power.

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14 For e.g., BGE #36 and GM 2.12.
My fourth section turns back to Heidegger and his description of 'art' (*Kunst*) as I examine in Heidegger's words, 'aestheticization', which has, for Heidegger, become prevalent, as well as Heidegger's critique thereto. Heidegger is in favor of rehabilitating art from such prevalent aestheticization. I then place Nietzsche's will to power in comparison with Heidegger's 'art', which Heidegger describes in “Origin of the Work of Art,” a work written contemporaneous to his first volume of *Nietzsche* lectures, as a force of truth in tension. It is significant that Heidegger uses the term 'preservation' in “Origin of the Work of Art,” as a laudable condition of his art ontology, whereas by the third volume of *Nietzsche* lectures, which Heidegger drafts and delivers at the same time he is writing this essay, he associates the term with a nihilistic pathology. Finally, I find that it is Heidegger's technologized version of Nietzsche's will to power which would engender an epoch of calculation (or, enframing) and not Nietzsche's art-like will to power itself.

More clearly, my overall thesis is that Nietzsche’s will to power describes an unresolvable tension between different ways of thinking and existing, and further, that Nietzsche's will to power is much more of a philosophical kin to Heidegger's own, especially post-*Kehre* thinking than Heidegger interprets it to be.
CHAPTER TWO:
HEIDEGGER’S KNOWLEDGE AND NIHILISM

In his third volume of Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger criticizes Nietzsche. Heidegger's criticism follows three main objections, all of which fail to refer adequately to Nietzsche's philosophical thinking. First, Heidegger criticizes Nietzsche calling him a metaphysician. For Heidegger, Nietzsche's thinking on will to power is founded on a 'metaphysics of presence', in the sense that Heidegger interprets will to power as a knowledge of the present which prescribes a purpose or objective to existing such that Nietzschean 'becoming' (the truth or essence of existing is becoming what you are) is 'permanentized' (made permanent) into a static present, presence, or Being. I address this charge and, though a thorough discussion is beyond the scope of this work, I suggest that Nietzsche is as metaphysical in his thinking of being and beings as Heidegger is himself, especially in this period of Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures, contemporary to Heidegger's writings in other works of an ontology of art as drives or forces relating.

Secondly, and relatedly, Heidegger charges Nietzsche's thinking of will to power as a form of knowledge which presumes to make clear the essence or truth of existing as value-positing—and which for Heidegger amounts to a purpose-oriented and utility-based calculation of growing and preserving power. The 'purpose' and 'utility' of preserving and enhancing life are necessarily steeped in what Heidegger classifies as subjectivist and anthropomorphic terms. Heidegger calls this subjectivist and anthropomorphic calculation a 'biological' knowledge, in that it presumes to classify and calculate the 'purpose of life' in incontrovertible terms of 'biological necessity'. I address this charge to question how Nietzsche's will to power is not a subjectivist,
anthropomorphic, biological knowledge and how Nietzsche repeatedly in his published works does not subscribe to a biological thinking of life.

Thirdly, and as consequence to these first two charges, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche's philosophical thinking bears responsibility for nihilism, which he describes as an epoch of calculation and utility-driven manipulation of beings and their meaning in existence. In brief, Heidegger reads Nietzsche to propose that the world of things means nothing until perspective values it. I will examine in the next chapter how Heidegger's charge might refer to an early Nietzsche but is completely off base once we consider Nietzsche's 'turn' to Dionysian pessimism and a world of things so abundantly meaningful that any truth or essence of existing is perpetually unfolding and transforming. Further, for Heidegger, perspective can only value the world of things using a 'biological' calculation to increase power. Heidegger thereby reduces Nietzsche's will to power to, simply, power, and defines power as a drive for increased power. In addressing Heidegger's third criticism, I suggest that consciousness—which we relate to this calculating knowledge of Heidegger's third *Nietzsche* volume—might lead to nihilism, but not Nietzsche's will to power, as it encompasses ways of thinking far excessive of consciousness alone.

Heidegger describes Nietzsche's 'will to power as knowledge' by the third volume of his *Nietzsche* lectures (*der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis*). I establish in this first section that, for Heidegger, knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] shares distinctive features of consciousness insofar as they entail, also in Heidegger's terms, the 'securing and enhancing of power [*Macht*]'. I begin by establishing Heidegger's vocabulary with respect to these terms, knowledge and, later, nihilism, to show in my subsequent sections that Heidegger's equation of will to power to knowledge amounts to a denigration or narrowing of will to power, to a thinking or existing analogous to consciousness, and so provides a violent misreading of Nietzsche on this point. In brief, and in
subsequent sections, I argue against what Heidegger surmises, that the essence of will to power is securing and enhancing an increase and permanence in power, by exploring how transmutation—which, by Nietzsche's view, amounts to will to power—is NOT synonymous with permanence or increase.

Knowledge, as Heidegger defines it, is synonymous with the 'securing and enhancing of power' by way of increasing power.\textsuperscript{15} Further, the 'securing and enhancing of power' implies a drive for permanence. If knowledge secures and enhances its power, knowledge implies or supplies a temporal continuity—a sense of 'future' defined by the coordinates of a 'present'—and this temporal continuity Heidegger defines as a metaphysical concept of 'permanence'. But, as I demonstrate in the sections which follow this one, Nietzsche's will to power is not reducible to this sort of knowledge (what I show is synonymous with 'consciousness') and, therefore, does not share the same presupposition of permanence that Heidegger's notion of 'power' or 'will to power as knowledge' have.

In this first section, I wish to challenge Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche as the 'last metaphysician' whose philosophy is entangled with nihilism and symptomatic of a late-modern sickness which Heidegger diagnoses as 'enframing' (\textit{Gestell}).\textsuperscript{16} For Heidegger, enframing is what happens when existence is objectified in a particular way; that is, when beings consider their existence to be an inherently meaningless resource (\textit{Bestand}) which is, much like any tool, only meaningful if optimized.\textsuperscript{17} Optimization implies a ready-made and ready-to-hand sort of

\textsuperscript{15} Heidegger, N4, 7.
\textsuperscript{16} Though during his \textit{Nietzsche} lectures Heidegger tends to use the word 'machination' [\textit{Machenschaft}], the concept is interchangeable with 'technicity', both which entail the consequence of 'enframing' [\textit{Gestell}]. Cf. N3, Part II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same and The Will to Power,” pp. 159-185.
\textsuperscript{17} Cf. Heidegger's \textit{The Question Concerning Technology} for his articulation of \textit{Bestand}, the notion of being as a meaningless resource which can but be optimized for efficiency and flexibility. Heidegger relates 'technologization' to 'calculative thinking'. Also, N4, 199-250, and \textit{Contributions #64-#76}. Thanks to Thomson, \textit{Heidegger and Ontotheology}, pp. 148-9.
knowledge about the purpose and use of said tool, and it is with this implied knowledge about existing—as though it is a tool—that Heidegger takes issue as a philosophical problem.

Heidegger uses this term 'enframing' to evoke the conceptual territory of his earlier uses of 'technicity' [Technik] and machination [Machenschaft], and in his Contributions, Heidegger levies a passionate caveat related thereto: “The hex cast by technology and by its constantly self-surpassing progress is only one sign of this bewitchery [of machination] that directs everything toward calculation, utility, breeding, manageability, and regulation.”

Described in quasi-mystical terms, Heidegger establishes a relation between this 'hex of technology' and a 'bewitchery' which 'directs everything toward calculation, utility, breeding, manageability, and regulation'. Heidegger has used the terms machination, enframing, technicity, and technologization to refer to similar directing. Heidegger, here, not only suggests that the 'hex' of technology is but one symptom of the age of enframing, but also that 'technology' and the 'hex cast by technology' are different. Importantly, Heidegger implies that the mere use of technology does not necessarily engender a hex; technology is not nor does it necessarily imply what Heidegger calls technologization.

Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's will to power 'technologizes' will to power—by reducing it to 'power' and equating it to a knowledge [Erkenntnis] which implies permanence. Heidegger finds will to power as a directing toward calculation, utility, breeding, manipulation, and regulation. We can instead think will to power as Nietzsche did, namely, that will to power is a technology of life. Indeed, in Heidegger's first Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger urged us to think the 'will to power as art' against aestheticization, or the technologization of art. The problem of

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18 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, trans. by Vallega-Neu and Rojcewicz, #59, GA 65 124, p.98. Thanks to Thomson, Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity, p.200-1. Here, the Vallega-Neu translation of Contributions uses the word 'technology' instead of the earlier translation's 'technicity'. Though the earlier translation makes a less ambiguous point, I have excerpted the later one and will address why technology per se is not what Heidegger is critiquing, but rather, technologization (AKA, technicity).
technologization, as a 'bewitchery...that directs everything toward calculation, utility, breeding, manageability, and regulation', is the *way of thinking* about technology and the way this thinking concerns 'the whole' of existence. The distinction, between technology and technologization, as surmised by Heidegger in his post-*Nietzsche* work, is that technology can challenge and transcend technologization.¹⁹ Technologization implies that existing may be treated like a tool—that which loses its worth once its pre-defined purpose is exhausted. A hammer that loses its heavy, metal head, will likely be tossed in the trash. But existing does not so easily come to such waste: first, because its purpose is not pre-determined; second, because whatever purpose can be found of existence is in constant transition and reinvention; and third, because the 'meaning' of existing itself exceeds any consciousness of purpose (as evidenced by the fact that even without a consciousness of purpose, existing continues to be meaningful). The condition of enframing is related to 'technologization' in that existing is treated like a form of technology which is only *meaningful through a presumed permanence of utility*. Heidegger writes that technologization (signaled by the term 'enframing'), is the 'the photographic negative' of any authentic event of being-in-the-world.²⁰ Heidegger links a rampant late-modern technologization to Nietzsche's own philosophy. This is in part because Heidegger reads Nietzsche's will to power as a brand of technologization.

This charge, that Nietzsche's will to power is a brand of technologization, leads Heidegger to further claim that Nietzschean philosophy bears a responsibility for nihilism, despite Nietzsche's own vociferous critiques against nihilism—even as Heidegger defines the term. In

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²⁰ “Enframing is, as it were, the photographic negative of enowning.” Heidegger (*Four Seminars* 60/GA15 366), cited in Thomson, *HAP*, p. 192.
this section, I more closely examine the evidence that Heidegger uses and his charge against Nietzsche. Generally, Heidegger's problem with Nietzsche's philosophy takes the form of this question: if the nature of existence is becoming, then how can Nietzsche account for Being, which appears for Nietzsche in a way that is intelligible? This is not an epistemological problem, but rather deals with the nature of Being itself. Heidegger surmises that Nietzsche's answer is, 'Being is will to power', which Heidegger interprets as a *metaphysical representation*. Heidegger's problem with Nietzsche, who Heidegger dubs 'the last metaphysician', is that will to power 'permanetizes' becoming into presence. I argue that Heidegger's interpretation of will to power as knowledge, an equivalence he introduces in his third volume of the *Nietzsche* lectures, leads him to his indictments of Nietzsche's thinking, which does Nietzsche's philosophy a disservice. In *Spurs*, Derrida critiques Heidegger for his logic of indictment of Nietzsche's project. For Derrida, Heidegger's question to Nietzsche, 'has Nietzsche surmounted Platonism?', is caught in a hermeneutic order, which is to say, it is itself a question whose proof-procedure imparts certain demands on Nietzsche's text which Nietzsche's philosophy attempts to put out of order [*déranger*].

The logic of Heidegger's critique is as follows: 1) will to power is a metaphysical representation, which stabilizes or 'permanetizes' becoming—a dynamic event—into Being—or a pure static abstraction; 2) will to power represents the knowledge or truth of existence, as value-positing, which is concerned with how best to grow and preserve power, and which Heidegger describes as a “biological” knowledge; 3) will to power as the knowledge of value-positing and which arrives as increasing power is nihilistic in that it devalues the highest values and leads to a cultural epoch of enframing by engendering a view of existence that is a form of

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technologization. I will follow the train of Heidegger's thought in the subsequent subsections.

_A Metaphysical Elucidation_

Heidegger's castigation of Nietzsche (which also contains a sense of reverence) is centered on his claim that Nietzsche is the 'last metaphysician'. Heidegger's claim explicitly targets Nietzsche's proposal that will to power is the explanatory force of all living things. For example, in _Beyond Good and Evil_, Nietzsche writes:

“Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of one basic form of the will—namely, the will to power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power...”

Nietzsche couches this explanation of 'all organic functions' in the language of a thought experiment, using 'suppose' [Versuch]. But many thinkers consider Nietzsche's language of supposition as more than a deflective rhetorical strategy. Jacques Derrida, for one, in his interview with Richard Beardsworth, refers specifically to Nietzsche's refrain of 'perhaps' in the second aphorism of _Beyond Good and Evil_ to characterize Nietzsche as the philosopher of the future; since the future is somewhat less certain than what has passed, to expound a philosophy of the future requires a commitment to what is uncertain, to a 'perhaps'.

In this very second aphorism, which Derrida references, Nietzsche writes, “But who has the will to concern himself with such dangerous maybes?” By using the term 'Versuch', with an etymology involving both 'attempt' and 'tempt', Nietzsche stresses the experimental and provocative nature of the philosopher of the future. Despite Nietzsche's own characterization of the ideal philosopher as

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24 Nietzsche, BGE #2.
one who experimentally supposes, Heidegger reads Nietzsche's recurrent mention of will to power as the very force which empowers all living things, to be a metaphysical elucidation of Being.

In the following section, I hope to bring this charge to light by, first, grappling with what, for Heidegger, metaphysics is. In short, Heidegger's definition of metaphysics is, when positing a distinction between the sensible and the supersensible, thinking “the truth of beings as such and as a whole.”

Heidegger's classification of Nietzsche as a metaphysician, albeit the 'last', is somewhat ironic, since Nietzsche expended many works on the critique of metaphysics. For example, and in Heidegger's words, “[Nietzsche] takes Platonism to be a "doctrine of two worlds": above this earthly, mutable world, accessible to the senses, there stands a supersensuous, immutable world beyond.” Nietzsche criticizes Plato's 'moralist' philosophy, which posits two separate worlds, as metaphysical. And Heidegger explains, “Every metaphysics of the sort that posits a transcendent world as true above a sensible world as a world of appearances springs from morality.” Nietzsche's thinking posited an 'immoralist' re-evaluation which privileged the sensible world of appearances, but for Heidegger, it follows this very same sensible-to-supersensible distinction. Heidegger writes, “Metaphysics thinks beings as a whole according to their priority over Being. The whole of Western thinking from the Greeks through Nietzsche is metaphysical thinking.” Metaphysics concerns a way of thinking of Being. Heidegger explains, “Thought metaphysically, Being is that which is thought from beings as their most universal definition and

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26 Heidegger, N4, 45.
27 Heidegger, N4, 77.
28 Cf. also Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche,” 61, on how Nietzsche is entangled in metaphysics.
29 Heidegger, N3, 7.
to beings as their ground and cause.”\textsuperscript{30} Heidegger does credit Nietzsche with a sort of 'reversal' of Platonism, in that he prioritizes the sensible and mutable world to the insensible and immutable one, but, for Heidegger, Nietzsche's commits to the same metaphysical framework, just reversed. Heidegger writes: “Nietzsche's thought of will to power thinks beings as a whole such that the metaphysical ground of the history of the present and future age becomes visible and at the same time determinative.”\textsuperscript{31} Said in other words, since Nietzsche dismisses the supersensory as a product of the sensory, the concept of 'Being'—roughly what and how \textit{it is} to exist, is thought from the senses of beings (which Nietzsche suggests as 'will to power'), and this thought ('will to power') is then treated as the 'ground and cause' of beings. Additionally, for Heidegger, Nietzsche still preserves the distinction between the sensible and supersensible rather than truly overcoming it.

With a sense of what 'metaphysics' means for Heidegger—thinking Being as a whole and as such—we can turn to the heart of Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche's thinking. Heidegger writes:

“[W]ill to power means: empowering to the excelling of one's own essence. Empowering brings excelling—Becoming—to a stand and to permanence. In the thought of will to power, what is becoming and is moved in the highest and most proper sense—life itself—is to be thought in \textit{its} permanence. Certainly, Nietzsche wants Becoming and what becomes, as the fundamental character of beings as a whole; but he wants what becomes precisely and before all else as \textit{what remains}, as “being” proper, being in the sense of the

\textsuperscript{30} Heidegger, N3, 6-7.  
\textsuperscript{31} Heidegger, N3, 7.
Greek thinkers.”

Here, “being” refers to a metaphysical thinking of being. Heidegger challenges the common reading of Nietzsche, which suffices to claim him as a novel, nonmetaphysical thinker of being-as-becoming, in that Heidegger argues that such an equation (of Being to becoming) itself privileges the selfsame historical tradition of metaphysics (which defines Being as though a stable, permanent quality) which Nietzsche at least explicitly attempts to turn upside down. This “turning upside down’ is not, for Heidegger, radical enough since it abides the same metaphysical distinctions. Heidegger claims that instead of the philosopher of the future, Nietzsche's will to power delivers to us the same old philosopher of the past—albeit somewhat transitional from this past—and concerned with 'what remains'. Heidegger continues, “Will to power is the permanetizing of Becoming into presence...This means that the primordial interpretation of Being as the permanence of presencing is rescued by being placed beyond question.”

Heidegger's charge concerns Nietzsche's attachment to presence, rather than presencing: though Nietzsche defines Being as becoming, Heidegger finds that Nietzsche's description of becoming as will to power to instead assert a very traditional definition of Being—that is, a sort of permanence. Heidegger's first critique of Nietzsche's thinking is that will to power implies a metaphysics of permanence or presence.

It is the concept of 'permanence' and its relation to Nietzsche's will to power which founds Heidegger's charge that Nietzsche is a metaphysician, even as he is the last. So what does 'permanence' have to do with metaphysics? We will look in the next section as to how the will to power specifically, for Heidegger, amounts to a sort of biological knowledge founded on the

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32 Heidegger, N3, 156.
33 Heidegger, N3, 156 and 157. In this way, Nietzsche, for Heidegger, commits the last metaphysical interpretation of Being by returning to its first, a Parmenidean abstraction.
image of 'permanence'. But first, to see why a concept of 'permanence' per se is metaphysical, we turn back to what metaphysics is, for Heidegger: the distinction between the supersensible and the sensible, especially in thinking beings as a whole and as such. 'Permanence' is a supersensible condition which must be imagined by beings who actually—more truly in philosophical way—sense their world as a sort of presencing (in play). For Heidegger, to think 'presence' is to commit to a metaphysical concept of permanence—a supersensible continuity of Being as a whole and as such, which tricks an existant as to the essence of their sensible reality by proposing an explanatory principle which transcends away from their encounters with it—toward static rather than dynamic phenomena and their causes.

In his 1943 essay, “The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'”, Heidegger defines the metaphysician to maintain “privilege of a condition far and away from phenomena.” But how can a vociferously self-proclaimed philosopher of becoming—of dynamic appearances, like Nietzsche, be interpreted as privileging a condition 'far and away from phenomena'? Against prevalent readings of Nietzsche's philosophy, Heidegger highlights how, rather than constitute the actual 'death of God' that the madman initially heralds, Nietzsche's position is proof that the 'tremendous event' of God's death 'is still on its way'. Heidegger finds much more continuity between the metaphysical (God-like) tradition and Nietzsche's thinking. For Heidegger, Nietzsche's will to power, posited as the 'essence of Being', is a metaphysical principle, that is, a representational explanation of existence that cannot be experienced but must be presupposed. Will to power is representational, for Heidegger, in that it presumes correspondence between the 'truth of beings' and Being itself. Though the 'truth of beings' can (and is) experienced as perspective, the contention that such 'truth of beings' corresponds to Being on the whole and as

34 Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche” (NW), 61.
35 Nietzsche, GS #125.
such is 'beyond' experience.

Heidegger elsewhere argues that Nietzsche's work is rife with philosophical gestures that go 'beyond' experience and examples Nietzsche's 'overman', who is a supersession of man—who must be brought beyond himself in order to subject the earth to his revaluation. Later in “The Word of Nietzsche,” Heidegger redefines the will to power as 'value-positing'—more specifically, as a revaluation [Wertsetzung] undertaken through 'preservation-enhancement' of life and adds, "But nowhere do we find such experiencing of Being itself." He continues, value-positing (the essence of life as will to power) "does not let Being itself be the Being that it is." Reading Nietzsche as we will in the following chapters, it is unclear to me how different Nietzsche's Wertsetzung (value-positing) is to Heidegger's own existential principle of reciprocative rejoinder, Auseinandersetzung. There is, if nothing else, linguistic similarity between them.

Briefly, I summarize Heidegger's contention: Nietzsche's will to power amounts to a value-positing which requires a subjective and conscious point of view from which such posited values are, in Heidegger's estimation, 'preserving-enhancing' life. Heidegger thinks value-positing is attuned only to this 'preservation-enhancement' and, as such, value-positing is itself a 'truth' of beings. If, as Heidegger reads Nietzsche to claim, this principle is to serve as “the grounding [of] the truth of beings as a whole,” then Nietzsche is caught in the same metaphysical error which begins with what is in reality the consequence (a perspective from beings) and confuses it for the cause (of beings). As we have excerpted Heidegger before, he explains in his Nietzsche lectures,

36 Cf. Heidegger, “Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?” 415. Perhaps Nietzsche might suggest the Overman's contributions to be more of an opening within the world and not beyond it.
38 Heidegger, NW 108.
39 Ibid.
“Thought metaphysically, Being is that which is thought from beings as their most universal definition and to beings as their ground and cause.”\textsuperscript{41} To say that Nietzsche is a metaphysical thinker is to say that he is unreflective about the conditions which make thinking possible—that he commits a mistake Nietzsche himself decries by confusing the effect (beings) for the cause (Being).

But, I will show in my next section, Nietzsche explicitly addresses this very problem of value-positing as a knowledge seeking to preserve-enhance life and directly obviates it by proposing a force 'in all organic matter' which is neither merely conscious, nor purpose-oriented (will to power is not a power-as-utility). This is not to say that Nietzsche does not wish to propose or suppose (in a 'perhaps') aspects of being-as-becoming. I am arguing that Nietzsche's philosophical intervention on being-as-becoming do not follow suit of Heidegger's description of such being requiring a knowledge of purpose, permanence, life—all which are aspects of a knowing akin to consciousness. Yes, Nietzsche is thinking of Being, and his 'starting point' is the phenomena of beings, but the 'truth of beings' is not any less dynamic than the 'truth of art' which, as I show in my last section of this work, Heidegger purports to be the 'essence of beings' and the 'essence of existing'. In short, it is not Nietzsche's will to power, but instead, Heidegger's reduction of it to 'preservation-enhancement', which distorts will to power as the 'truth' or projection of beings that must correspond to Being, without due consideration of the conditions which make such 'preservation-enhancement' possible. By the concluding third part on nihilism of this section, I demonstrate how Heidegger thinks that Nietzsche sees no intrinsic meaning to existing so it all must be posited by existents in the sense of values. Heidegger thinks there is intrinsic meaning, and all existents may do is posit a rejoinder or response to a call. In what

\textsuperscript{41} Heidegger, N3, 7. Cf. Also Ibid., 154: Nietzsche is a metaphysical thinker because “Nietzsche always and from the outset thinks on the basis of the projection of beings as whole to their Being as will to power.”
follows, I reject this reading of Nietzsche and bring him closer to Heidegger.

Heidegger leaves out this Nietzsche—whom I set out in my second and third sections and, instead, treats Nietzsche as following in a tradition of metaphysicians who have chosen the wrong starting point in their inspection of Being. Nearly by way of introduction, at the beginning of his third volume of Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger aligns Nietzsche with those who his own madman calls unwitting murderers of God, “[Nietzsche] affirms the predominance of beings over against Being, without knowing what is involved in such an affirmation.”

We shall further examine the way that the knowledge or truth of beings operates in Nietzsche's philosophy in the next subsection. Suffice it to say, at this point, that the induction of what constitutes 'the truth of being as a whole' (Being) from the truth of beings—from perspective—is, for Heidegger, the metaphysical error of making a distinction between the supersensible and the sensible. Now, this last assertion bears an ironic condition: how can what seems to posit equivalence, or at least, comparableness—i.e., that the experience of Being is reducible to beings—in fact constitute, for Heidegger, a 'distinction' between the two (supersensible Being and sensible beings)? Well, the point is that, for Heidegger, Nietzsche's will to power is an explanation avowedly rooted in perspective which posits 'the truth of being as a whole'. It is the 'as a whole' which is most significant here, to see what Heidegger describes as metaphysical. To say, for example, that will to power could “gain the right to determine all efficient force univocally,” as Nietzsche does in Beyond Good and Evil #36, is to surmise a condition of Being which is static and ahistorical—that is, determining “all organic functions.”

In "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra," Heidegger notes that Schelling (among others) ranks the

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42 Heidegger, N3, “1 – Nietzsche as the Thinker of the Consummation of Metaphysics,” 6, my emphasis. To be fair, Heidegger does go on to say, that by his affirmation “Nietzsche anticipates the consummation of the modern age with his unique thought of the will to power.” (Ibid.)

43 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, #36.
principle idea of any metaphysics to be 'eternity'–an ahistorical time—when it is considered to be a predicate of Being. 44 Nietzsche's 'eternity', even as an immanent 'eternity of Now', still attributes eternity, as a predicate, to Being, and thereby draws a distinction between the sensible and supersensible.

Heidegger writes,

"That Nietzsche experienced and expounded his most abysmal [abyssal?] thought from the Dionysian standpoint, only suggests that he was still compelled to think it metaphysically, and only metaphysically. But it does not preclude that this most abysmal thought conceals something unthought, which also is impenetrable to metaphysical thinking." 45

The 'abysmal' thought Heidegger refers to is Nietzsche's description of a concomitance between the sensible and supersensible. 46 Perhaps unfairly, to illustrate this abysmal thought in Nietzsche's writing, Heidegger excerpts the last line from Ecce Homo: 'Have I been understood--Dionysus or the crucified.' 47 For Heidegger, Nietzsche's Dionysus represents Nietzsche's preference for the (Dionysian) sensible values over the crucified's preference for the supersensible values which would lead one to valorize a self-made crucifixion. Heidegger's interpretation is that Nietzsche's either/or presupposes the metaphysical distinction. What becomes more interesting is investigating what, for Heidegger, is concealed within Nietzsche's so-called metaphysical distinction, which is 'impenetrable to metaphysical thinking'. It is perhaps that which is concealed in Nietzsche's thinking which brings Heidegger to surmise his own account of Being in

46 “Peak and abyss—they are now joined together...It is out of the deepest depth that the highest must come to its height.” (Nietzsche, Zarathustra. Pt 3. “The Wanderer” p. 264 and p.266.)
47 Ecce Homo #4.9. It is significant to note that, in Nietzsche's later work (post-turn), Nietzsche's Dionysus is not so simple a figure in opposition to the crucified, but is itself a synthesis of what Nietzsche's earlier work—most notably The Birth of Tragedy—dubbed 'Dionysian' and 'Apollonian' drives. Thanks to Josh Rayman for this point.
supposedly non-metaphysical terms.

Rejoinder in brief

Heidegger's use of Nietzsche's 'Dionysius or the crucified' provides an unfair example of textual support for Nietzsche's so-called metaphysical commitments. Heidegger argues that Nietzsche needs a basis for the evaluation of different sensible perspectives, and that can only be will to power. So will to power is beneath and foundational to all perspectives. My point is that Nietzsche's will to power is not “beneath or foundational” in the metaphysical sense—that is, Nietzsche's will to power does not posit a distinction between the sensible and the supersensible, it is not a knowing that knows purpose or permanence—of a whole and as such—nor of “life.”

Nietzsche explicitly challenges the traditional metaphysical distinction in his rash of retroactive prefases of 1886. The most relevant definition of a metaphysician—in that it seems at first blush to catch Nietzsche's will to power precisely in just such a category—can be taken from Nietzsche himself, in Beyond Good and Evil #34. Here, he rails against the lure of deceptive principles which account for “the essence of things” without deference to what he calls the 'erroneousness' of thinking itself. Nietzsche explicitly writes that will to power could be the essence of all organic functions, but, in the same breath, he grapples with the possible 'erroneousness' of this thinking. Regaling a 'duty to suspicion', Nietzsche fully acknowledges the falseness and error of his own suppositions. He asks if it is not “sufficient to assume degrees of apparentness,” rather than an “essential opposition of “true” and “false,”” and admits that “there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective estimates and appearances.” So, does Nietzsche posit, in the will to power, a 'permanent' Now, from which 'the whole of Being as such'

48 See my second chapter, “Nietzsche's Turn; Or, How to Recover from Romantic Pessimism”
49 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, #34.
50 Ibid.
is to be known? Perhaps; but only if this 'now' is a kind of dynamic, transformational, non-metaphysical permanence which is perspectival (and not as a whole and as such), and which conditions phenomena/appearances—what Heidegger has called the 'truth of beings'—to arrive as differences, which engender degrees of 'truth' to any 'being as a whole'. Resisting a monopoly on the 'truth' of 'being as a whole and as such', Nietzsche proposes an ontological pluralism and, therefore, dissolves the traditional metaphysical distinction of opposites (between supersensible and sensible appearances) or the representational, correspondent assimilation of one to the other. And further, if Heidegger is going to indict Nietzsche's thinking, namely, that 'truth' arrives ek-statically, via perspective, because the sensible—which transforms continually amidst its transmissions—can but provide a supposition of any permanent and inexhaustible condition of Being itself, then Heidegger's own thinking is guilty of the same charge. I will show how this is the case in my final section on Heidegger's thinking on art.

'Metaphysics' traditionally heralds a distinction between this—and other—worlds. But, Nietzsche's philosophical project seeks to abolish other-worldly valuations, i.e., values which seem to prize a world beyond or impossible to our own. It is not metaphysical in the traditional way to say that existence is too much to contain, that it is inexhaustible. A supposition of 'inexhaustibility' is not the same metaphysical move of negative theology, for example, which claims that there can be no sensible knowledge of the supersensible, transcendent God/Being, because 1) sensible knowledge is incompatible with the supersensible, transcendent God/Being, and 2) the supersensible is, thereby, affirmed logically but not empirically (nor phenomenologically). To this version of a traditional metaphysical position, sensible knowledge is a privation of 'true' knowledge; the truth and essence of sensible knowledge remains

unknowable because its nature is supposed to be supersensible, i.e., divine. For the traditional metaphysical position, the whole of Being as such does exist, but it can be known only via faith.

Nietzsche's claim, instead, is that existence is too superabundant to be exhausted in our senses. For Nietzsche, the whole of Being as such does not exist yet, and so—as unfinished—it cannot be known. Between traditional and Nietzsche's so-called metaphysics, knowledge of Being is impossible for different reasons. For the traditional metaphysician, knowledge of Being is impossible because Being is supersensible. For Nietzsche, knowledge of Being is impossible because Being is unfolding.

For Nietzsche, existence is knowable through our senses, but not the whole of it. The 'whole' of existence is yet to be completed, and so as a whole it cannot be sensed or known. This is not a distinction between the supersensible and the sensible; rather, it is their radical co-extension—a codetermination of different ways of thinking in an interminably transformative process (a Being as becoming). Yes, Nietzsche supposes a sort of 'permanence' to this process (as will to power might be the explanatory force in all organic functions), but it is not the 'permanence' of traditional metaphysics, i.e., an abstract idea which is 'beyond' phenomena or out of touch with sensible knowing. Nor is it the permanence of presence—a self-identical moment in time or site; rather, Nietzsche's gesture toward permanence is akin to Heidegger's—i.e., of a transcendental permanence of transformation, a presencing.

Further, a metaphysical distinction privileges the supersensible or the sensible, but more importantly, preserves their distinction. To be fair, Heidegger indeed charges Nietzsche with preserving a metaphysical distinction, but, to sound this subsection's refrain: Nietzsche dissolves their distinction. Rather than say that the supersensible dream is a lie, only sensible life is true (a position Nietzsche calls nihilism), or vice versa, that only the supersensible dream is true, and sensible life is a lie (which Nietzsche calls Platonism), Nietzsche writes that the truth of life is a
woman with whom 'life itself is a dream of life', i.e., life is a dream. Here and for Nietzsche, we see NOT the opposition and distinction of life and dream, but rather their equivalence, their radical coextension: life IS a dream. The example in this sentence (the co-extension rather than the opposition of dreams to life) echoes Gay Science #346: “[W]e laugh as soon as we encounter the juxtaposition of 'man and world', separated by the sublime presumptuousness of the little word 'and!'” Nietzsche's claim is not the metaphysical one that sensible language is not adequate to predicate a supersensible truth of Being, which is ever-transcendent to life (à la negative theology); but rather, that language is the only adequate predicate to Being, which is ever-changing, ever-dreaming in life.

