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## Measuring Trust in Post-Communist States: Making the Case for Particularized Trust.

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Measuring Trust in Post-Communist States: Making the Case for Particularized Trust

by

Nicole M. Ford

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in Government  
with a concentration in Comparative Politics.  
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## Acknowledgements

My passion for Russia and politics began as a little girl as far back as I can remember. At the age of three, my parents gifted me with a puzzle of the world and a picture atlas. I quickly fell in love with the largest puzzle piece: The (then) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I wanted to know everything I could about the land, the culture, the food, the history, and its people. I have many happy childhood memories of hours spent pouring over my children's atlas, and then on to encyclopedias, globes, and maps pretending to travel to Russia and imagining what life was like. Over the years my parents lovingly indulged me; they sat me with them to watch documentaries of Russian history on PBS, to watch "The Nutcracker Ballet" on TV, or point out Russian dolls in the store. As I aged and became more aware of world events, we discussed the USSR at the dinner table over the *Nightly News* or *60 Minutes*. I knew I wanted to devote my life's work to the study of the region as a whole. This ambition carried me through high school, as I watched the Berlin Wall fall, and through college, as I traveled to Moscow to watch Russia negotiate its democratic transition. My time in Russia only solidified my love for all things Russian, especially its culture and its people. Ultimately, my personal experiences and past research led me towards the path to pursue my Doctor of Philosophy focused on Russia and the region; my personal passions, though an important foundation, were not enough to carry me through this journey on my own. I owe much thanks to those who have supported me and inspired me along the way.

I began my Ph.D. work at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. I was fortunate enough to be under the mentorship of Dr. David Armstrong; there he provided me with his unwavering support. He believed in my topic, helped to correct R coding errors, and talk through my hypotheses. This dedication to me as a student did not stop when my husband's job transferred us to Tampa.

Though he was technically under no obligation to do so, he was always there to help clarify methods, code, concepts through the years. I can honestly say without his help, this work would not be what it is today. I am eternally grateful for all of his help.

My husband's work lead us back to Tampa, to my alma mater, and fortuitously back to my long-time mentor: my dissertation chair, Dr. Darrell Slider, whom I first met as an undergraduate. He is a brilliant scholar of Russia and the Former Soviet Union; I count myself lucky to have been under his tutelage for so many years. I thank him for always providing thoughtful insight into my work, for sending relevant articles as he came across them, funny Russian political cartoons for moments of levity, and for helping me to keep things in perspective when the results were not exactly as I imagined them. And of course, for introducing me to the best pizza and subway sushi in Moscow.

I would also like to thank my committee members: Dr. Steven Tauber, who I have also known for many years. Thank you for believing in my abilities and supporting my strengths. Dr. Ken Malmberg, who was my Bayesian professor. Thank you for helping to spark a love for Bayesian inference and agreeing to sit on the committee. Dr. Bernd Reiter, thank you helping to push me along and keep me accountable through the writing process.

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Dr. Steven Reader who has also been available to read drafts and offer critiques of my work, and so much more, thank you for all you have done to support me.

My many, many other friends, Melissa, Neiva, Shelly, Kathi, Stephanie, too numerous to list, who have put up with my long absences, missing personal milestones, and much more, but who were always there for me when I could find the time. Thank you all so much. Your friendships have made this journey much more bearable.

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I must also thank my children, Elric and Zoya who have had to also endure a mother who was not always present. They have been wonderful children who delight in pointing out to me all things Russian they see out in the world or learn about in school. They always inspire me to strive to continuously better myself. I am grateful for their love and patience.

Lastly, I must thank my husband Christopher. While our many moves have been stressful, each one has profoundly enriched our experiences and expanded our circle of friends. We have always worked hard to make the best of each new city for ourselves, our careers, and our family. Together, we have forged new paths and opportunities for growth for our children, for each of us, and specifically, with my education and research. From NYC, to Orlando, to Chicago, to Milwaukee, to Tampa, to Rochester, and now back to Tampa— It really has been an adventure. I also want to thank you for enduring my many long nights, thrown together meals, and the overall stress that comes along with a partner who is engaged in research. Without you none of this would be possible.

While my love for Russia and the Former Soviet Union and sphere has been nearly lifelong, that drive alone could not have carried me through. The accounting presented here shows this work was not accomplished purely through my own efforts, but rather with the help of an entire network of friends, family, and colleagues supporting, not only my research, but adding support and love to my life experiences. I sincerely wish to thank each one of you for richly contributing to the tapestry of my life.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

WVS - World Values Survey  
CPI - Corruptions Perceptions Index  
RE - Random Effects  
FE - Fixed Effects  
HLM - Hierarchical Linear Model  
MCMC - Markov Chain Monte Carlo  
OLS - Ordinary Least Squares

## ABSTRACT

While the literature on democracy and its relationship to trust provides little consensus regarding the role of trust, researchers have emphasized the importance of generalized trust over particularized in relation to democracy. This research marks a departure from this consensus, and exposes the neglected role of personal relationships in fostering successful democracy.

One of the key measurements of democracy in a country is social trust. There are three forms of trust: generalized, particularized and institutional. Previously, the measurement of social trust focused on the importance of generalized trust, that is, trust in those we do not know (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995, et. al). Generalized trust is marked as having the greatest benefits for democracy. Those who are generalized trusters have the will to bridge across ethnicities and join civic groups in larger numbers. Institutional trust is society's trust in its institutions. Countries ranking high on institutional trust are also believed to have positive democratic outcomes. By contrast, particularized trust is often dismissed because it is seen as highly atomizing and, therefore, incapable of making bridges to ethnic others resulting in a bankruptcy of democratic values. Thus, the combination of institutional and generalized trust has been the main crux of measurement and understanding in relation to a country's ability to democratize.

The problem with this approach is two fold: first, it assumes the unidimensionality of trust and ultimately resigns a country of trusters to one category or the other with often negative impacts. The reality is, we are not solely one truster or the other: we are a combination of each form of trust. Secondly, this approach is Western in focus and does not account for the differentiation within cultures and is therefore unable to truly account for trust in a society. Nor does it account for new forms of trust and civil society in the new digital age. Recently, some questions about the legitimacy of this approach have surfaced and new methods have been employed to ascertain the true nature of social trust, however these methods have also fallen short (Gibson 2001; Bhary, et. al. 2005).

Because trust is one measure used to determine the amount of democracy in a nation or the ability for it, accurate description is vital.

Here, the author will take a new approach and focus on the importance of the often overlooked particularized trust, as well as control for the importance of institutionalized trust. Using Khodyakov's (2007) research on trust and the Soviet case as the launching pad, the author will empirically examine trust in the former Soviet Union today. Using the most recent World Values Survey data, a new trust variable will be constructed that will be better able to capture the true, dynamic nature of trust. Placing this new trust variable in a Bayesian hierarchical linear model which will control for country level variables, it will be revealed that particularized trust can and does have positive impacts on support for democracy, debunking current notions to the contrary.



## CHAPTER 1: EXAMINING THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL TRUST.

### INTRODUCTION.

The primary goal of this research is to create a new multidimensional trust variable that will account for the nature of social trust and trust relationships. Social trust can be generally understood to be "the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community."<sup>1</sup> There are three accepted forms of trust: generalized, particularized and institutional. Generalized trust is a form of social trust in which one trusts the people they do not know. Particularized trust is form of social trust in which one trusts only the people they do know such as family or friends. Institutionalized trust is a society's trust in government institutions. Previously, the measurement of social trust focused on the importance of generalized trust as being paramount in creating and fostering a civic culture that values democracy. Social trust is the basis of social capital, as described by Putnam as being "features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit."<sup>2</sup> While debate exists about the importance of social capital itself,<sup>3</sup> social trust is widely seen as one of the hallmarks of a vibrant civil society in liberal democracies.

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<sup>1</sup>Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 26.

<sup>2</sup>Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995), 67.

<sup>3</sup>Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 188.

As a result, social trust captured the attention of those who study democratization. Liberal democracy, specifically, is seen by many as being the standard of governmental systems.<sup>4</sup> Liberal democracies not only feature a free press, independent judiciaries, a rule of law, and effective institutions, but also an active civil society with vast trust networks and a strong civic culture.<sup>5</sup>

Our trust relationships with one another and the state have changed over the course of human history. Though the concept of democracy was first given to us by the ancient Greek philosophers, it was an idea that had lost favor. After the fall of the Roman Empire the world<sup>6</sup> was largely governed through a series of conquests by feudal lords. Though feudalism gave way to absolutism, personal trust relationships based on kin remained largely unchanged and political loyalty and 'trust' merely shifted from lords to kings. People were seen as 'subjects' of the crown whose only purpose was to serve their King, promoting the stability of the system. Personal family ties, or the "Tyranny of the Cousins",<sup>7</sup> as well as the Church, tightly governed one's daily life and helped maintain the political and social order of society. Anyone "beyond the walls" was seen as suspect and not to be trusted.<sup>8</sup> Individualism was treated as dangerous and punished severely.

This state of affairs morphed overtime through the Protestant Reformation and the subsequent Enlightenment; individualism was no longer feared but rather revered. The Modern State was coming into its own.<sup>9</sup> Democratic principles of life, liberty, and property, as well as political accountability, were touted as the Natural Rights of men.<sup>10</sup> This ushered in a wave of revolutionary liberalism that took hold in the English Colonies in America. Thus began the democratic experiment in earnest. Democracy spread back

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<sup>4</sup>Francis Fukuyama, "The Future of History," *Foreign Affairs*, September 30, 2013 , accessed April 13, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-01-01/future-history>.

<sup>5</sup>Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 11.; 2002; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 9-11.

<sup>6</sup>Referring to the Western world, in particular, though feudalism existed via the Golden Horde, China, and Japan, for example. Fukuyama 2011

<sup>7</sup>Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals* (New York: Penguin Books, 1996).

<sup>8</sup>Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 18; 108.

<sup>9</sup>Max Weber, Peter Lassman, and Ronald Speirs, *Weber: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 310; 368.

<sup>10</sup>J. LOCKE and Johnathan Bennett, *Second Treatise on Government*, comp. Peter Millican and Amyas Merivale (1956), , March 2008, <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1689a.pdf>.

across the water to Europe and was then spread to the far reaches of the Earth via colonialism<sup>11</sup>. This ideological shift from the collective based on strong family ties in pre-modernity to the individual ultimately changed the relationship between "citizens" -now imbued with rights- and the state. Individuals expected recognition from the state and from one another. Personal relationships were also transformed; no longer were one's relations based solely on family considerations and/ or duties but rather personal choices and preferences.<sup>12</sup> Trust was extended to unknown others through the shrinkages of time and space attributed to advances in travel and technology. By the end of World War II and after the defeat of fascism, the promotion of liberal democracy was the paramount concern of Western powers in an attempt to control the Red Wave or Communist expansion.<sup>13</sup> Thus began the global struggle for power between the Communist Soviet Union and the Democratic West.

When the former Soviet Union collapsed, and with it the old Communist regime in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, liberal democracy was claimed as the new ideal; not only among the former republics and satellites, but of the Motherland herself.<sup>14</sup> This dramatic shift towards democracy was marked as the "End Of History", meaning democracy had won the global struggle against authoritarianism signaling the end of global wars.<sup>15</sup> Many wondered how these formerly authoritarian states would fare during this transition in meeting each of the benchmarks of liberal democracy. Questions, specifically, were circulated about the formation of civil society in Eastern Europe and Russia.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, Poland was well on its way towards a thriving democratic state already. The active involvement of the Catholic Church, as well as the expansion of the transnational social

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<sup>11</sup>Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 301-313.

<sup>12</sup>Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 4.

<sup>13</sup>Ernst Gellner, "The Civil and the Sacred" (lecture, Harvard University, Boston), <https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/documents/a-to-z/g/Gellner91.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup>Vladimir Putin, *First Person* (London: Hutchinson, 2000), 183.; Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, *Midnight Diaries* (London: Phoenix, 2001), 248.

<sup>15</sup>Fukuyama 1998 The "End of History" theory posits democracies do not war with one another. If the world falls like dominos to democracy, there will be no more war, no more political progressing or regime change.

<sup>16</sup>David Remnick, *Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia* (New York: Random House, 1997), 27. ; James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition," *Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy*, 2001, doi:10.4324/9780203428092\_chapter5.

movement Solidarity from the ground up both played a major role in that country's road to democratization -despite the totalitarian regime trying to push it down. Solidarity, in particular, was seen as civil society at its best.<sup>17</sup>

However, when people turned their attention to Moscow, the future of trust and civil society seemed less hopeful. After all, Russia had two factors working against her: First, a long history of totalitarian regimes (much longer than other states of Eastern Europe). Second, persistent low-levels of interpersonal trust, meaning the building blocks necessary for civil society formation are in low supply.<sup>18</sup> Some analysts argue that while it is true there was some civil society in Russia prior to the fall that helped usher in a new democratic regime, there is little hope for civil society to make a comeback and put down deeper roots. Without a vibrant civil society, it is argued, all hopes for democratization will be lost.<sup>19</sup> Today, concerns about the future of democracy in the region have borne fruit as a persistent pattern of backsliding away from democratic ideals has occurred in some of the post-Communist and post-Soviet states rendering the "End of History" theory void.<sup>20</sup> Analysts see the lack of generalized trust and civil society stemming from "radical individualism, social anomie and distrust" as well as greed that is prevalent in the governments of these former Soviet states, including Russia.<sup>21</sup> It is because understanding the cause and patterns of discontent or apathy will help researchers better predict outcomes or recommend policy prescriptions, having a true understanding of how trust functions in relation to civil society and the state is vital to the study of democratization.<sup>22</sup>

This work will explore trust in the context of post-Communist states of Eastern Europe and Russia in order to help understand how this region trusts in the face of perceived corruption and government distrust. It will also tackle questions surrounding how long

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<sup>17</sup>Mary Kaldor, *Global Civil Society: an Answer to War?* (Oxford: Wiley, 2003).

<sup>18</sup>James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition," *Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy*, 2001, , doi:10.4324/9780203428092\_chapter5.; Putnam, 1998; 1995; 1993

<sup>19</sup>Jeffery J. Mondak and Adam F. Gearing, "Civic Engagement in a Post-Communist State," *Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy*: , doi:10.4324/9780203428092\_chapter9.

<sup>20</sup>Freedom House "Freedom in the World" 2017

<sup>21</sup>James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition," *Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy*, 2001 , doi:10.4324/9780203428092\_chapter5.

<sup>22</sup>Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993).; Ibid.

histories with authoritarianism has effected social trust and in turn a given society's prospect for democratic support. This chapter will proceed as follows: First, the author will offer a statement of the problem existing in the current literature on social trust and institutions. Next, the purpose of the study will be explored. This will be followed by a summary of the questions not adequately explained by the literature, followed by the hypotheses this project will seek to answer. The author will then provide a brief discussion on how this work contributes to the discipline and to the body of knowledge. Finally, the author will end with concluding thoughts and an outline of the chapters to come.

### **STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.**

While the literature on democracy and its relationship to trust provides little consensus regarding the role of trust, researchers have emphasized the importance of generalized trust over particularized. My research marks a departure from this consensus, and seeks to ascertain the true nature of trust and exposes the neglected role of personal relationships in fostering democracy.

There are two main schools of thought in the social trust literature: the culturalists and the institutionalists. The debate between the two exists around which way the causal arrow flows. Does trust begin via early associations with family, friends, and flow upwards and out to others in society and to government institutions as the culturalists believe?<sup>23</sup> Or are the institutionalists correct who posit trust considerations are formed later in life and due to personal experience with institutions, and it is those experiences which flow downward effecting trust at the individual level?<sup>24</sup> The problem with the former is it is too limiting, implies entrenched trust beliefs, and relies on largely pre-deterministic outcomes. However, the later assumes some level of rationality; human beings do not always act or trust rationally. Both do agree, however, social trust is vital for democracy. Further, generalized trust, that is trust in people you do not know, is believed by both to

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<sup>23</sup> Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 177.

<sup>24</sup>Bo Rothstein, *The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 145.

be paramount in fostering trust among those in society, promoting individuals to become active in social and political groups supporting democratic values. On the other hand particularized trust, that is the trust in the people you do know such as family and friends, is believed to be atomizing, blocking society off from those who are different from them, creating echo chambers in which society cannot grow or learn new information. A highly particularized society, it is said, is in danger of atomization where social trust is utterly bankrupt.<sup>25</sup> This atomization, the literature indicates, leads to apathy and distrust in government further creating an environment for anti-democratic attitudes to take hold. This is understood by both schools of thought to be detrimental to the survival of democracy or the birthing of it.

Thriving democracies are comprised, in part, of citizens who are active in civic organizations, such as the Shriners, or the Key Club for example, where unknown others come together around a common goal or goals of improving society in some specific way. This exchange with those you do not know allows new information about government and society to come into one's world and permits individual and social growth.<sup>26</sup> As such, a reliance on generalized trust measures has become the lingua franca when discussing trust and its relationship to democracy. However, this approach is problematic and perhaps unrealistic in some societies who do not have similar forms of civil society and typical, or Western, trust networks. This mode of thinking blocks from consideration other ways societies who have a history of authoritarianism have come to understand and trust one another, as well as their hopes for a different future.

The most common used measure has become the World Values Survey (WVS) generalized trust question which asks "Generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted or you cannot be too careful?"<sup>27</sup> This single, binary response question is intended to capture a society's capacity to trust and foster democracy. The question becomes, can a unidimensional trust measure, which relies on only one form of how human beings

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<sup>25</sup>Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993), 89.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 90.

<sup>27</sup>Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>.

trust, be adequate or reliable in order to predict democratic outcomes and civil society? Is it fair to hold societies outside of the Western world to the same standard while not recognizing other trust networks and relationships that may also benefit democratic growth? The author of this research believes the answer to this question is a resounding 'no.' Instead what is needed is a new measure that is flexible and multidimensional that will more adequately mirror how individuals in society trust. We are not just one sort of truster or another; rather, we are complex beings who rely on a varied set of trust networks, both generalized and particularized and to different degrees. Social scientists understand human beings are difficult to predict because of high variance.<sup>28</sup> As such, the measure must be able to capture the degrees to which individuals reflect different levels of trust simultaneously. Given the high amounts of variance among human beings, a dynamic trust measure trust may not fit neatly into the culturalist camp, nor into the institutionalist camp.

#### **PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY.**

This study seeks to create a new measure for social trust that is more dynamic than current measures. Because trust is used as part of a litmus test for a country's ability to democratize or to sustain it, accurate measurement is paramount. To this end, the author will rely heavily on Khodyakov's<sup>29</sup> research suggesting trust is a process of learning and relearning based on both early socialization and experience. Further, he believes particularized trust is not as atomizing as previously imagined. This is particularly the case in post-Communist and post-Soviet countries, due to a history ineffective institutions causing citizens to form a dualistic view of the state. Khodyakov (2007) calls this the "Strong-Weak" state model. The state was seen as both strong in its ability to provide basics such as quality education and global security, however it was seen also as weak and ineffective in providing goods for survival, such as food, or to improve the quality of life of their citizens. Where the state was unable or unwilling to provide, the state became a

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<sup>28</sup>USA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Sciences Office, *Human Social and Behavioral Variability: Scientific Challenges and Opportunities*, by Adam Russell and Bill Regli..

<sup>29</sup>Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.

sort of "non-entity"; society turned to one another to fill those gaps, creating vast social networks that included intermediaries from different networks and even ethnicities.

The new social trust measure was created with Khodyakov's (2007) theory of trust in mind. The author takes his theory a step further, providing empirical testing that has, thus far, been lacking. As such, it follows logically to first test the measure and the "Strong-Weak" state model in the post-Communist and post-Soviet context. For a closer examination of how the new trust variable operates, the case of Russia will be isolated from the region and contextually examined. This approach will have the benefit of also potentially answering questions surrounding endogeneity or which way the trust causal error flows.

The multidimensional trust variable was created by using the World Values Survey (WVS) generalized trust question and particularized trust question and compressing them into a single variable.<sup>30</sup> The result is a 3-leveled trust variable consisting of generalized, particularized, and a new other category. The author believes this variable will be a more accurate reflection of how human beings and will have greater accuracy establishing the relationship between trust and institutions, as well as democratic support.

## **RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES.**

The examination of the relevant literature exposes 3 main questions this research will seek to answer: 1) Do country-level perceptions of corruption present towards institutions have a credible impact on how society trusts one another at the individual level? 2) Is there any credible difference between particularized trust and generalized trust in relation to one's support for democracy? 2) In thinking about atomized others, do they have a credible negative impact on one's attitudes towards democracy?

In order to answer these questions, three hypotheses have been formed which will be the backbone of this research. These are:

**Hypothesis 1** *H1 Country level corruption will not create a credible negative effect on individual trust outcomes in light of support for liberal democratic values.*

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<sup>30</sup>This will be explained in more detail in Chapter 5.



This question should answer for us whether or not institutions have a direct impact on social trust at the individual level when a respondent imagines the importance of democracy. In order for us to accept this hypothesis, the data must demonstrate no significant or credible interaction between country-level concerns over corruption and trust at the individual level, as each person considers the importance of democracy in their lives. Acceptance of the hypothesis will provide support for the "Strong-Weak" state model, implying perhaps cultural considerations are at play. On the other hand, for us to reject this hypothesis, the data must show countries that are perceived corrupt or have low levels of government trust experience negative impacts on social trust, particularly at the level of generalized trust, which will in turn net negative results for how society sees the importance of democracy. Rejecting the hypothesis will result in support for the institutionalist position. At both the region and individual country-level for Russia, this hypothesis found support.

**Hypothesis 2** *H2 There is no credible difference between those who trust generally and those who trust particularly in relation to support liberal democracy.*

Accepting this hypothesis will mean the data have shown that particularized trusters and generalized trusters are substantively the same when considering the importance of democracy. This would contradict the current literature from both the culturalists and the institutionalists who claim particularized trusters are atomizing and bad for democracy. However, if we are to reject this hypothesis, it will be because the data have indicated there is a credible difference between the two forms of trust and the impact is negative when one considers the importance of democracy. This finding will support the current literature. This hypothesis was accepted at the level of the region and found mixed results when Russia was isolated.

**Hypothesis 3** *H3 Atomized others have a credible negative impact on democratic attitudes.*

Removing atomized trusters, or those who have little to no trust in anyone, should provide a more accurate picture of how particularized trust operates. Further, it will reflect the

true nature of how atomized others function when considering their likelihood to support democracy. Acceptance of this hypothesis will mean the data have demonstrated atomized others have a measurable negative support for democracy when compared to others forms of trust. This hypothesis also was accepted at the level of the region and found mixed results when Russia was isolated. The results for each hypothesis can be found in Chapter 6.

## **PROCEDURES.**

This project is quantitative in nature, though technically qualitative. Though the author will be using survey statistics and statistical modeling, these tools will be deployed only in a specific region, and further still down to a single country. Though the measure itself was constructed for the purpose of generalizability, one should not take the results of this study to make inferences to the larger body of knowledge across the globe. Testing this measure in other regions or states is beyond the scope of this work, and will be the task of future research. Here, the author will test the measure in the region of the former Soviet Union and post-Communist sphere. The World Values Survey (WVS) data for Waves 5 and 6 will be employed for the creation of the trust variable, as well the dependent variable and relevant controls. For country-level institutional concerns in the region, Transparency International's "Corruption Perceptions Index" will be used. When Russia has been isolated, the WVS's "trust in government" question will be used. In order to resolve concerns surrounding endogeneity, a Hierarchical Linear Model will be utilized to help account for the nested nature of the data. Further, the author will use Bayesian inference at the region level to help reduce bias and increase the reliability of the results given the small  $M$  sample space of five countries at the region level. A standard ordinary least squares model will suffice when Russia is isolated.

## **CONTRIBUTION OF THIS WORK.**

This work provides a measure of trust that is more dynamic than current measures, as it captures trust in multiple degrees and levels simultaneously. Previous literature has

been unable or unwilling to grapple with the true nature of trust by focusing solely on one form of trust: generalized trust. The literature claims that particularized trust can lead to the atomization of society, which is detrimental to democracy. However, atomization is the absence of trust in others. Particularized trust is based on trust in people you know. Atomization is the mirror negative of trust. Therefore conceptualizing a bankruptcy of trust with those who do trust does not follow, logically. With this in mind the author has separated out those who are atomized from those who have trust. The creation of a new "other" category for those who are not trusters is another unique contribution to the discussion of trust measurement.

Since social trust is seen as the cornerstone to civil society<sup>31</sup> and, in turn, liberal democracy<sup>32</sup>, it is important to have a true understanding of where countries stand on this important measure. If one aspect of a measure is incorrect, then the final result will be flawed. A new measure must be created accounting for particularized trust that will be applicable across other countries making it generalizable. The author has taken great care when creating the trust measure to ensure its application in a wide variety of political and social contexts. If this can be accomplished, our previous held views of countries as not being trusting will have to change, and with it, our attitudes towards them and their prospects for democratization. This research is an important "first step" in this process.

## CONCLUSION AND CHAPTER LAYOUT.

The main goal of this research was to create a new measure that would more accurately reflect the nature of how human beings trust. Given the important role trust has been given in the democratization literature, it is vital to be able to measure trust in a way that more accurately reflects how human beings trust. How we trust has slowly changed overtime, from a hyper-focus on kin relationships, to a focus on individualism. Debates between philosophers over the Rights of Man and clashes between religious ideologies, as

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<sup>31</sup>Francis Fukuyama, "The Future of History," *Foreign Affairs*, September 30, 2013, accessed April 13, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-01-01/future-history>.

<sup>32</sup>Larry Diamond, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan J. Linz, *Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988).

well as improvements in technology shrinking of time and space, have morphed how we relate to ourselves, one another, our governments, and our role within them. Nonetheless, what has not changed is our need for recognition and affirmation related to our human nature. We are inherently social creatures. On the whole, we cannot tolerate atomization. When we have been pressed down upon from above, like water finding the path of least resistance, we have made our way to one another, and when necessary joined forces to topple authoritarian regimes. As Oscar Wilde once said: "Discontent is the first step in the progress of a man or a nation." We saw evidence of how discontent can fuel a movement in the so-called low trust societies of Eastern Europe and Russia as the Wall came tumbling down. And while the "End of History" was not realized, there is current evidence of similar discontent brewing in the region today. Now, perhaps more than in recent memory, we need a trust variable that will help predict patterns of civil discontent. This work seeks to accomplish this task.

The rest of this work will unfold in the following manner: Chapter 2 will consist of two parts. Part one will provide the reader with a theoretical and historical background to the relationship between citizens and the state, from the so-called "State of Nature" through to modernity. Part two will offer a review of the general literature on social trust and institutions. Chapter 3 will also proceed in two parts: first, the reader will be presented with an extensive background into the post-Communist condition. Specifically, the Russian case given its dominance over land, policy, and institutions in the region over most of the past century or longer. Second, the author will review the literature on the region, and Russia more specifically, as it relates to social trust relations and institutions. Chapter 4 will offer a theoretical framework for the construction of a new trust variable that will better capture the nature of trust itself. This chapter will rely on an interdisciplinary approach drawing on works from psychology and child development, sociology, and political philosophy to make the case for a more dynamic understanding and measurement of trust. Chapter 5 will lay the groundwork for the methodology employed here and present the new trust variable. The author will be using survey research in the region from the WVS, to measure trust in a quantitative nature. The Random Effects

Hierarchical Linear Model (RE HLM) method provides us with the best opportunity to capture concerns around endogeneity, especially when combined with Bayesian inference with small  $M$  models. The ordinary least squares (OLS) linear model will be utilized to examine the Russian case more closely. Chapter 6, will offer the results of this testing. Finally, Chapter 7 will provide a discussion of the results as well as possible directions for future research. It will end with concluding thoughts on this project.

## CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF THE GENERAL LITERATURE.

### INTRODUCTION.

The most pervasive variable in all of social, economic, and political life is trust; it is the base from which all social interactions are launched in both political and non-political spaces.<sup>33</sup> That is, trust is the key to understanding the manner in which societies and people within societies interact with one another, the state, and what is an ever interconnected global society.<sup>34</sup> ; Anthony Giddens. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990 While the literature on democracy and its relationship to trust provides little consensus regarding the role of trust, researchers have emphasized the importance of generalized trust over particularized. My research marks a departure from this consensus, and seeks to ascertain the true nature of trust and exposes the neglected role of personal relationships in fostering democracy in an effort to create an accurate empirical measure for trust.

There are three accepted forms of trust: generalized, particularized and institutional. Previously, the measurement of social trust focused on the importance of generalized trust, that is, trust in those we do not know.<sup>35</sup> Generalized trust is marked as having the greatest benefits for democracy. Those who are generalized trusters have the will to bridge across ethnicities and join civic groups in larger numbers. Institutional trust is society's trust in its institutions. Countries ranking high on institutional trust are also believed to have positive democratic outcomes. By contrast, particularized trust in those

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<sup>33</sup> Erikson, Erik H. *Childhood and Society*. 2d ed. New York: Norton, 1964.; Seligman, Adam B. *The Problem of Trust*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. 13

<sup>34</sup>Adam B. Seligman, *The Problem of Trust* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 14

<sup>35</sup>Putnam, Robert D., and Robert Leonardi. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993.

you know is often dismissed; it is seen as highly atomizing and, therefore, incapable of making bridges to ethnic "others" resulting in a bankruptcy of democratic values. How did we come to this understanding of trust? This chapter will proceed in two parts: In Part I, a theoretical history will be offered of how we have evolved over time through our trust relationships with one another and the state; In Part II, I will discuss the accepted literature on trust in general terms, as well as how trust is commonly measured. I will conclude by covering gaps in the general literature.

## **PART I: BACKGROUND.**

Theoretical understandings of the state and its relationship to the people, as well as to one another are important to establish before delving into the prevailing literature. It helps to provide uncover the path from where previous understandings were launched and propelled forward. Combined with more current historical understandings, we can shed those parts which are inaccurate and take with us those truths that will help provide a deeper understanding of the nature of trust itself. I will begin with a discussion of Trust in the State of Nature, this will be followed a discussion on Trust and the State in Pre-Modernity. The author will conclude this section with Trust and the State in Modernity. What is uncovered here will help us have a better understanding of where the gaps in the general literature are in Part II.

### **Trust and the State of Nature.**

Classical political thought on trust begins with the period of time in which man settled down from a hunter-gather existence and into communities. Of course, no one was present to record how the first societies came to be. As such, this 'period' was outlined theoretically by the various Social Contracts of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.

These were intended more to be 'thought experiments' as to the possibilities rather than any real attempt to get at a factual historical accounting. The state of nature, that is the time before private property, society, and government, for these theorists consisted of isolated individuals; group behavior was not natural.<sup>36</sup> What those rights were and how they came out of the state of nature depended upon the philosopher in question. At the core of each of these considerations was the implied conflict of trust and distrust in others, as well as related fear and instability and the attempt to gain control over their environments. This was believed to have been done through the coming together of rational individuals and the selection of a leader whom could provide protection and stability.<sup>37</sup>

## **The Coming of the Leviathan.**

For Hobbes, the state of nature was a virtual hellscape wrought with near constant violent conflict, or the threat of it; where humans interact based on some combination of jealousy and fear. Human nature was primal and humans were, at their core, evil. Man's life is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." Because man is individualistic and does not share a moral community with other men, one can not claim any act in 'unjust' because there is no moral authority. <sup>38</sup>The threat of a violent death is most pressing; therefore, it is the absolute right of nature that provides every man with the liberty to preserve his own life even if it means stealing someone else's labor or taking the life of another.<sup>39</sup> Man, in order to escape this constant state of war, fear, and violence agrees to give up some of his liberty and natural rights to do as he wishes. In doing so, others will give his right to life and liberty deference creating a shared moral community.

The Leviathan (the state) will ensure these boundaries between men are respected, thereby securing peace, in exchange for the position of power over them. This gives men the space to trust one another, or not, within the bounds of performance based on

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<sup>36</sup>Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 29.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), xiii.13.

<sup>39</sup>Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 26.



societal expectations in which the ruler is the arbiter. In other words, trust began by putting trust first in the state, allowing the environment to be created where people in a society could trust one another creating societal trust. For Hobbes, the Leviathan was best exemplified in a monarchical system. Subjects of the Leviathan may not seek redress for alleged offenses; once a covenant has been entered into subjects cannot breach it. He stresses natural law does not provide any opportunity to criticize or revolt against laws made by government.<sup>40</sup>

## Natural Law and the Power of the People.

While Locke somewhat shared with Hobbes the belief of a power exchange for purposes of security, he differed on the notion the state of nature was a terrifying hellscape. The state of nature was not based on war, but focused on mixing labor with resources found in nature, producing things they could exchange for stuff they might need. This mixing of labor resulted in private property, which Locke felt was the main source of conflict arising out of the state of nature.<sup>41</sup> Locke's understanding of natural law is based on life, liberty, and property, which later also became the basis for the rights enshrined in the U.S. Declaration of Independence.<sup>42</sup> Locke also felt the best form of government was characterized by leaders who were elected by citizens, though he was also accepting of a monarchical system, so long as the citizens chose it. The state becomes a necessary arbiter in the disputes between individuals, who are inherently good, though are still essentially human bent towards err. Another key distinction is Locke understood the state could become tyrannical and potentially use that power to restrict or deny the rights of man. As such, he reserved the right of man, once trust has been breached, and unjust acts have been committed, to overthrow the tyrannical ruler and install a new one. Revolution, in such circumstances, is a sort of 'civic duty' to protect the rights of man and reestablish

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<sup>40</sup>Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan*, Chapter xviii. <https://www.ttu.ee/public/m/mart-murdvve/EconPsy/6/HobbesThomas1660TheLeviathan.pdf>

<sup>41</sup>Locke, *Second Treatise*, 192. J.; Locke and Johnathan Bennett, *Second Treatise on Government*, comp. Peter Millican and Amyas Merivale (1956), March 2008, <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1689a.pdf>.

<sup>42</sup> Justice Joseph Story 1832 \*

trust in the state.<sup>43</sup>

## Private Property as a Root of Distrust.

Rousseau also indicates man is not void of virtue and good, but in the state of nature is more meek and timid and would flee sooner than engage in violent conflict. Though he may not be inherently bad, he is hyper-individualistic; even the notion of family bonds are not natural for Rousseau. Instead of seeing the coming of the state as a Good, he sees it as an unfortunate event in which men gave of their liberty for what amounts to bondage based on growing interdependence on others in society. Further, he traces societal injustice to the advent of agricultural and private property: "this is mine and not yours" fencing off land in an act of greed and distrust of others. Thus, creating castes or classes of those with and without.<sup>44</sup>

## The Classics Synthesized.

For these theorists, there are a few important take aways: as previously stated, their intellectual musings were more heuristic in nature and less and attempt to uncover historic truths. Given the time periods in which these men were writing, it is understandable to conclude men were individualistic. As will be discussed in the sections to come, this was the seminal idea amongst Enlightenment thinkers, offering a counterbalance to the the *ancien regime*. Their aims were merely to parse out the nature of man. They wanted to explore how much of what makes up man is based on nature or biology and how much is the result of conditions created by societal development.<sup>45</sup>

While there are very few records of pre-modern times before people begun to settle into communities, there are clues in the anthropological and archeological evidence.<sup>46</sup> One

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<sup>43</sup>J. Locke and Johnathan Bennett, *Second Treatise on Government*, comp. Peter Millican and Amyas Merivale (1956), 194-196, March 2008, <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1689a.pdf>.

<sup>44</sup>Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 64.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, 65

<sup>46</sup>Nicolas Naudinot, Jeremie Jacquier, "Socio-economic organization of Final Paleolithic societies: New perspectives from an aggregation site in Western France", *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology*, Volume 35, September 2014, Pages 177-189, ISSN 0278-4165, <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaa.2014.05.004>.

thing we can be clear on: the pre-modern world was not based on roaming individuals as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau would have you believe, but rather it was organizationally based on small family bands and tribes with each member depending upon the other to help the group survive. Trust was vital—each person in the band was expected to preform some duties for the survival of the whole. Modern evidence provides needed clarity: we are not individualistic by nature, but rather our instincts are social and communal. Even as children today, we are taught there is 'safety in numbers'. The deep seeded notion of human beings being individual rational actors seeking to preserve their individual self-interest was learned over time and is not part of our innate human *biology*.<sup>47</sup>

We know now, empirically, human beings will act in an altruistic manner to those whom they share kinship in proportion to the amount of genes they share.<sup>48</sup> Trust in the state of nature seemed to be based on particularized links between families and the immediate community of those who looked like they did and shared the same values. Communal organization was not the result of some rational choice for individual protection, because communal organization was already our natural state. In other words, the state of nature was highly particularized, if not atomized from other groups or bands. How it progressed and developed depended upon other external factors such as geography, disease prevalence, and culture.<sup>49</sup>

## **Trust in Pre-modernity.**

When theorists imagine the pre-modern period, they are typically thinking of feudal European societies through the period of territorial consolidation that occurred under absolutism, however it is necessary to consider what lead up to the absolutist period in early pre-modernity, in order to see the process unfold. Further, it is worth noting there is some debate surrounding where the first modern state arose. Weber believes the

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 65.

<sup>49</sup>Ola Olsson, Christopher Paik, "Long-run cultural divergence: Evidence from the Neolithic Revolution", *Journal of Development Economics*, Volume 122, September 2016, Pages 197-213, ISSN 0304-3878, <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.05.003>. ; Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 30.

first modern states arose out of Europe,<sup>50</sup> Christopher Pierson, *The Modern State* (London: Routledge, 1996), 19. Fukuyama and others point towards China as having many features of the modern state, save rule of law, beginning from the Qin Dynasty in 221 BCE or the Islamic.<sup>51</sup> While the Western focus is, of course, reductionist, it is nonetheless important to consider how this period is discussed; it is out of these understandings of institutions and trust in feudal Europe, which gave way to absolutism, the modern state developed.<sup>52</sup>

## Political Order in Pre-Modernity.

Society was highly stratified in feudal Europe with multiple layers within the power structure. While lords ruled over a given set of people whose borders were often in flux due to power struggles from competing lords. In this way, power was determined by whom could consolidate resources through a strata of lesser-lords. In order to establish their power base, lords would award large plots of land to vassals in exchange for loyalty both militarily and politically. In turn, the vassals could then tax the peasants living on the land known as a fief. The peasants had no rights and often became military fodder for their lords in battle when called upon to do so. The peasant's ultimate loyalties lay with their lord; this loyalty was immutable. Serfdom was another feature of feudalism and serfs, who were a step beneath peasants, were bound to the land at birth. Unlike peasants, serfs could not own property but both were forced to produce agricultural and

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<sup>51</sup>Fukuyama argues the Qin Dynasty had all of the Weberian trappings of the modern state sans his own understanding of the rule of law. He points to a lack of accountability at all levels of society and government meaning the Emperor, in particular, was above the law. He refers to this as 'rule by law' not 'rule of law'. Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. Chapter 3, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 24; 79

<sup>52</sup>Of course, this is with a focus on Western societies. The discussion of how trust in pre-modern periods looked is important and also illuminates the development of trust and political institutions but is beyond the scope of this particular work. Some work on this has already been completed. See: Ernst Gellner (1994) *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* where he contrasts Islamic and Soviet political and social development against the ideals of liberal democratic values, as well as Francis Fukuyama's (2011;2014) 2 volume set: *Political Order and Political Decay* in which he details his theories at the apex of geographical positioning and political and social development.

other goods for their lords.<sup>53</sup>

As such, pre-modern economies were highly agrarian. This, ironically, allowed for some 'freedom' from the King, particularly given in regions outside of the center, and even their lords. The most advantageous positioning were those communities sub-divided by mountains or other such terrain. Sub-communities were loosely governed by intermediaries of the lords and vassals with little or no institutions present in these communities.<sup>54</sup> This resulted in situations where the Medieval 'state', due to a lack of governing bureaucracy, was producing scant political goods for its people, leaving peasants in these distant locales to be largely self-governing. At times, they would band together to make demands such as reduction or avoidance of taxation (with varying degrees of success).<sup>55</sup> Yet, at the same time the Catholic Church also played and increasingly Kings ruled over some general region of land, intertwined role with the "state"; the Church's role was to essentially establish legitimacy of the King, and reinforce each economic group's political and social position in it.<sup>56</sup>

As feudalism was being shed as a result of the consolidation of territory via military and political power and conquest of the Kings, political and social order shifted understandings of sovereignty, loyalty, and legitimacy away from a strata of local lords and towards the King, exclusively. The swapping of a pluralistic and stratified society in favor of an absolutist ruler resulted in a King who became particularly correlated with the idea of "the state."<sup>57</sup> At around the same time, the position of the Catholic Church was coming into question in some states as a result of the Protestant Reformation and the break with England under Henry the VIII.<sup>58</sup> However, the Protestant Reformation and subsequent period of Enlightenment brought new ideas on the Rights of Man, resulting

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<sup>53</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 111.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>The Peasant Revolt of 1381 in England is one such instance. Ernst Gellner. 1994. *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals*. p. 7

<sup>56</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 111.; Ernst Gellner, "The Civil and the Sacred" (lecture, Harvard University, Boston), <https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/documents/ato-z/g/Gellner91.pdf>.

<sup>57</sup> Louis XIV "L't c'est moi." I am the state.

<sup>58</sup>Herbert H. Rowen, "'L'Etat c'est a moi": Louis XIV and the State," *French Historical Studies* 2, no. 1 (1961): , doi:DOI: 10.2307/286184.

in a political order in jeopardy. Previous views of unwavering, forced loyalty and trust were being challenged as absolute power increased concentrating corruption at the top, and economies began to fail.<sup>59</sup>

## **Tyranny of the Cousins and Social Order.**

The pre-modern area was marked by a distinctly different form of civil society from how we understand it today. Much like in the state of nature, society at all levels was centered entirely around familial and kinship bonds. Intertwining alliances through marriage for the sake of peace with neighboring clans or, even, to expand empire, were established. Time was bound with space and the notion of travel -which was expensive, dangerous, and time consuming- and was reserved for the select few either engaged in commerce or with the financial means to do so. Individuals within society often never left the town in which they were born, or engaged in ties with outside others. The notion of a stranger was understood to be someone from "beyond the walls", and it was those people who were not to be trusted.<sup>60</sup> Communities were tight knit and all social activities were confined within.

Constraining rituals, rules, and traditions guiding everyday social life were controlled by kin and community and helped to reinforce the social, and political order. For such an order to exist it must be maintained through a series of strict rules, norms, and exacting expectations. Any deviation from expected behavior could cause the breakdown of the community.<sup>61</sup> As such, each person is expected to act in accordance to the rules or be punished. This creates an environment where everyone must place trust in each other for the proper functioning of society. Because there are so many opportunities for individuals to transgress unwittingly, each person must cultivate good will and reciprocity from others in their community. In essence, society is, as Gellner says, shedding the tyranny of the King for "tyranny of the cousins."<sup>62</sup> Symbols are honored and tradition kept because

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<sup>59</sup> particularly in England and France.

<sup>60</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 102.

<sup>61</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals*. (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 7.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

it has been the experience of past generations such structures 'work' for maintaining social and political order. In other words, perceptions of trust and civil society were socialized at the level of the family, reinforced through the Church and the pre-modern state. This is not to imply pre-modernity saw no progression in relation to the state of nature but rather the changes in social norms came about through a process of examining previous traditions and norms and reinterpreting, clarifying, or updating them for present circumstances.<sup>63</sup>

Early pre-modernity in Europe established placing a somewhat stratified pecking order of elites (that was often in-flux) over the class structure; one that is near immutable for all levels of society, especially peasants and serfs, and reinforced through the Church and social order. Trust was mainly placed in those you know in your community, and especially family members. This divine political and social order was under scrutiny through the passage out of feudalism and into absolutism. The people were no longer willing to accept man's sole purpose was to serve God only as an agent of the "state" via the class he was born into. The Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment created a paradigm shift and the belief that man's natural state was individualistic born with natural rights, and the people longed for this part of the 'state of nature' to return.<sup>64</sup>

## **Trust and Institutions in Modernity.**

What we know as "modernity" did not arrive all at once, globally,<sup>65</sup> as we believe occurred with the transition from "the state of nature" to pre-modernity, it was a slow process.<sup>66</sup> Without a doubt, however, the Protestant Reformation and the subsequent Enlightenment<sup>67</sup> brought with it a focus on individualism, science, and reason which

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<sup>63</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 79.

<sup>64</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals*. (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 7.

<sup>65</sup> Again, see Fukuyama (2011, 2015) and others on discussions related to China's flirtations with the Modern States in the Qin Dynasty.

<sup>66</sup> ...with such events as issuing of The Magna Carta, first in 1217 acting as a check on the king, and came to a head via the The Glorious Revolution in 1688.

<sup>67</sup> Enlightenment thought can be credited, not just to the Protestant Reformation, but also (ironically, perhaps) to the Crusades, especially the so-called "Western Crusades" in Spain. The information exchange that occurred through interaction with the Muslim world, who cultivated and protected the works of ancient philosophers and scholars via the vast libraries of Alexandria and Baghdad, as well as throughout their empire, allowed us to interface with Muslim philosophers influenced by the ancient

stood in stark contrast with the absolutism, collectivism and mysticism that defined pre-modernity. Though the latter ideas were initially formed in absolutism, they are credited for ushering in what would become the modern state.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, what has later been called the Weberian model became the gold-standard of defining (modern) statehood and citizenship.<sup>69</sup> From the Marxist perspective, this led to an environment where capitalism led to innovation and industrialization, bringing about rapid technological advances bearing both positive and negative effects, including the exploitation of the working class and subsequent threat to the political order of democratic societies. Resolution of these struggles allowed for new opportunities to re-establish institutional trust in an improved political order. Modernity steamed forward, taking up breakneck speeds at the end of WWII ushering in a new sort of modernity where, according to constructivists, technology increased global interconnectedness, ironically, allowing families to re-establish bonds of trust lost in the wave of increasing mechanization. Globalization also led to our developing trust networks with unknown global others to engage politically, as well as deepen our own personal social bonds of trust.

## **Trust and Institutions in Modernity.**

In pre-modern times, geography, as well as time and space were often inhibitors to control and interaction with 'distant' locales increasing the need for 'self-governance' and decreasing the direct roll of the state in local affairs; an inverse relationship with between the citizen and state occurred with the shrinkage of time and space. Citizenship within the modern state was shaped around what Almond calls the "rationality-activist model." This highlighted the importance of creating and sustaining democratic principles where all citizens were actively engaged in the political process in a manner that was "informed,

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Greeks, as well more direct access to philosophical texts long lost to history. See: Cloud, Randall R. *Aristotle's Journey to Europe: A Synthetic History of the Role Played by the Islamic Empire in the Transmission of Western Educational Philosophy Sources from the Fall of Rome through the Medieval Period*. Dissertation, University of Kansas, 2007 and Butterworth, Charles E., and Blake Andr Kessel. *The Introduction of Arabic Philosophy into Europe*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994.

<sup>68</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011)

<sup>69</sup>Ibid.



analytical, and rational."<sup>70</sup> The modern state had evolved from authoritarian monarchies colluding with religious powers to maintain political, economic, and social order, into a more secular state grounded in reason and subject to the rule of law; a state in which its citizens play an active, and more equal, role in their own destinies in the political, economic, and social realms.<sup>71</sup>

Further, the modern state became an increasingly tangible entity that citizens could interact with on a variety of levels and visa versa. A hallmark of the Weberian modern state, an effective bureaucracy, became indispensable to the state who sought legitimacy and to citizens seeking security.<sup>72</sup> Mercantilism gave way to capitalism and state institutions were formed or expanded to help provide a growing citizenry with the political goods, such as public education, police protections, and clean water, needed to create and foster real trust in the system and encourage greater political participation.<sup>73</sup> Further, deepening beliefs of political accountability and rule of law also helped engender feelings of trust and good-will between the state and its citizenry. While initial attempts to provide political goods helped foster an overall sense of trust in the system were taking place before 1800, advances in technology lead to rapid growth, and ultimately exploitation of the working class. As the Industrial Revolution steamed forward in democratic societies, a lack of intervention from the state stymied trust in the political order and institutions overtime, calling into question the dynamic between the state and its citizens.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Gabriel Abraham Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publ., 1980), 16.

<sup>71</sup> This is an important distinction for Weber in the "Modern State"; a citizen has agency and subject, in the Feudal sense, does not. A citizen has rights, a subject does not. A citizen can choose his rulers via rational-legal means, and by contrast, a subject can only hope to reinforce the current social order by knowing his place and not straying from it.

<sup>72</sup> The idea of bureaucracy and institutions generating good-will through the effective distribution of political goods is discussed in Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 55. Further the first real modern bureaucracy took place in China some 1300 years earlier. He also points out some Muslim states, as well as Israel also had functioning bureaucracies. Francis Fukuyama, 2015.

<sup>73</sup> Joyce Appleby, "Ideology and Theory: The Tension Between Political and Economic Liberalism in Seventeenth-Century England," *The American Historical Review*. 81, no. 3 (1976): , doi:10.1086/ahr/81.3.499.

<sup>74</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 43.

