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The Influence of The Armenian Diaspora on The American Foreign Policy

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The Influence of The Armenian Diaspora on The American Foreign Policy

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
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ABSTRACT

After the weakening of Turkish-Armenian relations and intensive American missionary activities, Armenians began to leave their home lands for educational, economic and political reasons. Emigration to the United States intensified in particular in response to the 1915 *Techir* (Relocation and Resettlement) Law. After achieving political rights in the United States, Armenian immigrants formed groups that began trying to influence U.S. government policy, working to win recognition of the alleged Armenian Genocide, financial assistance for Armenia, and other policies favorable to Armenia. The process that began resolution the alleged Armenia Genocide was removed from the historical dimension and moved to the political dimension and an international policy instrument was created.

In the United States, the Armenian Diaspora strives to influence government policy systematically through diaspora organizations that carefully follow the international scene and advocate for United States foreign policies in favor of Armenia. In this study, the ultimate aims of the Armenia Diaspora over American politics and policy-making, and the activities of the Armenian Lobby will be examined.

INTRODUCTION

The history of the Armenian people began in the 6th century B.C. The historical Armenia, or Great Armenia, included territory today found in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran and northern. Mentioned is made of an Armenian kingdom established near present-day Alanya, Mersin and Adana in Turkey between 1080 and 1375. Armenians lived under the domination of such great empires as those of the Romans, Byzantines and Ottomans and interacted with Byzantine, Ottoman, Persian and Arab cultures. The Armenian language, religion and culture have very long histories, and the Armenians have succeeded in maintaining their own languages, religions and traditions to this day (Miller and Miller, 1991).

After the fall of the Persian Empire (330 B.C.), the Armenians lived under the reign of Alexander the Great, and then in succession the Seleucids, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Seljuk Turks and finally the Ottoman Turks. Over this long period the Armenian were denied independence, living under the control of others and paying taxes to their overlords. Of all these rulers, the Armenians received the best treatment from the Turks; in fact, during the Ottoman Empire period, many Armenians were assigned positions in the upper echelons of the state (Arslan, 2006).

The aim of this thesis will be to describe the people of the Armenian Diaspora who today live in various countries all over the world. The thesis will address four main topics. In the first chapter, it will concentrate on the definition of the concept of diaspora. The second chapter will discuss the formation and historical development of the Armenian Diaspora. The third chapter

will be related the Armenian Diaspora's activities all over the world, with particular emphasis on lobby organizations and other institutions in the United States. The fourth and final chapter is devoted to an examination of the influence of the Armenian Diaspora on American foreign and domestic policy, and the goals of Armenian Diaspora organizations the U.S. political sphere.

This study can be summarized as follows: As a result of conflicts between Turks and Armenians and the influence of missionaries from the United States, Armenians migrated from Turkey in pursuit of better education and better lives elsewhere. They travelled to European countries and to the USA and settled down there after 1915, period of large scale immigration during the First World War. Having established themselves and achieved political rights in the countries in which they settled, Armenian communities, now including second and third generation descendants of the original immigrations, became politically active, criticizing Turkey and working to win political benefits of Armenia (Kantarci, 2004).

The United States is one of the most powerful countries in the world able to reframe the world order and reshape global policy. This thesis will analyze the activity of Armenian Diaspora organizations, focusing on their influence over U.S. foreign policy. This research concludes that America is a multi-ethnic country, a nation of immigrants, and its development is strongly influenced by the activities of the advocates of various ethnic groups. While the Armenian Diaspora comprises different groups and organizations working at both federal and state levels, the analysis will focus on the activities of the US Federal government, though there is no doubt that state level contacts and political activism by individuals throughout the United States contributes to the end result and accomplishments of the Armenian Diaspora.

In addition, I would like to mention the impact of the Armenian lobby and ethnic groups to see clearly the big picture. Lobbying is an important and historical component of American

political life and can play a key role in the political affairs of the country. The term “Armenian lobby” is used to describe the coalition of all special interest groups and individuals who seek to influence US foreign policy in support of Armenia, the Armenians, and their interests. The Armenian lobby organizations have achieved success in influencing American legislators to favor Armenian interests. The Armenian lobby consists of domestic institutions such as the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) and the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA). These two institutions have similar lobbying purposes, mostly revolving around improving US relations with Armenia in terms of assistance, blocking aid to Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as their ultimate goal, the recognition of the alleged Armenian Genocide (Zarifian, 2014).

Although these two groups have similar goals, they have different approaches in supporting causes related to Armenia. The ANCA focuses mostly on grassroots initiatives to influence Armenian-American voters whereas the AAA focuses on raising donations from influential Armenians in America. The competition between these two groups creates a hyper-mobilization of resources in the Armenian community. Therefore, the aim of this study is to show that the Armenian-American lobby has achieved considerable success with regard to political and material support from Congress. Such achievements include increased support for official the US Government recognition of the alleged Armenian Genocide of 1915-1921, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, maintenance of section 907 of the Freedom of Support Act, and annual aid for the state of Armenia (Tuncer, 2006).

Methodology

This thesis relies upon the methodologies of historical analysis, discourse analysis, case studies, and process-tracing to determine the development of the Armenian Diaspora. In

addition, this research is the screening model because after it was gotten information regarding Armenian population, American assistances, other countries' populations and as a term Armenia word that mentioned in Congress, it was scanned to get clear data. Data on the subject of the study has been collected from books, magazines, newspapers, and encyclopedias. I will provide an overview of the historical development of the Armenian Diaspora in order to track the causes and reasons that have led to the current status within the American political landscape of the alleged Armenian Genocide, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and aid policy towards the South Caucasus region (Beach,2018).

The research design is qualitative though some components of the research utilize numerical data mostly available through U.S. government websites. Since this research does not utilize a quantitative data collection instrument, the analysis relies mainly on the use of secondary data available through congressional records and other sources. Thus, the research methodology used primarily comprises content analysis of documents and expert interviews and quantitative analysis of budgetary data covering the period 1990-1999 and the last 3 years (2016-2017-2018).

Data collection consisted of Internet mining and expert thoughts, conducted with various experts, both in the Republic of Armenia and in the United States of America. Various U.S. governmental websites (Government Printing Office, Department of State, Library of Congress, foreignassistance.gov), as well as Armenian American community websites (Armenian National Committee of America and Armenian Assembly of America), were mined for information pertaining to the topic.

Experts were selected based on their role or level of awareness of the interrelationships among the different players, including the US Congress, US Congressional Armenian Caucus,

and the Armenian lobby, including political action committees and cultural and church organizations.

My research dedicated to relations between the Armenian Diaspora and the US government directly or indirectly concerned with the alleged Armenia genocide and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. I will investigate the multilateral relationships between America and Armenia, America and Turkey, America and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey, and Armenia and Azerbaijan from the perspective of institutional links established between them, taking into consideration the role of different formal institutions used by such lobby organizations in the course of these conflicts. The principles of deductive analysis will be used to analyze the current state of the conflict over the alleged Armenian genocide and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and synthesis methods will be applied to forecast future developments in these conflicts and America's behavior toward these events.

Bibliographic sources used for the purpose of conducting my research include publicly available printed scientific publications, and information available on the web. I have used publications by authors supporting Armenia or Turkey in the conflict over the alleged Armenia Genocide issue and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and third-party authors who have tried to remain objective in their analysis of those events. This is crucial for forming a complete image of the current state of things in the region and drawing a comprehensive conclusion on the role of different parties involved in the conflict.

To investigate the current and potential future role of the USA in the resolution of the alleged Armenia Genocide, I will analyze not only official U.S. government documents but also expert opinions clarifying the ways American legislative decisions were reached. In the single research model, a research study was conducted with discourse analysis. The data used in this

study have been obtained as a result of the investigation of the studies conducted on the subject up to the present time. However, in the analysis of Armenian lobbies, the official websites of the lobby organizations were also used to a great extent (Beach, 2018).

The data used in the fourth part of the study vary in terms of sources. The studies dealing with the international relations of the Armenian Issue were accessed through the use of libraries and internet resources. The draft laws submitted to the U.S. Congress reviewed in this section and the 24 April messages of the U.S. Presidents have been made available via the Internet at the official website of the Armenian Studies Institute. The remainder is from the official websites of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the U.S. Library of Congress.

Scope of Study

This thesis will be limited to the Armenian Diaspora in the U.S. focusing on the patterns and achievements of its political lobby, including its impact on U.S. foreign policy. Analysis of the results achieved by the Armenian lobby will be related to development programs and other types of assistance provided by the U.S. government in and for Armenia, as well as corresponding budget appropriations to the Republic of Armenia.

It must be noted that the Armenian lobby in the U.S. spends considerable time, financial resources and effort on other issues on its political agenda. The wideness of this thesis allows expansion of the research into other areas and activities. Issues related to the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, for example, allow a significant portion of the Armenian lobbyists' efforts throughout major states of the United States.

Definition of Terms

- Pressure Group: Various definitions of pressure groups emphasize different aspects of the concept. According to Akad (1976), a pressure group is a pluralist group which consciously organizes various social forces in the society, transmits social interests to power in the pursuit of their own interests and shares the decision-making process with it, and determines its true will and gives its legitimacy to the administration (p.64). The author Turan (1977) argues that a pressure group is a community that perceives that the members have common interests and tries to influence the political system without aiming to take power (p.132). Meynaud (1975), with a more general view, draws attention to the efforts made by the public authorities to make their decisions appropriate to the interests or ideas of any category of society (p.5).
- Lobbying: Lobbying refers to the conscious work carried out in order to ensure that the management takes decisions in the legal sense. These works cover all activities aimed at influencing legislators and civil servants. Activities can be carried out by organized groups. According to Ari (2000), lobbying is to influence the activities of decision-makers and to make decisions favorable to the interests lobby justifies (p.156). It is also possible to define lobbying as simply supporting a point of view by individuals or groups.

CHAPTER 1: WHAT IS THE MEANING OF DIASPORA?

Introduction

It has been suggested that the concept of diaspora provides an alternative to the theological and nation-state understanding of migration and assimilation of the diaspora from the point of definition, classification and current point of activity. However, there is no consensus on what the word “diaspora” means. From this point of view, diaspora emerged as a controversial concept in terms of definition. In the course of time it is clear that there is a transition from classical to contemporary, from the local to the global, or from the primitive to the modern. Diaspora, homeland and nationalism emerge as conflicting, contradictory and controversial concepts. The most important point here is what these concepts evoke the perception of Armenian Diaspora.

The Term “Diaspora”

“Diaspora” is derived from the Greek word *διασπορά* (Strong, 1890). Etymologically, it is a combination of “dia” (*δια*), meaning “scattering and spreading,” and “spora” meaning “seeds.” It is translated in Turkish as *kopuntu* (Turkish Dictionary, 2005) referring to “breakage.” When used in the botanical sense, the term literally means the scattering and spreading seeds to soil, but it is most often used in the metaphorical sense of the scattering of a people from their homeland.

The word “diaspora” was used with this meaning by Sophocles, Herodotus, and Thucydides in the early 5th century BC to describe Greek colonies in Asia Minor and the Mediterranean in the Archaic period, 800-600 BC (Mansel, 1971). In the third century BC, Jewish scholars in Alexandria applied its use in the present sense in the translation of the Old Testament into Greek. This sacred book was known as the *Septuaginta* which means seventy because 70 people worked on translating the Old Testament into Greek (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, 1974). The concept of diaspora is mentioned in 20 places in the *Septuaginta*. The use of the term “diaspora” in this translation, however, is not related to the Jewish exile and the cause of the Jewish people, which began after the Babylonians captured Jerusalem in 586 BC. Until recently, the concept of diaspora, which is mentioned in three places in the Bible, was used within the Christian Traditions.

Alfred (2015) observes that historically, diaspora has come to be associated with “migration, exile, nostalgia, the maintenance of traditions and tongues, the dream of returning to the homeland,” and in the specific context to represent the “mandatory deportation of the Jewish people” who maintained a national identity in their new land (p.88). The concept of diaspora, and later, began to be used for Jews living outside Israel.

The homeland can become a mythical place in the diasporic imagination, and in this sense, it is possible to visit the geographical region from which one has been exiled, while one’s “place of origin” remains a place to which one cannot return (Krikorian, 2007). The diaspora comprises first-generation immigrants and the following generations of children born outside the mythical home country. Thus, the Diaspora represents people who are often common citizens of their country of birth but, do not equate their motherland with their geographical, physical, homeland (Yamashiro, 2013). From an international perspective, the diaspora focuses a minority

group that has migrated to a foreign country but who, due to ethnic origins, maintain the roots of their tangible and spiritual lives to the country of their or their people's origin (Singh, 2008). The sociological meaning of diaspora can be expressed simply as "immigrant communities scattered in different lands."

As a concept, diaspora has moved farther away from its original botanical meaning to describe the historical process of human communities departing from their original countries and settling in other regions, which has become quite widespread in recent years. Historically, the concept of diaspora was mainly associated with the Jews, who came to mind when diaspora was mentioned, calling up painful events such as forced migration. This narrow frame was expanded over time, and the concept evolved from referring only to forced migrations to include voluntary emigrations of ethnic groups, refugees, political asylum seekers, quest workers, and other groups of immigrants (Clifford, 1994).

The expansion of the use of the term diaspora, besides increasing its influence and power, also created confusion about the concept.

There are basically two perspectives on the concept of diaspora. Among these views is the traditional diasporic approach taken by diasporic researchers like Robin Cohen, William Safran, and James Clifford stand. For example, Cohen (1996) identifies the following meanings:

1. To disperse, generally traumatically, from their homeland to two or more territories.
2. Seeking a job, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions.

3. To have a common memory of the lives, dates, and achievements of the homeland
4. To have a covalent bond for living in an idealized old dwelling and the continuation, restoration, security and welfare of this dwelling
5. To gain a common excitement in the return movement
6. To maintain a strong consciousness for many years based on certain feelings, common history, and common fate belief
7. The fact that the relationship to the hosts societies with the society is problematic. The fact that the host country does not accept the diaspora group, or any other troubles are experienced.
8. To approach each other with sympathies and solidarity with their fellow countrymen in other countries
9. To enrich the countries where they live, which tolerate pluralism (p.507-508).

Safran (1991) includes these characteristics in his definition:

1. To spread to two or more regions or geographies from a living place.
2. To have a common history, point of view, and myths about the homeland of the people who are scattered in places different from their place of origin.
3. To feel completely isolated from the regions in which they live.
4. To have the belief that the lands they or their ancestors emigrated from are their original homelands and that when conditions are appropriate, they will one day return to those lands.
5. To have a belief that the security and prosperity of the original homeland must be restored.

6. Maintaining relations with the motherland. The continuation of the relationship with the homeland has a significant influence on the assistance of the racial consciousness and the people of the same race (p.83).

Recent events have necessitated a new perspective on diaspora approaches, especially since the 1980s when the foundations were laid for technological developments experienced in the 1990s and 2000s and associated with transnationalism and globalization, which have strengthened diaspora communities' ties with their homelands. Regarding the modern perspective on diaspora, Michele Reis (2004) states:

“While the classical diaspora is directly associated with exile, as is the case with Jews, Palestinians, Africans, and Armenians, the classical diaspora means that it is not a definite break from the motherland, nor is the diasporic group permanently severed in relation to the contemporary diaspora ...” “Contrary to the classical diaspora, the 'new diaspora' encompasses diasporic societies on a broader scale, and their reasons for disintegration are far more diverse than in the classical period, especially with respect to globalization” (p.83).

According to Safran's (1991) approach, diasporas comprise individuals who have a collective memory, vision, or myth about their origins. These individuals, despite their physical location, their past experiences and their successes, idealize their ancestral homeland as their home and regard it as the place to which they or their descendants should eventually return, when conditions are appropriate (Laycock, 2012). A diaspora thus consists not only of the immigrants of previous generations, but also their progeny who retroactively claim the ancestral homeland as their place of origin. Diasporas, along with other transnational phenomena, are concepts generally associated with globalization (Bjorklund, 2003). Diaspora can also be thought

of as an analytical tool used to understand relationships between places and beliefs beyond the migration and ethnic dimensions of people (Gallo, 2010). If the key word of diasporic identity is “home,” it suggests the, desire to return home. Diasporic identity involves a process that seeks citizenship while rejecting reform, transformation, fragmentation and assimilation (Singh, 2008).

The characteristics attributed to the concepts of diaspora and homeland in the classical sense have lost their importance, while the language categories such as Francophone, Anglophone, and Lusophone have been accepted as “Community Diasporas.” Brubaker (2005) states that from the point of view of a homeland, immigrant groups have been conceptualized in terms of diaspora even if they have been largely assimilated (p.3). In the academic literature, many diasporas have been categorized by nationality such as the Belarusian, Brazilian, Cambodian, Colombian, Egyptian, British, Estonian, Ethiopian, Gypsy, Hawaiian, Igbo, Iranian, Iraqi, Japanese, Javanese, Kazakh, Latvian, Lithuanian, Mayan, Polish, Romanian, Scottish, Senegalese, Somalian, Soviet , Sudanese, Syrian, Tutsi and Ukrainian diasporas, as well as politically, such as the Dixie Diaspora, North American Diaspora, White Diaspora, Liberal Diaspora, Conservative Diaspora, Gay Diaspora, Red Sea Diaspora, Numerical Diaspora, Fundamental Diaspora and Terrorist Diaspora. Yet other diasporas are associated with religious communities including Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Confucian, Huguenot (French Protestant), Muslim and Catholic Diasporas (Brubaker, 2005).

Finally, the present use of the diaspora also suggests that seed laid on the soil yields its own identity by spreading to different spots on the soil. Assimilation to the new location results in loss of identification with the homeland. However, it should be noted that in the current era of technological development, which enables living physically in one location while remaining

communicatively connected with another, diaspora communities are more resistant to threats of losing their identities and becoming assimilated into their host countries (Rosse, 1991).

Interaction Between Diaspora and the Nationality

The interaction between the diaspora and the host nation takes place in the form of the influence of the nation on the diaspora under normal conditions. The nation may display a protective attitude toward the diaspora's citizens living away from their motherland. In this case, the nation may be economically supportive of the diaspora and support its political rights. But this situation does not develop in relation to some diaspora-nation relations, in which the nation may exercise dominance over the diaspora and direct its activities. In terms of the position presented here, the focus is on the interaction between the Armenian Diaspora and the Armenian Nation, and in this part, we will try to show a different network of relations from the normal.

Although different definitions are used, as I mentioned above, the concept of diaspora is generally used to describe the situation of group of people and individuals who live separate from their historical soil, which includes Turks, Kurds, Jews, Armenians, Chinese, Africans, Palestinians and many other nationalities. Among these, groups from some nations have come to the forefront with their numbers, economic significance, political influence, and lobbying institutions. Armenian are among these prosperous diaspora groups. The Armenian diaspora is spread across many countries including the USA, France, Lebanon, Russia, Canada and South America. In the countries where the Armenian diaspora exists, Armenians are trying to teach their fellow citizens about Armenian culture and identity at the same time that they are making efforts to improve their political, social and economic relations with the countries in which they live.