But Heidegger reads Nietzsche differently. Heidegger claims that Nietzsche's thinking commits to a distinction between the sensible and supersensible. By supposing will to power as an explanatory force on the whole of organic life, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche makes a metaphysical elucidation which turns what is ever-changing (Being) into a modicum of metaphysical permanence in presence. Heidegger writes that Nietzsche unwittingly thinks Being as a metaphysical permanence through his commitment to the will to power as 'knowledge' about the 'truth of Being'. We will see in the next section, how it is Heidegger's understanding of 'the will to power as knowledge' which, in part, leads Heidegger to criticize Nietzsche's thinking as metaphysical, as well as amounting to nihilism. Duly, I will next examine what Heidegger means by 'knowledge' and 'truth', to assess how Heidegger construes Nietzsche's philosophical 'permanence' to be the continual securing of growth and preservation of power.

**Knowledge and truth**

In volume three of his Nietzsche lectures, "The Will To Power as Knowledge" (der Wille
zur Macht als Erkenntnis), Heidegger continues to embark on a conceptual transition which he initiated in his second volume, through which we see him develop an interpretation of will to power that is inextricably conjoined to the repetition of eternal recurrence. By these third series of lectures (delivered 1939), he performs a veritable sous rature to his early equation of the will to power with art (delivered in 1936-7, during the time he was also drafting “The Origin of the Work of Art”), and he redefines the will to power as knowledge [Erkenntnis]. Heidegger describes knowledge as that which preserves and grows. In part, his critique of the will to power as a 'metaphysical elucidation' relies on his equation of will to power to knowledge: 'that beings know how to preserve and grow' is, per Heidegger's interpretation, Nietzsche's metaphysical explanation of the 'essence of Being'. We are well aware that Nietzsche supposes the will to power as the essence of Being (at least, I take this proclamation to be uncontroversial and easily grounded in textual evidence). But what about the other term in this purportedly metaphysical elucidation—'knowledge'? Heidegger frames it as 'that beings know how to preserve and grow'. But what kind of knowledge does Heidegger signal when he describes a 'how to' of (what Heidegger also calls) 'preservation-enhancement'? This subsection will explore what Heidegger means by Nietzsche's 'knowledge' and 'truth', which Heidegger claims was considered by Nietzsche to be 'biological'. Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's biologism manifests as traditional metaphysics. Before moving to this concept of 'biological', in this sub-section we see how Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's knowledge and truth as self-reflective, schematizing, and representational.

Heidegger's third Nietzsche lectures seems heavily influenced by Heidegger's own early critique of knowledge. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes, "knowing [Erkennen] is grounded

54 Cf. BGE # 36, GM 2.12. If you prefer the notes, WTP 2 is often cited.
beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world, which is essentially constitutive for Dasein's Being."\textsuperscript{55} That 'knowing is grounded beforehand' is to say that, for Heidegger, 'knowing' is not 'essentially constitutive' for the Being of beings. Further Heidegger writes,

"But a 'commercium' of the subject with a world does not get created for the first time by knowing, nor does it arise from some way in which the world acts upon a subject. Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world. Thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be Interpreted beforehand."\textsuperscript{56}

Heidegger's use of 'founded', here, implies that knowledge (in Dasein's being-in-the-world) is non-essential to the 'basic state' of the Being of beings.

Heidegger misinterprets the will to power (when he claims it is 'as knowledge') and, in calling it knowledge, conjures the nihilist criminal for whom he is looking, as Nietzsche. For both Nietzsche and Heidegger, knowledge often presumes a subject-object relation, a relation which both thinkers critique. More importantly, both thinkers write that different ways of thinking are more fundamental than cognition [Erkennen], e.g., for Nietzsche, instinctual or unconscious valuations; for Heidegger, 'familiarity'.\textsuperscript{57} It is the similarity of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's critique of knowledge—in favor of openness to other ways of thinking—which calls into questions Heidegger's equation of knowledge and the will to power by this third series of lectures.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., H62, p90. And also, Ibid., sect. 43A, H202 p.246: in contrast with knowing, which is a 'founded' mode (founded on being-in-the-world), care is more primordial state of Being ("Being alongside entities within-the-world").
\textsuperscript{57} It is true, however, that Nietzsche wants to break with traditional—or 'familiar'—valuations and forge a new type of human who re-values. 'Familiarity' is not Nietzsche's value of choice. But, this does not mean that Nietzsche wants to disengage the human from her 'natural' position. Instead, Nietzsche argues that it is the ascetic who enacts this kind of disengagement—here, and similarly to knowledge/cognition, the ascetic uses an unnatural knowledge to sever the human from his primordial condition, which is immersed in and responsive to drives. So, whereas Heidegger thinks that 'familiarity' describes the pre-cognitive being-in-the-world, Nietzsche will cast at least a glance of suspicion upon the familiar. But, both theorists here agree that the pre-cognitive operation of beings is the most natural, i.e., most attuned to the essence of Being.
It is this term, 'knowledge,' and related thereto, 'truth', that this section seeks to clarify in Heideggerian terms.

Referencing Munchhausen’s intention to pull himself out of a swamp by his own hair, Heidegger explains that “knowing itself already implies self-knowing.”\(^{58}\) But who is this self? Might it not, as Nietzsche suggests, be itself another fiction? Nietzsche applies a 'duty of suspicion' to 'the self' and to 'knowledge' in general, as he writes, “Is it not permitted to be a bit ironical about the subject no less than the predicate and object? Shouldn't philosophers be permitted to rise above faith in grammar?”\(^{59}\)

If knowing is a self-knowing, Heidegger does describe this 'self' as always already entangled by and situated in that which it knows, in a way which surpasses any dualistic, Cartesian notion of self who is essentially distinct from its situation. Heidegger explains,

“Knowing consists in the relation of a knower to what is knowable and known...this relation vibrates throughout our basic posture.

This basic posture expresses itself in the way we take beings and objects in advance, in the way we have determined what is decisive in our relation to them.”\(^{60}\)

Here, Heidegger signals a kind of knowledge which might sound circular in its obviousness (as in, knowing is what is known and knowable by that which knows). Importantly, knowing is in relation to (‘vibrates throughout’) our 'basic posture', but is not this basic posture. Is knowing

\(^{58}\) Heidegger, N3, “11 – Knowing as Schematizing a Chaos in Accordance with Practical Need,” 68.

\(^{59}\) Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* #34.

\(^{60}\) Heidegger, N3, 69.
essential? Not for Heidegger, as knowing is distinct from a more 'basic posture' which appears, here, as the 'decisive' way we 'take beings and objects in advance' of a relation between a knower and what is known. This 'decision' is very akin to the event [Ereignis] of de-cision Heidegger writes about in “The Origin of the Work of Art.”

Later in this passage, and in a somewhat contrasting claim, Heidegger clearly states that “the essence and history of Western man are distinguished by the fact that knowing and cognition belong to his basic relation to beings as a whole,” and, so, the “Western man is in part decided and shaped by reflectiveness.”61 So, here, knowing and cognition are aspects of the 'basic relation to beings as a whole'. There are times, though, when this 'Western man' is “overwhelmed by a lack of reflectiveness,” and must be 'rescued and grounded' in a passion for reflection. For Heidegger, the “African tribe” is spared this destiny.62 Heidegger's insinuation—that the African tribe is not essentially reflective, and so any 'lack of reflectiveness' would not appear to them as a crisis, is insulting, to say the least, and it also substantiates my claim that the knowledge which Heidegger equates with will to power (as aspects of the 'basic relation to beings as a whole') is an interpretation of will to power related to consciousness, since some beings can develop a relation to knowledge and others not. In this example of Heidegger's, knowledge, counterpoised as it is to 'the African tribe', is very akin to an enframing brand of empire-building. Further, are we to interpret 'knowledge' as Western man's predilection for self-reflection?

'Lack of reflectiveness' requires a rescue, and one that is not, for Heidegger, the development of a “boring and esoteric “theory of knowledge” in which the question of knowing asks about something that has always already been finally or temporarily predecided for the

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61 Heidegger, N3, 69.
62 N3 69.
questioner.” Even Heidegger thinks knowledge in very ambiguous terms—as sometimes not the essential way beings relate to the being of beings, and sometimes as involved in the essential, and also, sometimes as involved in the essential, but lost and in need of rescue. And Heidegger seems to think this 'rescue' of knowing and reflectiveness comes with a different way of thinking: not a 'knowledge' already 'finally or temporarily predecided for the questioner'. Is this not akin to the perspectival valuations of Nietzsche's supposition of interpretive knowing?

Heidegger moves on to use a note of Nietzsche's to redefine knowledge as 'schematizing', which means “to impose upon chaos as much regularity and as many forms as our practical needs require.” From this Heidegger surmises that, for Nietzsche, “what is to be known and is knowable is chaos, and what knows is the praxis of life.” Again, we find Heidegger committing Nietzsche to a dualism that Nietzsche himself foreswears. Interestingly, and more fairly, Heidegger brokers a mediation between 'chaos' and the 'praxis of life' to explain Nietzsche's thinking on knowledge. Further in this lecture, Heidegger writes,

“[W]hat is knowable [chaos] and what knows ['the praxis of life'] are each determined in their essence in a unified way from the same essential ground. We may not separate either one...Knowing is not like a bridge that somehow subsequently connects two existent banks of a stream, but is itself a stream that in its flow first creates the banks and turns them toward each other in a more original way than a bridge ever could.”

Here we find a seldom explicit note of Heidegger's to the chaotic—that which is uncontained and

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63 Ibid.
64 N3, 71-72; the note is cited as WM 515, March-June 1888.
65 N3, 72.
66 Heidegger, N3, 83.
unschematic, as part of knowing. This interplay, between chaos and the praxis of life, invokes Heidegger's thinking on the earth-world tension of art and truth, or aletheia. But Heidegger is not content to stay in consanguineous conceptual territory with Nietzsche for long. Referring to Nietzsche's 'knowable chaos,' Heidegger asks, in a manner befitting a prosecutor, set to convict Nietzsche of the metaphysical tartuffery which Nietzsche himself is so fond of belittling:

“Has he [Nietzsche] not...seen the world immediately surrounding...have they [Nietzsche and the thinkers before him] not paid heed to their own everyday experience of the world?...To what standpoint has thinking and reflecting about knowledge ranged, so that it can arrive at such peculiar statements as this—knowing is a schematizing of chaos carried out in accordance with practical life-needs?”

Rather than dignify Heidegger's rhetorical question with a response, I use it to highlight how Heidegger lambasts Nietzsche for his supposition that chaos is knowable. This demonstrates how Heidegger is unwilling, here, to consider knowledge as related to different ways of thinking—thinking which could and could not intelligibilize chaos. Heidegger, instead, defines knowledge as an 'imposition of regularity', as applied in an 'everyday experience of the world'. Granted, there is a Heideggerian ambivalence of the term, 'everydayness'. As in, the difference between the 'average everydayness' of Das Man which Heidegger often disdains and the 'everyday experience' which he uses as gold standard against so-called 'metaphysical elucidations'. Here, Heidegger seems to be on the cheering side of everydayness, as he uses it to ridicule Nietzsche's 'knowable chaos' as being so 'peculiar', i.e., a metaphysical notion. The clearer that Heidegger seems to
make knowledge—as self-reflection and order (not chaos)—the less it seems in line with how Nietzsche describes the will to power, as pre-conscious (and therefore, impractical), accidental (and therefore, unschematized), excessive to the pretext of purpose (which is more accurately, a post-text), and necessary (therefore not 'freely' willed).

Heidegger acknowledges that, for Nietzsche, art “comes closer to what is actual, what becomes, to “life,” than what is true, what has been fixed and immobilized.”68 Here, we might read 'truth' as an indelible aspect of knowledge, as Heidegger writes, “Truth is what is essential about knowledge.”69 Further, on knowing, Heidegger writes that what knows is “the living being that grasps the world and takes it over.”70 So, we find that art is likened to life, and what becomes of life, which is chaos; whereas, knowledge is likened to truth and what enhances-preservation life, which is a grasping of the world as a fixing, immobilizing, schematizing. The 'schematizing' character of will to power is what would smuggle in its metaphysical status—asserting a fixed, immobilizing takeover. Heidegger explains, knowledge as “the securing of the permanence of human life.”71 Recall that permanence is a metaphysical idea. Since knowledge schematizes toward securing permanence, it hungers after a transcendent, metaphysical immobility which, in turn, devalues an actual flux of experience. So, what if we consider, as Heidegger did in his first Nietzsche volume ('35-'36), that Nietzsche's will to power is 'as art' [als Kunst] instead of 'as knowledge' [als Erkenntnis]? Might this consideration not bring the will to power 'closer to life'?

We will see in subsequent chapters how Nietzsche makes a turn, from thinking truth in the Kantian romantic pessimist tradition as epistemologically opposed to illusion—whether, thereby, as Kant, one privileges 'truth', or as early Nietzsche, one privileges illusion—to thinking truth as

68 N3, 82.
70 N3, 82.
71 N3, “22 – The Essence of Will to Power; Permanentizing Becoming into Presence,” 153, my emphasis.
structured like and co-determinate to illusion. Heidegger does not credit Nietzsche's thinking with this turn, and seems to focus his criticism of Nietzsche on the presuppositions from which Nietzsche turned away.

Heidegger traces Nietzsche's so-called metaphysical thinking of the 'essence of truth' (truth is 'illusion') to Heraclitus' fragment 28, which he translates as “For having views is also the knowing of the most highly regarded one, watching over holding fast to a view.” Heidegger says that for both Heraclitus and Nietzsche, the beingness of beings is presencing [physis]. But since the 'concept of the image', or that which comes to presence, changes from antiquity to the Middle Ages to the modern period, Heidegger claims Nietzsche's common ground with Heraclitus is curbed by his inability to speak from outside his own modern corner, whereby the concept of image invokes a representational object. It is Nietzsche's purported indebtedness to representation, among other mistaken criticisms, which account for Heidegger's conjecture that Nietzsche is the “last metaphysician of the West.” Heidegger writes, “what 'is', what is still happening in Western history—hitherto, at present, and to come—is the power of the essence of truth. In it, beings as such show themselves and accordingly are grasped as this self-representing in representation, and one understands such representation generally as thinking.”

Representational thinking is the sort of thinking at work in positing that the 'experience' of beings must be in accordance with a 'permanence' of Being.

Ensnared by the demands of representational ways of thinking, Heidegger's Nietzsche is, for Heidegger, a philosopher who at/tempts a certain kind of representational truth. Heidegger

72 N3, 28.
74 Ibid., 29. Here, Heidegger notes the three historical transitions of the meaning of image: 1 (ancient): coming to presence; 2 (middle ages): referential correspondence within the order of creation; 3 (modern): representational object. Foucault seems to take up these three historical transitions in his The Order of Things.
75 N3, 8.
76 N3, 31.
writes,

“Truth means the assimilation of representing to what beings are and how they are,” and “representing means having and bringing before oneself beings, a having that perceives and opines, remembers and plans, hopes and rejects.”\(^{77}\)

In this framework, truth bespeaks a correspondence ('assimilation of representing') between beings (the 'what') and Being (the 'how'), while representing implies permanence, a 'remembering', a continuity in Being over time. If Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's will to power as knowledge, which is a truth indebted to representation, then Heidegger is asserting that will to power presumes a correspondence between representation, permanence, and Being itself. So far, we have an account of knowledge as truth, which is self-reflecting, schematizing, representational, and concerned with a permanence of presence. But let us recall Nietzsche's words: "purposes and utilities are only signs that a will to power has become master of something less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a function..."\(^{78}\) Here, Nietzsche argues that purposes and utilities are the sign of a mastery over some weaker element; but Nietzsche regards existing as extremely strong—and this will be demonstrated in the chapters that follow. Suffice it to say that as Heidegger confines will to power in a knowledge which, like purpose and utility, show a mastery over existence, I think it will become clear how Heidegger is fashioning a will to power much different than Nietzsche's own.

Heidegger notes that Nietzsche stresses a truth which is illusion, and so the traditional concept of 'correctness' as truth must be tweaked to involve the value-posing which accounts for

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\(^{77}\) N3, 34.  
\(^{78}\) Nietzsche, GM 2.12., (see earlier cite, 177).
correctness itself, as a 'value-estimation'.\textsuperscript{79} Heidegger concludes the section, “The Essence of Truth (Correctness) as “Estimation of Value,” quoting from Nietzsche,

> “All our organs of knowledge and our senses are developed only with regard to conditions of preservation and growth.” [Heidegger follows] Accordingly, truth and grasping the truth [knowledge] are not merely in the service of “life” according to their use and application; their essence, the manner of their organization, and thus their entire activity are driven and directed by “life.””\textsuperscript{80}

The Nietzsche excerpt here seems like pretty good evidence in favor of Heidegger's view of will to power as knowledge. Per Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, truth is a self-reflecting, schematizing, representational knowledge grounded in “life,” a bio-logic, of what helps one to preserve and grow. But Nietzsche's own writing will show how, for Nietzsche, truth and knowledge are not synonymous. For Heidegger to show that knowledge is developed “with regard to conditions of preservation and growth” is merely to assign to knowledge a definition analogous to conscious thinking. But for Nietzsche, will to power is much more than simply the conscious avenues of thinking; for Nietzsche, will to power is not merely a conscious-akin knowledge. In this above-referenced passage, Heidegger uses Nietzsche's words and then assigns to them a narrower field of “life” knowledge. We move now to examine Heidegger's concern over this very 'biological' nature of knowledge.

\textit{The problem with “life” knowledge}

In an important section, Heidegger charges Nietzsche with a “biological” interpretation of

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, 36-7.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid. 38; Nietzsche's note is cited as follows: number 507 (Spring-Fall 1887), see W II 1 [38] at CM, 12, 352-53.
knowledge. For a moment, I wish to dispense with the particular term 'biological' and, instead, focus on what I gather to be the weight of Heidegger's conceptual critique against Nietzsche, when he argues that the will to power is knowledge. Heidegger frames his objection, writing:

“Nietzsche thinks tacitly as follows: All thinking in categories, all nascent thinking in schemata, that is, in accordance with rules, is *perspectival*, conditioned by the essence of life [will to power]; hence it is also thinking in accordance with the fundamental rule of all thought, that is, the law of the avoidance of contradiction.” ⁸¹

For Heidegger, this 'tacit' or 'unthought' thought of Nietzsche's is that, though Nietzsche seemingly unfailingly notes that all thinking is perspectival, he at the same time purports to offer an explanation of the essence of existence that “has the same character as all rules and schemas.” in order to avoid contradiction⁸² Nietzsche posits a rule: all thinking is perspectival. But, then, by Nietzsche's own rule, his posit is itself perspectival. Nietzsche, of course, anticipates this objection: “Supposing that this [Nietzsche's exegesis] is also only interpretation—and you will be eager enough to make this objection?—well, so much the better.” ⁸³ Nietzsche is all too ready to suggest that his own supposition is also just a standpoint—and a demonstratively non-conformist one at that, as he says 'all the better'. Rather than take up this self-reflective and reflexive Nietzsche, Heidegger interprets Nietzsche to, instead, claim that this rule—will to power is the only life force, all thinking is perspectival—cannot be contradicted because it is a *biological* compulsion.⁸⁴ Heidegger argues that 1) by such a claim, Nietzsche subscribes to what Heidegger confusingly calls the 'law of contradiction', namely, that if Nietzsche reveals rules which are also

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⁸¹ Heidegger, N3, 102.
⁸² Ibid.
⁸³ Nietzsche, BGE # 22.
biological compulsions, they must necessarily trump any other philosophical explanations. The coinage is confusing in that the 'law of contradiction' at once signals what is generally known as 'the law of non-contradiction' and, also, ironically, what Heidegger argues is Nietzsche's contradiction: to posit a rule which must hold universally from within a perspectival ontology. Heidegger also argues 2) Nietzsche conveys a metaphysical elucidation in the cloak of a logic of 'life'. In Heidegger's estimation, Nietzsche begins with the knowledge of beings (that thinking is perspectival) and, thereby, tacitly assumes Being (which 'has the same character as all rules and schemas' in that it must avoid contradiction and follow a 'biological compulsion'). For Heidegger, to account for Being by beginning with beings is to commit the very error which he spends his lifetime critiquing the tradition of metaphysics for committing. We will examine this error more closely in Heidegger's assertion that Nietzsche's will to power is a "'biological' interpretation of knowledge.'

Heidegger constructs this argument against Nietzsche's biological interpretation of knowledge, and also places the word 'biological' in quotes. Heidegger invokes and calls into question this term 'biological' to criticize Nietzsche's philosophy as performing an "explanatory reduction of all appearances to life, [in] a manner of explanation that fully convinces everyone who is used to biological (that is, scientific) thinking, who takes facts for what they are, namely, for facts..." Heidegger's dismissive tone regarding such 'scientific' thinking is hard to miss. Bearing in mind Heidegger's always latent (if not explicit) critique against technologization and calculative thinking, Heidegger chastises Nietzsche's philosophy for committing the grave error of reducing truth to biology—that is, to what must without contradiction be the case.

85 Heidegger, N3, p.101, “16 – Nietzsche's “Biological” Interpretation of Knowledge”
86 Heidegger, N3, 103.
87 Ibid. p.102.
To be fair to Heidegger, he uses Nietzsche's own words, in Nietzsche's note 515, to facilitate Heidegger's critique. Therein Nietzsche writes that “the subjective compulsion [will to power] is unable to contradict a biological compulsion.” Nietzsche's reduction of truth to biology constitutes, for Heidegger, the same kind of 'metaphysical elucidation' which conceals more than it makes clear; that is, the reduction hides, in its self-evident presumption, precisely what existential presuppositions are required and produced by it for it to obtain as truth. Heidegger's phraseology is more poetic: “[A]ll metaphysical elucidations be what they are, which is to say, phantoms that are not brought to light in their own true provenance.” Further, Heidegger points out that contradiction is existentially possible, and only logically impossible. Heidegger writes, “If any statement is ever valid according to the testimony of experience, it is this one: human beings contradict themselves in their thinking...” If contradiction is possible—'experienceable' by some ways of thinking—and yet Nietzsche's theory of truth/knowledge disbars it, then Nietzsche is committing to a metaphysical interpretation of existence which attempts to make a supersensible distinction about what is and is not possible to sensibility. After clarifying this point about contradiction and its relation to biology—I will depart from using the term 'biological' (for further discussion, please see my above note on my choice against using Nietzsche's notes). Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's supposition that 'all thinking is perspectival' to be itself a rule which must abide by a principle of non-contradiction.

Heidegger points out that Nietzsche's 'law of contradiction' does not describe existence as it actually appears, but instead, as a consequence of a certain, logical, even metaphysical, way of thinking. Here, again, we find how significant the way thinking works is to Heidegger's and

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88 Nietzsche quoted in Heidegger, N3, 102.
89 Heidegger, N3, 104.
90 Heidegger, N3, 105. I am unclear as to why, then, Heidegger so adamantly opposed the notion of a 'knowable chaos'.

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Nietzsche's philosophy. Heidegger writes, “[T]he law of contradiction does not say that “in truth,” that is, in actuality, something self-contradictory can never be actual at the same time; it merely says that man must avoid contradiction to escape confusion and chaos or in order to master it.”

Here, it seems clear that Heidegger is referencing both the scientific 'principle of non-contradiction' and Nietzsche's so-called *faux pas*, the assertion that will to power, the ontology of perspectival truth, is a preservation-enhancement of life, which, as a 'biological compulsion', cannot be contradicted. Moreover, Heidegger writes, “The law of contradiction thus has only “subjective” validity; it depends on the constitution of our faculty of thinking.” Here again, the term 'law of contradiction' could mean both the principle of non-contradiction and Nietzsche's own contradictory law of perspectival thinking. But both seem to follow a metaphysical assumption of the distinction between the sensible and the supersensible, which deigns to describe beings as a whole and as such.

Now, what might Heidegger mean by using a diminutive adjective ('only') to describe the 'subjective validity' of this law? The unthought in Heidegger's thought is that one cannot posit a rule which holds in all respects while at the same time posit that all rules are only expedient to a particular perspective. Note that Heidegger's unsaid but implied objection here—to a validity which is 'only' subjective, itself presupposes that the law of non-contradiction obtains. For Heidegger, this argument remains 'unthought', at least at this point in his lecture, but he articulates a similar conceptual problem when he criticizes Nietzsche's “biological” reduction. Heidegger explains, that rather than begin with the 'law of beings' (Nietzsche's 'law of contradiction' regarding the trump of biology, or, later, the will to power), we must first “ask what this law properly presupposes and posits in such a way that it can then as a consequence be a rule for

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91 Heidegger, N3, 103.
92 Heidegger, N3, 107.
What might this 'law of contradiction' presuppose? The 'biological fact' of the law of contradiction presupposes and posits a knowledge which secures permanence, interpreted via preservation and enhancement of life. Heidegger surmises that knowledge is a way of thinking which must abide the law of contradiction in order that the thinker might “find his way around in his environment, in that way securing his own permanence.” Here, we find how Heidegger's account of the will to power as knowledge relates to his charge against Nietzsche that he is a metaphysician—one who considers existence as a matter of permanence.

For Heidegger, it is not enough to acknowledge the perspectival nature of thinking to stave off what Heidegger calls, by way of critique, subjectivism. Though defined here anachronistically by a later text, for Heidegger, 'subjectivism' is a belief that all meaning comes from the subject who imparts a 'mastery over what is', and Heidegger implicitly describes how subjectivism “somersaults beyond itself” [selbst überschlägt] into enframing. Therefore, if we can understand why Heidegger describes Nietzsche's will to power as subjectivism, we can link this interpretation of the will to power to Heidegger's diagnosis of enframing and technologization. For Heidegger, 'The metaphysics of will to power' is a 'value thinking', and 'value thinking' is centered on a subject. Heidegger writes,

“The self-consciousness of will to power consists in value thinking, whereby the name consciousness no longer signifies a neutral representing, but the powering and empowering reckoning with itself. Value thinking belongs essentially to the very being of will to power, in such a way that it is the subjectum (founded on itself,

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93 Heidegger, N3, 109.
94 Heidegger, N3, 103.
96 Heidegger, N1 77, cited in Thomson, HAP, p.57.
underlying everything). Will to power manifests itself as the subjectivity that is characterized by value thinking.\textsuperscript{97}

But we will see by my third chapter how Nietzsche's 'value thinking' is not subjectivity, nor is it consciousness; perspective is also and largely unconscious. Thereby, Nietzsche posits an existing with intrinsic meaning and value. For Nietzsche, it is not the subject who speaks.

Duly, Heidegger comments that Nietzsche would resist identification with subjectivism, “that exhausts itself in proclaiming whoever happens to be there—whether an individual or a community—the standard and purpose of everything. Nietzsche would claim with equal right to have brought a metaphysically necessary subjectivism to completion by making the “body” the guideline of his interpretation of the world.”\textsuperscript{98}

But Heidegger is less than charitable in his reading of Nietzsche's 'body', which for Heidegger becomes the cornerstone of Nietzsche's resistance to subjectivism—that is, the drive to 'master what is'. Even if, here, we find Heidegger intoning “body” as Nietzsche's guideline—thereby implying some non-conscious drives and strivings contained within will to power—it is, for Heidegger, still a body which strives to empower itself through a representational field of presence. I will show how Nietzsche affirmed a body's ambiguous com/position, at an interchange between particular and universal inheritances and decisions, givens and free will, and described a body far differently than a locus of “biological” strivings toward empowerment armed with a representational vision of enhancing and preserving its presence.

But it is a so-called 'biological' concession to the “body”—which abets a knowledge of

\textsuperscript{97} Heidegger, N3 in black book, 2. “Will to power,” 200.
\textsuperscript{98} Heidegger, N3, 155.
permanence in a 'law of contradiction'—that Heidegger calls Nietzsche's "anthropomorphism." For Heidegger's Nietzsche, the concession to biology does not, like for Nietzsche, check a drive to 'schematize chaos', in confrontation with the ineradicable and un-chosen inheritances of the given body one inhabits, but rather, the 'biological body' is the condition of possibility and uncontradictable guide to a drive to schematize. Anthropomorphism means here for Heidegger both the explicit 'schematizing' which follows from a 'free will' assertion that a being can determine its own character of existence, and also the determinist assertion that a being is already operating at the behest of its biology. Heidegger dubs this "'biological' knowledge' anthropomorphism because, contrary to what Heidegger's Nietzsche claims (in his notes), the deferral to 'biology' does not reach far enough past the subjectivist presuppositions which beings rely upon while thinking the essence of Being metaphysically. Heidegger shows that the 'biological fact' is but another consequence of a particular way of thinking, one directed at securing permanence as knowledge. It is knowledge, not Being itself, which places the human being, or the subject, at the center of Being. The 'biological' knowledge which is anthropomorphism or subjectivism is, for Heidegger, the character of Nietzsche's knowledge of (and as) will to power, since it is essentially a drive to preserve and enhance life (i.e., will to power is literally a bio-logic). This is why, then, for Heidegger, who interprets Nietzsche's will to power as an anthropomorphic, subjectivist knowledge, Nietzsche's will to power leads directly to technologization, that is, a treatment of existence which objectifies in a particular way, when beings consider their existence to be an inherently meaningless resource (Bestand) to be optimized "toward calculation, utility, breeding, manageability, and regulation."100.

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99 Heidegger, N3, 154-5.
Now, for Heidegger, technologization leads to nihilism.

The limit of Western metaphysics is revealed in Nietzsche's philosophy, wherein “Being is already overshadowed by beings and by the predominance of the so-called actual. The overshadowing of Being by beings derives from Being itself—as Being's abandonment of beings [i.e., the way that beings can but anthropomorphize Being]¹⁰¹, in the sense of the refusal of the truth of Being.”¹⁰² For Heidegger, Nietzsche completes the metaphysical epoch by thinking a perspectivism which privileges actual beings over an heretofore mistakenly anthropomorphized Being. Heidegger speaks poetically of Nietzsche's own 'death of God' aphorism, in which the humans who murder God must become one to be worthy of the deed. Further, this privilege of beings over Being 'derives' from the abandonment of beings—i.e., in the way that heretofore Being was thought only as some supersensible opposition to beings. Given this metaphysical opposition, between sensible beings and supersensible Being, Heidegger says Nietzsche chooses beings. But, as I will show, Heidegger misses Nietzsche's turn away from this metaphysical distinction, and instead, and even like Heidegger, thinks a Being which is informed by and transforms with beings, in interplay between that which appears and that which disappears in existing.

Heidegger's somewhat opaque charge brings me to my third task in this section, which will be to explore what Heidegger means by the 'refusal of the truth of Being', which Heidegger will also call nihilism, as well to as provide an account of why Nietzsche's will to power implies such a refusal. As stated in my introduction, the relation between Nietzsche's thinking and nihilism itself stems from Heidegger's own interpretation of Nietzsche. I will evaluate

¹⁰¹ N3, 154-5. Also, Heidegger writes that the abandonment of Being “consists in the fact that the revealing of Being as such remains in default.” (N3, 155).
Heidegger's adequation laid out in this section—that the will to power is knowledge—as we turn to Heidegger's charge against Nietzsche's philosophy as entangled with a nihilistic worldview.

The Problem of Nihilism

Heidegger writes, "Nietzsche's metaphysics is nihilistic insofar as it is value thinking, and insofar as the latter is grounded in will to power as the principle of all valuation."\(^1\) We have seen how Heidegger considers Nietzsche's will to power to be metaphysical elucidation, in that it posits a distinction between sensible and supersensible realms, by purporting a permanence of a force which seeks preservation and enhancement of life as prescribed by a subjectivist, biological knowledge which cannot be contradicted. More generally, Heidegger claims, "Metaphysics as metaphysics is nihilism proper."\(^2\) This means that even Plato is a nihilist. For Heidegger, what is concealed in Plato comes to appearance in Nietzsche. Heidegger writes, "The essence of nihilism is the history where there's nothing left of the Being" and "[I]n this [nihilistic] metaphysics, there is nothing to Being."\(^3\) Both Nietzsche and Heidegger explicitly write against nihilism, and though they may invoke different specific examples of this term, each abide definitions which amount to 'the essence of existing is ignored'.\(^4\) But for Heidegger, Nietzsche's thinking is a classically nihilistic knowledge because the will to power "conceals the truth of the Being of beings."\(^5\) Heidegger defines 'classical nihilism' as that which must "unwittingly put itself on extreme guard against knowledge of its innermost essence."\(^6\)

Heidegger ropes Nietzsche's thinking in with the epoch of enframing, which is characterized by nihilism. The danger of enframing is the trick that ordering is the sole means of

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\(^1\) Heidegger, N4, 204.
\(^2\) Heidegger, N4, 205. Cf. Also Heidegger, “Nietzsche's Word”: “In its essence...metaphysics is nihilism.” (in the Off the Beaten Track, edited and translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, 198)
\(^3\) Heidegger, N4, 203-4, 208 n3.
\(^4\) Nietzsche, GM 2.12 p.515.
\(^5\) Heidegger, N4, 855.
\(^6\) Ibid. 855.
revealing, or to say in other words, that knowledge is the only or privileged way of thinking being.\textsuperscript{109} We have called this process of enframing, by which calculation, manipulation, utility are prized modes of relating to the world, technologization. Rather than focus on metaphysics or not, Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche can also be cloaked in these other terms. Namely, for Heidegger, Nietzsche's thinking of the essence of beings, as will to power, is a technologization of Being. I have already stated at length why this interpretation of Nietzsche is unfair. But let us look again briefly at Heidegger's charges.