## Marx and the critique of the Modern Political Order and Capitalist Response to "Correct" the System.

Increasing industrialization and innovation across the globe, at the expense of cottage industries and agriculture, created an economic and political environment which led to decreased political trust as ordinary citizens became increasingly aware of their poor living and working conditions and increased poverty.<sup>75</sup> Indeed, German philosopher Karl Marx's seminal critiques of the capitalist order, particularly in England, France, Germany, and America, during the height of the Industrial Revolution highlighted capitalist failings to provide needed protections from the greed corporations taking place at the expense of workers. For the sake of this work, the American experience will be focused on briefly.

Technology and growing industry meant average self-employed artisans, farmers and the like, could no longer afford to keep up with the rate and cost of production. This forced people to leave agrarian centers or leave their own small shops and/ or move into urban areas in search of work at factories as wage laborers. Mechanization reduced the need for highly skilled workers, and as such, paid below sustenance wages; income inequality ballooned out of control.<sup>76</sup> This created an environment where workers felt alienated from that which they produced. Previously, workers used their minds and specialized skills to create goods. Now, according to Marx, they are but a cog in a machine, engaging in mindless, menial, though back-breaking, and dangerous work; they are forced to sell their *labor* working to produce wealth for the owners of the means of production in order to survive.<sup>77</sup>

Historically, the political order of democratic capitalist societies largely took a laissez-faire approach to business and industry creating a situation in which the populace felt a deepening distrust of government in the face of growing exploitation.<sup>78</sup> Political corrup-

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<sup>75</sup>Ibid., 47

<sup>76</sup> Karl Marx et al., *The Communist Manifesto* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Karl Marx et al., *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1* (London: Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1990), Chapter 6; Melvyn Dubofsky, *The State and Labor in Modern America* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1994), 3; 234.

<sup>77</sup>Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 45.

<sup>78</sup> Seymour Lipset and Gary Marks, *It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton Company., 2001), 108.

tion was rampant all levels of government. Aggravating working conditions, housing was relatively expensive and dangerous. Sanitation in urban centers was virtually nonexistent as well as hazardous.<sup>79</sup> Overall, laws had the net effect of favoring business owners at the expense of ordinary people.<sup>80</sup> Surveying modern democratic bureaucracies, Marx postulated capitalism had sown 'the seeds of its own destruction' and its collapse 'inevitable'.<sup>81</sup> Workers were at the whim of the bourgeoisie and could expect no help from the state to intervene on their behalf, largely because politicians were in cahoots with the bourgeoisie colluding to impede the rights of the working class.<sup>82</sup> This resulted in capitalist states who can not be trusted rationally as a direct response to state-sponsored violence via exploitation.<sup>83</sup>

The philosophies of Marx and Engles were spread through immigration around Europe and to America as the working class recognized their lived experiences in their writings.<sup>84</sup> This inspired workers around the world to form unions and demand increased wages and safe working conditions from their employers, better rents and living conditions from their landlords, and political accountability from their elected officials, in some instances violently. It became apparent capitalist states must act to save the system or face the real threat of, what Marx described as, the inevitable bloody revolution of the proletariat.<sup>85</sup> The capitalist system partially outwitted Marx by adapting, curtailing predatory business practices against workers and consumers via regulation, providing legal protections and increased wages to labour and securing their right to unionize and bargain,

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<sup>79</sup> Roy Lubove, *The Progressives and the Slums: Tenement House Reform in New York City 1890-1917* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974), 124.

<sup>80</sup> Melvyn Dubofsky, *The State and Labor in Modern America* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1994), 3

<sup>81</sup> "Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League." Letter from Karl Marx. March 1850. London.

<sup>82</sup> There are many example to support this idea even beyond the death of Marx. Deeper exploration is beyond the scope of this work. For examples, see: Dubofsky, Melvyn. *The State Labor in Modern America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994, 208. among others.

<sup>83</sup> John Dunn "Trust and Political Agency", in Gambetta, Diego (ed.) *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, electronic edition, Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 2000, chapter 5, pp. 73-93, <<http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/dunn73-93.pdf>>

<sup>84</sup> Seymour Lipset and Gary Marks, *It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton Company., 2001), 34. Lipset and Marks note while the Socialist Labor movement across Western Europe was strong, the American movement was second only to Russia in terms of relative strength.

<sup>85</sup> Karl Marx et al., *The Communist Manifesto* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

as well as improving building and sanitation codes urban centers largely squashing the specter of communism and re-establishing greater political trust in the system.<sup>86</sup> While capitalism may have halted the global spread of communism, it became the paradigm for modernization going forward, ushering in a sense of cosmopolitan awareness or a global civil society.<sup>87</sup>

## **Giddens and Political Order in the Post-War Era.**

As stated previously, institutions in modern democratic states exist to help maintain political order; this is accomplished by providing needed political goods effectively. Constructivists have critiqued the political landscape that has resulted from speed in which technology continued to transform the globe in the post-War era. The disruption that occurred in the pre-War era surrounding a changing economic and political model, forcing people to leave their families and communities in search of new opportunities began to settle after the post-War era due, in part to advances in technology and strengthening institutions. Modernity ultimate has, as Anthony Giddens<sup>88</sup> refers to as a "disembedding" effect. In other words we are being pulled out of space and place through rapid changes in technology, which shrink time and space, resulting in a time-space distanciation. This pulling out of 'space' results in our 'place' (or physical locale) becoming blurred. The disembedding nature of modernity has two features: symbolic tokens and expert systems. We can think of symbolic tokens taking the form of money, particularly credit. In the pre-modern era money took the form of coinage worth its face value and had physical mass. Today, we often rely on credit or debit cards, which alone have no inherent value. Each debit or credit card will have the same format and size but will carry digital information

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<sup>86</sup> In America, for example, this began with Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Era through his 5th cousin's administration Franklin D. Roosevelt. Though we can also point to the hyper-radicalization of the Marxist movement in America and its refusal to work more broadly with less radical labor unions as a reason for quashing revolution in the US. A greater degree of political socialism was adapted in Europe because of Socialist leaders willing to cooperate with labor on more pragmatic social goals building a deeper political base, however it still did not result in a coup of the regime, as pointed out in greater detail which is beyond the scope of this paper: Seymour Lipset and Gary Marks, *It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton Company., 2001).

<sup>87</sup> Francis Fukuyama, 2015, 47.

<sup>88</sup> Giddens tries not to separate the political from the social in a very clear way. As a constructivist, for Giddens, What is political is also social. Here, I will pull out those aspects of his theory which apply most directly to political order and institutional performance.

representing monetary value in the owner's account in some online space. One's money is both present and absent. Expert systems are also somewhat phantasmagoric. Expert systems are "systems of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organize large areas of the material and social environments in which we live today."<sup>89</sup> They can take the form of private or state institutions which are ultimately intertwined.

These characteristics of modernity have a way of producing trust in the political and social system overall. Hitherto, trust and interactions with others were seen to be based in fortuna, or luck. However, modernity has caused a shift in our ideologies to trust based on *risk*,<sup>90</sup> or educated calculation of probabilities and degrees of certainty. For example, I trust that when I use my debit card, the money in my account will be there for my purchases anywhere in the world. If it is not, I trust that the bank will correct the error or make me whole if my account has been compromised. I can rely on this because the state guarantees the safety of my account. I trust when I bring my children to school they are safe and the building will not collapse on them.

This is an example of placing trust in experts, unknown others to us, who possess specific knowledge we do not. We trust this system of experts works, and those who make up the system are competent. We trust unknown others to not harm us as we are walking down the street. Of course, there is always risk of failure in the system, however, political and institutional performance allows us to calculate the risk through experience. This sort of trust is, according to Giddens, a direct result of the process of globalization. In pre-modernity trust politically and socially was very much tied up with space and place. In modernity we have shifted away from trust in those we know, to taking risks with those we do not in order to regain control over our ever morphing environment. However, this form of trust has become so routine, it is something we have internalized and taken for granted.

Of course, our social experiences have also shifted dramatically as a result of the disembedding nature of modernity. The social main focus in modernity is the individual; we are no longer at the whim of the tyranny of the cousins. For example, at the most

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<sup>89</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 27.

<sup>90</sup> see also: Ulrich Beck, *World-Risk Society* 1996.

personal level, bonds of intimacy were no longer based on strengthening bonds of civil society and reinforcing some immutable political order, as was the case in pre-modernity; rather, it became about finding another who reflects one's need for self-determination.<sup>91</sup> This betrays a significant change: we now find mates for our own ends rather than to fulfill some societal goal. In turn, the disembedding nature of modernity has also affected other social relationships and created new ways for trust in others to develop.

## **Giddens and the Role of Technology in Fostering Social Trust in Modernity.**

The rapid way in which technology and communication has impacted all societies, whether directly or not, has caused some people to feel a lack of control over their local environment and, as a result, turn inward, atomized, and away from society. As discussed previously, it can also have the effect of re-embedding people back into their communities. "Re-embedding" occurs, in this case, by repairing some personal disconnections resulting from modernity. More specifically, "reembedding" is possible through the shrinkage of spatio-temporal relationships due to globalization. Indeed, people are able to travel farther in shorter periods of time and engage in new forms of communication at a rate never seen before in history, allowing them to re-establish lost bonds and/ or create new ones.<sup>92</sup>

Further, Internet applications, such as Skype and FaceTime, allow us to reconnect and construct bonds which were previously much more difficult to build and maintain. New social networks have emerged out of this this technology. Just as we have the ability to strengthen our so-called "strong ties", that is, relations with the people we know, such as family and friends, neighbors and co-workers, we are also able to build new trust networks made of "weak-ties", that is, unknown "others" across town, or even the globe, via the Internet. Sites such as Facebook, Twitter, LiveJournal, Reddit, and VKontakte (Russia) are "spaces" of interaction which *transcend* state borders, effectively blurring them. As a

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<sup>91</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).

<sup>92</sup>Ibid.

result, they have the ability to move out of the realm of personal and congenial relations<sup>93</sup> and into the arena of global social trust and movements taking the form of a global civil society.<sup>94</sup>

Early theoretical thought projects on trust and institutions in society born out of the Enlightenment presented us with belief that, in the State of Nature, man was solitary and individualistic. While Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau varied on the specifics within their philosophies that unifying theme was present. However, modern anthropological and archeological evidence has shown otherwise. We are social beings who wandered in familial small bands relying on one another to perform some function for the survival of the whole.

Surveying the historical context of democratic institutions and social trust we see a dynamic political and social structure adapting to changes as technology advanced. Settling down into communities and then forming the political structure of the state did not break the familial bonds formed in the State of Nature; in some ways they strengthened them, though not always in a positive direction. The tyranny of the cousins could in some ways reinforce a lack of individual liberty. In others it reinforced societal trust amongst the group for the 'optimal' functioning of the whole. With the Protestant Reformation and the ushering in of Enlightenment ideals of liberty and innovation, technology and philosophy gave way to industrialization and modernization. It was at this point the rights of the individual were championed above those of communal good.<sup>95</sup> As individuals began to climb up or down social and economic ladders and moving across geographic

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<sup>93</sup>This focus on the positive aspects of globalization in relation to the first world. However, this focus favors the industrialized world and leaves out two-thirds of the global population who do not have access to the technological spoils of globalization and rather than actively participate are often acted upon. While Giddens does admit there are some who may suffer in the process of constructing modernity, this is glossed over and one is reminded of the institutions which have come as a result of globalization to address some of these ills. Inayatullah Blaney, as well as Rosenberg, take constructivists like Giddens to task for their inability, or perhaps, refusal to address the underlying negative forces which set some of these globalizing forces and events in motion, as well as their potentiality for negative consequences for "others" on the global field. For them, this sort of omission is tantamount to the tacit approval of the oppression and violence perpetuated by the modernizing forces of globalization. This "western focus" will be addressed in Chapter 4.

<sup>94</sup>Kaldor, *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War?* 111-13

<sup>95</sup> Sascha O. Becker, Steven Pfaff, Jared Rubin, "Causes and consequences of the Protestant Reformation", *Explorations in Economic History*, Volume 62, October 2016, Pages 1-25, ISSN 0014-4983, <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2016.07.007>.

space away from their familial centers, leading to social ennui, alienation, and depression. Threats to the system emerged during the Industrial Revolution as Marxism took hold among the working class across Europe and America, driving workers to form bonds and unite against the state to demand change. The Capitalist system did adapt, largely averting catastrophe. Further, advancements in technology allowed society to form new bonds of trust with the state, institutions, with family and friends, as well as meet new people from all over the world and see themselves as potentially part of a global community, blurring state borders. They can take what they learned from global others and re-embed themselves back into their local communities with new ideas they then share with their local trust networks. This history shows us that human beings are inherently social creatures. As such, even when faced with threats from the state, we will find solace in one another and form new bonds to amend the existing political order. This is key to understanding the nature of trust relationships discussed in Chapter 5.

## **PART II: CONCEPTUALIZATION OF INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNANCE AND TRUST IN THE GENERAL LITERATURE.**

There are two main thoughts on how to examine the effects of institutions on governance, as well as the formation of social trust. First, there is the culturalist approach that posits the prevailing culture present in a given society will impact how social trust and institutions are formed. Second, there is the institutionalists who believe it is institutions that impact how society is structured, and thereby how society trusts one another. There have been significant attempts to bridge across most valid points of each theory; the new-Institutionalists, have taken on this task.

### **The culturalist approach.**

Culturalists believe institutions are created as a reflection of cultural norms and expectations established via early-life socialization.<sup>96</sup> In short, what people have come to

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<sup>96</sup> William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?," *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 1 (February 2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.; Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and its alternatives: Understanding post-Communist Soci-*



expect politicians and their institutions are capable of and/ or are willing to perform. It is a bottom-up theory of institutional formation. Macro-cultural theories focus on trust formations are synthesized at the national level homogenizing norms and expectations, which are largely fixed, establishing a dominant political culture. Societies with free-markets and democratic institutions will be the result of a culture of individualism and democratic spirit, while those societies that are focused on authoritarian values and norms have low levels of interpersonal trust which in turn will produce authoritarian states and institutions.<sup>97</sup> Individual level micro-theories posit social trust is first formed in the familial unit and extended out towards society and then towards institutions, forming the basis for how institutions are created. The focus is on the experience individuals within the cultural setting which allows some individual variance of trust outcomes.<sup>98</sup> Regardless of which specific theory of culturalism one presents, they agree that socialization and networks of trust are ingrained from an early age, transmitted to political life as the child grows into adulthood, and then transmitted again through the generations.<sup>99</sup>

This transmission occurs through a state's political culture. A main feature of the culturalist perspective, it is defined as "the pattern of cognitive, evaluative, and affective orientations towards *political objects*."<sup>100</sup> It is spread by individuals or groups through a combination of socialization, and personal experience. It takes into consideration the history within a state, both politically and culturally, that formed society and its institutions. As such, they believe that societal and institutional trajectories are 'path dependent' and difficult to change.<sup>101</sup> Those societies which have a high civic culture

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*eties*. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 116-117.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.; Gabriel Abraham Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publ., 1980), 32.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.; Gabriel Abraham Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publ., 1980), 32.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.; Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

<sup>100</sup> Arend Lijphart, "The Structure of Inference," in *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, Company, 1980), 38.

<sup>101</sup> Samuel P. Huntington et al., *The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate* (New York, NY: Foreign Affairs, 2010).; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).; Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993).; Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

will more likely to demand political goods and hold their officials accountable, leading to horizontal institutions who are more likely to be effective. When societies exhibit low levels of civic engagement they will produce vertical institutions that are not effective or accountable. Overall, culturalists focus on the quality of political culture present in a society because their research seems to support the notion a society that exhibits a politically active polity, combined with high levels of social trust, help create the conditions in which democracies can be sustained. Indeed, culturalists often point towards the United States and Great Britain when making their case. These countries both have long histories of active civic societies with a political culture that reinforces democratic principles.<sup>102</sup>

The trouble with this approach is the idea of "path dependency" This leaves societies, in the minds of those who follow this approach and potentially other world leaders, to have little or no faith for positive change to come out of authoritarian systems or if it does it will take generations to manifest. It is a prejudicial view that ignores or downplays the ground swells of revolutionary change throughout history that have resulted in positive changes through regime or institutional change that came from the bottom-up. It also ignores or downplays the legitimate efforts from elites to change the system from the inside out. Further, this assumes a sort of rational and linear thought process in trust formations. One of the main difficulties facing any empirical study in the social sciences is the notoriously high variability of human beings. For example, not all who 'join' necessarily project trust outwards towards political institutions. By the same token, not all who trust 'unknown others' trust their government or institutions, or even their own family members. Similarly, not all who have had negative early socialization experiences grows to become atomized away from society, not do all who are atomized distrust institutions. Further, there is evidence that institutional trust has little to do with social trust to begin with. These combination of experiences vary across cultures, as well.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>102</sup>Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

<sup>103</sup>William Mishler and Richard Rose 2001; Kenneth Newton, "Social and Political Trust in established Democracies," in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford,

## The institutional approach.

This school of thought dominated concepts of the importance of institutions on society up until the post-war era of World War II. Institutionalists believe that trust, or the lack of it, in institutions is a direct result of rational choices based on personal experiences. The main focus was on quality of design rather than performance. Performance matters, however to what degree depends on the theorist. It was believed if an institution was simply designed 'correctly' everything else would fall into place along proper democratic expectations.<sup>104</sup> Overtime, the focus would then turn to performance: How effective is the state at delivering stability and economic performance at the aggregate level of the state, as well as political and economic goods to its citizens?<sup>105</sup> Thus, proper design leads to legitimacy and optimal performance which feeds back to increasing societal trust.

When examining social trust, institutionalist posit that it is *adult* leaning, rather than early life socialization, that forms views of political institutions. As such, institutionalists also recognize the importance of individual variance in experiences with the state and institutions. It is believed examining an individual's values, what they deem is most important, can also predict individual experiences with institutional performance. In short, lifetime of socialization and experience, if adult experiences demonstrate positive interactions with institutions in providing political goods, then this will in turn feedback into society creating greater generalized trust and a stronger civil society. A key feature of the institutionalist approach is the belief that stability and trust is not locked on a dependent path determined by culture or of past political experiences.

Again, the problem with this approach is the emphasis on generalized trust and traditional forms of civil society. Further, prevailing theories of institutional trust do not account for situations where social trust may act independent of institutional performance. For example, if social trust depends of high rates of institutional trust, how have societies been able to bond with one another in social networks with unknown others to

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UK: Oxford University Press, 1999).

<sup>104</sup> Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. 1993. p. 9

<sup>105</sup> Jose Antonio Cheibub et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (1996): , doi:10.1353/jod.1996.0016; Adam Przeworski, "Democracy and Economic Development," New York University, Department of Political Science., 2007, , accessed April 15, 2017, <http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/sisson.pdf>

fill the void left by an ineffective state?

## **Putnam and the so-called 'new Institutional' Approach.**

According to the established literature, trust matters for developing democracy; not because it causes democracy in and of itself, but rather because it helps foster the conditions in which democracy can grow. Authors differentiate between the kinds of trust, particularly the difference between generalized, particularized, and institutional. The new institutional approach tries to reconcile the two schools of thought by examining, what those researchers feel, are the best portions of each. In his seminal work, *Making Democracy Work* (1993), Putnam, et. al. examine social trust and institutions through the case study of Italy. They argue Italy is a perfect test case for the importance of institutions and trust because, in 1970, the Italian government instituted a series of institutional reforms across the country at the same time. From the level of regions and society, the North had a prevailing culture of more civic action, while the South had a cultural tradition of societal distrust and political patronage. This allowed them to hold institutions constant while allowing civic traditions and other societal attributes to vary in relation to strength of and efficacy of regional so-called democratic governments.

They demonstrate one of the key indicators of a thriving democracy is a strong civil society. Putnam<sup>106</sup> defines civil society, at the political level, in terms of institutions that act independently of the state.<sup>107</sup> Further, an important measure of civiness present in any society is social trust. There are two kinds of trusters: those who trust the people they don't know (generalized trusters) and those who trust the people they do know (particularized trusters). He and his colleagues conclude generalized trusters are *joiners*, that is, those who identify as generalized trusters are more likely to join civic groups which are the basis for social capital that Putnam feels is absolutely vital to the functioning of

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<sup>106</sup> Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993); Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Culture and Politics*, 2000, , doi:10.1007/978-1-349-62965-7\_12.

<sup>107</sup>This is contrasted by civil society in pre-modernity, which was seen as a function by the state and of the state Mary Kaldor. *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War?* (1st ed.). Boston: Polity; Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*; Robertson, R. "Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept." *Theory, Culture Society*: 15-30.

a strong civil society.

Social capital, can be thought of as the accumulation of trust one carries based on previous actions allowing them to be understood as 'trustworthy', in turn allowing those with direct experience to 'vouch' for those with high levels of social capital. From the perspective of the individual, social capital encapsulates behaviors and attitudes towards politics, as well as interpersonal trust and cooperation.<sup>108</sup> Specifically, *social capital* contains the features of social life -networks, norms, and trust- that enable participants to collaborate with a host of others to pursue common goals with confidence. Examples include individuals joining social (bowling leagues) or volunteer groups (such as the Shriners or Elks). This sort of networking allows people to form ties outside of their family and close relations. It is within these groups people share ideas about politics and expand their knowledge of the political system. These people are, in turn, more likely to become politically active— a necessary characteristic of effective liberal democracy. In order for people to feel comfortable forming these networks, people must feel they can trust those outside of their family or ethnic group. People who join are people who trust.<sup>109</sup> Generalized trust operates from the assumption most people will share the same beliefs and values, as well as claim membership to the same moral community.<sup>110</sup>

His work in Italy supported these claims. Putnam finds those regions of Italy, which tend to be in the North, with historically high instances of civic action are more likely to engage with political institutions for purposes of furthering democratic values. By contrast, societies with historically low instances of civic cooperation, which tend to be in the South, have institutions that are weak and ineffective. He posits the people of the South do not have a wide-base of trust networks and, as such, do not extend trust to political leaders nor institutions. While the people are very politically active, they are not civically active; they are often looking for personal patronage rather than democratic political goods or accountability. His work in the United States comes to

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<sup>108</sup>Jeffery J. Mondak, and Adam F. Gearing. "Civic Engagement in a Post-Communist State." *Political Psychology*: 615-37.

<sup>109</sup> Putnam and Leonardi, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. 169-71.

<sup>110</sup>Eric M. Uslaner, and Richard S. Conley. "Civic Engagement and Particularized Trust: The Ties That Bind People to Their Ethnic Communities." *American Politics Research*, 2003, 331-60.

similar conclusions. There he finds a decline in civic involvement in the US is the result of declining social trust that he blames on technology.<sup>111</sup>

It is further argued generalized trusters are not only more likely to engage with the system, but also support democratic values. In turn, as institutional trust is fostered, this feeds back into societal trust at the generalized level. Known as the "virtuous cycle", this represents the hallmark of any strong democratic system.<sup>112</sup> Fukuyama agrees calling social capital, the *crucible* of trust claiming it is paramount to building and sustaining democracy.<sup>113</sup> He takes this idea a step further; those states which exhibit low-trust have a history of authoritarian systems and a *culture* of mistrust of outsiders.<sup>114</sup> Because of this, a strong emphasis is placed on the importance of generalized trust. It is recommended those societies who are seeing a decline in social capital must *join* civic groups, engage with other members of society or risk losing democracy.

Putnam's dire conclusion has prejudiced particularized, or strong, ties. Particularized trust is based on the idea people trust those only in their family or friends and do not trust those outside or from different ethnic backgrounds. It is claimed, because these individuals do not join traditional social groups, they are not creating social capital, nor bridging across to widen their social circles bringing in new ideas and information about government and democracy.<sup>115</sup> Instead, they are simply bonding; this offers no new growth to the group and leads to the atomization of society. This theory claims social capital<sup>116</sup> based on bridging is vital to the development and sustainability of democracy (Putnam 1993; 2000). This sort of trust is seen as detrimental to the creation or sustaining of democratic polities. Thus, the combination of institutional and generalized trust has been the main crux of trust measurement and understanding in relation to a country's ability to democratize.

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<sup>111</sup>Robert Putnam "Bowling Alone"

<sup>112</sup>Putnam and Leonardi, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*.

<sup>113</sup> Fukuyama, F. (1995). *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: The Free Press, 33.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid.

<sup>115</sup>Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology*. 78, no. 6 (1973): , doi:10.1086/225469.

<sup>116</sup> i.e. People whom join the face-to-face groups that make up civil society.

## Critiques of Putnam: Fukuyama, Ingelhart, and more.

Fukuyama's more recent works are an exhaustive account, among other things, of trust and institution building, across the globe from prehuman times to modernity.<sup>117</sup> He takes more of an institutionalist approach to trust and institutions, meaning he ultimately feels that institutions matter for building social trust, though he does offer context to his assertions. Examining the history of institution building and democratic stability or decay, he found additional variables to consider. His work uncovered when a state developed democracy as being a predictive factor in its ability to create institutions and civil society, as well as sustain democracy or fall into political decay. He calls this sequencing: those states, he claims, that developed democracy before they went about the business of building a modern state were more likely to develop problems surrounding good governance than those states who inherited a modern state from an autocratic regime.<sup>118</sup> He also emphasizes the importance of a national identity before nation building. Those states, he claims, that have multiple notions of national identity are more likely to face problems building an overarching national narrative that helps unify and strengthen institutions and society as a whole. All of this is set against geographical concerns. The quality of institutions implemented, the strength of national identity going in, will fall apart of the geography does not tend towards a conducive environment for said bureaucracies and institutions. Fukuyama's position is more dynamic than typical institutional approaches, indicating geographical, political, and social patterns on the ground shape how countries developed and can perhaps even predict challenges to the system.

For example, Fukuyama takes issue with Putnam's conclusions about Southern Italy and historical low-trust being the cause of vertical nature of institutions that perform poorly.<sup>119</sup> Noting the vertical power ended in the Kingdom of Sicily in 1164, the real

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<sup>117</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015).

<sup>118</sup>Ibid. 30.

<sup>119</sup>Not only the role of history in the creation of societies and institutions, but also the geography in which the entire setting is placed. This is a key difference which Putnam does not explore in any particular detail. He points to societies in Papau New Guinea and Africa who are still largely tribal societies and who never developed the Weberian model in the first place and are still patrimonial. See

reason for ineffective governance in the South today rests in the inverse of Putnam's own reasoning. Fukuyama instead points to a weak central authority characterized by its inability to prevent the exploitation of peasants at the hands of its aristocracy.<sup>120</sup> Ultimately by the time Italy was undergoing unification, the North was unable to create an overarching national narrative with the South whom they regarded as 'country bumpkins,' and Piedmont lacking the strength to drive such a narrative.<sup>121</sup>

Regarding the role of trust, Fukuyama does warn against what he calls narrow trusters, that is, those people who trust the people they do not know though do not trust the people they do know. This implies there is importance to the role of particularized trust in building democracy, instead, one finds this is downplayed as being detrimental to the growth of social capital because of the potential for atomization. However, this betrays a lack of understanding of the dynamic trust process. It is not particularized trust in and of itself which *leads* to atomization; atomization of the individual does not happen in a vacuum, but rather the result of negative interactions with those we know, as well as those we do not know. Therefore, perhaps atomization should be seen as a separate product of negative *trust* interactions and not wholly the blame of particularized trust in and of itself.

Fukuyama claims individual trust is based on interaction within societal constraints and norms in a given time. In other words, trust is given or not based on experiences, both positive and negative within the political and social spheres. One of his most important departures is the belief that societies are not trapped in path-dependency. He feels states must have leaders with the political will to change what must be changed and to maintain what is good. Citizens must work together to form civic institutions to hold those in control accountable for political goods and demand democratic governance. Still he emphasizes the importance of social capital<sup>122</sup> and generalized trust in sustaining

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Chapter 7 in: Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015)

<sup>120</sup>Ibid. 112.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid 110-113

<sup>122</sup> ...calling social capital the 'sine qua non of stable liberal democracy.' "Social Capital and Civil Society - Francis Fukuyama - Prepared for delivery at the IMF Conference on Second Generation Reforms," International Monetary Fund, accessed April 20, 2017, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuyama.htm#figI>.



democracy.

Ronald Inglehart's research finds no supporting evidence for the importance of social capital, however. In evaluating 43 countries of the World Values survey, he employed regression analysis to answer whether or not membership in voluntary associations directly impacted democratic stability, as Putnam claims. He does not indicate there is no connection between social capital and democracy, simply, he is unable to support a causal claim through his own empirical investigations. While the correlation between social capital and democracy is high, the relationship itself was not found to be statistically significant.<sup>123</sup> Still, using the same data, he does find significant evidence for social trust playing a key role in sustaining democracy.<sup>124</sup> Indeed, it is countries who rank high on personal "well-being" and "interpersonal" or generalized trust that will see democracies flourish.<sup>125</sup>

## **Prevailing Measure of Social Trust.**

Because trust is one of the variables to determine the amount of democracy in a nation or the ability for it, accurate description and subsequent measurement is vital. Since the theoretical underpinnings are ineffective and prejudicial, and new approach to understanding trust must be considered that is more inclusive and dynamic than previous understandings. This view of trust has inspired the World Values Survey (WVS) archive director Jaime Diez Medrano to create a "Trust in the World" report based on the importance of generalized trust. The Trust in the World map ranks countries on their amount of 'trustiness'; a country who receives a ranking of 20 or below is considered 'more careful' when trusting others and a country who receives a score of 140 or above is ranked as 'more trusty'. When one looks at the the most recent rankings from Russia, they rank as "cautious" with a score of 55 out of a possible 140+. Looking at other former communist states, Romania comes in at 43; Lithuania is 52; Poland is 40; while

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<sup>123</sup> Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Post-modernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 193.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid. 194.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid. 197

the Ukraine registers with a score of 60.<sup>126</sup> The most commonly used measure of social trust is the World Values Survey social trust indicator.<sup>127</sup> Scores on social trust, past and present, have been accepted and repeated numerous times in various research since the survey's inception in 1981.<sup>128</sup> In Russia, where hitch-hiking is as common as public transportation, it makes one wonder how valid these claims really are.

The WVS measures components of social change around the world. Topics covered are religion, gender, good governance and democracy, to name a few. The representative surveys are carried out in 97 states, covering 90% of the world's population.<sup>129</sup> However, when one examines the methodology of the WVS as it relates to social trust, one finds only a single question is asked to gauge something as nuanced as trust: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?"<sup>130</sup> Does this question really measure trust? Is it really possible to accurately measure social trust with just one question? My answer is a resounding no. Recent attempts of the WVS to answer these criticisms have resulted in a four-level generalized trust question. However, this measure, when used, is deployed alone to indicated the amount of trust in a given nation. Does this question answer any true measure of trust? The author believes the WVS question only tell part of a deep and winding process. Placing "trust" within the bounds of an single-dimensional model of high or low trust societies does not account for the true complexity of trust.<sup>131</sup> Visualizing and measuring trust in this manner betrays the bankruptcy of current understanding of how trust operates, uncovering the gaps in the accepted literature on trust, as well.

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<sup>126</sup>World Values Survey, 2006

<sup>127</sup>Simone Polillo, "Globalization: Civilizing or Destructive? An Empirical Test of the International Determinants of Generalized Trust," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 53, no. 1 (2012): , doi:10.1177/0020715212448666.; James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition," *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.2307/2669359.

<sup>128</sup>"Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>.

<sup>129</sup>"Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>.

<sup>130</sup>"Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>.

<sup>131</sup>Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285. ; James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition," *Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy*, 2001, , doi:10.4324/9780203428092<sub>chapter5</sub>.

## Gaps in the General Literature.

The culturalist approach can be applauded for recognizing the importance of historical and cultural influences on the creation of state institutions and trust relations. Ignoring or downplaying the role of culture in both arenas, as institutionalists do, is, at best, folly. Political structures and social relationships are not created in a vacuum. States are nested in cultures, which are nested communities, all of which exist on a timeline of historical experiences. At the same time, denying or dismissing the role of elite driven aspects of institutional creation or change is also a misstep. As we will examine in the next chapter, creating strong democratic institutions can have the effect of stimulating a growth in institutional trust and stability.

The glaring deficit of the emphasis on generalized trust is two fold: first, it assumes the unidimensionality of trust and ultimately resigns a country of trusters to one category or the other. This results in the exclusion of the other with often negative impacts.<sup>132</sup> The reality is, we are not solely one truster or the other: we are a combination of each form of trust. Secondly, this approach completely ignores or downplays how these societies have developed their own trust systems in spite of institutional failings and how they are still capable of supporting and demanding democracy. Further, it does not take into account modern technology and its role in 're-embedding' people back into their local communities, as well as bridging across to unknown others across the globe via online social networks. As previously stated, some questions about the legitimacy of this approach have surfaced and new methods have been employed to ascertain the true nature of social trust, however these have also fallen short.

The gaps in the current literature are thusly unable to capture the nature of trust specifically or reflexively because they are structurally flawed. Putnam has reified trust by removing its dynamic nature as well as emphasizing one characteristic of trust over another, thereby neutering the human element of trust relations. Fukuyama emphasizes the lack of path dependency on any given society, indicating their ability to break the cycle. Ultimately, however, he has emphasized the role of generalized trust in democratic

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<sup>132</sup> Ulrich Beck, "Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision," *Constellations* 16, no. 1 (2009): , doi:10.1111/j.1467-8675.2009.00534.x.

sustainability while eschewing the role particularized trust relations play.<sup>133</sup>

## CONCLUSION.

This chapter has explored the background of democratic state building and the resulting political and social order on the path to modernity. It is important to recall that while Enlightenment thinkers who postulated man in the State of Nature as being individualistic were in fact not so. The archeological and anthropological evidence points to our 'natural' state as being communal based on familial bonds. Setting down into communities resulted in our selecting leaders which ultimately placed us in the position of subject. The difficulty in maintaining control over far-flung agrarian centers resulted in a situation where the peasants were largely self-governing. Politically and socially, society was ultimately governed by the tyranny of the cousins. Family bonds were still important, as they were in the State of Nature, however society adapted to meet the current circumstances. Bringing this idea together with the current literature on trust, we can see that family bonds have been important for us to engage with those around us, as well as the political world. The coming of modernity "opened the walls" and saw rapid advances in technology which had a disembedding effect from our local environments and family bonds, emphasizing the individual over the community. The state began trying to compensate for this growth and its negative effects by creating more state bureaucratic institutions in order to deliver needed political goods. However, the Industrial Revolution exposed the state's initial willingness to collude with business interests rather than deliver for its citizens, particularly in the American experience. New forms of civic and political interest groups were formed to demand their rights in the face of the increasing exploitation of the poor. Citizens banded together with those they did not know but who shared their same values in order to hold the system accountable. In the face of the global wave of Marxism, the state recognized it must adapt or fall. It chose to adapt, showing the power of civic action, as well as the political will of leaders to make such changes in order to preserve the system. The lightning speed pace of modernization

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<sup>133</sup>GJames. "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition." *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 45, no. No. 1 (2001): 51-68.

hurdled forward in the post-War Era accentuating the depth citizens have been removed from their locales. The massive shrinkage of time and space has allowed us to use technology to create new networks of trust that blur borders, incorporate our families and reconnect us to our communities through computers and the Internet, and new communication tools such as mobile phones and Skype, and new social platforms FaceBook and reddit. This new technology has allowed us to re-embed ourselves back into our locales and re-establish bonds with family and create new bonds. This is an important idea going forward. Giddens talks about the creation of a new global form of civil society through the use of technology. This begs the question, have we been focusing on the negative aspects of technology while ignoring the increasing positive role technology is playing in reconnecting us with one another and global others, perhaps deepening trust bonds with family and generalized others? The current culturalist and institutional approaches both fall short of explaining the role of institutions and trust in the modern world. The culturalist bottom-up approach resigns states and their citizens to the path-dependent position of high or low trust and high or low institutional performance based on historical and cultural patterns. If change occurs it will be slow and problematic. The institutional top-down approach traditionally focuses on the design of institutions, claiming this will solve all ills. If the institution is designed 'correctly' with all the proper (Western) trappings of democratic values, everything will fall into its natural and right place. This will generate good-will in society and it will feed back into institutions, again feeding back into society. Putnam attempted to account to account for the short comings by acknowledging the role of institutions but still falls back on the path-dependent thesis. His thoughts on trust also do not account for the dynamic nature in which people actually trust and form networks. His hyper-focus on generalized trust and outmoded forms of civil society are ineffective. Fukuyama uncovers the misplaced focus on European development of the state and ideas of civil society as well as recognizes that the future of democracy in any given state is *not* path dependent. However, he falls back into the trap of claiming the important of generalized trust, at the expense of particularized, in formation of institutions and democratic consolidation. Building on this understanding the WVS has

created generalized trust questions, which are unidimensional in nature. This results in a flawed measure resigning a society to one sort of truster or another without the needed complexity. When forming trust networks, we do not typically rely on unknown others to the exclusion of family, nor visa versa. As such, a new understanding of trust, as well as a new measure must be developed. A new approach to understanding trust must answer these questions: What is the nature of trust? Does particularized trust matter and, if so, how does it affect democracy? How can we appropriately measure trust to capture its true and dynamic nature? For potential answers, it is important to examine the current research on trust in the region to see if there are clues to how different societies outside of the typical Western and democratic experience have tackled such issues.? The next chapter will follow a similar pattern and will also occur in two parts: In Part I, I will present background into the Post-Communist history and trust experience, as well as Russian history and experiences with trust. Further, in Part II, I will examine a selection of researchers who attempt to measure trust in the Post-Communist and Russian sphere, specifically.

**CHAPTER 3:  
BACKGROUND ON POST-COMMUNIST STATES AND REVIEW OF THE SPECIFIC  
LITERATURE.**

**INTRODUCTION.**

The coming of the Third Wave democratization led many in the fields of comparative politics and international relations to assume a teleological path forward. Just as Marx's historical materialism posited the coming of Communism was inevitable, the growing assumption led by Francis Fukuyama, declared a sort of historical liberalism stating the coming of liberal democracy was inevitable. This global wave of liberalism would result in the 'End of History', meaning all political history of regime change would end, as the standard bearer form and ideal regime will have been met globally. This 'end of history' would also mean the end of global wars, as it was believed democracies do not war with one another.<sup>134</sup> Indeed, Communism in the home of revolution, the USSR was collapsing under its own weight. As the Berlin Wall fell, and states within the Communist 'sphere of influence' broke away, as Soviet Republic began seeking and declaring their independence, it seemed as if this theory may bear fruit. Civil society groups such a Solidarity in Poland were pointed to as evidence of a growing civil society emerging, breaking away at the chrome gilded facade of a crumbling regime. This came to a head when Boris Yeltsin mounted a tank outside the Russian White House in Moscow rallying the military behind his democratic movement, putting down their arms abandoning the attempted coups by the Communists trying desperately to grasp on to the dying Communist state.

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<sup>134</sup>Bruce M. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton University Press, 1993), 119.

After the collapse, what unfolded was anything but teleological. Some states, such as Poland, saw incredible gains towards a legitimate liberal democratic state including increasing societal trust and civil society. Others, such as Russia herself, saw a broken state claiming to seek liberal democratic ideals, but in practice, created an increasingly corrupt and authoritarian state, lacking in social trust and the trappings of a free and independent civil society. Freedom House's Nations in Transit report<sup>135</sup> follows states of Central Europe, the Balkans, and Eurasia as they shed authoritarianism at the end of the Third Wave and ranks their progress towards or regression away from democratic consolidation.<sup>136</sup> Rather than a domino effect culminating in a global order towards liberal democracy, an examination of the data reveals a more persistent backsliding towards authoritarianism for the past twelve years in a row (Figure 1). This is a great area of concern. Many theorists in the literature pointed towards a history of autocratic rule and an inability to adapt to democratic values and expectations. Others still pointed to ineffective institutions that were either half-heartedly pursued, initiated too late, or at worst, not at all. The answers to these questions are vital; if we truly care about democratic reform, strong institutions and social trust, we need to understand the people or a given society, as well as the nature of trust itself.




Figure 1: "Nations in Transit Report", 2017. Changes in Democracy Score.

<sup>135</sup>"Nations in Transit 2016," | Freedom House, January 04, 2017, accessed July 19, 2017, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2016>.

<sup>136</sup>For a detailed description of each ranking for purposes of measurement, please see: "Nations in Transit Methodology," | Freedom House, October 07, 2016, , accessed July 19, 2017, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit-methodology>.



The gaps in the general literature betray the likelihood of deviant cases in other political and cultural circumstances. Indeed, a deeper look at the literature on trust shows a large body of work on the states of the former USSR and its influential sphere. As such, it seems an appropriate place to examine trust more closely. What different kinds of regimes have emerged since the fall? What is the historical background actors are operating against? What does trust look like in the region? What does civil society look like, and further, are there new forms of civil society and trust networks emerging? I will first explore the relevant background of the post-Communist and post-Soviet sphere. Next, I will then examine the specific literature on the region to see if any gaps from the general literature can be filled. What can be learned here can be used as a possible path forward to a more dynamic understanding of the nature of social trust.

## **PART I: BACKGROUND.**

Initially after the fall of the USSR in 1991, theories regarding the trajectory of post-communist systems fell into one of two pre-existing camps: modernization or transitology. The former tended to draw comparisons on modern states and their transition from pre-modern or authoritarian system to a more modern state system.<sup>137</sup> Modernization theory focused on levels of industrialization present. It was believed the way to change a political system was first through the modernization of the economy towards a more capitalist system, which would force social and ultimately political changes, and finally democratic regime change.<sup>138</sup> This idea was peddled heavily in the post-War period with the onset of the Cold War<sup>139</sup> and the perceived need to promote democracy and capitalism throughout the world as a way of staving off Communism. The later built off modernization theory, however focused on actor-oriented explanations vs purely economic ones and stressed

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<sup>137</sup>Max Weber, Peter Lassman, and Ronald Speirs, *Weber: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

<sup>138</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 01 (1959): , doi:10.2307/1951731.

<sup>139</sup>Jordan Gans-Morse, "Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-Communist Transitions and the Myth of a Dominant Paradigm," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 20, no. 4 (2004): , doi:10.2747/1060-586x.20.4.320.

there were no structural preconditions required for democracy to take root.<sup>140</sup> Particularly, the kind of economy is not deemed relevant in a state's ability to democratize, but rather the level of social unity present, elite bargaining with opposition leaders, and finally, the quality of elite lead transition involving the co-opting of the opposition (which determines the strength of democratic outcomes). Scholars of modernization posited one would expect any transition to be linear in nature, assuming a single end-point: liberal democracy. In short, the coming of *liberal democracy* was 'inevitable.'<sup>141</sup>

When it became clear modernization explanations, related to economic changes, were insufficient, and time proved we had not, in fact, reached the *End of History*<sup>142</sup> after the Third Wave, some theorists began searching for other alternatives. They became aware that, rather than being teleological in nature, transitions in post-communist states seem to have divergent courses from Latin American democratization that do not easily apply across regions or even sometimes, within the region itself.<sup>143</sup> Indeed, authors who have attempted to cross-compare have run into dead ends, something researchers the former USSR and sphere, specifically, point to a uniqueness of the Soviet and post-Communist cases.<sup>144</sup> Katherine Verdery notes:

In my opinion, to assume that we are witnessing a transition from socialism to capitalism, democracy, or market economies is mistaken. I hold with Stark, Burawoy, Bunce, and others who see the decade of the 1990s as a time of transformation in the countries that have emerged from socialism; these

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<sup>140</sup> Friedbert Rb, "Guillermo O'Donnell/Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Bd. 4: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore/London 1986.," *Schlsselwerke der Politikwissenschaft*: , doi:10.1007/978-3-531-90400-9\_90.

<sup>141</sup>Mike Alvarez et al., "Classifying Political Regimes," *Studies In Comparative International Development* 31, no. 2 (1996): , doi:10.1007/bf02719326. ; Adam Przeworski, "The "East" Becomes the "South"? The "Autumn of the People" and the Future of Eastern Europe," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24, no. 1 (1991): , doi:10.2307/419369.; Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest*, 1989, <http://www.kropfpolisci.com/exceptionalism.fukuyama.pdf>.

<sup>142</sup> Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest*, 1989, <http://www.kropfpolisci.com/exceptionalism.fukuyama.pdf>.

<sup>143</sup>Robert Alan Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1971), 32.;Jordan Gans-Morse, "Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-Communist Transitions and the Myth of a Dominant Paradigm," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 20, no. 4 (2004): , doi:10.2747/1060-586x.20.4.320.

<sup>144</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 01 (1959): , doi:10.2307/1951731.; Vladimir Gelman, "Transformatsiya v Rossii: politicheskiy rezhim i demokraticeskaya oppozitsiya," *Moscow: MONF* , 1999.; Linz 1996

transformations will produce a variety of forms, some of them perhaps approximating Western capitalist market economies and many of them not....<sup>145</sup>

Questions have continuously been raised whether or not liberal democracy is truly the most appropriate end point in the region. Further, concerns around such a litmus test might cause scholars to miss characteristics which are unique to post-communist states. The transformation approach has emerged out of this debate. It required the theorists to continuously re-evaluate the current state of transformation and update previous findings with new information. It is not path dependent and has no particular end-point in mind.<sup>146</sup> However, as Gans-Morse (2004) points out, this is perhaps not the best approach, either. He proposes a more moderate approach; specifically, taking from transformation the notion of consistently revisiting one's models and expectations and updating them, while comparing them to the most likely and closest seeming short term endpoint of a specific regime or state. In other words, a more appropriate comparison might be more towards an authoritarianism or hybrid regime rather than a comparison to liberal democracy.<sup>147</sup> The next section will examine the kinds of regimes one might expect in this region.

## **The varieties of post-communist transitions.**

The varieties of regimes types are a hotly debated topic though most agree, for purposes of empirical measurement, one cannot simply place hard markers between regimes because of the high variability between them. For the sake of ease, only the three major regime types will be discussed.

### **Regime types: Democracy.**

There are 3 main regime types, all of which are present in the post-Communist, post-Soviet sphere: democracy, authoritarian, and hybrid regime. The first of these regime

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<sup>145</sup> Katherine Verdery, *What was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 15.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*; Gans-Morse 2004

<sup>147</sup> Gans-Morse 2004.

types seems the most obvious. The term is used often to describe specific states or ideals for developing states, however the truth is more elusive. The question over what is and is not a democracy has been an ongoing affair for decades and its characteristics is hotly debated.<sup>148</sup> For example, some theorists prefer a minimalistic definition of democracy, amounting to an 'electoral democracy' which provides its citizens the right to vote in elections, as well as minimal or restricted levels of some other rights to speech, press, and assembly providing some context to the right to vote.<sup>149</sup> While some see suffrage as a necessary condition, they do not feel this in and of itself is sufficient to capture democracy. As such, these researcher would, for example, claim the United States was not truly a democracy until slavery was abolished, others would deny the title until women had the right to vote, still others would deny it until the Civil Rights movement gained its victories through the Civil Rights act,<sup>150</sup> or the inclusion of marriage equality. In other words, a minimalist description falls short of considering human rights.<sup>151</sup>

In his seminal work *Polyarchy*, Robert Dahl, attempted to grapple with this question.<sup>152</sup> Dahl, eschewing in some sense the word '*democracy*'<sup>153</sup> favors the term *polyarchy* to describe polities requiring truly competitive elections that are both free and fair, but also have a buttressing guarantee of certain rights which make life in such a system have more meaning. These include the near absolute freedom of expression as well as

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<sup>148</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. Chapter 3, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Juan J. Linz, "Types of Political Regime and Respect for Human Rights," in *Conditions for Civilized Politics: Political Regimes and Compliance with Human Rights*, ed. Asbjørn Eide (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996), 186.; Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2nd ed. (London: Allen Unwin, 1947); Robert Alan. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (Yale University Press, 1971); Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), and many others.

<sup>149</sup>Alexander Keyssar, *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States* (New York: Basic Books, 2009); Alexis De Tocqueville, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Delba Winthrop, *Democracy in America* (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

<sup>150</sup> Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2nd ed. (London: Allen Unwin, 1947), 269.

<sup>151</sup> Juan J. Linz, "Types of Political Regime and Respect for Human Rights," in *Conditions for Civilized Politics: Political Regimes and Compliance with Human Rights*, ed. Asbjørn Eide (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996), 187.

<sup>152</sup> Robert Alan Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (Yale University Press, 1971).

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, 2. Dahl makes the point clearly he does not believe a true democracy has ever existed in the history of the world in which its citizens were truly deemed equal and given rights accordingly. He also states what we imagine as democracy does not always produce 'good' and exists on a sort of spectrum.

organization and association.<sup>154</sup> Also vital were a free and independent press, and assurances that policies crafted by governmental elites actually reflect the manner in which people vote or otherwise express their preferences. Dahl understood states could have some characteristics but not all which made it difficult to compartmentalize some states into a specific box. This is especially true of nations shedding a hegemonic past and transitioning towards 'something else.'<sup>155</sup>

Taking from deTocqueville, Larry Diamond (1990) explains any sort of democracy given any name can be viewed as a work in progress and can be continuously improved upon.<sup>156</sup> However the generally accepted true standard form of democracy is known as liberal democracy. It is considered the gold standard by which all other regimes are compared as it provides the best hope for 'reducing social injustices and correcting mistaken policies and corrupt practices.'<sup>157</sup> It builds upon the basic tenants of electoral democracy and adds several characteristics:

- \* Executive power is constrained, constitutionally and in fact, by the autonomous power of other government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, parliament, and other mechanisms of horizontal accountability)
- \* Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies, in fact as well as in constitutional theory, with (democratically) elected officials of the state; in particular, the military is subordinate to the authority of elected civilian officials.
- \* Electoral outcomes are uncertain.<sup>158</sup> The opposition vote is significant and there is a presumption of party alteration in government. No group that adheres to

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<sup>154</sup> ...provided it is done within the confines of the law. For example, one cannot scream FIRE in a theater, or threaten the life of the President.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 7. See the Figure 1.2 Liberalization, Inclusiveness, and Democratization. Dahl posits a variety of circumstances in which a regime could be moving towards one position, away from another, or back again.