Since the late 1980s, references to the Armenian diaspora have appeared in many publications, especially in European countries and the USA. Turkey's interest in securing the Ottoman state and the possibility of Armenian relocation triggered the regeneration and strengthening of the Armenian diaspora, resulting in the presence of socio-culturally strong and organized groups in many countries, especially the USA. Thus, it can be said that the Armenian diaspora exhibits a character molded by the historical events, discourse and actions related to the problem that caused it.

The Armenian Diaspora is very eager to influence, even shape, Armenia foreign policy. Hence, Armenian Diaspora are working as a natural sub-department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia to meet some expenses of Armenian embassies and other representations. However, this willingness is not universally shared in Armenia because it is not usual that people who live outside of a country determine the foreign policy of that country. Because a population's needs are determined according to the geography of a country, only those who live there can understand these needs, so it is considered impossible for those who live in far-away countries such as the USA and France to know the needs of Armenia and understand the realities of the Caucasus. No matter how much they try to understand and support Armenia, they cannot go beyond satisfying their diaspora needs. Moreover, a second handicap of Diaspora Armenians emerges when they try to shape Armenian foreign policy. Because external politics is the balancing of ideals and truths, the processes of making concessions that compromise ideals and meet basic needs require pragmatic thinking and realistic actions, which may not be possible for diaspora Armenians. The Armenians abroad, who think that they can be an important intermediary to realization of their dreams of Armenia's independence, began to impose their goals on the Armenian state, which Armenia cannot fully accept or fulfill. Thus, the Armenian

government does not want to respond to these impositions. According to Armenians in Armenia, the Armenians of the victims of a genocide, and the Turks who still deny their statehood are responsible. Unless the alleged genocide is acknowledged by the Turks, Armenia cannot be regarded as reaching its foreign policy goals. However, many diaspora organizations are against any interactions with Turkey, at least for a temporary period or until Armenia has received and acknowledgement of the genocide from Turkey. According to them, in such a case it would be consorting with a “bloody killer.” In brief, the diaspora Armenians are extremely strict about communications with Turkey, and if they make concessions to problems which are related to Turkey, they feel they are betraying their Armenian identity. However, Turkey is one of Armenia's largest neighbors and the most important power in the region. It can be easily understood that relations with Turkey are of vital importance for Armenia, to overcome its economic and political crises a position that it is not possible for diaspora Armenians living thousands of kilometers away to realize. As a matter of fact, this attitude has become a topic of frequent criticism in Armenia recently (Celik, 2017).

It has been suggested that the concept of diaspora provides an alternative to the theological and nation-state understanding of migration and assimilation of the diaspora from the point of definition, classification and current point of activity. However, there is no conceptual definition about diaspora. Therefore, it is necessary to rethink diasporas as identity-based actors or to critically examine transnational social movements and their current theoretical approaches (Celik, 2017).

As we will mention at the next chapter, the Armenian Diaspora refers to Armenians living as citizens of those countries and in many countries around the world. According to Baibourtian (2009), The formation of the Armenian Diaspora is taken to the 11th century with its

historical background. However, the Armenian Diaspora was defined mainly in 1915 Tehcir (Relocation and Resettlement) law and later (Koinova, 2011). Moreover, we will dwell on causes that show immigration of Armenian population to the USA that is the center of Armenian Diaspora.

CHAPTER 2: WHAT IS THE FORMATION PROCESS OF THE ARMENIAN DIASPORA?

Introduction

Table 1: Armenian Settled and Their Population in 1923 (McCarthy, 1963).

Places of Settlement	Number of Armenians
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)	400.000
Greece	45.000
France	30.000
Bulgaria	20.000
Cyprus	2.500
Lebanon	50.000
Iraq	25.000
Palestine and Jordan	10.000
Other European Countries	2.000
Egypt	40.000
Syria	100.000
North America	35.000
Others	1.000

accepted in Lausanne as one nation, the Armenian diaspora from Anatolia reached its real power. By the 1920s, Armenians were a nation spread all over the world. Armenians now live in many geographical areas, including the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Latin America, and North America. Table 1 and Table 2 show the places where the Armenians settled in 1923

The foundations of the Armenian Diaspora were laid in the last days of the Ottoman Empire. In particular, the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 led large populations of Armenians to settle outside their borders in numbers that gave them local influence (Mirak,1983). In 1918, the Ottoman Empire accepted defeat at the hands of the Allies, and until the Turkish War of Independence (1919) started and the new Turkish state was

Table 2: Armenians Settled and Their Population in 1926 (Schahgaldian, 1980)

Places of Settlement	Number of Armenians
Soviet Armenia	750.000
USSR Countries	820.000
USA and Canada	120.000
Lebanon	50.000
Iran	140.000
France	35.000
Turkey	125.000

and 1926. Following is a discussion the formation and causes of the Armenian Diaspora that may affect the occurrence of the Armenian Diaspora, and specifically causes of immigrating to the US.

Table 2 shows the distribution of the Armenian population, but lacks data on such countries as Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Bulgaria, Austria, Czech Republic, Italy, Poland, Brazil, Palestine, and Argentina, all of which had an Armenian population in 1926. It is estimated by some sources that the number of Armenians in Bulgaria exceeded 22,000, while others put the number at 46,000. Some have suggested that there were 43,000 Armenians in for Romania and 79,000 in Greece and the island of Cyprus during the period (Ozdemir, 2006). According to Panossian (2006), in the mid-1920s, there were 300,000 Armenians in the Middle East and the Balkans, and 250-300,000 Armenians in North America, Western Europe and Australia (p.318).

We do not know exactly the size of the world Armenian population in the 2000s. Nevertheless, an Armenian source stated that there are more than 10 million Armenians in the world. According to this source, there are about 3,000,000 in Armenia, more than 1,000,000 in Russia, about 1-1,500,000 in the US, between 250,000-750,000 in France, 90,000-11,000 in Germany, 70,000-80,000 in Syria, and 120,000 Armenians in Iran (Armenia, 2017).

Armenian Diaspora, Occurrence and Geographical Distribution

Since the late 1980s, the Armenian Diaspora has been sub-divided into the **External Diaspora** (the Big Diaspora) and the **Internal Diaspora**, especially in European countries and the USA. The external diaspora refers to Armenians who migrated to Western countries. The internal diaspora refers to Armenians who migrated to the former Soviet Union of Socialist Republics (USSR).

To keep the Great Armenia Project alive, Armenians refer to the Armenian Diaspora comprising Armenians who live scattered in various parts of the world outside of Armenia, as well as laying claim to territories not only in the Armenian state in the Caucasus but also parts of Turkey, Georgia, Iran, and Azerbaijan (Taskiran,2003). Members of the Armenian Diaspora in the West defend these views and are working towards their acceptance.

On the other hand, many Armenians who are technically considered as members of the diaspora do not define themselves as such. In particular, Armenians in Moscow do not identify themselves as members of the diaspora. In the past, there was only one homeland, the USSR, and they lived in Moscow, the capital of this country. Tbilisi and Istanbul are places where modern Armenian culture and many of the institutions of this culture were born. The Armenians in Javakheti (Georgia) live in a place close to Armenia so that they do not feel themselves to be members of the diaspora. Most of the new migrants from Armenia and Azerbaijan have difficulty in seeing themselves as part of the diaspora (Libardian, 1999). The Armenian Diaspora has been a constantly changing phenomenon.

Historical Development of the Armenian Diaspora

1915 *Tehcir* (Relocation and Resettlement) Law (May 27, 1915)

Tehcir, which is a word of Arabic origin, in the Qur'an's *Surat al-Hasr* carries the meaning of migrating from one place to another (Suslu, 1990). The name of the law, which is famous for *Tehcir*, is actually the law of relocation and resettlement. There is no such conceptual provision in Contemporary Law or Western Law. Western writers have chosen terms that refer to exile (Suslu, 1990). *Tehcir* does not mean deportation or exile, as people move within the borders of their country. This is an error in the philological aspect as well as in historical terms.

The term, concept in Ottoman Law, refers to the temporary or permanent emigration of a person or community to a more appropriate and problem-free place within the boundaries of the State in order to save them from the negativity of others. For such reasons such as the revolts of the Armenians, their attitudes and behaviors, and their cooperation with enemies, the Ottoman Empire decided on the relocation of Armenians to ensure the security of their lives and property of and also to compel their cooperation against the invasion of Eastern Anatolia by the Russians. Many Armenians were thus relocated to Syria, Lebanon and northern Iraq (Ozgiray, 2003).

The general opinion about the formation of the Armenian Diaspora is that the Armenians were forced to emigrate after the Ottoman Empire's *Tehcir* law, and therefore they moved to many regions of the world. (Arslan, 2006).

The Ottoman Government implemented the law in light of the circumstances of the day. The four-point law includes measures to be taken by military units for those who oppose government administration in the event of war. The process of the implementation of the law is described in the following section.

While the Interior Ministry took some measures such as the arrest of rebel Armenians, the governments of Russia, France and the United Kingdom, which issued a joint statement on May 24, 1915, claimed that Armenians had been exposed to insufficient living conditions in East and South East Anatolia. After the international attention of the law in this way, Talat Pasha sent a letter to the Prime Minister on May 26, 1915 concerning relocation, explaining that after the Armenian rebellions were pointed out, it was decided to transfer the Armenians in the war zones to other regions. This proposal was placed on the agenda of the parliament by the Prime Ministry and was put into practice. The Prime Minister stated that the displacement initiated for the security of the state was in place and expressed the necessity of linking it to a procedure and

rules. Thus, the *Tehcir* Law that was issued by the Assembly on May 27, 1915 was published in the official newspaper *Takvim-i Vekayi* on June 1, 1915 and entered into force (Akter, 2007). The *Tehcir* Law contained the following rationale and conclusions:

1. The military measures against those opposing government orders, national defense, and the protection of peace and against those organizing armed attacks and resistance and killing rebels during aggression and uprising in wartime.
2. The Army, the Independent Army Corps, the Division Commanders may transfer the inhabitants of the villages and towns, for reason of military necessities or if they suspect espionage and treachery, individually or collectively.
3. This law is valid from the date of publication
4. People who are responsible for the implementation of the law are specified (Gürün, 2001).

As can be seen, this law not only applies to the Armenians but is valid against any communities within the boundaries of the Ottoman state, that is, communities who do not obey the Ottoman government, those who resist with arms, and whoever spies for the enemy. The *Tehcir* Law is thus a law against violence, which is enforced purely to protect the state and public order. The most important feature is that no specific ethnic group or class is mentioned or implied in the text of the law.

Within the scope of the law, Muslim, Greek, and Armenian citizens of the Ottoman Empire were dispatched to other places. In a letter sent by the Prime Ministry to the Ministry of

the Interior, Harbiye and the Ministry of Finance on May 30, 1915, how to apply the immigration is described in detail and summarized as follows:

- The displaced persons will be transported comfortably, security provided to protect their lives and property, to the regions assigned to them;
- Until they settle in their new homes, their job will be covered by the Immigrant Allowance;
- In accordance with their old financial situation they will be given real estate and land;
- For those in need, housing will be built by the government; seedlings, tools, and equipment shall be provided to the farmer;
- The movable goods they left behind will be delivered to them; the value of real estate and other assets will be determined, and their monetary compensation shall be paid to them;
- Such income-generating places as olive groves, mulberry fields, vineyards and orange orchards, shops, khans, factories and warehouses, will be sold or rented by auction, and the money raised paid to the treasury to be paid to the owners (Bilgi, 1999).

Talat Pasha always stated that the measures taken against the Armenians were not intended to destroy them and that the main aim was to prevent them from engaging in activities against the government. Therefore, measures were taken against such negativity as the destruction of the Armenians during the relocation (Bakar, 2003).

The arrangements made for such issue as the security of the deportees, the assessment of the value of the goods left behind by the Armenians subjected to the relocation, and the delivery of the goods, food, and sheltering needs of the Armenians in their places of destination were reported to the authorities (Oke, 2001). The relocation decision, which was initially limited to the Gregorian Armenians in the war zones, was extended to a number of Catholic and Protestant Armenians living in Anatolia due to the creation of an internal war environment incited by the Armenian leaders.

Diaspora Before *Tehcir* (Relocation and Resettlement) Law

The *Tehcir* Law was one of the important factors that increased in the numbers of Armenian Diaspora, but there were other factors in the formation and historical development of the Armenian Diaspora. The existence of Armenians as a diaspora, which is a society that has been forced to migrate for centuries, is not entirely based on migrations that took place after the First World War. In the early 11th century, the eastern regions of Anatolia, which were claimed by Armenian, were the scene of aggressive and prolonged occupations and migrations. As a result of these conflicts, the number of Armenians in the region was reduced, and Armenians became a minority. Meanwhile, many Armenians, mostly merchants and intellectuals, migrated to cities in Russia, Poland, Western Europe, and India. This was the first Armenian Diaspora (Mutluer, 2003).

Armenians, who had a very comfortable life under the Ottoman rule and were especially successful as merchants, were considered the “faithful nation,” the “faithful people” and became a part of the country (Suslu, 1990). When the Ottoman Empire began to lose its power and was economically weakened, the Armenians, who had their freedom feelings stirred by the influence

of their foreign powers, began to lose their characteristic loyalty to Ottoman State and began launching independence movements, revolts, and rebellions (Bakalian, 1993).

In the 19th century, rebellions among the Armenians developed from two sources. The first one is the Mekhitarist doctrine developed by the Armenian priests (Nalbandian, 1963). Secondly, the social-political developments of the 19th century, that resulted from the French Revolution (1789), had a major effect on educated Armenians. Among the Armenians, religious officials of the Mekhitarist doctrine emphasized the importance of Armenian history and language in their teaching. The Nersesian College in Tbilisi (1823) and the Lazarian College in the Lazarevski Institute of Moscow (1816) were the most influential educational institutions in the formation of the Armenian national consciousness. Mikayel Nalbantyan, Khachadur Abovyan and Stepan Nazaryan were among the educators working in these educational institutions (Suny et al, 2005). Like many Ottoman citizens in the 19th century, many Armenian youths went to Europe for education. The first Armenian students who went abroad to study went to the Mekhitarist Monastery in Italy and then to Paris. These students lived in an atmosphere heavily influenced by the French Revolution and were influenced by the ideas of thinkers such as Lemartine, Chateaubriand, Victor Hugo, De Musset, Aguste Comte, Michelet, Guizot and Quinet. Some students witnessed the revolutions that took place in France in 1830 and 1848, then returned to Istanbul with a stronger love for independence (Nalbandian, 1963). The Armenian Nation Ordinance of 1863 included regulations defining the authority of the Patriarch while describing the situation of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. The establishment of the Armenian National Assembly was seen as a turning point by the progressive Armenians.

In addition to these improvements, a second development was the introduction of Protestant missionaries in primary schools, colleges and other educational institutions in

Armenia. Communication with the Armenian newspapers also improved. Books on Armenian history enabled readers to compare the current conditions with the past and opened up new horizons for nationalism. These developments led to an evolution in a political Armenian consciousness, from a situation which was entirely based on a cultural romanticism, to an action-based program (Suny et al., 2005). It continued with the establishment of various associations that formed the Armenian committees. The first of these associations was the Charitable Community established in 1860. This community aimed to glorify Cilicia. This community was followed by the Community of the Devoted. Apart from these, many associations were established in 1870 School Lovers Society, in 1876 Araratli Society, in 1879 East and Cilicia Societies, in 1880 Society of Armed and Women Society in Erzurum, in 1881 Motherland Defender Society, in 1881 Union of Independence for Liberation (one of the most secret societies) in Van, and in 1882 Black Cross Society. Araratli, School Lovers and Eastern societies later merged under the name of Armenian Unity Association. This community brought together Turkish and Russian Armenians under the same roof to achieve their national goals (Gurun, 1983). In addition to the committees mentioned above, many societies were established whose only aim has been to establish an Armenian state in eastern Anatolia. The main activity areas were Istanbul and Anatolia (Suslu, 1990). In order to reach this goal, the policy of all of them is to spread feelings of nationalism among the Armenians by applying all kinds of means to attract the intervention of the Western states.

All these societies aimed to educate young people primarily by opening schools in Eastern Anatolia. The Ottoman Government also saw the educational activities of these societies as their natural right and did not think that these societies could then participate in activities harmful to the state. Therefore, the Ottoman Government allowed Armenian societies to open

schools. In fact, in 1880 the Cilician Society opened a school in Zeytun (Suleymanli) where male and female students studied together. In 1881, the Union of Armenian Societies opened a branch here. The number of schools opened by the Cilicia Society was 11, and the community budget was almost 3307 Ottoman gold. In addition, the Eastern or School Lovers' Association, 5 schools and 1386.28 Ottoman gold; Araratlı Society had 8 schools and about 423 Ottoman gold. The Armenian Unity Association aimed to spread the ideas of national spirit and independence among the Armenians. Russian Armenian and Russian consuls provided great aid to the Armenian Unity Association. One of the Armenian societies mentioned above, the Motherland Defenders 'community founded in Erzurum in 1881 had formed partisan troops. These partisan units consisted of more than 400 people and they were regularly given military training and equipped with weapons and ammunition. About the activities of this society Russia's Ambassador to Erzurum, A. Deneti, in his report prepared in 1882, stated that the society was conducting an effort to raise an armed rebellion against the Turkish administration and that there were declarations and weapons during the searches. Moreover, the members of the community, taking their guns in their hands, swore that they would protect the interests of the homeland (Armenia). The activities of these societies were not limited to this, but in 1862, 1865, 1875, 1878, 1879 in Zeytun, in 1862 in Van, in 1863 in Mus, in 1865 in the Carsancak played a role in the Armenian rebellion (Ozsavli, 2012). After these uprisings, Ottoman Armenians migrated to the Caucasus, Lebanon, Egypt, Bulgaria, France, and the USA (Bakalian, 1993).

Diaspora After *Tehcir* (Relocation and Resettlement) Law

It has been observed that Armenians who left Anatolia before 1939 were more concentrated in areas with neighboring Turkey. In Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, and Jordan some small

Armenian Diasporas were also formed. In the West, a remarkable growth of the Armenian Diaspora occurred in Cyprus Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania in 1910s (Arslan, 2006).

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the diaspora was perceived as a temporary measure as Armenians took refuge in places provided by Armenian churches, associations and families. About 10% of the Armenians living in diaspora in 1946-1947 returned to Armenia. These returns to Armenia were short-lived, however, and for various reasons, Armenians who came from the previous diaspora eventually migrated to Great Britain, Canada, Australia and especially to the United States (Arslan, 2006).

After the end of World War II, the orientation of the diaspora began to change. From 1945s onwards, in the light of the developments in the world, the Armenian Diaspora's face was turned from the east to the west. Thus, the process of Westernization began in the diaspora, while the oriental diaspora (Romania, Palestine, Iraq, Egyptian diaspora) began to decline. In this period, France, other countries of the European Union (EU), and especially the United States, were destinations for Armenians of the Diaspora; Canada and Australia attracted Armenians who had been living in the eastern regions and in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Bruneau, 2010).