Heidegger breaks 'will to power' into its constituent parts to analyze the term at large. Early in his lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger agrees with Nietzsche that willing overcomes itself.\textsuperscript{110} 'Overcoming' here suggests an element to willing which is beyond intention, and not synonymous with utility. But by the fourth lecture in the series, Heidegger pronounces that 'power', in will to power, is in its essence, always an increase in power.\textsuperscript{111} Notice the shift from 'overcoming' to 'overpowering'. By equating will to power with knowledge, Heidegger seems to privilege power over will in Nietzsche's 'essential force' and seems to reduce the entire phrase to power alone. By his fourth volume of \textit{Nietzsche} lectures, Heidegger writes, "will to power means the accruing of power by power for its own overpowering."\textsuperscript{112} He continues, "power and only power posits values, validates them, and makes decisions about the possible justifications of a valuation."\textsuperscript{113} Here, especially, we see how knowledge—defined by Heidegger as a know-how, regarding the preservation and enhancement of beings, seems nearly synonymous with 'power', defined here as a posited validation and decisions on justifications.

\textsuperscript{109} Cf. Heidegger, \textit{QCT}, 337.
\textsuperscript{110} Heidegger, N1, 136.
\textsuperscript{111} Heidegger, N4 851.
\textsuperscript{112} Heidegger, N4, 852.
\textsuperscript{113} Heidegger, N4, 852.
Heidegger's definition of power as 'always an increase in power', the transmutation of the will to power is NOT synonymous with increase. To suggest that will to power 'always increases' is to already presuppose a permanence, i.e., that there exists an eternal ('always') continuity in time and, as though from a static (metaphysical) position from outside of it, such that metrics may be adduced as to 'less' and 'more'. For example, that a river flows (transmutes) need not mean that a river will always do anything. Neither must a river's transmutation be adduced from a stationary position from outside it—whether from a bank, or from within it. On the contrary, that a river's flow increases bespeaks a stationary observation from outside the river itself, or from within it, as a 'thing' distinct from its current. This is to suggest that Heidegger could have rightly concluded will to power entails a metaphysical position only if will to power indeed is synonymous with 'increase' (and even if this means power, so be it; will to power is not simply power). But will to power is not simply an increase; it is more a transmutation. Nietzsche's praise of some thinkers and criticism of others is founded on this commitment to transmutation—that is, his preference in philosophical thinking is expressed by one's willingness to embrace a will to power as transmutation.

Knowledge, as Heidegger defines it, is synonymous with the 'securing and enhancing of power' in this way of 'increase'. But, as I will demonstrate in my following sections, Nietzsche's will to power is not reducible to power-as-utility or knowledge (what I am calling 'consciousness') and, therefore, does not share the same presupposition of permanence that Heidegger's notion of 'power' or 'will to power as knowledge' have. Yes, Heidegger's 'will-to-will' places emphasis on power to “establish and secure” itself toward “enhancement-
preservation.”\textsuperscript{114} But will-to-will is an inadequate interpretation of will to power. Will-to-will overlooks the excessiveness of will to power as an interplay of forces which move in the way that they must. All intents and purposes are but vain pretexts which come after-the-fact. Heidegger's privilege of power in the whole equation turns will to power into a motor for enframing.

In his illuminating article, “Heidegger, Nietzsche, and the Origins of Nihilism,” Dan Conway argues that the origin of nihilism is consciousness and the value systems which privilege consciousness over other ways of thinking.\textsuperscript{115} This is a common theme running through Nietzsche's '86-'88 works. Conway takes Nietzsche's description of 'will' in Genealogy of Morals: "the basic fact of the human will is its horror vacui: it needs a goal—and it would rather will nothingness than not will."\textsuperscript{116} For Conway, the emptiness of the will, and our horror over its 'empty space' leads beings to posit a goal in the form of the ascetic ideal.\textsuperscript{117} But this is not to mean that the will must be necessarily linked to consciousness. Rather, the fear or horror over the empty vacuity of the will is the aspect of the will which is consciousness itself. Conway writes the 'horror vacui' "originates in the conviction that the suffering endemic to human existence requires a justification, lest this suffering, if meaningless, constitute a mortal objection to life itself."\textsuperscript{118} But if this 'horror' originates in a conviction, is the 'basic fact of the will' a conscious demand: a demand for justification which is made manifest as a 'conscious' confrontation with suffering? Without aligning the 'basic fact of the will' with consciousness, we can follow suit with Nietzsche's vociferous criticisms against this sickly organ of consciousness. Instead, let us see

\textsuperscript{114} Cf. Heidegger, N3, 197.
\textsuperscript{115} Cf. Conway, 26: Diagnosis of the origin of nihilism as "the human animal's consciousness its own mortality." Also 28. I disagree with Conway's account of Nietzsche as a subjectivist, at least insofar as Nietzsche undermined the notion of 'subject' and does not fit Heidegger's term of 'subjectivist' because Nietzsche embraced the excessive and unconscious aspects of value and perspective. Also, in his footnote 11, Conway makes a distinction between essence and meaning, saying Nietzsche is concerned with meaning. But I think Nietzsche dissolves this distinction (GM 3.23).
\textsuperscript{116} Nietzsche, GM 3.1.
\textsuperscript{117} Conway, 27. Cf. Also Nietzsche, GS #355, on how fear is the origin of the concept of knowledge.
\textsuperscript{118} Conway, 26.
that 'the basic fact of the will' is that it is empty, and this emptiness refers not to meaninglessness, but rather, of unintelligibility or pre- or un-consciousness. The drive to supply and thereby control the meaning of suffering (a conscious value) originates in the emptiness of the will (a largely unconscious value). Reading Nietzsche's aphorism thusly, we find that the need for justification is not a necessary or basic aspect of the will, but rather a consequence of a more basic and unconscious cause.

If we credit that nihilism evolves out of consciousness, nihilism is not the necessary culmination of will to power. Knowledge [Erkenntnis] shares the relevant features of consciousness insofar as they relate to the 'securing and enhancing of power [Macht]' (Heidegger's definition). The historical fact that consciousness increasingly becomes the primary way of thinking for societal enhancement-preservation is not a necessary development of the will to power. There are other ways of thinking that are even more beneficial to the flourishing of (human) beings.

If will to power is the energetic 'essence of existence', it is not more responsible for nihilism than for all that is. If nihilism is what comes to dominate western culture, as Heidegger remarks, then this could surely be a will to power at work. This is to say, nihilism need not have evolved from Nietzsche's philosophy. Indeed, it is only by interpreting Nietzsche inadequately—and equating the will to power with consciousness and knowledge—that nihilism as a logic is consummated. Heidegger's charge of Nietzsche's 'nihilism' works only because Heidegger transforms Nietzsche's will to power into a mostly conscious 'will-to-will.' In doing so, Heidegger misrepresents how, for Nietzsche, will to power includes other, even unconscious, ways of thinking. Unconscious ways of thinking matter to the philosophical question of where values come from as it amounts to values which are already present in the world and in existence—that is, they are unchosen or unknown to any existant, they aren't imposed on existence.
Heidegger is a deft enough reader to understand that the will to power is not becoming toward a goal, but rather a principle of animation. As much as Heidegger claims to disavow the goal, he slips it in, writing, will to power is the “empowering for overpowering.” The 'for' ascribes a teleological judgment to an otherwise adjectival description. Especially for Nietzsche, the philosopher who declares the 'death of God', teleology, the articulation of and even commitment to a goal or purpose, is a problem of consciousness. But will to power is for Nietzsche also a matter of unconsciousness.

If the will to power is also unconscious, then how can it be said to resemble a tool—which is as such because of a conscious knowledge of its purpose. Though it is true that one of Heidegger’s greatest insights (in Being and Time) is into how little conscious thought or knowledge goes into tool usage or understanding, it is not this insight which he builds upon to declaim a prevailing “tool-mindedness” of nihilism. For Heidegger's critique of nihilism—an epoch of “tool-mindedness”—it is conscious, teleological determination makes a tool what it is—meaningful if it achieves the purpose of its design or of its user. But Nietzsche's thinking of the essence of existing is very different than this association with purpose and function. The tool-mindedness that Heidegger finds to be a necessary conclusion of Nietzsche's philosophy is instead only the logical extension of Heidegger's own hasty interpretation of the will to power as knowledge, and a knowledge that seems very much like 'consciousness' at that.

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119 Heidegger, N3, 197.
120 Heidegger, N3, 197.
121 Cf. Gemes, The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, Edited by Ken Gemes, John Richardson. There is a scholarly debate on how to distinguish 'Kraft' and 'Macht', which are often translated as, respectively, force and power. Some suggest that 'Kraft' is a power without 'knowledge', and contrast the two: distinguishing between force, an undifferentiated potentiality, and power, its creative actualization. This discussion could be very significant, especially if we emphasize how Nietzsche might at times describe Kraft as the check on permanence. I have decided to bracket this aspect of the examination because, even crediting Heidegger's definition of 'power', the argument that will to power is the same as power is not supported. Again, "purposes and utilities are only signs that a will to power has become master of something less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a function..." (Nietzsche, GM 2.12., (see earlier cite, 177).)
There are different knowledges, even for Heidegger. In his first volume of *Nietzsche* lectures, he defines, for example, *techne*, i.e., a knowledge that guides procedures and modes of bringing-forth.\(^{123}\) He writes on the relationship of this knowledge to others:

> “If man tries to win a foothold and establish himself among the beings (*physis*) to which he is exposed, if he proceeds to master beings in this or that way, then his advance against beings is borne and guided by a knowledge of them. Such knowledge is called *techne*. From the very outset the word is not, and never is, the designation of a "making" and a producing; rather, it designates that knowledge which supports and conducts every human irruption into the midst of beings. For that reason *techne* is often the word for human knowledge without qualification. The kind of knowledge that guides and grounds confrontation with and mastery over beings.”\(^{124}\)

Here we see that *techne* is what grounds and guides a different sort of power-knowledge [*Erkenntnis*]; first, there is *techne*—that which supports and conducts 'every human irruption' and constitutes a knowledge of beings, secondly, should one 'advance against beings' or attempt to master them, there a different sort of knowledge toward mastery. Similarly then, to Heidegger, *Nietzsche* too writes of different ways of thinking and knowing. *Nietzsche*’s ownmost explanatory supposition, will to power, might deign to describe a thinking and knowing like *techne* but it cannot be exhausted simply by power-knowledge.

As we have learned in our introduction to this section, 'enframing' (*Gestell*) is a term

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\(^{123}\) Heidegger, N1, 82.
\(^{124}\) Heidegger, N1, 81.
Heidegger uses in "Question Concerning Technology" (1953) to describe the demand of technological thinking which turns being into an instrument which has no meaning other than that which maximizes its efficacy. Though “Question” is written much later than the Nielsen lectures, their conceptual overlap is abundant. For example, Heidegger defines 'enframing' as the instrumentalization of being, into "standing-reserve" (Bestand) and, ultimately, a passive mode of existence—as though being is a tool to be used, at best, in an orderly way.\footnote{Cf. also Heidegger, NW, 103, for 'standing reserve'.}

Iain Thomson makes the link between the age of enframing (Gestell) and Nietzsche. This link is only hinted at by Heidegger, in references to 'standing-reserve' (Bestand) in Heidegger's essay “Nietzsche's Word,” and Question Concerning Technology, and a translator's footnote which meekly suggests a parallel between will to power and enframing, and writes, “In keeping with this, Heidegger's discussion of man under the dominion of the will to power has a close parallel in his discussion of the rule of enframing in the modern age.”\footnote{Heidegger, NW., p. 84} Otherwise, Heidegger couches his acknowledgement of the Nietzsche-technologization complex in the fugal poetry of Contributions. In “Nietzsche's Word,” Heidegger describes the rule of enframing,

“The world changes into an object. In this revolutionary objectifying of everything that is, the earth, that which first of all must be put at the disposal of representing and setting forth, moves into the midst of human positing and analyzing. The earth itself can show itself only as the object of assault, an assault that, in human willing, establishes itself as unconditional objectification. Nature appears everywhere—because willed from out of the essence of
Being—as the object of technology.”

Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's will to power as just this sort of objectifying and representing relation, and one driven toward positing and analyzing values toward the preservation and enhancement of a biological concept of life. Thus, we find in Heidegger's Nietzsche, the 'disposal' of the earth, as the 'object of assault' through 'unconditional objectification'. Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche's 'biological' knowledge is echoed in Heidegger's charge that, in enframing, 'nature appears everywhere'; for Heidegger, Nietzsche posits a 'law of contradiction' concerning biological knowledge and life, as will to power, and so sets forth a willed nature which is the 'object of technology'. I have argued here and will show in the forthcoming two chapters how Nietzsche's nature is not biological, nor is it an object, nor is it 'nothing' unless manipulated by power-as-utility. Instead, Nietzsche's nature is irrational, transformational, dynamic, and inexhaustibly meaningful.

If we take 'enframing' as a term which relates to Heidegger's characterization of Nietzsche's philosophy, we see how, for Heidegger, Nietzsche's thinking is entangled in nihilism and responsible for the late-modern technologization of being. Now, a philosophy or politics wherein 'power'—whether defined specifically from the work of Nietzsche, or others, like Foucault—singly describes the force responsible for all events in the cosmos might provide a fitting example of Heidegger's technologized worldview. Why? If power indeed means the drive for overpowering and gaining more power, a philosophy of power would provide a very mechanical and metaphysical description of the universe and its workings—in terms like 'always', 'as a whole', 'as such'. But, Nietzsche's philosophy is not so power-driven, as he offers critiques of power-as-utility and explicitly criticizes a mechanical understanding of the world as being
nihilistic, thereby distancing himself from at least this aspect of nihilism. Instead, for Nietzsche, some aspects of existing push back against and resist reduction to utility. Nietzsche explicitly regales the unuseful, irrational, unconscious aspects of will to power; Nietzsche is a philosopher who champions different ways of thinking. Further, I find it ludicrous that Heidegger misses this. During his delivery of the Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger is drafting his "Origin" essay, which describes the truth or essence of beings as this very tension between different ways of thinking/being (Heidegger dubs it 'earth-world tension'). More likely, it seems as though Heidegger forges these charges against Nietzsche to draw a distinction between Nietzsche's and Heidegger's own work. 

Nietzsche is not a nihilist in his own terms. How is it that Heidegger levels this very charge of nihilism against one of its most vociferous critics? Heidegger claims that Nietzsche is unaware of the metaphysical presuppositions of his own philosophy, namely that to espouse the will to power as the 'essence of beings' unwittingly entangles Nietzsche in the consummation of nihilistic logic.

From nearly the last line of Heidegger's third volume of Nietzsche:

"'Nietzsche's metaphysics," that is to say, the truth of beings as such and as a whole, which has now been preserved in words derived from his fundamental position, is the fundamental trait of the history of our age, which is inaugurating itself only now in its

128 Nietzsche, GS #373.
129 Nietzsche describes nihilism as 1) conceding a predetermined existence 2) proclaiming existence is infinitely malleable. Ibid.
130 Rather than mince nihilism into either an historical epoch or a logic, as, for example, Dan Conway does in his article, Heidegger dissolves the distinction and claims that the former always relies upon the latter. Conway, Heidegger, Nietzsche, and the Origins of Nihilism.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies. No. 3, Nietzsche/Heidegger, Spring 1992. pp. 11-43.
incipient consummation as the age of modernity...[citing Nietzsche's note:] "The time is coming when the struggle for dominion over the earth will be carried on — it will be carried on in the name of fundamental philosophical doctrines" (XII, 207). That is not to say, however, that the struggle for unrestrained exploitation of the earth as a source of raw materials or the cynical utilization of "human resources" in service to the absolute empowering of will to power will explicitly appeal to philosophy for help in grounding its essence, or even will adopt philosophy as its facade. On the contrary, we must presume that philosophy will disappear as a doctrine and a construct of culture, and that it can disappear only because as long as it was genuine it identified the actuality of the actual, that is, Being, on the basis of which every individual being is designated to be what it is and how it is."

Heidegger's characterization of Nietzsche's thinking seems more like it was torn from the headlines of a 1938 newspaper: "the struggle for unrestrained exploitation of the earth as a source of raw materials or the cynical utilization of "human resources" in service to the absolute empowering of will to power." How Nietzsche became in favor of 'unrestrained exploitation' or 'cynical utilization' for 'absolute empowering' is beyond my ability to read Nietzsche's own words. The degree of variance of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche suggests another motive to Heidegger's position on Nietzsche than perspicuous philosophical interpretation. I can but suggest the following, as proving my suggestion lies outside the scope of this work: Heidegger used

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131 Heidegger, N3, 200. Cf. Also Thomson, HAP 202 for more on how Nietzsche's ontotheology leads to an "unrestrained exploitation" of the earth as raw materials.
Nietzsche as an emblem for where Heidegger saw German political and philosophical thinking on its way—toward the age of enframing. Rather than highlight Nietzsche's thinking post-turn, which shares many themes and even metaphysical presuppositions with Heidegger's own post-

*Kehre* work, Heidegger instead built a prescient contemporary critique of German values on a bogey of Nietzsche which Heidegger created through cherry-picked notes.

Iain Thomson argued in his brilliant *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, that what typifies Heidegger's *Kehre* was a new insight on nihilation, as that which exceeds the ontological difference between being and entities.\(^{132}\) For Thomson, Heidegger learned to encounter noth-ing differently; not as an absence of presence, which is a substance-based way of relating to things, but rather, as an absencing and presencing of that which is un/concealed.\(^{133}\) Heidegger abandons Nietzsche's turn which incorporated precisely this insight. In other words, Heidegger makes his philosophical turn at the expense of Nietzsche's turn. Nietzsche's turn can be summarized as acknowledging that existence is not meaningless but richer in meaning than can be conceived.

Thomson writes on Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's thinking of beings as "nothing but intrinsically meaningless resources awaiting optimization" as meaningless forces combining with no other end but self-augmentation.\(^{134}\) But for Nietzsche, beings are not intrinsically meaningless; not just the teleology of beings, but the essence and truth of existing is provisional and not predetermined, yet existing is already overabundantly meaningful. 'No other end by self-augmentation' implies only conscious knowledges, but Nietzsche regales many ways of thinking as part of the will to power. Valuation is excessive of subjectivist or biological knowledges and largely unconscious, and perspective is not simply consciousness. Nietzsche's

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\(^{133}\) Thomson, HAP, 217.

\(^{134}\) Thomson, HAP 217. Cf. Also Thomson, 211.
philosophical drive is not for optimization of beings, but for a re-examined truth and essence of existing. In this same text, Thomson expertly examines Heidegger's critique of aestheticization in art as a form of technologized thinking.\textsuperscript{135} This technologization is precisely what Heidegger does to Nietzsche's will to power.

I have, in this chapter, set out what Heidegger means by charging Nietzsche's as a metaphysical thinking, and that Nietzsche's will to power entails a knowledge of permanence and purpose which ascribes to a biological compulsion, and further, how Nietzsche's thinking of will to power leads to nihilism. This knowledge, which Heidegger claims Nietzsche's will to power constitutes, I find bears great resemblance to consciousness. Though this section was suffused with my arguments against Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche on this point, in the following sections, I will examine more closely what will to power means in Nietzsche's own writing to offer a direct refutation to Heidegger's mischaracterization of Nietzsche's nihilism.

\textsuperscript{135} Thomson, HAP, 211.
CHAPTER THREE: INTERMISSION TO NIETZSCHE

In this second chapter, I examine what I am calling Nietzsche's “turn.” I use this language to invoke Heidegger's own well-documented turn (Kehre) and also to show that Nietzsche turned or shifted his philosophical thinking on the 'essence of existence'—which he often refers to as will to power. In Nietzsche's early writing, pre-Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche often exhibits the presupposition of what he calls “romantic pessimism.” My first section on Nietzsche's turn will 1) explain what romantic pessimism is, 2) using Nietzsche's own writing, apply Nietzsche's definition of romantic pessimism to some philosophical concepts proposed by Kant, 3) analyze how Nietzsche's own early writing exhibits these conditions of romantic pessimism, and finally 4) evaluate how Nietzsche's post-Zarathustra writings escape romantic pessimism.

The third chapter of my examination on Nietzsche's will to power will demonstrate how, for Nietzsche, the will to power is not a knowing that knows permanence nor purpose. Recall from my first chapter how Heidegger's definition of knowledge—in his works which associate the will to power as knowledge—is a thinking/existing that knows permanence and purpose. Nietzsche will refer to this “knowing that knows permanence and purpose” as consciousness and will rail against the reduction of will to power to a definition of consciousness. This is important to consider since it is Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power which reduces will to power to a “knowing that knows permanence and purpose.” I will examine Nietzsche's
objections to such reductions in order to supply a direct refutation of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power as such knowledge.
CHAPTER FOUR: 
NIETZSCHE’S TURN


Nietzsche writes a preface to *The Gay Science* in 1886, four years after its first four books were in print. In this address, he explains that he has *been ill* and is *in recovery*. What was the nature of his illness? He attests to symptoms of nausea wrought from seclusion and contempt for humanity—he diagnoses himself as having suffered from “romanticism.”\(^{136}\) Nietzsche then warns that not only will he henceforth vent his malice on the sort of lyrical romantic sentimentalism from which he suffered, and, that by the end of the book, a tragedy will begin. Nietzsche then undertakes to write an additional fifth book to the corpus, thereby providing a *new* end. In departure from his previous romantic excursions of the initial four books of *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche finds a new 'birth of tragedy'\(^{137}\) by book five, which he added in 1887—a year after the above-referenced preface. I wish to trace how these claims—of convalescence and 'incipient tragedy', are related, and further, how the tragedy to which Nietzsche alludes in his 1886 preface, is related to the 'romantic' sickness or the 'beginning' of his convalescence.

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136 Nietzsche, Friederich. *The Gay Science*. “Preface,” Pt. 1, p.4. He notes that should anyone re-experience such an illness, the invalid “would pardon even more than a bit of foolishness...'gay science'.”

137 This 'new birth' contradicts and offers a replacement to his assertions in the 1872 *The Birth of Tragedy*, when he located a rebirth of tragedy in the work of Richard Wagner. Indeed, by 1882 and the initial publication of books 1-4 of *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche is still under the sway of the illness of his *Birth of Tragedy* assertions. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, it is not until after his work on *Zarathustra* and *Beyond Good and Evil* that he is able to recover and pose a new (and different) tragedy.
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche proclaims, in at least two different points, the beginning of
tragedy: once, at the conclusion of book four and in reference to Zarathustra's 'going under'
(_Untergang_)\(^{138}\); and the second, in the penultimate aphorism of book five, after his description of
the emergent 'superhuman' (_überschmückten_) who incarnates as parody to usher in a new
destiny with 'great seriousness' (_große Ernst_)\(^{139}\). Is the 'great seriousness' that which is exhibited
by the legislator of values who is prepared to become a god to be worthy of the deicide she
committed?\(^{140}\) In other words, for Nietzsche, is it this 'going under' and 'great seriousness' that
befit Nietzsche's ideal of health, or are they part of the sickness of romanticism? Through
Nietzsche's work, we find a philosophical transformation occur involving these two tragedies—
one marked by 'going under'--a decline in health and altitude—and the other, by a 'great health'
and an ascent to the highest peak.\(^{141}\) The transition between the two, from descent to its
apotheosis, parallel Nietzsche's turn away from illness toward convalescence. Though he begins
_The Gay Science_ with aphorisms entrenched in the sentimentalism and epistemological
presuppositions he explicitly seeks to destroy, to Nietzsche's credit, by the later publication of
book five of _The Gay Science_ (indeed, after extensive work on different projects, i.e. _Zarathustra_
(1883-5) and _Beyond Good and Evil_ (1886)), he foresees what he in this later work calls
'romantic pessimism'--the illness to which the first and original books of _The Gay Science_ are
indebted. My chapter addresses this transformation which Nietzsche undertakes, a sort of self-
reflective criticism-as-convalescence, with specific emphasis on his treatment of 'nature'. In
grappling with and improving upon his concept of nature (from thinking nature as valueless to,
instead, adopting a position of nature as value-laden)--a move which he calls 'tragic', Nietzsche

\(^{140}\) Ibid. Book three. “The madman” #125. p. 119-120.
\(^{141}\) Nietzsche describes those who are 'dangerously healthy' to attain “such vistas” that they are no longer satisfied with that which lies below. (_The Gay Science_ book five, “The great health” #382, p.247).
proves himself to be the very 'philosophical physician' for whom he claims to be waiting.\textsuperscript{142}

For Nietzsche, what is at stake in philosophy is not truth, but good health.\textsuperscript{143} Nietzsche's pathology of 'romanticism' presents as a “craving for Apart, Beyond, Outside, Above...cloaks of the objective...no more than an interpretation of the body and a misunderstanding of the body [Missverständniss des Leibes].”\textsuperscript{144} This philosophical 'misunderstanding' chiefly concerns a neglect of the inextricable relation between one's value judgments and one's physical constitution.\textsuperscript{145} Nietzsche writes, “Behind the highest value judgments that have hitherto guided the history of thought are concealed misunderstandings of the physical constitution...the question about the value of existence, may always be considered first of all as symptoms of certain bodies...”\textsuperscript{146} He admits to having previously borne this misunderstanding and explains how he passed through it—by explicitly linking illness of the body to illness of philosophy.\textsuperscript{147} Crediting Dr. Nietzsche's diagnosis, I will demonstrate how Nietzsche begins his Gay Science sharing certain romantic strains of thought with those figures from whom he explicitly wishes to distance himself, and then, show how he, passing through the bogeys of romantic misunderstanding, recovers his health—which plays out in specific reference to his understanding of how the value of existence is a symptom of the health of a body. We will see how the body itself transforms in his turn to a philosophical position on nature as value-laden.

How is 'nature' related to a body? Is the 'nature of the body' a biological nature? Not for Nietzsche. Even in early books of GS (III), Nietzsche remands the condition of the body, or the

\textsuperscript{142} Nietzsche. \textit{The Gay Science}. Preface, Pt. 2, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{143} Nietzsche. \textit{The Gay Science}. Preface, Pt. 2, p. 6. Heidegger, among others, criticizes Nietzsche's development—which revives a philosophical focus on health rather than on truth—as a metaphysical equivocation. In other words, what makes 'good health' intelligible is an ontotheological (i.e., metaphysical) notion of 'good' and 'health' and so is itself a thinly veiled 'will to truth'.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., Pt. 2, p.5.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} “A philosopher who has passed through many kinds of health...has passed through an equal number of philosophies...” (Ibid., Pt. 3, p.6.)
The concept of bodily health, to the “ideals and phantasms of the soul.” The nature of the body is linked to the soul. What sort of soul, or body, can think the idea of nature as valueless as opposed to value-laden? We will see how Nietzsche's description of life-denial characterizes the ideals and phantasms of the soul that can think of a valueless nature.

How does one know what is to be considered sickness or health? Nietzsche addresses the radically relative definition of health:

“[T]here are innumerable healths of the body; and the more one allows the particular and incomparable to rear its head again, the more one unlearns the dogma of the 'equality of men', the more the concept of a normal health, along with those of a normal diet and normal course of an illness, must be abandoned by our medical men.”

'Health' is not a term to be normalized or which can constitute a standard of equivalence by which one is to be measured against another. 'Health' is instead is defined in a highly particular manner, which is 'incomparable'—that is, unable to be a term of comparison.

And so how, then, is health to be determined? Nietzsche himself declared himself in poor health and surmised a process to better health. Here, we follow his aphorism further: “Only then would it be timely to reflect on the health and illness of the soul and to locate the virtue peculiar to each man in its health—which of course could look in one person like the opposite of health in another.” Health is not a biological determination. This is not to suggest that Nietzsche is unconcerned in the flesh and bone—the biological matter—of a body in his discussion of health.

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148 Ibid., Bk. 3, 120, p. 117.
149 Ibid., Bk 3, 120, p.117.
150 Ibid.
More clearly, Nietzsche is resisting the 'normalization' and dogmas of “biological science” and “medical men” which make universal and static claims about what health must look like for everyone.

Nietzsche concludes this revelatory and foundational aphorism on health by undercutting any certainty in his own suppositions, asking whether this sort of 'will to health' “is not a prejudice, a cowardice and a piece of most refined barbarism and backwardness.”151 Perhaps Nietzsche ends by becoming comfortable with the distress, or barbarism his own thinking may propose to the world, in terms of his development of a concept of fitness.

Echoing the narrative of Zarathustra, Nietzsche describes his convalescence as a descent (Untergang).152 The romantic pessimist bears what Nietzsche calls a 'misunderstanding of the body' which presents as a yearning for heights--'apart, beyond, outside, above'. By contrast, the healthy body—who Nietzsche describes as the 'Dionysian pessimist'—seeks a new depth which, ironically, arrives as the greatest height. This depth, a profundity, is also what is most grounded, and comes at the level of a body, rather than 'apart, beyond, outside, above' it. What is it that comes at the level of a body rather than 'apart, beyond, outside, above' it? For Nietzsche, this is will to power. In his convalescence, Nietzsche affirms a profound overabundance within the depth of the surface; the 'depth of the surface', what is most grounded, at level with, a body: the will to power.

This is not to simply equate body (Leibe) with will to power, nor with perspective. We can certainly, though, note how 'perspective' emanates from out a body. Nietzsche only uses this word, 'perspective' in two aphorisms from the beginning books of Gay Science—1 (13) and 3

151 Ibid.
152 Ibid., Pt. 3, p.6: “Only great pain...forces us philosophers to descend into our ultimate depths and put aside all trust...”; As for Zarathustra, I reference the vocation to teach the eternal recurrence which calls Zarathustra down from his mountain. Indeed, we may find that the eternal recurrence is key to Nietzsche's conception of how to convalesce toward good health.
(233). He does use it in his *Nachlass* throughout '84 to '86. The closest explicit denotative similarity I can find is in his *Nachlass* from '85: “er hat die Verkleinerung der Perspective, den „Egoismus“ nöthig, als zeitweilige Existenz-Bedingung” he has the diminution of perspectives, "egoism," as a temporary condition of existence\(^{153}\)

There is a relationship between will to power and the fitness of a body. Simply, a body is fit if it connects to its will to power. The means of connection between a body and will to power is perspective. Perspective, for Nietzsche, is the condition for life and that which supplies—from *inside* rather than from 'apart, beyond, outside, above'--the complex and excessive quality or *values* of this life—its concomitant abysses and peaks.\(^{154}\) Perspective is *both* a principle of individuation, as perspective accounts for an individual's will to power (*Wille zur Macht*)—unique in its manifest for each living difference--and is also a mark of belonging to others, a symptom of one's herd—the familial, familiar point of view.\(^{155}\) The will-to-power is not consciousness. As will be demonstrated, unlike Kant, who demands a self-subjection and obedience to supersensible universals (whether via intellectual categories or moral imperative), Nietzsche finds a 'play of forces' in one's relation to the world and to oneself as irreducible to consciousness or universal ideas. The will-to-power is combination of obedience and command of such forces.\(^{156}\) For Nietzsche, will-to-power is the principle of individuation—obedience and command of it takes place in the individual as perspective, and is expressed by the individual to

\(^{153}\) *NF-1885.35[68]* — Nachgelassene Fragmente Mai–Juli 1885.

\(^{154}\) Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*. “Preface,” p.2. Here also we find 'perspective' described in relation to the orientation or stance of a body: “[Speaking of Plato,] To be sure, it meant standing truth on her head and denying perspective, the basic condition of all life...”