<sup>156</sup> Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 18.

<sup>157</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. Chapter 3, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

<sup>158</sup> Adam Przeworski's notion of democracy as "institutional uncertainty" comes to mind. Political alternation is possible. Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

constitutional principles is denied the right to create a party and contest elections.

- \* No group (regardless of ethnicity, culture or religious beliefs) is kept from expressing their interests in the political process or from speaking their language or practicing their culture.
- \* Citizens have continuous and numerous avenues to express and have their voices be represented- these include independent associations and movements, which they may elect to join.
- \* Sources of information, aside from government information, (to include an independent media) are easily accessible.
- \* The individual is granted extensive freedoms as they relate to speech, belief, opinion, expression, demonstration and petition.
- \* All citizens are equal under the law, even if they have few political resources.
- \* Groups, as well as individual liberties are protect by an independent judiciary-their decisions are respected and upheld by other sources of power.<sup>159</sup>

Diamond also suggests that these criteria imply an eleventh condition: "if political authority is to be constrained and balanced, individual and minority rights protected, and rule of law assured, democracy requires a constitution that is supreme." The rule of law is vital because, in part, it helps ensure the citizens are able to trust their government and its institutions. He argues that:

"The citizenry will be more likely to favor democracy if they have faith in their leaders. As, their leaders give them greater freedoms and protection through the rule of law, citizens will have a higher approval rate of Democracy. The regime should also focus on human rights to help ensure legitimacy among its people. It is through a liberal form of democracy that this high rate of legitimacy is obtained."

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<sup>159</sup> Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy; Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 11.

As such, a liberal democracy requires political leaders to have the 'political will' to check their own power, be subject to established rules, and support a thriving civil society.<sup>160</sup> The bureaucracy is a vital part of the modern state as imagined by Max Weber and democracies tend to have a stronger rule of law, as well as effective bureaucracies providing adequate political goods for their citizens.<sup>161</sup> In turn, democratic institutions and the rule of law are said to provide citizens the space to trust one another, thereby increasing societal trust.<sup>162</sup>

## **Regime types: Authoritarian.**

By contrast, an authoritarian regime can be described as a regime which lacks democratic characteristics.<sup>163</sup> This vague depiction demonstrates that often times, the lines between democracy and authoritarianism can be blurred.<sup>164</sup> There are three main forms of authoritarian rule, military, personalist, or ideological, however a regime may be a combination of these. This also betrays the reality of high variance between regimes permitting them to fall into any infinite number of places along the spectrum of authoritarianism, in turn even making typology difficult.<sup>165</sup> Further complicating matters, often times the stated beliefs and ideals of the Supreme Leaders in authoritarian regimes are not 'authentic', that is, what they proclaim is not translated into appropriate action. Instead, they are simply words intended to give a perception of certain ideals to the outside world.<sup>166</sup> Nonetheless, as discussed in the previous chapter, modern states have specific characteristics, this holds true even if the state in question is authoritarian. One

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<sup>160</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. Chapter 3, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Larry Diamond. "Assessing Global Democratization a Decade after the Communist Collapse." Address to the Workshop on Democratization, New Europe College and Romanian Academic Society, Bucharest May 6, 2002 [http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/papers/romania\\_speech.pdf](http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/papers/romania_speech.pdf).

<sup>161</sup> Weber 1958\*

<sup>162</sup> Rothstein 2006\*

<sup>163</sup> Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 53.

<sup>164</sup> Larry Diamond, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan J. Linz, *Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988), 17.

<sup>165</sup> Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 167-179. Further, Linz does a respectable job outlining typologies which can be found beginning with figure 4.1 on page 174 and detailed descriptions beginning on page 184.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid. 50. One can think of North Korea's official name as "The People's Democratic Republic of North Korea." There is not a universe in which any political scientist would place North Korea anywhere along the democratic spectrum.

will typically find judiciaries present, as well as some form of bureaucracy and supporting institutions, as well as a legislature and an executive; one could even find relatively free elections and participation among its citizens.<sup>167</sup> What helps distinguish an authoritarian regime is the amount of participation allowed by its citizens and the degree to which repression is used to control them.<sup>168</sup>

Judiciaries are present in authoritarian regimes, as well as some form of the rule of law. Typically, however, the executive and related government institutions are exempt.<sup>169</sup> When permitted, it is often conflicts between citizens or otherwise non-political cases which are heard. The presence of a judiciary or limited rule of law does not guarantee a fair resolution as wealthy private citizen or businesses are more likely to be able to pay off judges to rule in their favor. This can lead to a political culture in which bribery or reliance on informal networks are accepted as the common currency to 'get things done', expanding the reach of corruption and reducing institutional trust.<sup>170</sup>

Formal institutions in authoritarian regimes can be the point of co-option of political or civil opponents.<sup>171</sup> Authoritarian leaders often attempt to bring their opposition under their control by offering them positions in government, or access to resources provided by specific institutions. One can also find cases where family members or prominent members of the leader's particular ethnicity or religious sect are also offered positions. At its worst, institutions can be headed by multiple leaders who have no skills related to the institutions they govern, nor care to obtain them, resulting in the degradation of the functioning of the institutions. This can also result in a weakening of the state as a whole. At its best, leaders who gain these roles may actually strengthen the institutions they lead, providing the regime with needed stability.<sup>172</sup> Regardless of regime stability,

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<sup>167</sup> The case of Iranian Theocracy comes to mind. While the Ayatollah has the final say, and the Guardian Council finalizes a selection of Presidential candidates, the people do participate in elections and their choices are upheld.

<sup>168</sup> Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 179.

<sup>169</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).

<sup>170</sup> Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 179.; Alena V. Ledeneva, "Practices of Exchange and Networking in Russia," *Journal of Financial Crime* 6, no. 3 (1999): , doi:10.1108/eb025886.

<sup>171</sup> Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 161.

<sup>172</sup> Steven R. Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability," *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 04 (2012): ,



however, authoritarian institutions tend to suffer from low levels of institutional trust because in the end they either do not produce enough political goods for their citizens or are perceived as corrupt or both.<sup>173</sup>

Where this co-option is met with resistance, the use of repressive tactics is employed. However, this can be a delicate balance. Too much repression or high-level violence can breed counter-violence and potentially regime collapse. An effective authoritarian will be able to circumvent high-level violence by eliminating the opposition, preferably through coercion. However, trying to co-opt the opposition through violence is costly both financially and militarily.<sup>174</sup> This quandary, known as the dictator's dilemma, highlights a leader's fear and uncertainty in the amount of support s/he has, thus can lead to an irrational amount of finances spent in attempts to placate the opposition. This is not always possible. In such cases, leaders may resort to violence with various rates of short-term success and long-term stability.<sup>175</sup> Any act of violence is likely to reduce institutional trust. Still further, perceived instances of corruption among activists or other citizens can reduce social trust.<sup>176</sup>

Civil society, if permitted at all, is usually repressed. Often times, what the state might call civic participation is really state-sanctioned and/ or mandated rallies, interest groups, or unions. This repression tend to stem from the fear of the leader in losing control of the message from the center and is seen as a direct threat to legitimacy of the state.<sup>177</sup> This environment tends to lead to low levels of generalized social trust and an increase in particularized trust relations. However, this is not a terminal diagnosis

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doi:10.1017/s1537592712002861.

<sup>173</sup>Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York :: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015).

<sup>174</sup> Though recent scholarship also indicates violent struggles can also lead to regime durability and elite cohesion in some authoritarian regimes. Steven R. Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability," *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 04 (2012): , doi:10.1017/s1537592712002861.

<sup>175</sup> Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 161. This is often seen in African personalist regimes, for example, which high rates of regime turn-over. Lucan A. Way and Steven Levitsky, "The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): , doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.07.001.

<sup>176</sup>Bo Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust," *World Politics* 58, no. 01 (2005): , doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0022.

<sup>177</sup>Lucan A. Way and Steven Levitsky, "The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): , doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.07.001.

for civil society. Indeed, we do find that social movements can arise out of civil society and challenge the state.<sup>178</sup> Again, here, co-option can be employed through patron-client relationships, promises of resources,<sup>179</sup> or a variety of physically coercive methods such as targeted low-level violence.<sup>180</sup>

One may see military rule, party pluralism, or single-party rule in authoritarian regimes.<sup>182</sup> One may find a legislature in which the legislators are elected, in others they are appointed, or one may find a combination of these. Authoritarian regimes can have several democratic elements, such as a popular vote for the Executive or a reliable judiciary for non-political cases.<sup>183</sup> In single-party regimes however, while elections may occur, the net result is a citizen's perceived choice of voting yes or 'rubber stamping' whatever it is the state has put before them. In still others, citizens may be provided with a series of choices giving the people relative power in an attempt to boost legitimacy and increase trust.<sup>184</sup>

## Regime types: Hybrid.

Sometimes referred to as the 'grey zone', a hybrid regime is generally defined as a state which combines democratic and authoritarian elements.<sup>185</sup> Some theorists deem hybrid regimes as being diminished forms of democracy, however recent scholarship suggests some cases may actually be diminished forms of authoritarianism. As with democratic and authoritarian regimes, one can see significant variance between hybrid regimes falling anywhere between regimes which lean more towards democracy and those who lean more

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<sup>178</sup> Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 18.

<sup>179</sup> Lucan A. Way and Steven Levitsky, "The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): , doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.07.001.

<sup>180</sup> Lucan A. Way and Steven Levitsky, "The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): , doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.07.001.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid. 184; Steven R. Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability," *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 04 (2012): , doi:10.1017/s1537592712002861.

<sup>183</sup> Iran, for example.

<sup>184</sup> Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 267. Also, recent literature suggests authoritarian regimes that exhibit relatively open elections and party systems tend to be ripe for democracy if a transition away from authoritarianism were to take place. Joseph Wright and Abel Escribolch, "Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy," *British Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 02 (2011): , doi:10.1017/s0007123411000317.

<sup>185</sup> Larry Diamond, 2002. "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes." *Journal of Democracy*. 13 (2).

authoritarian. Attempts have been made to parse out the varieties of hybrid regimes; Robert Dahl termed hybrid regimes 'near polyarchies', Diamond, Linz and Lipset referred to such regimes as 'semidemocratic', Diamond discusses 'pseudodemocracies', Livetsky and Way cover 'competitive authoritarian', and so on.<sup>186</sup> Again, while such states may not be democracies or authoritarian regimes, they are found in modern states, which allows for a useful starting point of analysis for hybrid regimes.

Bureaucracy and institutions are present, as they are vital to the functioning of any modern state. However, the degree to which they are effective varies. Hybrid regimes tend to focus on informal rules and networks which typically exist alongside formal rules and related institutions; the degree to which informal practices are given up for formal rules institutions is a predictor a state is moving more towards democracy. Of course, as a state begins to regress and expand reliance on informal practices tends to predict backsliding towards authoritarianism. Where institutions experience lower levels of trust, one will find greater levels of reliance on informal practices and networks. In short, commitment to democratic rules of the game can be measured by performance of institutions and levels of good governance. Where institutions elections and political parties seem to be improving in function, a greater hope of transitioning to a democratic polity is predicted. However it is important to keep in mind, transition towards democracy is not always the true aim of a hybrid regime, even if their stated goals claim otherwise.<sup>187</sup>

One will also find legislatures and executives present in hybrid regimes and, as such, popular elections. Whereas, typically, an authoritarian regime can be marked by its predictability in outcomes, hybrid regimes experience fierce electoral battles, whose outcomes can sometimes be unpredictable. However, one can find instances where the political opposition is harassed or sometimes assaulted, where coverage of elections and candidates is fair and balanced, and the overall process may be rather opaque. Hybrid regimes do have regular elections and tend to be free from blatant or massive vote rigging.<sup>188</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Diamond 2002; Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

<sup>187</sup> Such was the case with Russia, who consistently claimed to the world to be building democracy. This is known as the hybrid governance dilemma.

<sup>188</sup>"Nations in Transit 2016," | Freedom House, January 04, 2017, accessed July 19, 2017, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2016>.

Where political alternation is not popularly believed to be feasible, or is not a political reality, again, institutional trust will lag. Further, some hybrid regimes effectively have single-party rule, even in the presence of a perceived multi-party system. This results in a circumstance where the ruling party co-opts smaller parties into a broader coalition effectively blurring the lines between parties. Or one might find such a vast number of parties, it confuses and diffuses the political arena of a state, resulting in citizens who feel they are not truly being represented.<sup>189</sup> Once elected, however, it also remains unlikely that popular demands will be met with any great frequency. Voting patterns in the legislator or policies in the executive will be less likely to reflect the will of the people, also resulting in lower levels of institutional trust.<sup>190</sup>

The rule of law will be present, at least on paper through a constitution and/ or written laws and regulations. However, the extent to which these are followed and consequently, the extent to which the elite are also governed by these laws may vary. While some regimes may 'crack down' on lower-level bureaucrats, typically, the highest levels are exempt from such a crackdown.<sup>191</sup> Weak or uneven rule of law can also lead to mistrust within society.<sup>192</sup>

## **Common features of Communist systems that affect trust.**

Overall, the Communist system could be characterized by a lack of choices the citizens had in relation to risk-taking behavior with state institutions. In other words, trust was assumed by the state, regardless of whether or not the citizens gave it. Left without alternative choices, citizens were expected to simply vote 'yes' and rubber stamp whatever policies, initiatives or symbols that were put before them. Without pluralism, there was

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<sup>189</sup>Drogus 2015\*

<sup>190</sup>Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens," *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 03 (2014): , doi:10.1017/s1537592714001595.; William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.

<sup>191</sup>Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).

<sup>192</sup>Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens," *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 03 (2014): , doi:10.1017/s1537592714001595.; Mishler and Rose 2001; William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.

no other viable option. The Party presumed to speak for all workers and citizens and knew what was best for them, so 'alternative' options were seen as irrelevant, at best, or subversive at worst.<sup>193</sup> As Mistzal points out, the system was binary: *we the people and they the bureaucracy*.<sup>194</sup> And there is no way we can act as a check against them. Without the opportunity to 'practice risk-taking', this leaves society in a vulnerable place during a regime transition towards a democratic system that requires it. It also results in a system in which the people are forced to turn inward to one another, to rely on or form informal trust networks, resulting in what researchers would call a 'low-trust' society.<sup>195</sup> There is a reliance on informal networks to fill the gaps when the bureaucracy is unable or unwilling to provide political goods.<sup>196</sup> As we will see, it seems the people swapped out one set of despots for another, which has a direct impact on their ability to trust both socially and generally. This will be outlined in more detail in the next several sections.

## **Political and Social Order during Tsarist rule through the Revolution.**

The absolute monarchy of the Tsars reigned over a repressive and strict caste system. The Feudal structure fixed an individual to a specific rung on the socioeconomic ladder, based on birth. One's positioning determined his or her prospects for social mobility, with only very few exceptions. The Russian peasantry very much like in pre-modernity, often lived in far flung areas away from the center or regional authority; as such they were typically self-governing, relying largely on *krugovaia poruka*, or joint responsibility. Everyone was responsible for ensuring the prosperity and survival of the village and those who fell short or broke laws or deviated from expected norms were punished according to

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<sup>193</sup> Alexey Tikhomirov, "The Regime of Forced Trust: Making and Breaking Emotional Bonds between People and State in Soviet Russia, 1917-1941," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 91, no. 1 (January 2013): , doi:10.5699/slaveastorev2.91.1.0078

<sup>194</sup> Barbara Misztal, *Trust in Modern Societies: the Search for the Bases of Social Order* (Oxford: Wiley, 1996), 251.

<sup>195</sup> Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.; Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" *Social Research* 76, no. 1 (2009): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146>.

village councils.<sup>197</sup> Serfdom was also a particular feature. Tied to their land and beholden to the moneyed gentry, they lived short, hard lives. Challenging this political and social order was to risk the often-brutal wrath of the Tsar, regardless from which caste you came.<sup>198</sup> Since the time of Catherine the Great, discussions surrounding the notion of eliminating the system were entertained, though it was clear the nobility were violently opposed to such an idea. It would not be until Alexander II, who instituted some civil and agrarian reforms, would the serfs be free from their age-old bonds to landed nobles in 1861. But this reform was muted by the still centralized autocratic political reality, resulting in unfinished freedom.<sup>199</sup>

While Alexander II's failure to adopt more sweeping democratic reforms eventually resulted in his death in 1881 at the hand of socialist revolutionaries, the Russian people saw little benefit from a change in leadership.<sup>200</sup> His son, lost faith in reform as a result of his father's assassination and took the policy of entrenching power. Alexander III openly targeted those who advocated political changes and social reforms. He cracked down on religious freedoms, supporting a policy of "Russification" to erase ethnic identities.<sup>201</sup>

After the early death of the Tsar,<sup>202</sup> his son Nicholas II took the reins of power. Raised strictly in the belief of the Tsar's divine right to rule and anti-reform policies he held the line against any reform. The tide was changing socially and politically in Russia, particularly after the loss of the Russo-Japanese War which exposed the weak state of the Tsar's Navy and military might, as well as the debacle of Bloody Sunday where the Tsar's guard fired on peaceful protesters. The endgame had begun for the Tsars, but even those who sympathized with both reformers and the monarchy felt a centralized government was still the state's best hope for survival. They tempered their words with deference to the need for a strong, centralized government. Consider this memorandum

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<sup>197</sup>Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia and the Russians: a History* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2011), 9-16.

<sup>198</sup>Hoskings 2009

<sup>199</sup> Ibid. The liberation of the serfs was only partial. It required hefty fines to be paid to their owners to purchase their freedom, making true freedom limited and onerous.; Edvard Radzinskii, *Alexander II: The Last Great Tsar* (New York: Free Press, 2005), 130.

<sup>200</sup>Ibid.

<sup>201</sup>Ibid

<sup>202</sup>\*Tsar Alexander III died at the age of 49 as a result of an infection from a bruise.

to Nicholas II from his Chief Minister, Sergei Witte:

"The great danger which resulted from centuries of stagnation, and threatened our country's very survival, calls for unity among us and the formation of a strong authoritative government that will be backed by the people's confidence- this alone can rescue our country from present chaos."<sup>203</sup>

Russians who sought political change found little encouragement in Orthodox Church pews either. Throughout the time of the monarchy, church leaders taught that the Tsars were anointed by God, and therefore predestined to rule. Similarly, all members of society were told it was also God's divine will they were born into a specific class and they should be content with their predetermined lot in life. The role of the Church was, in short, to reinforce the political and social order under the Tsars.

The February abdication of the Tsar to the Mensheviks and subsequent October Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 seemed to offer the first real opportunity for change on behalf of Russia's oppressed and poor. Instead, the Soviet order merely transformed existing institutions. They swapped loyalty to the double-headed eagle of the Tsars with devotion to the hammer and sickle of the Soviet worker. But while a peasant farm boy might now indeed rise to become Premier one day (ala Nikita Khrushchev), the Bolsheviks stressed the importance of the "labor collective" over the needs of the individual. The promise of the redistribution of wealth alone was to be considered adequate reward, rather than encouraging the achievement of individual goals. As the Soviet system matured, the extent of a Russian worker's political power was to vote "yes" to a slate of Communist party candidates. The "role of the self" of the average Russian had been quickly reduced to effectively "rubber-stamping" the new but equally centralized authoritarian system. It quickly became evident the promises of Lenin were empty: The Russian Revolution merely exchanged one set of despotic rulers for another who, perhaps, were even more brutal.

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<sup>203</sup> Rempel, *Reform and Reaction Under Alexander II and III*, <http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/grem-pel/courses/russia/lectures/22reactreform.html> \*Witte, Memorandum Witte to Nicholas (October 1905), <http://www.strath.ac.uk/Departments/History/c30366.htm>

## Stalinism: Political, Social Order, and and the regime of 'forced trust'.

There are two main schools of thought regarding institutional trust under Stalin. The first is that trust under Stalin is defined by its absence. It posits that trust during Stalin's reign was undermined due to the perceived need for political order, as achieved through oppression. The second is that Stalin's regime created "forced trust".<sup>204</sup> Under this school of thought, the oppressed citizens have no choice but to place their trust in the state, so that they may feel some control over their environment. However, it seems both forms of trust existed during this time. Trust in broader society was decimated and trust in family and friends was also damaged.

### Political Order.

After Lenin's death in 1924, Stalin moved quickly to consolidate power. By 1927, he had removed all political opposition and touted his new plan: "Socialism in One Nation". Under this doctrine, the Soviet Union would no longer rely on the hope of a global revolution, or assistance from a Socialist Europe.<sup>205</sup> The New Economic Policy (NEP)<sup>206</sup> was discarded in favor of a Centrally Planned Economy (CPE).<sup>207</sup>

The CPE policy called for the eradication of cottage industry and *blat'*. Lenin had allowed such businesses to continue as a necessary evil, but Stalin argued that modernization of industry was only possible by eliminating competing industry even at the smallest scale. The CPE also required the collectivization of the peasantry.<sup>208</sup> Through

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<sup>204</sup> Alexey Tikhomirov, "The Regime of Forced Trust: Making and Breaking Emotional Bonds between People and State in Soviet Russia, 1917-1941," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 91, no. 1 (January 2013): , doi:10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.91.1.0078; Alena Ledeneva, "The Genealogy of Krugovaya Poruka: Forced Trust as a Feature of Russian Political Culture," in *Trust and Democratic Transition in Post-Communist Europe*, ed. Ivana Markova (Oxford, 2004).

<sup>205</sup> Alfred B. Evans, Laura A. Henry, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, *Russian Civil society: A Critical Assessment* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 32.

<sup>206</sup> Lenin's "New Economic Policy." This economic approach allowed the budding capitalist economy that was occurring prior to the revolution to continue. He argued this was necessary because there was not enough time for capitalism to take root in the Marxist tradition and the proletariat Vanguard Party would oversee capitalist development and prepare the country for a transition to a Socialist state.

<sup>207</sup> Edvard Radzinskii, *Alexander II: The Last Great Tsar* (New York: Free Press, 2005), 252

<sup>208</sup> Alfred B. Evans, Laura A. Henry, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, *Russian Civil society: A Critical Assessment* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 33.



collectivization, it was argued, the state would consolidate resources to address the needs of industry.<sup>209</sup>

While many supported Stalin's push for collectivization, it met resistance from the *kulaks*, the so-called "rich peasants" who stood to lose their agricultural wealth. In response, Stalin launched a carefully-constructed "us vs them" propaganda campaign. The *kulaks* were portrayed as greedy capitalists and subhuman animals. They were characterized as traitors who would hoard grain and slaughter animals rather than join collectives. In August of 1932, Stalin drafted a new law proclaiming that "persons misappropriating public property must be regarded as enemies of the people."<sup>210</sup> Kulaks who did not comply were sent to labor camps or executed by the secret police (OGPU). But with food shortages sweeping the country, Stalin's campaign succeeded in convincing many that the kulaks simply "got what they deserved."<sup>211</sup> Propaganda campaigns of this nature are typical of governments that systematically target a portion of the population to advance social and/or economic change. But unlike Hitler's genocidal assault on the Jews, Stalin's targeting of the kulaks was based primarily on class, not ethnicity. In Stalin's mind, the kulaks were obstacles to the Centrally Planned Economy and the future of Socialism.<sup>212</sup>

Stalin ultimately achieved his goals through taxation, famine and force. At least five to eight million Soviet citizens starved to death.<sup>213</sup> Some estimates suggest as many as ten million people starved to death in the Ukraine alone, with more dying across Russia due to the combination of famine and forced collectivization.<sup>214</sup> Ironically, even at the apex of the famine, the USSR was still exporting grain: from 864,000lbs in 1930 to 10,000,000lbs

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<sup>209</sup>Geoffrey A. Hosking, *The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1996), 158.; Edvard Radzinskii, *Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives* (New York: Anchor Books, 1997), 257.

<sup>210</sup>Edvard Radzinskii, *Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives* (New York: Anchor Books, 1997), 258.; Geoffrey A. Hosking, *The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1996), 158.

<sup>211</sup>O. Hieronymi, "Identity, Integration and Assimilation: Factors of Success and Failure of Migration," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (2005): , doi:10.1093/rsq/hdi095.; Ervin Staub, "The psychology of Perpetrators and Bystanders," *Political Psychology* 6 (1985).

<sup>212</sup>(Edvard Radzinskii, *Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives* (New York: Anchor Books, 1997), 258

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.* 259

<sup>214</sup>Myron B. Kuropas, *THE UKRAINIAN GENOCIDE/HOLODOMOR, 1932-1933 A CURRICULUM and RESOURCE GUIDE for EDUCATORS*, pdf, Chicago: Ukrainian Genocide Foundation, 2005.

in 1933. This dichotomy helped undermine trust in Soviet institutions among those who survived.<sup>215</sup> Those who were duped by the system, were either unable or unwilling to believe any other version of events if it contradicted with the state, exemplifying forced trust. Vassily Grossman's *Forever Flowing*<sup>216</sup> depicts exactly this scenario of forced trust in Chapter 14. A young woman who works at the offices of a collective farm in Ukraine sees everything that is happening to the kulaks, however convinces herself the propaganda is correct, and finds herself angry at the kulaks and indifferent to their suffering. She felt she had to make the lies a truth in order for her to make sense of her chaotic surroundings as the Holodomor waged on.

The kulaks were not the only victims of Stalin's fear and paranoia. From the 1920s through the late 1930s, Stalin launched purge after purge across the USSR. Everyone from the lowest peasant to Stalin's inner circle were touched.<sup>217</sup> Nikita Khrushchev plainly described this era in his "Secret Speech" (1956): "I often talked with Nikolay Alexandrovich Bulganin. Once when we two were traveling in a car," he said, "It has happened sometimes that a man goes to Stalin on his invitation as a friend. And when he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will be sent next: home or to jail? Such is the story of many in the top echelons of the Party and Stalin's inner circle."<sup>218</sup> Two of Stalin's main political enemies, Bukharin and Zinoviev, were arrested and tortured by the NKVD in order to provide false confessions of their alleged crimes and conspiracies against the state (Siegel 1998). Leon Trotsky fled to Mexico, where he was later traced by the NKVD and assassinated under direct orders from Stalin. Trotsky's entire family was systematically hunted down and killed after Trotsky left Russia (Edvard Radzinskii, *Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives* (New York: Anchor Books, 1997) 438. Trotsky's case was extreme, but not unique in Soviet society. An estimated 2000 artists, writers and intellectuals were sent to labor camps or prisons. So were scientists suspected of spying. Dissidents were

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<sup>215</sup>Ibid.

<sup>216</sup>Vasilii Grossman, *Forever flowing* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997).

<sup>217</sup>Hiroaki Kuromiya, *The Voices of the Dead: Stalin's Great Terror in the 1930s*. (New York City, NY: Vantage Press, 1991), 15-17.

<sup>218</sup>Achim Siegel, *The Totalitarian Paradigm After the End of Communism: Towards a Theoretical Reassessment*. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), 278.

frequent targets: the arrest and assassination of Sergey Kirov, once an ardent supporter of Stalin, typified the "Great Purges" of 1936-38. During this period, families often paid a price for the choices of their dissident relatives. Wives were routinely arrested with (or shortly after) their husbands, and their children were then sent to orphanages. An estimated 200,000 children were sent to homes around the USSR <sup>219</sup>" *Cahiers du monde russe : Russie, Empire russe, Union soviétique, at indndants 39, no. 1 (1998): , doi:10.3406/cmr.1998.2520.* Children 16 and older were labeled "socially dangerous elements" and sometimes shipped to gulags. Dissident children of any age were closely monitored for subversive behavior<sup>220</sup>.

By 1938, it was determined that arresting mothers not directly linked to the alleged acts of their husbands was not an economically prudent policy. It simply cost more for the state to care for these orphaned children. The process was halted, but for hundreds of thousands of children the damage was already done. Many blamed themselves for what happened to their parents. Some strived to be the best Soviets they could be, hoping to prove that their family's fate might be some terrible mistake. Others volunteered for the front lines during the war in hopes of "rehabilitating" their own parents' reputations <sup>221</sup>.

During the purges, people were encouraged to turn in all "enemies" they personally knew, even their neighbors or coworkers. In some cases, people would give up the first name that came to mind to save their own lives or spare their families. In others, this system was used to settle personal scores, rather than any instance of true subversive behavior. According to recent estimates, a total of 2.5 million people were arrested. Of those, approximately 700,000 were shot and killed<sup>222</sup>. It is easy to see how, in this environment, the average citizen might lose trust, not only in government institutions, but also everyone in society.

Not all were ready to blame Stalin, however, indicative of the forced trust in the system.<sup>223</sup> Many still believed him to be a protective and loving father, and felt he

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<sup>219</sup>Corinna Kuhr, "Children of "enemies of the people" as victims of the Great Purges",

<sup>220</sup>Ibid.

<sup>221</sup>Ibid.

<sup>222</sup>Ibid.

<sup>223</sup> Alexey Tikhomirov, "The Regime of Forced Trust: Making and Breaking Emotional Bonds between People and State in Soviet Russia, 1917-1941," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 91, no. 1

could not possibly know the cruelties being perpetrated against the Soviet people. Many even wrote to him, hoping he would save them from the rapacious NKVD. The Soviet system had made clear that *they* were the particular authority who defined who and what was trust worthy and it was the citizens who must earn *their trust*. This is perhaps one reason why letter writing was so prolific: letters are filled with a deference and love towards Stalin, proclaiming their deep loyalty, explaining some mistake must have been made in their particular case, appealing to Stalin via a proclamation of loyalty. Of course, letters went unanswered, forcing many to internalize what had happened to them or their family members and make a variety of excuses in order to make sense of their now chaotic world view. This seriously damaged a healthy notion of trust in Soviet institutions.<sup>224</sup>

### **Civil Society and Social Order.**

Some of problems that lead to a decrease of institutional trust also correlate to a decrease in overall trust within the population, both generalized and particular. The collectivization of the kulaks and the Great Purges had a dire effect on how the Soviet people related to one another. The forced trust in the system created a situation where, so long as everything was stable, those who were not labeled 'enemy of the state' could publicly engage with one another across ethnic and social divides. Stalin also sought to bring all civil society based organizations (*obshchestvennye organizatsii*) under the control of the state, further complicating generalized trust. It is through civil society people build on and express generalized trust in one another and act on it for the betterment of themselves and society. State control of civil society left the populace no place to turn to honestly engage in society under to the oppressive state system.

Only those organizations that were under control of the state and were believed to promote Stalin's vision of a Soviet society were permitted, all others were dissolved. The nomenklatura system guaranteed party control over civil society and through the Secretariat.<sup>225</sup> The Komsomol (Communist Youth League) was meant to serve as a

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(January 2013): , doi:10.5699/slaveastorev2.91.1.0078.

<sup>224</sup>Ibid.

<sup>225</sup>Hosking 1993, 89

model for future socially-based groups.<sup>226</sup> Officers were appointed by Communist Party officials and answerable to them.<sup>227</sup> By contrast, the Zhenotdel, or Women's Department of the Central Committee Secretariat, was initially given the power remove obstacles in the path of women's rights. But fear of "bourgeois feminism" led to the dissolution of the Zhenotdel in 1929 (Schrand 1999 ; Buckley 1989, 70). Lenin himself had formed The RAPP (Russian Association of Proletarian Writers). But Stalin believed the RAPP overrun with "Trotskyites" <sup>228</sup> and replaced it with the Union of Soviet Writers by 1932. The famed novelist Maxim Gorky would lead the first meeting of the Union of Soviet Writers, using the opportunity to describe the new "Soviet Man" literature should aim to portray: "He possesses a faith in the organizing power of reason. He is conscious of being the builder of a new world, and although his conditions of life are still arduous. He has no grounds for pessimism."<sup>229</sup>

Soon only artistic works deemed "socialist in content," which promoted Socialist realism, were permitted.<sup>230</sup> Artists that complied with Stalin's will were greatly rewarded, particularly writers. They were given lavish apartments and received some of the highest pay in the USSR during his rule. This is because Stalin felt they were the "engineers of the soul". <sup>231</sup> The most celebrated art and literature of this period were those works that also served as an instrument of propaganda for the state.

The artists, writers and poets who opposed this new ideal were sent to labor camps. The poet Osip Mandelstam died in one such camp, despite efforts by Anna Akhmatova and Boris Pasternak to intervene on his behalf.<sup>232</sup> Akhmatova's own work was banned as "bourgeois." Even the life-long Marxist playwright, poet and propagandist Vladimir Mayakovsky became disillusioned with Stalinism's artistic restraints and took his own life. The examples of these beloved artists were not uncommon.<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>226</sup>Evans 2004.

<sup>227</sup>Hill and Frank 1986, 131

<sup>228</sup>Edvard Radzinskii, *Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives* (New York: Anchor Books, 1997) 266.

<sup>229</sup>John Gordon Garrard and Carol Garrard, *Inside the Soviet Writers' Union* (Free Press, 1990), 31.

<sup>230</sup>Ibid. 30

<sup>231</sup>Edvard Radzinskii, *Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives* (New York: Anchor Books, 1997) 271.

<sup>232</sup>Ibid. 309-10

<sup>233</sup>Ibid.

The Russian Orthodox Church was another bastion of civil society. Long vilified by the Bolsheviks, the Church saw renewed scrutiny under Stalin. The Church was banned from performing charitable acts, and confined to sermons and sacraments.<sup>234</sup> With the Church diminished, Soviet leaders believed citizens would abandon it. When the plan failed, priests were rounded up, jailed and sometimes executed (Radzinsky 1996, 244). Churches were closed, their property seized. As new cities sprung up, churches were not built with them. Forty-six thousand churches existed prior to 1917. By 1939, only one to two hundred remained (Davis 1995, 13). Those that did exist under strict state oversight.<sup>235</sup>

The Church persisted in this fashion until the Great Patriotic War, when some churches were reopened. But the reigns of the state were only pulled tighter, as the Church became assimilated into the nomenklatura system. The Church was now used as a tool to offer legitimacy to Stalin's rule and policies.<sup>236</sup> But it was unable to independently represent the needs of the people or act in their interests.

By the late 1930s, nearly all aspects of Russian civil society functioned as an appendage of the Soviet state.<sup>237</sup> While it is true that this process began under Lenin, who was said to distrust any organization that wished to be independent, the deathblow was issued under Stalin. The authentic social bonds that could not be found in public spaces, citizens often could not find at home, either.

*Family life.* In times of deep social and political upheaval, family usually turns to one another for comfort and support.<sup>238</sup> But families living in Stalinist Russia could find little comfort at home. The system encouraged family members to report their own kin for anti-Soviet tendencies, remarks and actions.<sup>239</sup> The story of the young kulak Pavlik

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<sup>234</sup>Alfred B. Evans, Laura A. Henry, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, *Russian Civil society: A Critical Assessment* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006) 33.

<sup>235</sup>Alfred B. Evans, Laura A. Henry, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, *Russian Civil society: A Critical Assessment* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006) 34.

<sup>236</sup>Thomas G. Schrand, "The Five-Year Plan for Women's Labour: Constructing Socialism and the 'Double Burden', 1930-1932," *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 8 (December 1999): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/153838>.

<sup>237</sup>Alfred B. Evans, Laura A. Henry, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, *Russian Civil society: A Critical Assessment* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006) 38.

<sup>238</sup>Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995) and other scholars on the topic of social trust discuss this at length.

<sup>239</sup>Achim Siegel, *The Totalitarian Paradigm After the End of Communism: Towards a Theoretical*

Morozov was touted as an exemplar for Soviet youth. Mozorov allegedly discovered that his father, the Chairman of the Village Soviet in the small farming village of Gerasimovka, was forging documents. As a loyal Soviet, young Mozorov reported his father to the GPU (state police). His disapproving family purportedly murdered him for his actions, but were later rounded up and executed themselves for their heinous act. The story (now doubted by historians) was touted by Stalin as a symbol of noble Soviet youth. Monuments were erected in Pavlik's name, songs were sung about him in schools, and poems written of his sacrifice. The message was clear: The Party was more important than family.<sup>240</sup>

Further, if a family member was arrested, this brought shame to the whole family. It was not uncommon for some to disown their accused family in an effort to help themselves and the rest of their family. An excellent account of this in Soviet literature can be found in the book *Sofia Petrovna*, written by Lydia Chukovskaya.<sup>241</sup> Originally written in the 1930s, Chukovskaya hid the work for fear of it being found, knowing it would put her life at risk (Medvedev 1974). It was first published in France in 1965. Though it is a fictional account, the story itself is based on her own experiences and encapsulates family life in the time of the purges.<sup>242</sup>

The novel tells the tale of Sofia Petrovna and her son, who are happily living a successful life in Stalinist Russia. Suddenly, Petrovna's son is accused of subversive behavior and arrested. She cannot believe it. Her son was a model Soviet; a member of the Komsomol and dedicated to Socialism and to Stalin. His picture was shown on the front page of Pravda for his model life. She advocates on her son's behalf to everyone, confident he would be set free once the powers that be realized their "mistake". Petrovna even writes to Stalin, but her letters go unanswered. Meanwhile, Petrovna is talked about at work, and eventually fired. Ostracized, her closest friend commits suicide from the stress.

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*Reassessment*. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998); Donna Bahry and Brian D. Silver, "Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSR," *The American Political Science Review* 81, no. 4 (1987): , doi:10.2307/1962579.

<sup>240</sup>Edvard Radzinskii, *Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives* (New York: Anchor Books, 1997) 257.

<sup>241</sup>Lidiya Korneevna. Chukovska and Aline Werth, *Sofia Petrovna* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997).

<sup>242</sup>Medvedev, Zhores A. "The Attack on Lydia Chukovskaya." *The New York Review of Books*. Accessed April 25, 2017. <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1974/03/07/the-attack-on-lydia-chukovskaya/>.

Life becomes almost unbearable. Then, years later, she finally receives a letter from her son in which he proclaims his innocence. Realizing his case cannot be won, she burns the letter to save herself.<sup>243</sup> Generally speaking, society became hyper-atomized during and after the Great Terror, often shrinking ever inward toward the individual himself.<sup>244</sup> According to Khodyakov,<sup>245</sup> it is within the family unit, as well as the extended family unit, that we first learn to trust. It is through positive experiences with our family that we learn to trust other's in our in-group. When that trust is damaged, particularized trust is shattered. For many living under Stalinism, this was their experience.<sup>footnote</sup> Donna Bahry and Brian D. Silver, "Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSR," *The American Political Science Review* 81, no. 4 (1987): , doi:10.2307/1962579.

Some historians argue that, while the atrocities of the Stalinist period cannot be discounted, the objectives of the period were still achieved. Under this school of thought, had industrialization and collectivization not been pushed through via Stalin's aggressive 5-year plans, Russia would have likely fallen to the Germans during WWII. Society was structured around the common struggle *My storim Kommunizum!* (we are building Communism!) a promise of increased living conditions. For those who bought into the system and were not marked as "enemies of the state" they may have felt the new social contract forged by Stalinism were indeed met. But even this sympathetic interpretation of Stalin's acts cannot dispute the result that his policies had on civil society and trust within the USSR by the time of his death in 1953. Only under Khrushchev, would society come to understand the depths of what had transpired during this time.

## **Khrushchev and a New Political Order.**

After the death of Stalin, and after some power struggles within the Politburo, one of Stalin's *vydvizhentsy*<sup>246</sup>, Nikita Khrushchev, was selected to take his place. He began

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<sup>243</sup>Lidiya Korneevna. Chukovska and Aline Werth, *Sofia Petrovna* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997).

<sup>244</sup>Donna Bahry and Brian D. Silver, "Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSR," *The American Political Science Review* 81, no. 4 (1987): , doi:10.2307/1962579.

<sup>245</sup>Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.

<sup>246</sup> or 'promoted workers'.



the business of restoring order and regaining legitimacy for the system were paramount in his mind, in order to save the Soviet political structure. This required several fronts that required immediate action: 1) destalinization. 2) what to do with the massive number of political prisoners? 3) the looming housing crisis and 4) agricultural reforms.<sup>247</sup> Khrushchev felt his actions were vital for the survival of the Revolution. However, his policies and pursuit of 'mature communism' were met with mixed reviews by the people.<sup>248</sup> He was also faced with an International incident which caused disappointment in more than one corner of society.<sup>249</sup> Social order focused on the development of the New Soviet People through a relatively more open space for discourse and expression, appreciation of the arts and science. Overall, the Thaw was marked by periods of freedom followed by periods of repression, which saw the forced trust system begin to crack.

De-Stalinization. The most striking difference of this time came about most clearly during the 1956 XX Congress "Secret Speech" where Nikita Khrushchev aired the excesses of the elite under Stalin, as well as a limited number of the crimes committed under Stalin's rule; a full confession might cause chaos in more than one corner. It was done so behind closed doors in a session of the Communist Party delegates. He was careful to paint Stalin as the perpetrator of all crimes and everyone under his rule, even the elites, as victims of his tyranny and the system itself correct and successful.<sup>250</sup> Famously coining the word, Khrushchev called the blind adoration of Stalin a 'cult of personality' and outlined the need to stamp this cult from existence and ensure that such a cult of one man could never rise again.

The secret speech was leaked in an attempt to control rumor, it was ordered the speech to be read at every Party meeting throughout the USSR.<sup>251</sup> and sowed confusion from Poland to Moldova to Moscow to Vladivostok.<sup>252</sup> However, for the first time since

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<sup>247</sup>

<sup>248</sup>Ibid.

<sup>249</sup>PROF WILLIAM. TAUBMAN, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (S.I.: SIMON SCHUSTER LTD, 2017), 180.

<sup>250</sup> Karl E. Loewenstein, "Re-emergence of Public Opinion in the Soviet Union: Khrushchev and Responses to the Secret Speech," *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no. 8 (2006)

<sup>251</sup>Ibid.

<sup>252</sup> Kemp-Welch, Tony. "Khrushchev's Secret Speech and Polish Politics." *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 2 (March 1996): 181-206. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/153206>; Karl E. Loewenstein, "Re-emergence of Public Opinion in the Soviet Union: Khrushchev and Responses to the Secret Speech," *Europe-Asia*

the 1920's, public discourse was finally taking place. Fear of arrest was gone, freeing people to have the space to air grievances with the regime and generally engage in public discourse. Local literary groups were the most active in this regard however just about any meetinghouse was a ripe location for community members to meet and discuss what was going on. Public-opinion polls began in earnest to gauge the mood of the people.<sup>253</sup> Rather than deepen legitimacy as was hoped, many in society were skeptical of the limited admission of wrongdoing by Khrushchev, as well as abdicating guilt on the part of party elites. Still others refused to believe any of it and resisted anti-Stalinist rebukes. Many felt it was the bureaucracy standing in the way of 'building communism' and not outside influence from capitalist elements. The elites took from these public debates and polls they needed to focus on repackaging the message for public consumption, just as was done under Stalin, to re-establish order and focus on the building the "New Soviet People." They also became keenly aware of the danger this public discourse had unleashed. As a result, further debated were limited and discussion that was deemed as 'anti-Soviet' was banned from public spaces.<sup>254</sup> People went back to discussions behind closed doors with trusted family or to writing letters to local officials with little success.

*Prisoners.* The death of Stalin left an another major immediate question: What to do about the millions of political prisoners in the gulags? It was well known the overwhelming majority had actually committed no crime, ergo, they must be released.<sup>255</sup> While they understood the moral necessity of release, they feared the political fallout which might occur as the evidence of the horrors of the Great Terror returned into society.<sup>256</sup> How could the elite justify their complicity in the arrest, murder, and incarceration of these people and simultaneously justify their continued role in the power structure? The great

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*Studies* 58, no. 8 (2006): , doi:10.1080/09668130600996572.; Igor Ca'u and Mark Sandle, "Discontent and Uncertainty in the Borderlands: Soviet Moldavia and the Secret Speech 1956-1957," *Europe-Asia Studies* 66, no. 4 (2014): , doi:10.1080/09668136.2014.899768.

<sup>253</sup> Darrell Slider, "Party-Sponsored Public Opinion Research in the Soviet Union," *The Journal of Politics* 47, no. 1 (1985): , doi:10.2307/2131072.

<sup>254</sup> Karl E. Loewenstein, "Re-emergence of Public Opinion in the Soviet Union: Khrushchev and Responses to the Secret Speech," *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no. 8 (2006); Darrell Slider, "Party-Sponsored Public Opinion Research in the Soviet Union," *The Journal of Politics* 47, no. 1 (1985): , doi:10.2307/2131072.

<sup>255</sup> Adler 1999

<sup>256</sup> PROF WILLIAM. TAUBMAN, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (S.I.: SIMON SCHUSTER LTD, 2017), 180.

poetess Anna Akhmatova said during this time, "Now they are trembling for their names, positions, apartments, dachas. The whole calculation was that none would return."<sup>257</sup> The official position was it was necessary to try and right the abuses of the past, while at the same time denying the system had been wrong. However, doing so would call into question the legitimacy of the whole Socialist society and political structure.<sup>258</sup>

Following the "Secret Speech" there was significant improvement on the procedure in identifying and releasing eligible prisoners. However, one lingering issue remained: prisoners did not leave the camps with the necessary certificate of rehabilitation. They had to obtain this of their own accord which could prove to be a difficult task which, in some cases, could take years to obtain. Historian and former *zek*<sup>259</sup> "rehabilitation became a sacred word; the rehabilitation certificate became a sacred document."<sup>260</sup>

Some zeks who were offered a higher level of rehabilitation than others. Those who were formerly privileged Party members often had the luxury of another privileged Party member in good standing willing to intervene on their behalf upon their return and speak for them. Many also received a hero's welcome.<sup>261</sup> This was not the case for the average Russian without such connections; their reality was quite different. Some others were able to circumvent these problems by participating in what became known as the "Khrushchev deal." This was created as a (hallow) method of regaining control over the political order and legitimacy. It was a basic, unspoken system of purchasing silence from released prisoners could gain a greater level of rehabilitation in exchange for their silence. The idea was that many of the prisoners might want to put the horrors of their past behind them. This would also allow the system to have some sense of security there would be less upheaval and questioning of the system resulting from their unjust incarceration. Years of abuse in the gulags tended to make some complacent to this option.<sup>262</sup>

*Housing.* In an effort to make good on unkept Party promises of new housing since

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<sup>257</sup>Ibid.

<sup>258</sup>Ibid. 257

<sup>259</sup>Russian word meaning 'prisoner.'

<sup>260</sup>Adler, Nanci. "Life in the Big Zone: The Fate of Returnees in the Aftermath of Stalinist Repression." *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 1 (1999): 5-19. doi:10.1080/09668139999092.

<sup>261</sup>Ibid.

<sup>262</sup>Ibid.

the Revolution, immediately after consolidating his leadership in July 1957, Khrushchev launched, what was often characterized as, "perhaps the most ambitious governmental housing program in human history."<sup>263</sup> It yielded approximately 34 million units of living space, and more than 126 million people -more than half the country- moved into them.<sup>264</sup> This was in stark contrast to previous Party policy on housing which had minimally attempted to supply every family one room within a large flat. From an empirical point of view, Khrushchev's housing campaign entailed a sweeping transition from *kommunalka*<sup>265</sup> to "single-family" living.<sup>266</sup> Single family apartments had been built during the Stalin era, but they were largely reserved for members of the state and Party elite, or for hero workers.<sup>267</sup> Further, *krushchyokova*<sup>268</sup> were minimalist in nature, as were the new trends in interior design. Khrushchev saw his housing as promoting Soviet egalitarianism contrasting the Stalin era which Khrushchev felt was consumed with individualism and materialism in architecture and design and as such were gaudy and over-done. Susan E. Reid, "Communist Comfort: Socialist Modernism and the Making of Cosy Homes in the Khrushchev Era," *Gender History* 21, no. 3 (2009): , doi:10.1111/j.1468-0424.2009.01564.x.

However, problems with the *krushchyokova* were evident immediately. First, they were too small and cramped for many families. While they came with so-called "luxurious storage rooms", it was often necessary to convert this space into another bedroom. As a result this "bedroom" lacked any ventilation or windows.<sup>269</sup> Overall, the insulation was very poor making the *krushchyokova* drafty- a particular problem during frigid Russian winters. The housing also lacked elevators, unlike Stalin-era housing. This made the lives of elderly citizens difficult if they happened to live on upper floors. Society was generally underwhelmed with what they saw as shoddy and impractical construction and design. While some appreciated individual living space, it was clear the system fell short of reasonable accommodations for the practical needs of everyday family life.

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<sup>263</sup> Reid 2009

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

<sup>265</sup> communal housing.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.

<sup>267</sup> Radzinsky 1996

<sup>268</sup> These were individual flats for each family in apartment blocks given this name after Khrushchev.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid.