After 1915, the Armenian population was scattered, especially to Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Iran, Ethiopia, Far East, Latin America (especially Argentina), Greece, Italy and England, and today, the Armenian Diaspora is globalized. That is to say, they reside as large communities in Russia, USA, France, Georgia and Lebanon. They have been scattered from Kolkata to Los Angeles and Buenos Aires, from St. Petersburg to Sydney for years. Population statistics are not clear, but according to some calculations there are about two million in Russia, more than one

million in the US, 500 thousand in France, 350 thousand in Georgia, 250 thousand in Iran, 190 thousand in Syria, 140 thousand in Lebanon, and 130 thousand in Argentina (Baibourtian, 2009).

Why Did the Armenian Population Choose to Emigrate to America?

In the 19th century, Armenians who were in the Ottoman Empire began to migrate to the United States by way of American merchants and missionaries. Until 1914, Armenian immigrants constituted a considerable Armenian population in the US, and the establishment of several Armenian churches indicates that these Armenians represented an important religious community (Kantarci, 2004).

The first questions to address concern when and why Armenians emigrated to the United States. Pursuing these questions help explain the basis for the emigration of this era. Most Armenian writers today claim that the migration originated in the need to escape Turkish hostility under pressures of the Ottoman Empire against them. Following is an attempt to explain the activities of the Armenians in the United States up to the present by examining the reasons for their immigration.

American Missionaries

The answer to the question of when and why Armenians migrated to the United States is that it is the Protestant missionaries who organized the first Armenian migrations from the Ottoman Empire to the United States. In the 1820s, the first American missionaries came to the Ottoman Empire and Armenians were selected as targets. The students who were educated in missionary schools started to think about going to the USA to complete their education. Most of the students who went to the United States did not return. Following the students, traders began to travel to the US. In later times, the poorer Armenians, whom we could call Anatolian peasants,

migrated to the US. Although the number of Armenians who live in the USA is almost 2000 in the years 1880-1890, diaspora Armenians began to organize and form associations in the USA (Selvi, 2003).

In 1823 the United States declared the Monroe Doctrine, the basic principle of which was that “America is for Americans,” in order to protect the acquired independence and keep the riches of the land from being colonized by Europe. The Monroe Doctrine, which was intended to separate the United States from the politics of the old world, created the dilemma that while on the one hand it prevented further European colonization or involvement in European conflicts, on the other hand it protected the colonies already established and therefore sanctioned the rapid colonization that the European states had undertaken (Kantarci, 2004).

The Monroe Doctrine was presented by U.S. President James Monroe to the Congress on December 2, 1823 and is considered a cornerstone of future U.S. foreign policy (Library of Congress, 2017). Elements of the Doctrine included:

1. The view of anti-colonialism: With their free and independent states they acquire and maintain, the Continents of America can no longer be the subject of the colonization aspirations of any of the European states.
2. The political system of the Holy Alliance is completely different from that of America. Any attempt to disseminate their systems anywhere on this hemisphere is considered dangerous for peace and security.
3. Non-intervention request: There will not be any interference with the existing colonies or regions by any of the European countries.

4. The principle of isolation: The United States have never been party to the wars European states suffered because of the problems that concern European states (New World Encyclopedia, 2018).

In the United States, as a multinational composed structure, “Christianity” was considered as a common element to hold the people together. However, adversarial relations among different sects of Christianity had fostered conflicts in Europe. If the United States were to fall into such a chaos, the pace of development of the rich and promising state would be stalled. Protestantism, which is said to be the least conservative structure among the Christian denominations, was popularized and, because secular nature of American Constitution prevented establishment of a state religion, implicitly supported as a way to preserve unity and prevent the events in Europe from happening in the United States. Nationalization of the people was facilitated largely through Protestant churches, and Protestantism was dominant at the start of the 19th century. At the same time, the birth of the Protestant mission emerged as the most important factor in the spread of U.S. influence beyond the continent. With two fundamental interests being violated by isolation from world politics and a state policy that mandated sharing the North American continent with colonial states, it has been suggested that the best method of mediation was to take advantage of the missionaries (Kantarci, 2004).

The U.S. interest in Armenia first grew in connection with its own economic interests. The resource richness of the Anatolian and Middle Eastern lands and the open market quality attracted the United States from the 1780s. After the U.S. policy of avoiding European political events was determined, this prime provision of the Monroe Doctrine would be violated as attention was drawn to the Ottoman lands with great interest and expectations, which could have attracted Europe's attention and led to European involvement in its own internal affairs. And

because the United States was declared a secular state, its approaches had to be carried out indirectly. With this in mind, the United States took the route of exploiting the Protestant missionaries' expectations in creating communities in the Middle East. Having found a way of reaching its goal, America began using its missionaries to acquire areas of influence and achieve political interests in regions of the world viewed as virgin and productive. Thus, the country was able to carry out politics that otherwise might have been restricted to propaganda. The opening of consulates in the regions where American missionaries were active over large geographical areas became an important step in the realization of the strategy. The United States had the opportunity to seize for itself the right to intervene in places through means that could not be confused with the state as well as the protection of American investments through consulates, arguing that missionary stations established by missionaries were founded by American capital (Kantarci, 2004).

The United States formalized its presence and commercial activities in the Ottoman territory through the 1830 Ottoman-US trade agreement. With the trade treaty of May 7, 1830, the United States obtained commercial capitulation rights from the Ottoman Empire with the status of "the most favored nation." This means the United States could draw on all kinds of advantages in Ottoman Empire lands (Kantarci, 2004). The articles of Ottoman-US agreement dated May 7, 1830 are as follows:

Article 1: Whether it is Muslim or non-Muslim, any merchant of the Ottoman government will have the treatment of the traders of other countries and the taxes it imposes will be the same and taxes will be the same rate as the taxes of merchants of other countries while they pass through American ports, cities. Similarly, if U.S. traders arrive at one of

the well-defended states or ports of the Ottoman Empire, they will not be subjected to any ill-treatment other than taxes and surety paid by the traders and their citizens of the most popular allies. Travel passports should be provided on both sides.

Article 2: When the Ottoman government considers it necessary, it can establish consulates in the American commercial areas and appoint its citizens as ambassadors.

Article 3: American merchants, who settled in the ports of the Ottoman Empire, can hold a mediator and have the treatment of the traders of other states.

Article 4: If a case arises between the citizens of the Ottoman Empire and the American citizens, no decision will be made without an American ambassador.

Article 5: Ships trading in the territory or waters of the Ottoman State can safely come and go with their own flags.

Article 6: The war vehicles and ships of the two sides should be friendly to each other within the borders of the navy.

Article 7: Commercial ships belonging to the United States of America have the right to access the Bosphorus and the empire and sail to the Black Sea with or without the charge.

Article 8: The merchant ships of the two sides cannot be forcefully detained and compelled to transport soldiers or ammunition if ships' captains do not agree.

Article 9: If the commercial vessels of either party are in danger, the other party must assist both the rescue of the crew and the goods that can be rescued (Fahir, 1997).

The 1830 Ottoman-U.S. trade agreement and the close commercial relationship of the two countries stood the USA in good stead. The fertile lands of the Ottoman territory, which promised various possibilities, were held in the foreground in terms of American interests. The Treaty of 1830 between Washington and Istanbul formed the basis for Armenia's important relations with the United States in the coming years. The third article of the Treaty granted American traders the right to use brokers in the territory of the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman Armenians were included in the business by the United States with the condition that these brokers could be from any nation (Kayapinar, 2017). In line with its own commercial ambitious, the United States wanted to benefit from trade with the Greeks in the coastal areas of Anatolia while also doing business with the Armenian population in its interior. As a result, a rich Armenian bourgeoisie emerged in Anatolia. Added to this bourgeois group were the educated Armenian masses, thanks to the active work of the American missionaries; the development of an educated middle class of Armenians caused problems for the Ottoman government including a series of political crises in the 19th century (Kantarci, 2004).

Protestant missionaries organized the first Armenian immigration from the Ottoman Empire to the USA. At the beginning of the 1800s, Protestant churches in America decided to work with other religions, and the American Desk was established for foreign missions in 1812 to organize their activities (Selvi, 2003). This American Desk chose the Muslims of the Ottoman State as one of the focal areas. According to Sisman (2006), America missionaries came to Anatolia in 1820 (p.15). According to the laws of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims were forbidden

to change their religion, so the missionaries selected native Christians. American missionaries wanted to modify the old Apostolic Church, if this were not possible, then they wanted to develop a Protestant society among the native Christians. However, they did not achieve much success from their efforts. While the Greek Orthodox community did not pay much attention to American Protestants, the Armenians were quite eager to engage the missionaries. Armenians filled Protestant schools, medical clinics and churches. The fact that there was demand among the Armenians expanded the American Desk, and its program here was wider than in other parts of the world (Papazian, 2000).

American missionaries in Anatolia had established nine colleges by 1891. These were Robert College in Istanbul (1862), Beirut University in Beirut (1864), the American College for Girls in Istanbul (1873), Central Turkey College in Gaziantep (1876), Harput College in Harput (1878), Central Turkey College for Girls in Maras (1882), Anatolia College in Merzifon (1886), the St. Paul Institute in Tarsus (1888), and the International College in Izmir (1891) (Papazian, 1986).

Young students studying at Missionary Schools were beginning to consider going to America to complete their education. Young people selected from among them were sent to America by missionaries, who hoped that they would return and assist in missionary schools as teachers, clergy or clinicians. But most of these students did not come back, and those who stayed in America had provided a new channel for U.S. interests (Papazian, 2005).

Following this first wave of these first-time students, traders began to go to America. These students and merchants quickly became adherents to America and encouraged ensuing immigrations. In the 1870s new groups of Armenians began to join them. These newcomers were the poorer Anatolian villagers, especially from the Harput region, who began arriving at the end

of the 1880s. In 1883 the first great Armenian settlement in America was in Fresno, California. In 1885 the first Armenian-American Vadookian School in New York was founded, and the first Armenian newspaper, "Aregak" (The Sun), began publication in Jersey City in 1888. The Armenians in America were organizing (Takooshian), 1987 Educated migrants were mostly located in New York, and economic migrants in Worcester, Massachusetts (Mirak, 1983).

Economic and Political Reasons

According to the American records, in 1854 there were 20 Armenians in America; by 1980 the population had reached about 70. No doubt there were also Armenian immigrants not included in these records. Not all of these people were trained in American missionary schools, but some came to New World at great sacrifice to seek their fortunes. They found jobs in factories in Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Migrant Armenians worked in the same factories, lived in the same locations, provided each other mutual aid. In this closed environment a few small Armenian shops, coffee houses, green groceries, shoe repairers and other small business provided them necessary services. By 1890, the number of Armenians in America had reached 2000, and in 1900 it had reached 15-20 thousand (Kaprelian, 1990). In 1904, migration from Russia to the USA began due to economic and political exigencies. Between 1899 and 1924, 3,500 Armenian emigrated from Russia to America, and 51,950 from the Ottoman Empire (Takooshian, 1987). By the 1970s, the number of Armenians in the United States had reached 350,000-400,000. Today there are around 1,500,000 Armenians in the United States, of whom 50,000 live in Boston (Kantarci, 2004). Most initially believed that they would stay in America temporarily, their aim being to send money to their families and save enough for their return (Papazian, 2000). All of the Armenian scholars today relate the migrations between

the years 1890-1923 to the events that took place in Anatolia during that period and the Turks ill-treatment of Armenians (Hagopian, 1988).

The Armenians, who settled in California, New York, Chicago, and Massachusetts, soon began to work in various business areas in the United States including the carpet trade, engineering, copper workmanship, and jewelry processing as well as agriculture, and some found employment in shoe factories, textile factories and rapidly growing automobile factories; others established their own workplaces. Between 1894 and 1930s, some Armenians sent money to Armenians in Anatolia. Hence Armenians came to a much better position in the 1930s. Now the new generation was made up of English-speaking and college-educated people who began to raise their voices in American society. New branches of the Armenian political parties established in the last quarter of the 19th century started to work more actively in cities such as New York, Boston, and Los Angeles. In these regions, newspapers and magazines were regularly published in both Armenian and English (Kantarci, 2004).

On March 29, 1892, Washington Ambassador Alexandre Mavroyeni gave the following report on the situation and the numbers of immigrants in America to the Ottoman Ministry of Justice:

“The population migrating to America during the 1890th year was 455,302, while 560,319 people migrated during the 1891st year, which ended in June. The most migrants to America from our country are the Syrians. They are engaged in their own business and have no political aims. Armenians come after them. The Armenians are provoking discontent, trying to humiliate the Ottoman State, and working against the public remains ineffective ... In America, the Senate is the one who decides the treaties. So, the Armenians are trying to refer to them and accept them for their own purposes and to

bring them. The senators, although, have foundations and information about their own country's business, do not have any information about the situation in which the Ottoman state is in majority, and they are putting the American government into a difficult situation by acting with their votes and decisions in accordance with both the Ottoman state and the Ottoman constitution (Basbakanlik Osmanli Arsivi (B.O.A.) Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Evrakı (Y.A.Hus.) 260/93).

After the collapse of Communism in 1989, the Armenian population from the Middle East and the former Soviet Union grew in both numbers and importance as Diaspora communities in France and the United States. U.S. Armenians are known to have a higher standard of living in terms of the economy than other Armenian Diaspora communities. They have also integrated with other established ethnic groups in the United States. However, perhaps the most important change of this organizational activity in recent times has been the growth of a strong Armenian political lobby in Washington. The Armenian organizers in the U.S. supported the Congressional drafting of a law to designate April 24 a day commemorating the Armenian people and their suffering at the hands of the Turks. In essence, the Armenian community learned lobbying tactics from Jewish-Americans. The Armenian lobby produced sponsorships, conferences, publications and joint exhibitions. They fully exploited the changing geopolitical landscape at the end of the Cold War (Cohen, 2008).

The Influence of the Armenian Church

The first information on how Christianity is spread among Armenians is based on Agathangelos or Good Messenger, also known as an anonymous writer. Agathangelos emphasizes the influence of those who came from the Armenian homeland of Cappadocia

(Turkey), which is one of the important settlements of the early Christians. However, his writings are more mythological than strictly historical (Kacar, 2015).

Another factor in the Christianization of Armenians is considered to be the influence of the Syrians from the south. The fact that the Armenian dynasty based on the former Arsak dynasty in Iran and that this dynasty was abolished by the Sassanids led the Armenians to break away from the Iranian cultural environment and Christianity became a significant accelerator of this rupture (Kacar, 2015).

Christianity, which large numbers of Armenians accepted in the 4th century, is an essential element in the formation of Armenian national identity since this period. The general opinion is that Armenians accepted Christianity around 301 B.C. However, for a number of reasons, it is difficult to conclude that the year of 301 is definite. Moreover, given the political history of the Roman Empire, it is difficult to credit this claim. It is known that Diocletian, who was the first Christian Armenian king's helper of Tiridates, and Galerius, his subordinate, did not look down to Christianity. Therefore, it is more plausible to accept 314 and later as the date when Christianity became legitimate within the Armenian Kingdom. Diocletian and Galerius's harsh anti-Christian policies ended in 311 with the edict issued by Galerius, and in 313, Constantine and Licinius published an imperial edict on the territory of the Roman Empire. Hence, 314 and later are more likely to be the date of acceptance of the Christianity of the Armenians (Thompson, 1976).

Armenians who emigrated to America came together to fulfill their social and psychological needs. The church was a center for meeting and community life because there was no central political formation in the Armenian community outside. The immigrants saw the church as their spiritual home, and they chose it as their guardian and leader. For these

Armenians, the Armenian Church is the mainstay of nationalism, a center of attraction where the spiritual and cultural values of the nation and its ideals, goals, and achievements revolve around the essence of national life (Guroian, 1991).

By the end of the 1880s, Worcester Armenian Armenians, of whom there were about 1000, opened the first Armenian church in America. Mıgırdıç Portakalyan, who came to Worcester in 1888, urged Armenians to establish a church (Mirak, 1983). An Armenian club attended by 250 people had been established here, and it was this club that founded the church. Joseph Sarajian, who was educated in Mus, came to America in the middle of 1889 and started the church building activities. On January 18, 1891, Holly Savior Church opened with the participation of thousands of Armenians. This opening in Worcester was followed by church openings in other regions (Papazian, 2005).

Since their first migration to the USA the Armenians continued to organize, and by the year 2000, they had established many organizations that provided contact among the Armenians in the USA and Armenians scattered throughout Armenia and various parts of the world.

Diaspora Armenians are effectively organized in the USA. For this reason, the diaspora's support of Armenian genocide allegations is concentrated in these countries, and they overlap with the viewpoints of the countries in question. More specifically, the Armenia Diaspora continues its efforts to prove its claims through hundreds of media tools and civic organizations based on the shared perspectives of these countries.

During the Cold War, interactions between Soviet Armenia and the Diaspora was divided by an ideological if permeable line. That is, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation did not regard Soviet Armenia as the legitimate locus of the Armenian nation and limited its official

contacts accordingly, while others in the Diaspora had established cultural ties with Soviet Armenia and accepted it as a homeland. In 1964, the Soviet Government Agency was established to contact the various Armenian communities outside the Soviet Union. During this period, the diaspora divided into two major factions: communities living outside Armenia but within the borders of the Soviet Union (the internal diaspora) and communities living in the Middle East, Europe and America (the external diaspora). Community organizations, traditional political parties, and churches have helped to keep these communities together and to protect their national identity, including some Armenian communities in the Soviet Union and some churches attached to Etchmiadzin (Messerlian, 1963). However, unlike the external Diaspora, those Armenian in the Soviet Union had no political structure for collective community action. They were governed by their own set of schools, cultural centers, and athletic clubs, and political parties were driven by youth movements (Policy Forum Armenia, 2010).

The Middle East was an important center of the Armenian Diaspora, with major Armenian populations in such countries as Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Iran. However, in the early and mid-1970s, the mass migration of Armenians from the conflicts in the Middle East (the Lebanese Civil War and the Iranian Islamic Revolution) led to a shift of the center of gravity from the Middle East to North America. At the same time, this led to the integration of the Armenian-American community, and to active participation in political co-operation and, consequently, in the political life of the host nation. The shift of the Armenian population from the Middle East to America led to a new importance of lobbying as part of their political agenda, reinvigorating the existing communities in North America. The period between 1988 and 1991 brought new dynamics to Armenia-Diaspora relations, such as the beginning of the “Karabakh events,” the December 1988 earthquake, and the declaration of Armenia's independence (Akcem,

2000). Armenian-Americans focused on providing humanitarian and economic aid for the newly independent republic. The diaspora's assistance toward Armenia was critical during the difficult period of independence movement and the devastating earthquake in northern Armenia. The prevailing opinion in Armenia in early 1988 was that the Republic, which was supported by the Diaspora (including culture and identity) and devastated by war and earthquakes after 1988, was in need of support that would help them weather the crises (Policy Forum Armenia, 2010).