\(^{155}\) C.f. *The Gay Science*, #348: ‘the faith in the proof is just a symptom’...of one's familial, familiar perspective, which is rooted in a body. Indeed, writing always bears a body's bloody mark (*Zarathustra*, pt. 1: write in blood)—at least insofar as our blood contains secrets and presuppositions that condition our declarative intention. Is this clear how the 'faith in the proof' is a matter of perspective?

\(^{156}\) Nietzsche. *Beyond Good and Evil*, #19. Please see the below section on Nietzsche's will-to-power for a more thorough discussion of this very significant Nietzschean term.
another through a herd-language.

The scope of this chapter cannot do justice to exploring the nature of Nietzsche's transformation toward convalescence: both Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, and The Gay Science (book five), allude to an affirmation of the eternal recurrence as key to a philosophical commitment to better health. It is not an unmotivated coincidence which finds the eternal recurrence as key to Heidegger's own Kehre, in his Nietzsche lectures in between his designation of will to power as art and then to knowledge. I will follow this present chapter with a description of the situation of a transformation in Heidegger's corpus very similar to, if not motivated by, the one I describe of Nietzsche's. But I can only humbly locate these transformations (or turns) rather than explicate the eternal recurrence itself, which is a lifework which may spawn from this study. Instead, in this chapter, I will locate Nietzsche's turn. To do so, I explain 1) how Kant's contemptuous brand of epistemological dualism (asserting a deep, irresolvable appearance versus reality distinction) is what Nietzsche describes as 'romantic pessimism'. I will first explain and then apply Nietzsche's terminology from book five of The Gay Science to typify Kant as befitting the term; 2) that Nietzsche suffers from this illness in the early books of The Gay Science. I use textual examples to demonstrate his 'Kantian' epistemological presuppositions and romantic-pessimistic preferences (which manifest as a defiant claim that fictions are preferred to reality, thereby still crediting an appearance-reality distinction); 3) show how by book five of The Gay Science Nietzsche plays a different tune by which prior dualisms dissolve in his affirmation of a coimplication of fiction and truth, such that a) neither are wholly separate from the other, and b) it becomes difficult if not impossible to distinguish between them; 4) finally, gesture briefly toward how his other writings inbetween the early books of The Gay Science and book five (Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil, and a new preface to The Birth of Tragedy) open Nietzsche to a cure—albeit one which requires life-long ingestion/application. By way of philosophical
affirmation, Nietzsche undertakes descent, 'Untergang', on the interminable road to recovery.  

Kant's Kant-temptuous Romance

Nietzsche briefly but succinctly defines pessimism as "the contempt for that existence which is knowable to us." Contempt of this sort can transform into a life-affirming vocation for ruthless criticism and a desire for 'destruction and change', but also, and for Nietzsche, more dangerously, as a nostalgia-laden resentment of, or resignation and submission to a contemptible existence. It is this latter combination of life-denying aptitudes which Nietzsche castigates as presupposed upon an epistemological dualism (asserting a deep, irresolvable appearance versus reality distinction), and for Nietzsche, a mascot—if not progenitor—of modern epistemological dualism is Immanuel Kant's philosophy. I will explain Nietzsche's association of Kant with epistemological dualism in what follows. The diagnosis of Kant, to which Nietzsche somewhat haphazardly commits to at this stage of his writing, is left undetermined in the earlier books of The Gay Science. Part of my project here is to illuminate, via immanent critique, the aspects of Nietzsche's own writing which relate to Kant (and, more so, to Nietzsche himself), in the earlier works of Nietzsche in order to highlight how Nietzsche overcomes the very same "Kantian" presuppositions that Nietzsche criticizes.

We find the clearest definition of the specific kind of pessimism--'romantic pessimism'--from which Kant suffers—at least according to Nietzsche's assault against Kantianism in other works and aphorisms, in The Gay Science, #370. Nietzsche begins this aphorism by admitting that, in earlier works of his, he had overlooked the distinct character of what is Kant's illness:

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157 This gesture, brief as it will be, sets up my starting point for further inquiry into the eternal recurrence.
158 Nietzsche, The Gay Science. #346 p.204. Cf. Also a meditation on this theme in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “The Great Contempt.”
159 Nietzsche may have had many reasons to focus his assault on the 'pessimistic epistemological dualism' in the work of Kant, instead of more thoroughly finding it in the thinking of his mentor, Arthur Schopenhauer.
romanticism. To explain, Nietzsche describes two types of suffering presupposed 'in the aid of a growing, struggling life'—those who suffer from a 'superabundance of life'—what he calls 'Dionysian'—and those who suffer from an 'impoverishment of life'—the 'romantic'. These latter sufferers are those who are bent on redeeming themselves for their suffering by establishing a sense of validation for it—whether through their 'art and insight' or through numbness and madness, and they require "mildness, peacefulness, goodness in thought and in deed...as well as logic...a fear-repelling narrowness and confinement to optimistic horizons." The needs as ascertained by Nietzsche of the romantic are instigated by a kind of poverty of spirit, impelled by those unable to confront existence as it really is, or to handle life and its opportunities in all that they can offer. The 'romantic pessimist' "takes revenge on all things by forcing, imprinting, branding his image on them, the image of his torture." Though Nietzsche emphasizes the personal pronoun ('his'), it should not be read as a heroic affirmation of perspective, but rather, a cowardly selfishness at work—the subsumption of the world in one's narrow field. This propensity to selfishness is why, for Nietzsche, the romantic imposes the values of mildness, narrowness, and confinement—in order to wish the poverty of themselves on others. The romantic pessimist wishes to submit the entire world to his own torturous legislates. Ultimately, Nietzsche draws a distinction between an impoverished romantic pessimism and the superabundance of Dionysian pessimism, which is full of "fertilizing forces capable of turning any desert into bountiful farmland." For Nietzsche, the Dionysian pessimist also suffers in

160 "You see that what I misjudged both in philosophical pessimism and in German music [here, referencing specifically Schopenhauer and Wagner] was what constitutes its actual character—its romanticism." (Nietzsche. The Gay Science, #370, p. 234.)
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid. p. 235.
163 Ibid., #370, p. 236. This language resounds with his earlier critique of Kant's selfish universalism, ("For it is selfish to consider one's own judgment a universal law..." (Nietzsche. The Gay Science. #335, p. 188); this is not the "innocent selfishness"of one who blossoms fearlessly— Nietzsche does cite Wagner in this aphorism (Ibid., #99, p98).)
164 Ibid. p. 235.
relation to 'a growing, struggling life', but from an exuberant, uncontrollable and also more uncertain relationship to life's bountiful and boundless shape.

Nietzsche uses two Latin adjectives to characterize this Dionysian pessimism, which he dubs the 'pessimism of the future': *proprium* and *ipsissimum* ('own' and 'ownmost'). Both of these terms hearken to (Aristotelian) principles of individuation. This is to suggest that Dionysian pessimism bespeaks a relation to what is precisely individuating in one's knowable experience. In other words, *Dionysian pessimism is a contempt for the sort of knowledge of the world which encumbers the individuating aspect of such knowledge*. It is here, in Nietzsche's association of Dionysian pessimism and one's ownmost individuation where we can see the relation between Dionysian pessimism and the *individuating* 'value of perspective'. This is not to say that Nietzsche's philosophical endorsement of Dionysian pessimism and assault against romantic pessimism is a purely epistemological discussion. But, for Nietzsche, the way one knows the world—both philosophically and psychologically—affects one's very being in the world. This is a point suggested by my earlier analyses of Heidegger's consonance with Nietzsche, and suffice it to say at this juncture that Nietzsche proposes a philosophy of convalescence, which involves an ontological commitment to change, becoming, and perspectival individuation, and which is founded on an epistemological notion of fitness—with respect to being-in-the-world with others. So let us first approach the epistemological framework of pessimism.

Indeed, Nietzsche characterizes both types of pessimism (romantic and Dionysian) with respect to the knower's relation to the knowledge of experience. Romantic pessimists *encumber the individuating aspect and relative 'value of perspective'* by submitting to or imposing an impersonal, universalized version of themself or typology of existence and, thereby, construct the world through devaluing any other's particular, excessive, and individuating perspective in favor of a unindividuated rule or axiom. For example, a romantic pessimist produces lamentation of
one's lover for 'the ideal one', or, debases another's moral compass for 'the categorical imperative'. For the romantic, the knowledge which one obtains, especially if in conflict or negotiation with another's, is treated as an imperfect privation to some 'objective' ideal, and is thus negated as epistemologically or ontologically relevant to 'a growing, struggling life'. The Dionysian pessimist, rather, affirms an excessive 'beyond'\(^{165}\) by which relations and constructions are value-laden, genealogically—i.e., through a play of forces, a personalized series of positions and articulated preferences that inform, inspire and transform the rules and axioms which intervene on personal decisions. This 'Dionysian' affirmation of universal-particular interplay preserves the responsibility endemic to an individuation achieved via perspective, i.e., it is Dionysian to account for perspective, which includes even the unintentional and relational values of existence; it is romantic to negate perspective—whether it be your own or other's in favor of the consecrated value of some objective value/s of existence. For the Dionysian, an individual is not simply 'subject to' an order outside it, but rather, participates in and changes all orders of intelligibility including 'the self', in ways which exceed intelligibility. Dionysian pessimism, too, seeks perfectionism, but not by using the coordinates which have been defined from an objective, impersonal, universalized point from nowhere. For example, the Dionysian pessimist laments if her lover is not conducive to her flourishing, or, if another's ethical compass leads another to self-sacrifice at the cost of another's health. In these examples and unlike the ones pertaining to the romantic, the standard of judgment is each one's ownmost own, and not a project, impersonal

\(^{165}\) Nietzsche uses the German *Jenseits* ('Beyond') in his title (Beyond Good and Evil). Interestingly, Hegel uses the term 'Jenseits' in both *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *The Science of Logic* to signify the work of the negative (from in-itself—infinite—to what consciousness makes of it—infinite). Here we find linguistic evidence to substantiate conceptual content that places Nietzsche's project in line with Hegel's, especially insofar as the “Beyond” relates to *Aufhebung*. A quick check on 'Nietzsche Source' brings up 23 uses of Hegel's most ownmost term in Nietzsche's *Nachlass*. For example, in references to “the family” and “morality,” in order to get 'beyond' the order of good/evil, it is the dogmatic order of morality/ family which must be superseded (i.e., without entirely obliterating the concept of, here, flourishing or kinship), so that a new form can persist. Invoking this Hegelian negativity as 'futurity' (Nietzsche's attempt to get 'beyond' bears the subtitle: “to a philosophy of the future”) might serve as a much better explication of 'nihilism'—if Nietzsche is to be ever correctly interpolated by this -ism.
universal.

In developing the distinction between Nietzsche's taxonomy of pessimisms, we find how 'tragedy' comes to mean very different things for the romantic or Dionysian pessimist. For the romantic, tragedy poses a threatening loss of autonomy which, in the wake of any self-determined and controlled valuation, confirms a meaninglessness of the world; but for the Dionysian, value obtains in the world despite a loss of autonomy or self-determination and control—and tragedy describes how beings are not yet ready to but also must come to terms with an overabundance of existence. Despite the term 'tragedy' here being woeful undefined with respect to Nietzsche's corpus, we might even begin to grasp Nietzsche's distinctions between pessimisms by using the term in a vernacular sense: in a 'tragic' event, a romantic thinks to have lost what she wanted or needed, and a Dionysian thinks instead, what will she now come to want or need. While 'romantic pessimism' attempts to carve the world out of one's ideal image, thereby making the world into a doppelganger of the self-same order of one's very own understanding of it, Nietzsche's Dionysian pessimism concedes to the world and its others that the superabundance of existence is too surprising to mirror our ideals as a self-same correspondence. And so, for Dionysian pessimism—in contempt of the limitation of our selfish and ideal canon of knowledge—one's 'ownmost' overabundance is treated as a unique and novel 'pregnancy' which carries the uncertainty of what is to come.166

By highlighting Nietzsche's criticism of romantic pessimism, I do not mean to downplay

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166 "[A]n overflowing energy pregnant with the future (my term for this is, as is known, 'Dionysian')" (Nietzsche. *The Gay Science*. #370, p. 235.)
its significance, which Nietzsche calls “the last great event in the fate of our culture.” Indeed, Nietzsche notes how Kant's initial move, in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, to regard our knowledge and its foundations as 'necessary fictions', bore strength and cleverness and had "broken open the cage." In his constructivist Copernican turn, Kant opens philosophy to perspective, but then, for Nietzsche, Kant selfishly and self-deceptively retreats back from this heroic escape to a transcendent universalism with metaphysical and moral categories and imperatives. Despite the prestige and prowess that Kantian thinking amounts to in even Nietzsche's philosophical tradition, it is laden with this harmful romantic pessimism.

Nietzsche's fictions: pick that mask that fits

In a register emblematic of Nietzsche's project to move 'beyond' moral imperatives, by book five of *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche asks, “Why do you not want to deceive?” Following Nietzsche, if we were to develop an ethical philosophy based on how life actually appears, it would best be 'aimed at semblance', and rife with error and simulation. Nietzsche explains that a philosophy whose foundation is instead aligned with a 'will to truth' in fact creates a separate world at the expense of the world of our experience, which is brimming with deception. Crusades against the deceptive character of life incited by a 'will to truth' could be “hostile to life and destructive.” It is here, in succor of this life-hostility, that Nietzsche places Kant. Now, Kant agrees that one must readily accept a sort of ontological deception (or at least, a metaphysical

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167 Nietzsche. *The Gay Science*. #370, p.236. The term “great event” can be cross-referenced to Zarathustra's “On Great Events,” where Zarathustra admits that he has “outgrown the belief in “great events” wherever there is much bellowing and smoke,” in favor of the “great events” of our “stillest hours,” by which “the inventors of new values (Werthen)” replace the traditional noisy barometer of greatness and become an “inaudible” fulcrum of the world. (Nietzsche. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. “On Great Events.” pt. 2, in *Portable Nietzsche*, pp.241-245.) It is here, when Zarathustra's shadow cries, 'It is high time to descend!', that we find an admission and parallel to Nietzsche's own recovery from romantic pessimism toward a 'descent' into Dionysian pessimism—which becomes Nietzsche's mature philosophy, taken up when I am calling post-Turn, as perspectivism.

168 Nietzsche. *The Gay Science*. #335, p. 188.


170 Ibid. “'Will to truth' – that could be a hidden will to death.”
presupposition) in order to philosophically understand or to ethically encounter life. For example, for Kant, there is no empirical knowledge possible of synthetic a priori; the 'subject' is a necessary and yet unprovable concept and so operates as a 'regulative fiction' for our understanding and reason to work as it does. But further, and abhorrent to Nietzsche, Kant surmises these 'regulative fictions' are universally binding on every being the same, such that these fictions prescribe and proscribe maxims which are then to regulate ethics and reality. As fictions regulate ethics and reality, Nietzsche finds in Kantian morality and philosophy a strange attitude of, at once, selfishness and self-submission to (mistakenly) universally imposed rules and categorical imperatives—against unique, individual, and relational events of experience.

In the article, “The Kantian Thing-In-Itself as A Philosophical Fiction,” Eva Schaper refers to Kant's use of 'heuristic fiction' as that which poses an 'as-if' method to investigation, “when confirmation of their veracity is in principle impossible.”\textsuperscript{171} As revealed in the title, Schaper argues that the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich) is also this sort of useful fiction, since it refers to “constructs which are not to be resolved into ingredients of the factual situation.”\textsuperscript{172} About such fictions, Kant “could say no more than that we proceed as if things-in-themselves really existed, as if they influenced us through their appearances, as if they constituted a structured, noumenal world. Such fictions are necessary in Kant's system to specify by limitation what we can know...”\textsuperscript{173} In Critique of Practical Reason, Kant himself claims that God, freedom, order, system—these 'ideas of reason' and 'regulative principles' are useful fictions: without being able to theoretically account for them, the 'practical' accounts of action require them.

Though this practical necessity may seem contrary to Schaper's claim that the truth of


\textsuperscript{172} Ibid. p.240.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., p.235.
such fictions are not empirically provable, Kant's argument—which Nietzsche dubs romantically pessimistic—is that certain useful fictions are necessary because experience (empirical reality) may only be understandable and therefore can only be a certain way. It is Kant's insistence on a universal form of epistemological intercession with the world which underscores his commitment to a necessary theoretical framework or fictional categories of being-in-the-world, like God, freedom, order, and system. But if we consider Schaper's classification of *a priori* and other Kantian heuristic fictions to 'as if', we can begin to follow Nietzsche's line of criticism of Kant, as performing an undefended reduction of being, motivated by a romantic pessimism. For example, one may consider phenomena *as if* there is order and systematicity; one may theorize morality *as if* there is freedom possible of an agent.¹⁷⁴ Likewise, in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, the subject as such cannot be proved but must be assumed ('as if') for the facts of theoretical knowledge to be sound (this is often referred to as Kant's 'transcendental argument'). In Schaper's words, the *a priori* principles of understanding and reason “are themselves possible only if we assume that what we can know is adapted or suited to the purposes of our knowing it.”¹⁷⁵ In an immanent critique of Kant, that is, in using Kant's transcendental argument noted above against his own conclusions, Schaper deftly highlights what, in Nietzsche's estimation, is Kant's philosophical shortcoming—that is, his rush to resolve the variability of perspectival ambiguity in his constructivist revolution and confirm that 'synthetic *a priori*' are universally necessary and binding as epistemological law for all knowers the same. Schaper explains, “[W]hat the argument

¹⁷⁴ “Consequently in this practical point of view their [(freedom, also God and immortality)] possibility must be assumed, although we cannot theoretically know and understand it. ...Here we have what, as far as speculative reason is concerned, is a merely subjective principle of assent, which, however, is objectively valid for a reason equally pure but practical, ...Nay, there is a subjective necessity (a need of pure reason) to assume them.” (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*; p.2; accessed on 10.10.13, at http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile?fk_files=3456149&pageno=2). Schaper notes Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, A5 (quoted here) and also A13-14. On this point, Nietzsche draws the reader's attention to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, B670, 799 (The Gay Science, # 344, p.200).

¹⁷⁵ Schaper, p. 242.
from experience to an explanatory hypothesis yields is that there are *a priori* presuppositions, not *which* presuppositions they are.”¹⁷⁶ For Schaper and Nietzsche, then, it is Kant who mistakenly (or romantically) proceeds to articulate which and which only heuristic fictions must be employed. In departure from Kant's 'selfish' universalism, Nietzsche is wont to invoke genealogical analysis to reveal such ill-conceived presuppositions in terms of social construction rather than metaphysical, transcendental reduction.¹⁷⁷ For Nietzsche, *a priori* presuppositions could manifest as variably as does perspective, and they are irreducibly tied to a complex and embedded world of perspectives.¹⁷⁸

Schaper, too, stresses Kant's own caveat, that his fictions must not calcify, like the silly facial expression which threatens to stay that way forever:

“[In the Dialectics of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant] holds explicitly [that] ideas of reason...are misused when they are hypostatized, and used legitimately only in their regulative capacity. The case for and against things-in-themselves is exactly parallel: only as limiting concepts are they ['ideas of reason'] useful; as thing-concepts they are seriously misleading.”¹⁷⁹

According to Nietzsche and Schaper, Kant did not pay just homage to his own warning, and created thing-concepts out of his 'as if' epistemological constructs by treating them as universal laws.

But both Kant and Nietzsche—at least at the initial writing of *The Gay Science* (1882)—

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¹⁷⁶  Ibid., 239; also, later: “Not *which* heuristic fictions must be employed, but *that* heuristic fictions must necessarily be employed, can be gained from Kant's transcendental argument.” p.241.
¹⁷⁷  See cite 26 above; Nietzsche. *The Gay Science*. #335, p. 188. Nietzsche's earlier critique of Kant's selfish universalism, (“For it is selfish to consider one's own judgment a universal law...” (Nietzsche. *The Gay Science*. #335, p. 188)
¹⁷⁹  Schaper, p. 241.
espouse an epistemological dualism accompanied with an ontological holism, which reveal the predilection for existence to appear as a lie.\textsuperscript{180} We have examined that charge in Kant's writing and, in what follows, I will show how we find this in Nietzsche's early writings as well. Yet even with these shared presuppositions, Nietzsche doggedly criticizes Kant. Why? Given the significance of 'useful fictions' in both Kantian and Nietzschean epistemology, and also keeping in mind how vociferously Nietzsche claimed to be at a distance from Kant, it is all the more clear that the attitude or style with which one uses these fictions is incredibly important for the philosophical upshot. To put the problematic a different way: how do these fictions work in the overall theory of knowledge? For Kant, they serve to privilege a 'pure' and yet unknowable realm over against the imperfect and messy phenomenal one of experience. For example, that the categorical imperative confirms whether an action is moral, and that the 'ideas of reason' are in play for a judgment of beauty. This privilege of the abstract, supersensible, and impossible over the concrete, sensible, and knowable reality is what Nietzsche dubs romantic pessimism. As will be addressed in the subsequent parts of this chapter, for Nietzsche, and his 'immoralist' brand of Dionysian pessimism, our necessity to don fictive masks so that our experience can be, in some sense, communicated and understood reveals how infinitely variable existence—and the masks donned to intelligibilize it—can be.\textsuperscript{181} It is the universalizing morality (Sittlichkeit der Sitte) of Kant's second critique and its coordination of all fictions to the same rules of construction which, for Nietzsche, expresses the harmful and life-denying kind of (romantic) pessimism.\textsuperscript{182}

In the first four books of The Gay Science, Nietzsche is not as far off from Kant as he might presume. In these initial books, Nietzsche often expresses a belief in what is unintelligible,
or pre-e/valuated and, thereby, like Kant, supposes an 'in-itself which is unknowable, or
meaningless. This preference and supposition for a noumenal, or metaphysical reality expose a
remnant of Kantianism, a Schopenhauerian romantic pessimism, and can—by Nietzsche's own
accounting and which will be treated later in this work—only lead to nihilism.

_Thus Spoke Zarathustra's_ “The Stillest Hour” describes what, for Nietzsche—with a
convalesced appreciation of life in Dionysian pessimism—might have served as an 'intervention'
for such Kantian homologies. In the chapter, Zarathustra conducts a conversation with a
disembodied voice and tells of his revelation in similar terms to his later preface of _The Gay
Science_: that his convalescence must begin.¹⁸³ Echoing the scene in “On Great Events,” when the
shadow of Zarathustra proclaims it is 'high time to descend', Zarathustra is told by this voice to
“go as a shadow of that which must come.”¹⁸⁴ Though a more careful study can be offered on
what Nietzsche gestures toward here, suffice it to say for now that, for Nietzsche, 'what must
come' is not a consequence of _a priori_ or universal certainty but, for each individual, is related
singularly to an ambiguous and perspectival individuation.¹⁸⁵ For Zarathustra, these shadowy
appearances signal a _recovery that obtrudes as descent into one's ownmost overabundance_, i.e.,
'of that which must come'.

Zarathustra introduces this revelatory parable by invoking the idea of a dream: “Yesterday,
in the stillest hour, the ground gave under me, the dream began.”¹⁸⁶ The phrase is significant, not

¹⁸³ For though his fruit was ripe, he was not yet ripe for it. (Nietzsche. _Thus Spoke Zarathustra_. Pt. 2, “The
Stillest Hour,” pp.257-259.)
¹⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 259.
¹⁸⁵ See my prior discussion on Nietzsche's use of 'future', cite 28, qua the work of the negative (from in-
itself—finitude—to what consciousness makes of it—infinitesimal), and how Nietzsche extolled a future which was not
deterministic but also was singularly achieved, i.e., a fate or destiny which was not simply imposed upon one by the
Gods.
¹⁸⁶ Nietzsche. _Thus Spoke Zarathustra_., p.257.
only because it explicitly recalls this 'inaudible' great event—‘the stillest hour’—whereby the inventors of values take precedence in constructing the world to come, but also due to the relation forged between a transformation ('the ground giving way') and the commencement of dream. In a way, we may consider how Nietzsche's convalescent philosophy, which espouses how invention and creation of value can take precedence over unilateral and inherited traditions when building a future world—is a new kind of dreaming.

In book one of The Gay Science, in which we find Nietzsche under the persuasion of his romantic-pessimist illness, Nietzsche describes a 'new insight' into existence as “consciousness that I am dreaming and that I must go on dreaming lest I perish.” He continues that this appearance-as-dream is not the opposite of some essence; “what could I say about any essence except name the predicates of its appearance!” Though, here, Nietzsche comes very close to his later, post-Zarathustra position of affirming appearance as all there is, this aphorism commits to at least two presuppositions which partake in a residual romantic pessimism. First, as the title of the aphorism reveals, he is too preoccupied with the “the consciousness of appearance,” whereas the Dionysian pessimist will deny the reduction of appearance to consciousness. Indeed, it is this conflation—of appearance with the consciousness of it—which leads to Nietzsche's romantic-pessimistic claim that the knower is a 'master of ceremonies' who can—as if by choice or in deference to appearance's own 'self-mockery'—“sustain the universality of dreaming.”

The word 'sustain', here, implies a sort of mastery and purpose, as well as knowledge very much

187 Nietzsche. The Gay Science. Book 1. “The consciousness of appearance.” #54. p. 63. Nietzsche's word is Bewusstsein, and is of course taken up by Freud. Cf. Also Marjorie Clark's Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy. Clark rejects the notion that Nietzsche changed his views on this point. And Lee Braver's A Thing of This World, in which he expresses a view more in line with my argument here, that Nietzsche adopts a different argument between early and later works.
188 Ibid.
189 And even if we should not fixate on the English 'consciousness', regardless, Nietzsche's word Bewusstsein implies a much narrower apperception of reality than the Dionysian would accept.
190 Ibid.
like consciousness. Second, and related thereto, appearance is likened to dreaming—but the feeling that the dream is 'all there is' is an effect of appearance's "self-mockery." The 'self-mockery' of appearance is tied to an 'earthly dance' which seems to confuse the feelings of the dreamer, and makes this dreamer feel that there is nothing else but the dance, the dream, and the knowledge thereby obtained, all of which are somewhat synonymous to each other. When Nietzsche describes the 'duration of the dream' like a tool which can be implemented by conscious design to sustain some sort of masquerade, or, alternately like a masquerade which compels dreamers toward feelings confused of their specious origin in mockery, we find conceptual markers of a dualistic romantic pessimism. Here, Nietzsche places dreaming in contrast with 'real' waking life as a confused privation, and considers the masquerade of dream to be more of a conscious contemptuous attempt to reassign the conditions of what really is rather than as a fundamental structure of reality itself. Acknowledging the position Nietzsche takes in The Gay Science as well as the 'intervention' of Zarathustra on dreaming, our question could become, when the ground drops out and dream begins, does it end?

It is Nietzsche's convalescent turn, post-Zarathustra, and to be described more fully below, which sees him ultimately dissolve this epistemological dualism by embracing, or more precisely, affirming—the logical effects of an ontological holism of force. In other words, life

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191 Ibid. "To me, appearance is the active and living itself, which goes so far in its self-mockery that it makes me feel that here there is appearance and a will-o'-the-wisp and a dance of spirits and nothing else..." (my emphasis).

192 We find this contrast—between existence as it appears to waking and, alternately, to dream—in refrain by The Gay Science book three, #232, p.146, though they are treated similarly in Nietzsche's exhortation: both are to be conducted interestingly.

193 A note on ontological holism: The first formulation of my argument sought to chart how Nietzsche shares Kant's dualist ontological presuppositions ... After reading Schonfeld's "The Thing-In-Itself in Nietzsche and Kant," I came to understand how Kant himself might not have the kind of dualist ontological presuppositions I supposed. That, instead, we find in both thinkers an ontological commitment to appearance as a reality of drives relating; i.e., reality as a unity that undergoes differentiation. I hold reservations about any strict demarcation between epistemological and ontological dualism. Nietzsche makes this point that will cannot affect matter, only other wills (BGE#36). This implies that a mind-independent reality—that which "eludes our cognitive grasp"—might very well reside in "ontic isolation" (though Schonfeld responds in the negative, 14). Nietzsche writes, "In short, one has to
itself *is* the various and variegated ways appearance 'shows up' / appears. But before elucidating Nietzsche's affirmative move here, or what could be called Nietzsche's proposed *new kind of dreaming*, I proceed to the next section which further explores and demonstrates Nietzsche's own early romantic pessimism.

In the Shadow of Nietzsche's Pessimism

that Nietzsche suffers from this illness in the early books of *The Gay Science*. I use textual examples to demonstrate his Kantian epistemological presuppositions and romantic-pessimistic preferences (which manifest as a defiant claim that fictions are preferred to reality, thereby still crediting an appearance-reality distinction)

Rather than crucify Nietzsche for the early inconsistencies of his thought as he attempts to recover new ground for his Dionysian pessimism of perspectivism, I instead hope to highlight, in deference to the prevalence and deep-rootedness of the Kantian imprint, the aspects of Nietzsche's early writings which still bear the mark of the very romantic pessimism which later he so staunchly sought to dispel. I do not wish to overstate Nietzsche's romantic pessimistic attitude, especially given that Nietzsche is explicit in his attempt to forge new paths in a radical philosophical turn against a historical tradition entrenched with romantic pessimism. For example, in book two of *The Gay Science*, he articulates his early account of perspectivism, against the claim for objective universal 'reality' that stands outside one's particularity, as from a

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risk the hypothesis whether will does not affect will wherever "effects" are recognized--and whether all mechanical occurrences are not, insofar as a force is active in them, will force, effects of will." (BGE #36). I also tend to think of the point like, 'perspective transforms and all there is is transformation'... Schonfeld makes a compelling point about isomorphism between noumenal and phenomenal worlds: "We would bump into things. We would fall off cliffs. The fact that we have stuck around suggests the match-up." (Schonfeld, 15). Instead of presupposing different worlds—as ontological dualists do—and then having to account for a 'match-up', I suggest—in line with Schonfeld's reading of Kant—that we speak of one world (replete with different forces at play). It is this 'one world' which I refer to as ontological holism. So, whether Kant is indeed an ontological holist is a question which will be bracketed at this point. I am arguing that Nietzsche sheds his commitments to epistemological dualism by often explicitly rejecting ontological dualism, which may or may not be logical entailments.

194 On this point, Cf. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* #34. More discussion of this aphorism can be found in the fourth section of this paper.
position from nowhere: “Subtract just once the phantasm and the whole human contribution from [the 'real']...if you could do that!...There is no 'reality' for us.”

But, as this section will demonstrate, at least insofar as the early books of The Gay Science are concerned, the stain of romantic pessimism remains despite Nietzsche's attempts to wash it out.

Though this section finds the most troubling and telling example of this latent Kantianism in Nietzsche's assertion that nature is valueless (which will be addressed below), it is also important to note that the very position of epistemological dualism (asserting a deep, irresolvable appearance versus reality distinction) is itself a logical corollary to romantic pessimism, which makes existence a habit of revenge against that which cannot be known through an assertion of sovereign control over that which can be known. By crediting an appearance-reality distinction, even if in so doing Nietzsche asserts that fictions are preferred to reality, Nietzsche's act of defiance continues to empower that which he ultimately (and later) attempts to get 'beyond': a will construed as that which is reducible to purpose and intention. As I established above, a will reducible to purpose and intention—a conscious will—is more how Heidegger describes Nietzsche's will to power in Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures. Further, in these lectures, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche’s preference for fiction/appearance to reality preserves the metaphysical distinction, thereby compromising its radicality. I argued above that Heidegger was unfair in his interpretation of Nietzsche because Nietzsche turns away from this stance in his later writing. But, in this case and in his earlier writings, Heidegger's critique lands a bull's eye: Nietzsche's defiant appearance-reality distinction empowers a will construed as an intentional assertion on behalf of a world of appearances known and preferred with respect to some other reality, and

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196 This is how I interpret Nietzsche's definition of the romantic pessimist as one who “takes revenge on all things by forcing, imprinting, branding his image on them, the image of his torture.” (Nietzsche. The Gay Science. Book five. “On Romanticism,” #370, p. 236.)
thereby, a being whose existence is purposed with a 'will against truth'.