*Agriculture and Food.* However, since the 1940s, Khrushchev advocated to help resolve food shortages in the USSR by planting corn. Specifically, the corn project was aimed primarily at producing feed for livestock and end the ongoing shortage. This in turn would produce more meat and milk for the people, making it possible to finally 'catch up' with and 'overtake' America and potentially win the Cold War. His dogged pursuit of corn led to his not so affectionate nick-name of *kukuruznik*.<sup>270</sup> The idea of a Soviet "corn belt" was promoted to meet these goals.<sup>271</sup> An Iowan corn farmer named Roswell Garst sold corn seed to the Soviets and became an informal adviser for Khrushchev.<sup>272</sup> He informed him of the necessity to grow the corn only in the southern regions of Russia stressed the important of pesticides; his advice was largely ignored. It was decided to plant the corn in additional places like Siberia, with a hostile climate, and only fertilizers were used. The result was predictable: the crops failed to produce at levels Khrushchev promised. His 'corn crusade' resulted in a loss of personal legitimacy for the Premier, as well as the state.<sup>273</sup>

A series of other poor decisions were made by Khrushchev in relation to agriculture. The end result was low food supply, ballooning breadlines, and rising cost of food. Outside of Russia proper, these feelings of ineptitude within the state as well as political oppression were most acutely resulting in growing sense of nationalism which would boil over later. Igor Ca'u and Mark Sandle, "Discontent and Uncertainty in the Borderlands: Soviet Moldavia and the Secret Speech 1956-1957," *Europe-Asia Studies* 66, no. 4 (2014): , doi:10.1080/09668136.2014.899768.; Tony Kemp-Welch, "Khrushchev's Secret Speech and Polish Politics," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 2 (March 1996): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/153206>. Food shortages led to riots in East Berlin, as well

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<sup>270</sup>meaning "Corn-Man". Aaron Todd Hale-Dorrell , *KHRUSHCHEV'S CORN CRUSADE: THE INDUSTRIAL IDEAL AND AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE IN THE ERA OF POST-STALIN REFORM, 1953-1964*, PhD diss., Thesis / Dissertation ETD, 2014, accessed April 20, 2017, <https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/indexablecontent/uid:06a2c101-8154-48b5-830f-72b069599282>.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.; Susan E. Reid, "Communist Comfort: Socialist Modernism and the Making of Cosy Homes in the Khrushchev Era," *Gender History* 21, no. 3 (2009): , doi:10.1111/j.1468-0424.2009.01564.x.

<sup>272</sup>Frese 2004

<sup>273</sup> Ibid.; Aaron Todd Hale-Dorrell , *Khrushchev's CORN CRUSADE: THE INDUSTRIAL IDEAL AND AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE IN THE ERA OF POST-STALIN REFORM, 1953-1964*, PhD diss., Thesis / Dissertation ETD, 2014, , accessed April 20, 2017, <https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/indexablecontent/uid:06a2c101-8154-48b5-830f-72b069599282>.

as Hungary and Poland; these were met with an iron fist, despite Khrushchev's promises of their being "many paths to socialism."<sup>274</sup> An October 1956 rebellion in Hungary was brutally crushed resulting in more than 2,500 dead and 13,000 injured. In Russia proper, circumstances were not much better. In June of 1963, a rebellion ensued in the city of Novocherkask; the Soviet Army or the KGB ultimately fired upon demonstrators killing 26 people and injuring 87 more.<sup>275</sup> The violent crack-down, reminiscent of the Stalin-era, caused Khrushchev's public opinion to plummet even further. In order to avoid further upheaval, he was forced to dip into state cash reserved to purchase foodstuffs to restock the Soviet food supply.<sup>276</sup>

*Cuban-Missile Crisis.* The state also lost favor with the people for what was seen as incompetency regarding international relations. The Cuban-missile crisis was seen as being one of the largest blunders of his career. Looking for a way to increase Soviet nuclear power against the US, he devised a plan to place intermediate range missiles in Cuba. Castro agreed to this plan believing that the presence of nuclear missiles on its soil would halt any plans of the US to attempt to invade Cuba. American reconnaissance planes uncovered the missile sites and President Kennedy took action. As tensions on both sides mounted, nuclear war seemed more imminent. Kennedy proposed if the USSR would remove the missiles from Cuba, the US would give their assurance to not invade Cuba.<sup>277</sup> Khrushchev entered into an agreement with Kennedy and used the US promise regarding Cuba as a show that he won the battle. However, most Russians did not see it that way; they felt this was a show of weakness and evidence he allowed the US to dictate terms to him regarding their own national security.<sup>278</sup> During Stalin, citizens felt the state was externally strong and able to protect them from external threats, though weak because they were unable to provide adequate internal security or political goods.

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<sup>274</sup> 1953 and '56, respectively. Geoffrey Pridham, *Building democracy: the international dimension of democratisation in Eastern Europe* (London : Leicester University Press, 1997), 136.

<sup>275</sup> Who began firing is hotly debated. 3 of the injured later died of their wounds. Geoffrey Hosking, *A History of the Soviet Union: 1917-1991* (London: Fontana press, 1992).

<sup>276</sup> Stephen J. Frese, "Comrade Khrushchev and Farmer Garst: East-West Encounters Foster Agricultural Exchange," *The History Teacher* 38, no. 1 (November 2004):.

<sup>277</sup> James H. Hansen, "Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis," Central Intelligence Agency, June 27, 2008, , accessed October 25, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no1/article06.html>.

<sup>278</sup> Ibid.

It would be Khrushchev's overall impression of ineptitude by the elite that would result in his 'retirement' from the office of general secretary in 1964.<sup>279</sup>

### **Khrushchev and a New Social Order.**

Khrushchev's policies had a resulting impact on the social order of the post-Stalinist era in several ways. First, thinking back to release of prisoners, upon their return they might face neighbors or family members who condemned them. Many in society were faced with a problem: they, like the elites, were expected to face the people they were accused when it was expected the *zeks* would never return. This created unease and a mutually decided upon segregation and mistrust amongst the two populations in society. Citizens who were not prisoners did their best to separate themselves from *zeks*, as they were a reminder of a terrible past everyone wished to forget. Similarly, *zeks* generally found it difficult to re-assimilate into society because they felt no one -not even their own families- would be able to understand what they had experienced, nor did they want them to. *Zeks* had difficulty assimilating on all fronts. While the official position was that *zeks* were to be compensated two months of their previous salary and have first priority for housing, this was often difficult to obtain, in part because the prisoners themselves were not aware of their rights. For those that were they sometimes encountered officials who were also genuinely unaware of these rights, as well. Further, they often had difficulty finding employment. While they were not required to tell employers of their former-prisoner status, their documents were often marked with travel limitations: a classic hallmark of the formerly accused.<sup>280</sup> However, for those *zeks* who were fortunate enough to find sanctuary in their family units, a different life was now possible. Society was beginning to reforge highly localized trust networks surrounding kinship which could again provide security and stability. This was a time in which strong family units were seen as the foundation for building a strong Communist state.

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<sup>279</sup> This was the official line, though he was indeed ousted. Donald J. Raleigh, "Russia's Favorite: Reevaluating the Rule of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev 1964-82," *Russian Studies in History* 52, no. 4 (2014): , doi:10.2753/rsh1061-1983520400.

<sup>280</sup> Nanci Adler, "Life in the Big Zone: The Fate of Returnees in the Aftermath of Stalinist Repression," *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 1 (1999): , doi:10.1080/096681399999092.

*Family Life.* Perhaps most importantly, the Thaw made family's homes a safe place once again. Soviet society was again based on highly localized trust surrounding kinship which could again provide security and stability where one could speak freely about life, politics, or seek help in difficult times.<sup>281</sup> Family connections during this time helped place one's trust orientation to other people. When the system was unable to provide the goods or services you needed, asking family members for help or assistance was always a reliable place to start. Interpersonal or particularized trust is the core of the vast social networks that were revived during the Thaw and persisted beyond the collapse of the Soviet regime. This was only made possible by the release of strictures to the family unit, a drastic reduction in the use of fear and terror to and within family units and the virtual elimination of the former policy of family informing. Overall, the era exemplified by the XX Congress was distinguished by the dismantling of Stalinist terror and authoritarianism creating the space for citizens to take chances on outside others and forge relationships to bridge across to unknown out-groups.<sup>282</sup>

*Blat' networks.* *Blat'* networks channeled an alternative currency "an informal exchange of favors" that introduced elements of the market into the planned economy and loosened up the rigid constraints of the political regime.<sup>283</sup> This practice blended within society to such depths that one came to expect *blat'*, as either a giver or receiver, from their circle of friends, family and acquaintances. On short, it was a social norm. The societal boundaries became particularly fuzzy as many favors were favors of a particular kind, i.e.: "favors of access." Examples include bribes, barter, entrepreneurship and small enterprise or cottage industry and became a needed tool to 'get things done' in Soviet society.<sup>284</sup> These exchanges took place at within all levels of trust and was a product of the state's inability to deliver political goods.

At the institutional level, *blat'* was also practiced among so-called "Red managers"<sup>285</sup>

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<sup>281</sup>Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.

<sup>282</sup>Donna Bahry and Brian D. Silver, "Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSR," *The American Political Science Review* 81, no. 4 (1987): , doi:10.2307/1962579.

<sup>283</sup>Alena V. Ledeneva, *How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business* (Cornell University Press, 2006), 4.

<sup>284</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>285</sup> or Soviet factory managers.



in order to compensate for the shortfall in goods or raw materials needed from the state to complete their tasks and or production quotas.<sup>286</sup> While -overall- the government tolerated *blat*, engaging in this system was still seen as risky requiring high-levels of trust in the other. If the state discovered they were trading goods and or services - even to cover shortfalls- they risked arrest or punishment. As a result, building and maintaining trust within these non-official relationships was absolutely vital.<sup>287</sup> These connections made between managers became a form of generalized trust. This is because they were not forming connections with the institutions themselves, but each person in their individual capacity in a series of "side-deals." As the years progress and the system begins to fissure, dependency on these informal networks will increase.<sup>288</sup>

Generalized and particularized trust often times were intertwined. This is because connections were often first made amongst family members to acquaintances outside of their own circle or in-group. Within this informal system, intermediaries were extremely important. Whether you were the intermediary or you were in search of one, reputation was vital. Establishing a good reputation as 'a person with connections', as the connection itself, or as a recipient meant you were better able to feed your family in times of hardship or make your life more comfortable through the purchase of such items as theater tickets.<sup>289</sup> Frequently, the connection holding access to the goods or services one needed had absolutely no kin relation to one's self and could even include people outside one's own ethnicity.<sup>290</sup> This lends further credence to the legitimacy of both strong and weak ties, breaking the "social divide" as they relate to social trust in post-Stalin Soviet society. These trust networks extended out into Soviet civil society, as well.

*Civil Society.* The concept of the "New Soviet People"<sup>291</sup> was introduced and rein-

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<sup>286</sup>Darrell Slider, "Party-Sponsored Public Opinion Research in the Soviet Union," *The Journal of Politics* 47, no. 1 (1985): , doi:10.2307/2131072.

<sup>287</sup>Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" *Social Research* 76, no. 1 (2009): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146>.

<sup>288</sup>Larissa Adler Lomnitz and Dianar Sheinbaum, "Trust, Social Networks and the Informal Economy: A Comparative Analysis," *Review of Sociology* 10, no. 1 (2005): , doi:10.1556/RevSoc.10.2004.1.1.

<sup>289</sup>Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" *Social Research* 76, no. 1 (2009): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146>.

<sup>290</sup>Donna Bahry et al., "Ethnicity and Trust: Evidence from Russia," *The American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (November 2005): , <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/stable/30038962>.

<sup>291</sup> this was a Soviet people focused on building Communism, love for arts, culture, science, work, and education.

forced in school, as well as popular literature, movies, arts, and civil society. Though still controlled by the state, groups such as the Komsomols, labor unions and guilds were given much more freedom to create ideas, and to interact with one another, and act on behalf individuals within their groups.<sup>292</sup> Leaders became extreme adept at circumnavigating the system in order to get what they wanted or needed by working within the system rather than against it. This was accomplished, in part, via blat' using their connections within government, or made connections through intermediaries.<sup>293</sup>

Society also saw a relaxation of the binds that were previously placed on the arts seen most clearly through a resurgence in the arts and literature which was severely repressed under Stalin. The XX Congress broke many of the taboos which previously existed regarding the expression and discussion of the horrors of the gulags. Themes regarding the gulags and anti-Stalin sentiments began to pour into literature, memoirs, film and literature. Once banned books and writers were rehabilitated. Many of whom were rehabilitated posthumously.<sup>294</sup>

Literature and art from the Thaw period became an important outlet to vent the horrors of Stalinism and illuminate weaknesses in the system overall. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's work, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* was one which received immediate acclaim. The power of Solzhenitsyn's writing comes from his own imprisonment from 1945-1953. Never before had such a revealing tale of life in the gulags been available for public consumption. *One Day* was harsh in its criticism of the Stalinist forced labor system. The brutal details which clearly outlined the reality of prisoner life captivated many who read it. Controversial poetess Anna Akhmatova's work was being published again after a ban under Stalin. Having been a victim of the Stalin's purges as well, her poems wreaked of the agony, fatalism, despair, and hope so many in society were feeling.

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<sup>292</sup>Gleb Tsipursky, "Conformism and Agency: Model Young Communists and the Komsomol-Press in the Later Khrushchev Years, 1961-1964," *Europe-Asia Studies* 65, no. 7 (2013): , doi:10.1080/09668136.2013.824140. This was true for children in the Young Pioneers as well, see: J. W. Hahn, "The Komsomol Kollektiv as an Agency of Political Socialization," *Youth Society* 1, no. 2 (1969): , doi:10.1177/0044118x6900100206.; Evans 2004.

<sup>293</sup>Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with 'Blat': Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" *Social Research* 76, no. 1 (2009): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146>.

<sup>294</sup>Larissa Adler Lomnitz and Dianar Sheinbaum, "Trust, Social Networks and the Informal Economy: A Comparative Analysis," *Review of Sociology* 10, no. 1 (2005): , doi:10.1556/RevSoc.10.2004.1.1.

Overall, her work is largely seen a subversive and sometimes outright attack on the Soviet system.

However, the overwhelming popularity of such literature, particularly among the youth began to create problem for the government as people began to protest or publicly speak their minds about the contradictions and hypocrisy they felt existed in the system.<sup>295</sup> This resulted in a form of institutional remorse where the government again created strictures reigning in artistic and literary expression.<sup>296</sup> A famous example of this over compensation can be seen in Boris Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago*, which was unjustly seen as subversive and critical of the system.<sup>297</sup>

Dissent was on the rise, particularly among the youth and intellectuals. The Thaw, and subsequent de-Stalinization, merely served to expose the inherent contradictions and corruptness of the system. Informal groups and networks, or *kompanii*, began to take the place of formal groups, such as the state controlled Young Communist League, or Komsomol. They showed particular lack luster enthusiasm for organized events, were derelict in their duties, or presented 'deep apathy.'<sup>298</sup> Expectations were rising out of this liberalization, ala deTocqueville,<sup>299</sup> and the state failed the anticipate or meet these expectations at every turn. The youth that grew up under the Thaw and would later become the elite would be heavily influenced by this period. But for now, they remained stymied.

## **Brezhnev: reassertion of state power and stability.**

Lenoid I. Brezhnev, another of Stalin's *ydvizhentsy*, was chosen by the Central Committee to take the office of the General Secretary. Political order was in a relative state of chaos, as such, he felt it was his duty to restore order from the top down. His plan was

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<sup>295</sup> Jeremi Suri, "The Promise and Failure of 'Developed Socialism' The Soviet 'Thaw' and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964-1972," *Contemporary European History* 15, no. 2 (May 2006):.

<sup>296</sup>Ibid.

<sup>297</sup> Later, Khrushchev will admit he never read the book an regretted heavily not allowing it to be printed. Once he did read it, he proclaimed there was nothing subversive or critical about the book at all. Tubman 2004

<sup>298</sup> Jeremi Suri, "The Promise and Failure of 'Developed Socialism' The Soviet 'Thaw' and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964-1972," *Contemporary European History* 15, no. 2 (May 2006):.

<sup>299</sup> Alexis De Tocqueville and John Bonner, *The Ancien Regime* (London: Dent, 1988), 222.

called 'developed socialism'. Ironically, it was a movement away from the hyper-focus on development and outpacing capitalist states, and a focus on 'forced maturity' and stability.<sup>300</sup> The Politburo felt the Thaw must continue, but do so in a more controlled way. Overall, its goal was buttressing Soviet power via controlled release of state repression, as well as complete control over domestic affairs, though offered mixed results. This was also a time in which the state saw great gains in security assets and military production which resulted in gains in political legitimacy.

### **Brezhnev: Political Order.**

Much of the political order was defined by the "Brezhnev Doctrine." It is not an official law but rather a stated guiding principle for how to approach the growing unrest, particularly in the Eastern-bloc. It was outlined in the Soviet run state newspaper Pravda:

There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path of development....<sup>301</sup>This means that every Communist party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement... Each Communist party is free to apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialism in its own country, but it cannot deviate from these principles (if, of course, it remains a Communist party). In concrete terms this means primarily that no Communist party can fail to take into account in its activities such a decisive fact of our time as the struggle between the two antithetical social systems-capitalism and socialism. This struggle is an objective fact that does not depend on the will of people and is conditioned by the division of the world into the two antithetical social systems.

The Brezhnev Doctrine can be analyzed in two main parts: The latitude given to the regions in governing their own affairs and pursuing Socialism how they saw fit, as well

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<sup>300</sup> Jeremi Suri, "The Promise and Failure of 'Developed Socialism' The Soviet 'Thaw' and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964-1972," *Contemporary European History* 15, no. 2 (May 2006):.

<sup>301</sup> Referring to Khrushchev's notion of many paths to socialism...

attempting to do so within structures the state deemed fit. For example, Brezhnev sought to rebuild relationships with party leaders in the regions; not with the political institutions themselves but through personal trust relations. To this end, Brezhnev adopted the policy of *doveire k kadram*, or 'trust in cadres.'<sup>302</sup> This was done, in part by awarding medals and honors to regional party leaders, to which they returned in kind, or personally visiting leaders when they experienced a death in the family. 'Trust in cadres' manifested in a near free-reign policy given to local First Secretaries, so long as they maintained positive relations with Brezhnev, and acted within the larger Socialist order, and was employed with varying degrees of success.<sup>303</sup>

Brezhnev felt strongly the way to strengthen political legitimacy was to open trade in a limited fashion to import goods that have been developed elsewhere, particularly in Western Europe. He also promoted this idea to allies in the Eastern Bloc, as he felt this was the simplest method of gaining immediate access to high-technology, but also to ease the financial stresses facing the USSR. It was also somewhat contradictory to the Brezhnev Doctrine calling for a renewed understanding of the divisions between capitalist economies and socialist ones.<sup>304</sup> Further, this 'market socialism' was a clear departure from the hyper-focus on playing developmental 'catch-up' that occurred under both Stalin and Khrushchev. Nonetheless, this left the country's numerous scientists and engineers little room or permission to innovate. This pivot towards the West began immediately as did the improvement of relations with West Germany, referred to as *Ostpolitik*, and resulted in a further ratcheting down of tensions and hostilities, or *dnt*. Strictures were also released on Eastern Bloc satellites flow of liquid capital from the West. Reversing Stalin's strict refusal of Western capital or loans from the Marshall plan, Brezhnev understood the stability of the Soviet economic structure was in immediate peril and the influx of cash was needed.<sup>305</sup> He also pursued *dnt* with the United States; though

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<sup>302</sup> Yoram Gorlizki, "Too Much Trust: Regional Party Leaders and Local Political Networks under Brezhnev," *Slavic Review* 69, no. 03 (2010): , doi:10.1017/s0037677900012195.

<sup>303</sup>Ibid.

<sup>304</sup> Jeremi Suri, "The Promise and Failure of 'Developed Socialism' The Soviet 'Thaw' and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964-1972," *Contemporary European History* 15, no. 2 (May 2006):.

<sup>305</sup> Interestingly, Brezhnev justified this action because he, and others in the elite, felt Capitalism was at the brink. However, the Carter justified these loans based on the idea, given to him by his NSA, that 'steady pressure' would result in the ultimate collapse of the Eastern Bloc from Soviet control. Patrick

this included only modest increases in exports to avoid criticism from other communist states and retain legitimacy.<sup>306</sup>

From the point of view of political and economic net gains, Brezhnev's policies did bring needed goods and money into the system, in turn, making it possible for the state to deliver on promises of political goods to its citizens. Living standards rose significantly. People could now afford to purchase a car, more household appliances, as well as televisions and telephones. Food lines shortened then vanished, stores were stocked, factories were adequately supplied.<sup>307</sup> This relative influx of political goods fostered higher levels of trust and confidence in the state. Some experts at the time believed history would look back favorably on the Brezhnev era and deem it the most successful of the Soviet era. This prediction has borne fruit; indeed, this period is often reflected upon even today with great nostalgia, but mostly among Russian citizens. This will be discussed more in the coming sections.

Ultimately, the de-emphasis on innovation and reliance on imports only hurt the Soviet economy, resulting in stagnation.<sup>308</sup> This is marked, in part, by both the need to import grain in from the U.S. 1975 after bad harvests, as well as the decline in the industrial growth rate which plummeted to its lowest point in some fifty years.<sup>309</sup> Though the production rate in industry (especially steel, petrol), as well as agriculture largely recovered by 1980, increased demands of inefficient central planning were unable to cope. Citizens seeing their lifestyles improving, suddenly saw them level off or drop.<sup>310</sup>

Once again, society in both the professional and personal realms turned to their *blat*' networks in attempts to fill the gaps, even if it meant stealing from the state: in the eyes of the average citizen, the real crime would be to steal from one another. The state was failing in their duties to provide, as such, it should be expected.<sup>311</sup> Reliance

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Vaughan, "BEYOND BENIGN NEGLECT: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AND THE POLISH CRISIS OF 1980," *The Polish Review* 44, no. 1 (1999): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25779091>.

<sup>306</sup> Donald J. Raleigh, "Soviet Man of Peace: Leonid Ilich Brezhnev and His Diaries," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 17, no. 4 (2016): , doi:10.1353/kri.2016.0051.

<sup>307</sup>Ibid.

<sup>308</sup> Geoffrey Pridham, *Building democracy: The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe* (London : Leicester University Press, 1997), 110.

<sup>309</sup>Ibid.

<sup>310</sup>Ibid.

<sup>311</sup> Donald J. Raleigh, "Soviet Man of Peace: Leonid Ilich Brezhnev and His Diaries," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 17, no. 4 (2016): , doi:10.1353/kri.2016.0051.

on the 'second economy' and cottage industries increased; the black and grey markets flourished. Corruption and bribery also rose, reinforcing the belief bureaucracy was, at best, inefficient, and at worst incapable. It also betrayed the need to circumvent official channels to get the stuff of everyday life done. Overall, many citizens still felt their material lives were better than they were even ten years previous.

At the same time, Brezhnev sought to focus on 'scientific and technological' advances rather than moving the whole of society towards 'developing communism' as Khrushchev had. This seemed to have an effect on society as a whole. Under Khrushchev, all peoples were said officially to have a part in 'building Communism'; it was seen as a collective struggle. Under Brezhnev, this struggle was only reserved for those citizens with the scientific and technological know-how, leaving out whole swaths of society from the equation of 'developed socialism.'<sup>312</sup> And one of the main areas of focus was state preparedness and security.

*Security.* Though Brezhnev sought dnte with the West, this did not preclude a focus on military industry and preparedness, an area the USSR has some comparative advantage.<sup>313</sup> Soviets were largely willing to accept economic hardships if security was the net return. The global prestige of being a citizen of a superpower was a great source of pride for Russians of the day. Adam Ulam states:

"The Soviet patriot believes that the function of the state is to be as powerful as possible. He remembers that tsarist Russia was defeated in World War I; now his country is one of the two greatest influences in the entire world. This is a sort of surrogate for his sufferings. Whatever else it has done to him, Communism has made Russia a much more powerful country." "A Fortress State In Transition Brezhnev's legacy: stability, security and—perhaps—stagnation.," *Time*, June 23, 1980.

Under Brezhnev, the state increased production of military assets and expanded its ar-

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*rations in Russian and Eurasian History* 17, no. 4 (2016): , doi:10.1353/kri.2016.0051.\*

<sup>312</sup> Graeme Gill, "Political Symbolism and the Fall of the USSR," *Europe-Asia Studies* 65, no. 2 (February 2013): , <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2012.759714>.

<sup>313</sup>Ibid.

senal. While the state was amassing more weapons stockpiles, the winds of nationalism were blowing across the Soviet periphery.

## **Brezhnev: Social Order.**

The tensions brewing in the Eastern Bloc were percolating just under the surface. While both Khrushchev and Brezhnev crushed rebellions, the underlying problem only retreated in order to regroup. Nationalism was expanding. The social order under Brezhnev was beginning to show nascent civil society, particularly in the regions of Eastern Europe. Growing dissatisfaction with the system, as well as growing nationalism spurred these movements. While there were a series of riots and civil unrest across the empire at different points during Brezhnev's rule,

footnote Donald J. Raleigh, "Russia's Favorite: Reevaluating the Rule of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev 1964-82," *Russian Studies in History* 52, no. 4 (2014): , doi:10.2753/rsh1061-1983520400. two main events would exemplify this period: The Prague Spring and the Polish Crisis.

The Prague Spring. As in Russia, there was a decrease in mandatory participation in state programs among the youth, particularly in the military. The discontent that led to this ennui and peaceful but visible agitation turned into criticism of General Secretary Novotny and the party elites. Students and intellectuals began making demands for reform. Dubcek, the First Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party (CCP), joined in these critiques and reasoned a less dictatorial move forward was the only option forward for peace and stability. Brezhnev agreed, though did not formally choose sides. Ultimately, as troubles intensified, Dubcek was given the position of General Secretary of the CCP and a period of 'controlled' liberalization began.<sup>314</sup> Though Dubcek gave multiple assurances to Brezhnev the situation would not spiral out of control as it did in Hungary in 1956, the amount of liberalization was worrisome to party elites back in Moscow. In the end, they convinced him the Spring had gone too far: allow it to stay its course or risk the collapse of the whole system.

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<sup>314</sup>Ibid.



After the Communist Party in Ukraine contacted Moscow out of fear the unrest would spread there, Brezhnev was placed in a corner. He, reluctantly, ordered the invasion of Prague in 1968 to erase the notion of socialism with "a human face."<sup>315</sup> Czechoslovakia was invaded by some 20 Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions totaling some 250,000, as well as 10 division from Poland, Hungary, and Eastern Germany for added effect. While they could not fight back militarily, the people bound together through networks of neighbors and friends, as well as strangers, and resisted for additional ten months through non-violent means.<sup>316</sup> The invasion only deepened the lack of trust in the Soviet system, particularly among some of the peoples of other satellite nations, and increased nationalist sentiments.<sup>317</sup>

*The Polish Crisis.* U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served under the Carter Administration warned of potential unrest in Eastern Europe. This was especially true, he felt, in his homeland of Poland, noting active civil societies gaining independence from the state.<sup>318</sup> Indeed, rising costs of food resulted in a massive labor strike in 1980 headed by Lech Walesa, a common electrician turned trade-union activist and *Solidarnosc* (Solidarity) head, and the Catholic Church in Poland. The Polish government met the revolts with a willingness to reform and increase liberalization. Solidarity was given the official seal of the Polish government to be an independent labor union with full rights to strike.<sup>319</sup> Concerns spread from East Germany to Moscow over the implications of the Solidarity victory. The message of this grassroots worker's rebellion would definitely spread via radio programs *The Voice of America*, and *Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty* and could mean, according to the head of the East German party Erich Hornecker, 'the death of socialist Poland' was 'imminent.'<sup>320</sup>

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<sup>315</sup> Donald J. Raleigh, "Russia's Favorite: Reevaluating the Rule of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev 1964-82," *Russian Studies in History* 52, no. 4 (2014): , doi:10.2753/rsh1061-1983520400.; Jeremi Suri, "The Promise and Failure of 'Developed Socialism' The Soviet 'Thaw' and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964-1972," *Contemporary European History* 15, no. 2 (May 2006):.

<sup>316</sup>Ibid.

<sup>317</sup>Ibid.

<sup>318</sup> Patrick Vaughan, "BEYOND BENIGN NEGLECT: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AND THE POLISH CRISIS OF 1980," *The Polish Review* 44, no. 1 (1999): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25779091>.

<sup>319</sup> W. Loth, "Moscow, Prague and Warsaw: Overcoming the Brezhnev Doctrine," *Cold War History* 1, no. 2 (2001): , doi:10.1080/713999924.

<sup>320</sup>Ibid

However, given the size of the revolt, and the stretched resources of the Soviet system, both economic and militarily, Brezhnev, was not keen on intervention.<sup>321</sup> KGB head and Brezhnev advisor insisted action would not be possible even if it meant Poland would fall from Soviet control. Despite repeated pleas from the Polish First Secretary Jaruzelski, Moscow refused to send in troops to bring the Solidarity movement under control leaving it for the First Secretary to manage alone; Brezhnev informed him, if he was going to act, the time was now or never. Moscow abandoned Jaruzelski out of fear of bloodshed, as well as the idea that Socialism could not be saved through the use of force. Further still, Soviet leadership felt it was vitally important to uphold the detente with the West.<sup>322</sup> In the end, it would be Jaruzelski who would declare martial law in 1981 in an attempt to bring the movement to its knees. Polish society, like Czechoslovakia before it, retreated again into itself, turning to one another in order to regroup, with renewed distrust of the state. Jaruzelski won the 'battle' of '81 under Brezhnev only to lose the upcoming 'war' of '89 under the 'young' prot of Yuri Andropov: Mikhail Gorbachev.

### **Gorbachev's reforms and the roll of trust in the Soviet collapse.**

By the late 1980s, the centralized Soviet economy was in dire straits. In 1985, moderate Politburo apparatchik Mikhail Gorbachev rose to become the new General Secretary of the Communist Party. Keenly aware the Union was cracking under the pressures of the Cold War and the weak Centrally Planned Economy, Gorbachev set out to reform the system, in order to preserve it. But Gorbachev's reform initiatives, *glasnost*<sup>323</sup> and *perestroika*,<sup>324</sup> would ultimately sow the seeds of the Union's own destruction. Another complicating factor was the growing nationalism across the eastern bloc and the trans caucuses, that would seal its fate. <sup>325</sup>

*Glasnost*'. Once the new policy of *glasnost*' was implemented, the people of the

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<sup>321</sup>Ibid.

<sup>322</sup> W. Loth, "Moscow, Prague and Warsaw: Overcoming the Brezhnev Doctrine," *Cold War History* 1, no. 2 (2001): , doi:10.1080/713999924.

<sup>323</sup>openness freedom of speech and more open channels with in the government to promote some transparency

<sup>324</sup> restructuring- economic reforms

<sup>325</sup>Mark R. Beissinger, "Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism," *Contemporary European History* 18, no. 3 (2009): , doi:doi:10.1017/S0960777309005074.

USSR felt emboldened to unleash grievances in a manner they had not been able to since the beginning of the Khrushchev era. While initially met with some skepticism out of fear of blowback that was a hallmark of earlier periods of so-called openness, eventually, Soviet society came to understand the seriousness of this movement.<sup>326</sup> Empowered, they began to openly criticized even the foundations of the system itself. Gorbachev himself was not immune, though it was his own policies that allowed this openness to take place. News and information was flooding in from the West and the Russian press was also given freedoms. A free press meant, together with a free society, the system could be held to account for promises not kept.

cope with this level of openness. This is best exemplified by the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986, and subsequent local attempts at cover-up. Local officials were concerned about the ramifications they would face for the disaster; it was a legitimate concern based on past experiences with the regime. However, once he was finally briefed on the full extent of this event, Gorbachev took swift action, including allowing international assistance, collaboration, as well as investigations into the crisis itself at all levels. Central to the notion of *perestroika* was *glasnost*'. Everything, all reforms, flowed from this premise; the state, he insisted must be open to pluralism,<sup>327</sup> new ideas, and even criticism if Socialism was indeed to ever survive. It must be built, he felt, on a solid ground of legitimacy and faith in the system. This was a very stark departure from what one would have expected to see in previous eras, where internal conflicts, upheavals, and disasters would have been completely covered up and concealed from the outside world.<sup>328</sup> Nonetheless, the tragedy exposed the extent of the crumbling infrastructure on the world stage and at home. The loss of life and the initial cover-up resulted in a loss of trust in the system.Ibid.

*Perestroika*. When Gorbachev had assumed the helm of the USSR, the economy was in

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<sup>326</sup>Ibid.

<sup>327</sup> This was also a dramatic change because before this moment, the general regurgitated line was only the Party could represent the collective. Divergent opinions or suggestions, or voices, were not only not allowed, they simply were not necessary.

<sup>328</sup>Diane Koenker and Ronald D. Bachman, *Revelations from the Russian archives: documents in English translation* (Washington: Library of Congress, 1997), 501.

crisis mode, despite his attempts to color it as "pre-crisis."<sup>329</sup> The concept of perestroika was not a new paradigm for the general secretary and he cultivated it carefully over time. It was initially conceived by him, before his tenure began, in a vague manner focusing mostly on changes in the psychology of the collective; this allowed the space for it to be interpreted in any number of directions. As time progressed, he synthesized current economic realities with the need for new attitudinal approaches, making the direction of perestroika much more defined. Gorbachev was convinced that a transformation to a nationalized economy, with targeted elements of capitalist enterprise, and a restructuring of the system to reflect these changes, was the right path to strengthen collectivism and, in turn, the Russian people. As the policy was implemented, it continued to morph into what he referred to as *revolutionary perestroika*,<sup>330</sup> towards an even more liberated economy, and even towards greater "democratization",<sup>331</sup> despite the best efforts of hardliners in the Party. He strongly advocated *uskoreniye*<sup>332</sup> of economic reforms. To this end his vision described a return to Leninist NEP which was widely supported by the people;<sup>333</sup> further, he advocated for the so-called "500 Days" plan to convert the centralized economy to a market orientation in less than two years. Gorbachev felt this was the only way to strengthen the socialist economy. He promised limited private property, enterprise, and limited private ownership of the means of production, particularly in agriculture.<sup>334</sup> Further, he promised these reforms would deliver a tangible difference for the people. In the end, his reforms did not produce as quickly as he was promised.

During the 19th Party Congress, he advocated, and won the support of the delegates to create a new legislative body called the Congress of People's Deputies. This was a body that would be elected directly by the people, insisting the Party would still play a centralized role. Regardless, this was another revolutionary action. For the first time in the history of the USSR, it was suggested the Party and the system itself, win the

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<sup>329</sup> Bhary 1993

<sup>330</sup> Donna Bahry, "Society transformed? Rethinking the social roots of perestroika," *Slavic Review* 52, no. 3 (1993):.

<sup>331</sup> In the Socialist understanding of the word, not the Western understanding.

<sup>332</sup> acceleration

<sup>333</sup> Ibid.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid.

confidence of the people as exemplified in open and free elections, rather than the legitimacy and confidence be assumed. This gave his discussion of pluralism more meaning, and suggested other parties, besides *the Party*, might have answers or solutions as to the future of the people and the system. Another structural change was the creation of the office of "President", a role Gorbachev assumed in March 1990. He then reaffirmed and strengthened the notion the Party must win over the public if it wished to have a role in the future of the state, though legitimacy through election was not a requirement for he saw necessary for himself.<sup>335</sup> This came to an end in 1991, when Boris Yeltsin became the first popularly elected President in Russian history, creating 2 parallel governments. Yeltsin and Gorbachev were forced to share their power, with Yeltsin as President and Gorbachev as Soviet Premier.<sup>336</sup>

## **Gorbachev's reforms and Social Order.**

At the core of both glasnost' and perestroika was a call or greater public participation and grassroots action. This was something the people of the USSR and sphere gladly took up, though not as Gorbachev envisioned. Until this point, uprisings had taken place in a single country at a time. Seweryn Bialer sagely predicted, "They will not be so lucky in the '80s."<sup>337</sup> Meanwhile, the kindling of the dissolution of the Soviet Union had already been ignited. It started in the relatively far-flung client states of the Soviet Union throughout the Eastern Bloc. The Center stopped providing subsidies to the periphery, accelerating the rate at which market reform was necessary. Once again, people turned to their social networks to help fill the gaps, or to create new enterprises in an effort to support their families. Ibid The problems soon spread across the Soviet Union like a contagion. It began in 1987, in the Baltic region, when the government of Estonia demanded autonomy. The other two Baltic republics, Lithuania and Latvia, soon followed. Gorbachev was trapped; his situation mirrored that of his mentor Andropov's

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<sup>335</sup> Richard D. Anderson, "Discourse and Strategic Continuity from Gorbachev through Putin," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 46, no. 1 (2013): , doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.07.016.

<sup>336</sup> Ibid.

<sup>337</sup> Richard D. Anderson, "Discourse and Strategic Continuity from Gorbachev through Putin," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 46, no. 1 (2013): , doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.07.016.

in 1968. He could not move against these rogue republics without military force; doing so would, not only jeopardized Gorbachev's western support, it would contradict his own policy of glasnost'. Moscow was silent.<sup>338</sup>

A ground swelling of popular revolt burst forth. The Berlin Wall was literally torn apart by the people of East Berlin sending a then KGB operative, Vladimir Putin, running for his life.<sup>339</sup> Civil society regrouped and Solidarity rose again, seizing power in Poland. The people were banding together in these so-called "low-trust" and atomized societies to demand their rights, something the prevailing school of thought would deem impossible. The power of the Central Authority was paralyzed; they refused to intervene in these uprisings or aid local Party apparatchiks, instead trying to hold steady in Moscow.<sup>340</sup>

The other shoe dropped in August of 1991. In a desperate move to save the Soviet system, a group of Communist Party hardliners organized a *coup d'état*, kidnapping Gorbachev. They announced on state television that he was no longer fit to govern because he was ill. Russia spiraled into chaos as *Swan Lake* was being broadcasted over the airwaves. as was typical under the Soviet system when some unhappy event had taken place. *My Perestroika*, etc. Protests were organized in Moscow, Leningrad, and several other major cities of the Soviet Union. President Yeltsin, now acted to protect Gorbachev from the Communist *coup*. In a move that has been seared in to the minds of people across the world, Yeltsin climbed atop a tank aimed at the protestors in front of the Russian "White House", he called on them to resist en masse. Taking a bull horn, he called out, "Soldiers, officers, generals! The clouds of terror and dictatorship are gathering over the whole country. They must not be allowed to bring eternal night!"<sup>341</sup> He hailed himself as the "Guardian of Democracy." Crowds swelled to over 100,000 angry Russians. The soldiers themselves rebelled, saying that they could not fire on their fellow countrymen. After

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<sup>338</sup> Vladimir Putin, *First Person* (London: Hutchinson, 2000).

<sup>339</sup> Ibid.

<sup>340</sup> Mary Elise Sarotte, "Putin's view of power was formed watching East Germany collapse | Mary Sarotte," *The Guardian*, October 01, 2014, , accessed May 25, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/01/putin-power-east-germany-russia-kgb-dresden>.

<sup>341</sup> John-Thor Dahlburg, "Soviet Right Tightens Its Grip : Troops Deployed; Some Defy Coup Leaders : Kremlin crisis: Yeltsin calls for a nationwide strike. Outraged citizens rally at the Russian government headquarters.," *Los Angeles Times*, August 20, 1991, , accessed March 25, 2017, [http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-20/news/mn-12341\\_russian-government.l](http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-20/news/mn-12341_russian-government.l)

three days of relentless protests, realizing they were powerless without military support, the coup organizers surrendered.<sup>342</sup> The people were still reeling from the high for the "August Days" and had flung their support behind the democrats. Reading the mood of the people and seeing no other political alternative, he resigned his post December 25th, 1991. By January of 1992, the USSR had collapsed. Communism was an ideology based on economic dialectics. From beginning, the struggle of the collective for a perceived end goal of economic and social equality for all. *My storim Kommunizum*<sup>343</sup> was the heart of the collective idea. Stalin said it could be measured by how the lives of everyone were improving and it was he who made the conditions possible. Once Khrushchev's knee-capped the Stalinist legacy, and focus was shifted to the Party rather than just one man. Ergo, all that was left of the Communist ideal was the Party and the notion of their common struggle: *My storim Kommunizum!* That, too, was taken away, abandoned by Brezhnev in favor of 'developmental socialism', leaving only the Party and the economic metric. Under Brezhnev, the increase in living standards was present and tangible, even through stagnation. However, by Gorbachev, the economy was showing wear. By introducing pluralism, he now called into question the legitimacy of the Party. The only remaining litmus the people had to measure the success of Communism and the justification of their struggles, the economy, was in free fall.<sup>344</sup> Communism was now "empty of meaning."<sup>345</sup> It was not the collective actions of the nationalists movements in and of themselves that caused the Union to collapse; it fell because Gorbachev did not successfully narrate a new collective struggle. His attempts to save the system through reform in order to increase legitimacy had the reverse effect. Instead, this era was reminiscent of the Prague Spring in an important way, as deTocqueville observed. Political legitimacy of the system was

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<sup>342</sup>Ibid.

<sup>343</sup>'We are building Communism'.

<sup>344</sup> According to the Levada Center, surveys show that 58% of the people felt the dissolution could have been avoided, and blame a range of options as to why it fell, most have to do with things such as "the complete absence of communist ideology" 16%; "The CPSU abandoning its role of leadership, weakening of Moscow during Perestroika" 16%; "The economy being overburdened by the military, leading to stagnation and poverty" 15%, and so on. "THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION," LevadaCenter, , accessed April 12, 2017, <http://www.levada.ru/en/2017/01/09/the-fall-of-the-soviet-union>.

<sup>345</sup> Richard D. Anderson, "Discourse and Strategic Continuity from Gorbachev through Putin," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 46, no. 1 (2013): , doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.07.016.; "THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION," LevadaCenter, , accessed April 12, 2017, <http://www.levada.ru/en/2017/01/09/the-fall-of-the-soviet-union/>.

dead, and as such, so was the system; it just refused to admit it. As such, the people turned to one another and their trust networks in search of a way forward. They experienced a freedom and openness through the cracks in the system and demanded more reform towards liberal democracy.<sup>346</sup> It would be Yeltsin, who would ultimately deliver.

## **Post-Soviet Russian Reforms and the question of trust.Yeltsin-Putin.**

After the fall of the USSR, the stated claim of the path forward was a political and social order geared towards building liberal democracy. However, they were foiled again by a new set of reformers. After many promising gains, and even more sets-backs, the hope of the democratic political order would finally collapse completely under the next President, Vladimir Putin, who never forgot how the state abandoned him in eastern Germany. Ultimately it would be the people who would pay the price. Those who fell behind or were looking to get ahead, they would simply fall back to what has always been their life-preserver: their trust networks of one another.

### **Yeltsin years.**

After the collapse in January of 1992, so much new hope for the future existed. Though the country was divided on Yeltsin, the people largely let down their guards, they were ready to give this experiment a chance. The Levada Center's polling at the time shows 57% of respondents were somewhere between neutral or very positive in relation to their feelings about Boris Yeltsin in September 1993.<sup>347</sup> This is key. Once a strong, viable leader, who seemingly had the political will to bring Russia out of the darkness, to bring her long awaited freedoms, economic security, and independence, climbed on top that take, they were largely ready to put behind them the years of Soviet oppression, stagnation, the pains of their past. Through collective action, the people saw their voices do matter. It seemed many people were ready to do what was necessary to build liberal

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<sup>346</sup>Diamond 1999\*

<sup>347</sup> "Fall of the USSR and Yeltsin Era," Levada Center, accessed March 09, 2017, <http://www.levada.ru/en/2016/04/05/fall-of-the-ussr-and-yeltsin-era/>.



democracy.

Yeltsin swiftly acted to crush the Communists; he swiftly ordered, by decree, the dissolution of the Communist Party in order to make a counterrevolution more difficult. He also suspended publication of the communist paper *Pravda*. Yeltsin did this in attempt to silence dissent. Yeltsin felt the only way forward would be with a very rapid set of reforms, undoing the old order as quickly as possible. Western advisors fell all over each other in order to be a part of the new reforms. Members of the Clinton Administration turned to a think tank of Harvard-based economic policy consultants and academics for guidance. The so-called "Harvard Project", in turn chose a group of young Russian reformers from St. Petersburg to help shape the fledgling democracy. Led by a charismatic former government economist named Anatoly Chubais, the "Chubais Clan" quickly cemented their ties to the Ivy league experts.<sup>348</sup>

Deputy Prime Minister Ygor Gaidar developed the idea known as "shock therapy", which was essentially a release of the market and prices. The results were disastrous; inflation skyrocketed to over 2000%.<sup>349</sup> Privatization of industry was also kicked-off by Anatoli Chubais. Citizens were given vouchers they would sell or use to buy stock in privatizing companies. In the end, the state's assets ended up in the hands of the 'red managers' for a fraction of what they were worth, creating an instant oligarchy class concentrating wealth in the hands of a few. Of course, it was the average Russian who suffered.<sup>350</sup> However, the plans implemented amounted to nothing more than 'market bolshevism' complete with pyramid schemes, and outright deception and theft.<sup>351</sup> Citizens lost their entire savings. Joblessness and homelessness ballooned during this period, even among the highly educated. In an effort to cope, some turned to cottage industry, or to their blat' networks. Those who had businesses or factories utilized "shadow barter": a complex system of trade or "payment in kind" where people within the company use

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<sup>348</sup>Janine R. Wedel, "How the Chubais Clan, Harvard Fed Corruption," Los Angeles Times, September 12, 1999, , accessed April 2, 2017, <http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/12/opinion/op-9170/2>.

<sup>349</sup>William H. Cooper, "Russia's Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States ," Federation of American Scientists, , <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34512.pdf>.

<sup>350</sup>[https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/privatizing\\_russiaDOTpdf](https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/privatizing_russiaDOTpdf)

<sup>351</sup>Peter Reddaway, Dmitri Glinski *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy*, 2001, p. 34

a network of intermediaries to get items needed to allow the proper functioning of the factory. This is a holdover from the Soviet system, as well. Those with the means, left Russia, resulting in a brain drain.<sup>352</sup> The market had been freed but there were not sufficient democratic institutions in place to support and protect the people. "*Bogatomu idti v sud - tryn-frava; bednomu - doloj golova*"<sup>353</sup> was the norm once again. Judges were grossly underpaid, could be easily bought by the highest bidder leaving justice the province of the wealthy. The police, who were also under paid, also became more corrupt. For-hire mercenaries became common in order to protect bank owners from one another. Shoot-outs in the streets to resolves financial debts or grievances, and all manner of lawlessness became a common feature.<sup>354</sup> This resulted in an environment where suddenly, it became difficult to know whom one could trust.<sup>355</sup> One thing was clear, the state had failed in its mission to protect the people.

The Constitutional Crisis of 1993 did little to ease people's minds. Yeltsin's opponents moved to have him deposed. It ended with Yeltsin calling in the tanks and firing upon the Duma, killing more than 140 people.<sup>356</sup> He dissolved parliament and called new elections. The new Constitution that was drawn up gave him "super presidential" powers, diluting the powers of the Duma. It also created a dual cameral legislature. The Constitution was ratified by popular vote two months later. Yeltsin and his reforms were seen to be corrupt, incapable, inept, or worse. His approval rating plummeted to single digits, while support for the Communists was surging. While he eked out a win in 1996 for a second term, it is widely suspected the votes were rigged and the real winners in '96 were the Communists.

The economy, after a yearlong rally form 1996-97, began to crack and then collapse

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<sup>352</sup>Ibid

<sup>353</sup> "If a rich person goes to court, it is all the same for him; if a poor person does, he loses his head."

<sup>354</sup> [http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/mediag2500\\_en.pdf](http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/mediag2500_en.pdf); Jeffrey Khan, "Vladimir Putin and the Rule of Law in Russia," *Geo*

<sup>355</sup> Richard A. Easterlin, "Lost in Transition: Life Satisfaction on the Road to Capitalism," *SSRN Electronic Journal* 71:, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1118263.