Diaspora communities continued to actively connect with each other through organized and informal activities. Especially in 1991, the independence of the Republic of Armenia caused the diaspora to become more rooted in host states and to engage in more civic participation. At the same time, besides directing attention towards Armenia, independence also sparked the revival of the national slogan "patriotism" in traditional diaspora fashion. The first President of Independent Armenia, Levon Ter Petrosyan, had not gone to any diasporic institutions or events in the new Republic. During Ter-Petrosyan's tenure from 1991 to 1998, relations between Armenia and the diaspora were strained. Ter-Petrosyan banned the Diaspora-based Tashnak political party and imprisoned some of its leaders, the diaspora by incorporating a total ban on dual citizenship into the constitution. As a reason for criticizing the diaspora Ter-Petrosyan stated that diaspora policies threatened the regime (Cavoukian, 2013). However, the second President Robert Kocharyan made the first attempt to institutionalize and manage the Armenian-Diaspora relationship. Under this presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized "Armenian Diaspora Conferences" of Minister Vartan Oskanyan in September 1999, in May 2002 and in September 2006. The purpose of these conferences was to try to connect a non-affiliated diaspora to the state. Armenian authorities were given invitations and invited to speak at these conferences. In addition, charities, lobbying groups, clubs, churches, and political parties

preferred to operate within the Diaspora organizations. As a result, people without organizational ties were excluded from the ongoing discussion (Cavoukian,2013).

Armenian Diaspora have a symbolic pattern that must be built on how State-Diaspora relations look. Unlike leaders of many former communist states, the Armenian State elites supported diasporas, near or far, according to their ability to have a political-cultural orientation and a symbolic vocabulary. Recently the concept of “Diaspora management” has become institutionalized to indicate a closer, more loyal and less troublesome part of the Armenian Diaspora than the heritage of the Soviet administration. Given the economic and political implications and wishes of the Russian Armenians, the loyalty of those engaged in diasporic activities and the assumptions of closeness based on a common political culture constitute a particular mentality. Members of the Armenian Parliament and the Diaspora Armenians both have intended to use the potential of the diaspora and help develop Armenia. Another priority of the Ministry is *Hayadartsutyun*, which is a revival mainly in terms of ethnicity. This word, like the Armenian word for repatriation, reminds the ministers of the Armenian prioritizing of “re-Armenization” and “withdrawing themselves to move home” (Cavoukian, 2013).

Starting from 1999, the Armenian State started to prioritize diaspora administration as an important initiative after a step-by-step policy declaration. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Russian Armenians, thanks to the growth of the Russian Armenian Community and its increasing economic influence, made an important contribution to such initiatives (Cavoukian, 2013). Diaspora, which is the most important identity of corporate organizations, was conceptualized as a National Security Strategy in 2007 and transformed into an institutional identity, followed by the establishment of the Diaspora Ministry 2008 (Ter-Matevosyan et al., 2017).

Beginning in the first half of the 20th century, Armenian-Diaspora associations had an impact on the diaspora politics and associated activity of the United States. Despite their physical distance from their own country of origin, the political activities of the United States in the 20th century were not ignored by the Armenian leaders, who occasionally tried to broaden their political influence over their communities to gather political and financial support. Most of the time, diaspora politics and factionalism have influenced the disagreements surrounding the legitimacy of domestic and foreign politicians, the return of the actors of the state, foreign supporters, and critics of the homeland governments (Yousefian, 2014).

The Armenian Diaspora was defined in 1915 and beyond. It was agreed with the vision of the *motherland* that based on an idealized national past and built in the Diaspora. In the years following the Second World War the homeland became a strategy supported by the Soviet authorities and Diaspora organizations. That is to say; it was idealized propaganda on the concept of motherland in order to legitimize Soviet Armenia as an authoritarian national home and to encourage return to the country. In this way, the Armenians have become an archetypal diaspora, the key to a common dream for the return of an ancestor. Diaspora communities aimed to establish active links with each other through organized and informal activities. In particular, the independence of the Republic of Armenia in 1991 caused the Diaspora to become increasingly rooted in the *host* states and to ensure more civic participation. It has also led to a revival of the concept of homeland, which is the symbol of the nation, along with the traditional Diaspora approach.

The Armenians, who started to organize here since their first migrations to the US, have established many organizations that have been in contact with the Armenian community in the US, Armenians in Armenia and in various parts of the world in the 2000s, and they have started

many busy lobbying activities. In the next section, it is going to try to give sufficient information about Armenian lobby organization, the influence of these organization on US policy, and which Armenian lobby organizations are very effective over US foreign policy.

CHAPTER 3: LOBBYING ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMENIAN DIASPORA

Introduction

Lobbying is a significant and historical component of American political life that enables individuals and groups to play a direct role in constructing the political policies of their country, based on the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which recognizes the right of citizens to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (Zarifian, 2014). The main goal of this chapter is to question the common perception of Armenian lobbying in order to propose a more accurate evaluation, with a special focus on the organization of the lobby, its lobbying methods, and its impact on U.S. foreign policy towards Armenia and its neighboring countries, specifically, Turkey and Azerbaijan.

To encourage or push political leaders in office to make decisions favorable to the interests is general goal of Armenian lobby. Armenian Lobbying activities can target any sphere, including both the executive and legislative branches, and any level of the American political landscape, be it the local, state, or federal levels. Usually, a lobby derives its main strength from the electoral weight and impact of its supporters. Other parameters, such as its capability of financing political campaigns, to impact public opinion, to make alliances with other groups or politicians, etc. can be important too. However, it is worth noting that the very term “lobby” can mean two quite different things. On the one hand, a lobby can be a group composed of

organizations, individuals, companies, possibly foreign states, etc., with no systematic interconnections, which promotes specific interests. On the other hand, the word also indicates a legally constituted organization that promotes and advocates for those interests (Zarifian, 2014). Although one must not neglect the impact of individuals and their personal lobbying, nor the activities of foreign states, in this paper we will focus on the most visible and organized expression of the Armenian lobby: the lobbying of groups whose official goal is to affect foreign policy.

The Armenian community's special pattern of settlement in the United States makes it potentially powerful when it comes to lobbying. Indeed, Armenians are concentrated in a few areas, such as California (especially in and around Los Angeles and in Fresno), New York city, and the Boston region. There are also significant settlements in Michigan, Illinois, and Florida (Zarifian,2014). They have lived in these regions for decades and are well integrated into local economic, social, political, and cultural networks. Therefore, they cannot be overlooked, especially in areas where their population are higher. Political representatives need them for election. In some electoral districts, especially around Glendale/Burbank, CA, Fresno, CA, and Watertown, MA, Armenians certainly make up around 10% of the potential voters, perhaps more (Zarifian, 2014). They also have local TV channels, radio stations, and newspapers, which can be used to mobilize voters. This electoral potential is of major importance in Congressional and sometimes in Presidential elections (Kumkale, 2007).

Paul and Anderson (2009) have identified four main methods used by interest groups to establish and maintain contact with and influence decision-makers, especially members of Congress: direct lobbying, grassroots lobbying, coalition building, and monitoring the policy-making process (p. 59). Direct lobbying is the best-known tactic: in order to influence public

policy, lobbyists speak directly to decisionmakers and try to persuade them to support their cause. Grassroots (or indirect) lobbying occurs when organizations mobilize their members and/or supporters to show policymakers that they massively support or oppose a policy proposal. Methods applied in indirect lobbying include writing letters to members of Congress, making telephone calls, and sending faxes and telegrams (Kantarci, 2004). Indirect lobbying can also try to influence public opinion, particularly through the media. Paul and Anderson (2009) observe that “Increasingly, organizations also form coalitions with other interest groups, policymakers, and other actors in order to develop initiatives, plan strategies, and enact policies” (p.64).

Finally, Smith (2000) states that

“[A] final hallmark of a successful ethnic lobby is its ability closely to monitor, and if possible actually define, the policymaking process. It is not at all enough for successful lobbyists to have access to policymakers and to make their preferences known” (p. 122).

Finance plays an important role in lobbying. Activities need money to form and carry out their organizations. Donations are important proportion of the income of lobbying organizations. In addition, sometimes government financing can be helpful for lobby activities. The economic situation of the community it represents and its capabilities to motivate its supporters to donate are of considerable importance to a lobby. The donations collected can be used to hire employees and to implement different types, either direct or indirect, of lobbying activities. For example, although giving gifts and paying for meals are now legally prohibited, interest groups are still allowed to pay for Congressmen’s trips, with the approval of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (Senate Legislative Transparency and Accountability Resolution, 2006). Zarifian (2014) states that money is also important because it allows lobbies to participate in financing political leaders’ electoral campaigns, which is crucial to politicians, and especially

members of Congress, who do not receive any public campaign financing and whose election/reelection campaigns may occur every two years (p.505). 501(c) (3) and 501(c) (4) organizations are not allowed to contribute to Federal electoral campaigns (Zarifian, 2014). Therefore, they often create Political Action Committees (PACs), which are the only entities (other than individuals) that are authorized to finance federal electoral campaigns.

Armenian Lobby Organizations

The members of the Armenian lobby operating in the United States are approximately 1,250. In 1972, these organizations gathered under the same name as the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) and started to work effectively as a lobbying institution (Kantarci, 2004). Approximately 7 thousand people are estimated to be working under the roof of the AAA and it is reported that they have reached 2.5 million dollars in their approximate budget (Laciner, 2001). In addition to the AAA, the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) has been established and the West wing (ANCA Western Region- ANCA-West Region) and the East wing (ANCA Eastern Region ANCA-East Region) are active.

The organization which has operated as the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA) later named the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), is the most effective Armenian lobbying organization in the United States. ANCA was established in 1918. ANCA was the only Armenian lobbying establishment operating in the United States until 1972. Zarifian (2014) describes the main goals of ANCA as

“To foster public awareness in support of a free, united and independent Armenia; to influence and guide U.S. policy on matters of interest to the Armenian American community; to represent the collective Armenian American viewpoint on matters of

public policy, while serving as a liaison between the community and their elected officials” (p.507).

The ANCA focuses mostly on grassroots initiatives to initiate action, focusing on Armenian voters.

The Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) was established in 1972 by Armenian community and Armenians living in the country. The Assembly focuses largely on its role in the Armenian community and involves Armenian-Americans in the democratic process. Political lobbying, strictly speaking, are only the fourth and fifth priorities of the AAA’s mission. The fourth priority is “To expand the organization’s pioneering research, education, and advocacy campaigns for universal affirmation of the Armenian Genocide and to secure Diaspora-wide consensus for the government of the Republic of Armenia to deal with the consequences of this crime against humanity,” and the fifth priority is “To support and deepen the U.S.-Armenia and U.S.-Karabakh relationships based on a common vision of democracy, the rule of law, open markets, regional security, and unfettered commerce” (Zarifian, 2014).

Both lobby organizations are driven by human power, the ability to communicate with similar structures, economic power, public opinion, and politics. The AAA and ANCA are united in their pursuit of the success of the Armenian case, including the issues of the development of Armenia, American economic assistance to Armenia, acceptance of Armenian sovereignty in Nagorno-Karabakh by the U.S. administration, prevention of arms sales to Turkey the defense of the rights of Armenian citizens living in the US, the survival and unity of the Armenian culture, and the transfer of the Armenian identity and consciousness to the younger generations. However, in some respects, they are in disagreement and competition with each other. The most important elements that show the achievements of Armenian institutions in the country,

especially these two lobbying organizations, are that the Armenian allegations are constantly brought to the awareness of the U.S. public, and the draft of a law approving the genocide allegations has appeared on the agendas of the House of Representatives and the Senate. In addition, every April 24, American Presidents have issued a speech or a statement to explain that they shared the Armenians' sufferings.

In political terms, two main differences emerge: (1) the AAA clearly mentions US interests, while the ANCA focuses only on Armenia and Armenians, and (2) ANCA's goals are more political and reflect more extreme positions. Another difference between the ANCA and the AAA was their relation to Soviet Armenia. The ANCA was hostile to Soviet Armenian authorities whereas the AAA considered that it was important to maintain relations with Soviet Armenia. During the Cold War, the ANCA's tough stance regarding Soviet Armenia pushed the organization closer to U.S. officials. In addition, the ANCA and the AAA have a different perspective in terms of their legal status. According to Zarifian (2014), the ANCA functions under a 501(c) (4) status (Zarifian, 2014), meaning that it is a non-profit organization whose lobbying activities can be extensive (p.507). The AAA, as a 501(c) (3), is not allowed to form a lobby for its main organization. That is why, for example, the AAA did not officially support a candidate in the 2008 presidential elections, whereas ANCA firmly endorsed Barack Obama in both the primary and presidential elections. However, the ANCA was not the only Armenian organization to take a position in the 2008 presidential elections. The Armenian American Pac (ARMENPAC) also supported Barack Obama too but initially preferred Hillary Clinton in the Democratic Party primaries. Officially the ARMENPAC is an independent PAC. However, it appears that one of its founders, Jirair Hovnanian, was one of the AAA founders and was a longtime chairman of its board of trustees (Zarifian, 2014). Although the Assembly is not

allowed to officially create or to be related with a PAC because of its 501(c) (3) status, it is close to ARMENPAC. The ANCA has an officially related PAC, the ANC-PAC, which allows it to finance candidates' campaigns (Zarifian, 2014).

The differences between the ANCA and the AAA also appear in their approaches to lobbying. The ANCA, which presents itself as “the largest and most influential Armenian American grassroots political organization,” counts first of all on a large number of supporters and sympathizers (Armenian National Committee of America). The Assembly, however, presents itself as “the largest Washington-based nationwide organization...,” but continues by adding: “... promoting public understanding and awareness of Armenian issues,” and it relies mainly on a small number of qualified and influential people to carry out its lobbying (Zarifian, 2014). Although the Assembly now seems to focus more on grassroots approaches, its traditional approach to lobbying has been “top-down,” whereas the ANCA approach is more “bottom-up.” The ANCA has 45 offices in 25 states and an important branch on the West Coast (the ANCA Western Region or ANCA WR) (Zarifian, 2014). The ANCA first opened an office in Washington, DC only in 1983 (King and Pomper 2004). The Assembly has only one U.S. office, in California, as well as one office in Yerevan where the ANCA apparently has no office. These two perspectives on lobbying turn out to be, incidentally, particularly complementary, which constitutes an asset. Indeed, the Armenian lobby is able to organize massive e-mail and petition campaigns, particularly through the ANCA, and individual meetings and networking through both organizations (Zarifian, 2014).

Both the ANCA and the AAA have significant support in Congress. The Armenian Caucus (AC) has both Republican and Democrat members, and the sympathetic approaches to

the Armenian problem of congressmen, who occupy key positions in Congress, facilitate the work of these two lobby groups.

The ANCA and AAA, which have actively carried out lobbying in the U.S. Congress since the 1980s, have been very influential on Washington's policies in Ankara, and the Armenian Resolution they have brought to Congress at various times has led to tensions in the Ankara-Washington relationship (Kantarci, 2007). These two organizations have gained a very effective position among U.S. politicians thanks to the Armenian votes they control. The Armenians who live together in certain parts of the United States have substantively supported particular candidates in both presidential elections and in races for the 100 Senatorial seats and the 435 seats of the House of Representatives (Tascioglu, 2017).

For example, in Pasadena, Burbank, and Glendale, California, the person who receives the Armenian votes is guaranteed a seat in the House of Representatives. These three districts, and in particular the Glendale region, known as called “Little Armenia.” (Kantarci, 2007). The Armenian community has become an important mass in U.S. elections to contribute to the electoral results of the Armenian vote. Therefore, according to Kantarci (2007), at the end of the 1980s, all the presidential candidates of the United States, starting with George H.W. Bush, developed special policies for Armenians residing in the United States and promised to recognize the “Armenian genocide” if elected.

A concrete example of the influence of Armenians on American politics at the state level is presented by proclamation in 1985 by the governor of California, Armenian-American George Deukmejian of April 24 as “Armenian genocide” day; on that day all the flags in the state were lowered to half-staff (Kantarci, 2004).

One of the working tactics of Armenian lobbyists in the United States is that they often take Senators on short trips to Armenia (Jamilli, 2004). The senators participating in these visits become Armenian sympathizers and, in their turn, provide explanations and activities that support the Armenian Diaspora in public or in senate meetings (U. S. Congressional Records, April 24, 1990).

On December 23, 1988, after an earthquake had devastated Soviet Armenia on December 7, U.S. President Bush sent his son Jeb Bush and his 12-year-old grandson George Bush to Armenia in an aircraft carrying aid, although he did not go to the earthquake zone. Jeb Bush was shown on American TV shedding tears and saying to his father “This is probably the biggest Christmas gift I can give my son” (Kantarci, 2007), which appealed to the sympathies of Armenian voters. Similarly, Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, who was taken to Armenia on April 24, 1990, told the U.S. media, and the Senate that he toured the region and talked with Armenian refugees and saw how much they suffered (Jamilli, 2004).

The Armenian Caucus

The diaspora communities are quite politically active in the US. Congressional Caucuses, authorized by a member of Congress, are one of the first marks of successful diaspora communities (Hammond,1998). These caucuses help to shape policies according to the interests of diaspora communities. Nevertheless, they cannot officially influence legislative committees. Their established objectives are generally related to economic concerns or domestic policy interest. Examples of caucuses concerned with economic issues include the Automotive Caucus, the Bearing Caucus, and the Boating Caucus while the Children’s Caucus, the Friends of Families Caucus, and the Social Security Caucus are concerned with domestic policy interests. The authority to establish these caucuses resides in the house of Representative, though Senators

can be informal members. Today, although the number of diaspora caucuses is relatively small, there are caucuses representing several diaspora communities, including the Irish, Greek, Albanian, Nigerian, Sri Lankan, and Ukrainian diaspora communities (King and Pomper, 2004).

The Congressional Armenian Caucus was founded in 1995 (The Armenian Assembly of America). The Armenian Caucus is a bipartisan forum for the discussion of policies to improve increased cooperation between the U.S. and Armenian governments (Zarifian, 2014). To strengthen the enduring relationships between the American and Armenian peoples is also quite significant. Although this definition does not articulate a political position, it is used to encourage and defend the positions of the Armenian community in the legislature, and to inform and influence other members of Congress. One of the biggest House Caucuses, it has counted more than 150 members over its tenure and, according to the ANCA website, it is currently made of 116 members. Most – although not all – members of the Armenian caucus have an important Armenian community in their district and often have a need with these Armenians, whose support in election campaigns they need (Zarifian, 2014). They, therefore, defend Armenian interests in Congress.