In an example of epistemological dualism, and also to show how epistemological dualism may imply or undergird an ontological dualism, let us look at an aphorism entitled “Only as Creators!” (The Gay Science #58). Here, Nietzsche describes the greatest trouble: “to realize that what things are called is unspeakably more important than what they are.” He describes appearance as “thrown over things like a dress and quite foreign to their nature,” and even though he notes, “appearance in the end nearly always becomes essence and effectively acts as its essence!” Nietzsche still seems to credit a primary distinction between the two: essence as distinct from appearance. Indeed, he goes further: “What kind of fool would believe that it is enough to point to this origin [essence] and this misty shroud of delusion [appearance] in order to destroy the world that counts as 'real', so-called 'reality'! Only as creators can we destroy!” His derisive language makes a clear, if desultory, point: in Nietzsche's estimation from the early books of The Gay Science, an essence, as 'origin', stands apart from appearance's 'misty shrouds'. Nietzsche does, in the later book of The Gay Science, treat this last clause very seriously and compels his readers toward a creative Dionysian pessimism. But importantly, we also find in this aphorism a bulb of what later flowers into his Dionysian pessimist view of value as an overabundance in this exhortation in relation to being creators. In aphorism #58, beings create in relation to the 'misty shrouds of delusion' but this act of creation is not yet considered the 'origin' or essence of things: he states, we are not creators, and thereby implies, we are but transformers of what is already there. This leaves open the door for a discussion of who, if not we 'foolish'
readers, are the creators of 'so-called reality'. It is to this point of origin that the later Nietzsche will return and for himself transform, with his post-convalescent conception of the nature of things.

Again, in *The Gay Science* #299, Nietzsche writes: “What means do we have for making things beautiful, attractive, and desirable when they are not? *And in themselves* I think they never are!” Nietzsche explains that we can learn this trick from artists, “To distance oneself from things until there is much in them that one no longer sees and much that the eye must add *in order to see them at all*...” The distinction, between appearance and reality, phenomenon and noumenal 'things-in-themselves', is clear here. But let us turn to what I argue to be the seminal example of early Nietzsche's Kantian romantic pessimism, in his declaration that nature is valueless.

Why is value important? A discussion on the relationship between value and meaning follows in the fourth (D) section of this part.

In aphorism #301 of book four in *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche offers an account that places him soundly within the philosophical position of nihilism, the rebuff to the scholastic epistemological tradition and teleological accounts of existence. He counters such preordained cosmogony and theodicy with the radical assertion that meaning comes from nothing. Nietzsche exclaims:

"Whatever has value in the present world has it not in itself,

according to its nature—nature is always value-less—but has rather

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201 Ibid.
been given, granted value, and we were the givers and granters!"\textsuperscript{202}

This is not an outright contradiction of his earlier claim that we are not creators (#58); he argues more precisely: “Only we have created the world \textit{that concerns human beings}."\textsuperscript{203} This is to say, we are not creators of the whole of the world, but only the world that we can know. The implication of epistemological dualism is no doubt clear: Nietzsche espouses a split between the valueless world as it is and the world of value which we can know. We have seen in the last section how epistemological dualism is synonymous with romantic pessimism. That is, how asserting a deep, irresolvable appearance versus reality distinction is associated with romantic pessimism, which makes existence a habit of revenge against that which cannot be known through an assertion of sovereign control over that which can be known.

By declaring that nature 'in-itself' is valueless, he not only denies that meaning is part of nature and therefore meaning is solely dependent on (human) beings to confer it upon an otherwise voidal nothingness, he also commits the error that Schaper finds in Kant—that is, Nietzsche turns what is purportedly a fictional entity (the 'as if' of the 'real' nature) into a universal law—the impossibly known supra-phenomenal nature now in Nietzsche's estimation bears a necessary predicate: it is value-less. In the first case, we find a Kantian privilege of the subject, as self-determined and determiner, who legislates meaning for a world through an activity that is likewise synonymous with consciousness ('we were the givers and granters!'). In the second case, he perpetuates the distinction between the 'real and natural' world and that world which bears our e/valuative mark ('the world \textit{that concerns human beings}'). Clearly, the Kantian epistemological dual, between in-itself and appearance, is upheld. But let us see how Nietzsche's description of value transforms in his later work. As noted above, rather than indict Nietzsche for

\textsuperscript{202} Nietzsche, \textit{The Gay Science}, #301, p.171.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.
such transformations—and, in this case, an outright 'about-face' reversal of his position, I hope to attest to his convalescence as a recovery from romantic pessimistic presuppositions to an adoption of a more life-affirming philosophy. 204

Nietzsche better works out his Dionysian pessimism after the first four books of *The Gay Science*, and we can see this as Nietzsche revisits this concept of the knower split between a world 'in-itself' and a world which can be known in the later text, *Beyond Good and Evil*. In a refurbished mode which dispenses with the previously held dualism, between the true but unknowable world in-itself and the false 'mystic shroud' of the world which can be known, Nietzsche notes in aphorism #34 that there is no “essential opposition” between true and false—*only gradations of different values*. He asks, “Why couldn't the world *that concerns us*—be a fiction?” 205 By redefining the word fiction—severing it from a connotation as a privation of truth—Nietzsche specifically dissolves the romantic dualism (an 'essential opposition between truth and false') by addressing the question of whether such a fiction must 'belong' to an author—which could provoke, by way of response, the Kantian claim of noumenal priority, or God—some absolute truth by which appearances measures up to be also true or false. Instead of responding with any claim of noumenal authorship, Nietzsche calls the question itself into question. Nietzsche responds, “*Why? Doesn't this “belongs” [as in, the fiction which must 'belong' to an author] perhaps belong to fiction, too? Is it not permitted to be a bit ironical about the subject no less than the predicate and object? Shouldn't philosophers be permitted to rise above faith in grammar?*” 206 Here, Nietzsche argues against the transcendental subject to further attack Kant's

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204 Indeed, in book five, Nietzsche fine-tunes this assessment of the creative power of beings and, thereby, alights on the tragedy of his convalescence, when beings discover that: “the world is not worth what we thought.” (Nietzsche. *The Gay Science*. Book five. “Our question mark,” #346. p. 205. ) Though this question could be framed as, is the world worth anything without our thought?, my point is that by Nietzsche's later thought, this question bespeaks that the world is worth much more than once thought—i.e., that the world was worth nothing.

205 Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, #34, p. 47.

206 Ibid.
philosophical commitment to a supersensible noumena, which stands apart from sensible reality. Now, in the initial books of *The Gay Science*, and indeed in Nietzsche's early work, he is not yet able to rise above, or transform, the 'faith in grammar'--like the oppositions consecrated between subject and object, or the assumption that creation adumbrates only a thing (predicates an object), rather than also transforming the subject in the activity of creation. What this strict opposition implies is that beings may only shape the world *which concerns us*, and within this world there is only mutability, and further, without this mutability or concern, the world is meaningless, valueless.

We are ready to move on the next section for a more thorough treatment of Nietzsche's passage.

Nietzsche's Dissolve: a Shift in Perspective

In 1887, five years after the publication of *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche adds a fifth book to the initial four. In departure from his romantic-pessimist aphorisms in the earlier books, in the fifth, Nietzsche clarifies or convalesces his Dionysian pessimism from his earlier romantic strain. For example, and in almost direct rejoinder to the nihilist aphorism #301, in which Nietzsche claims the 'natural' world 'is always value-less', he returns to the concept of meaning or value in the world and reforms his stance on the evident 'valueless' nature of this world:

"We take care not to claim that the world is worth *less*; indeed, it would seem laughable to us today if man were to aim at inventing values that were supposed to surpass the value of the real world. That is exactly what we have turned away from...modern pessimism...The whole attitude of 'man against the world', of man as a 'world-negating' principle, of man as the measure of the value of things...the monstrous stupidity of this attitude has finally dawned on us and we are sick of it; we laugh as soon as we encounter the juxtaposition of 'man and world', separated
by the sublime presumptuousness of the little word 'and'!”

In what he describes as a latent dawn which dispenses with the presupposition of a separation between man and world, he imparts the revelation of his new position on value. Here, he also refers to this old or earlier position, which he is “sick of” as “modern pessimism.” And, as explored at great length in my first chapter, it is this earlier position which Heidegger attributes to Nietzsche as though Nietzsche never turned away from or transformed this view. Nietzsche introduces an equivalence between 'romantic pessimism', 'modern pessimism', 'man as the measure of the value of things', and 'the juxtaposition of 'man and world". And the antidote to these ill-conceived attitudes? Laughter.

But he is clear to point out that laughter, in this case, is not a pedantic resignation, as one might throw up their hands and say in amusement 'to hell with trying'. No, Nietzsche instead confronts this very concern over resignation head-on by regaling a new commitment to authorship and artistry. Duly, he asks:

"Have we not exposed ourselves to the suspicion of an opposition...between the world in which until now we were at home with our venerations—and which may have made it possible for us to endure life—and another world that we ourselves are: a relentless, fundamental, deepest suspicion concerning ourselves that could easily confront coming generations with the terrible Either/Or: 'Either abolish your venerations or— yourselves!' The latter would be nihilism; but would not the former also be— nihilism? The is our question mark”

For Nietzsche, it is a growing suspicion of ourselves as somehow set out against or in separation from the world which may lead future generations to choose between the world or ourselves. In

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207 Ibid. #346 p.204.
208 Ibid. #346 p.204.
his conjecturing style, Nietzsche suggests that both horns of the 'either/or'—abolishing 'yourself', or alternately, abolishing your 'venerations' (here, the world in which we are at home with them)—lead to nihilism.\textsuperscript{209} As in our prior example, Nietzsche defines nihilism in equivalent terms with romantic pessimism.\textsuperscript{210} Here, Nietzsche pin-points what in his early work contributed to a Kantian strain of romantic pessimism—a commitment to this 'either/or' dualism between a world replete with venerations which might not be real but which allow us to 'endure life', and a real world 'which we ourselves are'. Nietzsche describes this supposed opposition between imagination or will and reality as nihilistic. And to be more precise, the either/or dualism itself might not lead to nihilism. But Nietzsche is clear to say that the 'suspicion' of this opposition between the world of venerations and yourself, which leads one to (at least seek to) abolish one or the other, is the recipe for nihilism. This 'suspicion' of opposition is promulgated by what Nietzsche calls the 'will to truth', which in its crusade against the deceptive character of life, supposes reality and appearance to be in dual opposition, and privileges the so-called 'true' reality.

As noted above, Nietzsche's early nihilistic aphorism (#301) poses existence through a romantically pessimistic, ontologically dualist either/or: as either a creation of man, or a world independent of man, and proclaims nature as originally in-itself value-less. But, on this point, Nietzsche undertakes convalescence, which he articulates in the face of an 'exposure to suspicion' over any such opposition between appearance and reality, between venerations and ourselves. He supposes that the suspicion of this either/or will impel a destruction of one or the other and will—

\textsuperscript{209} To be fair, Nietzsche rather states that abolishing 'yourselves' would be nihilism and asks (the question of the aphorism's title, "Our question mark") whether the abolition of our venerations—as though they were aberrant or mistaken versions of 'yourselves'—would not also be nihilism. I find there is little argument to be made over answering his question with anything but an affirmative, as questions are themselves a certain response which calls for affirmation. Cf. Nietzsche notes: "Es bleibt übrig, entweder unsere Verehrungen abzuschaffen oder uns selbst. Letzteres ist der Nihilismus." (KGW VIII-1.127). Cited in Wrathall, "Between God and..." Religion After Metaphysics.

\textsuperscript{210} And the explication that it is for 'coming generations' to face this problem of nihilism helps to explain why romantic pessimism is a 'modern' pessimism.
whichever 'choice' is made—both lead to nihilism. In his turn toward convalescence, Nietzsche no longer finds a philosophy of opposition or resignation to opposition, between 'endurance' and reality, regardless of how we become 'at home with our venerations', and distinct as they may seem at times from what 'we ourselves are'.

His project—after penning, along with *Zarathustra*, also *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*—is much more grandiose: to propose a coimplicated relation instead of an opposition, between venerations and who we are ourselves. In convalescence from the torturous, life-denying pathology of romantic pessimism, Nietzsche finds appearance (venerations) and reality (ourselves) to be linked and to inform each other. Nietzsche's rehabilitated project asks one to live life like a work of art, in deference not only to an intentional creative direction, but also to that which upsurges unintentionally and inspires our sacred veneration (“that which helps us to endure life) in the creative act. Nietzsche forges a path of life back to existence as *both* our venerations—our imaginings and willed values—and ourselves. For this convalescent Nietzsche, existence does not abide a reality versus appearance distinction, but rather, reality and appearance are intertwined, they inform each other, and both are fictitious aspects of a fictitious author. This is not to say that existing is meaningless—instead, it entails how overabundantly meaningful existence is such that its meanings exceed the epistemological and ontological opposition of a life or existence which is “as such” and so then as such opposed to the dynamic and transforming beings or existants who think, feel, know, and are.

Nietzsche's shift toward an 'and' or *bothness* of existence does not arise *ex nihilo*. We find, as early as book three of *The Gay Science*, his nods to just such an 'and', which alights through

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211 In his 1886 preface to *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche laments his earlier lack of courage for developing his own language, caught instead in the snares of his predecessors, Schopenhauer and Kant. Specifically, Nietzsche cites Schopenhauer on the tragic leading to resignation and exclaims, “How differently Dionysus spoke to me! How far removed I was from all this resignationsim!” (Nietzsche. *The Birth of Tragedy*. Trans. Kaufmann. “Preface” Pt. 6, p. 24.)
talk of life's 'overabundance', i.e. life as more than one's will within it or consciousness of it. If existence is 'both' our veneration and ourselves, we see how existence is both what we are most 'at home' and familiar with, and also what exceeds this familiarity and brings us to confront what is not-at-home, and that which we did not generate or create, about ourselves. 'Overabundance', in this sense, describes the aspects of existence which are not simply synonymous with our at-home veneration, by which we endure life, but are also that which takes us away from home and even can make life appear unendurable. Such considerations appear generally, in Nietzsche's work, as acknowledgments of the limitations which consciousness places on an otherwise overflowing and irreducible experience. For example, Nietzsche—in a proto-Derridan note—offers, “thoughts are the shadows of our sensations,”\textsuperscript{212} and, “Even one's thoughts one cannot entirely reproduce in words.”\textsuperscript{213} This is not the self-same romantic pessimistic dualism between appearance and reality; instead, here Nietzsche remarks how even our thoughts themselves bear with them shadows of thoughts, and that realities contain submerged realities. Rather than a strict opposition, here Nietzsche admits of something like a knot, or a fold, between appearances and realities, between veneration and ourselves, such that their discreet disentanglement becomes impossible or nonsensical.

Following suit to his ontological thinking, in Nietzsche's later additions to \textit{The Gay Science} and through his work in \textit{Zarathustra} and \textit{Beyond Good and Evil}, we find that he also consistently reorients his view of value by coming to terms with an excessiveness of existence which cannot fully manifest in intention, consciousness, thought, words. This is significant to

\textsuperscript{212} \textit{The Gay Science}. Book three. #179, p.137. Nietzsche makes a similar point in the early “Truth and Lie in An Extra-Moral Sense.”

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid., #244, p.148.
countermand Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche by which Heidegger interprets value-positing as similar to conscious knowledge. And Nietzsche's later additions constitute a philosophical turn from his prior position that such manifestations (appearances) are privations and at odds with what actually exists. His later, convalesced position holds that appearances are real and that both appearances and their values undergo such persistent transformations that neither are reducible to an a priori, non-transformed or static thought, word, intention, conscience, or consciousness. For convalesced Nietzsche, no longer is nature 'value-less'--a noumenal void—it is, instead, an overabundant excess. Thought itself is part of this natural chaos (it happens to us). Since thought is also part of value—our values themselves are not simply reducible to conscious preferences (we will reinforce below what I have explained in a prior chapter as how this conscious preference is related to what Heidegger calls 'will-to-will'). Nietzsche's genealogy will take shape as a project to map how beings contend with this excessiveness to orchestrate value systems. As shown in this section, by book five of The Gay Science, Nietzsche specifically remediates some of his earlier claims in the initial books of this work and exhorts the new immoralists to pass through nihilism and find reality as appearance, not in opposition, nor as simple identity, but rather, as an always intertwined complex.

In the later additions to The Gay Science (book five as well as its preface, which is also written after the initial and original books), we find a transformation in the way Nietzsche treats the definition of and relation between appearance and reality. He describes this transformation in part three of his preface:

“The trust in life is gone: life itself has become a problem. Yet one should not jump to the conclusion that this necessarily makes one sullen. Even love of life is

214 Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil. #19: thought comes when it wishes.
still possible—only one loves differently. It is like the love for a woman who gives us doubts...But the attraction of everything problematic, the delight in an X [which is as such only through pretense; otherwise the X would actually be a U], is so great in highly spiritual, spiritualized people such as these that this delight flares up like bright embers again and again over all the distress of what is problematic, over all the danger of uncertainty, and even over the jealousy of the lover. We know a new happiness...”

Here, life is a problem because there is no trust in life. But one may still love, and find happiness, albeit a new kind; one can delight in a pretense. Nietzsche is clear here to note that though his position is one that enjoins a 'duty to suspicion' with an acclamation of the 'problem' of life, happiness and love are still possible as a new happiness he calls 'Dionysian pessimism'. But how does one cultivate a love which delights out of suspicious, doubtful ground? Let us recall the relation Nietzsche recognized between value judgment (for example, values of love and suspicion) and physical constitution. We began by drawing attention to Nietzsche's call for a philosophical physician and placed it in relation to a tragic turn in Nietzsche's thinking. Tragedy once meant for Nietzsche a romantic-pessimistic opposition between appearance and reality, and then Nietzsche turns on tragedy—such that the term now refers to a Dionysian-pessimistic coimplicated relationship between appearance and reality.

Following suit, a new understanding of the body as a multiplicitous composition is central to his philosophical convalescence. Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and Evil #19, “[O]ur body is but a social structure composed of many souls.” For the convalescent Nietzsche, the body is

216 Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil. #34, p.46.
217 Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil. #19, p. 26. In this section, will to power is very similar to Hegel's concept of 'spirit' from The Phenomenology of Spirit: “a plurality of sensations through which one encounters both a commanding and an obeying, “on the basis ...of a social structure composed of many “souls.”” (Ibid. #19, p.27.)
a complex assemblage—a “spiritous” surface of folds, of particulars and universals, and the appearance of these folds must be regarded reverently, as they are significantly who were ourselves are.\textsuperscript{218} Taking this new understanding of the body into account, convalescent Nietzsche develops a philosophy of \textit{ambiguous affirmation}—an open comportment to and affirmation of the impossibly excessive and folding nature of existence. It is in light of this ambiguous affirmation that Nietzsche develops his 'philosophy of the future', founded on a series of 'perhaps'.\textsuperscript{219} For example, “Perhaps truth is a woman”—Nietzsche (in)famously writes\textsuperscript{220} --who we are able to love in spite of our doubts. This 'love in spite of doubt' is an affirming of a body's ambiguous com/position, 'over all the danger of uncertainty'. A body becomes here both figuratively evocative and a practical, objective reference as the site of a 'distressing' interchange between particular and universal inheritances and decisions, givens and free will. That is, I \textit{am} my body, and I \textit{am not} any body. Nietzsche's 'new happiness' suffers privileging one or the other in a dual between the appearance and reality of a body, and instead regales delight in the complex of them both, which he dubs a 'depth' of a plurality of perspectives.\textsuperscript{221} This depth is for what Nietzsche praises the Greeks, who acknowledge what he calls a 'superficial profundity'.

Throughout book five of \textit{The Gay Science}, Nietzsche continues to distinguish between a 'nature' which is pre-conscious and unknowable and a 'nature' which, through a veneer of consciousness, becomes knowable. This is an important distinction to keep in mind, if Nietzsche is ever to be correctly classified or indicted as a 'naturalist'. But, by book five, this distinction—

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This multiplicity leads Derrida to dub 'Friederich Nietzsche' itself a homonym, saying that rather than account for one person or another (as in the famous conclusion of \textit{Ecce Homo}: “Dionysus --or the crucified”), Nietzsche is the countername [i.e., ‘or’ itself]. (Derrida, \textit{The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation}. Translated by Avita Ronell. New York: Schocken Books, 1985. pp. 8-11).
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\textsuperscript{218} Nietzsche. \textit{The Gay Science}. Preface. Pt 4, p. 8: “what is needed for [knowing how to live] is to stop bravely at the surface, the fold, the skin; to worship appearance...”
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\textsuperscript{219} For e.g., Nietzsche, \textit{Beyond Good and Evil}, #2, p. 10. Also see cite 15 below.
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\textsuperscript{220} Nietzsche uses this turn of phrase in both the prefaces to \textit{The Gay Science} (pt. 4, p. 8) and \textit{Beyond Good and Evil} (p. 1).
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\textsuperscript{221} Nietzsche. \textit{The Gay Science}. Preface. Pt. 4, p. 9.
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between pre-conscious and conscious nature—constitutes a difference of degree—Nietzsche writes, as 'only provisional perspectives'—rather than a dualist opposition of reality and appearance. Duly, Nietzsche writes,

“For one may doubt, first, whether there are any opposites at all, and secondly whether these popular valuations and opposite values...are not perhaps merely foreground estimates, only provisional perspectives, perhaps even from some nook, perhaps from below...” 222

It is this degree of shading, like 'looking through colored glass', which becomes his 'deep recovery' and rehabilitation of perspectivism.223 To explain, Nietzsche offers a rebuke to the account of perspectivism as merely a translation of thought and sensation into the language of the herd—typified as 'consciousness'—which develops in response to the 'need to communicate.'224 Following suit with his schematization of noble and slave values, Nietzsche decries this 'need to communicate' as a weakness and describes as an illness the growing reliance on 'consciousness' as adequate to the experience of existence and the 'pressure to communicate'. Leaving little to the imagination in terms of how he regards the growing significance of 'consciousness' to science and culture, he writes:

“...[D]ue to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we can become conscious is merely a surface—and sign-world, a world turned into generalities and thereby debased to its lowest common denominator, —...everything which

enters consciousness thereby becomes shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, a
sign, a herd-mark; ...all becoming conscious involves a vast and thorough
corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization. In the end, the
growing consciousness is a danger...a sickness.”

Dr. Nietzsche's diagnosis might strike his reader as ambivalence: is he not again privileging a
mind-independent reality over the sickened consciousness of appearance? Importantly, he claims
not to be concerned with dichotomizations of subject and object—“the snares of grammar”—nor
of 'thing-in-itself and appearance: “for we 'know' far too little to even be entitled to make that
distinction. We simply have no organ for knowing, for 'truth'...” So, how to square Nietzsche's
vociferous disdain for consciousness and his assertion that his interest is not in the classic
Kantian epistemological distinction between noumena and phenomena, a romantic-pessimistic
distinction between reality and appearance? A careful reading of Nietzsche's criticism finds
'consciousness' and not 'appearance' or phenomena at the root of his concern. And 'consciousness'
is not equivalent to appearance or phenomena, but is rather a way of knowing or enduring
appearance or phenomena. Similarly, consciousness is not equivalent to, but merely an aspect of,
perspective.

Nietzsche's rehabilitation of perspectivism, in fact, involves this very reclamation of the
un- or pre-conscious aspect of perspective. Without them—the un- and pre-conscious aspects of
perspective and value—Nietzsche might be indistinguishable at times from his overwhelming
contemporary philosophical context of romantic pessimism, let alone from Heidegger's

225 Ibid. p. 213.
226 Ibid. p. 214. This declaration of having no organ for knowing, for truth, motivates Nietzsche's silence on
the question of Being.
invocation of Nietzsche as the foil to Heidegger's post-turn thinking. Let readers of Nietzsche not be so quick to resolve 'appearance' as wholly contained in consciousness. Nietzsche's 'recovered' sense of nature presumes that existence is what appears to beings, but this appearance takes many 'shapes, tones, words'.\textsuperscript{227} Indeed, to follow Nietzsche's account, our need to communicate creates consciousness, which is a translation of an individual and unique experience into a herd-language. Our thoughts, once enunciated, bear this herd-mark, and no longer seem to be the unique, individual phenomena of experience. This account of translation suggests that there is something originally excessive to consciousness in the phenomena we experience. Nietzsche writes,

``At bottom, all our actions are incomparably and utterly personal, unique, and boundlessly individual, there is no doubt; but as soon as we translate them into consciousness, they no longer seem to be...This is what I consider to be true phenomenalism and perspectivism...''\textsuperscript{228}

'True' phenomenalism and perspective, thus, underscores how the actions through which we come to be ourselves are not only conscious. Unfortunately, as we have seen in my first chapter, Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power associates it with a form of knowing that is deeply synonymous with just such conscious thinking. Further, and in a different aphorism, ``[W]hat we call consciousness constitutes only one state of our spiritual and psychic life (perhaps a sick state) and by no means the whole of it...''\textsuperscript{229} 'Our...life' is much more than our consciousness of it. \textit{It is the unique and personal aspects of experience that are excessive to consciousness which constitute the individuating and transformational excess of perspective.} Though Nietzsche

\textsuperscript{227} This last phrase echoes Nietzsche's praise of appearance from his preface to \textit{The Gay Science}. (pt. 4, p. 8-9).
\textsuperscript{228} Nietzsche, \textit{The Gay Science}, #354, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{229} Ibid., “On the old problem: 'What is German'? Book five. #357, p.217.
is clearly calling 'consciousness' a distorted mirror to thought, 'perspective' is both this distorted mirror—significant as a common denominator—and the unique, excessive position from which we experience prior to translation. It is this excessiveness that accounts for how Nietzsche's 'will' is not equivalent to 'purpose' or 'goal'. In “Two kinds of causes that are often confused,” he writes that the 'discharge' (lassen) of will is the powderkeg, not the particular match—a 'goal' or 'purpose' ascribed almost accidentally and after-the-fact.230

This multi-verse of perspective—what Nietzsche has dubbed the 'new infinity'231—offers an irreducibly numerous, indeed overabundant, alternative to the Kantian universalism which presumes that any and every experience is processed by the same set of intellectual categories and that each and every action can be reduced to the same set of moral claims. Kantian philosophy, in a sense, produced, and justified the requisite and privileged place of consciousness in any ontology of existence. Instead, for Nietzsche, it is a revelry of difference and transmutation (how 'U turns into X') that triumphs over the 'jealous' value of similitude that seeks to contain or master such transformations, and that praises a predictable and static model over a risky and uncertain life.232 Affirming the infinity of perspectives allows a single being to transform itself in departure from herd-mentality.233 For Nietzsche, not only are there multiple and nearly infinite perspectives, manifests of multiple and often conflicting forces, there are also multiple and different ways of thinking. This multiplicity is how Nietzsche is able to castigate a certain form of thinking (consciousness) and not throw the baby out with the bathwater—that is, not sacrifice 'thinking'

230 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, #360, p. 225. Further, “Is the 'goal', the 'purpose', not often enough a beautifying pretext, a self-deception of vanity after the fact that does not want to acknowledge that the ship is following the current into which it has entered accidentally? That it 'wills' to go that way because –it must?...We still need a critique of the concept of 'purpose'.”
231 Nietzsche. The Gay Science. #374, p. 239-240
232 Cf. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Part I - Aphorism # 10. Thanks to Dr. Lee Braver for this note.
233 This allows Nietzsche's philosophy to be read against his detractors, who note he is an exclusionist, a determinist, and in favor of social conservatism as stasis. (Aret Karademir, “Nietzsche's Politics: Dynamis or Stasis?” Southwest. Philosophy Review 29(1), 39-47.).
and appearance in toto as deficient in comparison to some idealization of an untouchable, unexperienceable (and Kantian) purely mind-independent 'reality'. With Nietzsche's perspectivism—which is not a perspective “on” some thing, but more aptly, a perspective from some where—Nietzsche can rebuke Kantian dualism, and not be outright hypocritical when he criticizes the distorted glass through which a being articulates its existence to itself and others. The glass as a distortion is not a privation from some undistorted glass; rather, the glass is distortion. The type of thinking that Nietzsche wishes to medicate is one ridden with claims of certainty from a 'will to truth' that separates reality and appearance into opposites; the type of thinking that Nietzsche endorses is one resistant to claims of identity and its demarcation of opposites, and, rather, is open to doubt—a thinking that accounts for the complex of singular and social, the transforming aspects of experience and enunciation. Nietzsche writes, “Above all, one shouldn't want to strip [existence] of its ambiguous character...[good taste demands] the taste of reverence for everything that lies beyond your horizon!”

By book five, we find Nietzsche's epistemological dualism/ romantic pessimism dissolve into a convalesced, rehabilitated perspectivism—all there is is a coimplicated play between various degrees of illusions, and our illusive knowing transforms the things that are. And we are stuck with these illusions, and so Nietzsche redefines these illusions; for, it is with too much arrogance that one may claim these illusions as oppositional to a 'pure' noumenal reality. Reality is not to be defined in stark opposition to these illusions, it is instead to become them.

Nietzsche's Tragic Convalescence

finally, gesture briefly toward how his other writings inbetween the early books of The Gay Science and book five (Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil, and a new preface to The Birth of

Tragedy) offer a cure, by way of philosophical affirmation, that sets Nietzsche on the road to
recovery.

Nietzsche writes in his 1886 preface to The Gay Science, appended to the book which was
originally published in 1882, that he has undertaken convalescence and that, by the end of the
work, a tragedy will begin. Why is this self-proclaimed 'descent into convalescence' a tragedy? To
garner a response, let us turn to another explanatory—and in many ways, exculpatory—preface
that Nietzsche writes in 1886 for another already published work: the one entitled “Attempt at a
Self-Criticism,” for The Birth of Tragedy (published 1872). In his preface, he criticizes Birth of
Tragedy for its indebtedness to Schopenhauerian influence. But further, in what appears to be a
now familiar diagnosis of cultural symptoms, he professes that this work sought to champion the
ancient Greek art of tragedy as an overcoming of the nihilism and pessimism rampant in either/or
accounts of existence, which declared worship in either Apollo or Dionysus mutually exclusive.
For Nietzsche, these two spiritual drives or values—for Apollonian rational order and for
Dionysian instinctual chaos—were both given form in tragedy. Since Birth of Tragedy deals with
very similar themes, then, as The Gay Science—insofar as the excessiveness, rather than the
mutual exclusion, of values, it comes as little surprise that in the first page of Nietzsche's belated
preface, he waxes philosophical on a theme so dear to The Gay Science: the nature of pessimism.

Echoing his injunction against romantic pessimism in book five to The Gay Science, he
asks in the Birth of Tragedy preface,

“Is pessimism necessarily a sign of decline, decay, degeneration,
weary and weak instincts?...Is there a pessimism of
strength...prompted by well-being, by overflowing health, by the
Nietzsche offers, by way of response, a new “god,” freed from the “distress of fullness and overfullness,” one who abides the contradictory (Apollonian and Dionysian) drives of existence, and who breaks with moralism for “a pessimism 'beyond good and evil'.” Placing the two prefaces in further consanguinity, he continues, in part six of this preface, to contrast 'romantic' with 'Dionysian'. Indeed, Nietzsche revisits the extant work of *The Gay Science* to offer a concluding book five which bears this Dionysian-Apollonian ode: to one, like in the ancient plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles—who conjoin elements of logos and pathos in all their brute contradictory play of force, for the 'superhuman'—who is both serious and playful, obedient and in command of life as will-to-power, “the tragedy begins.” Nietzsche's convalescence is a redefined tragedy in that it leads him to confront the overfullness—and at times apparent contradiction—of the drives of force which constitute existence.

From Nietzsche's articulation of the tragic in his new preface to *The Birth of Tragedy*, therein defined as an interplay between excess and order, we can consider how the 'tragedy' of Nietzsche's convalescent *turn*—from treating nature-as-valueless to a more complex description of nature as value. By 1886, Nietzsche's sense of 'values' refers to those which are not wholly instinctual, but not always conscious. This emendation, to a definition of value which includes the tragic interplay of excess and order, leads Nietzsche to find, in addition to the intelligible and conscious thinking and values imposed and created of existing, also a value-laden nature—a nature not only intelligible and conscious, but also constituted as full of values and valuations.

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236 Ibid., pt.5., p.22. And what better captures this contradictory amalgam of Dionysian-Apollonian virtues than 'Dionysian pessimism'?
237 Ibid., pt. 6., p. 25.
which are pre- and un-conscious.

This is not to create an oppositional dualism between, say, a transparency of consciousness and an opacity of instinct. Instincts are not simply mechanistic, which, for Nietzsche, is equivalent to being meaningless; he writes, “But an essentially mechanistic world would be an essentially meaningless world!” 239 Rather, the instinctual world, whose appearance is a reality of drives relating, manifests itself as an overflow of meaning. 240 But consciousness, too, the progenitor of 'intention', offers intention as "a sign and a symptom that still requires interpretation--moreover, [it is] a sign that means too much." 241 Indeed, for Nietzsche, both the instinctual and the intentional registers of existence overflow consciousness. It is this complicated 'plurality of sensations' that draws Nietzsche to his immorlist conclusions: to embrace value as also 'unintentional' or 'beyond' intention. This point is supremely significant as it defies Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power—this essence of existence—as synonymous with intention in the form of preservation and enhancement.