<sup>356</sup> Sonni Efron, "In Moscow, a Dirge for Defenders of White House : Russia: Thousands of hard-liners gather to pray for victims of violence at Parliament, and to curse Yeltsin.," *Los Angeles Times*, November 14, 1993, , accessed March 5, 2017, [http://articles.latimes.com/1993-11-14/news/mn-569451\\_white-house](http://articles.latimes.com/1993-11-14/news/mn-569451_white-house).

in 1998.<sup>357</sup> The IMF was called in to create a bailout package. That failed. The Russian banks began devaluing currency. The collapse of the economy in 1998, as well as the various corruption scandals surrounding Yeltsin and his cabinet, Yeltsin's "Rule by Decree" government, bloated bureaucracy filled with friends or patrons, the seemingly constant rotation of Prime Ministers, had cemented in the minds of the Russian people the system had failed, and did little to endear them to "democracy." The people reverted again, back to one another in order to survive, relying on the trust networks, and *blat*, and "shadow barter" just as they had done under the old regime.<sup>358</sup>

In the end, Yeltsin would resign, promoting his newest Prime Minister, Vladimir Lenin, who had gained fame related to his 'investigations' into the Moscow Apartment Bombings, and subsequent Second Chechen War, of which he was in charge. Some accepted his line about his health as the reason for his resignation. It was well known Yeltsin was a drunk and not the most robust man. Others felt his strategic retirement on December 31st, 1999 was to anoint Putin as his chosen successor.<sup>359</sup> Some scholars take this a step further and charge, Putin was chosen because he could be trusted to keep Yeltsin's corruption secret.<sup>360</sup> Whatever the reason, the Russian people were not impressed with the Yeltsin era. The Levada Center polling in January 2000 showed 67% of the respondents felt their lives were made worse under Yeltsin. Still further, only 10% of the citizens surveyed at the end of 1999 felt their country was headed in the right direction.<sup>361</sup> However, as the year ended and a new one began, Russia's "Freedom Score" was 4.5 with a ranking of "Partly Free."<sup>362</sup>

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<sup>357</sup> According to Ariel Cohen, Several factors contributed to the drop in foreign investor confidence in the spring and early summer of 1998. The communist-dominated State Duma passed legislation prohibiting foreign ownership of more than 25 percent of the stock of Unified Energy Systems (UES), the national electrical monopoly, at a time when foreign ownership already was over 28 percent. Foreign investors became jittery when a huge government-owned oil company with oil reserves worth tens of billions of dollars that was slated to be privatized failed to attract any buyers at the asking price of 2.1 billion." *Russia's Meltdown : Anatomy of the IMF Failure* The Heritage Foundation, 1998.

<sup>358</sup> Ledeneva *How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business* Chapter 5. 2016

<sup>359</sup> Levada Center poll at the time shows 40% of respondents attributed this to his health, while 28% attributed it to Putin, in particular. <http://www.levada.ru/en/2016/04/05/fall-of-the-ussr-and-yeltsin-era/>

<sup>360</sup> Karen Dawisha;

<sup>361</sup> <http://www.levada.ru/en/2016/04/05/fall-of-the-ussr-and-yeltsin-era/>. That number increased to 75% in December 2000

<sup>362</sup> Freedom House *Freedom in the World Report*, 2000.

## The Putin era.

Before the March 2000 Presidential elections, Putin had a book published, issued "letters to the public" in various newspapers, and made many TV appearances. This was done in order for the people to become more acquainted with him; his public popularity polls hovered around 2% when he assumed the seat of Prime Minister just months before.<sup>363</sup> In these communications, he makes a strong case for the need to hold back on developing democracy, or as he implied "grandiose plans," all at once while target reforms are pursued. For example, he claimed one of the most important areas of reform was the rule of law, cracking down on corruption, as well as judicial reform.<sup>364</sup> He felt everything else flowed from here. He promised to strengthen Russia's economy, increase modernization, and continue the pursuit of democratic goals.<sup>365</sup>

As the Second Chechen War wagged on, Putin took the helm of the Russian Federation. The first few years of Putin's presidency were enigmatic. He is a master of vagueness and double speak when outlining his specific policy prescriptions. He lauded the value of democracy, yet at the same time attacked its institutions. He claims to be a promoter of democracy, yet he has attacked both the independent press, as well as various religious organizations, such as the Salvation Army, YMCA, and the Jehovah's Witnesses. He has largely made good on his promise of regaining control over 'law and order', except, of course, when it comes to political opponents or any form of accountability for himself or his *apparatchik*. Indeed, his first act as President was to sign a decree granting Yeltsin and his family complete immunity. He openly praises Russia's multiparty system, yet viciously attacks political opponents. And while the Russian people were looking for a renewed hope in President Putin, he had little intent on delivering. As Putin's chief of staff, Alexander Voloshin has said behind closed doors, "The Russian people are not

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<sup>363</sup>Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, "The Rollback of Democracy In Vladimir Putin's Russia," *The Washington Post*, June 07, 2005, , accessed April 6, 2017, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/06/AR2005060601723.html>.

<sup>364</sup>Putin said there are several big problems that must be taken into account if the nation are to make any "grandiose plans." He called democracy a 'dictatorship of law', and went on to say, "Only an effective and strong state can afford to live according to the rules, according to the law, and it alone must guarantee freedom of enterprise, freedom of the individual and society." "Otkrytoe pismo izbiratelyam", accessed May 10, 2017, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24144>.

<sup>365</sup>Ibid.

ready for democracy."<sup>366</sup>

Consolidation of power via uneven rule of law and political corruption. Putin immediately went about the business of consolidating his power. Unlike the Yeltsin, those around Putin did not eschew the idea of a "party of power." Yeltsin disliked party politics and felt the need to stay above the fray and not join any party so long as he was President. However, when Putin was being named as his successor, those around Putin felt creating a party of power was vital, in the short term, to ensure his success and a smooth transition, though was left unfinished after this election.<sup>367</sup> He continued to surround himself with members of "The Family", Yeltsin top aids and advisors. Overtime, his inner circle shifted away from "The Family" and more towards the *siloviki*, former spies from Putin's KGB days. During this time, he also took aim at Russia's oligarchs.

One in particular, caught the ire of Putin and his *siloviki*, oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was, among other things, funding opposition parties, as well as NGOs. When Putin called a meeting of the oligarchs to discuss the future of Russia, Khordorkovsky openly questioned Putin about a corrupt state oil field deal. He also called for a more open Russia, where the old ways of getting things done, via corruption and back-room deals, was put behind them. This enraged Putin, regardless of his measured public response. He had sealed his fate.<sup>368</sup> He would be arrested on trumped up charges related to tax evasion and fraud, his oil company Yukos, became state property, and his assets seized. This action signaled the beginning of Putin's war on the oligarchs, which won support among the Russian citizenry who blamed them for their suffering during privatization.<sup>369</sup>

At the same time, the so-called "color revolutions" were taking place across regions of former Soviet control or influence. He has personally lived through popular revolt in East Germany and he has never forgotten the experience.<sup>370</sup> The fear of such a revolt spreading

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<sup>366</sup>Baker, Peter, and Susan B. Glasser. "The Rollback of Democracy In Vladimir Putin's Russia." The Washington Post. June 07, 2005. Accessed April 6, 2017. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/06/AR2005060601723.html>.

<sup>367</sup> File footage from Putin's meeting with the Oligarchs.

<sup>368</sup>Masha Gessen, "Vladimir Putin and Mikhail Khodorkovsky: One Man's Truth, Another Man's Tyranny," The Hive, January 29, 2015, , accessed April 6, 2017, <https://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2012/04/vladimir-putin-mikhail-khodorkovsky-russia>.

<sup>369</sup>Ibid.

<sup>370</sup>Vladimir Putin, *First Person* (London: Hutchinson, 2000), 80.

to Russia dominated much of the restructuring of the political system from top down to civil society below. However, this was done without changes to the Constitution. Putin and his elites began to consolidate power within the existing system, by simply changing election laws, resulting in what amounts to a single party rule. This meant elections moving forward must have expected outcomes, in the name stability. Onerous changes were made in 2005 to the process of registering political parties before elections. The official line, of course, is to make the system more democratic. Specific rules were penned in such a way it became impossible for new parties to meet the difficult to meet signature requirements or pay outrageous deposit fees. A law passed in 2007 reduced party the number of parties allowed from 44 to 14. Further, some older parties who had popular leaders were wholesale rejected from registered for technicalities or vague, unspecified reasons, allowing smaller parties with less popular candidates to register. This had the net effect of funneling support away from opposition parties and candidates. United Russia would utilize popular candidates to bolster their ticket in certain elections only to withdraw their name once the election was over. However, most members of United Russia had little popular sway; once the popular names were removed another member would occupy the seat who had little interest in truly representing the people of the district in question.<sup>371</sup>

Another change was the removal of the popular "against all" option on the ballots. This option allowed frustrated voters the chance to still participate in the process, if only to express their disapproval of all candidates.<sup>372</sup> This would sometimes lead to scenarios where run-offs were possible, creating additional costs and uncertainty for the center. The removal made necessary the removal of minimum voter turnout. Ultimately, the strategy worked, making United Russia the dominate party in the Duma. Parties other than United Russia are either closely aligned making them virtually indistinguishable or pushed to the margins of irrelevance.

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<sup>371</sup> Darrell Slider, "Putin and the Russian Electoral System: "Reforms" To Prevent Regime Change," *The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review* 34, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1163/187633207x00049.

<sup>372</sup>Alexander Nurnberg, "Russian Independence Day Recalls Collapse of Soviet Union," *The New York Times*, June 12, 2006, , accessed April 7, 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/13/world/europe/russiasumm.html?mcubz=1>.

This strategy was taken to the regions, as well. In an effort to eliminate regional parties, registration laws were also implemented regionally and unevenly. Established parties were exempt regionally, as well. The same policy of listing popular candidates on regional ballots, only to remove them, was also employed. In 2007, these open lists ballots were eliminated in the regions. He seized power from regional governors by removing popular election, citing corruption amongst their ranks, making them agents of the center rather than of the people creating a power vertical of accountability to the center and the party.<sup>373</sup> Ultimately, elections returned in 2012, however the political order had been established. In other words, in order to stay in power, a governor must please the center creating a principle-agent problem.<sup>374</sup>

To his credit Putin did do a great deal to reduce corruption in the lower ranks of state institutions, as well as ensure a proper functioning of the rule of law for every day citizens. Booming oil prices afforded him the financial liquidity to push forward with judicial reform. His new initiative "Plan for the Improving the Courts 2002-2006"<sup>375</sup> focused on judicial and legal pay, as well as restoring the prestige and legitimacy to the institutions. Criminal reform in 2002 and civil law reform in 2003 was vital in establishing the rules of the game.<sup>376</sup> This has made every day interaction between the citizen and legal institutions much more functional. Citizens generally feel they have a fair shake if they ever have to go before a court of law, be it civil or criminal, increasing legitimacy and trust. However, supporting institutions, which are vital for the full functioning of the rule of law, have been severely curtailed rendering them neuter. Wherever democratic institutions cross with political considerations, one can assume they have been compromised by the state in order to entrench power and maintain "stability."

Attacks on the free press. Ironically, though oligarch Boris Berezovsky via his media empire helped catapult Vladimir Putin to popularity and success in the Presidential

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<sup>373</sup> Darrell Slider, "Putin and the Russian Electoral System: "Reforms" To Prevent Regime Change," *The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review* 34, no. 1 (2007)

<sup>374</sup> Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, "Subnational Governance in Russia: How Putin Changed the Contract with His Agents and the Problems It Created for Medvedev," *Publis* 40, no. 4, , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40865420>.; [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/russian\\_a\\_wakening.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/russian_a_wakening.pdf)

<sup>375</sup> this plan was also expanded through 2011.

<sup>376</sup>"Russia," Country report | Freedom in the World | 2004, April 11, 2013, , accessed April 6, 2017, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2004/russia>.

election, he was one of his first targets. Vladimir Gusinsky, the owner of Media-Most' and independent NTV, was also targeted. Putin was enraged at critical coverage of his government. Berezovsky saw the writing on the wall and fled to Britain. Gusinsky was arrested; prosecutors levied, what most considered were, trumped up charges related to corruption during the privatization years. He ended up in exile in Spain, forced to sign over his media holdings to Gazprom-media. The state took over all other TV and newspaper outlets over the next few years.<sup>377</sup> By 2002, the last established independent TV station, TV-6, was taken over by the state. These events led Freedom House to update Russia Freedom of the press report to "Not Free", a rating of 66 out of 100, as of 2003 and has shown a steady decline ever since.<sup>378</sup>

Independent TV media does exist in some fashion in Russia, however it is either shut down after a brief period of operation, not easily accessible or have significant viewership. Vague anti-extremist laws<sup>379</sup> are given a wide berth and can be applied in just about any instance making censorship and shutdowns relatively easy. Strict enforcement of these laws tends towards "self-censorship" otherwise the price can be steep. TV *Dozhd* (Rain) is a recent example of this phenomena. After airing questions regarding the Siege of Leningrad in 2014, the state pressured cable companies to withdraw their broadcasting rights. However, some believe it is more politically motivated. The station worked with opposition Alexei Naval'ny's investigations into corruption. They were forced to adopt an online subscription model to remain active.<sup>380</sup> Investigative newspaper *Novaya Gazeta* has also moved to online only formatting. They have a history of turbulent events surrounding their intensive investigation around corruption and human rights violations. Reporter Anna Politkovskaya was found killed outside of her apartment after critical re-

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<sup>377</sup>"Russia," Country report | Freedom in the World | 2003, April 15, 2013, , accessed April 6, 2017, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2003/russia>.

<sup>378</sup> "Russia," Country report | Freedom of the Press | 2004, March 14, 2013, , accessed April 5, 2017, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2004/russia>. and reports 2002-2017.

<sup>379</sup>Federal Law No. 398 passed in 2013 - gives the prosecutor general a short cut around the court and direct Roskomnadzor to shut down websites which call for 'extremist' activities. It is often used as a weapon against opposition leaders and websites.

<sup>380</sup>Daniel Schearf, "Russia's TV Rain Swims Against Tide in Sea of Kremlin Propaganda," VOA, April 26, 2016, accessed April 5, 2017, <https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-s-tv-rain-an-island-in-sea-of-kremlin-propaganda/3303338.html>; *Freedom House Freedom of the Press Report*, 2015.



porting of the human rights violations during the Second Chechen War.<sup>381</sup> She is not an isolated incident. Indeed, a total of six of their reporters have been murdered.<sup>382</sup> The paper reported sponsors had been fleeing the paper due to pressure from the Putin government. Many other journalists who have been critical of the Kremlin have been badly beaten during the course of duties. These laws have also extended to online bloggers, as well. Sergey Reznik, who had written blog entries alleging corruption of local officials in Rostov-on-Don, was sentenced to a three-year prison term for, among other things, "insulting a government official."<sup>383</sup> The new Yarovaya laws, under the pretense of combating terror and extremism, increased prison sentences for anyone caught 'promoting terror or extremism' online and forces internet companies to hold and decrypt anyone's data at the will of the state.<sup>384</sup>

With the TV and print media in control of the state, Putin was free to ensure his vision of Russia and world events was the prevailing narrative.<sup>385</sup> Indeed, in 2015, 88% of respondents named TV as their main source of information while the Internet was a distant second: only 30% named it as an important source. However, this is starting to change; a 2017 survey shows a drop in reliance on TV to 78%, as well as an increase in the use of the internet for news to 39%. Further, only 50% of Russians believe the TV news; this is down from 63% in 2015.<sup>386</sup> In addition to strengthening 'extremist' laws online, they have resorted to online propaganda campaigns, and automated internet 'bots' to disseminate propaganda and attack dissenters. Recent studies also show alternative independent sources are gaining influence via RuNet, or the Russian Internet,<sup>387</sup> and

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<sup>381</sup><http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/08/world/europe/08russia.html?mcubz=1>

<sup>382</sup>"Journalists Killed in Russia/Motive Confirmed," Committee to Protect Journalists, , accessed May 3, 2017, <https://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia/>.

<sup>383</sup> "Freedom of the Press 2015," Freedom House, February 19, 2016, , accessed May 3, 2017, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2015>.; he is by no means alone: Vadim Tyumentsev, Darya Polyudova, Oleg Novozhenin, to name a few.

<sup>384</sup>Freedom House Freedom of the Press Report 2017; Mike Eckel, "Russia's 'Yarovaya Law' Imposes Harsh New Restrictions On Religious Groups," RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, July 12, 2016, , accessed April 5, 2017, <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-yarovaya-law-religious-freedom-restrictions/27852531.html>. ; Valeria Zenovina, The President of the Russian Federation signed the "Yarovaya Package", Garant.ru, July 17, 2016, <http://www.garant.ru/news/782190/>

<sup>385</sup>"Tret Rossii za Borbu s "Ryatoj Kolonnoj"," Levada Center, July 14, 2014, accessed May 1, 2017, <http://www.levada.ru/2014/07/14/tret-rossii-za-borbu-s-pyatoj-kolonnoj/>.

<sup>386</sup>"Rossiyane stali menshe doveyat' telenovostyam," Interfax.ru, February 12, 2017, , accessed April 25, 2017, <http://www.interfax.ru/russia/549537>.

<sup>387</sup>"Rossiyane stali menshe doveryat telebideniu," Levada Center, , accessed May 2, 2017,

the Levada Center number support this. They show an increase in those who trust the internet for news an information to 37%.<sup>388</sup> The Kremlin is struggling to keep up.<sup>389</sup>

Weakening civil society. Independent civil society has been under constant attack in Russia under the Putin regime. Religious charity groups have been forced to register since 1997 due to a law passed to boost the prominence of the Russian Orthodox Church. However, in 1999, the state started pushing back against certain non-Orthodox groups citing 'extremism' refusing to authorize their re-registration. Groups have included the Salvation Army, and the YMCA. They continue to face protracted legal battles in Russia.<sup>390</sup> Other religious groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses have also fallen victim under the Yarovaya laws. Its members are being registered as 'terrorists'; their names appear on a registry with member of al-Qaeda and ISIS.<sup>391</sup> Some cite their U.S. headquarters as making them ripe for suspicion. Others point to their refusal to be political.<sup>392</sup>

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also fallen prey. A 2012 law forced many NGOs to register as "foreign agents," and pay heavy fees, if they received minimal funding from organizations outside of Russia and tend to target political groups, though this is vaguely defined, and those focusing on human rights.<sup>393</sup> Some organizations buckled under the financial pressure and were forced to shut down completely. In 2014, the law was amended so the Ministry of Justice could register an organization without their knowledge or permission. The Levada Center, Transparency International Russia, Russian Research Center for Human Rights, and over 150 other organizations have been registered since 2014.<sup>394</sup> The costs of being labeled a "foreign agent" are tan-

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<http://www.levada.ru/2016/11/18/rossiyane-stali-menshe-doveryat-televideniyu/>.

<sup>388</sup>Ibid.

<sup>389</sup>Christina Cottiero et al., "War of Words: The Impact of Russian State Television on the Russian Internet.," *Nationalities Papers* 43, no. 4 (2015): , doi:10.1080/00905992.2015.1013527.

<sup>390</sup>"CASE OF THE MOSCOW BRANCH OF THE SALVATION ARMY v. RUSSIA," European Court of Human Rights, October 5, 2006, , <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Russia/Moscow%20Branch%20of%20Salvation%20Army%20v.%20Russia>

<sup>391</sup>"Perechen' obshchestvennykh i religioznykh ob'edinenii", accessed May 10, 2017, <http://minjust.ru/ru/node/41959>.

<sup>392</sup>Andrew Higgins, "Russia Moves to Ban Jehovah's Witnesses as 'Extremist?'," *The New York Times*, April 04, 2017, , accessed April 25, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/world/europe/russia-moves-to-ban-jehovahs-witnesses-as-extremist.html>.

<sup>393</sup>"Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups," Human Rights Watch, September 08, 2017, accessed September 25, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-chronicle>.

<sup>394</sup>Ibid.

gible. They face loss of reputation, difficulty working with other organizations due to fear of "guilt by association", decreased capacity to engage in civic activities, cumbersome paperwork, and hefty fines.<sup>395</sup> One can now also include the threat of criminal prosecution.<sup>396</sup> They are also prohibited from engaging in "political activity" which can often hinder their work. For example, providing reports to the United Nations, campaigning against political initiatives, raising public awareness over human rights issues, corruption, etc., publicizing public opinion polls and data, and much more.<sup>397</sup> As a result, the number of civic organizations is down 33%.<sup>398</sup>

This creates a situation where public participation in civil society is difficult. As of 2014, participation in NGO activity ranks around 5% in the city of Moscow and about 2% nationally. Of course these numbers were measured just before the 2014 laws were implemented.<sup>399</sup> In larger cities, people have more opportunities to interact short term for certain causes or simply meet people of like mind, about a third of the population of Moscow fall into this category. There are, of course, other opportunities that arise when tragedies happen and individuals are moved to help and participate in coordinated events. Politically speaking most people do not see any benefit in appealing to governmental authorities through such acts as petitions, human rights appeals. They feel they are more likely to see results through their informal *blat*' networks.<sup>400</sup>

The state has moved to "nationalize" some civil society groups in order to neuter them. Indeed, the state has granted \$112 million dollars in funding to civil society groups in just 2016 alone. The groups that are typical recipients are those who eschew political causes, such as health and social groups. However, this means human rights and environmental

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<sup>395</sup>"Potentsial grazhdanskogo uchastiya v reshenii sotsialnyh problem," Levada Center, , accessed April 25, 2017, <http://www.levada.ru/2014/09/09/potentsial-grazhdanskogo-uchastiya-v-reshenii-sotsialnyh-problem/>.

<sup>396</sup>"Briefing on Shrinking Space for Civil Society in Russia," Human Rights Watch, February 24, 2017, , accessed April 25, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/24/briefing-shrinking-space-civil-society-russia>.

<sup>397</sup>Ibid.

<sup>398</sup>Olesya Zakharova, "Vladimir Putin Loves Civil Society (As Long As He Controls It)," *Foreign Policy*, October 12, 2016, , accessed April 25, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/12/vladimir-putin-loves-civil-society-as-long-as-he-controls-it/>.

<sup>399</sup>"Potentsial grazhdanskogo uchastiya v reshenii sotsialnyh problem," Levada Center, , accessed April 25, 2017, <http://www.levada.ru/2014/09/09/potentsial-grazhdanskogo-uchastiya-v-reshenii-sotsialnyh-problem/>.

<sup>400</sup>Ibid

groups, for example, are excluded. The money comes with restrictions: they can have their grants revoked for political statements or working with groups that are deemed "foreign agents." Further, pro-Kremlin student groups such as Nashii have been mobilized to create a countervailing narrative to the anti-Kremlin opposition.<sup>401</sup> However, this runs the risk of the state losing additional legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

Lack of political alternation, attacks on political opponents and political dissent. When the Russian constitution was adopted in 1993, already gave the President substantial powers in terms of power-sharing with parliament, or more precisely, the lack thereof. Attempts were made to correct the balance of power issues under Yeltsin, however they were met with opposition. In 2007 when Putin's second term was coming to a close, many wondered what Putin would do. Would he go into private life? Would he remain some position of power, perhaps as Duma deputy?<sup>402</sup> Will Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov take the helm and Putin be his Prime Minister? Questions were answered in a surprise move when his Deputy Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev announced he would run for office and, if elected, he would appoint Putin as his Prime Minister. Putin endorsed Medvedev as the head of his United Russia party. The pair easily held control of the Presidency with 70% of the vote. Not long after entering office in 2008, Medvedev<sup>403</sup> announced the powers of the President would be extended from two, four year terms to six year terms. His presidency showed some attempts at independence from Putin. In particular he was more open to warm relations with the West, switch focus from natural resource driven economy to an economy of the future emphasizing technology, and he attempted to relax domestic controls over civil liberties and increase transparency.<sup>404</sup> Though public opinion polls showed Medvedev as being popular,<sup>405</sup> in September 2011, he announced he would "step aside" and Putin would assume the spot of Presidential

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<sup>401</sup>Julie Fedor Rolf Fredheim. "We need more clips about Putin, and lots of them: Russia's state-commissioned online visual culture". *Nationalities Papers* Vol. 45 , Iss. 2,2017

<sup>402</sup><http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/world/europe/02russia.html>

<sup>403</sup> The pair have a long relationship going back to Putin's days with Anatoly Sobchack, chairman of St. Petersburg city council where Medvedev worked under Putin as an advisor.

<sup>404</sup> He was largely unsuccessful here. Katri Pynnoniemi, "Science fiction: President Medvedev's campaign for Russia's 'technological modernization'" *Demokratizatsiya* 22 , no. 4 (2014):.

<sup>405</sup>Levada Center polling as of August 2011, a month before the announcement in September, show Medvedev at 63% popularity and Putin at 68% popularity."Indikatoriy odobrenie organov vlasti," Levada Center, , accessed April 25, 2017, <http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/>.

candidate on the United Russia ticket.

This sent the country into high dudgeon; many were not interested in what they felt was a never ending cycle of Putin rule. After a series of smaller protests throughout the month, on December 24th, 2011 tens of thousands of Russians took to the streets protesting the United Russia ticket, but also reports from international elections experts alleging ballot stuffing and widespread fraud in the December Duma elections.<sup>406</sup> Videos also appeared online reportedly taken by voters allegedly showing various forms of election fraud. Various news agencies spoke to the protestors. The overall feel was anger; they had gone out and voted but evidence demonstrated a foregone conclusion and their votes were pointless. They were tired of Putin and blamed him for the high rates of corruption in the country.<sup>407</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev publicly called on Putin to step aside as he had done in 1991 and make way for new leadership.<sup>408</sup> Seeing popular dissent filling the streets of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and smaller protests across the country, shouting '*Rossiya bez Putina!*'<sup>409</sup> was sobering for Putin. Protests continued to break out well into the new year. May 6th, 2012, the day before his inauguration for his 3rd Presidential term, Putin was faced with large protests in Moscow. It became known as the Bolotnaya Square case; approximately 400 protestors were arrested, including opposition leaders Alexei Naval'ny and Boris Nemstov. Protests would continue despite new laws cracking down on protests.<sup>410</sup> However, protestors and experts have both pointed to the lack of unified and organized opposition for failing to make progress. In the past, opposition has been largely stymied due to the government's effective campaign against the so-called "fifth column."<sup>411</sup>

The government has waged a brutal war on TV, in print, and online, as well as in the

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<sup>406</sup>Ellen Barry, "Rally Defying Putin's Party Draws Tens of Thousands," *The New York Times*, December 10, 2011, , accessed April 19, 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/world/europe/thousands-protest-in-moscow-russia-in-defiance-of-putin.html>.

<sup>407</sup>Ibid

<sup>408</sup>"Fresh Voices Against Russia's Old Regime.," Levada Center, January 2012, accessed April 2, 2017, <http://www.levada.ru/en/2012/01/16/fresh-voices-against-russia-s-old-regime/>.

<sup>409</sup> Russia without Putin!

<sup>410</sup>Gleb Bryanski, "Russia's Putin signs anti-protest law before rally," *Reuters*, June 08, 2012, , accessed April 2, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-protests-idUSBRE8570ZH20120608>.

<sup>411</sup>Joshua Yaffa, "Putin's New War on Traitors," *The New Yorker*, June 18, 2017, accessed April 2, 2017, <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/putins-new-war-on-traitors>.

court rooms against the opposition. Opposition leader Alexi Navalny is a prime example of this. A young attorney, he came to prominence via his Live Journal account exposing corruption or local politicians and other officials. Alexei Navalny, "Alexei Navalny's Live Journal" , accessed June 11, 2017, <http://navalny.livejournal.com/>. His unique approach (taking pictures of the wrist watches of various officials and comparing their worth to public records showing their salaries) and his charismatic personality helped him grow a sort of cult like following online. Once it became clear he was posing a threat to the state, he was arrested and tried on trumped up charges of corruption. This is typical Soviet-style politics: blame the opposition for what they are accusing you of, arrest them, try them, and convict them. The European Court of Human Rights ruled the arrests and cases against Navalny were politically motivated and without substantiation.<sup>412</sup> Russia watchers and human rights organizations point to Russia's growing fear of Navalny's increased popularity as a reason to discredit him so he will be unable to run in the next presidential election in 2018.<sup>413</sup>

Navalny's efforts since 2012 have become much more organized. He has established satellite campaign offices across the country, even in the far East. Indeed, his online campaigning has become more sophisticated, as well.<sup>414</sup> He is present on a multitude of social networks where he, or proxies, constantly push content, including highly produced special investigation videos, live streams, and candid reactions to news of the day. He continues to expose alleged corruption through complex investigative reporting and puts together impressive and witty videos he posts online which receive high viewership both inside Russia's borders and beyond.<sup>415</sup> One of his most recent, published March 2nd of this year, was an expos Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev alleging vast corruption via his charity organizations in which "Dimon"<sup>416</sup> allegedly hides properties and money. This

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<sup>412</sup>"Navalny and Yashin v. Russia - 76204/11," HUDOC - European Court of Human Rights , accessed April 19, 2017, <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-10301>.

<sup>413</sup>Alec Luhn, "Alexei Navalny: Russian opposition leader found guilty of embezzlement," *The Guardian*, February 08, 2017, , accessed May 25, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/08/alexei-navalny-russian-opposition-leader-found-guilty-embezzlement>.

<sup>414</sup>Clare Sebastian, "Alexey Navalny and Russia's YouTube insurgency," *CNN*, June 12, 2017, accessed April 19, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/11/europe/russia-navalny-youtube-protests/index.html>.

<sup>415</sup>Aleksei NavalnyRu, YouTube, accessed April 19, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/user/NavalnyRu>.

<sup>416</sup> Dimitry Medvedev. He does not like the diminutive, which is why, of course, it is used freely in the

video was viewed as of June 11th, 2017 over 22,781,621 times.<sup>417</sup> There is evidence in recent months his efforts have borne fruit. Organized protests erupted across Russia (not just in Moscow) after the video was aired. March 12th of this year saw vast protests in 90 cities across Russia.<sup>418</sup> Many of the protesters were youths though the demographics ran the range of age. However, the youth aspect is interesting; most of the youth involved in his protests have grown up under Putin and know no other system. One would imagine they have been socialized to this political culture, however they are revolting. Exact numbers are difficult to gauge but this is a promising development for civil society going forward. Through the use of new forms of civic engagement, the people are banding together with unknown others in order to stand up and demand their rights. This is a test for the Putin regime.

As a function of this double system between democratic words and authoritarian deeds, Russia's "freedom score" has consistently dropped since 2000 and has landed at the level of "consolidated authoritarian regime" in 2016.<sup>419</sup> Yet his personal trust rating is at 74% as of November 2016.<sup>420</sup> Indeed, it seems Putin has developed a near Stalin-esque level of cult of personality, something Khrushchev has warned about some 60 years before, however there is early evidence this is fading.<sup>421</sup> Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind it is Putin who has driven his country towards a consolidated authoritarian bent. This was in no way an 'inevitable' direction resulting from the weight for authoritarianism in Russian history. After all, it was the people who rose up all over the Soviet Union, and not just in her periphery. They answered Yeltsin's call to not allow the Soviets to drag them back into the darkness. What Russia needs now, are leaders who have the political will to resist corruption and the courage to push Russia back towards a free society the people rightly deserve. However, they must be prepared to demand it for themselves.

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video entitled: "Don't call me Dimon!" Aleksei Navalny, "Don't call him "Dimon!" Aleksei Navalny's YouTube (video blog), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7CF9g>.

<sup>417</sup><https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7CF9g>

<sup>418</sup>Clare Sebastian, "Alexey Navalny and Russia's YouTube insurgency," CNN, June 12, 2017, accessed June 19, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/11/europe/russia-navalny-youtube-protests/index.html>.

<sup>419</sup>"Freedom in the World 2017," Freedom House, September 25, 2017

<sup>420</sup>"Institutsionalnoe Doverie," Levada Center, October 13, 2016, accessed October 19, 2016, <http://www.levada.ru/2016/10/13/institutsionalnoe-doverie-2/>.

<sup>421</sup>Ibid.

## PART II: SPECIFIC LITERATURE ON TRUST IN RUSSIA

As with the general literature, researchers on Russia and its sphere can be broken down in to two main strains of thought: the culturalists and the institutionalists. Here, both camps will be explored. Next, the gaps in the specific literature will be uncovered. Finally, lessons will be synthesized and a way forward will be proposed.

### The Culturalists.

These researchers claim Russia is doomed because of its long history of strong leaders under both Communism and Imperialism. For these researchers, Russia's societal trust is based on centuries of experiences which are deeply ingrained in their civic and political culture, not amenable to short term changes, leading to a lack of trust in institutions. The idea is Russians have been socialized from a young age to have no faith in government.

The culturalists believe trust in institutions is taught from an early age in the process of socialization within cultures, as are other forms of trust. Institutional trust is established through a society's political culture. Due to socialization, their form of trust is particular. Citizens of these states are not joiners and therefore are not likely to be exposed to differing ideas concerning democracy. Culturalists believe that civil society and social capital really did not exist under the old regime and that so-called practice has continued into the new regime(s). As such, trust and social capital are only weakly related to organizational membership in Eastern Europe/ Post-Communist and former Soviet states.<sup>422</sup> Established norms of low trust in a given society will result in automatic low trust in institutions. In the end, because of these norms, they feel Russia will not likely be able to overcome the collective action problem sufficiently to form a strong liberal democracy because of its long history of authoritarian leaders under both Communism and Autocracy. If they do, it will be a very long and slow process, as such societies are very slow to change. Researchers such as Almond and Verba, to Samuel Huntington<sup>423</sup> who believes Russia is stymied by inexperience with democracy, long histo-

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<sup>422</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).

<sup>423</sup>Ibid.; Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2 (1991): ,



ries of authoritarian rule, Orthodox tradition,<sup>424</sup> and a culture that favors authoritarian leaders.<sup>425</sup>

It is important to note here the types of organizations people matter for both join for the culturalists and the institutionalists. After all, there are democratically undesirable groups, such as the Nazis in the Weimar, who would use their power for ill gains. Nonetheless, as Letki and Evans (2012) specifically point out, trust and social networks/civil society did exist under the old regime: it merely operated in a different, yet no less important fashion. That type of trust in Russian society has persisted in Russia and remains today, perhaps in an altered form. With this critique in mind, some researchers offer a bit more hope for Russia and those within former sphere of influence of the USSR.

## **The Institutionalists.**

This is in contrast to the instrumentalists who believe trust in Russia is based on institutional factors, that is how well the institutions in Russia operate and provide political goods to the people. These researchers feel political performance and economic success is what drives trust from the top down. In other words, when society trusts their institutions who will adequately provide economic stability and democratic performance, trust will be felt at the level of the individual and spread out into society fostering trust in institutions and engendering generalized trust, cooperation and work, in part, to solve the collective action problem.<sup>426</sup>

Those in the instrumentalist camp believe change is possible, because trust in institutions is rationally based. As such, they find poor performance and economic inequality have a great impact on generalized trust. The idea is, if a state and its institutions can provide political goods to its citizens, they will generate high levels of trust. By contrast, if a state is unable or unwilling to provide adequate political goods to its citizens and/

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doi:10.1353/jod.1991.0016.

<sup>424</sup> Orthodoxy is particular to Huntington.

<sup>425</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2 (1991): , doi:10.1353/jod.1991.0016.

<sup>426</sup>Mishler and Rose 2007\*

or see their leaders and institutions as corrupt, the amount of trust in unknown others reduces.<sup>427</sup> It results in a vicious circle of trust and distrust between citizens and their leaders. Instrumentalists do not dismiss outright the notion of cultural influence on the trust calculus, however they emphasize that citizens evaluate a change in regime based on performance today based on experience rather than persist with previously taught beliefs.

Instrumentalists can make their case when examining trust in a times-series and comparing that to known instances of economic or political turmoil; a clear pattern develops. Mishler and Rose found these "shocks to the system" coincided with a reduction in institutional and generalized trust.<sup>428</sup> Nonetheless, their research finds the strongest support for the "top-down" theory, however the results also show the "bottom-up" perspective is also statistically significant, though has a lesser power variance in their models. Therefore, they advocate taking a mixed approach moving forward.

Letki and Evans (2005) employed a similar method by measuring what rate democracy was at in 1989 and measuring the "shocks" that occurred after the fall of the USSR and the creation of new constitution in 1993-94, and then measuring the differences using a posttest survey completed in 1998.<sup>429</sup> Their results yielded a cyclical pattern where initial trust is degraded by political and economic disappointment in institutions which will rise again over time when institutions are performing to their satisfaction and then drop again with societal disappointment.

Additional research also found similar cyclical patterns, called these public and private cycles, examining the undulations that existed and continue to exist under Putin. When the public felt relatively comfortable with the economy and the political environment, fostered by the idea that they can do nothing about their situations, society would retreat

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<sup>427</sup>William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002. , Natalia Letki and Geoffrey Evans, "Endogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe," *British Journal of Political Science*, 2005th ser., 35, no. 3, , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092242>. , Elena Chebankova, "Public and Private Cycles of Socio-Political Life in Putin's Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 26, no. 2 (2010): , doi:10.2747/1060-586X.26.2.121.

<sup>428</sup>The Impact of Macro-Economic Shock on Russians" *Post-Soviet Affairs* 2010.

<sup>429</sup>"Endogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe". *British Journal of Political Science*. 2005

into the private cycle in where individual goals and material wealth. According the Chebankova, the new public phase is in its infancy and is a result of the growing discontent with the growing income gaps between the wealth and the poor as well as the state of opaqueness within their political institutions. The concern with the retreat into the private realm is when people withdraw, they are less politically and socially active. This lack of activity allows unsavory acts of corruption to go unchecked, entrenching deeper and deeper into the institutions and among the political elite, a view Lussier would agree with. When people feel the effects of inequality of job instability, they tend to feel as though their political freedoms are suppressed and cannot muster the political will to act. It becomes a vicious circle were elites are free to impinge on the democratic rights of the citizens. What these researchers offer is a contextual understanding of Russia and that one key to understanding how trust operates in relation to democracy is by viewing the effects over time.

Specifically in regards to corruption, Mishler and Rose, using the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), examine the gap between perceived levels of corruption and actual corruption in Russia to measure what effects this has on levels of trust in Russia.<sup>430</sup> Further, they examine if either perceptions of corruption or actual instances of corruption have any impact on the current regime. They link perceptions of corruption with performance and trust in institutions, which they also measure. They show there is no evidence for corruption or political trust to have any impact on support for the current regime or democracy itself. In fact, they found that while 89% of those surveyed perceive their institutions as corrupt, this had no statistical significance in relation to support for the current regime. Further, the only significant variable was economic performance. At the time of the New Russia Barometer (NRB) survey, the oil market was "booming" netting a 66% positive feeling towards the economy which showed an increase in regime support, as well. They offer no insight, however, to how the perceived level of corruption up top affects levels of trust down below at the individual level. In other research, the authors do indicate that levels of institutional trust do impact generalized trust support-

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<sup>430</sup>"Experience versus perception of corruption: Russia as a test case" *Global Crime*. 2010

ing a "top-down" approach to how trust works in Russia. Alternatively, they do not show any indication that trust or institutional trust has any impact of support for the current regime. This is likely because society largely supports their idea of democracy, regardless of its distrust in institutions. This leads to the looming question: while society may support the idea of democracy, in general, is Russia a democracy?

Most authors in the recent literature have been talking around the issues of the state of democracy in Russia and exactly how to classify it. Calling a spade a spade, Karen Dawisha reminds us that Russia is not a democracy, but an authoritarian regime of the type she labels a "corporatist-kleptocracy." Her research focuses on the very distinct form of corporatism and kleptocracy which is completely different from states in Europe, Asia, or America who are corporate.<sup>431</sup> It does share with Italian fascism and Asian corporatism that the state has an inherent right to intercede and involve itself in all levels of the economy, suppress uprisings and demands from labor, as well as social movements. Of course, all of this undermines the liberal notion of democracy Putin espoused to be in pursuit of when he took office. The key difference in Russia's corporatism is the kleptocratic elements of "a closed circle of state officials, having suppressed both the market and democratic rights, begin to use their position as state officials raid these newly-renationalized companies for their private gain."<sup>432</sup> It is because of these considerations, Russian society is forced to create informal rules and networks on order to function from day to day within the system.<sup>433</sup>

While solving the problem of a lack of institutional or interpersonal trust is beyond the scope of this work, it is worth noting that Bo Rothstein (2011) offers this advice: providing good governance. He agrees with many of the other authors regarding the dangers of corruption and low trust. Corruption as: a holder of public office who violates the impartiality principle to achieve private gains. For the author, impartiality is vital to good governance. When one applies the rules evenly and efficiently, good governance

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<sup>431</sup> "Is Russia's Foreign Policy That of a Corporatist-Kleptocratic Regime?". *Post-Soviet Affairs*. 2011.

<sup>432</sup> Karen Dawisha, "Is Russia's Foreign Policy That of a Corporatist-Kleptocratic Regime?" *Post-Soviet Affairs* 27, no. 4 (2011): , doi:10.2747/1060-586x.27.4.331.

<sup>433</sup> Alena V. Ledeneva, *Can Russia modernise?: sistema, power networks and informal governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014). 19-49.

is the natural result. He eschews the focus on democracy which dominates the literature because he feels there are many examples of highly functioning democracies which have large instances of corruption, kleptocracy, etc., ergo the discussion would be moot and remove focus on where he feels it should be: good governance and impartiality. Good governance requires specific principles guiding the state and its institutions and should reward officials who exhibit impartiality while punishing those who do not. Rothstein agrees that impartiality of officials is vital in cultivating trust within a society. Where corruption is present, trust is reduced and inequality is fostered. Because he feels social trust is an absolutely vital component of internal legitimacy (because it has both political [support for government institutions] and economic [support and confidence in the market] value), he feels governments who are unable to function effectively are the worst "social ills" of all. However, it is clear with this level of corruption that is so entrenched, that has so many doing all they can to maintain the status quo, the measured effects mentioned above on trust and democracy seem not likely to change anytime soon.<sup>434</sup>

The problems with both of these approaches to trust in Russia are clear. Both the culturalists and the institutionalists focus on the importance of generalized trust. The culturalists ignore the importance of particularized trust completely pointing towards a bankruptcy of Western civic organizations and social capital all of which are measured via liberal global institutions leading to the atomization of society. This creates a sort of 'West not the Rest' version of trust. While the instrumentalists recognize the possibility of alternate types of civil society and joining, they still emphasize the importance of faith in institutions impacting generalized trust. Different societies have formed alternate trust networks in reaction to a combination of factors which can include, but are not limited to, authoritarian regimes, access to technology, religious beliefs, tribal societies, as well as experience with others.<sup>435</sup> This suggests it is possible to have a society which does not feel connected to their institutions, yet still can function with one another, as well as support democratic values.

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<sup>434</sup>(Bo Rothstein, *The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011) 104, 214.)

<sup>435</sup>Alena V. Ledeneva, *Can Russia modernise?: sistema, power networks and informal governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014)19-49.

Human beings are inherently social creatures; while various factors may cause them not join 'typical' forms of social groups, they will find other ways to interact and exchange information often through informal practices and networks and Russians are no exception.<sup>436</sup> In response to inefficiencies and paradoxical nature of Russian bureaucracy, or *sistema*,<sup>437</sup> Russians lost faith in the system and developed their own informal rules and networks in order to 'get things done' in the face of competing bureaucracies and interests which often stymied the efforts of every day Russians to function.<sup>438</sup> What began under the Imperial and Soviet systems, has continued on today, updated for the current regime in response to modern technology, issues, etc. It suggested in post-communist and post-soviet regimes such as Russia, different forms of civil society have emerged, particularly online which are vibrant, personal, highly active, and sometimes politically active.<sup>439</sup> While investigating the Russian case, Lonkila discovered that the internet has become the central tool in organizing groups to meet both on and offline for both political and non-political purposes.<sup>440</sup> Initially, the Russian "hacker" culture began to form almost as instantly as computer technology began to spread in Russia. It was born out a bankruptcy of reliable information in what was happening within the country and the rest of the world. Even under Gorbachev, reliable information was hard to come by. Russian hackers used the new technology to exchange information with one another. After the

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<sup>436</sup>Ibid.

<sup>437</sup> sistema- (1) from Greek, "sistema", creation (sozдание), constitution (sostavlenie), order or structure of correlated and co-ordinated parts, working in a synchronised way; (2) in political contexts, a political system or system of governance; (3) in the vernacular, a euphemism for the informal corporate code followed in organizations (4) in hippy jargon, self-definition of the hippy movement in the USSR and, more widely, dependence on the systematic intake of heroin, drugs, living from dose to dose; (5) in corporate contexts, the "Sistema" corporation headed by Evtushenkov; (6) in this book, the system of governance with its peculiar formal rules and informal norms, combined in a way that is non-transparent for outsiders but recognized by insiders of the public administration in Russia. In the context of Putin's rule, a co-dependence of parasitic power elites and parasitic masses; an implicit social contract between the rent-seeking elites conniving at enriching themselves at the expense of public resources or raiding while not reforming/diversifying the economy, and the compliant masses, living at the expense of the trickle-down income from the oil-dependent economy, producing little but engaged in entrepreneurial scheming. "Glossary", in *Can Russia Modernise?: Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 273-280

<sup>438</sup>Alena Ledeneva, "How Russia Really Works," Center for European Reform, May 22, 01, accessed July 10, 15, [https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/e246\\_unwritten\\_rules-2203.pdf](https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/e246_unwritten_rules-2203.pdf).

<sup>439</sup>Ibid.

<sup>440</sup>Markku Lonkila, "The Internet and Anti-military Activism in Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 7 (2008): , doi:10.1080/09668130802230671.

fall, the flow of information seemed to be improving, however, this was sharply reversed under Putin.

The new president immediately set out new programs which included the breaking down of public civic groups, and the free and independent media. NGOs were now required to register with the state and meet harsh requirements for operating in the Russian Federation. Some were outright barred (YMCA and the Salvation Army, for example) and others struggled to meet the minimum requirements. This allowed the state considerable control over the civic organizations which remained operational in Russia; it also severely curtailed and later eliminated all public demonstrations without a near impossible to obtain permit. Putin also began the takeover of independent media and by 2003 brought nearly all media under state control. Those that remained were minor and non-influential or seen as a threat to the state, even if they were critical of the state.<sup>441</sup>

Under these conditions, Russian hackers began to find ways around these barriers via RuNet. The Russian Internet began with a relatively very small number of people; this small "community" of tightly knit IT professionals and several ex-patriates gave life to RuNet via the LiveJournal blogging environment and with it a growing subculture. These groups created their own legends and cult heroes, and the growing online community religiously began following the projects and blogs of these individuals.<sup>442</sup> Overtime, these online spaces have come to form a legitimate sort of civil society in which people exchange ideas with one another about a wide variety of topics. According to Lonkila, these connections seem to operate as "weak ties" connecting people and transferring information between different social groups.

In short, RuNet plays a critical role in civic activism. Examining anti-military groups, Lonkila discovered:

Activists may not only search for and distribute information on the internet, communicate with each other, the media, the public and the authorities, but

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<sup>441</sup>Henrike Schmidt and Katy Teubener, "Control Shift Public and Private Usages of the Russian Internet," Katy-teubener.de, 2006, , [http://www.katy-teubener.de/joomla/images/stories/texts/publikationen/control\\_hift01.pdf](http://www.katy-teubener.de/joomla/images/stories/texts/publikationen/control_hift01.pdf).

<sup>442</sup>Ibid.

also recruit new members and organize online and offline actions. In Russia, the significance of the internet as an alternative medium for information diffusion, communication and mobilization has grown markedly with the strengthening of state control over the traditional media, particularly television, in the early twenty-first century.<sup>443</sup>

Online news sites, e-mail and blogging systems are crucial for the disbursement of information and communicating among activists, pressuring the authorities, and organizing online and offline protests and demonstrations. Civil society, though not fitting the Putnam vision of bowling leagues, is alive and well, for those who have access, reaching across a wide variety of interest groups in Russia. Human beings are inherently social, when faced with obstacles that make traditional forms of civil society impossible, they will make due and work around the system to form connections and bonds with others through vast social networks. These new social networks are not that much different than the old. Both required interaction at some level with unknown others. Both are the fruits of in direct response the authoritarian state pushing it down.

## **Khodyakov and the Strong-Weak State Model.**

Khodyakov (2007) describes the trust relationship which was present in Soviet times. He outlines a similar process of understanding trust as the culturalists do. Essentially, strong-ties are one's first interaction with trust. We learn to trust or not trust based our interactions with immediate and extended family. This gives us confidence to then branch out and form our own associations and friendships outside of the family unit. These relationships are known as weak-ties. However, strong-ties do not lead to the atomization of society, as culturalist believe.<sup>444</sup> How one feels about their institutions or government has no impact what so ever on how they trust one another. Khodyakov (2007) finds this to be the case; particularly in the Soviet system. In Soviet society,

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<sup>443</sup>Markku Lonkila, "The Internet and Anti-military Activism in Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 7 (2008): , doi:10.1080/09668130802230671.

<sup>444</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).; Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Culture and Politics*, 2000, , doi:10.1007/978-1-349-62965-7\_12.



strong ties were important for meeting intermediaries whom you trust to help bridge across to form weak-ties. Typically, a friend's relative or another family member of your own might act as the intermediary who would introduce you to someone they know and trust who is outside of the group to help you obtain goods or services you might need.<sup>445</sup> The formation of weak-ties through one's strong ties was an absolutely essential part of survival under the Soviet system<sup>446</sup> Khodyakov offers his own definition of trust:

Trust is a process of constant imaginative anticipation of the reliability of the other party's actions based on: (1) the reputation of the partner and the actor. (2) the evaluation of current circumstances of action, (3) assumptions about the partner's actions, (4) the belief of the honesty and morality of the other side.<sup>447</sup>

He uses this definition to establish trust as a process that must be evaluated on multiple levels; particularly when extrapolating it out to social trust. He claims social trust must be evaluated with this understanding at each level, particularized, general, and institutional trust, and how they interact with one another in order to be properly understood and evaluated.