As is the case with most issue-specific caucuses, the characteristics of members' congressional regions are strongly related to the membership of the Armenian Caucus. Because 54% of Armenian-Americans live in the state of California (City-data.com) it is no surprise that California is well represented in the Congressional Armenian Caucus with 34 of 124 members (The Armenian Assembly of America). In addition to this, 209,504 Armenian-Americans live in Massachusetts State. Therefore, every member of the Massachusetts House delegation is in the Armenian Caucus (King and Pomper, 2004).

Armenian Caucus members come from these thirty states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington (The Armenian Assembly of America).

Social Democrat Hunchakian Party (SDHP)

The Social Democrat Hunchakian Party, is the oldest Armenian political party and called “Hunchak.” Hunchak means “Bell” in Armenian. In time it was organized as a front against the Ottoman Empire under the influence of Russians. In 1887, this political entity, which believed in Marxist ideology, was founded in Geneva, Switzerland. This institution was founded by Avetis Nazarbekian, Mariam Vardanian, Gevorg Gharadjian, Ruben Khan-Azat, Christopher Ohanian, Gabriel Kafian and Manuel Manuelian. (Social Democrat Hunchakian Party, 2005). It was the first socialist and revolutionary party in the Ottoman Empire and Iran (Turabian, 1916).

The principles of the Society were inspired by Karl Marx's Communist theories and most of the members were Russian Armenians. They also issued a publishing called *Hunchak*. The aim of the committee was to win the independence of Western Armenia from the Ottoman Empire and to unite it with Russian and Iranian Armenia, thus establishing Great Armenia (Turabian, 1916).

This political party has played an important role in the history of the Armenian community in America. The Worcester Armenian Club began to meet to discuss the writings of the Hunchaks in the early 1890s. The Hunchaks soon spread to New York, Worcester, and Boston. The first leader of the Hunchak in America was Nisan Garabedian (Mirak, 1983).

All the aims of these societies in America were in line with those of the Hunchak Society Center. All the efforts of the Armenians were intended to create confusion in Anatolia, to provide material support for the Armenian revolution, and to determine the effect that the United States Senate would have in this matter. The first stage of this goal was achieved with the turmoil in Anatolia between 1892-1895. The second phase of the movement was to influence the Senate by presenting to the American Public their view of the events in Armenia. On December 20, 1893, a private letter was sent to President Grover Cleveland addressing the Armenian issue. This article, which is the essence of Armenian propaganda in America, is worth quoting it here:

“We thank you for your statement in the Congress on the occasion of the Armenian Issue. This issue cannot be solved by the judge. The greatest misfortune of the Armenians is the fact that the world they live in is unknown to the civilized world. The Armenians are a Christian tribe living under the rule of an Islamic government. It is well-known fact that the Islamic world is so conservative. It is really strange that they are subjected to persecution by a nation that is the greatest enemy of Christians, who exceed four hundred million people. The Armenians are intelligent, knowledgeable, artistic, intelligent and courteous people. Americans cannot remain indifferent to Armenians who protect their religion despite such oppression ... Americans have special interests in the Ottoman lands where Armenians are. It costs two hundred and fifty thousand dollars per year for the schools, churches, and hospitals there. We ask that you appeal to the Sultan for the acceptance of the complaints of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire for humanitarian reasons” (Basbakanlik Osmanli Arsivi, Y.A.Hus. 292/39).

Other Armenian Formations and Activities

Armenians who came together in the United States have formed organizations within their population. Kantarci (2004) reports that such organizations include school alumni associations, Armenian studies and research centers, sports organizations, community centers, citizens' organizations, and cultural organizations. In this study, the organizations created by Armenians are divided into groups according to their subjects and activities.

Schools and Other Educational Institutions

Armenian Schools (pre-primary, through high school levels) and other educational institutions are important among the existing establishments. One of the general objectives of these schools is for students to be bilingual. In addition, teaching Armenian history, and in particular, the reality of the Armenian Genocide is among the aims of these schools (Buke, 2012). There are also research centers established in universities. The main objectives and areas of activity of these research centers are to conduct academic research on the alleged Armenian Genocide and to organize and financially support activities such as conferences and panels. Other aims are to carry out research on Armenian culture, history, language and literature both within Armenian and outside of Armenia and to address the socio-political and economic problems of Armenians (Kantarci, 2004). Some of these schools and educational institutions are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Schools, Education centers, and Residential areas

School Name	Location
AGBU Manoogian-Demirdjian School (MDS)	Canoga, California
Holy Martyrs Cabayan Elementary & Ferrahin High School (HMCEFHS)	Encino, California

Table 3 (Continued)

Krouzian Zekarian Vasbouragan Armenian School	San Francisco, California
Rose and Alex Pilibos Armenian School	Los Angeles, California
Armenian Studies Program- Fresno State	Fresno, California
St. Stephen's Armenian Elementary School	Watertown, Massachusetts
TCA Arshag Dickranian Armenian School	Los Angeles, California

Non-profit organizations

Armenian non-profit organizations, which include sporting organizations, community centers, and citizen organizations, help to keep the Armenian community together (Kantarci, 2004). They are The American Armenians Movement Committee (ARAMAC), the Armenian Information Services (AIS), the Armenian Network of America (ANA), the Armenian Missionary Association (AMA) and the Armenian Bar Association (ABA). These are lobbying activities on behalf of the Armenian community. In accordance with the American law, these non-profit organizations are organizations with the status of a social purpose (Ari, 2000).

Political Associations

A number of political organizations exist in the United States whose aim is to support awareness of the alleged Armenian genocide and in particular to influence the U.S. Senate to shift American political relations with Turkey in a direction supportive of Armenians. Among the other organizations that have been partisan lobbying and acting in conjunction with AAA and ANCA, are the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), the Armenian Democratic Liberal Organization and National Armenian American Republican Council (NAARC), the Armenian

Council of America, the Embassy of the Republic of Armenia, and the Armenian Youth Federation (Tuncer, 2006). ARF is the party that politically supports ANCA. ANCA's infrastructure, program and activities are carried out by this party (ARF) (Kantarci, 2004). ARF is in contact with Armenian schools. For example, a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Viken Hovsepyan gave an address in Glendale High School commemorating the 120th anniversary of the Federation (Asbarez, 2010).

Publications of Armenian Lobby Organizations

The Armenian organizations have placed great importance on propaganda to influence American opinion in their favor through newspapers, magazines, posters, and declarations. The Armenians in America have also conducted an intensive propaganda campaign claiming that the Ottoman Empire was a cruel state in order to have their independence revolutionary ideas accepted by the American people and government. Two routes for this campaign are the publication of articles in newspapers and organization of frequent rallies.

The Armenian lobby carries out successful grass roots activities with the help of the above mentioned Armenian organizations. In this process, it will be necessary to look at several of the publications of AAA: *Daily News Report from Armenia*, *Armenia This Week*, *Assembly This Week*, *Special Report on Armenia*, *Armenia Factbook*, *Armenian Assembly Issue Brief*, *The Armenian Mirror-Spectator* and *Monthly Digest of News from Armenia*. These publications are also sent to members of Congress and all bureaucratic institutions such as legislative, judicial and executive. On the eve of each project and decision, with these publications, the bureaucrats and parliamentarians are warmed up and prepared the infrastructure. The regular and long-term publication of these publications is Assembly Action which is distributed in AAA. The Armenian lobby, which is mostly supported by these periodicals in the 435-member parliament,

guarantees the possibility of seeing many other projects before coming to the commissions (Ari, 2000).

In addition to newspapers, books about Armenians were also used as means of propaganda. A book titled *The Armenians and the Ararat People* was published in Philadelphia in 1893 by Reverend Gabrielian, who had been a theologian and medical practitioner in America for ten years and was supported and patronized by American missionaries. In the book, there is information about Armenian literature and history and a denunciation of both Ottoman rule and Islam (Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler, c. 12, Document No: 154 and c. 13, B. No: 33). In 1895, another book, *Armenian Depression in the Ottoman State and the 1894 Massacre* was written by Frederick Davis Greene of the American Mission. Greene had served in Anatolia for four years (Basbakanlik Osmanli Arsivi, Y.A. Hus. 327/61).

The most important issue for the Armenians was money and arms for the revolutionary movement against the Ottoman Empire. One of the main sources of funding for the Armenian Revolutionary Committees, a center for aid and public meetings, was donations used for supplying weapons for the war. Armenian priests voluntarily or under compulsion fulfilled the orders of the committee and even provided leadership. The priest Saraciyani in Worcester asked people to help the committee by talking at Sunday weddings. After such activities, until April 1894, the Armenians in America purchased 50,000 martinis, 75,000 guns, 2 million rifles, pistol bullets, and various amounts of dynamite and sent them to Anatolia (Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler, c.19, Belge No: 20.). The Armenians, who wanted to include the Americans in these efforts, established the "Armenian Friendship Association" on 1 May 1894 (Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler, c.19, Belge No: 63.).

Armenians have continued their lives without leaving the Christian tradition, and in many organizations, the outreach of the Armenian community is among their basic tools. Awareness of claims of the Armenian Genocide generally figures into most activities involving cultural and political issues and a variety of images sustain the Armenians' negative attitudes and actions against Turkey. Therefore, when examining the subject of the Armenian Issue, the structures, objectives, and activities of the organizations and institutions established by the Armenian diaspora should be well understood.

Moreover, most of the academic and journalistic writings on the Armenian Lobby have tended to reach the same conclusion, which is triumphalist: the lobby has been successful. This emphasis has shaped a general perception of a small US Armenian lobby that can influence the foreign policy of a superpower (Zarifian, 2014).

In the 2000s the Armenians, who started to organize in the US since their first migrations to the US, the Armenian lobby has firstly worked on and continued to work at the Congress is to pass the alleged Armenian genocide from the American Senate and to allow the United States to accept it officially. Second one is to provide humanitarian assistance programs, technical assistance and development assistance to Armenia. Third one of the themes is to prevent proposal and attempts in favor of Turkey and Azerbaijan. The last theme, which intensifies the lobby activities, is the development of policies in favor of Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

CHAPTER 4:
THE PURPOSES THAT THE ARMENIA DIASPORA SEEKS TO ACHIEVE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS

Introduction

The activities carried out through the organizations migrated from Armenia and other countries to the US and which have been established by the citizens of this country are called as Ethnic Lobbying as a whole. The policy advocated by one ethnic group to achieve success in the American political life must not conflict with the US strategic interests. In other words, the aims the Armenian Diaspora should not coincide with US policies. The Armenian issue is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon that is related to almost all social sciences, in particular sociology, history, political science. Among the themes of the work of the Armenian diaspora in US foreign policy are recognition of the alleged Armenian Genocide; assurance of humanitarian aid to Armenia including technical assistance and development assistance; prevention of U.S. humanitarian aid and technical assistance to Azerbaijan (Section 907); and support of Armenia in the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Recognition of the Alleged Armenian Genocide

One of the most important activities of the Armenian Diaspora in America is to organize rallies commemorating each anniversary of the alleged Armenia Genocide in the Ottoman State in various cities, including Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston and California. The external elements,

which are among the most important sources of the Armenian Issue have shifted the problem in different directions over time and thus the current situation has moved away from the original starting point. With regard to external sources, the most important factor concerning the Armenian Issue is that the Armenian population constitutes formations in countries other than Armenia, that is, the diaspora (Tascioglu, 2017).

Diaspora Armenians are effectively organized in the USA. For this reason, the diaspora's activism concerning Armenian genocide allegations is concentrated in the USA. More specifically, the Armenia Diaspora continues its efforts to support its claims using a wide range of media tools and civic organizations in the USA (Tuncer, 2006).

The Origin and Development of the Armenian Issue

The Turks and Armenians, who lived in peace together on the same land for many years, started breaking apart with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, creating problems that are still going on today. According to Suny (2015), some 2 million Christian Armenians lived in the Ottoman lands. Most of them were peasants and townspeople in the six provinces of eastern Anatolia (p. XIV). The Armenians, who historically were subordinate to the Turks, merely tolerated by Turks in the states under their domination and were called "*Millet- Sadika*" (Loyal Nation); during periods when the Ottoman Empire was strong some Armenians held important government positions. With the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians received the support of the powerful imperial nations, including the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the United States, and began to pursue independence (Akçay, 2010).

Throughout history, Armenians have lived in South Anatolia. After the 11th century and the arrival of the Turks to East Anatolia, the Armenians, who lived in the Yerevan-Gökçeğöl

region, spread to the West and the Taurus mountains and Antalya regions called Cilicia (Dogan, 2008).

In fact, most Armenian history recorded in ancient times was written by non-Armenian people in Greek and Assyrian, who often incorporated mythological ideas that did respect the integrity of other societies (Tosun, 2003). In other words, the Armenians do not have access to reliable knowledge about their historical roots. Most of the stories are myth rather than accurate documentations of historical events. In later periods, these works were mentioned in the works written by Armenians, but they could not escape the influence of the ancient works. The works written by many foreign authors in the 19th and 20th centuries also included propaganda characteristic of the politics of the states to which they belonged.

Although some Muslim Turks entered Anatolia beginning in the period 1064-1070, the Turks had entered the region about 500 years earlier. Some Turks eventually acquired new identities in the Christian Congregations, and some entered Gregorian denominations and sects that belong to the Armenians. The first contacts of the two communities during this period were in Anatolia. The contacts between the Hayk tribes, who were faithful Gregorians, and Kipchak Turks took place in the Caucasus in the same period.

The Armenians, who had lived under the rule of the Roman and Byzantine empires, lived under Seljuk and Ottoman rule when the Turks became the dominant Anatolians and they helped the Muslim Turks to conquer Anatolia. During these periods, Turks and Armenians lived side by side in harmony and were influenced by each other's cultures (Kucuk, 1997).

Because of the Turkish-Islamic philosophy of tolerance to non-Muslims, the rights of Armenians, like those of other non-Muslims, were secured. For the Armenians, the establishment

and development of the Ottoman Empire after the conquest of Istanbul and collapse of Byzantium led to a period of living in peace and prosperity that had not been seen in any previous period of their history (Akçay, 2010).

With Sultan Mehmed II's conquest of Istanbul, Hovakim, the Armenian leader in Bursa, was brought to Istanbul, and an Armenian Patriarchate was established in. After this development, Armenians from many regions, such as Iran, Caucasia and Crimea, emigrated to Istanbul and Istanbul became a center of Armenian community and culture (Halacoglu, 2006). The attitude of the Ottoman administration towards Armenians within the Ottoman Empire contributed to the life and development of the Armenian community and the church. The Ottoman Empire organized the Gregorian Armenians under the name of "nation" and left their administration to their religious leaders. The Armenians were given the opportunity to establish foundations to acquire the necessary financial means to carry out religious, cultural, educational and charitable activities, and if their financial resources were not enough, the Ottoman administration provided additional financial support.

The Armenian society was thus renewed and developed rapidly thanks to the rights and privileges that were granted to it. Moreover, Armenians adopted the Turkish-Ottoman culture, lifestyle and management style and gained the trust of the Ottoman government in a short time. Thanks to this trust, many Armenians held important places in public services as well as in business life. For example, Halil Pasa and Mehmet Pasa as a chief admiral were active in the 16th century (Hulagu, 2008).

However, the Armenians had differences among themselves from time to time. Before and after the conquest of Istanbul, the Armenians who came from Anatolia and Crimea to Istanbul were called "indigenous," and Armenians who came from Iran and Caucasia were called

“Eastern” or “countrymen” and these two groups engaged in struggles over the election of the Patriarch and complained about each other to the rulers of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman administration remained as neutral as possible toward the internal disputes of the Armenians.

The second half of the 19th century, especially after the 1856 Royal Edict of Reform, the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78, and the Ayastefanos Treaty and Berlin Conference, was the period when the Armenian problem started in the Ottoman Empire. Without examining the factors that caused this, some directly connect the problem to the Royal Edict of Reform (1856), but this is too narrow a view (Tascioglu, 2017).

The Armenian Issue and Its Development

When the Ottoman Empire began to weaken and was exposed to the intervention of Europe in almost every aspect, the deterioration in the relations between the Turks and the Armenians began. Western countries tried to break up the Ottoman Empire and separate the Armenians from Turkish society in order to serve their own regional interests. In particular, some of the powerful states of Europe interfered with the internal affairs of the Ottoman State under the name of “reforms” while Armenians were organized against the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the Armenian community gradually began to break away from the Ottomans as a result of the activities of the Armenian Churches and the Armenian committees organized and armed inside and outside the country (Yildirim, 2000). If we look at the topic from a broad perspective and look for an origin of the problem, we can base the problem on the nationalist movements beginning with the French Revolution (1789). Greece gained independence in 1829, and then with the Ayastefanos (Yesilköy) Treaty (March 3, 1878) after the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) Bulgaria was given autonomous status. After Romania, Montenegro, and Serbia got their independence, the Armenian population who lived in the Ottoman Empire lands decided to get

their independence with the help of Western Countries (the USA, France, England, Russia), the Armenian Patriarchate, and Armenian churches (Akçay, 2010).

When the Muslims and non-Muslims had been brought to equal status with the 1856 Royal Edict of Reform, the Armenians, who lost their privileges, demanded that the Russian withdraw from the Eastern Anatolian lands they occupied at the end of the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War and grant autonomy to the region or institute reforms in favor of Armenians. Russia partly acceded to this petition of the Armenians. The Yesilköy / Ayastefanos Treaty (March 3, 1878) was signed at the end of the Ottoman-Russian War, and with the Berlin Conference the Armenian Issue gained an international dimension. At the same time, this situation led to the intervention of foreign powers to divide the country into the Ottoman Empire (Akçay, 2010).

During the First World War, a significant number of Armenians fought against the Turks, in contrast to those Armenians who were fighting against the Allies as Ottoman soldiers. Organizations established outside of Anatolia such as Hunchak, Tasnak, Ramgavar, the Hunchak Revolutionary Committee, the Armed Forces Society, Armenian Right Society, the Young Armenian Society, the Ittihat and Halas Societies and Karakaj Community, and Protakalyan Committee, encouraged the people to have armed rebellion (Akçay, 2010).

In addition to these organizations, when officials of the Ottoman Empire saw that the Armenian people in the regions near the Russian border were in rebellion against the state, they took measures to remove Armenians involved in the rebellion from the battle zone by deporting them in the name of relocation and resettlement in safe regions of the country. At this time, the safety of the Armenians in the inner battle environment was secured behind the front. The Turks began to pay for what the Armenians did against the Turks in the region. The Sevres Treaty, which would liquidate the Ottoman Empire after World War I, gave a large part of Eastern

Anatolia to the Republic of Armenia. However, the government of Ankara, which had started to hold the power now, did not accept Sevres, and the great powers who had supported Sevres did not want to take actual military action, so the work of achieving the goals of the treaty was left to the Armenians, but they were stopped by the Turkish army under the command of Kazim Karabekir, and the Treaty of Gumru was made on December 3, 1920 as a result of which the present Turkish-Armenian border was drawn (Treaty of Gumru, 1921).