There is a litany of references to Kant in Beyond Good and Evil, which clarify Nietzsche's position with respect to the romantic pessimism that he once (perhaps unwittingly) endorsed. 242 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche's most well-known English translator, notes that both Kant and Nietzsche have "necessary fictions." 243 Their difference, as I've argued, is whether these fictions promote or desert life. The Kantian dogmatic appeal to appearance, which belies an ambition for objective certainty, instead, for Nietzsche, transforms into 'perspective': an eagerness for life that

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239  Nietzsche. The Gay Science. Book five. “‘Science' as a prejudice” #373. p. 239.
240  Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil. #36.
241  Ibid. #34.
242  The falsest judgments, including Kant's synthetic a priori, are indispensable. "Removing false judgments would mean renouncing life and a denial of life" and "...untruth as a condition of life" (BGE #4). Kant's categorical imperative has no courage to mock itself (BGE #5). Nietzsche lambasts Kant's faculty of deceit ('a faculty of a faculty') by which his a priori judgments are possible (BGE #11 pp.17-19). The 'thing-in-itself' as a "seduction of words" (BGE #16, p.23).
243  Nietzsche. BGE, footnote 6, p.12.
“in good humor, let[s] their securest possession [i.e., the certainty of knowing] go.” Altogether and generally, each reference fleshes out the barometer with which Nietzsche is able to castigate Kant for his fictions while endorsing Nietzsche's own: "The question is to what extent it [falsehood] is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating." Of course this statement begs the question of what 'life', 'species', and then, 'preservation' entail. This examination will be taken up once we look to Heidegger's critique of what he calls Nietzsche's biological naturalism.

Nietzsche develops his 'philosophy of the future' toward collapsing the Kantian dual (appearance and reality), but he still is concerned about the concealing aspect of consciousness. Interpretation of signs, our faith in the proof, these are symptoms of our world-historical-values, of our herds, so the immoralist has a 'duty to suspicion'. He is clearer in Beyond Good and Evil than in The Gay Science that the world which concerns us is a fiction, that "perspective is the basic condition of all life," but also that our "natural" instincts guide our (less natural?) consciousness. So, as demonstrated in previous sections, both Kant and Nietzsche have these 'necessary fictions', like the "I" of consciousness—which might presuppose an ontological dual (real, instinctual, nature versus surface dress of consciousness), if Nietzsche didn't also develop an account of how these transformative interventions (the 'discharge' of value qua will to power) are themselves excessive and irreducible to consciousness. Value is what arises from an interplay of knowing and not-knowing. So, for Nietzsche, one's valuations are not the mere skein

244 Nietzsche, BGE #10, pp. 16-17.
245 Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil. #4.
246 Nietzsche, BGE #38, #32.
247 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. #34.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid. "preface".
250 Ibid. #3.
251 Ibid. #13.
of consciousness, overlaying on an otherwise unknowable reality. No, for Nietzsche, valuations are both instinctual and contrived by consciousness, and unconscious. The “bothness” of existence—that both inform and transform existence—dissolves an epistemological and ontological dualism between them.; epistemological and ontological dualism do not allow for such transforming pluralisms. A fictive phenomena is, thus, not to be found in opposition to a true, noumenal reality (a la Kant). A fictive phenomena is reality; it is fictive in no traditional sense—only this word remains to resist the dangerous “will to truth” which seeks to dispose of any and all fictions. Kant harnesses beings with a universal trope/archetype of categorical necessity to how forces manifest and how, then, manifestations of force 'should' interact. Kant's necessity is knowable by consciousness; it is rational or rationally deduced (for example, in the work of Kant's transcendental deduction). But for Nietzsche, 'necessity' is just what can be said is happening; conceit to a 'rational' knowledge of necessity is a vanity because necessity appears to consciousness as accident. This is why an 'acceptance' of reality (and necessity) as ambiguous affirmation is so important to Nietzsche; for him, a strong will is one that says 'yes' to thoughts which happen to it. Nietzsche does not share the Kantian preoccupation with transcendental c.o.p.s (conditions of possibility), because our conditions of belief (and our faith in these proofs) can only trace back to our own corners, which are not validated by some sort of logical supersensible presupposition of static necessity but rather by the very sensible realities that beings in their existing encounter. For Nietzsche, one must be able to say, 'yes', in spite of the knots or folds our figments and reasons lead us to— inexorably back to our herds and—beyond that—to our instincts. We find this remedy of affirmation best articulated in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and

252 C.f. "[E]very power draws its ultimate consequences at every moment." (Nietzsche, BGE #22.)
253 Nietzsche, BGE #17; "the hidden Yes in you stronger than all Nos" (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, #377).
254 C.f. Cite 16: The Gay Science, #348: 'the faith in the proof is just a symptom' ...of one's familial, familiar perspective.
255 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. #36.
Beyond Good and Evil. And so, it is with these works in mind that Nietzsche revisits his earlier four books of The Gay Science to add a preface and fifth book to recover himself from the claims he errantly perpetrated from the Kantian heritage he came to more consistently outgrow.

Far from a last consideration, I wish to consider the impact that Zarathustra had on Nietzsche's transformation. Nietzsche concludes book four of The Gay Science with Zarathustra, who commences a descent (Untergehende, Untergang). The descent is into the core of value, which is dark, superficial, and excessive. This language of “going under” to “step into the depths” appears in “The Convalescent,” in part three of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Here, Zarathustra explains how “my abyss speaks. I have turned my ultimate depth inside out into the light” such that there is no “outside” himself. But ‘descent’ is not always conceived as convalescence. In “Despisers of the Body,” Zarathustra explains that those who turn away from life, no longer able to create beyond themselves, also desire to 'go under'. The ambivalence of the term—as, in the same text, a life-affirming convalescence and a life-denying desire to turn away—both translated as 'go under' parallels the way which fictions can serve to affirm life—toward 'self-overcoming’—or can serve to deny life—and aid, instead, the 'despisers of the body'. Zarathustra, too, makes this transition: from one who was not ripe for life, to the Dionysian prophet of the eternal return. In “The Wanderer,” a figure who also features in the concluding aphorisms of book five in The Gay Science, we find a terse explanation as to why such an incipient tragedy, embarked upon toward convalescence, would take the shape of a descent. Zarathustra speaks, “Peak and abyss—they are now joined together...It is out of the deepest depth that the highest must come to its height.”

258 The Gay Science “‘The wanderer’ speaks” #380.

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Science is redeemed through a descent into the ownmost depths only to then recover a new happiness that wants eternity in the rising dawn of a new, future age. Since affirmation of 'life' becomes Nietzsche's litmus test for a convalescent, Dionysian pessimism, we will next consider in the next part the idea of 'life', and how Heidegger indicts Nietzsche for this very un-Dionysian concept.

This part demonstrated that the complex and often contradictory nature of Nietzsche's work is not merely an enactment of immoralist chaos. At least insofar as Nietzsche's considerations of how appearance relates to reality, Nietzsche's early writings are far more Kantian than Nietzsche admits. Or, rather, he does admit it, through the transformations he undergoes with respect to 'value' in his later work. Nietzsche's early Kantianism—which he calls romantic pessimism—finds nature value-less. He then turns to favor instead an excessiveness of existence as value-laden, that is, composed of meaning excessive of those imposed on it. Understanding the depth of the surface as perspective, Nietzsche turns to an account of existence such that its appearance is not identical nor reduced to consciousness. This is to say that Nietzsche's view on nature changes. But, as I have tried to show, this change is indebted to Nietzsche's transformation in his thinking on 'value', which shifts to include forces beyond knowing or knowledge. His transformation, which he deems a 'cure' for the prior romantic (and in later work dubbed 'nihilist') malady, implements an affirmation of this excessiveness—beyond consciousness and knowledge, which we find further developed in the work he completes inbetween the first four books and the fifth book and preface to The Gay Science.
In this section I hope to demonstrate what I consider to be a fairly banal claim: in Nietzsche's terms, the will to power is not reducible to consciousness. Yes, consciousness is an outgrowth of the will to power, but the will to power is not wholly expressed by conscious thinking. I characterize this claim as banal since those who assent to it abound, even despite their strikingly different readings of Nietzsche.\footnote{Cf. Brian Leiter, who uses Nietzsche to argue that willing (or the experience of willing) is itself a product of unconscious willing, to support his skepticism of free will/autonomy (versus determinism) in the causation of action. (Leiter, "Nietzsche's Theory of the Will," accessed http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx/nietzsche-s-theory-of-the-will.pdf?c=phimp;idno=3521354.0007.007.) And Bret W. Davis's work on Heidegger and Nietzsche in which he argues that Heidegger's \textit{Being in Time} is rife with Nietzsche's concept of the will, especially in regards to a critique of subjectivity. (Davis, \textit{Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit} Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007).} Banal as it may be, this claim is extremely important to my overarching, more controversial claim, against Heidegger: it is Heidegger's misguided equation, developed in the third volume of his \textit{Nietzsche} lectures, of the will to power with knowledge \([\text{Erkenntnis}]\), which \textit{consciously knows permanence and purpose}—and, as such, is synonymous with consciousness, and not Nietzsche's own use of the term, which grounds Heidegger's charges against Nietzsche's philosophy as remaining within the metaphysical tradition and initiating an epoch of technologization wherein existing is treated as a meaningless tool fit for optimization. In order to limit the scope of my textual examples, I have tried to focus on passages in Nietzsche's published works which relate both to the will to power and to consciousness, and, more specifically, to the term that Heidegger will later use, knowledge.
Though some of these examples refer simply to 'will' and not will to power, as long as we understand 'will' through Nietzsche's appropriation of the term—by which will to power is implied, it is sufficient to demonstrate that, for Nietzsche, the will is not expressed fully in consciousness in order for my similar claim about the will to power to be valid.\textsuperscript{262}

Nietzsche's will to power is the 'basic form of will' he proposes to explain 'all organic functions': the problem of 'procreation and nourishment', the 'intelligible character' of the world, 'our entire instinctive life', Nietzsche explains as will to power and \textit{nothing else}.\textsuperscript{263} That will to power serves to explain all organic life means that this explanatory force underlies both conscious and unconscious events in organic life.

The will to power is at times described as a more-or-less conscious assignation of value, as with Nietzsche's interpretation of Mill's English utilitarian version of the 'good' as a more-or-less conscious reflection of English values. Nietzsche writes,

> "Ultimately, [English Utilitarians] all want \textit{English} morality to be proved right—because this serves humanity best, or the "general utility," or "the happiness of the greatest number,"—no! the happiness of \textit{England}, [will be best served thereby]...."\textsuperscript{264}

Here, I classify Mill's version of the 'good' as 'more-or-less conscious' because it matters not whether, per Nietzsche's example, Mill himself articulates a theory of the good \textit{and} consciously acknowledges that this is the theory best suited for his way of life; rather, if such links are, upon

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{261} Please see my above note in the preface on justifications for considering Nietzsche's published works for this inquiry.
\item \textsuperscript{262} Of course the fitness of this equivalence, between will and will to power, can be argued. Cf. For example, Kaufmann's discussion on the significance of the term 'to' (or \textit{zur}), in Nietzsche's will to power (\textit{Wille zur Macht}). \textit{Basic Writings of Nietzsche}, Kaufmann, “Editor's Introduction,” p.440.
\item \textsuperscript{263} Nietzsche, \textit{Beyond Good and Evil}, # 36. It is arguable as to whether the word 'explain' is suitable to Nietzsche's project; one might more accurately say that Nietzsche supposes. For more on this distinction, please see note below 196.
\item \textsuperscript{264} Nietzsche, \textit{Beyond Good and Evil}, # 228.
\end{itemize}
analytic or genealogical inspection, easy to uncover and bring to consciousness—such that one could even become self-conscious about such links—then this relative ease of uncovering implies that such evaluations are fairly available to consciousness. On the other hand, there are unconscious evaluations that are not so easily diagnosed or made apparent. Indeed, will to power is at times also an unconscious necessity, for example, as when Nietzsche states that, rather than because of the decision of its helmsman, the ship moves in the direction that it must. Nietzsche continues in this aphorism, “The usual view is different: one is used to seeing the driving force (treibende Kraft) precisely in the goals (purposes, professions, etc.), in keeping with a very ancient error; but it is only the directing force (dirigirende Kraft)—one has mistaken the helmsman for the stream.”

This difference between 'driving' and 'directing' force could amount to the somewhat anachronistic—or at least proto-Freudian—difference between, respectively, unconscious and conscious events.

Will to power, thus, accounts for an irreducible combination of different ways of thinking: both the conscious way that life's happenstance is afforded and codetermined by rational explanation (e.g., I explain that I wish to raise my right hand and then I do so), and also the unconscious flow of potential energy which conditions the possibility that I may move at all (e.g., if such flows are unavailable to my arm such that it might be raised, it matters not whether I rationally 'elect' to do so—my arm will not move). In this sense, Nietzsche's will to power is not an explanation of causation, but rather, an explanation of conditions of existing. Will to power is an explanation of energy that is always in transition; that is, not fully attested to by consciousness, nor wholly unavailable to consciousness. This is to say that consciousness, though

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265 Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, # 360. We will return to this aphorism below.

266 It is outside the scope of this particular work to trace the relation between the work of Nietzsche and Freud. Suffice it to say here that Freud's concept of the unconscious is entangled with the work of 'drive' (*Trieb*). Also see cite 144 below.
unable to explain the entirety of organic life, is efficacious in such life: if I consciously assign a negative value to smoking, it is more than likely that I will not smoke. I use this example in order to explore its complexity. What if, I consciously assign a negative value to smoking, and yet I do smoke? In part, this type of scenario is precisely what Nietzsche wishes to account for in his *On the Genealogy of Morals*; namely, how does the will act against itself? This 'acting against' can be construed as both a problem for conscious and unconscious evaluations.

This term 'value', albeit in English, is extremely significant to Nietzsche's philosophy. 'Value' finds consonance with Nietzsche's use of and directive toward 'new values' (*neuen Werthen*), a 'revaluation of values' (*Umwert[ung] aller Wert[e]*) or a 'transvaluation of values', and it appears in Nietzsche's works in various forms: *Werth/e, Werthen, Werther*, *Werthschätzungen*, etc. 'Value' is so significant because, for Nietzsche, thinking constitutes a re-evaluation—of truth, of goodness, of health, and this 'value' replaces any universal account of those concepts. Another way of saying this is that, for Nietzsche, there is no Truth or Good or Health *per se*, as in unequivocal, unchanging, ahistorical. I do not mean to suggest that there is an opposition, between, say, truth and un-truth, and that Nietzsche prefers the latter; instead, Nietzsche calls into question the very opposition of truth and un-truth, and says that instead of this opposition, there are only "degrees of apparentness and, as it were, lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance—different "values."*267 An axiom from Lacan echoes this point nicely, 'truth has the structure of fiction', replete with these 'degrees of apparentess' and 'shades of appearance'.*268 Nietzsche suggests in the famous aphorism in which the madman proclaims the 'death of God' that no longer may the myth of a universal truth, transcendent to

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267 Nietzsche, *BGE* # 34.
268 Psychoanalysis is avowedly indebted to Nietzsche's philosophy, as Freud claims that Nietzsche wrote everything that Freud himself ever did, and better.
contingent experience, be possible; instead, humanity has *murdered* such universal, transcendent truth by our very epistemological tradition, which surmises that it is through an activity of thinking that we can know the world as it appears to us. After the 'death of God', and so without the entailments of God—faith in an unexperiencable, unmediated, pre-appearance, nor in a metaphysical, universal archetype of how, for example, thinking occurs or how goodness is achieved—Nietzsche pushes this Kantian epistemological point (indeed, revolution)–that phenomena are mediated by thought—to the ends of its logical consequences: such thinking is invariably diverse, and, as such, there can be no single, unified account of reality predicing all the real and multiple iterations of perspectives. *The entirety of organic life is a matter of how events appear, which is interpreted variously according to different perspectives.* Perspectives operate by evaluating these appearances and, indeed, are their very condition of possibility. This is Nietzsche's *perspectival* philosophy, whose explanation for these appearances is will to power. For Nietzsche, the will to power is the essence of all organic life. So, it is will to power that conditions how events appear to the various perspectives which constitute the whole of organic life.

Let us say, at this point, that will to power can also be considered the 'valuation of value'. As discussed above, such a 'valuation' is not wholly conscious—there are many instances in which a conscious value is unavailable or outright contradictory to that which can be said to have happened. For Nietzsche, happenstance is always a *valuation*. Take the smoking example above—why would I continue to smoke in spite of my conscious evaluation of the habit as something I do not want to do? We can refer to Nietzsche's point that there are more than conscious ways of thinking which are involved in will to power. In another example, I am on the

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269 Nietzsche, *GS* #125. Cf. Also “Es gibt keine sittlichen Triebe, aber alle Triebe sind durch unsere Werthschätzungen gefärbt [There are no moral drives, but all drives are colored by our valuations.]”
highway driving 70 miles an hour and my front tire explodes. During this emergency I pull the steering wheel to the left. Why do I do such a thing? I evaluate the situation to prefer a trajectory toward the left-side rather than the right-side of the road. There is no 'truth' *per se* involved in such an event, only my perspectival valuations of value, i.e., my will to power. (I could, in fact, not evaluate this scene to be an emergency at all.) For Nietzsche, the “better option” is not evaluated based on a gesture toward some “objectively better,” of which is more likely to result in preferable conditions, since any one's values may actively work against some objective standard of “preferable” at any point. No, for Nietzsche, the “better option,” in my scenario is only toward a (somewhat opaque, transitory and transitional) “subjectively better,” that is, a complex of conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious values. Now, this evaluation of preference for trajectory may have little to do with my conscious conception of this event—that there is a shoulder to the left and a ditch to the right; this, of course, is not to discount that such conscious evaluations can be present. But in addition to whatever conscious evaluation of said situation may be present, the way that this event appears to me is also conditioned by unconscious aspects of thinking. This is similar to saying that one 'goes with the flow' in many ways outside of rational thinking. In Nietzsche's terms, I pull the steering wheel to the left 'because I must'—this is to say, the process of valuation is not simply a checklist of cost-benefit analysis performed by the rational mind, and indeed, such a process nearly always comes after-the-fact of an 'valuation of value' which has already been made, unconsciously. The unconscious valuations of value are themselves what makes conscious valuations of value possible by delimiting the field of possibility in which such opportunities for conscious choices can appear at all. This is a Kantian point: in order to even talk about objects in space, there must already exist an idea of space.\(^\text{271}\)

\(^{270}\) Nietzsche, *GS* # 360.

\(^{271}\) As such, Kant calls space a “transcendental ideality,” *Critique of Pure Reason*, A28/B44.
Duly, Nietzsche demonstrates his Kantian lineage with his concept of will to power: in order to consciously value values, to manage or understand perspectivally how an event appears, there must already exist an event. For Nietzsche, this event 'already exists' not in the sense that there is a universal truth of its appearance which is only then attenuated by different conscious interpretations of it—this event in-itself. No, Nietzsche goes beyond Kant in this respect to dissolve such epistemological oppositions, of noumena and phenomena—which he classifies as the romantic-pessimist opposition of truth and un-truth. For Nietzsche, the event which 'already exists' such that conscious evaluations can be made of it, is an event which itself appears only as valuations of values *via perspective.*\(^{272}\) I pull the steering wheel to the left, because I have already unconsciously willed it to be possible. Said in other words, the unconscious aspects of will to power underscore Nietzsche's observational warning that 'God is dead' and that no universal truth is tenable, since it is especially via these unconscious aspects that all which appears is through 'degrees of apparentness' and not herd-like or 'essential oppositions of “true” and “false”'.\(^{273}\)

If will to power were solely conscious, then the way the world appears quite differently to various perspectives would establish an opposition between those whose conscious apperception 'valued reality right' and those whose conscious apperception 'valued reality wrong'. But it is this presumptive fixity of valuation, which Nietzsche identifies as the strife between Good and Evil, which Nietzsche stridently encourages a philosophy of the future to move beyond. This is not to suggest that values cannot “miss their mark”—like a boxer missing her opponent who dodged well in a match. This is rather to say that Nietzsche's will to power is not an explanatory principle for the *accuracy* of value; it is rather a description of how truth the thinking and existing related

\(^{272}\) There is not adequate space here to explain how the infinite regress set off hereby is what Nietzsche describes as eternal recurrence.  
\(^{273}\) Nietzsche, *BGE* # 34.
there to come to be and unfold. Instead of only becoming enmeshed in practical or ethical examinations of good versus evil valuation, Nietzsche is also concerned about the nature of reality. And for Nietzsche, reality appears in many shapes and tones.

Additionally, if will to power were solely conscious, then the only explanation of how events appear when conscious evaluation is not possible (when, say, an event occurs too quickly or is startlingly new), is that there exists a reality 'in-itself' which is then only later adduced as phenomena by our consciousness. But Nietzsche's philosophy explicitly challenges such universalist claims to the one true account of reality and ridicules the epistemological oppositions which lay claim to the bogey of a reality that is ever 'in-itself'. Nietzsche writes that “absolute knowledge” and the “thing-in-itself” are a “seduction of words.”

Further, if will to power is solely conscious then what accounts for the ways which events happen and are valued in contradiction to a conscious evaluation, like in the smoking example? Without unconscious aspects of will to power, we are left to explain such occurrences in terms which question all efficaciousness of conscious decisions (e.g., nothing I consciously decide to do effects what actually does happen), or in terms which undercut the possibility to accurately disclose the content of conscious decisions (e.g., what you consciously decided is not what you really wanted to consciously decide to do). By response, Nietzsche does not invoke a superficial opposition between consciousness and unconsciousness, such that the unconscious—operating like consciousness as a decision-making force, is in fact, 'driving the car' so to speak. Instead of wallowing in these conceptual dead ends, Nietzsche's will to power is an explanatory principle that accounts for the 'entire instinctive life', those events which appear both consciously and

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274 Nietzsche, *BGE* #16, p.23.
unconsciously. In deference to the interplay of conscious and unconscious forces of power, Nietzsche's *Genealogy* examined how unconscious and conscious flows of power constitute value systems.

To grasp Nietzsche's philosophy, one must reckon with both of these aspects of thinking as part of the will to power. This is an important point, because much of the appropriation of Nietzschean philosophy—most infamously by the Nazi regime—discounts how the will to power conditions the whole of organic existence unconsciously, in favor of a brute oversimplification of will to power as the way one consciously makes one's way in (or crassly overpowers) the world. Such oversimplifications tend to homogenize the forces at play throughout will to power by reducing it to only a sort of conscious 'power' which seems a conflation with 'utility'.

This power-as-utility implies a repetition; be it a recognition of strength or an operational capacity to be used, power-as-utility bespeaks a repetitive intelligibility—that some force be efficacious in some way. Foucault deftly locates the danger of this field of intelligibility, which he dubs, in *The Order of Things*, ‘monotonous structures of similarity’. Monotonous structures create similarity out of differences (or, the whole of instinctive life), and are generally deployed to thwart the appearance of differences. The appearance of differences (and, further, their valuation as significant) poses challenges to the repetitive intelligibility of power-as-utility. For example, if the heating unit of a house began to recognize different forms of energy than electricity, then electricity would cease to be intelligible as the necessary 'utile power source' for the heat. And, more politically, if merchants stopped honoring dollars in favor of different forces of exchange, then dollars themselves would no longer be intelligible as the necessary source of

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275 Here, again, we see the overlap between the unconscious aspects of will to power and psychoanalysis, which poses the question, how can you deduce what it is you want from what it is you do—a question which often finds that what one wants is not wholly accounted for by what one *says* one wants, but rather, is also related to what one does, even unconsciously (especially if this 'doing' is in contradiction to what one 'says' one wants to do).

utile power. Power-as-utility requires a repetitive or 'monotonous structure' to be intelligible as useful.

But intelligibility per se does not require consciousness, nor utility. Intelligibility is not the consequence merely of repetitive monotony. One can intelligibilize radical difference—indeed this is how revolution, revelation, and invention occur. To say in other words, unconscious or un-useful aspects of will to power may be intelligible. Nietzsche writes in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, that will to power "is always a way to greater power," which is sometimes achieved through a "diminution of utility."277 Here, we find how power, for Nietzsche, is not synonymous with utility. Rather, 'power' is the mark of a capacity, 'a way to', reckoned as such through a logic of permanence—such that a capacity can persist. Nietzsche does not claim that will to power must always lead to greater power, only that will to power is a capacity for 'greater power'. And this 'greater power' is possible even through a 'diminution of utility', what Nietzsche defines as "an atrophying and degeneration, a loss of meaning and purposiveness—in short, death."278 If 'greater power' can result from such loss of purpose and meaning (even death!), then power is not only the accumulation of conscious valuations of value. Power is, instead, also an unconscious continuity (e.g., 'life goes on' without knowing how). What we might (following Heidegger) call 'permanence'—does not mean that power is only in the provenance of consciousness.279 The permanence of power is not necessarily the intelligibility of conscious repetition, but it is this intelligibility of conscious repetition by which Heidegger defines Nietzsche's "metaphysical

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278 Ibid.
279 Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche's "metaphysical permanence" is correct insofar as Nietzsche's will to power is an explanatory force for all things. But Heidegger's critique is not correct insofar as this 'permanence' supposes a continuation of massing greater power—which is, instead, how Nietzsche describes 'utility', and prescribes a view as though "as a whole" of existence. The difference, which I examined in the first section above, is one between a condition of possibility (which for Nietzsche is 'will to power') and an implied outcome (which for Nietzsche is 'utility').
permanence.” We will further examine what 'permanence' means with respect to power in what follows.

So, there are ways of thinking 'power' which require permanence, but not consciousness of this permanence. Conscious (but not unconscious) ways of thinking do imply a repetitive, monotonous intelligibility; and such monotony breeds an enforceable 'understanding' of energy flows in light of their potential permanence, which can be homogenized and controlled by one's herd. But Nietzsche's 'power' is not as monotonous, homogenized nor controllable as those bent on regimes of homogeneity might cast it to be. Let us not forget that, for Nietzsche, "in all events a will to power is operating."\(^{280}\) This is not to say that the will to power could or should be treated as a force like gravity or light, which physical science deigns to mechanize through its algorithmic deductions. In his *Genealogy*, Nietzsche places his genealogical analyses of will to power in opposition to the prevalent historical method which embraces a "mechanistic senselessness of all events."\(^{281}\) Such mechanistic senselessness prevails when happenstance is attributed to simple mechanisms of analytic concern—logic, causality, biology, archeology, etc. He criticizes the reactive scientific biologists—like Herbert Spencer—who claim adaptation is the way of the spirit—its existence and development, because this simplistic concept of 'adaptation' ignores the will to power—"the essential priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and directions."\(^{282}\) Placing himself in opposition to Spencer, Nietzsche calls Spencerism nihilism.\(^{283}\) Here, we revisit this point in my first section below—that consciousness or (here) a conscious valuation of adaptation as the explanation of 'the way of spirit' leads to nihilism, and not will to power. So that we may prove the claim of this

\(^{280}\) Nietzsche, *GM* 2.12.
\(^{281}\) Ibid.
\(^{282}\) Ibid.
\(^{283}\) Nietzsche, *GM*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 2.12, p. 515.
section, that will to power is not reducible to consciousness, we place emphasis on the spontaneity—that is, accidental irruption—of the will to power\textsuperscript{284}, i.e., that which is not wholly accounted for by conscious valuations. In any case, so far, I have examined how 'power' is not synonymous with consciousness. Therefore, if Nietzsche's philosophy is a philosophy of power (I will argue to the contrary below), then it is of both unconscious and conscious forces at play, which underscores how Nietzsche is no suitable accompaniment to the banner of empire-building regimes or psychological injunctions which use his work to justify campaigns of domination (consciously overpowering others).

We have seen how Nietzsche's will to power is not a permanence of conscious repetition, but instead of a capacity, and that power itself should not be thought as synonymous with utility (as 'greater power' can be achieved through a 'diminution of utility'). Now, we will show that Nietzsche's will to power is not reducible to power. This is important because Heidegger, for one, uses this equation, of will-to-power with power, to found his entire critique of Nietzsche's philosophy—in that Nietzsche's thinking is 1) following in the tradition of metaphysics rather than breaking with it, and 2) theoretically equivalent to nihilism. My first chapter of this work dealt specifically with this second charge of nihilism. Let us consider Heidegger's first claim about the tradition of metaphysics, which he defines as thinking a distinction between the supersensible and the sensible.\textsuperscript{285}

Heidegger declaims Nietzsche as following the metaphysical tradition in that will to power implies permanence, and permanence is a metaphysical principle. As noted above, will to

\textsuperscript{284} It is interesting to think of accident and contingency in a way that does not already presuppose order. (Cf. Quentin Meillassoux, \textit{After Finitude}). Such a thinking must partake in a 'duty of suspicion' of any causal account of existence sufficing to explain the whole of what happens.

\textsuperscript{285} Cf. Heidegger, N3, 156 and 157, and my third section's “A Metaphysical Elucidation,” below. If Nietzsche bears a metaphysical permanence, he does perhaps only as much as any ontologist. But Nietzsche does not at all subscribe to, and in fact rails against, the permanence which presumes of life a nihilistic brand of utility.
power entails a permanence, though not necessarily a consciousness of such permanence. If will to power entails permanence then how does will to power not metaphysical—in Heidegger's use of the term? Here, I argue that only certain concepts of 'permanence' are metaphysical. Permanence defined as conscious repetition is metaphysical in Heidegger's sense of the term in that it asserts a frame beyond experience and representational to a static present. Such permanence proposes a frame of reference and intelligibility at once coincident with my conscious one and yet superseding it into the supersensible—an unknown future and unintelligible infinity of time. But permanence defined as a capacity (such that will to power 'is always a way to greater power') does not pose such distinctions between the sensible and supersensible, since it suggests a path or stipulates a condition rather than positing an eventuality or a cause.

To further reiterate the will to power as this pathway, we point to the significance of 'zur' in the phrase Wille zur Macht, the German phrase which is translated in English as 'will to power'. 'Zur' is a preposition with many meanings. For example, in Kauffman's “Introduction” to Zur Genealogie der Moral, he justifies his translation of the title, etc. (On the Genealogy of Morals), in part, by claiming that Nietzsche is not like Heidegger: in the case of Heidegger, one would aptly translate 'zur' as 'toward' because "Heidegger is always on the way toward the point from which it may be possible some day to ask a question." He continues, "But not Nietzsche."286 We push the issue of 'zur', not insofar as the Genealogy—though I do think Nietzsche's project therein is certainly not complete enough to truly discredit it being "toward" altogether. Instead, we look at 'zur' in 'der Wille zur Macht': a will not wholly power but toward it. This to say, I want to make the case that 'will to power' is a tension between the different ways of thinking which constitute

286 Basic Writings of Nietzsche, Kaufmann, “Editor's Introduction,” p.440.
“the development and ramification of one basic form of the will.” The 'development' and various manifests of the 'ramification' of this 'one form of the will' compels change, impermanence, what Nietzsche—following in the pre-Platonic tradition of Heraclitus—calls 'becoming'. This becoming is possible because the 'one basic form of the will', 'operating in all events', and providing an account of 'our entire instinctive life' is not the permanence of the metaphysical sort—conscious repetition, but rather, is the tension between different ways of thinking, appearing, and being-as-becoming.

Let us briefly look at Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, which we challenge in this work. Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's will to power as a sort of power-as-utility, which he confusingly calls 'the will-to-will.' I find the term confusing because, though the term does not offer a signal to the importance of power, the oversimplified sense of power (or power-as-utility) is central to the idea it conveys. Heidegger explains his coinage, noting, “‘Will’ here...suggests different things: on the one hand, commanding, and on the other hand, having disposition over effective possibilities.” Though Heidegger explains this 'will-to-will' without using the word 'power', both of the 'different things' which, in his estimation, account for willing—'commanding' and 'efficacy'—imply power-as-utility. Will-to-will places emphasis on power-as-utility to “establish and secure” itself toward “preservation-enhancement.” Said in other words, Heidegger surmises that the will-to-will presupposes the repetitive intelligibility of consciousness—that one continue to go on willing—which we have demonstrated as the modus operandi of power-as-utility and metaphysical permanence. Heidegger states, “power

287 Nietzsche, BGE # 36.
288 Again, Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche is more thoroughly examined in section one above.
290 Ibid., 196.
291 Ibid., 197.
itself and power alone posits the conditions of enhancement and preservation.” ⁹²⁹ Here we see how Heidegger's thinking of power is power-as-utility. Further, by Heidegger's definition, will to power (which he calls will-to-will) implies consciousness, since it 'establishes and secures'—and these are rational judgments (based on outcomes which have been rationally deduced to “preserve and enhance life”). Heidegger's conscious will-to-will, which seeks outcomes, is very different from Nietzsche's will to power, which amounts to life's conditions of possibility. Recall that will to power is the condition of possibility for greater power, but need not result in greater power.