In relationship with the state, institutional trust is independent from the other two forms of trust. One can have no faith in the government but this does not interfere with societies' trust in one another. What impacts institutional trust is the relative strength of the institutions. In the Soviet context, the state was seen as both strong and weak at the same time; strong because they could provide some basic needs such as education and healthcare, as well as a sense of security on the global stage, however, they were also seen as weak because often, stores were empty and lines were long for some of the most

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<sup>445</sup>Alena V. Ledeneva, "Practices of Exchange and Networking in Russia," *Journal of Financial Crime* 6, no. 3 (1999): , doi:10.1108/eb025886.

<sup>446</sup>Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.; Vladimir Gelman, "Subversive institutions, informal governance, and contemporary Russian politics," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45, no. 3-4 (2012): , doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.07.005.);Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with 'Blat': Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" *Social Research* 76, no. 1 (2009): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146>.

<sup>447</sup>Khodyakov, Dmitry. "Trust as a Process." *Sociology*, vol. 41, no. 1, 2007, pp. 115-132., doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.

basic food items or other necessities.

This forced society at all levels, the individual, the state factory owner, etc., to turn to one another in order to survive. Through a series of vast social networks, people were able to get what they needed. The system is known as *blat*' and continues to function to a slightly lesser degree today. Ironically, what others saw as atomizing was anything but. People made connections through the use of intermediaries, or *po znakomstvu*,<sup>448</sup> which would often result in bridging across to truly unknown others and even across ethnicities to work together for shared interests. Because of the nature of the authoritarian state, the risks of getting caught were real and could result in jail time. So there was a level of risk involved, demonstrating the trust in the other while making these connections.<sup>449</sup> The clear implication here is that what impacted institutional trust was the strength of the state to deliver on its promises to the people in the form of strong institutions and economic well-being.

There have been some attempts to include social networks when measuring how trust operates in Russia though one in particular has interesting lessons to absorb. In his examination of Russian society, Gibson (2001) tries to account for the lack of typical networking groups in Russia and its implications for trust.<sup>450</sup> He argues examining trust in terms of social capital is the wrong focus. Just because people are not joining volunteer groups does not mean society is atomized. Quite the contrary, it is possible for a state or society to have vast social networks, which includes intermediaries, that substitutes for social capital and can be used to function in much the same way.<sup>451</sup> Social networks would be similar to strong-ties, however does not include family members; they tend to be co-workers, neighbors, acquaintances. Further, these must be people with whom they discuss politics. For Gibson, social networks must be political in order to have value in relation to democratization. Using Putnam's litmus test, this would leave one to imagine

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<sup>448</sup>Alena V. Ledeneva, "Practices of Exchange and Networking in Russia," *Journal of Financial Crime* 6, no. 3 (1999): , doi:10.1108/eb025886.

<sup>449</sup>Ivana MarkovTrust and Democratic Transition in Post-Communist Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

<sup>450</sup>James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition," *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.2307/2669359.

<sup>451</sup>Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.

there being little to no hope for developing and sustaining democracy in societies with low social capital.<sup>452</sup> Inglehart came to a similar conclusion; social capital itself is not an important building block for democracy, but rather trust is. Trust is most important when considering the support of democratic values and democracy.<sup>453</sup>

Gibson is able to demonstrate how one conceptualizes trust can have an impact on the final outcome. I disagree, however, with the notion that social networks cannot include family members. Turning to Habermas and his notion of the elements of civil society, he relies heavily on the idea that family members are important players in the development of civil society.<sup>454</sup> One wonders, then, why they should be excluded from social networks that are a vital part of civil society? This is something Khodyakov well understands (2007). However, Gibson (2001) claims in order for social networks and social trust to be useful that it must be political in nature. Inglehart would disagree with this stance; he claims social trust is often formed without any thought of political discussion or action. Just because trust might begin at a non-political level amongst family and friends today does not translate into an inability to do so at a later time or when democracy is threatened. He further claims that social trust-independent of any political ties- is the corner stone of civil society.<sup>455</sup>

## CONCLUSION.

This chapter has covered the three main kinds of regimes one can expect in post-Communist systems. A consistent pattern of backsliding has shown cause for concern and heightens the need for more specific research in the variables affecting the reversals.

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<sup>452</sup> Putnam, Robert D. "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." *Journal of Democracy*: 65-78.

<sup>453</sup> Michael Hout and Ronald Inglehart, "Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in Forty-three Societies," *Contemporary Sociology* 27, no. 2 (1998): , doi:10.2307/2654810. 127.

<sup>454</sup> The initial reason the family was excluded from these notions was based on the male-dominated society which wished to exclude women from its ranks due to the view they were not suited to be political engagers. This changed in the 1960s and 70s with the coming of the women's movement. Habermas sought to include them as societal actors particularly suited to engage with the politics of the day (Kaldor 2011: 22).

<sup>455</sup>Michael Hout and Ronald Inglehart, "Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in Forty-three Societies," *Contemporary Sociology* 27, no. 2 (1998): , doi:10.2307/2654810. 127.

It has also been uncovered that some regimes, though they have fallen back, are not in a state of chaos, but rather have achieved stability. Patterns that are common among post-Communist regimes were also briefly discussed. They share a common history and shared memories relating to authoritarianism.

Indeed, Stalinism and its Great Terrors, as well as forced famines resulted in a political and social environment of 'forced trust', causing society to become hyper-atomized. Not until the Thaw and de-Stalinization was Soviet society able to begin to experience an environment where interpersonal trust relations were renewed. Continued ineptitude by the state forced society to rely on one another through informal networks known as *blat*'. However, creeping nationalism in Eastern Europe resulting from a lack of trust in the system were brutally put down. Khrushchev's promises of Communism by 1980 were clearly untenable, and under Brezhnev completely abandoned in favor of "developed socialism." Focusing on trade with the West and importing needed goods rather than focusing on innovation, and increasing production and military strength were the hallmarks of the Brezhnev era. However, the loss of a common struggle of "building Communism" left some listless. Further, political experiments with looser interpretations regarding Marxist-Leninism in Eastern Europe renewed nationalist movements only for them to be temporarily put down by local authorities. A new era of non-intervention emerged that would shape the coming decades.

The reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev would unwittingly hasten the end of the floundering Soviet system, rather than save it. Introducing pluralism into the system as part of perestroika removed the central ideology necessary for the Communist system to survive: it implies other voices may have answers and the Party alone did not carry them. This idea was revolutionary, and together with *glasnost*' exposed the system well in decay. The people were now able to voice their anger and distrust openly. The brewing nationalism in the East and around the Soviet system came to a head. Again, the state, strapped financially and militarily, did not intervene to quash nationalist rebellions in Poland, East-Germany, or the Baltics, in hopes of keeping hold at the center. However, Russian nationalism also sprung up from the bottom. Citizens began to demand their rights and

democratic leaders such as Boris Yeltsin emerged to oblige them.

The system finally collapsed under its own weight and a new hope for democracy in Russia and the breakaway states finally emerged. In Russia, people were excited to participate in elections, however the reality of the shock-therapy and privatization policies saw their hopes dashed. The new system was just as corrupt, however now many social protections were gone. Further, the democratic institutions needed to protect the people from the new robber barons were not in place, or if they were, were inept or corrupt, as well. Once again, society turned to one another in order to fill the gaps left by the indifferent state, relying on their old trust networks and the second economy to survive.

The second democratically elected President has brought stability but rather than fulfill the promises of creating a strong liberal democracy he has created a strong consolidated authoritarian state and seemingly endless rule. There is no real alternation in place and the breakdown of civil liberties has taken place. Freedom of the press and association are virtually non-existent. Civil society is extremely curtailed, as is civic participation. However, there is new hope coming from the grassroots of society. Through the use of new forms of civic engagement, particularly social networks, opposition leaders and average citizens are braving danger and banding together in protest, demanding a new political order.

This chapter also looked at research specifically examining trust in the region to see if deviant cases can help build a better understanding of how trust works. While Putnam and Fukuyama's considerations are the crux of understanding trust and democracy today, they fall apart on further examination. Their desire to eschew particularized trust is an important failing, this is because it is the first step in the process of trust. Those who identify as generalized trusters incorporate all experiences grounded in their cultural realities which they gained over time and will continue to gain or lose through the process of trust they first learned to navigate through their caregivers. Moreover, because trust is grounded in time and space, as well as projected forward into the future, cultural understandings of how trust networks operate must also be taken into consideration. In other words, bridging to unknown others may not take the same form in Brazil as they

do in Italy, America, Iran, or Russia.

The gaps in the current literature are thusly unable to capture the nature of trust specifically or reflexively. Putnam has reified trust by removing its dynamic nature as well as emphasizing one characteristic of trust over another, thereby extracting the human element of trust relations. Even areas specific theorists are also guilty. The culturalists notions of trust are so entrenched in the notion of particularized trust being atomizing, they leave little hope for the future of Russian democracy. Similarly, institutionalist approaches miss the mark, as well in terms of how particularized trust can be cultivated to bridge to unknown others. research by Khodyakov and Ledenva reminds us that partiluarized trust is the basis for bridging to unknown others and informal networks operate in the Post-Soviet time and space to fill gaps the state is unable or unwilling to perform. This creates bonds that act independent of the state and re-embed society in the local and with one another. And while Gibson strives to account for social networks, he still emphasizes generalized trust and the need for networks to be political in nature. As such, a new approach to understanding trust must answer these questions: What is the nature of trust? Why does particularized trust matter and how does it affect democracy? Are atomized trusters different from particularized trusters?

Chapter 4 will establish the theoretical support for the creation of a multidimensional variable that builds on a process of trust. I will then build on these considerations and advocate for a mix of culturalist and institutionalist approaches moving forward, adding in the elements of particularized trust, as well as atomized others.

**CHAPTER 4:  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE NATURE OF TRUST.**

**INTRODUCTION:THE NATURE OF TRUST AND ITS PROCESS.**

Particularized trust is the basis of trust formations. Without it, generalized trust cannot be considered. Trust is the result of the process of trust experiences, both positive and negative, throughout our lives grounded in time and space.<sup>456</sup> Examining Erikson's stages of development supports this notion. At each stage Erikson underscores the importance of primary trust developed as an infant for reinforcing positive values at each stage. Our level of trust is a product of our upbringing, familial interaction, experiences in school, with our neighbors, friends, society at large, and the group of seen and unseen institutions in our societal cultural setting.<sup>457</sup> Trust is the first stage of a child's development. Children learn to either trust or mistrust those whom are charged for their care, from birth to 18 months. This period is deemed as the most important stage of development. Positive interactions with their caregivers informs the child s/he is safe and can trust those around him/ her. "The amount of trust derived from earliest infantile experience" [depends] on the quality of the maternal relationship.

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<sup>456</sup> Trust is a process of constant imaginative anticipation of the reliability of the other party's actions based on: (1) the reputation of the partner and the actor. (2) the evaluation of current circumstances of action, (3) assumptions about the partners actions, (4) the belief of the honesty and morality of the other side. "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.

<sup>457</sup>Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York City: W.W. Norton and Company, 1963) 218.

Mothers create a sense of trust in their children by "sensitive care of the baby's individual needs and a firm sense of personal trustworthiness."<sup>458</sup> x In other words, caregivers create a sense of inner security and outer predictability for the child via a continuity in actions that fulfill the infant's needs results in a rudimentary sense of ego identity. That is, internal memories and anticipated sensations that the child correlates with the "outer populations of familiar and predictable things and people"<sup>459</sup> that build self-esteem and confidence.<sup>460</sup> This trust is carried with us through our different stages of development and reassessed as we gain new knowledge and experiences over time.

### **The role of recognition in trust.**

Our trust calculus, to trust or not trust, is based on this understanding when engaging, particularly, with unknown others. Our decision to act to trust or mistrust is based on the process of trust itself that includes positive and negative experiences related to *recognition*. Our own identity, that is built from self-esteem and confidence, is challenged as we engage with others in society. Hegel has demonstrated that subjects capable of action owe their potential for creating a positive relationship to the self via the involvement in mutual recognition.<sup>461</sup> All this depends on the personal and physical interactions with individuals who offer us special feelings of appreciation that we can return in kind. When one experiences appreciation, they can then learn to turn these positive feelings inward, building self-confidence.<sup>462</sup> Honneth believes this can be taken a step further by using his proposed structure to illuminate the various forms of social disrespect. This disrespect can lead to atomization, of which we must remain cognizant. I will continue with that idea and say it also has as an end how one builds on the process of trust relationships within a similar moral infrastructure of the social life-world in which he describes.<sup>463</sup>

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<sup>458</sup>Ibid. 249.

<sup>459</sup>Ibid, 218.

<sup>460</sup>Honneth, A. "Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition." *Political Theory*, 1992, 187-201.

<sup>461</sup>Ibid.

<sup>462</sup>George W.F. Hegel and Arnold V. Miller, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 112.

<sup>463</sup> Honneth, A. "Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition." *Political Theory*, 1992, 187-201.



Honneth offers his own patterns of recognition, that are quite similar to the levels of trust: love, that is analogous to particularized trust that operates at the level of the family and those you know; *rights* that correspond to institutional trust, that is your interactions with the state's institutions that are the caregiver of your right to recognition; finally, solidarity, that aligns with generalized trust in unknown others. Solidarity is the act of seeing yourself reflected in unknown others. It leads to empathy with the other. Honneth does not link the various levels nor describe how one informs the other, instead each level is bracketed or outlined in structure, that he fully admits. His aim is to name and define the moral infrastructure itself in which the social life-world must consist of in order to protect its members. A more complete understanding how recognition helps uncover the nature of trust as a process, however, is illuminated by examining human agency and how individuals and groups interact within and between the structure brackets.

The structure in which trust operates is hierarchical or nested. It has different levels or brackets, as Honneth suggests, however individuals and groups are able to interact with this structure.<sup>464</sup> The prevailing culture is the stage in which the structure is embedded and in which institutions of the state operate based on sculptural ideas, norms, laws. These institutions are the keepers of the rights of individuals afforded by the state. As such, trust in institutions will be a product of how affective those institutions are regarding the individual recognition and politics of recognition.<sup>465</sup> Society itself is another part of the structure, that is also based in cultural norms in time and space, and takes to form of social institutions. Individuals within society will respond to societal norms to interact with other levels of the structure via social networks and other forms of civil society. Further, individuals can be fostered or hindered through experiences within the structure as a whole. It is not static; in other words, serve to merely act on individuals removing their agency. It is an organic structure made up of humans who actively engage or disengage via the process of trust. The amount of trust each person has in any given situation in unknown others or the people they know, or institutions exists on a

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<sup>464</sup>Ibid.

<sup>465</sup> see: Charles Taylor and Charles Taylor, "Politics of Recognition," in *Multiculturalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). The demands for recognition and inclusion that have arisen since the 1960s in racial, ethnic, gender and other minority or socially marginalized groups.

*spectrum* as a direct result of their experiences with the trust process. A process that begins at birth and is constructed via familial relations, expanded upon, as the process is continuous and ever evolving, to branch out to others in society with varying degrees of inclusion and exclusion, and up the structural ladder over time.

### **The process of trust, described.**

Therefore, the process of trust can be described in the following manner: human beings trust via a continuous process, initially formed via our earliest trust interactions, that are dynamic and change as we receive new information about the "other" or "others". Our initial decision to trust in any given circumstance is based in prior experiences with others, information about the other's reputation, and our own personal interactions with the other, knowledge about the circumstances surrounding the trust calculus, grounded in time and space. As we receive new information in the form of experiences, knowledge, etcetera, we update our prior information to determine the probability the other is has integrity and is, therefore, trustworthy. It is a process that we engage in everyday, in a myriad of situations, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes with full intent, but it is an on-going process. Further, we are complex beings who trust in complex ways. We are not solely one sort of "truster" or another. We create, to varying degrees, intricate social networks that draw on all of those whom we trust, which one we rely on depend specific circumstances, as we need them. Ergo, it is important that our trust in one another be considered in such a way to to reflect, as close as possible, the nature in which we actually trust and include separated into brackets via how they trust or do not trust, to varying degrees, and can intermingle between these brackets as the process of trust is all trust realities. If particularized trust is contingent, in part, on culture, so will generalized trust be. Culture is the stage on which trust relations are played out. Moreover, it appears society and individuals seek alternate routes to fulfill needs, when institutions of their state and culture fall short of reciprocal recognition, by turning to one another, nurturing individual level trust in other ways. The distinction is at which level is trust fostered, and this seems to depend on the society in question.

## Theoretical difficulties with previous approaches.

The current approach to trust is Western in focus; it does not account for differentiation in cultures and histories. As Erickson points out, we cannot remove trust away from the time and space, as well as culture in which they are embedded and created. Currently, the liberal trust approach has a hyper focus on generalized trust and creates a specific western liberal version of civic organizations and civil society, that leads to a minimum of liberal democracy: all of which are measured via liberal global institutions. This creates a sort of *West not the Rest* version of reality that leads to the exclusion of the other by the dominating group or system.<sup>466</sup> It is vital we get at the true nature of trust, as negative connotations based on flawed understandings have the direct impact of excluding people and or groups, as well as states, from state and global benefits of mutual cooperation and support.

Erickson argued that particularized trust formation correlates to the myriad societal and political institutions. For example, the belief in a higher power and observance of religious practices is correlated to the infancy stage of development. This is because one is giving themselves over to God as their caretaker; having faith in God is the tantamount to trusting one's parents to fulfill one's needs, both physical and emotional.<sup>467</sup> Individuals seek recognition in the process of trust creation not only with one another and society, but with the state and its institutions. We turn to the state in an effort to ensure they recognize us as individuals having a set of inalienable rights and entrust the government to reflect ourselves in its vision.<sup>468</sup> When they fail to recognize our rights in which they are entrusted, a mistrust in institutions results. This is particularly the case for minority and ethnic groups. Specifically, it is termed as a violation of the politics of recognition that, too, is internalized as a form of *disrespect*, resulting in mistrust. After such violation of trust, individuals or groups turn away from said institutions and toward one another.<sup>469</sup>

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<sup>466</sup>Ulrich Beck, "World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society?" *Theory, Culture Society* 13, no. 4 (1996): , doi:10.1177/0263276496013004001.

<sup>467</sup>Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York City: W.W. Norton and Company, 1963). 220.

<sup>468</sup>George W.F. Hegel and Arnold V. Miller, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 113.

<sup>469</sup> Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285. ; George W.F. Hegel and Arnold V. Miller, *Phenomenology of*

This "turning inward" does not always mean individuals are resolved to be victims of such an affront. They look to have their needs met through their social networks, that include intermediaries from other groups who may have the ability to fulfill those immediate needs. These interactions have the ability to branch out to address other unrequited<sup>470</sup> needs of recognition from institutions.<sup>471</sup> They bind together in-person or online to form new social networks with unknown others who share their vision and reflect the other in themselves; they can even band together to create alternate forms of global civil society and institutions to address their desire for recognition. This myriad of activity is also a process of trust formation that unfolds across time.

## The problem of atomization.

In order to continue with our understanding of trust, it is important to discuss the role of atomized others in relation to particularized trust. The literature claims that particularized trust can lead to the atomization of society that is detrimental to democracy.<sup>472</sup> However, atomization is the *absence* of trust in others. Particularized trust is based on *trust* in people you know. Atomization is the mirror negative of trust. Therefore conceptualizing a bankruptcy of trust with those who *do* trust does not follow, logically. Atomization occurs when individuals experience negative interactions with the people they know and/ or society.<sup>473</sup> Ultimately what humans seek is recognition of the self.<sup>474</sup> Negative trust relations resulting in the lack of recognition can cause the individual to lose trust in the world. School aged children, for example, become aware of the color of their skin, the background of their parents and even the kinds of clothes they are wearing in relation to others around them.<sup>475</sup> They seek recognition from others of who they are

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*Spirit* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977),113.

<sup>470</sup> Use of this word is intentional, as it relates to Erickson's infancy stage that is tied trust creation, that he in turn ties to institutions (1963: 229).

<sup>471</sup> James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition," *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.2307/2669359.

<sup>472</sup>Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Culture and Politics*, 2000, , doi:10.1007/978-1-349-62965-7\_12.

<sup>473</sup> Erikson. *Childhood and Society*. 248.

<sup>474</sup> Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York City: W.W. Norton and Company, 1963). 222.; Hegel. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. 113; Axel Honneth, "Integrity and Disrespect," *Political Theory* 20, no. 2 (1992): , doi:10.1177/0090591792020002001.

<sup>475</sup>Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York City: W.W. Norton and Company, 1963). 229.

and try to see themselves in others. The self necessitates validation by being directly "satisfied or answered"; recognition takes place in the form of emotional encouragement and acceptance.<sup>476</sup> When others do not offer recognition it is out of the fear of the other because they do not see themselves reflected in the other; this leads to the exclusion of those who do not reflect their own sense of self. The excluded other will withdraw into themselves, seeking comfort in those more like them in whom they will find acceptance, recognition and trust. It is when they do not find trust, they turn inward to themselves, away from society and family. These same kinds of interactions are modeled again and again throughout one's life as they interact in different settings over time.<sup>477</sup> Therefore if we turn *away from* trust, how can we be labeled as part of the particularized group of trusters as Putnam and others would suggest? If we indeed wish to get at the true nature of *trust* and how it affects democracy, it follows this group should be considered separately when thinking about trust groups. A more appropriate approach would be to examine trusters and non-trusters.

If we are truly interested in democratic values that consider the rights of individuals, not only must we account for atomized others separately, we must consider the process and events that lead to the atomization in the first place. This demands a reflexive undertaking among individuals and societies. If we can recognize the causes, we will better be able to address them and work to reincorporate the atomized other into society. This process can, in turn, result in an increase of democratic values.

Further, It is important we do not underestimate the inherent, though perhaps obscured, value that can exist when society turns away from state institutions and retreat into the comfort and security of one another or the self. Gellner claims atomization may not always be detrimental for democratic values.<sup>478</sup> Indeed, it may be a symptom of pending change from the ground up. Humans are inherently social creatures; even in the most trying times of institutional distrust, bonds are created sparks of resistance are ignited.

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<sup>476</sup>George W.F. Hegel and Arnold V. Miller, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 111; Axel Honneth, "Integrity and Disrespect," *Political Theory* 20, no. 2 (1992): , doi:10.1177/0090591792020002001.

<sup>477</sup>Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York City: W.W. Norton and Company, 1963). 229.

<sup>478</sup>Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 129-136.

In severe cases, it can lead to demonstrations, new social movements within and beyond state borders, and possibly even revolution of the oppressive regime. These individuals and movements should be sought out and their support for democratic ideals and values be recognized.

## **Recognition of the other.**

The previous section reminds us is not enough to consider trust in relation to the current state of democracy inside of borders. We must be aware of how trust operates and relate it to the current state of affairs for others. These others could be the marginalized within societies, but also others, globally. Giddens work reminds us of what trust looks for industrialized nations. But what about the rest of the world? When thinking about others on the global stage Beck offers some insight. Taking Giddens notion of risk to the level of state and international relations, it becomes the basis of what he calls the *world risk society*. This occurs first at the individual level. Engaging with others can be seen as risky. Beck would also argue that all individuals in society are more or less risky. When a group represents risk, this leads to the marginalization of the group. He feels risk (at the microcosm) involves a relation between at least two people, i.e. the "decision maker" who takes the risk and the "other." The decision maker, once decisions are made based in the reality of threat or perception of it, triggers a set of consequences on others who may or may not be able to defend themselves. All of their positive attributes are dissolved under the "reality" (real or imagined) of this "threat". In the horizon of risk via cosmopolitanism, the purely black and white nature or events or situations -legal or illegal, good or evil, right or wrong, etc., no longer exist. People become more or less risky. For Beck, it is important to understand that all people as individuals pose some level of risk for everyone else in society. While he does not specifically use the word trust, the author argues the consequences of this use of the word risk correlates to trust. When we trust, we are taking a risk, the degree of belief in the level of risk we take on is formed by positive or negative interactions from past experiences at each level of trust. The

amount of risk we take relates to our past experiences with others.<sup>479</sup>

Beck argues this risk defined world takes on a dichotomous relationship: "it is the existent and the nonexistent, present and absent, doubtful and real" inhabiting the same cognitive space. In short, it assumes that "the threat which does not (yet) exist really exists."<sup>480</sup> In the global space global space, global risks take on a moral and political space of responsibility. The others in this space are near and far, present or absent whose actions are more or less risky and do not take on the pure binary nature of good and evil. For Beck, proximity, reciprocity, dignity, justice, and trust have meaning and are "transformed within the horizon of expectation of global risk."<sup>481</sup>

Beck takes Giddens notion of global civil society (or risk communities for Beck) and trust relations based on risk rather than *fortuna* (Beck would call this "uncertainty") beyond the surface to allow for a reflexivity when evaluating risk or trust in modernity. Trust based in risk for both Giddens and Beck is an attempt of the individual to regain control over his environment by turning uncertainty into risk. Risk implies an *educated* calculation for the probability of the degree of belief you have in the other depending upon previous experiences or events or faith in "expert systems." Beck takes this a step further: expert systems (institutions or government) often convert uncertainty into risk in a rather ambiguous way that only seemingly can protect security and reduce risk. However, this facade is quickly dashed when a catastrophic event occurs that the system was unable to predict and prevent. This results, again, in *uncertainty* that the system will then recalculate and transform (again) into *risk*. For global actors, trust is based on the sense of security. There is an underlying assumption that the world is filled with risks of all kinds and the state and other global actors are there to protect individuals from these risks: famine, flood, terrorism, war, etcetera. If the state and global actors can protect those under their charge and provide their needs, trust in the system is secured. However, if a catastrophic event occurs and the state is unable adequately provide security for the

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<sup>479</sup>Ulrich Beck, "Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision," *Constellations* 16, no. 1 (2009): , doi:10.1111/j.1467-8675.2009.00534.x.

<sup>480</sup>Ibid.

<sup>481</sup>Ibid.

needs of society, the previous risk becomes uncertainty and trust is lost.<sup>482</sup>

Beck believes these realities cause people to form into risk communities that he believes is a kind of "glue" for diversity. Global risks (that is, globalization, global warming, war, etc) naturally create a sort of "compulsory cosmopolitanism" in which state lines are blurred as it regards communication and economics. The manner and method in which the other is represented within the "global risk publics," he feels, is absolutely vital for establishing morality in the world. From his normative perspective, the representation and presentation of the other implies not only they been seen and heard ("sound and image") but also, meaning. That is, the alien "other" must and has the *right* to be *understood*; this is cosmopolitan understanding or cosmopolitan hermeneutics.<sup>483</sup>

We can see this reflected in modernity. Globalization does not negatively impact social trust by closing us off from one another. As Giddens<sup>484</sup> points out, in some ways, it enhances it. Even societies with non-Western trust realities have come to adapt. For example, societies with access to the Internet have formed alternate trust networks in reaction to a combination of factors that can include, but are not limited to, authoritarian regimes, access to technology, religious beliefs, tribal societies, as well as experience with others. London: Routledge, 2004. Further, recent research has strongly suggested new forms of social networks and civil society have emerged, particularly online that are vibrant, personal, highly active, and sometimes politically active.<sup>485</sup> However, this is all dependent on having technology to re-embed trust back into the local and across global spaces.

This sort of connection to unknown others gives us a chance to see ourselves reflected in them and offers those suffering the recognition they seek. Further, it gives us avenues to come to gather and act half-way around the world in a myriad of ways that include but are not limited to, sharing information with our own networks, offering financial support

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<sup>482</sup>Ulrich Beck, "Living in and Coping with World Risk Society: The Cosmopolitan Turn" (Moscow), June 2012, [http://www.gorby.ru/userfiles/ulrich\\_beck\\_final\\_version\\_moscow.pdf](http://www.gorby.ru/userfiles/ulrich_beck_final_version_moscow.pdf).

<sup>483</sup> Ibid.

<sup>484</sup>Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 4.

<sup>485</sup>Markku Lonkila, "The Internet and Anti-military Activism in Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 7 (2008): , doi:10.1080/09668130802230671.;Wim Van de Donk et al., *Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements* (London: Routledge, 2004) 87.



to those organizations that are in a position to help, engaging our own politicians to act to change the conditions in which the injustice sprung. Overtime, these online spaces have come to form a legitimate sort of civil society in which people exchange ideas with one another about a wide variety of topics. According to Lonkila, these connections seem to operate as "weak ties"(or generalized trust)<sup>486</sup> connecting people and transferring information between different social groups. There will likely never be a world in which all governments are democracies and all states are trusted by their citizenry. However, this process of joining together in global risk publics allows us to build weak-ties to unknown others globally, to build trust, and seek a more democratic world in which others are given the right to be *understood* and recognized, and injustices are addressed, transforming these global uncertainties into risk, thereby fostering trust with one another.

## CONCLUSION.

Until now, the seminal works on trust have focused on the importance of generalized trust over particularized, claiming the later is detrimental to the growth of democracy. Institutional trust has been seen as being vital, as well, as it feeds back into generalized trust creating a virtuous circle of trust in which democracies can thrive and survive. However, upon closer examination, we see that this view of trust is unidimensional. It cannot possibly account for the true nature of trust as it resigns each of us to one sort of truster or another. As such, it negates the trust realities of non-Western societies and leads to the exclusion of each one as being capable of developing democracy. It does not accurately take into account the *process* of how humans build and develop trust over time. Nor does it account how technological advances can affect trust of unknown others, nor how trust can be transformed to create new bonds of global civil society<sup>487</sup> and allow us to see our selves in oppressed others and work together to create change in the system.

As we can see trust is an ongoing process that begins when we are born. As we grow

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<sup>486</sup>Ibid.; Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 6 (1973): , doi:10.1086/225469.

<sup>487</sup>Mary Kaldor, *Global Civil Society: an Answer to War* (Oxford: Wiley, 2003).

we learn how to evaluate trust relationships via learned experiences. We evaluate one another in based on those experiences. We are active agents in the trust process. We are not resigned to one level of trust or another. We are a combination of those trusts and we interact with institutions accordingly. When faced with dilemmas, either personal or with institutions, we draw on all of our trust networks to varying degrees to form a plan of action moving forward. As we gain positive experiences, our trust grows in a manner reflective of the cultures we reside. As we have negative experiences, we may retreat into our families. Still others may become atomized away from society. It is even apparent that a lack of trust in institutions does not drive us from one another in ways that are always atomized. Society finds way to fill the gaps institutions are unable or unwilling to fill by turning to one another. And in the age of globalization we see those bonds can also help free us from oppressive regimes, support those who stand up and demand democracy, or at the very least, allow us in a globalized age to reach out to a global civil society for help. For those unable to do so, it is up to us to not forget how our lives impact unknown others in the corners of the world. We have a responsibility to them, they have the right to be understood and we have an obligation to listen, to see ourselves in the other and act on their behalf. This process of trust invokes a constant calculus of others in our immediate lives, of institutions, as well as those beyond our borders. It is a reflexive process. This is the human process of trust in modernity.

The next chapter will lay the methodological foundations for this work. It will explore limitations, as well as the contributions to the study of social and public trust in institutions.

## CHAPTER 5: THE METHODS.

### INTRODUCTION.

The examination of the relevant literature exposes 3 main questions this research will seek to answer: Do the country-level perceptions of corruption present in institutions have a credible impact on how society trusts one another at the individual level? Is there any credible difference between particularized trust and generalized trust in relation to one's support for democracy? In thinking about atomized others, do they have a credible negative impact on one's attitudes towards democracy? These questions can be answered by considering the following hypotheses: (H1) Country level corruption will not create a credible negative effect on individual trust outcomes in light of support for democracy. (H2) There is no credible difference between those who trust generally and those who trust particularly in relation to feelings of democratic importance. (H3) Atomized others have a credible negative impact on democratic importance.

Proper research must adhere to some method; according to King, Keohane, and Verba, the best method for the evaluation of our research involves the standards of the scientific method of inquiry.<sup>488</sup> As such, this chapter will unfold in the following manner: First, the research design will offer explanations of region specific study, and will justify the use of secondary survey data. Further, the data extracted from the World Values Survey will be specified. Next, the relevant terms to this research will be operationalized.

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<sup>488</sup>Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994), 8.

Then, the method here will be explored. In particular, why the use of the mixed or random effects hierarchical linear model (RE HLM) was employed versus the standard ordinary least-squares (OLS), or fixed effects hierarchical model (FE HLM), which will account for problems related to endogeneity. In addition, the choice to utilize Bayesian inference will be explored. And finally, an examination of the Russian case will take place employing an OLS model. In the end, this method will allow the author to account for corruption and its possible effects on trust and importance of democracy, while allowing the levels of trust to be measured more accurately. Then, the benefits of this research to the general knowledge will be explored. Finally, all research has its difficulties and this project bears no exception. As such, the limitations will be expressed.

## RESEARCH DESIGN.

*Depth vs. Breadth.* This project will examine the group of post-Communist countries as a potential deviant case related to the social trust questions outlined in the prevailing literature. As such, it will be qualitative because it is focused on a particular region or country. The findings of qualitative studies cannot be generalizable to the larger body of political science because of their specificity.<sup>489</sup> The trade-off here is potential contextual and particularized understanding in exchange for generalizability, gaining internal validity in the place of external validity. While qualitative studies have their drawbacks, the payoff can be beneficial. It is possible that through a more careful look into one's subject, one will be able to have a deeper understanding of the theory explored,<sup>490</sup> or one might uncover potential causal triggers for certain phenomena,<sup>491</sup> both of which will be of great use to the expansion of the body of scientific knowledge. Though this research is technically qualitative, the author will be using quantitative tools. Quantitative tools allow the researcher to "falsify, modify, or provide support for existing theory."<sup>492</sup> Moreover, it

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<sup>489</sup>Chava Frankfort. Nachmias and David Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences* (New York: Worth Publishers, 2007), 241.

<sup>490</sup>Ann C. Lin, *Reform in the Making: The Implementation of Social Policy in Prison* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 174-175.

<sup>491</sup>Natasha Borges Sugiyama and Wendy Hunter, "Whither Clientelism? Good Governance and Brazil's 'Bolsa Familia' Program.," *Comparative Politics* 46, no. 1 (2013): , doi:10.5129/001041513807709365.

<sup>492</sup>Chava Frankfort. Nachmias and David Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences* (New York: Worth Publishers, 2007), 241.

values the understanding of causal mechanisms via hypothesis testing. This is done deductively through the development of hypotheses from theory and then using the data collected for the purposed of testing their hypotheses.<sup>493</sup> Large data surveys are a common method employed for quantitative research in political science.<sup>494 495</sup>

*Search for generalizability.* The particular findings of qualitative research can lead to further study netting generalizable results. One obstacle to such an option can lie in a variable or set of variables that are so contextual specific, it creates a hurdle for measurement validity in broader set of cases. When possible, the researcher should seek to find a middle ground from the outset.<sup>496</sup> For example, this research has constructed a new trust variable in such a way it can next be used in a generalizable fashion to test across all countries of the WVS to check for broader, generalizable implications. The variable was constructed with the nature of how human beings trust in mind which is general and universal, though easily amendable for hyper-specific cases. Further, the model employed in this research will focus on quantitative techniques, particularly statistical methods with large data, to evaluate the hypotheses. As such, eschewing typical limited qualitative designs, such as focus groups or field work in one region, is favorable in the face of ready-made large  $n$  representative samples in each country in question; this is especially true in the quest for broader generalizability.<sup>497</sup>

## **METHOD.**

The author of this paper feels, based on Khodyakov's "Strong-Weak State" model, one can find cases which will deviate from previous results, and will provide the right environment to test out the new multidimensional trust variable. This requires and examination of those countries who would have existed in that sphere. A closer examination

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<sup>493</sup>Ibid.

<sup>494</sup>Babbie, 2011 106; Chava Frankfort. Nachmias and David Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences* (New York: Worth Publishers, 2007), 156; Earl R. Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research*, 13th ed. (Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning, 2013), 106.

<sup>495</sup>Ibid.

<sup>496</sup>Robert Adcock and David Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research," *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 03 (2001): , doi:10.1017/s0003055401003100

<sup>497</sup>Ibid.

of the Russian context will then be able to take place. Due to the nested nature of the data, a hierarchical design is required. Further, in order to test the institutionalist thesis which states it is the institutions in a given state that impact social trust at the individual level, an appropriate statistical model will need to be employed to parse out the causal arrow. Does democracy cause trust? Or does trust cause democracy? <sup>498</sup> Complicating matters further, does institutional performance cause trust, or as Bo Rothstein aptly puts it: does the "fish rot from the head down?"<sup>499</sup> To this end, a Bayesian RE HLM model will be employed in the regional context, in order to address these issues surrounding endogeneity. Once this is established, it will be possible to employ the OLS method to examine the specific case of Russia.

Using a Bayesian approach here is vital; this research is most interested in the inverse probability, in other words, the probability of the model given the data. Specifically, this project must examine the appropriateness of the model itself, which only Bayes can capture with greater confidence.<sup>500</sup> Through the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) implementation using the 'Gibbs sampling' method, one can improve the approximate distributions of the data at each step in the chain process, even for small n data as is found here. This will ultimately allow the MCMC to 'hone in' on the target posterior distribution,  $(\theta | y)$ , revealing whether or not the model is an appropriate fit for the data.<sup>501</sup>

This project will proceed in two parts: first, it will examine the Russian and post-Communist case using WVS data over the two-wave period between 2005-2015, as well as CPI data for 2008 and 2013 for country-level perceptions of corruption. A Bayesian Hierarchical Linear Model will be employed to determine if the country-level ?corruption? might impact how trusters support democracy in a given country. Wave 5 will first be explored examining the post-Communist states and Russia. Wave 6 will follow;

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<sup>498</sup>Helmut Rainer and Thomas Siedler, "Does democracy foster trust?" *Journal of Comparative Economics* 37, no. 2 (2009):.

<sup>499</sup>"Corruption and Social Trust: Why the Fish Rots From the Head Down," *Social Research* 80, no. 4 (Winter 2013): , doi:10.17506/ryipl.2016.17.1.3760.

<sup>500</sup>John K. Kruschke, "Bayesian Estimation Supersedes the t Test," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 142, no. 2 (2013): , doi: 10.1037/a0029146.

<sup>501</sup>Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 392.

unfortunately, not all of the same countries appear in this wave, limiting the number of countries from six to three. In the second part, an OLS model of Russia alone will be examined.

## Choice of HLM.

The regular ordinary least squares (OLS) method assumes independent and identically distributed int(iid) of all variables within the model. As such, all higher level variables assumed to be the same and can be "pooled" into a single population. Random Effects can deal with this partially by allowing the intercepts to vary across countries; in the case of this research this is not enough when exploring multiple countries at once. Because the variables for social trust and institutional trust can vary quite a bit between nations, one must also take into account the importance of the slopes varying, as well. The concern here is, according to the literature, trust in institutions is quite different from societal trust, however they can and sometimes do play into one another;<sup>502</sup> therefore they must be considered separately, and for purposes of this research, at different levels.<sup>503</sup>

The HLM method will account for the inherent nested nature of the data, while allowing the variables to vary appropriately with in the model, reducing Type I errors.<sup>504</sup> Indeed, most data in the political sciences are nested: for example, individual trusters inside countries, inside a region. Therefore, it is only appropriate to consider the data in such a way.<sup>505</sup> This research will be using the CPI data to represent institutional considerations. This attitudinal country-level variable will allow one to account for "perceptions" of institutions. In turn this will be used to control for "trust" and "importance of democracy" ; both variables will be taken form the WVS. Social trust is also allowed to vary by country. An interaction between social trust and institutional trust was created to see if such an interaction might affect the model. Overall, previous research tends to ignore is the potential effect of political institutions on social trust overall, while focusing

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<sup>502</sup>Bo Rothstein "Corruption and Social Trust: Why the Fish Rots From the Head Down," *Social Research* 80, no. 4 (Winter 2013): , doi:10.17506/ryipl.2016.17.1.3760.

<sup>503</sup>Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 251.

<sup>504</sup>Ibid.

<sup>505</sup>Ibid.

exclusively on generalized trust. Adding the multidimensional trust variable, as well as using mixed effects models over time, one can control for unobserved heterogeneity and address simultaneity.<sup>506</sup> Further, because this project is interested in differences in the levels of trust between nations on support for democracy, holding all others constant, the HLM method is most appropriate.<sup>507</sup>

Specifically, a mixed effect model which Gelman and Hill call "random effects" will be utilized here. Random or "mixed" refers to "the randomness in the probability model for the group-level coefficients."<sup>508</sup> This allows both the slope and the intercept to vary by groups. When used in conjunction with the HLM, this is referred to as "multi-level" modeling.<sup>509</sup> The random effect will be on trust. Random effects deals with the error terms in the level two equation; another way to think of this is error terms for the coefficient estimates. HLM is broke up into two pieces: the individual level, where indicators, data clusters are denoted as  $i$  and the group level, where the indicators are denoted as  $j$ . This research is concerned with  $i$  level individual level variables: the new multidimensional social trust variable and typical controls which include: age, gender, job satisfaction, net usage, and level of education. The institutional level variable will be CPI which is allowed to vary with trust by country. Constructing the model via HLM and examining it across both waves allows for the possibility of determining which direction the causal really arrow flows, reducing concerns over endogeneity.<sup>511</sup> It does this by allowing the independent variable "trust" to vary across the level two variable "country." Accounting for the various concerns related to endogeneity is also paramount. In other words, does the arrow flow from attitudes of trust to country-level considerations or visa versa? Measuring where these indicators fall over time and measuring the difference

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<sup>506</sup>Ibid. 245; Bell and Jones 2012

<sup>507</sup>Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9

<sup>508</sup>p. 245

<sup>509</sup> Gelman and Hill eschew the use of the term "random" because they feel it can be misleading and might also encourage the use of a solely fixed effects approach, which they claim are counterintuitive in social research; since random effects should "always be used" they opt for the single term,<sup>510</sup> however the author here will use random effects for additional clarity as it is also commonly used

<sup>511</sup>William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.; Natalia Letki and Geoffrey Evans, "Endogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe," *British Journal of Political Science*, 2005th ser., 35, no. 3, , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092242>.



between them can expose which direction the causal arrow points. Further, controlling for CPI will help account for the third variable omission.<sup>512</sup>

### **Problem of Endogeneity: Fixed Effects.**

It is en vogue today for many researchers to "eliminate" the endogeneity problem by simply employing a Fixed Effects (FE) model.<sup>513</sup> However, this method, while very simple and attractive in its ease of use, leads to serious variable omission issues. This method holds fixed the 2nd level variables at a mean of 0. In other words, it treats the higher level variables as completely separate from the individual exogenous variables when in fact they may not be and most likely are not. This essentially "strips out" the variables from their appropriate nested context and will result in telling us nothing particularly contextual or useful about the model or the data.<sup>514</sup> Further, because it is known there is an endogenous relationship between the DV and the IV, it is important to also control for the relationship at the country level and allow the IV to vary appropriately. Removing the FE will allow for endogeneity if it exists, while preserving context. To this end, it seems advisable to employ a random effects/mixed effects/multilinear effects model (RE) with some slight modifications to Mundlak. Before this is settled, an exploration of a commonly used method for dealing with endogeneity in HLMs, the Hausman test, should be addressed.<sup>515</sup>

### **Problem of Endogeneity: Hausman test.**

One typical test for endogeneity for HLMs is the Hausman test. However, it has recently been shown to have serious drawbacks in this regard.<sup>516</sup> The results of the Haus-

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<sup>512</sup>Chava Frankfort. Nachmias and David Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences* (New York: Worth Publishers, 2007), 208.

<sup>513</sup>Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones, "Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data," *Political Science Research and Methods* 3, no. 01 (2014): , doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.7.

<sup>514</sup>Ibid.

<sup>515</sup>Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones, "Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data," *Political Science Research and Methods* 3, no. 01 (2014): , doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.7.

<sup>516</sup>Ibid.

man are not particularly interesting and often yield little useful information in relation to endogeneity. Ultimately, it is very similar to the within and between effects. It is "neither necessary nor sufficient"<sup>517</sup> to use the Hausman test as the sole basis for one's own methodology. The issue can arise when there is a potentiality of covariance within groups/ across individual indicators and predictors. Clearly, the FE method and the Hausman test will not do What is required is a framework which is flexible, parsimonious, and one which allows for "endogeneity not simply to be fixed, but for it to be explicitly modeled."<sup>518</sup>

Establishing and maintaining the role of context in the model, be it individuals, neighborhoods, counties, cities, countries any parameter which denotes a "higher level", is typically of profound importance the research question, particularly in the political sciences, "one must model it explicitly."<sup>519</sup> Here, one simply cannot remove the country level effects and allow trust and corruption to be examined together at the individual level. This "pooling" will result in additional error to the model. Another method, the Multi-level or Random Effects (RE) model can analyze "both the within and between components of an effect explicitly", whilst preserving explanatory power.<sup>520</sup>

## **Solution for Endogeneity: Multi-level or Random Effects (RE) HLM model.**

The RE HLM method not only solves the "problem" of endogeneity across levels; it is specifically modeled and accounted for (Bell and Jones 2012). The adaptation of Muldak (1978) as notated in Berlin et. al., 1999 is parsimonious and effective way of dealing with endogeneity.  $\beta_1$  is the within effect and  $\beta_4$  is the between effects for  $X_{ij}$ . The  $X_{ij} - \bar{X}$  deals with the specific correlation, with the data centering around the group mean. The process shown above of "de-meaning" the x, results in the loss of the multicollinearity

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<sup>517</sup>Tom S. Clark and Drew A. Linzer, "Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects?" *Political Science Research and Methods* 3, no. 02 (2014): , doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.32.

<sup>518</sup>Ibid.

<sup>519</sup>Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones, "Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data," *Political Science Research and Methods* 3, no. 01 (2014): , doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.7.

<sup>520</sup>Ibid.

between variables, netting a much more stable and precise estimate. In other words, it returns an unbiased estimate of within group effects. The effect  $X_{ij}$  is separated one at each level into 2 different processes, "interpretable, and relevant to the researcher".<sup>521</sup> Also, the higher level residuals are assumed to be normal which results in efficiency over the FE model. In the FE case, higher level variables are assigned dummy indicators which are then switched 'off,' losing the needed context. The RE method, which functions via partial pooling, assumes error  $u_{0j}$  comes from a common sampling distribution and has been selected from the same sample space, more reliable predictions are the net result.<sup>522</sup>

$$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(x_{ij} - \bar{x}) + \beta_4\bar{x}_j + \beta_2z_j + (u_{0j} + e_{0ij})(1)$$

The above formula can be related to this research, however the model will include an interaction with CPI to see if that relationship has an effect of the DV, while being allowed to vary across clusters/ countries. This is justified, again, because multiple literatures suggest there is a direct relationship between societal trust in institutions and trust in one another in relation to democracy. If the variables still show a high level of correlation after the HLM has been complete, it would be worth it to not only move on to other methods to check this result, but potentially switch out the IV and DV and run a new model.

It is also important to note here that there is also current research which provides solid empirical evidence that neither side of the argument is completely right on its own, as is shown in Robbins 2012 cross-national panel study of political institutions and generalized trust over the years 1980-2009. Again, this method still focuses on the importance of generalized trust, which I feel is incorrect for reasons outlined above. Mishler and Rose (2012) also yielded similar results. One final, yet very important step: this research will be conducted using Bayesian inference, rather than the typical frequentist method.

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<sup>521</sup>Craig K. Enders and Davood Tofghi, "Centering predictor variables in cross-sectional multilevel models: a new look at an old issue.," *Psychology Methods* 12, no. 2 (June 2007): , doi:10.1037/1082-989X.12.2.121.

<sup>522</sup>Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones, "Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data.," *Political Science Research and Methods* 3, no. 01 (2014): , doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.7.

## What is Bayes?

Bayes theorem begins with the prior probability distribution of some unknown parameters and improves or updates it via the likelihood of that data which results in the posterior prediction (Figure 1). The prior probability is chosen as a starting point for the posterior is what is used to make predictions and inferences.<sup>footnote</sup>Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 143. The posterior distribution will become the new prior probability distribution and the chain will begin again, and continue as many times as required, to test all possible iterations. This is a time consuming process in relation to the frequentist method, which is one reason why it is often not employed. This is due to the use of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo/Metropolis.




Figure 2: Bayes Theorem

*The problem of priors from the frequentist approach.* The choice of priors has been the central critique surrounding Bayes. Indeed, priors have been called an "aberration of the intellect."<sup>523</sup> There are two camps to the Bayesian approach on how to select priors. In the first camp are the subjectivists in the style of De Finetti and Savage and use "uninformed priors". The other camp, called "Objectivists," focus on the use of so-called "informed priors."<sup>524</sup>

The subjectivists take a unique approach to prior formation. One can set any prior they wish, based on a variety of reasons. This includes setting a prior to be flat or uniform if one has no prior information or strong belief about the posterior distribution. It

<sup>523</sup>Goldstein 2005 <http://www.stat.cmu.edu/bayesworkshop/2005/goldsteinDOTpdf>

<sup>524</sup>Ibid.

also allows one to consider the data already at hand, and include other information that is not included in the data set, for example our 'hunches' about the posterior distribution.<sup>525</sup> Further, the subjectivists would not feel it is required to provide any justification or restrictions on the belief because, in the end, they feel any justification is introducing subjectivity into the equation. However, frequentists frown on this method. If one has no prior belief, claim the frequentists, assuming equally likely priors is not appropriate and "not scientific."<sup>526</sup> Rather than a problem for Bayes, it is actually one of its strongest points. Where frequentists would say one cannot model that which is not directly in the data set, Bayes allows for the Inclusion of all information that can affect the distribution, even after the initial collection of the data.<sup>527</sup> However, the subjectivists would not feel it is required to provide any justification or restrictions on the belief because, in the end, they feel any justification is introducing subjectivity into the equation. Further, when one has many observations contained within the data, the use of the so-called "uninformed prior" is justified. In the end, given enough iterations and data, the data will converge on the appropriate posterior distribution, regardless the prior set.<sup>528</sup>

Objectivists follow the "Principle of Insufficient Reason" which states prior distributions should be uniform unless there is some absolute reason to consider that one event has a greater probability than the other event, however a justification for your decision is not required.<sup>529</sup> In short, objectivists believe there must be some *initial* stage of knowledge. As such, one should be able to make some inferences on the data collected from the beginning. This is done when one has a strong belief some prior information is most

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<sup>525</sup>Michael Goldstein, "Subjective Bayesian Analysis: Principles and Practice," *Bayesian Analysis* 1, no. 3 (2006): , doi:10.1214/06-ba116.