Causes of the Armenian Issue

In addition to the literature which directly deals with US-Armenian relations, this review utilizes information found on the internet about Turkey, which has a very important place in U.S. foreign policy, and the factors of this policy that have deeply influenced the “Armenian Issue.”

– The Factor of Nationalism

Although there are many reasons for the deterioration of Turkish-Armenian relations, perhaps the most important of these is the nationalist movement that emerged after the French Revolution, challenging the imperialists' idea of permanent colonialism by promoting the principle that everyone should be free and equal, and that it is not right for people to be ruled by other people, a movement which also had an effect on the Armenians (Karayumak, 2007).

While the colonized countries were valued for their manpower and goods before the Industrial Revolution, they became important as a consumer market after the Industrial Revolution. Therefore, the great imperialist powers of Europe wanted to annex and control the underdeveloped countries which were not self-sufficient. For this reason, important transportation routes gained great importance, especially in countries with important raw material resources needed for the production of industrial goods.

The nationalist movements in the 18th century and the Ottoman Empire being in the process of sharing the world with the great powers in the 19th and 20th centuries became the most appropriate target of the imperialist nations. Because the Ottoman Empire, previously seen as weak had become a player state due to the economic potential and strategic location of its approximately two billion square kilometers, at this point, the great powers began to support the Armenians- an Armenian State in Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus would prevent the formation of a Turkish Union by bringing about the fragmentation of the former Ottoman Empire after its liquidation. That is, Armenia, that was expected to be a buffer zone between the Ottoman and Caucasian reforms, and among Central Asian Turks (Akçay, 2010). At this point, the element of nationalism that had swept the country was an effective element in the uprising of the Armenians.

- The Armenian Church

As many Western writers, including Armenian historians, have stated, the Armenian Patriarchate and its church were engaged in missionary activities, which allowed the Armenians to live as a community in every period, regulated their religious as well as their worldly lives, and protected themselves from many dangers, also sometimes inspired them with political instincts that threw them into the danger. The Armenian Patriarchate and church have always been institutions in which national issues are freely discussed (Suslu, 1990).

The church had embraced the flow of nationalism in order to preserve its earthly power, taken the part of an Ottoman territory and restricted its borders to a certain region, tried to create an Armenian nation which would protect Armenia, and played an important role in the development of the Armenian Question (Oke, 1996).

- Missionary Activities

Missionary activities played an important role in the emergence of the Armenian Issue. Missionaries started to be active in the 18th and especially in the 19th century when the great powers such as France, England, and Russia undertook the role of “Guardian of Christians” in the Ottoman Empire. The majority of the missionary facilities were established in the regions where the Armenians lived (Gürün, 2001, Küçük, 1997).

The British, Russians and French began to attract Armenians in Anatolia to their own religious sects. These missionaries wanted to achieve two goals in their work. The first was to add the Armenians to their sects, and the second was to raise them against the Turks. In doing so, the missionaries did not only study in the field of press and diplomacy against the Ottoman Empire and Islam, but also the history and literature (Kantarci, 2004).

The source of the idea of insurgency among the Armenians was the Protestant schools which were opened by American and British missionaries. In these courses the Armenian maps, the coat of arms was given to students and for Armenians, they had idea that there was no other way without revolt against Turks (Oke, 2001).

- Religious Factor

The religious factor has always played an important role in contacts between the Turks and the Christian nations. The Turks, who were consistently viewed as Muslims, received different treatment from the Christian community. This was true not only for the Turks but also for all non-Christian communities that came to Europe. For example, Hungarians and Bulgarians were subjected to similar treatment until they accepted Christianity (Gürün, 2001).

In the Ottoman state, the two major non-Muslim communities were the Orthodox Greeks and Gregorian Armenians. Besides religious rights, they had broad cultural and legal rights. But these rights became tools that the various foreign states could easily use in periods of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, during which American missionaries tried to take the Armenians who were drawn to Protestantism under their auspices (Gürün, 2001). Therefore, it can be seen that the religious factor was an important one that encouraged Armenian desires for independence.

This religious factor played important role in the emergence of the Armenian Issue. The Armenian Church also benefited from this religion factor. With the promise of an independent or at least autonomous Armenia, the Armenian Church became part of plans for the destruction of the Ottomans because of its increased influence and authority (Gürün, 2001).

Armenian Issue in the International Arena

The political activities of the Armenians to validate the events of 1915 as genocide started in the second half of the 1970s and continued after the independence of Armenia resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. This campaign had two purposes in the first stage. The first was to persuade the international community to recognize the events of 1915 as a genocide, and the second one was to specifically influence Turkey to accept this event as a genocide.

According to Suny (2015), genocide involves not only physical destruction of a people but also its cultural annihilation (p.226). The convention of provision for “the Prevention and Punishment of the Genocide” was adopted by the UN in 1948 after the Second World War. Since then, Armenians have campaigned intensely to apply the legal definition of genocide to the events of 1915, promoting their claims to Turkey and the world, but there are a number of those

who think that the demands for land and compensation are very high. In the decision of the European Parliament in 1987 which accepted the 1915 events as genocide and called on Turkey to accept this definition, it was indicated that the Republic of Turkey cannot be held responsible for the Armenian genocide today, and this decision did not support political and financial demands on Turkey. The Court of Justice of the European Union has also highlighted this point in the decision given to the Armenian families and emphasizing the political nature of issue, admitting that the European Parliament's decision to not apply legal consequences was the result of a desire to avoid any risk to European Union-Turkey relations.

More than 20 countries, mostly in Europe and Latin America, have adopted resolutions recognizing the 1915 events as genocide. Except for France and Greece, all of these decisions are advisory and not binding for the executive bodies of those countries. Switzerland and Greece criminalized the disclosure of the views that do not accept the 1915 events as genocide. A similar parliamentary decision in France was annulled by the French Constitutional Court on the grounds that it violated freedom of expression (Celikkol, 2015). The common feature of the majority of countries that have made parliamentary decisions that define the 1915 events as genocide is the high number of Armenians in these countries and the existence of an Armenian lobby.

Armenian groups exert pressure on local and provincial governments in countries where they are effective alongside national parliaments and are working to pass the “genocide” plans through local and regional legislatures. In the United States, 48 out of 50 states have accepted the “Armenian Genocide” (The Armenian Weekly, 2017). Such programs have been adopted at the level of local government in the United Kingdom, Spain, Australia, Argentina, and as well as in

the United States. In the United States, a number of programs on the alleged Armenian Genocide have been introduced into school curricula.

Today, the population of Armenia, a country which occupies slightly more than 29 thousand square kilometers, is 3 million, while the Armenian diaspora population is around 7 million. About 1.5 million Armenians are living in the United States as well as in Russia, and a half million in France, while there are also sizeable Armenian populations in Lebanon, Argentina, and Iran (Armenian National Institute). For Armenians living in Western countries, where they can easily be assimilated, unification within the framework of genocide allegations is used as a starting point for maintaining their Armenian identity.

It is clear that Armenia's campaign for including the 1915 events in the definition of genocide have adversely affected the efforts launched to normalize Turkey-Armenia relations at the state level. Turkey was among the first countries to recognize Armenia's independence in 1990; however, normal diplomatic relations between the two countries have not been established so far. Because of Armenia's war with Azerbaijan in 1993, the Turkey-Armenian border is closed. The Nagorno-Karabakh issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Armenian occupation of 20% (9% if the Karabakh is not considered) of the territory of Azerbaijan has complicated the relationship between Turkey and Armenia. Armenia has not adopted the recommendation of the joint historians' commission that Turkey has put forward. The process initiated by Switzerland in 2007, despite the signing of two important protocols to regulate bilateral relations, has not been achieved so far, and the ratification of the protocols has been frozen by Armenia. Steps taken towards resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem could have a positive effect on Turkey-Armenia relations (Tascioglu, 2017).

Influence of the Armenian Issue in the U.S. Congress

Armenia holds a special place among Caspian nations in the minds of members of Congress because not every diaspora community is concentrated in a district that spawns a U.S. President and a Speaker of the House (King and Pomper, 2004). The efforts of the Armenian diaspora to ensure that the U.S. Congress recognized the events of 1915 as genocide gained momentum after 1977, when genocide resolutions were first brought to the House of Representatives, which failed to pass a genocide resolution despite the efforts of the Armenian lobby almost every year in the first half of the 1980s. The American authorities initially opposed the Armenian resolution because Turkey's persistent complaints to Congress led them to believe that passing such a resolution could seriously damage Turkish-American relations (Tascioglu,2017).

In 1985 The Armenian lobby in the United States attempted to introduce four resolutions to Congress all regarding allegations of genocide (Kantarci, 2007). The first of these was H.J.R. no:35, which was presented by Robert Roe; the second was a resolution no:192, introduced by the California representative Tony Coelho in March; the third was S.J.R. No:101, presented by Cari Levin in March; the fourth was resolution H.R. No:142, requiring U.S. foreign policy to recognize the alleged Armenian genocide the end of April, introduced by Charles Pashhayan, an Armenian-born California representative (Tascioglu, 2017).

Bernard Lewis, Justin McCarthy, Dankwart Rustow, Heath W. Lowry, J.C. Hurewitz and 64 other American academics who opposed the resolution no:192 prepared a declaration and sent it to the U.S. House of Representative. In this declaration;

“The weight of evidence so far uncovered points in the direction of serious intercommunal warfare (perpetrated by Muslim and Christian irregular forces), complicated by disease, famine, suffering, and massacres in Anatolia and adjoining areas during the First World War. Statesmen and politicians make history, and scholars write it. For this process to work scholars must be given access to the written records of the statesmen and politicians of the past. To date, the relevant archives in the Soviet Union, Syria, Bulgaria, and Turkey all remain, for the most part, closed to dispassionate historians. Until they become available, the history of the Ottoman Empire in the period encompassed by H.J. Res. 192 (1915-1923) cannot be adequately known. As the above comments illustrate, the history of the Ottoman-Armenians is much debated among scholars, many of whom do not agree with the historical assumptions embodied in the wording of H.J. Res. 192. By passing the resolution Congress will be attempting to determine by legislation which side of the historical question is correct. Such a resolution, based on historically questionable assumptions, can only damage the cause of honest historical inquiry, and damage the credibility of the American legislative process” (*New York Times*, 1973).

Turkey has objected to the draft resolutions introduced to the U.S. Congress on similar grounds as well as those discussed in parliaments of other countries. Turkey based its objections on the claim that political bodies such as parliaments have no power to make decisions on historical matters, and history should be written by historians. According to Turkey, the genocide of these resolution has been overestimated, and all the great sufferings in history cannot be qualified as genocide. Also, decisions on genocide should be made only by international courts established in accordance with international law. This argument also draws attention to the fact that although many historians have acknowledged profoundly painful consequences, the 1915

Events cannot be included in the definition of genocide as, the emphasis is only on the suffering of the Armenians and ignores the suffering of the Muslim population, which is not in accordance with the historical facts and equality.

The American Armenian lobby has continued to pressure Congress to pass the Armenian genocide resolution, which has been brought to the House of Representatives almost every year since 1989. Although drafted resolutions have been passed by committees, they have been rejected by the General Assembly of the House of Representatives (Hinsdale, 1900).

In 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998, Armenian genocide commemorative meetings were held in the U.S. Congress and the “anti-Turkish” perspective put forward both in the Senate and in the House Representatives. In addition, a policy restraint against Turkey and Azerbaijan was pursued by the United States. In 1998, the Armenian lobby designed resolution 55, which was signed by David Bonior and George Radnovich of the Armenian Caucus in the House of Representatives, but failed (Kantarci, 2004).

In November 1999, a Republican and two Democratic Congressmen presented a new proposal, House Resolution no. 398 entitled “Education and Memorial Decision on the Armenian Genocide” signed by 134 members of Congress (Kantarci, 2004). In the draft, it was argued that 2,000,000 Armenians were subjected to relocation and 1,500,000 killed in Anatolia between 1915 and 1923, and the U.S. State Department and other public officials including U.S. presidents were asked to acknowledge the matter and declare that the events constituted a “genocide” (Taskiran, 2017).

The Armenian resolution no. 398 was presented to the Congress in November 1999 and discussion of it began on September 14, 2000; on June 28, 2000, Armenian President Robert

Kocharyan held a meeting with the congressional members of the United States who had cooperated with the activities of the Armenian lobby before the discussion began (Kantarci, 2004). Following the meeting, the Armenian resolution no. 398 was discussed by the “International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee,” consisting of 14 members of the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives.

The transfer of the resolution no:398 to the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives through the International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee was discussed in the National Security Council (NSC) in Turkey, which was convened on September 29, 2000, under the presidency of Turkey President Ahmet Necdet Sezer.

As a result of the NSC meeting, it was stated that the developments regarding the Armenian lobby's claim were regrettable, and it was decided to take more effective measures against the Armenian question by Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. The statement, which reproached the United States and warned Armenia, claimed that the initiatives were brought to the agenda under the direction of militant Armenian circles, and further stated that

“It is thought that the efforts to be carried out on the basis of subjective judgments, falsified documents, internal and external political gains will not contribute positively to regional and world peace...”. “For as long as there are historical facts, official documents, church records and witnesses, by creating non-essential issues between the two peoples who have to live together in the geographical region, knowing that you will put in the seeds of *nifak* and that you will not earn the reputation of it will benefit everyone, especially the neighboring country (and) Armenian administration and people” (Kantarci, 2004).

Measures that could be taken on the issue were also discussed at the NSC meeting held under the presidency of President Sezer. In line with these measures, Turkey first thought to turn off the air corridor H-50 number and to stop charter flights to Yerevan (Tascioglu, 2017). Among the measures determined by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was emphasized that Yerevan does not recognize the territorial integrity of Ankara and that a campaign related to the situation should be initiated. For this purpose, the Turkish Government decided to first address the issues highlighted in the Declaration of Independence from the Soviet Republic issued by the Republic of Armenia on August 23, 1990:

In the explanations related to the topic, it was expressed that in the 11th article of the declaration of the Armenian Soviet Republic of 23 August 1990,

“The Republic of Armenia will support the effort, that will continue, in the international arena in order to be accepted about the Genocide perpetrated in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia in 1915 and defining the Eastern Region of Turkey as Western Armenia as among the priority issues to be dealt with sensitively in this campaign will be held. It was also decided to implement such practices as calling for the recognition of Armenia and the Kars Treaty dated 1921 which defines the borders” (Kantarci, 2004).

As is known, the area called Western Armenia is a part of Turkey's eastern and southeastern Anatolia regions by Mediterranean and Eastern Black Sea. The territory, which includes 19 provinces of the territory of the Republic of Turkey, was shown as Western Armenia in Armenian and U.S. school atlases (Goode, 1948).

The Armenian resolution was accepted by the International Operations Subcommittee on International Operations of the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of

Representatives as Resolution 398, and discussion by the International Relations Committee began on October 3, 2000. After the negotiations the proposal was submitted as H.R. 596 to the Representative Assembly (Kantarci, 2004).

After the resolution was sent to the U.S. House of Representatives Sub-Committee, such measures as closing the air corridor to Armenia were considered as a crisis management scenario recommended by the NSC and in the Armenian Declaration of Independence necessary, Turkey was mentioned as a Western Armenia. Turkey's determination on the Western Armenia issue had the expected impact on the U.S. administration, and U.S. President Bill Clinton was forced to take the initiative to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Clinton sent a letter to the House Speaker Dennis Hastert requesting that the draft not be brought to the General Assembly because passing it would cause irreparable harm to the relationship between the United States and Turkey (Kantarci, 2004). Given these developments, Dennis Hastert withdrew the Armenian Genocide Resolution on October 20, 2000 (Tascioglu, 2017).

In the period following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Turkey did not face the possibility of another Armenian Genocide Resolution in the Congress because the U.S. government needed Turkey's aid in the region. However, in June 2005, H.RES. No. 316 was presented by the congressional representatives of the Armenian lobby, California Republican George Radanovich and Democrat Adam Schiff, and Armenian Friendship Co-President Joe Knollenberg and Frank Pallone (Ari, 2009).

In June 2005, resolution 195 was offered and accepted simultaneously by the United States House of Representatives and the Senate, stipulating that

The Congress commemorate the 1915-1923 Armenian Genocide, the Republic of Turkey recognize the Armenia Genocide that committed by the Ottoman Empire, and the Republic of Turkey is forced to enter into rapprochement with the Republic of Armenia and Armenian people. The Congress supports the membership of [Turkey in] the European Union provided that Turkey fulfills certain conditions.

as well as allegations that 2,000,000 Armenians were deported and 1,500,000 of them were killed (Tascioglu, 2017).

On January 30, 2007, under the influence of the Armenian lobbies, a draft of a new Armenian Genocide Resolution, resolution H.RES.106, was brought to the 110th session of the House of Representatives, by Democrats Adam Schiff and Frank Pallone, one of the leaders of the Armenian lobby, and Republicans George Radanovich and Joe Knollenberg, claiming that

“the Ottoman Empire carried out genocide against Armenians between 1915 and 1923, that approximately 2,000,000 Armenians were deported, [that] 1,500,000 women, men and children were killed and [that] 500,000 Armenians survivors were expelled from their homes” (Kantarci,2004).

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives supported H.RES.106, which described the events of 1915 as genocide, by a 27-21 vote. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey delegation headed by Egemen Bagis, who was Justice and Development Party (AKP in Turkey) vice chairman and Istanbul deputy, and Nabi Sensoy, who was Turkey's Ambassador in Washington, went to Washington to explain Turkey's opposition to the Armenian Resolution. However, Turkish delegations could not prevent decision making.

Resolutions presented in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate accusing the Turks of genocide have continued to gain momentum since 2009. On March 17, 2009 two years after H. RES.106, Adam Schiff, the architect of the Armenian design in 2005 and 2007, drafted the design numbered 252 and submitted it to the U.S. House of Representatives. One month later, U.S. President Barack Obama visited Turkey. In his speech in to Grand National Assembly of Turkey, he voiced his demands that the Armenian border with Turkey be opened, that Halki Seminary be reopened (it is having been closed by the Turkish government in 1971), that the cultural rights of different ethnic groups be respected, and that issues concerning Cyprus be addresses (Tascioglu, 2009).

The issues covered in draft number 252 largely overlap with the HCON 195 IH decision brought to the Congress in 2005 and with the H.RES.106 resolution brought to the Congress in 2007. On March 4, 2010, 252 was discussed by the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee and approved by a 23 to 22 vote (Tascioglu, 2017).

Another Resolutions;

- H.Res.304 - Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution (2011).
- S.Res.399 - Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution (2012).
- S.Res.410 - A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the anniversary of the Armenian Genocide (2014).
- H.Res.154 - Calling on the President to work toward equitable, constructive, stable, and durable Armenian-Turkish relations based upon the Republic of Turkey's full acknowledgment of the facts and ongoing consequences of the Armenian Genocide, and

a fair, just, and comprehensive international resolution of this crime against humanity (2015).

- S.Res.136 - A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the 102nd anniversary of the Armenian Genocide (2017) (Congress.gov).