If we read Heidegger as charitably as possible, then we might interpret his emphasis on a will to power which 'establishes and secures' as just such a condition of possibility of what could be established and secured. In this way, to 'establish and secure' need not be a conscious, rational judgment, but rather a capacity to do so. This tact purports a charitable rescue of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power, since we have seen that, by Nietzsche's own account, the will to power is not wholly conscious and also includes unconscious ways of thinking. Additionally, if we read Heidegger in this charitable sense, we can think of an unconscious movement 'toward power', which is not a position identical to (having) power. But, Heidegger clearly says that 'only power' provides the conditions for preservation-enhancement, and preservation-enhancement, as the 'will-to-will', he claims is synonymous with will to power. In one sense, we can agree that the will to power is a condition for preservation-enhancement, just as Nietzsche says that power is always a way to greater power. But if Heidegger's equivalence of will-to-will, which works through preservation-enhancement, and will to power were fair to Nietzsche's philosophy, then how could Nietzsche's thinking ever account for how the

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²⁹² Ibid.
unconscious and sometime un-useful aspects of will to power might not preserve or enhance a life?

It seems that for Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power, there must be a conscious affirmation of power-as-utility—that is, such that one may consciously value preservation and enhancement, which, respectively, implies conscious values of static duration and of meritorious development. And it is this requisite 'conscious valuation' of preservation and enhancement which underscores a commitment to metaphysical permanence—a supersensible temporal continuity by which one determines intelligibility and purpose293. Thus, Heidegger might negligently de-emphasize the other ways of thinking which Nietzsche incorporates into his own explanation of will to power. Let us more closely examine Heidegger's terminology and logic on this point.

What does Heidegger mean by 'preservation-enhancement'? Heidegger defines 'life-enhancement' like “looking ahead and through the scope of something higher”294 such that other perspectives are not “precluded and undermined in advance”.295 To be fair, Heidegger calls this scope (through which one looks ahead as from on high) 'perspective' and does explain how Nietzsche attempts to dispense with all 'supersensuous' valuations.296 Yet, though here Heidegger does treat Nietzsche's perspectivism as a thinking against the metaphysical tradition, Heidegger also defines the nature of perspective in metaphysical terms (which are not Nietzsche's own).

Here, we find a definition of 'enhancement' which presupposes—from a position above and toward some place 'ahead'—a transcendent condition, or a metaphysical concept of being outside of or 'higher' than oneself, from which the requirements for “life-enhancement” can be adduced.

293 Cf. My first chapter, “Heidegger's Will to power” above.
294 Heidegger, N3, 16.
295 Heidegger, N3, p. 16-17.
296 Ibid. ,17.
Thus, 'enhancement' entails a sort of looking—from above and in advance—which seems patently metaphysical.

Heidegger continues, “[I]n order to decide about the necessary and sufficient conditions for life as life-enhancement, the new valuation must go back to what life itself is as self-enhancement.”

Heidegger, here, more evidently casts a fundamental drive which he thinks underlies Nietzsche's philosophy (life-enhancement) as an entailment of consciousness ('in order to decide about') and rationality ('the necessary and sufficient conditions').

Heidegger also claims that such seemingly rational and conscious decisions concerning life-enhancement must originate from considerations of 'self-enhancement'. Between self and life, Heidegger seems to think 'enhancement' as requiring operations of consciousness and rationality. This relationship between 'self' and consciousness and rationality is apparent regardless of whether Heidegger also supplies a critique of more traditional (Cartesian) accounts of what this self is (i.e., how atomistic, to what extent self is separate from or discreet with respect to its environs, etc.). So far, we see how Heidegger thinks 'enhancement' pertains to a metaphysical looking toward conscious, rational decision-making. To put it bluntly, Heidegger seems to read Nietzsche's will to power as a disclosure of purpose. Heidegger's definition of the will to power, as the will-to-will which concerns itself with 'preservation-enhancement', appears as little more than an acclamation of consciousness.

Though the above examination of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche is brief, it is also somewhat redundant, as Heidegger himself and in this third volume of the Nietzsche lectures, dubs the will to power 'as knowledge' [Erkenntnis]. Despite Heidegger's tricky language which

297 Ibid., 18.
298 It seems unlikely that Heidegger, in this text, uses the term 'decides' in a way evocative of the de-cision in “Origin of the Work of Art,” and instead refers to an operation of consciousness.
might redefine 'knowledge' from its use in average everyday vernacular, his interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power is that it privileges conscious and rational ways of thinking. In the last subsection of my first chapter (on knowledge and nihilism), above, I address why this equation of will to power with consciousness (rational knowledge) leads to nihilism and not Nietzsche's own definition of this term. Though power (and Heidegger's power-knowledge of 'preservation-enhancement') implies consciousness of permanence and purpose, Nietzsche's will to power does not. Now we will turn to specific textual examples wherein Nietzsche addresses these very issues.

When addressing the notion of 'purpose', Nietzsche is wont to explain that consciousness of purpose is subsequent type of expression of will to power; this is to say that will to power engenders values in many way, and a valuation of purpose trails behind. In The Gay Science #127, Nietzsche explains that thinking 'will' as a concept like sovereignty or intentionality is a holdover from religiosity and he redefines willing, against this 'primordial mythology', as what comes about when a 'violent stimulus' becomes a matter for the 'interpreting intellect', which “generally works without our being conscious of it (uns unbewusst).”\(^{299}\) Importantly, and in a break with tradition, Nietzsche describes that the intellectual interpretation of a 'violent stimulus' is first a generally unconscious and yet still interpreting perspective from which values arise.\(^{300}\) It is perspective—what we have described as itself 'will to power'—which conditions the possibility for consciousness of purpose, sovereignty, or intentionality.

Following suit, on the fundamental operation of unconscious ways of thinking, Nietzsche further argues that what is often considered as 'cause' (as in, a conscious decision) is, instead, the effect. From The Gay Science # 360, “Two kinds of causes that are often confused,” and due to its importance, I quote at length:

\(^{299}\) Nietzsche, GS # 127.
\(^{300}\) Ibid. The 'tradition' I speak of includes Schopenhauer and “everyone else.”
This seems to me to be one of my most essential steps forward: I learned to distinguish the cause of acting from the cause of acting in a certain way, in a certain direction, with a certain goal. The first kind of cause is a quantum of dammed-up energy waiting to be used somehow, for something; the second kind, by contrast, is something quite insignificant, mostly a small accident in accordance with which this quantum 'discharges' (auslöste) itself in one particular way: the match versus the powder keg. Among these small accidents and matches I consider all so-called 'purposes' as well as the even more so-called 'vocations': they are relatively random, arbitrary, nearly indifferent in relation to the enormous force of energy that presses on, as I said, to be used up somehow. The usual view is different: one is used to seeing the driving force precisely in the goals (purposes, professions, etc.), in keeping with a very ancient error; but it is only the directing force - one has mistaken the helmsman for the stream. . .Is the 'goal', the 'purpose', not often enough a beautifying pretext, a self-deception of vanity after the fact that does not want to acknowledge that the ship is following the current into which it has entered accidentally? That it 'wills' to go that way because it – must? That it certainly has a direction but - no helmsman whatsoever? We still need a critique of the concept of 'purpose'.

Nietzsche calls his distinction between the 'cause of acting' and the 'direction of acting' as 'one of my most essential steps forward'. Let us not forget that, for Nietzsche, the 'cause of acting' is will to power. The 'direction of acting' is named as secondary, insignificant, and even accidental, and is often referred to as 'purpose', along with a litany of other terms which are synonymous with

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301  Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* # 360, “Two kinds of causes that are often confused.”
conscious valuations. Thus, Nietzsche is clear here in saying that *will to power is not wholly exhausted in consciousness of purpose*. The direction of acting, a conscious valuation, Nietzsche describes as the match to a powder keg of energy (a will to power which is largely unconscious or pre-conscious). He explains that purpose is arbitrary and 'nearly indifferent' to the will to power which drives it, and that purpose is simply a consequence (accidental and a pretext of vanity) of a force which moves 'because it must'. In Nietzsche's description, accident and necessity serve as the somewhat strange, if not contradictory, conditions of possibility for the events which appear to constitute reality. 'Accident' and 'necessity', in the way that Nietzsche thinks them, are not effects of consciousness, but instead, make the conscious valuation of values possible.

According to Nietzsche's words, the will to power is not consciousness of purpose, nor is it consciousness of permanence. In his *Genealogy*, Nietzsche writes,

"[W]hatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous "meaning" and "purpose" are necessarily obscured or even obliterated."^302

Here, existing is an encounter with endless transmutation. Thus, rather than the metaphysical supposition of supersensibility or the repetitive intelligibility required for consciousness, will to power is an indelibly sensible and interpreting force which manifests as an ever-changing field of possibility, without constraint of what repetition (power-as-utility) deems likely or intelligible. He

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continues, "purposes and utilities are only signs that a will to power has become master of something less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a function..."\textsuperscript{303} Nietzsche declaims 'function', or utility, as a secondary imposition on the more powerful force of life.

Further, and in a more direct conversation with Heidegger's notion of will to power as 'preservation', Nietzsche writes in \textit{Beyond Good and Evil} # 13, “A living thing seeks above all to \textit{discharge} its strength—life itself is \textit{will to power}; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent \textit{results}."\textsuperscript{304} To account for the force of existence as 'preservation', as Heidegger does in part, is to confuse the result of will to power for its condition. Whether preservation or enhancement is at issue, both require consciousness is, of primary focus in Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power, but there is overwhelming textual refutation of this focus in Nietzsche's own published and popular works.\textsuperscript{305}

The German term, here in \textit{Beyond Good and Evil} #13, translated as 'discharge', is \textit{auslassen}, a word which is etymologically similar to Heidegger's ownmost term to describe authentic existence, \textit{Gelassenheit}. I stress this similarity, in part, because I think that Heidegger is incredible unreflective (or negligently occluding) of his debt to Nietzsche's philosophy for Heidegger's own. This is why Heidegger's insistence of their distance, for example in thinking will to power as knowledge (a will-to-will), is extremely vexing.

Will to power is not reducible to a power-as-utility, which implies consciousness and

\textsuperscript{303} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{304} Nietzsche, \textit{BGE} # 13.
\textsuperscript{305} Please note, again, my discussion from the introduction about how I have decided to make my case based on the overwhelming evidence from Nietzsche's published and popular works and not his notes. Indeed, Heidegger pillages Nietzsche's notes and does find textual support for his claims. Cf. These other cites to explore how the will to power is not reducible to consciousness: BGE #19 (where Nietzsche describes how the will is a complicated "plurality of sensations" and notes how, often, the effect is taken to be the cause); BGE #32, #34, GS #354 (where Nietzsche describes at length that consciousness is a response to a need to communicate but serves as a "corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization" of what comes prior to it—i.e., the will to power).
which amounts to the imprecise interpretations which seek to justify our generally unconscious encounter with sensations. What is often called 'nature' or 'the natural' is just such an explanatory-justificatory exercise of consciousness. In *Beyond Good and Evil* # 22, Nietzsche proclaims, “*Ni Dieu, ni maître!*” against the supposition that 'nature' (or 'consciousness') suffices to explain the workings of reality, and instead offers that this world “has a “necessary” and “calculable” (berechenbaren) course, *not* because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely lacking...”

For Nietzsche, existing is interpreting; interpreting does not follow a mechanistic course—as per the laws of nature—nor a simply rational course—as per the laws of consciousness.

He concludes with a note on power which challenges any reduction of Nietzsche's concept of 'power' to simply a 'power-as-utility' which bespeaks a metaphysical permanence and consciousness of purpose: “every power draws its ultimate consequences at every moment.”

If we think power, with Nietzsche, as 'drawing its ultimate consequences at every moment', then we see how Nietzsche's philosophical concept of 'power' is very different from a metaphysical permanence which entails an eternal duration. Flouting a temporal sense of a 'to-come', as in, this will be the consequence of this action, and instead, affirming the pregnancy of the now to impart the extent of every power's consequences at every moment, renders the valuations of consciousness like purpose and permanence as irremediably aspects of the aftermath. Therefore, not only is consciousness not the fundamental part of the will to power, but consciousness is also not constitutive of Nietzsche's notion of power. Nietzsche's will to power is not defined as consciousness, nor as purpose, nor as a metaphysical concept of permanence. But, of course, will to power is also these things, since it is the explanatory force of our 'entire instinctive life'. My

306 Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, # 22.
307 Ibid.
point is that, for Nietzsche, will to power is not fully exhausted as such operations of consciousness, which are but outgrowths of a vanity or temerity to justify one's existing.

The implications for law and philosophy are manifold. If the one force which accounts for all events is not only conscious, then a practice which institutes the privileging of conscious ways of thinking at the expense and often the incrimination of other, unconscious ways of thinking, is a practice which inhibits life in its authentic unfolding. Nietzsche writes,

“I am still waiting for a philosophical physician in the exceptional sense...someone who has set himself the task of pursuing the problem of the total health of a people, time, race or of humanity—
to summon the courage at last to push my suspicion to its limit and risk the proposition: what is at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all 'truth' but rather...health...”

It is just such institutionalization of 'inauthentic' living which promotes the type of bad health which Nietzsche sought to cure.

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CHAPTER SIX: 
PRÉCIS

So far, we have looked at Nietzsche's philosophy to reveal a 'turn' in his thinking on the truth or essence of existing. We use Nietzsche's terms to describe this turn as from romantic pessimism and epistemological dualism to Dionysian pessimism. Romantic pessimism is Nietzsche's description of an epistemological, and perhaps even ontological, dualism in the tradition of Schopenhauer and Kant. Namely, epistemological dualism begins with a premise from substance ontology of a thing in itself, ding an sich, especially insofar as when thinking the truth or essence of existing. The thing in itself is that which exists apart from and in spite of what is known or knowable to exist. For epistemological dualism, we can only know a world full of things different from what they are in themselves. Our knowledge is adulterated by rationality, or categories of understanding, such that what we know is delimited from what really is. We might hope that our knowing corresponds to what really is, but there is no guarantee that it must, nor is there a possibility to know anything without looking through the lens of our capacity for knowing. For the epistemological dualist, this capacity for knowing is not transformed or modified by the thing in itself; instead, our capacity for knowing is an aspect of the knower and bears little interrelation with what it perspects. Further, for the epistemological dualist, the thing in itself is treated as closer if not equivalent to the truth or essence of that which exists. Nietzsche calls this position of epistemological dualism romantic pessimism. 'Pessimism', as it negates an affirmation of the truth or essence of actual, true, sensible, encounterable existence in a favor of a 'thing' which is notably impossible to ever know, experience, encounter.
We further found how Nietzsche claims Kant to be a romantic pessimist. For Nietzsche, Kant's 'noumenon' amounts to one example of this untouchable, unknowable thing in itself, and so Kant's thinking which founds itself upon the ding an sich contributes a romantic pessimism; Schopenhauer's thinking is named as another example of a romantic pessimist. For Nietzsche, Kant's philosophy privileges as closest to truth a world of things entirely unapproachable, unknowable, unlivable to a human being, and so, it seems to Nietzsche, that Kant demonstrates in his thinking a preference for the negation of human existing itself. For Nietzsche, Kant enforces a conceit upon actual existing—of the agent in her freedom, or her knowledge of the world, or the moral rules which should govern human activity as universal norms—and each of these philosophical apparitions may only asymptote to what really is.

Though even early Nietzsche proclaims disgust over romantic pessimism—of Kant's, of Schopenhauer's and others, we have also found how Nietzsche often bears this stain of romantic pessimism in his early thinking, and so is unwittingly or hypocritically connected to Kantian or romantic pessimist commitments. Early in his writing career, Nietzsche casts doubts on the philosophical privilege of an impossible world with regard to questions of a truth or essence of existing. But early Nietzsche still describes an epistemological or ontological dualism of existing: rather than hold a thing in itself in highest regard as closest to truth, early Nietzsche regales the asymptotic 'fiction' we can but know. Nietzsche concedes the dualism of a romantic pessimist—noting that a human being is limited by its perspective, and as such, can access a world of things which skirts the truth—which he presumes to be residing as some whole thing in itself. In contrast to, say, Kant, early Nietzsche exhorts his readers to praise this epistemological asymptote as all there is, and thereby reinforcing an ontological dualism which affirms human existing in all its diabolical and necessary fictions, through a fabricating lens of our capacity for knowing. For the world of things is worth nothing, this early Nietzsche might say, if not for our fabrications of
it. Here, too, we saw the trappings of the Nietzsche who Heidegger critiques as the last metaphysician and of a thinking Heidegger says leads to nihilism.

Finally, in the first section, we found how Nietzsche escapes romantic pessimism. We located this escape, or 'turn', in a period in which he wrote a series of retroactive prefaces, and a sojourn through, among other works, a substantial work of fiction. In these later works, Nietzsche turns to an ontology of relating drives, and a thinking of the truth or essence of existing as amounting to competing or cooperating valuations and degrees of apparentness from a manifold of perspectives. And for this later Nietzsche, there is no longer a thing in itself which is more true than our capacities for knowing; instead, Nietzsche turns to a thinking of the truth or essence of existing is the relational interplay which mixes a world of things and our capacities for knowing as indistinct and coextensive iterations of each other. Here, Nietzsche's turn supposes thinking of existing as relational, all the way down. Thereby, values are not simply subjective—that is, asymptotic fictions imposed on the world of things in themselves. For later Nietzsche values are also given to human beings entangled in a world of things, each (values, beings, and things) which transform in relational interchange. Capacities for knowing are informed by a world of things which is informed by capacities for knowing. For later Nietzsche, in truth is really existing transforming—as a complex of drives or forces relating. This 'turn' solves the problems raised in Nietzsche's early writings insofar as Nietzsche, in his later published writings, becomes more consistent with his critique of epistemological dualism, which he calls romantic pessimism.

Nietzsche's ontology of relating forces is reinforced in the next chapter, which underscores how Nietzsche did not reduce will to power—the interplay of relating drives which amounts to the truth or essence of existing—to consciousness. This point might seem obvious at this stage of immersion into Nietzsche's thinking, but the premise must be established to directly refute Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche in Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures. This chapter helps
reinforce my refutation of Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche's will to power.

Now I move to consider Heidegger's philosophical description of art that he undertakes while delivering and writing the *Nietzsche* lectures. I undertake this examination of Heidegger's art in my last chapter and after my refutation of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power as knowledge. This way, we are best prepared to see Heidegger and Nietzsche's philosophical similarities as well as call into question Heidegger's simplification or misidentification of Nietzsche's thinking. So, in this Nietzschean chapter we examined Nietzsche's writings on the will to power to find that it encompasses many different ways of thinking and existing. Consciousness accounts for a sort of thinking—one which is associated with an awareness of knowing, if not outright rationalization. In many senses, consciousness is the sort of thinking which lead romantic pessimists to consider that a world of things must exist apart from and in spite of a lens of rationalization or awareness, which tends to drape the world of things (in themselves) in an adulterated dress. Nietzsche's proto-Freudian move was to promote how unconscious drives or thoughts or forces often elude or accompany any subject-oriented consciousness. For Nietzsche, the truth or essence of the world of things is not simply what any person consciously makes of it. Instead, the world of things and existence itself appears as a complex interplay of relating drives, many of which are not conscious. This complex interplay of conscious and unconscious relating drives entails that reality and its appearances are not in epistemological or ontological opposition to each other and distinct from each other, but instead, reality and its appearances are inter-related, coextensive, transforming, and often indistinct or indistinguishable knots.

Thus concludes the brief replay of the last two chapters on Nietzsche's thinking on the truth or essence of existing. Now and finally, we move to examine Heidegger's thinking on art. As with our examination of Nietzsche, our look at Heidegger is focused on a few works which
surround a 'turn' (kehre) in Heidegger's thinking, a turn which can be—without surprise—located commensurate to when Heidegger is writing and delivering lectures on Nietzsche. We remark that this Heideggerian 'turn' is without surprise during a period of immersion in Nietzschean philosophy precisely because the ontology which Heidegger at least initially describes in or after his 'turn' will resonate with—if not in different terms impersonate—Nietzsche's own post-turn philosophy.

In what follows, I conclude with how Heidegger describes art. For Heidegger, art is not founded on the premises of substance ontology, which entails that a thing in itself exists as itself in self-identity and apart from that which it is surrounded by and is not. This sort of premise contributes to epistemological dualism, which we examine now in the register of art. We explore a brief introduction to Heidegger's thinking on art, which will then provide a contrast to the art implied by epistemological dualism. To think art in terms of epistemological dualism, a work of art is a representation to a correspondent but asymptotic reality—a thing in itself.

Heidegger's thinking of art does not fall prey to the problems which besiege aesthetics, in part, because Heidegger thinks of beings and things as becoming what they are in a strife between that which remains hidden and that which arrives disclosed. The essence or truth of beings is, for Heidegger, an ek-static process of unconcealment and related to a perpetually unfolding and entangled co-constituting presencing.
CHAPTER SEVEN: INTERMISSION TO HEIDEGGER’S ART

Though Nietzsche writes extensively on art, this section will focus less on his account of art, and more on Heidegger's. Qua Nietzsche, Julian Young has persuasively argued that Nietzsche's corpus consists of three major positions on art (he articulates four but says that the fourth is a return to the first). Acknowledging the transition which takes place in Nietzsche's philosophy is important, I could use excerpts from Nietzsche's middle ('78-'82) and late ('83-'88) works to paint a holistic account of Nietzsche's thinking in admittedly broad strokes. But for the sake of this work, I prefer to, in brief, contend that Nietzsche's understanding of art, throughout his more mature extant published works, is that art serves as an antidote to pessimism, which can summarily be taken to mean an attitude which denies life. More importantly, I wish to show the consonance between Heidegger's art in his middle ('36-'40) works and Nietzsche's articulation—not of art—but of 'nature', or more specifically, of the interplay of forces which accounts for 'all natural life' described by will to power. We have already spent the prior chapters developing Nietzsche's 'nature' through a thorough examination of how will to power is an interplay of different ways of thinking and existing. It is through this lens we turn now to Heidegger's discussion of art. We will see that Nietzsche's 'nature' of will to power and Heidegger's 'essence or truth' of art each contribute a philosophical description of existing which unfolds as an interplay of forces. The sort of consonance I establish between them concerns an ontology of an interplay of forces.

309 Julian Young, *Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art*, 1.
310 This middle period (circa 1936 to 1940) has been dubbed, by some scholars, Heidegger's metaphysical period.
Though I am arguing that both thinkers share philosophical ideas on the 'essence of beings', their ontological consonance manifests in different contexts; for Nietzsche, we examined his ontological commitment to the essence of existence as 'the interplay of forces' qua 'will to power' and for Heidegger, we will do so concerning 'art'. So, rather than place Heidegger's text in direct comparison with Nietzsche's, and especially because I do not wish to conflate the different considerations at work in discussions of nature and art—even if these differences are ultimately irrelevant to their ontological similarities—I will instead examine Heidegger's ontological thinking on 'the interplay of forces' in Heidegger’s own writing on art in the mid 1930s. We will first look take a cursory look at Heidegger's discussion of art in his Nietzsche lectures, where he, too, makes the association between Nietzsche's thinking on the essence of being (will to power) and art. We turn next to a very similar concept of 'the origin of art' found in Heidegger's most well-known essay on art. These sections will prime us to see, in the very last section, how Nietzsche's and Heidegger's shared philosophical commitment to an ontology of forces at play confronts head-on the pitfalls of modernism and avoid calculation and nihilism.

Heidegger’s Arty Nietzsche

In volume one of his Nietzsche lectures, entitled "The Will To Power as Art" (der Wille zur Macht als Kunst), Heidegger describes Nietzsche's 'unthought' metaphysics as the 'grand style' of art. Far from praise, and by volume three of these lectures, Heidegger defines the 'grand style' as a mistaken anthropomorphic paradigm of subjectivity.311 But to examine what Heidegger would rather think by 'art', we can turn to Heidegger's essay, "Origin of the Work of Art"—which he drafted at the same time he delivered these momentous Nietzsche lectures. In brief, Heidegger describes art as a strife or tension (Streit) between earth (that which is self-secluding and never

311 Heidegger, N3, 154.
fully exhausted in articulation) and world (that which orders and stabilizes—"formulated, sprawling on a pin," so to speak). For Heidegger, the truth, or *a-letheia* (un-concealing), of art is this struggle which engenders the creative and transformative becoming of existence. So, if Heidegger reads Nietzsche's 'will to power' as art, and we examine *der Wille zur Macht*—this force which inures in all organic life ("the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and directions" operating in all events)—as we have done in the second and third sections of this work—as an interplay of ways of thinking and existing—we can now turn to an examination of Heidegger's art, which is a productive tension between that which reveals in unfamiliarity and that which conceals in familiarity, to see its similarity and comparison with Nietzsche's will to power. Further, if Heidegger's ontology of art is indeed consonant with Nietzsche's will to power, we set up the last argument of my work, which undertakes to reveal the relation between Heidegger's thinking and Nietzsche's, especially in assessing Heidegger's charge against Nietzsche's 'metaphysics'. In Heidegger's own words, as he calls the 'Will to Power as Art', we find that perhaps the provenance of Heidegger's thinking, especially the thinking which characterizes Heidegger's 'turn' (*Kehre*) is in Nietzsche's own. Should this relation be adequately demonstrated, it would call into question the pains which Heidegger goes through to create of Nietzsche and his philosophy the great foil to Heidegger's own thinking—indeed which Heidegger casts Nietzsche to be.

Throughout his career and especially after his 'turn' (*Kehre*), Heidegger uses Nietzsche's philosophy as inspiration and foil to his own philosophical moves. Heidegger's first publication, in 1909, and many of his later books, involve Nietzsche's philosophy, and the *Nietzsche* lectures

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('36-'40) coincide with Heidegger's own 'turn'.\(^{313}\) Heidegger's “turn” is a conceptual-historical shift in his philosophy which, uncoincidentally, parallels his transition away from \textit{Dasein} as the locus of the “ontological difference” between Being and entities (beings) to the conditions which make \textit{Dasein} possible, and which he calls 'the event of enowning' (\textit{Ereignis}). In a phrasing which refers both, then, to this theoretical shift in investigation—from \textit{Dasein} to \textit{Ereignis}—and to Heidegger's own philosophical shift, in the \textit{Beitrage}, Heidegger writes that enownment underlies the \textit{Kehre (die Kehre im Ereignis)}.\(^ {314}\) Heidegger also notes, in his 1947 “Letter on Humanism,” that his turn could not be adequately addressed in \textit{Being and Time} since the third section “Time and Being,” was never completed.\(^ {315}\) He underscores how the standing sections of this work failed to wholly abandon the language of subjectivity or metaphysics and he mysteriously notes that said unfinished section would address such failures and proceed with the investigation of the nature of Being “experienced from the fundamental experience of the oblivion of Being.”\(^ {316}\)

Without immersing in the well-published scholarly disagreements about Heidegger's 'turn' suffice it to say here that Heidegger undertook an immanent critique of his philosophical project, including some of his key ontological commitments, by the time that he began writing the \textit{Nietzsche} lectures and 'The Origin of the Work of Art'.\(^ {317}\)


\(^{314}\) GA 65 407, CP # 255, and also Thomson, Ibid., 64.


Heidegger's turn toward the event of enowning (*Ereignis*) and away from the phenomenological testimony of *Dasein* seem to echo his initial insights on Nietzsche's will to power, particularly the tension found therein between consciousness and other ways of thinking. In the first volume of Heidegger's *Nietzsche* lectures, entitled 'The Will to Power as Art' (*Der Wille Zur Macht als Kunst*), and delivered from fall of 1936 to spring of 1937, Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's concepts of will to power and art as *both* essentially fraught from a struggle between that which arrives accidentally and necessarily and that which is engendered more methodically as regulation, modification, and control—terms which mirror the earth-world tension of Heidegger's forthcoming middle works. In the very next year, '37-'38, Heidegger drafts his famous “Origin of the Work of Art,” the essay in which he develops his contention that art reveals the truth of Being as through a strife (*Streit*) between that which is accidental-necessary and that which is engendered-methodical, which he calls earth-world tension, and which also establishes a focal point for his critique of technological ways of thinking. In this essay he dubs such technological thinking 'aestheticization', which contrasts with an authentic encounter with art. Beyond Heidegger's own admission of their equation in this first *Nietzsche* volume, we should see in Heidegger's 'Origin' essay how will to power is incredibly analogous—if not synonymous with—Heidegger's earth-world tension.

Let us compare the will to power, which for Nietzsche, could be the force operating in all events of the cosmos, with Heidegger's concept of truth as *a-letheia* from 'The Origin of the Work of Art'. In “Origin,” Heidegger describes being—as that which emerges (in a clearing) from the strife among forces. Heidegger characterizes the forces at play as in two modes: one sort, as "the curious opposition of presencing,” which covers over a more unintelligible, or at least pre- and

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un-conscious flux of existence; these covering forces are what Heidegger calls "worlding".\textsuperscript{319} Second, Heidegger describes forces which uncover by hiding themselves from the calculative thinking of 'clarification' and systematicity; these “self-secluding” forces are related to what Heidegger calls 'the earth'.\textsuperscript{320} Like Nietzsche's will to power, Heidegger's strife of earth and world (\textit{a-letheia}), involves these different ways of thinking and different aspects of being. For example, the will to power is at times described as a more-or-less conscious valuation of value (e.g. Mill's English utilitarian version of 'good')\textsuperscript{321} and so accounts for a 'worlding'; will to power is at times also an unconscious necessity (e.g. the ship moves in the direction that it must) and so will to power is also 'earthly' because it is excessive to attempts to cognize it fully. Here, I leave aside Heidegger's definition of 'world' from 1929-1930 and focus instead on Heidegger's use of the term from his middle period, 1937-1938—and beyond. Likewise, for 'earth', I am not focusing on the other term Heidegger uses to describe the same aspect of existence from his early work—namely, 'nothing' (from the in/famous, 'the nothing noths').\textsuperscript{322}

Nietzsche's will to power is analogous to Heidegger's concept of an interplay of forces which accounts for existing. Will to power includes 'earth': excessive, preconscious, necessary, untameable, as well as the efficacy of worlding. It is a tension between that which "offers and resists" and that which anchors and transmits, as Nietzsche writes, an obeying and commanding. Heidegger concludes his lecture, "The Will to Power as Art," by writing that the overman "grounds Being anew—in the rigor of knowledge and in the grand style of creation.\textsuperscript{323} As mentioned before, though 'grand style' might serve as a form of critique—with respect to Nietzsche's so-called anthropomorphizing of all beings to the paradigm of subjectivity—it also

\textsuperscript{319} Heidegger, \textit{WoA}, in \textit{Basic Writings}, Trans. 178.
\textsuperscript{320} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{321} Nietzsche, \textit{Beyond Good and Evil}, # 36.
\textsuperscript{322} The infamous phrase, the nothing noths.
\textsuperscript{323} Heidegger, \textit{Nietzsche}, Vol. 1, last line of last lecture.
serves an evocative allusion to Zarathustra, who espouses a new form of humanity. By volume three, Heidegger calls this 'grand style', “the style that has a sense for what is rare and long in coming.”^324 Here, we can see consonance between what is 'long in coming' and the undetermined 'to-come' of Nietzsche's philosophy of the future. But even if, for Heidegger, Nietzsche's 'grand style of art' is subject to Heidegger's critique of subjectivism or anthropomorphism, Heidegger himself still has praise for certain aspects of “Nietzsche's art”. Heidegger writes in an earlier section of this third volume, “The highest value [for Nietzsche] is art, in contradistinction to knowledge and truth...art transfigures life, moves it into higher, as yet unlived, possibilities.”^325 Though Heidegger, here, calls Nietzsche's value of art 'metaphysical'–and we have seen a thorough examination of this term in the first and third chapters—it is at least 'metaphysical' in a sense very similar to Heidegger's way of framing the 'essence of beings'. Heidegger writes, “Art ventures and wins chaos, the concealed, self-overflowing, unmastered superabundance of life.”^326 We might ask, what does it mean 'to win' with respect to chaos? Winning, here, must not imply a mastering, but more so an affirmation of its undeterminable character. For both Nietzsche and Heidegger the essence of existing is not predetermined and, instead, arises of an interplay of forces. Heidegger's art as with Nietzsche's will to power both offer an explanation of the essence of existing as a condition of its existing without consigning this explanation to a determination or cause. This description of art from Heidegger's first Nietzsche lecture, as related to the 'concealed, self-overflowing, unmastered superabundance of life', seems to echo Heidegger's own ontology of art, insofar as art reveals the strife between earth and world in a disclosure of truth which is always at play among that which is concealing and that which is unconcealing.