<sup>526</sup>Ibid.; Robert E. Kass and Larry Wasserman, "The Selection of Prior Distributions by Formal Rules," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 91, no. 435 (1996): , doi:10.1080/01621459.1996.10477003.

<sup>527</sup>Goldstein 2005 <http://www.stat.cmu.edu/bayesworkshop/2005/goldsteinDOTpdf>

<sup>528</sup>John K. Kruschke, "Bayesian Estimation Supersedes the t Test," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 142, no. 2 (2013): , doi: 10.1037/a0029146.; Peter Boedeker, "Maximum Likelihood, Restricted Maximum Likelihood, and Bayesian Estimation for Mixed Models," *Practical Assessment, Research Evaluation*. 22, no. 2 (April 2017): , <http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=22n=2>.; Michael Goldstein, "Subjective Bayesian Analysis: Principles and Practice," *Bayesian Analysis* 1, no. 3 (2006): , doi:10.1214/06-ba116.

<sup>529</sup>Robert E. Kass and Larry Wasserman, "The Selection of Prior Distributions by Formal Rules," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 91, no. 435 (1996): , doi:10.1080/01621459.1996.10477003.

likely to be more credible over some other prior belief.<sup>530</sup> Therefore, a higher degree of belief is weighted on the prior in said direction.

Overall, the frequentist critiques leveled at the use of priors is the accusation a prior is just "guess" or subjective belief. Further, it was claimed probabilities should be measured by objective frequency of events rather than "subjective degrees of belief."<sup>531</sup> It is important to give thought to our choice of priors in order to overcome some of these criticisms. As such, a prior cannot be chosen on a whim; one must be prepared to justify their prior to a scientific or critical audience. The process must be transparent in order for it to stand up to scientific scrutiny. If one is uncertain about the data, and employs a uniform prior reflecting that uncertainty as a result, this is justified because the data will eventually take over or overwhelm the prior as it hones in on the target distribution.<sup>532</sup>

## Choice of Bayes.

When thinking of Bayesian data analysis, we are referring to the practical ways one can make inferences from all available data using probability models for the "stuff" we want to learn about. What makes the Bayesian approach unique is the exact use of probability in order to quantify uncertainty in our inferences using statistical methods.<sup>533</sup> In other words, we are turning our inferences into measurements of uncertainty.<sup>534</sup> It can also be thought of as the "reallocation across a space of candidate possibilities."<sup>535</sup> Uncertainty is measured via probability. Probability is a method of assigning numbers to a set of mutually exclusive possibilities; and probability is the basis of Bayesian inference.<sup>536</sup>

One of the main features of the Bayesian approach is one can make inference with little (small  $n$ ) to no data, which is optimal here for the regional study. Frequentists require set

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<sup>530</sup>Peter Boedeker, "Maximum Likelihood, Restricted Maximum Likelihood, and Bayesian Estimation for Mixed Models," *Practical Assessment, Research Evaluation*. 22, no. 2 (April 2017):

<sup>531</sup>Ibid.

<sup>532</sup>John K. Kruschke, "Bayesian Estimation Supersedes the t Test," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 142, no. 2 (2013): , doi: 10.1037/a0029146.

<sup>533</sup>Andrew Gelman, *Bayesian Data Analysis* (Baton Rouge: Taylor and Francis Group, 2003), 5.

<sup>534</sup>John K. Kruschke, *Doing Bayesian Data Analysis: A Tutorial with R and BUGS*. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2011), 10.

<sup>535</sup>Ibid.

<sup>536</sup>Ibid., John K. Kruschke, "Bayesian Estimation Supersedes the t Test," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 142, no. 2 (2013): , doi: 10.1037/a0029146.

data from which to measure, and do not allow for any influx of new information because it is believed this is not scientific and will corrupt their data. Where the frequentist paradigm would give up, or point to issues of internal validity, Bayes shines.<sup>537</sup> Because the examination in the post-Communist sphere contains few cases due to the way in which the WVS conducts its own research, this project is forced to make-due with limited country observations from which the HLM can vary. The choice of Bayes in this case is clear: one can infer credible beliefs even in the face of few cases.<sup>538</sup>

As such, this research seeks to determine the appropriateness of the textitmodel: this is one of the many benefits of the Bayesian approach. Bayes assumes inverse probability, that is, the probability of the model given the data. In the multilevel context with group level predictors, non-informed uniform priors are assigned. Each individual level of trust is given a hyper-prior with a mean of 0 and standard distribution of .1 distributed  $N$ .<sup>539</sup> Through the complex Monte Carlo (MCMC) process, the model will hone in on the target distribution, sampling through the chain and discarding "unlikely" possibilities, converging on the final parameter. The specific Bayesian formulae for the RE HLM model can be found below:

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_{ij} = & \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}ParticularizedTruster_{ij} + \beta_{2j}OtherTruster_{ij} \\
 & + \beta_3Age_{ij} + \beta_4Gender_{ij} + \beta_5Education_{ij} + \beta_6Income_{ij} \\
 & + \beta_7Net_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \tag{2} \\
 \beta_{0j} = & \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}CPI_j + \nu_{0j} \\
 \beta_{1j} = & \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}CPI_j + \varepsilon_{1j} \\
 \beta_{2j} = & \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21}CPI_j + \varepsilon_{2j}
 \end{aligned}$$

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<sup>537</sup>Daniel Stegmueller, "How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches," *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 3 (2013): , doi:10.1111/ajps.12001.;Sharon Bertsch McGrayne, *The Theory That Would Not Die: How Bayes' Rule Cracked the Enigma Code, Hunted Down Russian Submarines, and Emerged Triumphant from Two Centuries of Controversy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).;John K. Kruschke, "Bayesian Estimation Supersedes the t Test," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 142, no. 2 (2013): , doi: 10.1037/a0029146

<sup>538</sup>Stegmueller 2013 His work specifically deals with Bayesian HLM in the context of examining multiple countries at the group level. His analysis finds 5 is the preferred minimum

<sup>539</sup>Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)

Where  $y$  is the dependent variable,  $\beta$  are related to the slopes,  $i$  are individual indicators and  $j$  are group level indicators. The equation can be specified as below:



$$\begin{aligned}
y_{ij} &= (\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}CPI_j + \varepsilon_{0j}) + (\gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}CPI_j + \varepsilon_{1j})ParticularizedTruster_{ij} \\
&\quad + (\gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21}CPI_j + \varepsilon_{2j})OtherTruster_{ij} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_3Age_{ij} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_4Gender_{ij} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_5Education_{ij} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_6Income_{ij} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_7Net_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \\
&= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}CPI_j + \varepsilon_{0j} + \gamma_{10}ParticularizedTruster_{ij} \\
&\quad + \gamma_{11}ParticularizedTruster_{ij}PI_j \\
&\quad + ParticularizedTruster_{ij1j} + \gamma_{20}OtherTruster_{ij} \\
&\quad + \gamma_{21}OtherTruster_{ij}PI_j + OtherTruster_{ij2j} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_3Age_{ij} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_4Gender_{ij} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_5Education_{ij} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_6Income_{ij} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_7Net_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \\
&= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}CPI_j + \gamma_{10}ParticularizedTruster_{ij} \\
&+ \gamma_{20}OtherTruster_{ij} + \gamma_{11}ParticularizedTruster_{ij}PI_j \\
&\quad + \gamma_{21}OtherTruster_{ij}PI_j \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_3Age_{ij} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_4Gender_{ij} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_5Education_{ij} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_6Income_{ij} \\
&\quad\quad + \beta_7Net_{ij} + \varepsilon_{0j} \\
&\quad + ParticularizedTruster_{ij1j} \\
&\quad + OtherTruster_{ij2j} + \epsilon_{ij}
\end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

And further simplified as such:

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{y}_{ij} = & \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}CPI_j + \gamma_{10}ParticularizedTruster_{ij} + \gamma_{20}OtherTruster_{ij} \\
& + \gamma_{11}ParticularizedTruster_{ij} * CPI_j \\
& + \gamma_{21}OtherTruster_{ij} * CPI_j \\
& + \beta_3Age_{ij} \\
& + \beta_4Gender_{ij} \\
& + \beta_5Education_{ij} \\
& + \beta_6Income_{ij} \\
& + \beta_7Net_{ij}
\end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

This is the final equation (4) which will provide us with the predicted values. An interaction between CPI and trust will take place at both the RE level and the lower FE level. This will help further specify the nature of the relationship between CPI and trust in relation to one's feelings for the importance of democracy. In the end, if the Bayesian results confirm the frequentist HLM results, this research can be optimistic in the outcome and conclude, not only is the model reliable, but it accurately reflects the data provided. In other words, one would be able to conclude this model has "less wrong" results in comparison to other research.<sup>540</sup>

#### **OLS MODEL FOR RUSSIA SPECIFIC DATA.**

Because this research is particularly interested in the Russian case, it is only natural to examine this case more closely. As stated previously, the OLS method assumes all variables within the model are independent. This means, in this case, country-level variables assumed to be the same and can be pooled into a single population model.<sup>541</sup>

<sup>540</sup>Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>541</sup>Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones, "Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data," *Political Science Research and Methods* 3, no. 01 (2014): , doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.7.

Because of the limited wave data on the new trust variable, a time series would not be particularly reliable here prohibiting HLM in this context. As such, a standard OLS model is sufficient, particularly if the RE HLM of the region demonstrates no credible effect from the country level variable to the individual level of trust on support for democracy. This method will provide additional contextual support to test the new trust variable. Because the model was examined via the Bayesian RE HLM method and found to be reliable and endogeneity accounted for, a Bayesian examination of the Russian case is not necessary.<sup>542</sup>

## DATA COLLECTION.

This research will use secondary cross-national survey data available online from the websites of the World Values Survey, as well as Transparency International's *Corruption Perceptions Index*.<sup>543</sup> Funding and access are the primary considerations for this project; the data required for such a study would be exceptionally costly to create from whole cloth and employ in the region in a manner that was representative of the populations. As a Ph.D. student, those kinds of funds are unavailable. However, both the World Values Survey and Corruption Perceptions Index are well known in the field and use reliable collection methods ensuring a representative sample alleviating considerations. Specifically, the World Values Survey was chosen to model the trust question because this survey is the only one to have a multilevel question for both generalized and particularized trust. For example, the European Social Survey (ESS) does have a generalized trust question ranked from 1-10, however they do not have a particularized trust question.<sup>544</sup> The Russiabarometer<sup>545</sup> has both questions, however only covers Russia, not allowing for examination in the Region. The Corruption Perceptions Index was imported to model country-level corruption data.

The initial idea was to create a longitudinal data study over a number of waves,

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<sup>542</sup>Daniel Stegmueller, "How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches," *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 3 (2013): , doi:10.1111/ajps.12001.

<sup>543</sup>WVS; CPI

<sup>544</sup> "Source Questionnaire.," European Social Survey, 2012, , [https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round6/fieldwork/source/ESS6\\_source\\_main\\_questionnaire.pdf](https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round6/fieldwork/source/ESS6_source_main_questionnaire.pdf).

<sup>545</sup>"New Russia Barometer," Takes you to the main page for this section, , accessed May 30, 2017, <http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog10.html>.

however, by the time of this project's completion, only 2 waves were available limiting the scope of the study. Further, only six countries were present that met the post-Communist criterion for Wave 5 (Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Poland, and Serbia). Because of the time it takes to conduct interviews for each nation, the WVS conducts surveys in "waves."<sup>546</sup> Countries not covered in one wave, may be covered in another, however they may not. For similar reasons, in Wave 6, the field was further limited to a re-run of only three countries: Russia, Ukraine, and Poland. The attitudinal dependent variable of "importance of democracy" will also be taken from the WVS survey. Controls will include gender, age, income levels, net usage, and trust in ethnicity questions, all of which are strongly suggested by the literature.

## **OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS:**

### **Dependent Variable:**

"Importance of Democracy". This question has been taken from the WVS's data. It asks: "What do you rate the importance of democracy being"? The WVS variable ranked 1-10 with 10 being the utmost importance and 1 being the least importance to the respondent. It is treated here as a continuous variable. The research question and hypothesis are best reflected by this question in the data set. This project does not try to claim trust causes democracy in and of itself, nor is it asking what variables most likely cause democracy. Instead, it seeks to answer the questions: how does the new trust variable function in relation to attitudes towards democracy, and what, if any, differences exist between the levels of trust in relation to democratic importance. If the prevailing literature is correct, we should see a credible difference in the levels of trust from one another against the response. However, if it is not correct, we will likely see no credible difference.

There is an important caveat to present here. Because the variable is attitudinal and the respondent is not provided a definition of democracy, they may evaluate that

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<sup>546</sup>"Data Documentation," WVS Database, , accessed October 18, 2017, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>.

term based on performance in their own country. For example, Russia has claimed to be pursuing liberal democracy, however if the respondent's only interaction with democracy is their own state, and they feel their state is corrupt, they may conflate both to bias their response.<sup>547</sup>

## **Independent variable:**

This research will focus on the definition of trust as outlined in Khodyakov's research understanding "trust as a process": Trust: a process of constant imaginative anticipation of the reliability of the other party's actions based on: (1) the reputation of the partner and the actor. (2) the evaluation of current circumstances of action, (3) assumptions about the partners actions, (4) the belief of the honesty and morality of the other side.<sup>548</sup> As discussed in Chapter 4, when one makes a decision to trust they are, in an instant, drawing on all experiences past and present at the level of both particularized and generalized trust. Further, when one is deciding on whether to act in conjunction with others, either to engage in civil society, or to act politically, they draw on their social networks which include both generalized and particularized trust networks. This betrays the need to create a trust variable that reflects this reality.

This variable was created by combining the four-level generalized trust question in the WVS survey with their particularized trust level (Table1). The new generalized trusters are those who always trust the people they do not know and always trust the people they do know. This is important because it addresses Fukuyama's concern about one's radius of trust and narrow trusters; specifically, in reference to the prevailing literature, those who always trust the people they do not but also do not trust the people they do know. These trusters will have a broader trust-radius.<sup>549</sup> There is also now a new 'other' category.

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<sup>547</sup> Fukuyama raises the concern, in survey research, what democracy means for each person may end up biasing the results, if what democracy is is not made clear at the outset. He provides the example of China where there is support for democracy but when respondents are asked what democracy is, one of the main responses is the government provides for our needs. As such, the people aren't in a particular hurry for regime change. 2011.

<sup>548</sup>Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.

<sup>549</sup>"Social Capital and Civil Society - Francis Fukuyama - Prepared for delivery at the IMF Conference on Second Generation Reforms," International Monetary Fund, , accessed May 30, 2017, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuyama.htm>.

As discussed in the chapter 4, the lack of a specific category reflecting atomization is problematic. How can one who does largely trust people, with some reservations, be ranked together with those who mostly or do not trust at all? This seems an unnecessary prejudice. Further, this gives one the opportunity to test Gellner's (1994) assertion that atomization is not always negative, particularly in the post-Communist sphere.

	p. completely	p. somewhat	p. not very much	p. no trust at all
g. trust completely	<i>gen</i>	<i>part</i>	<i>part</i>	<i>other</i>
g. not at all	<i>part</i>	<i>part</i>	<i>other</i>	<i>other</i>
M=5; 5				

Table 1: New Trust Variable: Wave 5 and 6 World Values Survey.

This variable has been created from the WVS' generalized trust question that asks: "Generally speaking, would you say people can be trusted or you can't be too careful?" This variable is combined with the WVS' particularized trust question: "How much would you say you trust the people you know?" This question is a Likert scale from 1-4 with one being "trust completely and 4 being "no trust at all." Overall, this particular variable resolves the widely held critique of the unidimensionality of the current measurement among prevailing cross-national surveys and depicts trust as being the process it is. As such, one would expect the difference between particularized trust and generalized trust to not be particularly interesting because both, if measured correctly, should matter. If there is concern in relation to trust, it might manifest in the area of new "atomized others" level, however it is also possible, if Gellner is correct, there is no credible difference between atomized others and the other levels of trust in given circumstances. The construction of the new trust variable accounts for this dynamism which has been omitted from the prevailing research, as such, the author proposes this method will add to the content validation of the study.<sup>550</sup>

<sup>550</sup> Robert Adcock and David Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research," *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 03 (2001): , doi:10.1017/s0003055401003100.

## Control Variables: socio-demographics and importance of democracy.

For this study, typical controls will be accounted for. These are "age", "education", "gender", and "job satisfaction". These variables are common controls in the study of social trust and democracy literature. An additional control will be added "net usage" to account for recent research in Russia.

textitAge. The WVS's age variable is continuous with a range of 16-99. This research will maintain the continuous nature of the variable for the sake of ease rather than breaking the variable into cohorts; this was done for expediency as it is only meant to be examined generally in relation to the independent variable "trust" and country-level variable "Perceptions of Corruption" (CPI) on the dependent variable "Importance of Democracy".

When thinking about the region, it is important to consider what might be expected from this variable. Mishler and Rose conducted research using the Russiabarometer data from 1998-2005 which demonstrated the younger generations tended to support the new regime, meaning those born in the post-Communist era after 1976, are more likely to be trusting of the new regime and less so of the old regime. Distrusting of the system because the cultural environment places them at a disadvantage over men.<sup>551</sup> In addition, the younger generations were far more likely to trust the President than the older generations. This is because older generations exhibit concern the new order will negatively impact their lives, in particular to their pensions as well as benefits for future generations. Having grown up in Communist political order, they have come to revere the social aspects of the old order. The younger generations have little to no experience with the old regime, and as such, they know nothing else except the new order in which they were socialized into distrusting of the system because the cultural environment places them at a disadvantage over men.<sup>552</sup> Further, those who supported the regime were more likely to have pro-Western and pro-Democratic attitudes until 2012 at which point the

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<sup>551</sup>William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.

<sup>552</sup>Ibid.

inverse became correct that is distrusting of the system because the cultural environment places them at a disadvantage over men.<sup>553</sup> Given this contextual research, one would expect to find the same holds true in the current research.

*Education.* The WVS education question is a 9-level variable ranging from "no formal education" to "university-level, with degree." As before, for the sake of ease, this research converts this variable to a continuous variable, as the specific levels are not as important to this research. A general understanding is sufficient here.

The prevailing literature suggests the more education one has, the more likely they are to trust others, as well as, support democracy.<sup>554</sup> This holds true in the post-Communist context, as well.<sup>555</sup> Broad access to education is key. Many of the post-Communist states have seen a rise in higher education; this is particularly true in post-Communist Russia. Both education and democratic attitudes have risen together. Further, previous research suggests the more education one has, the more trusting they are of others.<sup>556</sup> This would be expected to be the case here.

*textitGender.* The WVS codes gender as a dichotomous variable. This arrangement will be kept in the current project.

The general literature on trust in relation to democracy reflects women are more trusting and support democracy more than men do and tend to be more politically and civilly engaged,<sup>557</sup>; however, other literature contradicts this.<sup>558</sup> Discussions around gender in the post-Communist setting often are related to cultural socialization,<sup>559</sup> however this is demonstrated in other cultural settings as well.<sup>560</sup> In post-Communist states, women

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<sup>553</sup>Ibid.

<sup>554</sup> Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993), 108-109.; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 397.

<sup>555</sup> Treisman 2017

<sup>556</sup> Bo Rothstein, *The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 163.; Bo Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust," *World Politics* 58, no. 01 (2005): , doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0022.

<sup>557</sup>Ibid.

<sup>558</sup>Georgina Waylen et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 566-570.

<sup>559</sup>Katherine Verdery, *What was Socialism, and What Comes Next?*(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), Chapter 3.

<sup>560</sup> Almond and Verba *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, 397.



can be more distrusting of the system because the cultural environment places them at a disadvantage over men. This can lead to gender based distrust in the government and institutions.<sup>561</sup> This research expects to find women are more trusting and supportive of democracy than men are and less trusting of the state when corruption is high.

*Income level.* The WVS scales incomes of the respondents on the variable ?income.? The scale is ranked from 1-10 is an ordinal variable. The respondents are given the following information and then asked the question : "1 indicates the 'lowest income decile' and 10 the 'highest income decile' in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in."<sup>562</sup> For the sake of ease, this variable is transformed to a continuous variable in this research.

Income is a common variable one must account for. The research indicates those who are not struggling and wishing the higher wage brackets tend to be more trusting of others, and also tend to find democratic values important.<sup>563</sup> Thinking of the region, specifically, this claim is also generally accepted as being true. Mishler and Rose's (1997) examination of Russia concurs, however they note the importance of including other sources of income are included in the measurement. This particular variable already accounts for such concerns. Further, Shields work in Poland shows similar results. As income gaps widen and the amount of poor increases, this leads to a rise in nationalism.<sup>564</sup> Countries who have a shared post-Communist history tend to take income more personally because of the previous regime's "cradle to grave" assurance of income and employment. As such, one would expect those who are doing well will more likely feel democracy is important<sup>565</sup>

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<sup>561</sup> Katherine Verdery, *What was Socialism, and What Comes Next?*(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), Chapter 3.

<sup>562</sup>"Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>.

<sup>563</sup>Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993), 169.; Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1996), 99.

<sup>564</sup>Shields 2007

<sup>565</sup>Elena Chebankova, "Public and Private Cycles of Socio-Political Life in Putin's Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 26, no. 2 (2010): , doi:10.2747/1060-586X.26.2.121.; Ksenia Northmore-Ball, "Increasingly unequal turnout in Eastern European new democracies: Communist and transitional legacies versus new institutions," *Electoral Studies* 42 (June 2016): , doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.01.012.

and extend trust to others<sup>566</sup> than those who are struggling under the new regime.

*Net usage.* The question is asked: "People use different sources to learn what is going on in their country and the world. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you used it last week or did not use it last week to obtain information (read out and code one answer for each)." The responses are dichotomous: "used last week," "not used last week." This structure has also been maintained. New research offer mixed results. One position posits the more one has access to the internet the less satisfied they will be with the state of democracy.<sup>567</sup> As the internet is more widely accessible, individuals have greater access to information than ever before. They can reach out and communicate with others and learn about the state of democracy or level of despotism in their own country. The other claims Internet usage has increased civic activism and involvement.<sup>568</sup> Indeed computer usage is up in Russia,<sup>569</sup> as well as the post-Communist sphere. This research expects there to be less of an impact on support for democracy during Wave 5 and an increased role in Wave 6, corresponding to the increase in percentage of people using the Internet.

Country-level control: CPI. CPI is ranked on a yearly basis and is a continuous variable ranging from 0-100 with a score of 0 being "highly corrupt" and a score of 100 being "very clean."<sup>570</sup> At the time of Wave 5, the variable was continuous between 1-10, with the same connotations.<sup>571</sup> Each country in each wave was coded with their respective CPI scores for the years their survey was taken in each wave.

This variable is important if Khodyakov's (2007) "Strong-Weak State" model is to be supported. Corruption and inefficiency are expected in this context. It is these expectations this variable will capture. Other research in the post-Communist system offers

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<sup>566</sup> Khodyakov 2007

<sup>567</sup>Erik C. Nisbet, Elizabeth Stoycheff, and Katy E. Pearce, "Internet Use and Democratic Demands: A Multinational, Multilevel Model of Internet Use and Citizen Attitudes About Democracy," *Journal of Communication* 62, no. 2 (2012): , doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01627.x.

<sup>568</sup>Natalia Letki and Geoffry Evans, "Endogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe," *British Journal of Political Science*, 2005th ser., 35, no. 3, , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092242>.

<sup>569</sup>Levada Center (2016, 171); "Internet v Rossiya: Dinamika ?proniknoveniya Zima 2015 - 2016. ," FOM MEDIA, , accessed May 30, 2017, <http://fom.ru/SMI-i-internet/12610>.

<sup>570</sup>Transparency International E.V., "How corrupt is your country?" 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index – Results, , accessed May 30, 2017, <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results>.

<sup>571</sup>Transparency International E.V., "Transparency International," Research - CPI - Corruption Perceptions Index 2008, , accessed May 30, 2017, <https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi2008results>.

some support. Alena Ledeneva's work focuses on the importance of informal networks in the face of an incompetent or corrupt state.<sup>572</sup> Indeed, her works, as well as others suggests corruption is accepted or even preferred as a method of "getting things done" because the formal channels are inefficient and time consuming.<sup>573</sup> However, these works depart from Khodyakov on the emphasis they place on generalized trust relations over particularized. The prevailing literature presupposes the importance of both generalized trust and institutional performance on social trust, overall. This research will be able to parse out the causal arrow and expects to find Khodyakov's case to be upheld with the new, more dynamic trust variable.

*Life Satisfaction* In order to measure one's happiness with their life, the WVS asks the question: "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?"<sup>574</sup> The response is measured on a Likert scale from 1-10 with 1 being the least satisfaction and 10 being the most satisfaction with one's life. This arrangement will be replicated in this research. The literature discusses life satisfaction as having an important role in determining one's support for democracy. It is said the happier one is with their life, they are more likely to live in states with well functioning democratic institutions, or at the very least, they will be more likely they are to support democracy. In countries where institutions are not functioning, nor meeting the expectations of the people, one would expect less life satisfaction, and less support for democracy.<sup>575</sup> This expectation is predicted to be upheld in this research, as well.

## **DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS RESEARCH.**

by focusing solely on one form of trust: generalized trust. The literature claims that particularized trust can lead to the atomization of society, which is detrimental to

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<sup>572</sup>Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with 'Blat': Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" *Social Research* 76, no. 1 (2009): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146>.

<sup>573</sup>Marina Zoloznaya, *The Politics of Bureaucratic Corruption in Post-Transitional Eastern Europe*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 66;115.

<sup>574</sup>"Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>.

<sup>575</sup>Christian Welzel, Ronald Inglehart, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "The theory of human development: A cross-cultural analysis," *European Journal of Political Research*. 42, no. 3 (May 2003): , doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00086.

democracy. However, atomization is the absence of trust in others. Particularized trust is based on trust in people you know. Atomization is the mirror negative of trust. Therefore conceptualizing a bankruptcy of trust with those who do trust does not follow, logically. Creating a trust variable that captures the dynamic nature of trust relations is a key departure.

This research will tackle head on the elusive nature of trust in a manner that will allow it to be more appropriately measured to reflect as close an approximation to reality as is possible. This includes the focus of the importance of particularized trust in relation to a society's attitudes towards democracy. This project also takes a new approach to trust by removing "atomized others" and giving them their own category separate from particularized trusters. Because this research has in mind the potential generalizability of the trust variable, the measure was constructed carefully to ensure it can be applied across divergent cases, as well as globally.

Since social trust is seen as the cornerstone to civil society and, in turn, liberal democracy, it is important to have a true understanding of where countries stand on this important measure. If one aspect of a measure is incorrect, then the final result will be flawed. A new measure must be created accounting for particularized trust that will be applicable across other countries making it generalizable. If this can be accomplished, our previous held views of countries as not being trusting will have to change, and with it, our attitudes towards them and their prospects for democratization. This research is an important "first step" in this process.

## **CHALLENGES.**

No research, particularly in the social sciences, is perfect; this project is no exception. Because of the inherent social nature of the data, it is important to recognize the inevitable shortcomings of one's own research and do one's best to mitigate and account for them. The first difficulty lies with current and available data to demonstrate the intermediary link, which has the effect of bridging ethnicities, found in Khodyakov's (2007) research. No dataset currently exists which asks the kinds of questions needed to directly measure

the intermediary variable in informal networks, nor its effect on social trust. As such, inference is the best one can hope for through the creation of a multidimensional trust variable that implies a radius of trust that would likely include intermediaries. That is, by parsing out atomized trusters, who trust no one most or all of the time, this increases the chances the new generalized and particularized trust levels are able to account for the potentiality of intermediaries.

Another consideration can be found in the dependent variable. A difficulty with survey research is the inability of the interviewer to follow up with explanations that are not already present in the questionnaire.<sup>576</sup> This leads to instances where the respondents, based on either a shared history or experiences, perceives a variable different from other regions or cases. This is a consideration when thinking about democracy in the region, particularly in post-Soviet cases, specifically. If one evaluates how they feel about a concept such as democracy, they may base understanding of it on past experience with "democracy," or how they were socialized to understand what that word means, both at home or at school.<sup>577</sup> In a perfect world, this variable would have been constructed in such a way as to be broadly understood and applicable across cases.

This research also had difficulties regarding out-group variables; it would have been optimal to account for broad out-group questions as previous research suggests high levels of xenophobia in the region. The question regarding diversity, which is a broad question capturing feelings regarding out-groups, was not asked across either wave of the WVS. Other variables related to out-groups such as feelings for immigrants were asked but too specific to cover such a broad topic. The question was asked "Would not like to have as neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers."<sup>578</sup> For example, in Russia, respondents were twice as likely to be concerned about homosexuals and three times as likely to be concerned with drug addicts than with immigrants.<sup>579</sup> Because this research has in mind

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<sup>576</sup> Robert Adcock and David Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research," *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 03 (2001): , doi:10.1017/s0003055401003100.

<sup>577</sup> Ellen Carnaghan, "The Difficulty of Measuring Support for Democracy in a Changing Society: Evidence from Russia," *Democratization* 18, no. 3 (2011): , doi:10.1080/13510347.2011.563113.

<sup>578</sup>"Data Documentation," WVS Database, accessed October 18, 2017, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSCContents.jsp>.

<sup>579</sup>Ibid.

generalizability, specific questions related to out-group trust had have been omitted from the RE HLM at this time. Part two of this project examines Russia, deploying an OLS with the immigrant question and, as we will see in the next chapter, it did not significantly impact the model over either wave one way or the other. Because the RE HLM is mainly looking trying to parse out endogeneity, the author felt it was safe to run the RE HLM without the out-group variables. Moreover, the dynamism found in the new trust variable implies out-group trust via the generalized trust question, however imperfect.

Finally, it is also important to remember that this data represents only a snapshot in time per country: the years 2005, 2006, and 2008 captured in Wave 5 and 2011, 2012, 2014 captured in Wave 6. As the WVS includes more waves as time progresses the construct validity of this research will increase.

## **CONCLUSION.**

This research seeks to fill gaps in the previous research by creating a more dynamic trust variable. Though this project is qualitative in nature, because it is seeking to test the measure in one region, followed by one country, the author sought the middle ground and took careful consideration in the construction of the variable so it can potentially be generalizable across divergent cases or globally. This project will overcome issues of endogeneity by employing a multilevel (RE HLM) model to examine cases in the post-Communist sphere. Once this is established, the author will look at both waves using an OLS model to examine the case of Russia more closely. Both models will utilize Bayesian inference preferable using small n data (as is the case when using the RE HLM), as well as ensuring the validity of the model, rather than the data. Each of the variables were given careful consideration and justified appropriately for use in the model.

Further, this chapter discussed how the research will improve on previous understandings of trust because it does a better job capturing the nature of how human beings trust. It resolves issues surrounding the radius of trust, particularly "narrow trusters," missing from the prevailing literature with its hyper-focus on generalized trust. While this research expects similar findings at the generalized trust level, treating particularized

trustees as they matter for democracy will do much to improve on our understandings of how it can be used to foster democratic support. It also establishes a separate variable for atomized trustees to examine the thesis "atomized trustees do not cultivate democratic attitudes" that exists in the prevailing literature. Finally, issues surrounding the shortcomings of this work have been addressed here. While the challenges are not insignificant, the author has done as much as possible to mitigate the concerns surrounding insufficient data, context-specific understandings of democracy, variable omission, and time analysis. In the end, the research will be

In the next chapter, model results will be presented against the three hypotheses. First, at the level of the region, the data will demonstrate there is no difference between generalized and particularized trust. Further, the claim atomized trust is bad for democratic attitudes is also called into question. Further, the data will also demonstrate support for the "Strong-Weak State" model proposed by Khodyakov (2007). In other words, country-level perceptions of corruption have no effect on in the levels of trust in relation to feelings that democracy is important. The same results will appear on closer examination of the Russian case, as well.

## CHAPTER 6: THE RESULTS.

### INTRODUCTION.

This research has been primarily concerned with the creation of a new trust variable that is more accurately able to capture the nature of how human beings trust. Further, because the author is concerned about potential generalizability, this was done with careful consideration to theory and practice. The result is a multidimensional variable existing at 3 levels: generalized, particularized, and a new atomized level. This variable overcomes the critique of the standard and flat hyper focus on generalized trust, and answers the call of attention to particularized trust put forth by Khodyakov<sup>580</sup>. The model to test this variable was also carefully considered. Due to the existing debate in the literature between culturalists and institutionalists, as well as concerns surrounding endogeneity this debate elicits, it was determined the use of a Bayesian RE HLM model would be most appropriate to resolve these concerns<sup>581</sup>. Though the factor of time was not sufficient enough to completely flesh out endogeneity in this project, the model was created with this in mind as additional research will be needed. Nonetheless, this project and its results have raised the question of the legitimacy of the insitutionalist approach as it relates to societal trust, and supports Khodyakov's (2007) research on the "Strong-Weak" state and the process of trust.

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<sup>580</sup>Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.

<sup>581</sup>Daniel Stegmüller, "How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches," *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 3 (2013): , doi:10.1111/ajps.12001.; Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones, "Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data," *Political Science Research and Methods* 3, no. 01 (2014): , doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.7.; Robert Adcock and David Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research," *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 03 (2001): , doi:10.1017/s0003055401003100.



## Research Questions.

The examination of the relevant literature exposes 3 main questions this research will seek to answer: Do the country-level perceptions of corruption present in institutions have a credible impact on how society trusts one another at the individual level? Is there any credible difference between particularized trust and generalized trust in relation to one's support for democracy? In thinking about atomized others, do they have a credible negative impact on one's attitudes towards democracy? Or will Gellner's suggestion that atomization can, in some cases, lead to changes towards democracy be upheld?

## Hypotheses.

These questions can be answered by considering the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 4** *Country level corruption will not create a credible negative effect on individual trust outcomes in light of support for liberal democratic values.*

**Hypothesis 5** *There is no credible difference between those who trust generally and those who trust particularly in relation to support liberal democracy.*

**Hypothesis 6** *Atomized others have a credible negative impact on democratic attitudes.*

The rest of the chapter will proceed as follows: First, a brief description of how the Bayesian RE HLM was specified for post-Communist states; then the results for Wave 5 will be examined against the hypotheses, followed by Wave 6. Second, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model will be specified for Waves 5 and 6 isolating Russia. These results will also be discussed in light of the hypotheses. Lastly, the author will provide concluding thoughts.

## THE MODELS.

There were two main types of models designed for the purpose of this research: First, a Bayesian Random Effects Hierarchical Linear Model (RE HLM)<sup>582</sup> was employed to

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<sup>582</sup>The models were estimated using R version 3.4.0 and JAGS version 4.6 on a Mac with OSX version 10.12.5.

explore the relationship between country-level corruption and trust on respondents' attitudes towards democracy across Wave 5 & Wave 6 of the WVS. Second, for closer inspection the data, Russia was isolated; a standard OLS was utilized for both waves for a more contextual look at the data.<sup>583</sup> The Bayesian RE HLM models were estimated, employing the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) with random walk Metropolis-Hastings, assuming normality using uniform priors set to  $\mu$  0 and the  $\sigma$  set to .1 as is typical for such models<sup>584</sup>. The burnin was set at 100,000 iterations. This means the first 100,000 estimations of the MCMC were tossed out in favor of more reliable estimations during the sample run. The models were given a sample of 100,000.<sup>585</sup> Both models converged and passed the Gelman and Rubin test, as well as the Geweke test, showing the chains ultimately converged towards a standard distribution.<sup>586</sup> In addition, the visual trace plot or 'fuzzy caterpillar' confirmed proper mixing of the chains and convergence. Heteroskedasticity was also checked, as well as the model density plot showing the chains overlapped appropriately and were indeed properly fitted for both models, and the posterior parameters were normally distributed (see diagnostic plots in appendix).

The OLS models were fit assuming normality of the data and the distribution of error would be random. Diagnostics were performed. The model was checked for heteroskedasticity and passed all tests. Further, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests were run to confirm the results of each run and ANOVA model comparisons were also run as final confirmation of the results.

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<sup>583</sup>The Bayesian RE HLM models return Fixed Effects and Random Effects for each country. The results for Russia return estimates that would be similar to a standard OLS, particularly for the information gained from the RE/ FE examining trust and corruption on democratic support. These results were examined and compared to the standard frequentist OLS results and were found to be reliably similar justifying this approach.

<sup>584</sup>Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, *Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 143; 430.

<sup>585</sup>The models were also tested using a longer burnin and more samples, however this did not improve the model.

<sup>586</sup>The result of the Gelman and Rubin test was a rating of '1' on all parameters, indicating the models did not need to be run for additional iterations.

**BAYESIAN RE HLM EXAMINATION ACROSS POST-COMMUNIST STATES. WAVES 5 AND 6 OF THE WVS. EFFECT OF GROUP-LEVEL VARIANCE ON INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS OF 'IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRACY.'**

The results for Waves 5 and 6 can be found in tables 1 and 2. It is important to keep in mind a few caveats whilst examining these results. As discussed in the previous chapter, the WVS does not survey the same countries in every wave. This means the sample space is likely to vary; this is what happened in this research. Wave 5 had Georgia, Moldova, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine.<sup>587</sup> Wave 6 saw a repeat of Russia, Poland, and Ukraine; the countries of Belarus and Slovakia were added to increase the group-level sample space. Because there is a difference in the sample countries used for each wave, and to include the passage of time, one would expect the results to perhaps look different. This also means one must limit possible explanatory language to the countries covered, though one can make inferences to the region, generally, though again with caution.<sup>588</sup> Further, because this research is examining two waves only, the author will caution against making conclusive causal arguments. Further, complicating this matter is the space of time between waves. There is an average of four to five years between each country's new survey. While the ultimate desire of this design is generalizability, because there are only two waves with years apart between them, this prevented the author from placing a third level of "time" on the HLM, as this would have further reduced the space for variation degrading the model. This means it will be difficult to

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<sup>587</sup>Wave 5 also included Serbia and Montenegro, however there were multiple technical issues with this data. The author contacted the WVS on 3 occasions regarding this and did not hear back. So this data was not employed here.

<sup>588</sup>Daniel Stegmueller's (2013) comprehensive exploration on reliable sample space for HLMs, specifically, the number of countries required for confidence must be noted here. Stegmueller specifically compared Bayesian vs. frequentist methods in the comparative political science context; his research shows, while neither method is perfect when the sample space is 5 countries, the Bayesian results will produce less bias and more reliable credible intervals, while the Maximum Likelihood Estimation approach of the frequentist method results in "over confidence" and comparatively wider confidence bounds. Another important note: when an interaction term is introduced, as is the case here, explanatory language must be qualified still further. Stegmueller also shows that the fixed effects results are reliable -regardless of group level sample space- because the prior will be overwhelmed by the number of individual data. While Stegmueller recommends an inverse Wishart prior for low country numbers at the group level, there is some debate around this topic. As a result, the author chose to utilize uniform priors for the final results. The author chose to test the robustness of model by adjusting the priors slightly in each direction as recommended by Gelman (2007, 355), however the results were not substantively changed by doing so.

use the WVS for this research moving forward because it will be challenging to track patterns effectively over time. Optimally, this research might perhaps encourage other surveys such as the Eurobarometer, who surveys the same countries every year, to begin asking the particularized trust question. For now, each wave was examined on its own at the "region" or "country" level.

## **Bayesian RE HLM Wave 5 World Values Survey results.**

### **Hypothesis 1.**

First, examining the 2nd-level variable CPI across the region, we note it has been allowed to vary across countries with trust independently and between levels, as well as to interact with trust. Allowing "CPI" and "Trust" to interact, one can see there is no significant impact between the levels of trust and CPI. We can take this to mean corruption has no credible impact on how people trust in relation to their support for democracy. This is in direct conflict with the prevailing "top-down" or institutionalists such as Mishler and Rose <sup>589</sup> or Rothstein and Uslaner <sup>590</sup> which have postulated country-level-corruption has a credible negative impact on social trust as a whole. Instead, this result does support Khodyakov's (2007) "Strong/Weak" state model, as well as Inglehart's Michael Hout and Ronald Inglehart, "Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in Forty-three Societies," *Contemporary Sociology* 27, no. 2 (1998): , doi:10.2307/2654810. claim that societal trust is not dependent on political trust. As such, the first hypothesis of this research, which states country-level perceptions of corruption will have no credible affect on how society trusts one another in relation to their feelings towards democracy, has been supported. The data above clearly shows that feelings government corruption and feelings of societal trust overall are largely independent effects. In this wave, all three levels of trust can operate exclusively from CPI. A person can feel deeply their country is corrupt but still have faith in one another.

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<sup>589</sup>William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.

<sup>590</sup>Bo Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust," *World Politics* 58, no. 01 (2005): , doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0022.

Table 2: Model 1: Wave 5 of the WVS. Bayesian RE HLM.

	Posterior Mean	HPDI, Lower	HPDI, Higher
(Intercept)	2.32905	-2.781	7.408
Particularized Trusters	2.63002	-5.357	4.955
Other Trusters	-0.51286	-5.657	4.599
Perceptions of Corruption	1.59379	0.054	3.120 *
Particularized:CPI	-0.04556	-1.603	1.518
Other:CPI	-0.03126	-1.564	1.510
<i>PRE</i>	.19 height $M = 5$		
* credible parameters in which 95% of the data is on the same side of zero.			

## Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).

One can see "Perceptions of Corruption" on its own does not have the Highest Posterior Density Interval (HPDI) values. This is similar to the frequentist "Confidence Interval." However the HPDI is a collection of the most reliable values of given parameters; that is, values that fall outside of the HPDI are given less credence. Specifically, the HPDI is the space which includes 95% of the posterior density.<sup>591</sup> that span zero. This means CPI does have an effect on how people perceive the importance of democracy; given there is 0.98% of the data above the mean, this suggests CPI is important to the model and has a credible impact on the y-axis. More specifically, a one unit increase in CPI increases the average level of feelings about democracy in the country by  $\sim 1.59$  points with trust held constant.<sup>592</sup> In short, the less corrupt a state is perceived to be, the more the respondents feel democracy matters.

## Hypothesis 2.

Examining the group-level variable "Trust", one notes HPDI spans a space which covers 0 form  $\sim -5.275$  to  $\sim 4.854$ ; this means the levels of trust are not credibly different from one another across the region. When "Perceptions of Corruption" (CPI) is set to zero, particularized trusters show an average deflection away generalized trusters

<sup>591</sup>John K. Kruschke, "Doing Bayesian Data Analysis," Why to use highest density intervals instead of equal tailed intervals, April 16, 2012, accessed June 20, 2017, <http://doingbayesiandataanalysis.blogspot.com/2012/04/why-to-use-highest-density-intervals.html>.

<sup>592</sup>Recall, CPI is measured on a scale of 1-100 with 1 being the most corrupt and 100 being the least corrupt (or "very clean"). The results are scaled 1:10 so the variable ranges 1-10 with 10 being the least corrupt. (Transparency International 2017)

of  $\sim 0.08$  in their feelings of the importance of democracy, however because the HPDI spans values of zero from  $\sim -5.357$  to  $\sim 4.955$ , we cannot confirm the decrease is reliable across the region. We also see a similar increase of  $\sim 0.09$  between other trusters and particularized trusters, however this increase is also not reliable. In other words, at the group level, while trust remains important, the kinds of trust are not. These findings support the second hypothesis; there is no reliable difference between particularized trusters and generalized trusters and how they feel about democracy. Hypothesis 2 is upheld for Wave 5 in the region.

### **Hypothesis 3.**

The results for other trusters return values that span zero. As such, the third hypothesis is not upheld. Other trusters are not reliably different overall in the region, nor do they have a credible negative impact, on average, on how one feels about democracy across the region. Both of these findings differ from the accepted view from Granovetter (1973), Putnam (1995, 1998, 2001, etc.), Fukuyama (1995, 2000, etc.) and others, that particularized trusters, as well as atomized trusters, are detrimental to democracy, because they will be less supportive of democratic institutions or attitudes.

## **BAYESIAN RE HLM WAVE 6 WORLD VALUES SURVEY RESULTS.**

### **Hypothesis 1.**

Again, the country level variable CPI was chosen to see if adding the additional second level would erode individual level of societal trust across the region. Just as before, the credible intervals for trust and the interaction with CPI indicates there are no reliable intervals which do not cover zero. As such, we can again note there is no credible difference between the levels of trust in relation to support for democracy when controlling for perceptions of corruption at the country level. The finding in Wave 6, as in Wave 5, supports  $H1$ , contradicting the institutionalist approach claiming the reverse.

Table 3: Model 2: Wave6 of the WVS. Bayesian RE HLM.

	Posterior Mean	HPDI, Lower	HPDI, Higher
(Intercept)	3.04487	-3.184	7.248
Particularized Trusters	0.11979	-5.360	5.177
Other Trusters	0.09133	-5.227	5.322
Perceptions of Corruption	1.12430	0.065	3.155 *
Particularized:CPI	-0.05255	-1.636	1.445
Other:CPI	-0.04620	-1.688	1.419
<i>PRE</i>	.21	$M = 5$	

\* credible parameters in which 95% of the data is on the same side of zero.

## CPI

More specifically, a one unit increase in CPI increases the average level of feelings about democracy in the country by  $\sim 1.59$  points with trust held constant.<sup>593</sup> In short, the less corrupt a state is perceived to be, the more the respondents feel democracy matters. This model clearly mirrors the outcomes of Model 1 Wave 5. The Bayesian results for Wave 6 reflects there is a reliable effect of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) on respondents feelings about democracy when trust was set to zero. One could expect an average of  $\sim 1.124$  increase on the y-axis for every one unit increase on CPI. This means there is an inverse relationship between "CPI" and "Importance of Democracy". The less corrupt a country is perceived to be, the more important one feels democracy is across the region for Wave 6. This result was a given.

## Hypothesis 2.

Looking at the variable "Trust" at the group level, one notes there is no credible difference between the levels of trust on average across the region when controlled for at the country level via "CPI" set to zero. There is an average  $\sim 0.12$  increase over the reference category "generalized trusters" on the y-axis "importance of democracy" however this was not reliable given the HPDI spans values of zero ranging from  $\sim -5.360$  to  $\sim 5.177$ . This finding again supports the author's second hypothesis which states

<sup>593</sup>Recall, CPI is measured on a scale of 1-100 with 1 being the most corrupt and 100 being the least corrupt (or "very clean"). The results are scaled 1:10 so the variable ranges 1-10 with 10 being the least corrupt. (Transparency International 2017)

there is no credible difference between generalized trusters and particularized trusters in relation to their support for democracy.

### **Hypothesis 3.**

The same occurs with "other trusters"; there is a  $\sim 0.091$  increase over the reference category, however this result also covers zero with an HPDI of  $\sim 5.227$  to  $\sim 5.322$ . This indicated there is no support for the third hypothesis for Wave 6, as well. This means that, on the whole, while trust matters to the model, the levels between them do not matter across the region.

### **Bayesian Model Summaries.**

The Proportional Reduction of Error (PRE) was estimated to capture the variation the model represents over the null. In particular for categorical models, this measure informs the researcher how much this model improves our knowledge of some phenomena over knowing nothing. The PRE has an upper bound of 1, however its lower bound; values could come in below zero indicating the model is actually worse than knowing nothing at all. In short, this measure is very similar to a typical  $R^2$ . For Wave 5, one notes the PRE is .19 meaning the model seems to capture a possible 19% of variance. For Wave 6, we see the PRE is .21, again, meaning the model has potentially captured 21% of the variance present. We also note that all 3 Hypotheses were upheld at the region level.

### **POOLED OLS MODEL: RUSSIA WAVES 5 AND 6.**

As stated before, by the nature of how the Bayesian RE HLM is constructed, not only does the model return the group level variance, it also returns the individual country fixed effects. In other words, the lower level fixed effects (FE) reports for trust and corruption are effectively OLS models for each country holding all other variables at a pooled group constant. Examining all of the effects for trust and corruption in each country is beyond the scope of this particular work. However, the effective Bayesian FE results for Russia



are checked against the frequentist results, because uniform priors were deployed, and found to be reliably similar. Now we can examine the OLS for Russia to gain a more contextualized understanding of how the new trust level will operate in for Wave 5 with the appropriate controls. Here, the author has chosen Russia to test the "Strong Weak State" model and because of its ranking as a historically low-trusting society. Further, because of its history of dominance in the region under the USSR and as the source of Soviet socialization, the effects may still linger strongest there. Just as before, Wave 5 will be examined, followed by Wave 6. Further, at this level, CPI was lost and replaced with "trust in government", which is generally seen as similar to perceptions of corruption.<sup>594</sup>

#### OLS EXAMINATION MODEL 1 WVS WAVE 5 RESULTS FOR RUSSIA 2005.

Before examining the Russian case, the author constructed a table to determine the number of 'trustees' in each category for Russia; this was compared to the prevailing measure of trust: the WVS's generalized trust question. They were as follows for Wave 5:

Table 4: Russia 2005. Number of Trustees with new Trust Variable.