Relations between the US and Armenia have grown closer recently; in particular members of U.S. Congress have made frequent visits to Armenia and made statements supporting the Armenian cause. In this context, a special delegation made up of members of the U.S. Congress, on the initiative of Armenian-American Congresswoman, Jackie Speier, visited Armenia from September 17 to 22, 2017. The delegation included Congress members Frank Pallone, who favors preparing and supporting the Armenian Genocide Resolutions presented to the U.S. Congress, Armenian-American Anna Eshoo, David Valadao, Tulsi Gabbard, who is a Congress member from Hawaii, and Jim Sensenbrenner who is a Congress member from Wisconsin, as well as the U.S. Ambassador to Yerevan and the Armenian Ambassador to Washington. Jackie Speier explained the visit as follows:

“The visiting delegation explained that it was... the purpose of the visit [to the Republic of Armenia] to strengthen the friendship between the two countries, to help them get rid of the corruption in Armenia and to create new possibilities for American assistance to Armenia” (ARMENPRESS, 2017).

On October 8, 2017, a U.S. delegation including representatives of the State of California and representatives of the Senate visited Karabakh to support the Karabakh administration, which was under occupation and had declared independence and its name as Artsakh (ARMENPRESS, 2017).

The Armenian Diaspora has not forgotten the support of members of the United States Congress for Armenia and its allegations of genocide, and on October 8, 2017, the American National Armenians Committee (ANCA - WR) honored California senator Anthony J. Portantino with its 2017 “Assembly Member of the Year” award for his support for the Armenian causes and claims of genocide (ANCA, 2017).

The line graph below compares the numbers of times Congress members rose to talk about each of five Caspian nations on the House or Senate floor and demonstrates that Armenian has received far more attention from the U.S. government than any other Caspian nation. In the period 1985-1986, for example, Armenia was mentioned 71 times more than twice the number of times of the other five states combined.




Figure 1: (U.S. Congressional Record, January 1985- December 2001)

According to King and Pomper (2004), the disparity in discussion between Armenia and other Caspian nations is that the result of the fact that these other Caspian nations had little

representation in Congress, their being little reason for legislators to care about the links between their home districts and these distant lands. Until U.S. petroleum companies rushed into the Caspian region after the Soviet collapse, there were no effective groups lobbying Congress on behalf of any Caspian besides the Armenians (King and Pomper, 2004).

The Armenia Issue and Identity of Senator Robert Dole

In April 1987, as a result of the work done by the Armenian lobby in California, the California State Senate passed a resolution declaring April 24, as a “Day of Remembrance of the Armenian Genocide.” On April 23, 1987 “Armenian Memorial Day” was organized in United States the House of Representatives and on April 24 in the Senate. Moreover, in the same year, the Armenian lobby submitted again its resolution to the House of Representatives.

When Robert Dole, the senate majority leader from Kansas and former vice-presidential nominee, brought the genocide resolution to the Senate in 1989, a serious debate began in the Senate. An Armenian immigrant doctor had treated Dole for injuries the senator has suffered while serving in Italy during World War II, forging a connection between Dole and the Armenian community. In a short period of time, he gathered 61 supporters of the Armenian genocide resolution, without consultation with the Turkish Embassy almost guaranteeing its passage (Celikkol, 2015).

From 1989 onwards, the Armenian lobby made great preparations for 1990, the 75th anniversary of the alleged genocide, and on September 29, 1989, Senator Robert Dole presented an Armenian Resolution to the Senate General Assembly, who began to discuss it in the third week of February 1990 (Tascioglu, 2017).

Following the deliberations in the House of Representatives and the Senate, the draft resolution No. 212, which Senator Dole had referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee as “National Memorial Day for the 75th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide” in 1985, was accepted by the Justice Commission and sent to the General Assembly. On February 22, 1990, in the first round after the intense debate in the U.S. Senate, 49 no votes were played against 49 yes votes, but the required number of 60 votes was not reached, and the Armenians lost the decision. In the second round, after the intense efforts of the Armenians and Senator Dole, the draft was again rejected by 48 yes votes to 51 no votes, which still felt short of the required 60 yes votes (Kantarci, 2007).

Why is the Armenia Issue so important for the Armenians?

Diaspora Armenians have a heterogeneous structure. When the Armenian diaspora is mentioned, it refers to a national group in which many different languages are spoken including Turkish, Russian, French, English, Arabic and Farsi. Even the Armenian language, is divided into Eastern and Western Armenian. Moreover, diaspora Armenians are also experiencing serious difficulties maintaining the Armenian language in younger generations, who naturally speak the languages of the countries where they live and move away from their heritage language (Akgonul, 2003).

Diaspora Armenians have an important influence on Armenia's foreign policy. There is cooperation between Armenian Diaspora Armenians and the Nagorno-Karabakh politicians, nationalist parties and actors, and the overcrowded political alliances formed in the military / civil bureaucracy, which holds power in the present. Armenians living in Western countries, such as the USA, France, Russia and Germany, which have serious weight in the functioning of the international system, have internalized the alleged genocide as significant in their historical

national identification, reminding them of who they are. Because the Armenians' national identity is closely linked to the genocide argument, the rejection of this thesis or its irrelevance in the context of foreign policy will mean that the Diaspora Armenians will lose or have to rebuild the identities they have internalized over time. For this reason, according to diaspora Armenians, the most important task of Armenia is to bring international attention to the alleged genocide and to build an institutional structure into which the Armenian Diaspora can integrate in every sense. Diaspora Armenians regard the alleged Armenian genocide as an institutional "link" that will solidify national identity and provide links with their history and homeland (Tuysuzoglu, 2014).

Diaspora Armenians have chosen the genocide rhetoric as a means of maintaining their national and ethnocultural identity even though they live in different countries. Diaspora Armenians, who have experienced a much more diverse and socio-economic and cultural socialization compared to those living in the motherland territories, have tried to demonstrate that they are Armenians who did not lose their identities in the course of historical developments. What is important for the Diaspora is to adhere to the campaign to influence foreign policy to support the reality of the alleged genocide and make the best use of the economic opportunities afforded them.

The division between the Armenians also show itself there are differences in the religious issues. The historical sect of Armenians is Gregorian. The Armenians are differentiated according to whether they have adopted Orthodoxy, Protestantism or Catholicism. In addition to divisions between religious, there is also a division between churches going Armenians and secularists (Koshian, 2002).

Although the Armenians have had various disputes among the different factions, and they are divided in political, sectarian, etc. terms, they can unite on some attitudes, especially towards

Turkey and particularly the issue of the genocide. The Armenians, who are described as moderate, agree that genocide was perpetrated on those living on the Ottoman borders. We can even say that the alleged genocide allegations are the most important tool they use to survive in the countries they live in. With this in mind, they are trying to cultivate an Armenian consciousness and empathy in the younger generation to keep the Armenian identity alive. French historian Anahide Ter-Minassian said that the claims of surviving a genocide in the events of 1915 constitute a point of intersection that has made the Armenian diaspora a great diaspora (Dufoix, 2008).

The Armenian lobbies are in a continuous struggle to convince the United States to declare the events of 1915 as a “genocide.” Until today, U.S. presidents have not directly accepted genocide allegations. George W. Bush did not say “genocide” in 2001 in response to the Armenian question but used the phrase “destruction.” In 2002, Bush called it the “massacre” and described it as “appalling” (Laciner, 2008). In his first year, Obama used the Armenian term *Meds Yeghern*, meaning “Great Disaster,” instead of “genocide” in his April 24 message (The Armenian Weekly, 2009), which Armenians considered going back on his word because during his presidential campaign he had promised to use the term “genocide.” The truth of the matter is that Obama supported all of the Armenian theses in his speeches but did not use the contested English word.

Both formal and informal relations between the Armenian diaspora and the West can be explained by two basic arguments. The first is that the Armenian diaspora is a social and geographical stakeholder in the Western world. In this context, the Armenian diaspora believes that there is an absolute alliance with the West in all conceptual and institutional aspects of the Armenian genocide allegations. The second is the overlap of the social and territorial

perspectives of both the Western countries and the Armenian diasporas on the Turkish side. When assessed on the basis of these two basic arguments, the Armenian genocide claims become a common instrument for both the Armenian Diaspora and the West. Armenian genocide allegations are gaining ground as a project that the western and Armenians share based on the Armenians' demands from Turkey for compensation and territory.

The entity that manages the Armenian diaspora directs all means within its power to influence political discourses. For this purpose, the Armenian Diaspora is endeavoring to realize two intentions in the Western countries. One is to convince the public that the claim of “genocide” is based on a real historical event. Secondly, they are trying to use the influence of public opinion to ensure that the “genocide” is used in the official discourse of the relevant countries and that it is perceived as a historical fact by putting pressure on their parliaments, senates, governments, municipal councils, in short, all the political organs of the states.

The activities carried out by Armenian groups in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in Armenian Genocide Resolutions that they repeatedly brought to the U.S. Congress from the middle of the 1980s. For this purpose, on September 12, 1984, the issue of the alleged Armenian Genocide was brought to the House of Representatives.

In the period following the decline of the Ottoman state, the issues involved in the ethnic conflicts demanded the construction of a nation-state, the redefinition of national identity and the determination of the nature of majority / minority relations. The Armenians, as part of the highly ethicized nature of the Ottoman State, continued to argue over the old and new interpretations of historical and cultural events. The fact that the discussions of the Armenian issue are central in the United States and Europe can be attributed both to the fact that current world dominance has shifted to these centers and that the Armenian diaspora is strong in these centers.

Financial Support to Armenia

An important aspect of the US-Armenian relations is the economic assistance provided to Armenia by the United States. The alleged Armenian genocide meetings in the U.S. House of Representatives or in the Senate include an image of the aid propaganda to Armenia. Every legislator who came to the stand, after making mention of the alleged genocide, they expressed his wishes that “we must make financial and moral assistance to Armenia at all costs” (Tuncer, 2006). It is emphasized in almost all the talks that the aid to Armenia will serve the U.S. interests.

Marc Levine, a Californian legislator mentioned that

“As it is important to remember the past, it is also vital to look towards the future. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the reproduction of an independent Armenia offers the only opportunity to build strong relations between the United States and Armenia, and thus the chance to lead the United States in the Transcaucasian region” (Tascioglu, 2017).

The lack of leadership of the United States in the region was mostly felt in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. In the last 10 years, this situation has been emphasized in the alleged Armenian Genocide meetings by the legislators. The issue of guaranteeing U.S. financial and technical assistance to the Republic of Armenia is a priority for both AAA and ANCA. In particular, the 1988 Armenian earthquake attracted American assistances from the Congress. In 1995, Armenia received \$85 million as humanitarian aid and \$30 million as development aid (Ari, 2000). In the following years, U.S. aid to Armenia has reached an annual average of US \$ 90 million. Although some congressmembers tried to reduce the aid to Armenia to US \$ 75 million in 1999,

Armenian Caucus (AC) efforts succeeded in maintaining a minimum of \$ 90 million (Ari, 2000). In 2002, aid to Armenia was announced as 82.5 million dollars (Ari,2009).

AAA, ANCA and its subsidiaries have been conducting intense lobbying activities with similar methods to secure and promote Armenia. ANCA and AAA are conducting intense lobbying activities toward Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operation in order to continue assistance to Armenia. In addition to its annual U.S. \$90 million, the AAA has secured a \$15 million loan as a starting fund for Synchrotron Light Source Particle Accelerator-SESAME (Ari, 2009).

The total amount of aid that the United States made to Armenia from 1992 to 2002 amounted to 1.2 billion dollars, while the total amount of aid to Azerbaijan in the same period was only 165 million dollars. By the year 2004, the total amount of assistance from the USA to Armenia since independence exceeded 1.5 billion dollars (Laciner, 2004). This amount continues to increase every year. The United States increased its economic aid to Armenia by 22% in its fiscal 2016 budget (Tascioglu, 2017).

Moreover, in 1992, three trade treaties were signed between Armenia and the United States, the “Commercial Relations Agreement,” the “Investment Agreement,” and the “Investment Protection Agreement,” which were enacted in 1995. On the legal basis of these agreements, about 70 U.S. companies are doing business in Armenia today. A significant part of the benefits from commercial relations and foreign investments are realized by American Armenians (Laciner, 2004).

Table 4: Total Per Capita U.S. Foreign Assistance 1990-1999 (\$/Nation's Population)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Decade Average
Armenia			6.77	20.66	25.59	14.86	19.76	4.63	20.23	19.96	13.25
Turkey	8.65	14.63	8.99	11.38	6.92	8.25	5.78	3.17	0.13	0.08	6.80
Azerbaijan					2.77	1.27	0.72	0.27	3.12	3.63	1.18

U.S. foreign assistance is a useful metric for demonstrating how strong diaspora communities are in Congress. Table 4 reports the total per capita assistance to countries in the Caspian Sea region throughout the 1990s. In 1999, Armenia received \$74.3 million in U.S. foreign assistance, and given the Armenian population of 3.8 million, U.S. foreign assistance to Armenia was \$19.96 per man, woman and child in the country or \$229 per person who was identified as an Armenian American in the 2000 U.S. census whereas Azerbaijan brought in \$3.63 per person in U.S. foreign aid in 1999 (King and Pomper, 2004). The Armenian lobby in Congress, supported by eminent figures like Senator Bob Dole, was extremely powerful. For example, Congress voted to aid to independent Armenia. U.S. government assistance to Armenia was \$102.4 million in 2000, was the second highest per capita after Israel (Waal, 2003).

While Armenia did very well in terms of U.S. foreign assistance when compared with most of its Caspian Sea neighbors, Armenia's per capita assistance in 1999 also ranked in the top 10 of all nations, according to the 2001 USAID Loans and Grants "green book." The top 10 per capita recipient nations in 1999 were Israel, Jordan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Egypt, West Bank/Gaza, Macedonia, Armenia, Cyprus, Georgia, and Honduras (King and Pomper, 2004).

When we look at the last three years, the ANCA urged Congress and the Administration to support the following key priorities for Fiscal Years (FY) 2016, 2017, and 2018:

- Fiscal Year 2016
 - At least \$5 million in U.S. developmental aid to Nagorno Karabakh,
 - At least \$40 million in U.S. economic assistance to Armenia (ANCA).
- Fiscal year 2017:
 - At least \$5 million in aid to Nagorno Karabakh for humanitarian and developmental programs,
 - At least \$40 million in U.S. economic assistance to Armenia, targeted to growing the U.S.-Armenia trade and investment relationship.
 - At least \$10 million in emergency aid to help Armenia settle the nearly 20,000 thousand people who have fled to Armenia from Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East (ANCA, 2016).
- Fiscal year 2018:
 - At least \$8 million in U.S. developmental aid to Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh).
 - At least \$40 million in U.S. economic assistance to Armenia, and \$11 million in U.S. military aid.
 - At least \$40 million to support Armenia's efforts to serve as a regional safe haven for at-risk populations fleeing violence in the Middle East.
 - At least \$20 million to support implementation of the Royce-Engel Peace proposals (The Armenian Weekly, 2017).

Nagorno-Karabakh Issue

Nagorno-Karabakh is a mountainous region between the Cure and Aras rivers and the Göyçe Lake. Nagorno-Karabakh has geopolitical importance because it is located at a point where it can be controlled by either Armenia and Iran. In addition, according to Waal (2003),

importance of Nagorno Karabakh in terms of cultural and symbolic for both Armenians and Azerbaijanis cannot be ignored.

For Armenians, Karabakh is the last out-post of their Christian civilization and a historic haven of Armenian princes and bishops before the eastern Turkic world begins.

Azerbaijanis talk of it as a cradle, nursery, or conservatoire, the birthplace of their musicians and poets (p.3).

The main determinant of Azerbaijani-US relations has been the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In this period of now, the United States' policy concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has three objectives. These are to solve the problem through negotiations, to avoid identifying either side as the aggressor, and-under the influence of the Armenian Diaspora-to take a pro-Armenian position (Tuncer, 2006).

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict emerged in the 1980s. On February 20, 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast which connects to Azerbaijan officially demanded unification with Armenia. Azerbaijan described this demand as a violation of its national interests. In Sumqayit, blood pressures rose with the murder of two Armenians. (Çiloğlu, 1998). On March 23, 1988, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR refused the Nagorno-Karabakh administration's request to join Armenia. After that, the tension in the region increased. On December 1, 1989, Armenia declared to the world its decision to attach Nagorno-Karabakh to itself, and on August 23, 1990, Armenia included Nagorno-Karabakh as its territory in its Declaration of Independence. The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh declared the Nagorno-Karabakh a republic on September 2, 1991, accelerating their political activism for inclusion in Armenia (Devlet, 1993).

This declaration was contrary to the UN Charter, which states that the territorial integrity of all member states is guaranteed, and the borders established by the founding treaty signed by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the dissolution of the USSR cannot be changed by force. On November 27, 1991, upon the renaming of Nagorno-Karabakh as the Artsakh Armenian Democratic Republic, the Azerbaijani Parliament canceled the autonomous status of the region with (Kasim, 2006). Armenia considered this decision of the Azerbaijani Parliament to be a declaration of war.

Moreover, the United States recognized Armenia immediately after its independence and established diplomatic relations with it in December 1991. Due to the presence of a large Armenian community in the United States, relations with Armenia are different from those of U.S. relations with other South Caucasus countries. The most important reason for this is that the Armenians who have emigrated to the USA since 19th century have a superior ability to organize their influence on the Congress and the Senate. The Armenian Diaspora has been of great importance to the formation of U.S. policies concerning Armenia since it gained its independence.

In the first years of Armenia's independence, the United States tried to keep out of some issues. However, even though it had established diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia, the U.S. government was more interested in the political, economic and financial problems of Armenia and showed a special interest in Armenia as a result of the successful operation of the Armenian diaspora.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the U.S. government helped the newly-independent Armenia by providing economic and financial assistance, and Armenia embraced democratic values. In fact, although Armenia attaches much greater importance to relations with

the United States than with Russia, Armenia has never been dependent on the US. Thus, the diaspora, rather than the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has kept the relations between the parties stable and has helped it to develop over time.

The main factor that affected Azerbaijan-US relations negatively and caused the decision of Section 907 was the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is possible to say that the policy of the United States in the Karabakh conflict has been to try to resolve the problem through negotiations, to avoid declaring either side the aggressor, and, under the influence of the Armenian Diaspora in the United States, to support Armenia (Cafersoy, 2001).

The first statement on the Karabakh conflict in the United States was carried out by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on December 12, 1991. In his speech, he cited Azerbaijan as an example and stated that some countries that were armed to fight did not receive any support from the West. Baker also underlined in a speech he made during his visit to Baku on February 12, 1992 that Washington would not help Azerbaijan without a solid guarantee of the rights of ethnic minorities in Nagorno-Karabakh (Guliyev, 2004).