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^324 Heidegger, N3, 154.  
^326 Heidegger, N3, 82.
In Heidegger's first *Nietzsche* Volume, we see how rather than accounting for the late-modern enframing, Nietzsche's philosophy diagnoses the illness and offers a cure by way of thinking the truth or essence of existence much like how Heidegger does, in his other writings on art and ontology. With Heidegger, we find consonance especially between Nietzsche's will to power and how Heidegger describes the origin of art.

In what follows, my aim is to show through suggestion and via description of Heidegger's writings on art, how similar his art ontology is to Nietzsche's will to power on the question of what and how does existing work. To do so, I undertake a closer examination of Heidegger's art ontology and the truth or essence of existing as the origin of the work of art.
CHAPTER EIGHT:  
HEIDEGGER’S ART

Teacher: even when our telling is only a retelling of the answer heard [that is enough]...

Scientist: ...and when it doesn't matter in this if there is a first retelling or who does it; all the more since one often doesn't know whose tale he retells.

Scholar: So let's not quarrel over who first introduced the name...


For Heidegger, the work of art discloses an origin of a different sort than its representational likeness to something actual. For Heidegger, to claim that the meaning or essence of art is what it represents repeats the ancient mistake which confuses the 'truth of art' with what he calls 'agreement' (*adaequatio* in the Middle Ages; *homoiosis* for Aristotle).\(^{327}\) It is by this very mistake that Plato, in *The Republic*, is able to castigate art as a privation of truth, thinking it as imitation. But Heidegger thinks art differently. For example, Heidegger writes, “The work [of art]...is not the reproduction of some particular entity that happens to be on hand at any given time; it is, on the contrary, the reproduction of things' general essence.”\(^{328}\) This 'general essence' is synonymous with, for Heidegger, “the truth of beings,” and so Heidegger proposes an examination of the meaning of art as it concerns itself with *how art discloses a truth of beings in the world*—rather than art's beauty. But again, and for Heidegger, the “truth” which art discloses is very different from a representational definition of truth—described via things' likeness or

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agreement with something else. Here, I do not prematurely equate the terms “things’ general essence” and “truth of beings.” We must first establish a Heideggerian terminology. In what follows, we gather how Heidegger's ontology of art, largely articulated in his 1935-6 “Origin of the Work of Art” (*Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*) sets forth a new thinking... of essence, of origin, for the work of art and also for a thinking of beings.

Heidegger writes that the work of art is different from the work of equipment in that the artwork discloses what equipment *is* in truth. In a work of art, “[t]his being [whether it be a tool, a tree, a person] emerges...” and this emerging into *what it itself is*, Heidegger calls 'unconcealment' (*Unverborgenheit*). Heidegger further rebrands this 'truth' which emerges from a work of art *alethia*, to invoke a Greek etymology for what is un-concealed, or a-lethia. Further, Heidegger describes this 'unconcealment' as setting to work in a work of art through a tension or strife between 'earth' and 'world'.

Before we, in what follows, try to define these terms more thoroughly, suffice it to say at this point that Heidegger is thinking of art in an ontological way. This is to say, beyond the epistemological tension, revealed by an activity in which a spectator/listener of art engages, negotiating between sensations and senses of the artwork, for Heidegger, the work of art reveals an ontological tension between what *is* and what *is-(not)yet*. In the work of art, Heidegger discovers an essence of existence which remains at play. Let us further examine the terms of this assertion.

Though much of his work is dedicated to dissolving binaries within a philosophical tradition of ontology, Heidegger abides two interacting but intransigent modes of bifurcation: that between earth and world and that between creation and preservation. As I have argued in prior

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chapters, such bifurcation is not ontological or epistemological dualism, whereby a world full of things which appear or what are knowable are substantially different from what they are in themselves. Further, we have seen “preservation” as a term Heidegger used to describe Nietzsche's metaphysical commitments in relation to the will to power. We must be cautious to equate these uses of “preservation,” and we will examine Heidegger's senses of “creation” and “preservation” below, but first let us turn to “earth” and “world.” “Earth” describes the facets of experience which “push back” on the structures of consciousness and habits of interpretation which create a digestible account of our experience, what Heidegger calls a “world.” For example, the “expanse” of “open relational context is the world...”331 The earth is “strange” and “uncommunicative,” precisely as it amounts to that which refuses an ordered intelligibility. Heidegger writes that the “earth” is the “ground” upon which beings base their being in this world, and is “that whence the arising brings back and shelters everything that arises as such.”332 Earth is not to be thought simply as a space, but also as a time (a 'whence'). Heidegger writes,

“What this word [earth] says is not to be associated with the idea of a mass of matter deposited somewhere, or with the merely astronomical idea of a planet....In the things that arise, earth occurs essentially as the sheltering agent.”333

Heidegger describes, here, not simple “things” which populate a field of vision, but rather transcendental conditions which engender the possibility of existence. This is what we call ontology, and further, how Heidegger is contributing an ontology of art.

In addition to the ontological aspects of existence which a work of art reveals, we may

also find an epistemological sense of the terms which Heidegger puts into play, i.e., how the encounter with art discloses these ontological aspects through a process of grappling with the intelligibility of a work of art. For example, those engaged with an artwork interpret its meaning in a framework which Heidegger calls “a worlding.” In the work of art, the earth is the aspects of the artwork which persist despite the failure of our best worlding efforts to enclose their encounters in “constellations of intelligibility.” This earth-world tension, both ontologically and epistemologically, is significant to Heidegger's oeuvre as he is concerned about the nihilistic proffer to enclose the whole of our existence in the dictates of reason and its senses of intelligibility, like understanding (and though he often diagnoses this proffer as a consequence of the enlightenment, he also, when writing on Nietzsche, dubs it the “will-to-will”). Though some might consider such enclosures of intelligibility the opposite of nihilism, I have shown in my prior chapters how both Nietzsche and Heidegger define nihilism to appear as both a commitment to utter meaninglessness and the supposition that the world of things is meaningless without a subjective imposition of meaning. Perhaps, as Terry Eagleton suggests, Heidegger's own witness of the transition from rural to industrial society in Germany informs this concern over nihilism, as well as his philosophical commitment to wariness of technology's proffer to capitalize on human ingenuity to conquer and reshape the natural environment. The earth-world feedback loop is Heidegger's attempt to forestall the end of disclosures of truth from an overly technologized worldview and, what would follow, the end of philosophy from the purported adequation (adaequatio) of existence into/as rote forms of institutionalized existing and sense-making. In what some have called metaphysical language, yet one which abides the inexhaustible nature of existence, Heidegger describes 'the essence of beings' as the bifurcation of earth-world in a circle,

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feedback loop\textsuperscript{335}, or in Heidegger's own term, “strife” (\textit{Streit}), to caution how there are aspects of existence which are still excessive to intelligibility, be they through ordinates of consciousness, or more or less reason-founded forms of knowing and thinking.

\textbf{But conceptual distinctions, what I have called bifurcation in deference to the two-fold nature of Heidegger's 'essence', is not synonymous with a philosophical tradition of propositional, dualist thinking.} As I have argued in prior chapters, it is in this framework of bifurcation and not dualism where Nietzsche and Heidegger find great similarity. Heidegger writes,

\begin{quote}
“Strife is not a rift (\textit{Riss}), as a mere cleft is ripped open; rather it is the intimacy with which opponents \textit{belong to each other}. This rift carries the opponents into the provenance of their unity by virtue of their common ground.”\textsuperscript{336}
\end{quote}

The “earth and world in strife” is not a description of two entirely distinct and self-identical terms in propositional opposition, but rather of an indebtedness and “belonging to each other.” For example, in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger explicates the indebtedness which creation bears to its creator: “The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist.”\textsuperscript{337} Artist and artwork are not themselves autochthonous, nor opposites in their respective self-identity, but rather, artist-artwork are co-implicated by virtue of a third term: art itself.\textsuperscript{338} This circular co-constitution highlights the two-fold (literally a sort of circular knot) of thinking for Heidegger. He states that a logic which compels oppositional terms, set to work through propositions, which therefrom derive concepts to define, by characteristics, a self-identity is a

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{335} Cf. Lee Braver for this description of feedback loop. \textit{A Thing of This World, or Groundless Grounds}, or \textit{Division III} essay.
\textsuperscript{336} Heidegger, \textit{Origin,,” 188, my emphasis.}
\textsuperscript{337} Heidegger, "Origin," 143.
\textsuperscript{338} Heidegger, “Origin,” 143.
\end{footnotesize}
process of “self-deception.”339 “Thus,” he continues,

“we are compelled to follow the circle This is neither a makeshift
nor a defect...Not only is the main step from work to art a circle
like the step from art to work, but every separate step that we
attempt circles in this circle.”340

And in this circle—the loop of strife, we find Heidegger's concept of truth. He writes,

“Truth establishes itself as strife within a being that is to be brought
forth only in such a way that the strife opens up in this being; that
is, this being is itself brought into the rift.”341

Perhaps here Heidegger's different ways of thinking existence are shades of how differently he
thinks logic itself from a philosophical canon which precedes him (or at least, precedes Hegel's
*Science of Logic*), and how similarity Heidegger's thinking here is to Nietzsche's post-turn writing
on will to power.

For Heidegger, art is especially exalted for its ability to reveal what is essential about
truth, which he associates with the essence of beings. Heidegger claims that the essence of truth,
as disclosed in art, is ek-static; rather than of a static, propositional, universal quality, for
Heidegger, the 'essence of truth'–related to the 'essence of beings'–arrives as movement, in (inter-
)play. This is both an ontological and epistemological point, which is to say that both meanings of
things in our world (qua epistemology, or how such things are known and interpreted) and
meanings of *beings themselves* (qua ontology, or how beings themselves are as themselves) are
not preset, predetermined, and are instead constantly unfolding, developing, and entangled with

340 Ibid.
341 Heidegger, “Origin,” 188.
For Heidegger, 'art' is the third term, or 'origin' of both the artwork and the artist.\textsuperscript{342} Heidegger describes origin as “the essence in which the Being of a being essentially unfolds.”\textsuperscript{343} This active verb tense (unfolds) is significant: for Heidegger, \textit{origin is not a point but a process}. Compare this to a sense of 'origin', which amounted to one point on a 'line of points', i.e., a timeline. By contrast, Heidegger's ontology of art describes this origin, knotted or circular—a process of unfolding, as both epistemological—as meanings unfold as interpretations and mis/understandings are decided, and ontological—as beings in themselves unfold to become what they are.

Heidegger's 'origin' is brought forth, which he calls 'creation', and discloses itself in a perpetual engagement with 'the truth that is happening in the work', which he calls “preservation.”\textsuperscript{344} “Creation” is not to be confused with a moment of genesis; for Heidegger “creation” is also a “receiving and removing” in relation to unconcealment, which compels “creation” to occur even after a work of art has been generated.\textsuperscript{345} Preservation is a restraint on the “usual” ways of knowing and looking which tend to condition the meaning and being of a work of art, and all artwork must be preserved; preserving the work of art is, for Heidegger, “letting the work be a work.”\textsuperscript{346} Heidegger thinks creation and preservation of the work of art such that “that which is concealed” and “that which is unconcealed” in the artwork is never presupposed or predetermined as a totality. It is here that we see the difference in Heidegger's use of 'preservation' with respect to his “Origin of the Work of Art,” and his use of it as an assault against Nietzsche in Heidegger's third series of \textit{Nietzsche} lectures (“The Will to Power as

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{342} Cf. above, and Heidegger, “Origin,” 182.
\bibitem{343} Heidegger, “Origin,” 182.
\bibitem{345} Heidegger, “Origin,” 187.
\bibitem{346} Heidegger, “Origin,” 191.
\end{thebibliography}
Knowledge”). In the latter, “preservation” is to mean the very presupposed and predetermined calculating knowledge which Heidegger mistakenly interprets of Nietzsche's so-called nihilistic essence of existence.

For Heidegger in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” the essence or truth of a work of art is not exhausted in its moment of creation, like how “[t]he production of equipment is finished when a material has been so formed as to be ready for use...to be used up in usefulness.”\(^{347}\) The 'createdness' of a work of art is not its point of genesis, nor the stamp of its creator, but rather it is the “being brought forth” of a work, or as Heidegger writes, a “that it is” of createdness which emerges.\(^{348}\) Preservation en-acts and continues to reveal the tension between earth and world, the truth of a work of art.

Preserving, in Heidegger's “The Origin of the Work of Art,” is not a commitment to similitude or self-identity of content, but rather, a constant, ongoing and repeated process of creative and disclosive inter-relation. Preservers are those who are “capable of responding to the truth happening in the work.”\(^{349}\) Remaining responsive to the truth of the work of art requires a certain discipline and persistence.

In the last part of this section on Heidegger's art, we will examine how “creation” and “preservation” are related to other Heideggerian themes, like Gelassenheit. Eagleton describes Heidegger's art ontology as “the persistent orientation of human existence to a mute familiarity with what surrounds it.”\(^{350}\) It is by this “persistent orientation” that the truth of a work of art is revealed. Heidegger's art ontology describes an essence of truth which is not preset and distinct from repetitive appearance (a persistent re-producing) for Heidegger, the essence of truth is

\(^{350}\) Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, 293, my emphasis.
instead itself a process of engaging in creative rejoinder \((Wiederholung)\) to, or repeating of, that which exists.\(^{351}\) Though anachronistic to his essay, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” I find resonances in Heidegger's description of repetition \((Wiederholung)\) in *Being and Time* with the role of the creator/preserver in “Origin of the Work of Art.” In my fourth and final section, I suggest the comportment required for the creation/preservation of the work of art, and again highlight Heidegger's thinking of origin, art, and the essence of existing itself.

**Heideggerian Traces**

Heidegger shows how, in creating and preserving of the work of art, the origin remains intact and in play, even in the age of mechanical reproduction. In this brief and somewhat anachronistic aside, I wish to briefly trace the concept of creation/preservation of the work of art with some other Heideggerian themes, in his other works. This is not to thoroughly support an argument of continuity within Heidegger's thinking throughout his philosophical works, but merely to suggest shades of similarity in works largely regarded as inconsonant.

Holding open the possibility of new and changing meaning without at the same time existing as a lack of possessing complete, exhaustive understanding, creation/preservation entails a 'not awaiting' of artwork. Duly, an authentic comportment—attuned to what is essential—with respect to the encounter with a work of art is NOT best served by an attitude intent on whether one is “missing something” of the experience, as though the truth of art already exists before those engaged with the art commit to found it. In “Conversation on a Country Path,” Heidegger notes that when one has envisioned, fleshed out, determined what one is waiting for, one no longer is 'not awaiting.'\(^{352}\) It is this 'not-awaiting', an indeterminate persistence which allows for engaged repetition of creation/preservation, which seems analogous to Heidegger's paradoxical

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351 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 304: essence is existence.
352 Heidegger, “Conversation on a Country Path,” *Discourse on Thinking*. 

153
notion of the authentic comportment, *Gelassenheit*.

Creators/preservers must be agents of *Gelassenheit*, a waiting that is not waiting for anything specific or (pre)articulatable. Thinking origin as creation/preservation allows the artwork to acquire a new “ecstatic horizon,” to bring it back from the lostness of its creation, especially a notion of 'creation' as site of genesis.\(^353\) In this way, through and of creation/preservation of the work of art, even mechanically reproduced artwork reveal an origin in fidelity to inexhaustible existence.\(^354\)

If we abandon the idea of art as imparting a unique inception as origin, we find a continued responsibility of those engaged with art to find or discover what is essential even when confronted with an evident reproduction. That is, the origin and authenticity of art is no longer chalked up solely to the 'novelty' of the work itself but is also a product of the attitude and comportment that those engaged with art develop in response to the work. The art preserver lingers, but openly; not waiting for anything in particular, and indeed, not seduced by a worldly pattern of interpretation/ reception to enclose the meaning found of an encounter by the coordinates of its past iterations alone. In this way, mechanically reproduced art dismisses 'originality' *per se* (as a unique inception) for, instead, the 'originality' of any event that is as-yet determined and entangled in an ongoing and unfolding ontological responsiveness. The representational premise of any art encounter—that the meaning of the art is predetermined by its correspondence to something actual—is diminished (as one is no longer waiting for something that does not arrive or arrives differently), and the origin becomes a process of the creator's and preserver's open and as-yet undetermined comportments to interpreting encounters. Without

\(^{353}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Translated by Joan Stambaugh, p. 333.

preset or determinate concepts or essences or substances, the origin becomes a production of reproduction, of the creator/preserver's openness to refound. This refounding is not a nihilistic proffer to confer meaning on a meaningless existence; rather, Heidegger thinks art's refounding much as Nietzsche thinks the nature of existing: as the complex between different ways of thinking and existing, which arise and occur often without any conscious attention—but because they must. Not simply an initial act of genesis, a work of art is what it is by every engagement and encounter, through the reproduction of creation/preservation.

To recognize an artwork as a product of reproduction is to signal an aspect of existence that is the same, but also different. Reproduction—in the mode of creation/preservation—need not be, in effect, a 'sameness' of hegemonic, conservative and representational confirmation. The 'sameness' recognized in creation/preservation is at once also the reclamation of uniqueness—now not at a spatio-temporal site, but a uniqueness constituted through a difference, forged in a process of rediscovery. In Heidegger and Ontotheology, Iain Thomson explains using Heidegger's work that:

"Sameness implies a relation of ‘with,’ that is, a mediation, a connection, a synthesis: the unification into a unity. . . . But that unity is by no means the stale emptiness of that which, in itself without relation, persists in monotony” (I&D 25/87)...[I]n other words, ...we recognize that for two things to be “the same” actually requires that they be different. As Heidegger puts it: “The same [das Selbe] is not the merely identical [das Gleich]. In the merely

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355 Heidegger, Being and Time, Translated by Joan Stambaugh, p. 343: to say as is to signal a repeat: “the “as-structure” is always already present.”
identical, the difference disappears” (I&D 45/111).” 356

Thompson highlights how in the 'merely identical difference disappears' and reads Heidegger as reclaiming difference from the disappearance it suffers in a self-identical concept of origin (as site). For Thompson, Heidegger claims that art encounters beg a new "ontological responsiveness” by which we "learn to discern and develop creatively the inherent meanings of artwork, to be open to the hints they offer and dedicate ourselves to bringing forth such hints responsively, and responsibly, into the world." 357 Creation/preservation is a commitment to marking difference and the 'ontological responsiveness' required to do so takes dedicated concentration to the task. In the movement away from origin as a site of genesis to origin as creation/preservation, Heidegger's ontology of art calls beings to concentrate on how art reveals the ek-stasy of our being-in-the-world.

Presencing and presence

The discussion of presence appears in Heidegger's “Origin” essay as bookends. Though noting that a thorough discussion lies beyond the scope of the essay, he begins with a nascent critique of 'presence'. To do so, Heidegger contributes a history of the interpretation of thingness. In all the noted designations of 'the thing' lurks, Heidegger claims, “the basic Greek experience of the Being of beings in the sense of presence.” 358 Though the concept of 'thing' is stabilized by the Roman (mis)appropriation of the Greek term, it is this 'sense of presence' which, for Heidegger, engenders the “current attitude toward things—our way of addressing ourselves to things and speaking about them.” 359 This conceptual framework takes hold in the language and thinking of aesthetics. We can think 'presence', here, as a self-identity based on a particular place (time and

357  Thomson, Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity, 104-105.
space), and likewise, a ‘present-tense’ as the sense one arrives at in complete, determinate self-identity from a 'substantive duration'.

Heidegger concludes his “Origin” essay with Rilke's words: “that which dwells near its origin abandons the site.”360 This is to say, if one can think 'origin' in a Heideggerian sense, then one leaves behind, even if reluctantly, the search for origin as a place, or present site. Instead of 'presence', Heidegger refers to a 'presencing'. In an attempt to bracket an endless investigation into Heideggerian terminology, and to focus on what Heidegger means by 'presencing', I excerpt the following portion of his “Origin” essay while truncating his discussion on 'clearing'. He writes,

“[B]eings are unconcealed in certain changing degrees. And yet a being can be concealed, as well...Each being we encounter and which encounters us keeps to this curious opposition of presencing, in that it always withholds itself at the same time in a concealment.”361

Unconcealment, the emerging of a being into what it itself is, occurs in opposition to concealment, the withholding of a being from what it itself is. This 'curious' opposition is what Heidegger calls 'presencing'. A substance ontologist presumes a being or thing or work of art is what it is as a site of presence, and thereby, its essence is always already substantially predetermined and determinate, discoverable as though a latent constant in the equation of a world of things. For Heidegger, a being or thing or work of art becomes what it is in and as a presencing; neither hidden nor disclosed fully, its essence is not preset and so is perpetually unfolding. The consequences for beings becomes apparent in his essay on “Origin,” as the concept of essence,

origin, art, and existing radically shift from a philosophical tradition steeped in substance ontology. And so, with this ek-static, persistently differentiating strife, Heidegger attempts to redefine 'now' temporality—and consequently the 'current' thinking of things and beings, and replace the static, self-identical concept of presence.

Heidegger is not a thinker of presence, but of presencing. The difference between the two—presence and presencing—is important to note here in conclusion, since Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche's thinking on 'essence' charges Nietzsche as beginning from the premise that he is a “metaphysical” thinker of presence. BUT... just as Heidegger's presencing relates to the temporal present ..... so too does Nietzsche's will to power.....
Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche is "reductive yet revealing," and, my point, it's more revealing of Heidegger's own mistakes than Nietzsche's. Heidegger gives up on thinking will to power as art. In volume one of his Nietzsche lectures, entitled "The Will To Power as Art" (der Wille zur Macht als Kunst), Heidegger embraces Nietzsche's 'unthought' metaphysics as the 'grand style' of art. What Heidegger means by 'art' here (and, indeed, what Nietzsche too means by both art and will to power in at least his early and middle works) is very similar to what Heidegger develops as earth-world tension. For Nietzsche, the truth of art and will to power is ontological pluralism; bearing the inheritance of tradition and guidance of history AND transforming it in unique iterations, art and will to power manifest as different appearances and interpretations. Consequently, if 'Wille zur Macht als Kunst', then Nietzschean so-called metaphysics—predicated as they are on will to power and perspectivism—is certainly not a harbinger to the technologization of existence. If we, like Heidegger, interpret will to power as power-knowledge or power-as-utility, we commit an analogous simplification based on metaphysical presuppositions like what 'aestheticization' does to art.

By the later Nietzsche lectures (and indeed while volume two is underway), Heidegger shifts his reading of Nietzsche and aligns will to power with knowledge. (Summarily, the title of volume three is "The Will To Power as Knowledge" (der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis).

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362 I thank Iain Thomson for this turn of phrase.
Heidegger describes knowledge here as some kind of reich-building, that which must establish and secure itself through what Heidegger calls preservation-enhancement. In other works, Heidegger also clearly denotes knowledge as a founded mode or break with a more primordial way of being-in-the-world. By volume three, as Heidegger describes *Wille zur Macht* as *Erkenntnis*, he sunders will to power from the unconscious, creative excessiveness of 'will' and instead privileges 'power' as the 'essence of existence'. This transition—from will to power as art (volume one) to will to power as knowledge (volume three) highlights Heidegger's concern for nihilism and his critique of 'enframing' but it does not serve as an adequate reading of Nietzsche's own philosophy. I make this case reading Nietzsche's widely published and popular works; I concede that some of Nietzsche's notes bear witness to some technologized thinking. Ultimately, it seems Heidegger creates a straw man out of Nietzsche in order to direct criticisms (of toxic metaphysics and their political implications) away from Heidegger himself and to distance himself from Nietzsche's thinking while all the while championing Nietzsche's actual brand of ontological pluralism as Heidegger's own. The charge of reducing existence to that which can but be calculated and optimized on behalf of a perfectionist model of human supersession could have been more authentically developed as an immanent critique of Heidegger's own (early 30s fundamental ontological) project.

The 'gestalt shift' which allows Heidegger to find promise of nothing/nihilation\(^{363}\) is already performed by Nietzsche in his rejection of Kantian dualism—which is ultimately a nihilistic view that pre-conscious existence is initially meaningless—and in Nietzsche's embrace of an existence which is overabundant, i.e. his philosophical development of perspectivism. Though Heidegger's *Nietzsche* lectures might account for the turn in Heidegger's own thinking, it

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\(^{363}\) Thomson, HAP, ch 1 and 7.
seems that he is able to reach this post-\textit{Kehre} view only by making an inverse turn in his reading of Nietzsche's will to power, making it a stand-in for the foreclosure of power instead of the opening excessiveness disclosed by authentic encounters with art. As revealed in such encounters with 'what is essential', will to power is not solely power (as Heidegger mistakenly characterizes will to power) nor is it wholly will—it is their tension and interplay.

Heidegger's Will to Power and the Problem of Nietzsche's Nihilism

Heidegger's will to power is at work in his misreading of Nietzsche's philosophical thinking. Just what will to power means is one of the things under question in this dissertation, but suffice it to say that Nietzsche and Heidegger both understand the term to express the essence of existing as well as how this existing has meaning to those who exist. I have argued that Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche tells us more about how Heidegger's sense and value of meaning operates philosophically than Nietzsche's own philosophical commitments and writing.

Heidegger's misreading of Nietzsche primarily occurs in his third and fourth series of \textit{Nietzsche} lectures. Here, Heidegger interprets Nietzsche as a metaphysical thinker, which required a false sense of totality and static nature of existence. For example, Heidegger writes that Nietzsche makes a distinction between the sensible ways existing appears and a supersensible explanation of existing as will to power. Heidegger also interprets Nietzsche as having a biological understanding of existence, by which he means that Nietzsche presumes a fixed picture of what “life” is and then imposes that image onto the meaning of existing. Heidegger misreads Nietzsche such that the forces at play in the will to power cannot supersede biological mandates of preservation and enhancement of life. This so-called biological understanding of existence relates to Heidegger's misreading of Nietzsche's will to power as “knowledge,” defined as a representational knowing of permanence and purpose. I have shown how this knowing of permanence and purpose is akin to consciousness. Heidegger's conclusion, in his fourth series of
Nietzsche lectures, is that Nietzsche's metaphysical thinking, biological understanding of existence, and ascription of the essence of existence (will to power) as a knowledge that knows permanence and purpose is symptomatic of nihilism.

For Heidegger, nihilism is a sort of forgetting of the essence of being, which presumes that being is meaningless. Nihilism can be both the resistance to disclosing any meaning of existing out of a belief that existing is and must remain meaningless and also the supposition that existing is empty of any meaning except that imposed on it through a sort of subjective declaration or activity. Heidegger further defines the nihilistic treatment of existing as a meaningless resource which may obtain meaning only through a subjective effort of optimization—a process he called technologization—as characteristic of the contemporary age or epoch called it “enframing.”

The problem of nihilism that emerges from this reading of Nietzsche becomes a focus for much of the remainder of Heidegger's works. Technicity, technologization, tool-mindedness, calculation, enframing, as well as Heidegger's critique of metaphysics and biological knowledge, are all concepts Heidegger dedicates many pages in his remaining oeuvre and are all related to Nietzsche's so-called nihilistic proffer.

But Nietzsche is not read by Heidegger adequately or charitably. Nietzsche's perspectivism is not metaphysical—at least insofar as any ontological thinking can be non-metaphysical. Heidegger's own philosophical project, even poised in direct refutation with metaphysical thinking, often takes him to metaphysical flights of fancy. It is in some sense indelible to any work on ontology, which seeks to address or account for the meaning of existing. Metaphysics, for both Heidegger and for Nietzsche, is an enterprise staked on deciphering the whole of existing, which, again for both thinkers, is not yet whole, nor is it discoverable as a whole.
For Nietzsche, existence is not static, fixed, nor should its essence be anthropomorphized in biological or subjectivist understanding. Rather, for Nietzsche, existing is irrational, transformational, and inexhaustibly meaningful in a dynamic interplay of forces he dubs will to power. Nietzsche is also a powerful critic of certain power-knowledges, like those of utility and purpose. His perspectivism encourages beings to discover their own unconscious and conscious predispositions and values, and undermines any presumptive superiority of conscious thinking by exalting the un- or pre-conscious aspects of thinking as all part of the interplay of forces in the will to power. Nietzsche was also not a nihilist, at least by his philosophical maturity. To this end, I have described how by 1886 Nietzsche made a “turn” away from his prior exhibited Kantian presuppositions, which Nietzsche calls romantic pessimism, toward Dionysian pessimism. The transformations in thinking—especially on the meaning of existing and the many, pre- and unconscious ways of thinking at interplay in the will to power—characterizes Nietzsche's turn and are what cure him of any nihilistic philosophical commitments.

What is the significance of Heidegger's misreading? By my third major part of the dissertation, I approached an answer motivated by the timing of Heidegger's misinterpretation. Heidegger is misreading Nietzsche while at the same time crafting works which come to be known as and associated with Heidegger's own “turn.” Although left unidentified by Heidegger, in many ways, Heidegger turns toward Nietzsche's thinking on an essence of existence as a play of forces. We can see the development of Heidegger's turn in his writings on art, especially “Origin of the Work of Art,” which he is completing during the time of the *Nietzsche* lectures. Heidegger's ontological look at art is at least an attempt to redress what Heidegger saw as problematic metaphysical accounts of art, and by extension, of existing itself. In short, Heidegger finds in art the essence of existing as the interplay of forces, which are concealing and unconcealing meaning.
Interestingly, Heidegger's first series of Nietzsche lectures, given in 1936, likened the will to power to art instead of (metaphysical, biological, and ultimately nihilistic) knowledge. Heidegger then, over the course of the next few years, develops his thinking on art as an interplay of forces, much like Nietzsche's will to power. Heidegger again returns to the lectern on Nietzsche in subsequent series and, by the third series delivered in 1938, casts Nietzsche's ownmost concept will to power as a type of knowledge rather than art.

Why does Heidegger begin to read Nietzsche as a foil to Heidegger's own project? Developing a better sense of why Heidegger is motivated to misread Nietzsche in this way will occupy my next research project. Is it a way to obscure Heidegger's own philosophical debt to Nietzsche's philosophy? Or, might Nietzsche—himself so emblematic of German thinking at this tumultuous time in the 1930s—serve as a prop for Heidegger to obscure his cultural critique of a disastrous state of affairs or philosophical misunderstanding writ large in his contemporary society? Heidegger is not usually one for such ontic or overtly socio-political concerns but these lectures are also two years after Heidegger's election and resignation as Rector of Freiberg University and his joining the Nazi party in 1933. Both of these efforts disclose a more political and social reformist interest than mere dispassion or quietude would suggest. Future paths will lead me to examine Heidegger's professional and political context in the 1930s and after, to gain better insight to his sense of professional precarity or any political interest in critique. It is well-known that Heidegger was an unapologetic member of the Nazi party and recent publication and scholarship surrounding the *Black Notebooks* once again rekindle interest in deciphering Heidegger's political commitments and both philosophical and more unsophisticated prejudices.

Further, the ways in which Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche reverberate through Heidegger's more staunchly critical philosophical work—on or against technologization, calculative thinking, metaphysics, enframing, etc—place Nietzsche in a central role to
Heidegger's critical writing through which he develops a stance which at points seems very nearly like socio-cultural critique.

I will also seek to develop a more thorough account of Heidegger's debt to Nietzsche's philosophy, tracing their consanguinity through more of Heidegger's works. Like many philosophers, Heidegger is not particularly transparent in his philosophical lineage. He does not often reference other writers, at least in a praiseworthy way. Further, the philosophical architecture of Heidegger's turn is strikingly akin to Nietzsche's turn and ascription of the essence of existence as a play of forces. On the face of it, this paints a picture of a thinker (Heidegger) who is generally reticent to attribute or allude to philosophical influence and may be especially so in the case of another thinker (Nietzsche) around whose philosophical thinking Heidegger himself turns. To do due justice to Heidegger's attention to detail and scholarship, to his philosophical profundity, I will need to undertake further research on the relationship Heidegger forges with Nietzsche throughout his corpus, as well as with other thinkers Heidegger either praises or criticizes. I hope in further efforts to capture the subtlety and erudition of Heidegger's approach to philosophical problems, while also fine-tuning my awareness of Heidegger's own motivations and activities. Heidegger's will to power is at work in his misreading of Nietzsche. This is not to say, as Heidegger suggests, that will to power is discerned by investigations which clarify one's conscious strivings. But to disclose Heidegger's will to power requires a careful approach to both the stated and unstated contexts and acts of Heidegger's thinking and writing. And this approach I hope to undertake in future projects.
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