The U.S. policy towards Azerbaijan and Armenia has been influenced on the whole region. In the development of such foreign policies, there can be disagreement between the American executive branch and the legislative branch. The Congress, which is influenced by the Armenian lobby on Nagorno-Karabakh, opposes cooperation with Azerbaijan, while the executive branch, under the influence of oil companies, hoped to see an improvement in relations with Azerbaijan and to convince the Armenian government to resolve the Karabakh issue (Tellal, 2000).

In the resolution of the Karabakh problem, the United States has shown a three-stage approach. First, the United States will call on the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia to initiate negotiations to solve the problem. Then, Turkey will ask to contribute to the solution of the problem. Finally, this conflict will be intervened in the problem through international organizations in which the United States was represented (Azerbaijan International, 1995).

The United Nations (UN) review mission, headed by former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, visited Nagorno-Karabakh in March 1992. The U.S., after the visit, mainly focused on the solution of the problem through the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Guliyev, 2004).

On February 17, 1993, with the proposal of David Bonier from the state of Michigan, the House of Representatives adopted Resolution 86 on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In this resolution against Azerbaijan it was demanded,

- Increasing humanitarian aid to Armenia and to help the development of its weak economy in accordance with the winter conditions;
- Helping to make fair decisions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the UN and OSCE ceremonies;
- Ensuring the participation of the Nagorno-Karabakh administration in the negotiations on the issue;
- Ensuring the treat Turkey's objective in making decisions about the issue;
- That the blockade of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, which was counter to the norms of international law, be lifted the delivery of humanitarian assistance be facilitated;
- Continuation of restrictions against Azerbaijan (Guliyev, 2004).

The Resolution accused Azerbaijan of blockading Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and stresses that Section 907 should remain in force. With the passage of Section 907, the Armenian lobby not only prevented significant U.S. aid to Azerbaijan, but also provided that Azerbaijan be regarded as an aggressive state in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Another strategic triumph of the Armenian Diaspora was that the Nagorno-Karabakh region was seen as a region outside of Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan was considered an occupier. In spite of the prevention of all American aid to Azerbaijan, the support of Armenia, which is in close cooperation with Russia and Iran, which are the rivals of the U.S.A., and allegedly occupying the territory of Azerbaijan, has been at the center of the Caucasus policy of the U.S.A., due to influence of the Armenian Diaspora.

The Armenian Diaspora tries to prevent military and economic aid to Azerbaijan are examples of the impact of cultural identity on foreign policy. This is closely related to the effects of the Armenian Diaspora on external policy. Organized Diaspora, which are non-state and international actors, have started to affect the foreign policies of their homelands where they continue their cultural and emotional ties, not only of the countries they live in. Especially in lobbying activities in America, Diaspora receives great support from American society. According to Ari (2000), religion, culture and interest relations are very effective in this (p.273).

The alleged genocide claims are mainly reflections of a cultural identity policy followed by the Armenians. The most powerful advocate of genocide-based identity policy is the Armenian Diaspora outside Armenia. In the context of genocide identity policies, Armenia is guided by Diaspora. The main reason for this is the necessity of eliminating the lack of a foundation by creating a historical value. Today thanks to Diaspora, Armenia receives a large

amount of assistance every year and it has been receiving all kinds of support from the U.S.A. (Ari, 2000).

The Prevention of American Aid to Azerbaijan (Section 907)

The ethnic phenomenon is as effective in contemporary American domestic politics as well as foreign policy. Some powerful ethnic interest groups, such as Jews, Greeks, and Armenians, have had great power in American domestic politics, and they tend to use this power increasingly in foreign policy matters that concern them. The impact of ethnic interest groups is closely related to a wide range of internal determinants, including the nature of the external political system, the nature of the internal political system, the role of state and society, public and social groups, and even the ideas and perceptions that influence the policymaking process. Therefore, I will evaluate the role of the Armenian Diaspora in defining the influence of the Armenian Lobby on shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Azerbaijan as an example of external politics, going from the early 1990s to the present day.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, three former Republics of the former USSR in the South Caucasus-Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia-gained independence. The existence of these independent states within the region of the former USSR opened a new path in U.S. foreign policy. Since 1991, the United States, which had earlier perceived this region as a threat, has considered it a friendly population. The geo-strategic importance of the Caucasus, the central point of the Great Silk Road, a network of roads connecting the Far East, connecting Central Asia and Europe, and the natural energy resources of the region were the main reasons for the U.S.'s territorial initiatives (King and Pomper, 2004). There is a serious competition between the US, Germany and Russia, especially on exporting Caspian Sea oil to the world market.

Washington is in search of a solution different from that of Russia, which is increasing its activity in this region.

In its attempt to draw governments of newly independent states of the former USSR into its orbit, the United States decided to introduce special legislation to contribute to the development of democracy, to facilitate the implementation of a free market economy, and to achieve the integration of these states into the West. When legislation was being prepared (October 24, 1992) to achieve these goals, assistance to Russia and 11 other former Soviet republics was part of the discussion. However, due to the influence of the upcoming the U.S. presidential elections, some suggested that limited should be placed on aid to Azerbaijan because of “Azerbaijan's embargo against Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other aggressive attitudes.” (Tascioglu, 2017).

On October 24, 1992, the U.S. Congress approved the “Freedom Support Act” Law. The most important of the issues that are difficult to understand in Azerbaijani- U.S. relations are the passage of Section 907 of this legislation in the second session of the U.S. Congress on October 24, 1992. The “Act on Promoting Freedoms” stipulates that financial aid will be provided to newly-independent states for the development of democracy and free market economies. However, “Section 907,” which was aimed at restricting all kinds of American aid to Azerbaijan, was presented to Congress in July 1992 by Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, where the Armenian community was strong. Senators Sarbanes, Saymons, and Council and a number of other congressional members also supported the bill. Senators Lugar, McConnell, Kassebaum and Sanford opposed Section 907 (Sobhani, 1992).

According to the law, which prohibits any economic aid to Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan is accused of imposing an embargo on Armenia. It was also emphasized that Azerbaijan's

investments related to Nagorno-Karabakh should be stopped. It was also stated that the decision would remain in effect as long as Azerbaijan, presented as an “invader” state, did not give up its position. It was also reported that the President of the United States would be able to withdraw from the exercise if the Government of Azerbaijan found that the Government of Azerbaijan had used embargoes and all forms of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan International, 1998). In addition, the expression “Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and other new republics” was used instead of the former “Russia and the other 11 former Soviet republics” in the text of the law. The law and “Section 907” were signed on the same day by then U.S. President George Bush (Public Law, 1992).

In this decision, the influence of the powerful Armenian lobby in the United States was great. The negative attitude of the U.S. Government and the public based on limited information about Azerbaijan and the industrious work of the Armenian lobby has been the reason for the adoption of the “Section 907” (Mamedov,2007).

Factors that allow various interest groups, including ethnic groups, to influence the U.S. policymaking process are broadly in the nature of state-society relations and in the political and party organizations of the country (Berls, 1999). One of the important points to be addressed here is that there are no pressure groups on behalf of Azerbaijan and no benefit to this country from these opportunities naturally provided by the United States. In other words, Azerbaijan did not have an ethnic pressure group that could affect U.S. foreign policy, despite the fact that Azerbaijan's anti-regime emigration to the United States due to historical and social reasons, especially after the Iranian revolution, increased the Azerbaijani population in the U.S.A. However, many of these people are “groups” that lack ethnic awareness and advocate only for

the regime change in Iran, so Azerbaijan does not have the opportunity to benefit from these groups in a real sense.

By contrast, reflecting the effectiveness of the Armenian pressure groups, the Congressional caucus that represents Armenians, formed in 1995, had 126 members as of January 2003 (Tuncer, 2006) making it the largest ethnic caucus of the U.S. Congress, followed by the 117-member Greek Caucus, and these two countries had close business ties with each other (Congressional Hellenic Caucus). Another important function carried out by ethnic interest groups and organizations is to make and follow political recommendations. Ethnic organizations inform their members and wider communities about the developments in the government and what they believe to be important in the world. For this reason, the U.S. embargo on Azerbaijan had been applied for years.

The US-Azerbaijani relations were asymmetric, as the United States was not so willing to strengthen its relations with Azerbaijan, which initially wanted to cooperate more closely with America in the political and economic arena (Tuncer, 2006). With the Section 907, the Armenian lobby not only prevented important U.S. government aid to the Azerbaijani government, but also created a negative image of Azerbaijan's aggressive role in the dispute in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Indeed, another strategic victory of the Armenian lobby was fostering an impression via Section 907 that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is a separate formation outside of Azerbaijan, when in fact it is considered to belong to Azerbaijan internationally, including by the USA and the publicizing of Azerbaijan's use of aggressive forces against Nagorno-Karabakh. The most interesting thing about the Section 907 was that the Armenian government had an authoritarian and aggressive government in friendly relations with Iran and Russia, which had been in the present position of the United States in the region, although the Armenian lobby did not make

use of Azerbaijan from the help of the new independent states that had left the Soviet Union (Guliyev, 2004). It was known that Armenia received a large number of arms, oil and other aid from Iran and Russia, and this has been repeatedly proven by Azerbaijani intelligence units (Mardanov,2012).

The Azerbaijani authorities have repeatedly criticized the fact that the U.S. Government, and in particular Congress, have left the policy decisions concerning the Caucasus in the hands of ethnic American interest groups. The Azerbaijani Government rejected Armenia's allegations of a blockade by freezing all its economic relations with a country in the case of war, arguing that they used their legal rights in terms of defense by not doing business on joint projects. The only land border Armenia could open to the world for that period was with Iran. The Azerbaijani authorities had told them that they are not Armenia's only frontier neighbor, and that they could not blockade Armenia (Mardanov, 2012). The embargo on the Section 907 was strongly criticized by high-ranking U.S. officials. U.S. mediator of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, John J. Maresca said:

Section 907 acknowledges that Azerbaijan is in an aggressive role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The expression of this restrictive substance is that Azerbaijan is using aggressive force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. What is clear, however, is that Azerbaijan has never used aggressive force against anybody. On the contrary, Azerbaijan, whose territory is invaded, has problems with hundreds of immigrants as a result. Azerbaijan defends itself for at least six years. Section 907 is, therefore, based on unjustified and unrealistic assumptions that are totally without reason (Blair, 1996).

It is also necessary to look at decision-making mechanisms in order to understand how the United States has shaped its policies on Azerbaijan and its region. Perhaps as we have seen in

the acceptance of the Section 907, which should be mentioned first, how differently the U.S. Congress and the Administration are working with each other and how differently Azerbaijani is perceived on both sides. However, this difference of attitude between the U.S. Administration and Congress, is not unique to Azerbaijan.

The U.S. Congress, which was very open to the influence of lobby / interest groups, could become an adversary of the Administration in many ways. For example, the Administration, which request authorization from Congress to negotiate with other countries on trade issues, was having difficulties in the passage of Section 907 (Beris, 2002). This difference stemmed from the way in which the members of Congress are elected. Especially in the House of Representatives, campaign financing rules legitimize certain special relations and integrates them into the system, increasing the value of each electorate in accordance with the number of its votes. These two features have increased the influence of various Armenian groups on Congress. Congress members remain indifferent to the demands of small ethnic minorities in their electoral districts and lobbying groups representing these minorities (Ari, 2000).

Politically, the influence of lobbies can be better understood in terms of the electoral system in the United States in the context of the 2000, 2004, 2012, and 2016 elections in which even small gains could decide the outcome of the struggle between Republicans and Democrats in many electoral districts (Guliyev, 2004). Financial contributions collected for Congress members were difficult to turn down given the high costs of election campaigns. Therefore, members of the Congress made decisions in favor of these groups, especially those that do not have much room in the upper part of the day and to whom ethnic lobby groups presented their causes as a struggle for existence (Guliyev, 2004). The US-Azerbaijani political relations, human rights, the Karabakh conflict, and the Armenian issue are examples of such issues.

It would be no exaggeration to say that Azerbaijan's conflict with Armenia and the activities of the Armenian lobby since 1990 deeply and adversely affected bilateral relations of Azerbaijan and the US. The end of the Cold War led both active or non-active ethnic communities to take a new role in American foreign policy, and with the establishment of an Armenian Republic in 1991, the Armenian diaspora in the United States had critical influence on the U.S.A.'s Caucasus policy (Smith, 2000).

The different approaches to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue are at the forefront of tension in Azerbaijan-US relations. In this regard, Congress members, for whom election concerns have priority, take a different approach from the U.S. administration, which tends to be guided by strategic interests. The Armenian lobbies in the United States have a serious influence on Congress members. Therefore, by holding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Armenian issue on the agenda, they can turn opinion against Azerbaijan and Turkey on the international platform (Abramowitz, 2000). The majority of struggles between the Republicans and the Democrats in Congress are based on minor differences in general, and their struggle for control of Congress have also facilitated the work of the Armenian organizations.

In time, however, new interests, especially in relation to trade and security, have brought Azerbaijani and American national interests closer together, reducing the influence and importance of the Armenian lobby on this issue, which was leading U.S. foreign policy with regard to Azerbaijan. The influence of Armenian lobbies continues to strengthen relations between the U.S.A. and Armenia. But the negative effects of the "natural blockade" on the Armenian economy puts U.S. investors and business circles in a difficult position. As mentioned earlier, Armenia's only exit is through Iran, and we know how bad the relationship between this country and the United States is. If we add in the uncertain environment in Georgia and Turkey's

relations with Armenia, we see that outlook for economic cooperation between the United States and Armenia is very poor for now.

As U.S.-Azerbaijani relations evolve, the Armenian lobby will not be able to affect the formation of foreign policy concerning Azerbaijan as easily as in 1997. As of now and perhaps in the future, Armenian interest groups still have a great influence on U.S. policies regarding Azerbaijan. However, we can foresee that in the periods that follow the US's national interests will increasingly overlap with those of Azerbaijan while the influence of the Armenian lobby narrows accordingly.

CONCLUSION

As mentioned in the discussion of the distribution of the Armenian Diaspora, the United States has one of the largest Armenian communities in the world. Identity politics conducted by this community has caused tensions in the United States' relationship with Turkey and Azerbaijan from time to time. The Armenian lobby's effort to prevent military and economic aid to Azerbaijan is an example of the effects of cultural identity on U.S. foreign policy, which is also closely related to the effects of non-state actors on foreign policy. Organized diaspora seeds sown by non-state and international actors have started to affect not only the countries in which they live but also the foreign policies of their homeland, to which they maintain cultural and emotional ties. Especially due to lobbying activities, the Armenian Diaspora has received substantial support from American society. In this enterprise, religion, culture and shared interests are very effective (Ari, 2000).

The Armenian communities in California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Florida and New York, whose numbers are approaching one million, are economically and culturally strong enough to attract the attention of politicians. In the United States, 21 daily and weekly newspapers, 17 Armenian annual reports, 188 bulletins, 25 radio programs and 10 continuous television programs sway public opinion in favor of Armenia. Today, 48 of the United States have accepted the claim that Turkey conducted genocide against Armenians. (Kumkale, 2007).

The Armenian Assembly was established in 1972 and the Armenians were encouraged to be more active in political life. This Armenian Assembly has made an effort for all Armenians in

the U.S.A. to proceed in the same direction. In addition to this assembly, the Armenians of America have placed great importance on education. In order to preserve their own identities, they have established churches and schools and made efforts to speak and teach their own languages. At the same time, lobbying activities have increased. Under the influence of the Armenian Lobby, the U.S. House of Representatives declared April 24th as “the day of commemoration of the inhumane crimes committed against the Armenians” (Laciner, 2008). This decision also led to the development of Armenian attitudes towards the United States at that time.

In a non-binding decision of the House of Representative in 1984, it was alleged that genocide was carried out by Turkey. In 1996, the U.S. House of Representatives authorized sending \$22 million in aid to Turkey, but a proviso was added regarding the alleged Armenian genocide for Turkey to receive this assistance. In 2000, Armenian claims were submitted in a draft resolution to the House of Representatives, but because the United States did not want to damage relationship with Turkey, this resolution was dropped from the agenda.

Every year, a resolution concerning the alleged Armenian genocide issue is brought to the agenda of the U.S. Congress. However, the U.S. administration blocks each resolution because the U.S. administration thinks it threatens relations with Turkey. Thus, the alleged Armenian genocide has been discussed many times, but no binding decision has been made.

According to Laciner (2002), “one of the relationships that influence the United States and are perhaps the most effective of the Armenian issues is Turkey- U.S. relations.” The diaspora Armenians have become leaders in terms of organization and activity in the United States. As a super power, the United States has helped Armenians because Armenians have tried to isolate Turkey alone in the economic and political spheres.

In fact, a balancing policy towards Turkey about the Armenian question is being pursued in the American administration in an effort to both prevent the deterioration of relations with Turkey and advance decisions regarding the Armenian issue to a further stage. However, it is clear that the United States Department of State, the Pentagon, and the White House itself have kept the draft resolutions from coming forward (Tascioglu, 2017). As mentioned before, with regard to negotiating bilateral relations between the United States and Turkey, the lobbying activities of the Armenian Diaspora have tried to intimidate Turkey. From another point of view, because the United States administration does not want relations with Turkey to deteriorate when they are needed, the resolutions that are related to the Armenian Issue do not remain on the agenda. Therefore, when the United States needs to improve its relations with Turkey, it is possible to say that the power of ethnic lobbies against Turkey are reduced. This is the result of the U.S.'s pursuit of a balancing policy.

In general, the Armenians have carried the Armenian Question to the agenda both unilaterally and purposefully in both the U.S. Congress and international platforms. The ultimate objective of their efforts with the United States and other governments is to achieve recognition of the alleged genocide and to demand compensation and land from Turkey. In other words, the Armenian lobby tries to establish the alleged genocide on the international level and receive reparations. In doing so, they are seeking the moral support of the international community. From this point of view, it is necessary to evaluate the effects of the Armenians' efforts to pass a draft resolution which validates the Armenian genocide in the American Congress on international forums and governments of the other countries. It would be correct to say that the success of the Armenians in the American Congress would be an example to others, and their laws in support of the claims would follow.

Politically, the Armenian Issue negatively affects U.S. relations with Turkey, and this impose an additional burden on the peace and stability of the region already coping with many existing problems, mainly in Karabakh. On the other hand, if Turkey does not accept the alleged Armenian genocide, a negative consequence for Turkey could be the failure of its acceptance as a member of the European Union.

Generally speaking, the Armenian lobby has succeeded in four basic areas since its emergence in the United States. The first of these is the increase in U.S. aid to Armenia. The second is that Armenia's policies have gained legitimacy with the U.S. government. The third point is the prevention of American aid to Azerbaijan, which is seen as a rival country and has had many issues, especially the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Finally, Armenians have acquired support in the United States Congress for recognition of the alleged Armenian genocide and lobbying activities that are against Turkey (Laciner, 2008). Although, given the foreign policy of the United States, which emphasizes the political interests of Turkey, it should be noted that, all these intensive activities, the influence of the Armenian lobby remains (Laciner, 2008).

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