Particularized	1064
Generalized	104
Other	190
n=1358	

Table 5: Russia, 2005. Generalized Trustees. Standard WVS measures.

	Trust completely.	Can't be too careful.
Generalized	352	1006
n=1358		

Examining the WVS standard measure (Table 4), one sees 35% of the respondents who answered this question affirmed they "trust completely" the people they do not know, while the remainder 63.5% claimed one "can't be too careful". The new trust measure

<sup>594</sup>Luigi Manzetti and Carole J. Wilson, "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?" *Corruption and Democracy in Latin America*, August 2007, , doi:10.2307/j.ctt9qh6n2.7.

shows  $\sim 0.08\%$  of the respondents were placed in the new generalized trust category,  $\sim 79\%$  are in the particularized trust category, while  $\sim 14\%$  are in the newly created "other" category. The reduction of generalized trusters is expected here; this is because of the higher criteria placed on generalized trusters in the new variable. "Generalized trusters" now include not only those who 'trust completely' the people they do not know, but also 'trust completely' the people they do know. This construction resolves the 'radius of trust' concerns discussed by Fukuyama (2005). Further, the multidimensionality of the trust variable overall will more accurately reflect how people trust in any given nation. Now, we can investigate the Fixed Effects pooled model for Russia.

Table 6: OLS WVS Wave 5 Russia 2005. Effects of Trust and Government Trust on Democracy.

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t )
(Intercept)	7.396731	0.893201	8.281	$< 2e - 16^*$
Particular Trust	-1.402886	0.629863	-2.227	0.0261*
Other Trust	0.901628	0.785842	-1.147	0.2514
Government Trust	0.357400	0.234072	-1.527	0.1270
Life Satisfaction	0.162540	0.030286	5.367	9.38e-08 *
Age	-0.007917	0.004703	-1.683	0.0925
Females	0.265323	0.144723	1.833	0.06697
Education	0.082369	0.041884	1.967	0.04943
Income	0.003307	0.032898	0.101	0.91995
Internet	0.050870	0.195012	0.261	0.79424
Immigrants	0.050870	0.195012	0.261	0.79424
Particular Trust:Gov	0.347850	0.247663	1.405	0.16038
Other Trust:Gov	0.060336	0.294000	0.205	0.83743
<i>N</i>	1385			
adj. $R^2$	0.03772			
Mult. $R^2$	0.04594			
p-value	2.023e-09			

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

## Hypothesis 1.

In order to address  $H1$  in the Russian context, the author fitted a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model for Russia and did a partial comparison to the Bayesian RE HLM's random effects with Russia (Table 5). The results were the same, as expected. Examining first the interaction the coefficients were estimates of  $\beta$  unit increases or

decreases of the interaction of "Trust" and "Government Trust", in relation to attitudes towards democracy while all others held constant. The Intercept relates to the position of "Generalized Trust" on "Importance of Democracy". While the results show an increase of  $\sim 0.34$  over the reference interaction of government confidence and generalized trust, it was not found to be significant. The same holds true for the interaction of government trust and other trusters when compared to the reference category. Overall, there is no significant interplay between the levels of social trust and government level corruption on individual level feelings of trust and importance of democracy in either the OLS here, nor at the group level or between states. In short, both parameters have independent effects on how one supports democracy. This finding contradicts the literature, particularly from the instrumentalists who find negative feelings about the state will lead to a degradation of trust at the individual level, especially generalized trust (Rothstein 2011, Mishler and Rose 2001). It could be the multidimensionality of the new trust variable provides enough context to account for this difference since atomized trusters were extracted from the particularized trusters. <sup>595</sup>

### **Trust in Government: In Nation's Capital.**

"Trust in Government", recall, is a variable taken from the WVS survey. It is a 4 level categorical variable where a score of 1 means "trust completely" and a score of 4 means "no trust at all". In order to put this variable in context and to compare results across waves, the author felt it would be appropriate to include the descriptive statistics for this variable. We notice 46% of Russians indicate they completely trust or somewhat trust the government, while 54% say they have little to no trust at all in the government. So it seems Russian society is fairly split on their feelings of trust for those in the Kremlin.

In Table 5 with the interaction, the variable is not significant with an  $\alpha$  0.127. However, when the interaction is removed, this changes. Referring to Table 6, how one trusts

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<sup>595</sup>An Analysis of Variance (anova() in R) was run on the frequentist models confirming the interaction was not significant. Another model was fitted without the interaction and there was no substantive difference on the outcome of the variables between the model with the interaction and the model without. The R package 'sjPlot' was used for visual confirmation, as well. These diagnostics can be found in the appendix

Table 7: Russia, 2005. Trust in Government: In the Nation’s Capital. WVS Wave 5

Trust completely.	Trust Somewhat.	Distrust Somewhat.	No Trust At All.
0.05%	0.41%	0.36%	0.18%
n=1385			

their government shows to be a significant factor in this model, however this is an independent effect when holding all others constant. For every single  $\beta$  increase in feelings of government distrust, one can expect an average decrease of  $\sim 0.13$  in individual attitudes towards democratic importance. In other words, the more trustworthy the Russian government is perceived to be, the less important individuals feel democracy is.

Table 8: Simplified Model Wave 5 Without Interaction, Russia 2005

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t )
(Intercept)	7.963098	0.708239	11.244	$< 2e - 16$ *
Particular Trust	-0.902604	0.267855	-3.370	0.000773*
Other Trust	-1.130256	0.319491	-3.538	0.000417 *
Life Satisfaction	0.164645	0.030266	5.440	6.29e-08 *
Government Trust	-0.132688	0.066375	-1.999	0.04580 *
Age	-0.007779	0.004703	-1.654	0.09834
Female	0.228869	0.143784	1.592	0.11167
Education	0.087610	0.041577	2.107	0.03528 *
Income	-0.031138	0.033265	-0.936	0.34940
Immigrants	0.033695	0.152399	0.221	0.82505
Internet	0.074351	0.193529	0.384	0.70090
<i>N</i>	1385			
adj. $R^2$	0.03715			
Mult. $R^2$	0.04401			
p-value	1.01e-09			

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

## Model Summaries.

This multivariate linear regression with interaction for Russia in the year 2006 provided similar results as the Bayesian RE HLM which was largely expected. The interaction model only accounts for  $\sim 0.038$  of the variance, and the reduced model accounts for  $\sim 0.037$  of that model’s variance however this was expected. The aim of this research was not to solve what accounts for democracy but to test hypotheses related to trust and democratic support, which required an attitudinal variable related to democracy be

the model response. An Analysis of Variance (anova() in R) was run on this model to determine which variables were important to this model. The anova confirmed the interaction was not significant. A model was fitted without the interaction and there was no substantive difference on the outcome of the variables between the model with the interaction and the model without. The model with the interaction showed an adjusted  $R^2$  0.038 and the model without showed an adjusted  $R^2$  0.037. Another anova was run comparing both models together and found there was no substantive difference between the model with the interaction and the model without the interaction. As such, the simplified model was chosen. The OLS models were also checked for heteroskedacity and passed. The results of these tests can be found in the Appendix.

## **Hypothesis 2.**

Now examining the simplified model (Table 7), one notes generalized trusters feel democracy is important at an 7.96 on a scale of 1-10, holding all other variables at their constant value. There is a -0.73 decrease between particularized trusters and generalized trusters and their feelings that democracy is important; this difference is shown to be significant. Further, examining the effects plot visualizing social trust on democratic attitudes, we see that particularized trusters are effectively closer to other trusters, confirming this result. This means there is a credible difference between the two levels and the difference is negative. Therefore, this result does not support  $H2$  for Russia in 2006.

## **Hypothesis 3.**

The third level of trust known as 'other trusters', correlates to 'atomized' in the literature (Putnam 1995, Fukuyama 1995). This group has a significant  $\sim -0.92$  negative deflection from generalized trust on the dependent variable. This is an expected effect. Therefore,  $H3$  is upheld showing atomized others have a credible negative impact on how one feels about democracy in Russia for the year 2006. Plotting the results yields additional insight. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the drop between generalized and partic-

ularized trusters becomes more clear, as do the similarities between the particularized trusters and other trusters.

The effects plot for trust shows particularized trusters support democracy with a ranking of  $\sim 7.45$  and generalized trusters feelings of the importance of democracy with a ranking of  $\sim 8.3$ . However, there is no substantive difference between the two. We also see the atomized 'other' category comes in at a rank around  $\sim 7.25$ . Overall, the author discovered it does not matter which type of truster you are (generalized or particularized), your impact on support for democracy is statistically the same. This is in direct conflict with the predominate theories of trust.

## Substantive Effects: Controls.

*Life Satisfaction* The results show for every  $\beta$  unit increase in feelings of satisfaction with one's life, we can expect a  $\sim 0.16$  increase in feelings democracy is important. This results was expected and conforms with the literature.<sup>596</sup> *Education* For every  $\beta$  increase in educational attainment, one's feelings towards democracy also improved by 0.088. The more education one has the more likely they are to support democracy. This was an expected effect.<sup>597</sup>

## Other Controls.

*Age* Age also seems to significantly influence one's feelings about democracy. There is an approximate drop of  $\sim 0.002$  in how one feels about democracy in Russia for every  $\beta$  increase of age with all others held at their constant. This means as Russians gain another year, their feelings about democracy decrease. This was expected and is supported by the current literature, particularly Mishler and Rose (2001) who found the same results. However, it was not significant in this research. *Gender* We notice females are approximately 0.23 more likely to support democracy with a ranking of 7.45 than

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<sup>596</sup>William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Trajectories of Fear and Hope: Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 28, no. 4 (1996): , doi:10.1177/0010414096028004003.

<sup>597</sup>Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993), 113-114.




Figure 3: Effects Plot: Social Trust on Democratic Attitudes, Russia 2006.

males in the year 2005. Given the general literature on gender which is mixed, this is an interesting finding. *Income*. Relating to income, the effects across income was found not to be significant. There is very little difference between those who are the least happy with their income levels over those who are happiest with their income; the effects is nearly flat. In other words, income has nothing to do with how one feels about democracy in Russia, a finding which contradicts the literature.<sup>598</sup> *Immigrants*. The author was unable to include variables related to xenophobia the the region level because they were not uniformly asked in each wave. However since the question was asked for Russia, it was decided to run a model to include the immigrant question. One finds those who are accepting having immigrants as neighbors see an expected  $\sim 0.03$  increase in support for democracy folding all other variables at their constant, however this was surprisingly not significant. This seems to also contradict literature which suggests xenophobia negatively impacts both trust and support for democracy in Russia<sup>599</sup> *Internet* Internet usage was

<sup>598</sup>William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.

<sup>599</sup>Sten Berglund, *Challenges to Democracy: Eastern Europe Ten Years After the Collapse of Communism* (Cheltenham, GB: Edward Elgar, 2002).; Donna Bahry et al., "Ethnicity and Trust: Evidence from Russia," *The American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (November 2005): , <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/stable/30038962>. In order to verify this somewhat surprising find, the author ran another model which included the interaction of trust and immigrant attitudes and found the relationship was also not significant. An anova was run to confirm these results, and the

also not found to be particularly interesting. Though this was not entirely unexpected given the year; Russians overall did not gain most of their information from the Internet in 2005. One might expect these results to look a little different in 2011 during Wave 6, however not significantly. The more interesting effects might not be seen until waves covering 2016 and beyond given the recent increases in Internet usage as a tool for news consumption. <sup>600</sup>

### OLS MODEL 2 WVS 2011 WAVE 6 RESULTS FOR RUSSIA.

As before the trust variable was looked at in more detail for the Russia OLS mode for Wave 6. This table will give us an idea of the number of 'trustees' in each category and comparing these results to the prevailing measure of trust: the WVS's generalized trust question. They were as follows for Wave 6:

Table 9: Russia, WVS 2011 Wave 6. Types of Trustees: New trust Variable.

Particularized	682
Generalized	76
Other	109
n=867	

Table 10: Russia, 2011. Generalized Trustees. Standard WVS measures.

	Trust completely.	Can't be too careful.
Generalized	266	601
n=867		

As before there is an expected drop in those who now meet the criterion for generalized trustees, since it now also includes the subset of those who also trust those they do not know all the time. For the standard WVS measure (Table 8), we see ~ 31% of respondents who answered this question were labeled as generalized trustees; the remainder would be labeled as particularized trustees with the potentiality to be atomizing. With the new measure (Table 7), of those who answered the trust questions, only ~ 9% were considered to be generalized trustees, ~ 77% are now considered particularized trustees, while ~ 13%

finding was upheld, as well.

<sup>600</sup>Levada Center 2016, 171



now fall in the newly created "other" category. Others are those who have little to no trust in anyone whether they know them or not. These percentages are essentially the same as found in Wave 5.

Table 11: OLS WVS Wave 6 Russia 2011. Effects of Trust and Government Trust on Democracy.

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t )
(Intercept)	7.333267	1.036416	7.076	3.11e-12 *
Particular Trust	-1.286484	0.818906	-1.571	0.1166
Other Trust	-1.494040	1.083571	-1.379	0.1683
Government Corruption	-0.522857	0.311167	-1.680	0.0933*
Life Satisfaction	0.100327	0.043078	2.329	0.0201 *
Age	0.008267	0.006373	1.297	0.1949
Females	0.304832	0.161199	1.891	0.0590
Education	0.078341	0.044720	1.752	0.0802
Income	-0.033856	0.050277	-0.673	0.5009
Immigrants	-0.123097	0.168384	-0.731	0.4649
Internet	0.034326	0.183378	0.187	0.8516
Particular Trust:Gov	0.480527	0.327620	1.467	0.1428
Other Trust:Gov	0.283372	0.403685	0.702	0.4829
<i>N</i>	867			
adj. $R^2$	0.02184			
Mult. $R^2$	0.03545			
p-value	0.002067			

\* indicates significance at  $p < 0.05$

## Hypothesis 1.

Just as before the interaction (Table 9) was looked at in order to assess  $H1$ . Again, as in Wave 5, we note there is no significant relationship between trust and government perceived corruption in Russia during Wave 6 interviews. This seems to suggest, as in the more complex model examining the region, how one feels about their government, no matter how negative, this will not impact individual levels of trust, overall.

## Model Summaries

This multivariate linear regression with interaction for Russia in the year 2011 provided similar results as the Bayesian RE HLM which was largely expected. The interaction model only accounts for  $\sim 0.022$  of the variance, and the reduced model accounts

for  $\sim 0.021$  of that model's variance however this was expected. The aim of this research was not to solve what accounts for democracy but to test hypotheses related to trust and democratic support, which required an attitudinal variable related to democracy be the model response. An Analysis of Variance (anova() in R) was run on this model to determine which variables were important to this model. The anova confirmed the interaction was not significant. A model was fitted without the interaction and there was no substantive difference on the outcome of the variables between the model with the interaction and the model with out. The model with the interaction showed an adjusted  $R^2$  0.022 and the model without showed an adjusted  $R^2$  0.021. Another anova was run comparing both models together indicating the interaction was not. The OLS models were also checked for heteroskedacity and passed. The results of these tests can be found in the Appendix.

### **Trust in Government: In the Nation's Capital.**

Examining the descriptive statistics, one notes a slight change in feelings of governmental trust. Comparing these results to Wave 5, one notes a slight 1% increase in those who indicate they have complete trust in the government while there is also a slight 3% increase in those who claim they have no trust at all. Substantively, these numbers have changed very little.

Table 12: Russia, 2011. Trust in Government: In the Nation's Capital. WVS Wave 6

Trust completely.	Trust Somewhat	Distrust Somewhat.	No Trust At All.
0.06%	0.41%	0.33%	0.20%
n=867			

Looking at government perception of corruption (Table 12), one sees for every  $\beta$  increase of government trust, which indicates reduced trust, we see a decrease of  $-0.12$  in feelings democracy is important. In other words, the less one can trust their government, the less support they have for democracy. However, this effect is no longer significant to the model in Russia for the year 2011. We also see no other control parameters significantly effect the model, as well.

Table 13: Simplified Model Wave 6 Without Interaction, Russia 2011

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t )
(Intercept)	6.386285	0.785931	8.126	$< 1.56e - 15$ *
Particular Trust	0.164866	0.284362	-0.580	0.5622
Other Trust	-0.912582	0.355294	-2.569	0.0104*
Government Trust	-0.110388	0.093931	-1.175	0.2402
Life Satisfaction	0.098890	0.043078	2.296	0.0219 *
Age	0.008269	0.006374	1.297	0.1949
Female	0.301827	0.161149	1.873	0.0614
Education	0.079470	0.044699	1.778	0.0758
Income	-0.033072	0.050260	-0.658	0.5107
Internet	0.044213	0.183326	0.241	0.8095
Immigrants	-0.122537	0.168421	-0.728	0.4671
<i>N</i>	867			
adj. $R^2$	0.02133			
Mult. $R^2$	0.03268			
p-value	0.001532			
* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$				

## Hypothesis 2.

Next we will look at the simplified OLS model for Wave 6 (Table 10). One will note immediately particularized trusters are now no longer significantly different from generalized trusters on the y-axis. While there is a -0.16 deflection away from generalized trusters, they are considered statistically the same in Russia this wave. This supports  $H_2$  which states there is no significant difference between generalized trusters and particularized trusters when considering how important they feel democracy is. This contradicts the literature on particularized trusters. (Putnam 1995, 2000; Fukuyama 1995). This research finds there is no significant difference between those who trust generally and those who trust particularly for Russia in 2011.

## Hypothesis 3.

Other trusters performed as expected for this wave. For every  $\beta$  increase on related to government trust, which a greater mistrust, we see a decrease of  $-0.91$  in feelings

democracy is important. This supports the third hypothesis and supports, generally, the understanding of atomized trusters in the literature.<sup>601</sup> Being an atomized trustee has a credibly negative impact on who one supports in democracy. We also see no other control parameters significantly effect the model, as well. Examining the effects plot (Figure 4) highlights this difference.




Figure 4: Effects Plot: Social Trust on Democratic Attitudes, Russia 2011

## Substantive Effects: Controls.

*Life Satisfaction* The repeat of life satisfaction playing a significant role in this model was expected. For every  $\beta$  increase of satisfaction, one should expect an increase of democratic feelings of  $\sim 0.09$ . This result conforms with the literature.<sup>602</sup>

## Other Controls.

*Age* the results show for every  $\beta$  increase in age, one might expect an increase of  $\sim 0.006$  in positive feelings about democracy while holding all others at their mean or 0, however this was not a significant effect for this wave. *Gender* While a person's sex seems to have some impact, females supporting democracy at a  $\sim 0.29$  increase over men,

<sup>601</sup>Putnam; Fukuyama; Uslaner; Mishler and Rose

<sup>602</sup>Putnam; Fukuyama; Mishler

it was not found to meet the  $\alpha$  of 0.05% threshold. This is not entirely unexpected as the literature can be mixed on this issue.<sup>603</sup> *Income* There is little evidence income levels drive support for democracy itself, particularly in the region. So this outcome was expected.<sup>604</sup> *Internet* As discussed with the last model, Internet usage was not expected to have a significant impact at this stage and was largely included as a possible "rising star" of indicators to be on the lookout for, given the rise of Internet usage as a source of information in recent years in Russia. This will be covered in more detail in the next chapter. *Immigrants* Again, not wanting to have immigrants as neighbors was not found to be a significant factor for how one supports democracy while holding all other variables at their constant. This result matches the last wave in this regard. And is still somewhat surprising given Russia's reputation as being a xenophobic country.<sup>605</sup>

## CONCLUSION.

The purpose of this chapter was to test the hypotheses against the prevailing literature. *H1* postulated there would be no credible impact of institutional level perception of government corruption on individual level trust and how important one feels democracy is. At the 2nd level of analysis is it clear: concerns around institutional corruption have no impact on how society trusts one another when individuals examine the importance of democracy in their lives. This was repeated when we looked at Russia, specifically. In each Wave the interaction bore not fruit, supporting *H1*. Instead, the data demonstrate, at both the region level, as well as in Russia when isolated, how one feels about their governments and how they trust act wholly independent of one another on the y-axis. Further, while CPI and government trust do have a credible impact on how respondents felt about democracy, the effects were different when looking ta the region overall vs Russia isolated. We noticed in the region the less corrupt a country was perceived to be, on average one would expect and increase in the feelings of democracy on each country.

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<sup>603</sup>Georgina Waylen et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 566-570.

<sup>604</sup>Daron Acemoglu et al., "From Education to Democracy?" *AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW* 95, no. 2 (May 2005): , doi:10.1257/000282805774669916.

<sup>605</sup>Donna Bahry et al., "Ethnicity and Trust: Evidence from Russia," *The American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (November 2005): , <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/stable/30038962>.

In Russia the same results held were discovered however, this effect was only significant in Wave 5. Looking at *H2*, we noticed in the region, this was largely supported; there was no credible difference between the particularized trusters and generalized trusters on average for each country in each of the two WVS waves. *H2* was supported at the region level. However, we noted for Wave 5 in Russia, particularized trusters were significantly different in Wave 5, in contradiction with *H2*. This was not repeated in Wave 6, however and *H2* was supported in Russia for 2011. Looking at the region, for both Waves 5 and 6, other trusters were seen to have no credible difference from generalized trusters in contradiction to the literature, as well as *H3*. However when looking at Russia isolated from the group, other trusters had a negative impact indirectly in Wave 5 and a direct negative impact in Wave 6, supporting *H3* which states other trusters will have a credible negative impact on how respondents feel about democracy.

Because of the unique challenges presented here, the author cautions from making any generalizable or causal claims. The WVS measure countries every four to five years meaning there is a significant space of time not accounted for. This makes difficult the measurement of differences between waves. It would have been preferable to have a survey which asks the particularized question every year, however no such survey exists. It is the hope of this work to encourage survey outfits to include this question every year. For now, the author can only report two snapshots on time for waves 5 and 6 in the region and in Russia, specifically.

The next chapter will be a discussion of the results found here. The author will explore possible explanations for these results, as well as their implications. Also, suggestions for future research will be examined.

## CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION.

### INTRODUCTION.

The purpose of this research was to create a new multidimensional trust variable that would more adequately reflect how human beings trust. Prevailing research has proven inadequate in this arena due to its reliance on aggregate data that offers little to no individual context <sup>606</sup> on a unidimensional variable (generalized trust only). As such, it fails to capture the true way in which human beings trust. <sup>607</sup> The author chose the case of the former USSR in order to test the "Strong-Weak State" model as proposed by Khodyakov's (2007) research. Khodyakov's asserts the shared history of Communist rule has left a mark on how individuals trust one another due to experiences with ineffective institutions. For the region, a Bayesian RE HLM was administered for both waves to address issues around endogeneity. Next, the case of Russia was isolated for both waves in order to look at a single case in more detail. The results in both cases yielded interesting results that seem to favor the "Strong-Weak" state model and the potential value of particularized trust, however additional research will be required.

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<sup>606</sup>Natalia Letki and Geoffrey Evans, "Endogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Europe," *British Journal of Political Science*, 2005th ser., 35, no. 3, , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092242>.; Bo Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust," *World Politics* 58, no. 01 (2005): , doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0022.; James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russias Democratic Transition," *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.2307/2669359.

<sup>607</sup>Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.; James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russias Democratic Transition," *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.2307/2669359.

This chapter continue as follows: First, the author will discuss the implications of this research first in the region, followed by Russia specifically. Next, the overall importance of the findings will be examined. This will be followed by an exploration of likely next steps for this particular research, as well as suggestions for how this variable might be utilized in the future. Finally, the author will close with a summation of this project and concluding thoughts.

## **DISCUSSION.**

This section will offer context for the results themselves. First, the region results will be examined in light of the literature and political realities for both waves. Table 1 helps to provide context to the scores and results. Then, we will take a closer look at the findings in the Russian case for 2005 and 2011. This section as a whole will help us gain an overall understanding why this research is important, as well as provide clues for future research. These were the hypothesis tested for this research.

**Hypothesis 7** *H1 Country level corruption will not create a credible negative effect on individual trust outcomes in light of support for liberal democratic values.*

**Hypothesis 8** *H2 There is no credible difference between those who trust generally and those who trust particularly in relation to support liberal democracy.*

**Hypothesis 9** *H3 Atomized others have a credible negative impact on democratic attitudes.*

## **Region Discussion.**

### **Hypothesis 1.**

*H1* is upheld for both waves calling into question the findings of the instrumentalists<sup>608</sup> who believe perceptions of corruption negatively impact interpersonal trust by degrading generalized trust and strengthening particularized trust, which they believe atomizing

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<sup>608</sup>William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002. ; Mishler and Rose 2001



and having negative impacts on democratic support. Removing atomized trusters and providing them their own category may have had an effect on the results for the region. The results for both waves returned non-credible results for the interaction of CPI and all levels of trust, supporting Khodyakov's (2007) findings and the "Strong-Weak State Model". This theory asserted that, under Communist or Soviet control, individuals saw the state as both strong and weak at the same time. The state was seen as strong because it reliably provided some political goods to the people. For example, education was free at all levels and seen as highly effective. Indeed, Soviet k-12 education was believed to be one of the best in the world. Another example would be the state's ability to provide universal healthcare. While the Soviet healthcare system was far from perfect, it was accessible to everyone. Yet still further, the state was believed to be strong from the vantage point of international relations. The geopolitical importance of the USSR was unquestioned, globally as it was seen as 1/2 of the two global super powers.<sup>609</sup> Conversely, the state was also seen as weak, for its inability to consistently provide needed political goods, such as food, nor were they able to consistently increase the standard of living. This state of affairs was accepted as a given forcing those in society, not to turn *on* one another as the prevailing literature might suggest but instead, to turn *to* one another in order to obtain necessities to survive, obtain 'luxury' items, or simply to just 'get things done'.<sup>610</sup> The system was seen as binary: it was *we* the people and *they* the bureaucracy. And there was no way *we* could act as a check against *them*.<sup>611</sup> Thus, informal institutions of *blat*' and *krugovaya poruka* were deployed; these relied on a vast social network of friends and family, and relied heavily on intermediaries acting as key links to other networks including those from out-groups.<sup>612</sup> Attitudes, overall, in the region are

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<sup>609</sup>Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285

<sup>610</sup>Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" *Social Research* 76, no. 1 (2009): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146>. ;Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285;

<sup>611</sup>Barbara Misztal, *Trust in Modern Societies: the Search for the Bases of Social Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 251.

<sup>612</sup>Onoshchenko and Williams 2016, 2013; Huseyn Aliyev, "Post-Communist Informal Networking: Blat in the South Caucasus," *Demokratizatsiya* 21, no. 1 (2013):.; Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" *Social Research* 76, no. 1 (2009): ; Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285

resistant to government institutions related to high levels of perceived corruption. This holds true even in states where democracy is objectively present and thriving such as Poland, accounted for in both waves of this research, suggesting perhaps cultural, social, or other latent factors are at play (see Table 1, particularly '06 results).<sup>613</sup>

After the fall of the USSR, the lingering distrust of the system was temporarily suspended with the hope of change to a more effective and less corrupt form of governance: democracy. This is especially true in the Visegrad countries of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Visegrad states shed themselves of all vestiges of Communism as quickly as possible after the fall <sup>614</sup>, swiftly adopting more liberal economic and political reforms, and were accepted into the EU rather directly<sup>615</sup>. Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, all former Soviet Republics, are part of the Commonwealth of Independent States. (CIS); <sup>616</sup> Russia and Belarus have not fared as well towards democratic development after the fall, with Russia consistently sliding backwards, and Ukraine has been met with mixed results.<sup>617</sup> Nonetheless, the process of trust resulted in the societies in these states assimilating what had been learned while interacting with their new respective regimes; as such this hope turned to apathy as expectations in each individual society were not met.<sup>618</sup>

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<sup>613</sup>Mishler and Rose 1997. The authors suggest there could be more than post-Communist legacies at play and include the possibility of country-specific influences, as well. Though their research finds cultural considerations play a minor role, institutional performance has the largest impact –citizens evaluate institutional performance by overall economic considerations.

<sup>614</sup>M. Steven Fish, "The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-communist World.," *East European Politics and Societies*. 12, no. 1 (December 1997): , doi:10.1177/0888325498012001002.

<sup>615</sup> Wilhelmus Antonius Arts and Loek Halman, *Loek Halman and Arts, "(Post-)modernization, Individualization And Individualism: Value Changes In Central And Eastern Europe In The First Decade After The Fall Of The Iron Curtain Advanced Search button for Search (Post-)modernization, Individualization And Individualism: Value Changes In Central And Eastern Europe In The First Decade After The Fall Of The Iron Curtain," in Mapping Value Orientations in Central and Eastern Europe (Brill, 2010).*. (Leiden: Brill, 2004).

<sup>616</sup>Ukraine is an associate state since 1993

<sup>617</sup>EIU Digital Solutions, "Democracy Index 2016," Democracy Index 2016 - The Economist Intelligence Unit, accessed June 31, 2017, [https://www.eiu.com/public/topical\\_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2016.](https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2016;); "NationsinTransit2016," |FreedomHouse, January04, 2017, accessed July19, 2017, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2016.>; "TwelveMythsaboutChangeinUkraine," StopFake.org, July18, 2017, accessed July31, 2017, <https://www.stopfake.org/en/twelve-myths-about-change-in-ukraine/>.

<sup>618</sup>"Twelve Myths about Change in Ukraine," StopFake.org, July 18, 2017, , accessed July 31, 2017, <https://www.stopfake.org/en/twelve-myths-about-change-in-ukraine/>; Loek Halman and Arts, "(Post-)modernization, Individualization And Individualism: Value Changes In Central And Eastern Europe In The First Decade After The Fall Of The Iron Curtain Advanced Search button for Search (Post-)modernization, Individualization And Individualism: Value Changes In Central And Eastern Europe In

Generally, individuals in the region for both waves lacked trust in their political institutions, even if the rate and success of democratization differs within the region. The average feelings of government corruption across the region or Wave 5, for example, show a  $\mu = 3.41$ , Poland reported the comparatively 'least' corruption with a 5.3 on a 1:10 scale. Alternatively, trust levels in government institutions across Wave 5 show an average of 31% respondents who replied they either 'trust completely' or 'trust somewhat' government. Looking at the individual results, Poland trusted their government the least with only 17%, though they have fared the best in the democratization project according to Freedom House with a ranking of "Free" for 2005 and 2012.<sup>619</sup> However, perceptions are important because they spur either action or inaction. For the first hypotheses we see negative perceptions do not, at least, cause individuals to mistrust one another. However there are other implications for this variable when looked at independent of social trust.

Table 14: Perceptions vs. Democracy Score By WVS Country and Year.

WVS Year	CPI*	FH Score*	FH Status*
Georgia '08	3.9	4.0	"Partly Free"
Moldova '06	3.2	3.5	"Partly Free"
Poland '06	3.7	1.0	"Free"
Russia '06	2.5	5.5	"Not Free"
Ukraine '06	2.8	2.5	"Free"
Belarus '11	2.4	6.5	"Not Free"
Poland '12	5.5	1.0	"Free"
Russia '11	2.4	5.5	"Not Free"
Slovenia '11	5.9	1.0	"Free"
Ukraine '11	2.3	3.5	"Partly Free"

\*CPI is scored from 1-10 where 10 is the least corrupt or "Very Clean". Freedom House scores democracy on a scale of 1-7 with 1 being "Free" and 7 rating as "Not Free" The numbers come from the year after the WVS interviews. This is because FH reports are for the year previous. For example Ukraine's 2006 results are in the FH 2007 report. <sup>621</sup>

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The First Decade After The Fall Of The Iron Curtain," in *Mapping Value Orientations in Central and Eastern Europe* (Brill, 2010),110.

<sup>619</sup>Freedom House "Freedom in the World" reports 2007. Other research has shown, on average, perceptions of corruption (CPI) can be associated with trust in government institutions, particularly the WVS question on this topic.<sup>620</sup> Given these results, the author created a model for Poland where the WVS's "trust in government" question was replaced by CPI to see if the effects would change; "trust in government" is ranked on a 1-4 scale where 1 is "trust completely and 4 is "no trust at all". The results did not change. An anova was run to confirm these findings. For the sake of thoroughness, the author repeated the OLS, as well as anovas, for each in each of the countries for each wave and was met with the same result: neither CPI nor trust in government had any interaction effect with trust, though it was sometimes found to be credible/significant on its own mirroring the CPI results at the country level for each wave.

## Perceptions of Corruption (CPI)

The results for both waves showed perceived levels of government corruption had an independent and credible impact on how the people in the region felt about democracy. The less corrupt the state was perceived to be, the more people felt democracy was important. These findings were theoretically expected and support current understandings of corruption and its effects on democratic support, though are interesting in the context of the region. Given the perceived levels of corruption one might have expected beliefs in high levels of corruption influence a greater belief in the importance of democracy.<sup>622</sup> The exact answer to this question is beyond the scope of this research, however it is still an important consideration to note. Widespread belief in the corruption of the state, according to the literature, makes a society more likely to accept and support authoritarian political behaviors.<sup>623</sup> Anderson and Tverdova find in countries where corruption is high, supporters of the regime do not share the notion their government is corrupt—when in fact empirical evidence supports it is.<sup>624</sup> The reverse may also be true. Perceptions drive reality for better or worse. However, they can also be drivers of change as was seen in the fall of the USSR.<sup>625</sup> A look at Table 1 allows one to see this in 'action'. Poland is ranked as "Free" with a Freedom score of 1 for Wave 5 and 6, however, Poles perceived their government as very corrupt for Wave 5, and corrupt for Wave 6. Could this be a result of cultural attitudes towards government and institutions? Or could it be more than that? If we are to believe trust is a process, it will take time and experience for society to have reliable interactions with a more credible government for attitudes and perceptions to change. Inglehart's (2006) research shows as positive experiences increase, so will improved perceptions. Looking again at Table 1, we can see this reflected with a higher CPI score for Wave 6, indicating a somewhat reduced belief in corruption among

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<sup>622</sup>Luigi Manzetti and Carole J. Wilson, "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?" *Corruption and Democracy in Latin America*, August 2007, , doi:10.2307/j.ctt9qh6n2.7.

<sup>623</sup>Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 224.

<sup>624</sup>Christopher J. Anderson and Yuliya V. Tverdova, "Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 1 (2003): , doi:10.2307/3186095.

<sup>625</sup>Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 133.

Poles. However, when one places the Bayesian RE HLM CPI results in the context of democratic support in the region overall, it is somewhat concerning.

Support for democracy in the region across both waves experienced a drop from 73% in Wave 5 to an average of about 63% in Wave 6.<sup>626</sup> This represents a full 10 point drop between waves. It is difficult to know if this drop is related to the loss Moldova and Georgia in Wave 6 in favor of Slovakia and Belarus. Given Slovakia's high democracy rating and relatively more robust civil society, and Belarus' poor ratings, according to Freedom House this likely does not explain the full drop.<sup>627</sup> In other words, the model results should not be taken on their face as good news for the region over all.

The current research on the region suggests poor institutions may to blame for the drop in democratic support.<sup>628</sup> Corruption is so embedded into the system of most of these states, it is impossible to avoid entirely. Indeed, in some instances it is ultimately 'preferred' to the official mode of dealing with the state and the ineffective and/ or corrupt bureaucracy. The *sistema*, as discussed in Chapter 3, is so entrenched across much of the region, bribes or favors are short hand for simply "getting things done" such as filing for travel visas, dealing with the courts, tax organizations, or even hospitals and schools.<sup>629</sup> Unlike *blat*' and *krugovaya poruka*, *sistema* corruption seeks to enrich individuals in the bureaucracy at the expense of the people. It is this perceived "moral" difference that creates resentment between citizens and institutions<sup>630</sup> , and potentially decreased satisfaction with democracy.<sup>631</sup> Though it is sometimes preferred or accepted

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<sup>626</sup> Meaning, those who offered a rating on the importance of democracy as being 8 or greater.

<sup>627</sup> "Freedom in the World 2017," Freedom House, September 25, 2017, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017>.

<sup>628</sup> Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" *Social Research* 76, no. 1 (2009): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146>. ; Luigi Manzetti and Carole J. Wilson, "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?" *Corruption and Democracy in Latin America*, August 2007, doi:10.2307/j.ctt9qh6n2.7.; Ivana MarkovTrust and democratic transition in post-communist Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).; Bo Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust," *World Politics* 58, no. 01 (2005): , doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0022.

<sup>629</sup> Zaloznaya 2017 pp 66, 115; Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" *Social Research* 76, no. 1 (2009): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146>.

<sup>630</sup> Marina Zaloznaya, *The Politics of Bureaucratic Corruption in Post-Transitional Eastern Europe*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 40.; Anderson and Tverdova 2003

<sup>631</sup> Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and its alternatives: Understanding post-Communist Societies* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 102.

this does not mean it is free from critique: this creates an environment where citizens feel it is ok to steal from the government or circumvent formal rules because the state is unable or, in reality, wholly unwilling to change *sistema* to benefit the people. It is this conflict between the governed and the state that likely accounts for the results found here.

However, the author of this research in no way wishes to leave the reader with the impression this result is fixed, predetermined, or immutable, regardless of the carry over of these behaviors from the Communist period. As discussed above with Poland, this situation has the ability to change overtime given the understanding trust is a process. As society has improved direct positive experiences with institutions, individuals may change their disposition towards greater trust in their governments. What this requires is both simple and at the same time, monumental: leaders with the political will to expose the system for what it is, and change course to a more transparent and efficient system.<sup>632</sup> While this research shows corruption is an independent effect from all levels of trust, in relation to democratic support, it is the belief of this author improved institutions can foster institutional trust where it is lacking.

## Hypothesis 2

*H2* Is supported at the region level for both waves. These findings uphold the notion trust is a process existing on different levels, often times multiple levels at the same time as discussed in Chapter 4. Trust matters to both models in both waves however the levels between them do not, on average, across the region. Making connections and creating and maintaining trust was important in these networks they remain largely intact across the region.<sup>633</sup> Further, the over all feeling of avoidance of interaction with authorities and apathy towards institutions remains and is understandable where institutions have failed. The very nature of *blat*' networks and *krugovaya poruka* is grounded in family, blood-ties,

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<sup>632</sup>Bo Rothstein, *The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 164-192.; Ledeneva

<sup>633</sup>Huseyn Aliyev, "Post-Communist Informal Networking: Blat in the South Caucasus," *Demokrati-zatsiya* 21, no. 1 (2013).; Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" *Social Research* 76, no. 1 (2009): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146>.; Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.

community, and social relationships which operate outside of government institutions, not for the personal profit of the participant but, for the general welfare of those in the network. Human beings are not unidimensional -existing at one level of trust at a time- but rather multidimensional; this means people often draw on all levels of their trust networks, to varying degrees, when help is needed. Studies have shown these networks can include intermediaries from out-groups, to include people of other ethnicities, and are not always exclusionary.<sup>634</sup>; James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russias Democratic Transition," *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.2307/2669359.. This is especially true when society generally has greater opportunity to interact with people outside of their own ethnicity because of higher concentrations of ethnic others in their communities.<sup>635</sup>

### **Hypothesis 3.**

*H3* is not supported for both waves, however the findings potentially support Gellner's understanding of atomization not being solely positive or negative in orientation to democratic values. This means, on average, atomized trusters do not have a credible difference between generalized trusters and their feelings of democratic importance. In other words, being atomized, at the aggregate region level, is not always going to have a negative impact on how one feels about democracy.

## **Russian Discussion.**

### **Hypothesis 1.**

*H1* is upheld across both waves. As expected, the findings in Russia mirror that of the region in both waves. How individuals feel about government corruption has no credible impact on how society feels for one another in relation to their support for democracy for the years 2005 nor for 2012. This contradicts the accepted literature on

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<sup>634</sup>Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.

<sup>635</sup>Donna Bahry et al., "Ethnicity and Trust: Evidence from Russia," *The American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (November 2005): , <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/stable/30038962>.

the region from the instrumentalists<sup>636</sup> yet supports Khodyakov's (2007) "Strong Weak" state model. The system of informal networks is steeped in Russian society from top to bottom. Unable, or in some instances –unwilling–, to interact with a state that is seen to be corrupt at worst or disinterested at best, Russians often prefer to turn to their trust networks in order to 'get things done'.<sup>637</sup> This common Russian perception that "politicians have one life and our lives do not cross" is perhaps explicitly modeled here.<sup>638</sup> Russian society has come to believe much more strongly in one in another, in so much as what is happening at the governmental or institutional level does not directly impact how they trust.

### **Trust in Government: In the Nation's Capital.**

Trust in government in Russia for Waves 5 and 6 returned conflicting results. For Wave 5 we saw a mirror image of what the region displayed overall. In other words, the less one felt they could trust the government, the less they were likely to support democracy. In Wave 6, the same result was returned, however the effect was not significant for 2011 which is difficult to explain, and goes against expected expectations in the literature. While a full discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this research, some considerations are in order. Thinking of Wave 5, which mirrors the literature on this topic, placing this wave in context of time, one should recall 2006 the second year of Putin's second term as President. While the economy was on the rise due to increasing oil prices world-wide<sup>639</sup> corruption was still seen as a pervasive problem. *Sistema* was in full swing, as President Putin was replacing oligarchs for new ones in the form of *siloviki*, his friends from his days in the KGB, who he had given considerable power. While the rule of law had been

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<sup>636</sup>Bo Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust," *World Politics* 58, no. 01 (2005): , doi:10.1353/wp.2006.0022.; William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.

<sup>637</sup>Alena Ledeneva, "From Russia with "Blat": Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?" *Social Research* 76, no. 1 (2009): , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972146>.; Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285

<sup>638</sup>"Public Opinion 2012," Levada Center, 2012, [http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/2012\\_eng.pdf](http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/2012_eng.pdf).

<sup>639</sup>The World Bank, "Russian Economic Report," Russian economic report (Russian) | The World Bank, March 24, 2006, accessed July 01, 2017, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/826961468295838920/Russian-economic-report>.



addressed to some extent as it regards to average Russian citizens, such as neighborly disputes or violent crime, political crimes, however, were clearly still adjudicated from Moscow<sup>640</sup>. As such, Russian society was still aware of the depth of political corruption still present in the government, leading to distrust.

However, as time passed between Wave 5 (2006) and Wave 6 (2001) much had transpired. Russia was coming to the end of Medvedev's first term as Russian President. It was widely speculated Putin would try to reassert power in some way increasing a mixture of apathy and anger in society: would Putin run again?<sup>641</sup> This discontent might account for the slight decrease in government trust between Waves 5 and 6 (see Chapter 6, Tables 6 and 11). What impacts institutional or government trust is their performance.<sup>642</sup> Indeed, it was announced in September 2011 Medvedev would step aside to be Prime Minister for Putin in the 2012 election. It could be society had written off their lack of trust in government as an absolute given in such a way it no longer had an overall significant impact how they felt about democracy that year. Anger was stirred, however, leading to numerous protests at the end of 2011 and well into 2012 amidst government crackdowns. There could also be other latent variables not accounted for here which explain why trust in government is no longer significant. For example, the growing tide of the extreme right authoritarianism and nationalism that was spreading across Europe at this time<sup>643</sup> had also affected Russia as well. It is no secret Putin's authoritarian presidency and control over the media already spurred this from within and even encouraged the extreme right in Europe during this time.<sup>644</sup> This could account for the 3% drop, from 60% to 57%, in overall feelings that democracy is important between Waves 5 and 6. In order to parse out the results of this wave, further research needs to

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<sup>640</sup>Amnesty International; Carnegie

<sup>641</sup>RFE/RL, "Twelve Days That Shook The Kremlin," RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, October 05, 2011; "Public Opinion 2012," Levada Center, 2012, [http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/2012\\_eng.pdf](http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/2012_eng.pdf).

<sup>642</sup>Dmitry Khodyakov, "Trust as a Process," *Sociology* 41, no. 1 (2007): , doi:10.1177/0038038507072285.; William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust?" *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 1 (2001): , doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002.

<sup>643</sup>Michael Allen Hansen, "Voting Radical Right in Europe: a Comprehensive Explanation for Vote Choice," PhD diss., University Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016, abstract, 2016, , <http://dc.uwm.edu/etd/1148>.

<sup>644</sup>Ibid.

be considered.

## Hypothesis 2.

*H2* is not supported for Wave 5 but is for Wave 6. Particularized trusters were credibly different from generalized trusters in their reduced support for democracy for the year 2006. A closer look at the data illuminates the differences. In 2006, ~ 79% of generalized trusters rated democracy's importance at 8 or higher, particularized trusters came in at ~ 50%, and other trusters at ~ 57%. One notes particularized trusters are more similar than generalized trusters, however it is important to note even other trusters came in at over 50% which is somewhat surprising. For 2011, generalized trusters rated the importance of democracy as being an 8 or higher at a rate of ~ 61% a drops of 18%, particularized trusters remained stable at ~ 60%, and other trusters saw a large drop to ~ 33% (see table in appendix). In the absence of longitudinal data it will be difficult to explain these results, however one possibility is what Chebankova (2013) found in her study of trust in the Russian context. Using longitudinal data, she was able to uncover cyclical patterns based on socio-economic conditions.<sup>645</sup> She termed these public and private phases. In short, from 2000-2006, Russia had entered what she called a "private phase" in which society was largely interested on focusing on self interests after the relative poverty and chaos of the 1990s. The initial excitement and hope with the coming of democratization ended by 2000, leaving the people exhausted and disillusioned. Russians did not seem to be disappointed with the change of regimes, per se, but rather how it was being implemented or governed in Russia. In short, Russian society was in a period of disillusionment with the 'debacle' of the Yeltsin years. Feeling they could do nothing to change the state of affairs brought a return to the *us* versus *them* positioning; society's focus became improving one's own personal position and retreating from the public sphere. The economy was on the rise in 2006 due to surging oil prices, which may explain why income was not significant during this wave, however, Chebankova's (2013) research finds this private phase had not peaked until 2006. However, the shift,

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<sup>645</sup>Elena Chebankova, "Public and Private Cycles of Socio-Political Life in Putin's Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 26, no. 2 (2010): , doi:10.2747/1060-586X.26.2.121.

she asserts began to appear in 2005.

This can be seen most acutely in a decision made the previous year to replace some government benefits with flat monetary compensation. This was a source of consternation among Russian society, and seemed to imbue citizens with a heightened sense of the binary nature of their relations with the state being an "us versus them scenario." Indeed, 22% of the people who responded to a Levada Center poll in March of 2005 felt Putin was responsible for creating societal tensions surrounding the benefits issue, 37% felt it was the government more generally.<sup>646</sup> Similarly, the same year, the WVS also asked a question regarding what Russians expect of a democracy in their state. The survey participants were asked to respond on a scale of 1-10 importance, with 1, being the least and 10 being the most important, to the following question: "Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor." 63% of the respondents answered 8 or higher, with 71% of those responding with a rating of 10. Taken together with the results of the interaction model, which showed there was no direct impact from government trust impacting how society trusted one another in relation to support for democracy, we can say improved economic conditions began to awaken a sort of renewed moral compass. In other words, government mistrust was not the impetus for society's shift in focus, but rather economic antecedent considerations.

As Chapter 6 showed, there was not a significant change in the percentage of trusters in each category. However, during 2011 there was an increase of  $\sim 3\%$  in particularized trusters feeling democracy was important and a decrease from generalized trusters of  $\sim 10\%$ . If we examine the notion of trust as a process, one sees it is capable of change, in either direction based on circumstances, and is not immutable. The data seems to suggest particularized trusters may have been spurred to relatively stronger feelings towards democracy by some possible event or anticipation while generalized trusters became dramatically more disillusioned; this is where longitudinal data would be especially helpful in order to see "shocks in the system".<sup>647</sup> Though we do not have the benefit of continu-

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<sup>646</sup>"Sotsialno politicheskaya situatsiya v Rossii v fevrale g po oprosam obshhestvennogo mneniya.," Levada Center, March 17, 2005, accessed July 01, 2017, <https://www.levada.ru/2005/03/17/sotsialno-politicheskaya-situatsiya-v-rossii-v-fevrale-2005-g-po-oprosam-obshhestvennogo-mneniya/>

<sup>647</sup>Natalia Letki and Geoffry Evans, "Endogenizing Social Trust: Democratization in East-Central Eu-

ous year-by-year data in this research, one can still look to events happening during this time for possible clues and compare this to other research. The results seem to confirm Chebakova's (2013) findings. Russia was beginning the ascent out of the private-phase as the economy continued to strengthen. This resulted in a sort of post-materialist mindset where improved economic conditions allowed society become more active and concerned over democratic issues and increased public participation, rather than be focused mainly on their economic survival.

One possible explanation centers around concerns over Putin's return and general anger over the upcoming Duma elections, both of which were anticipate to be rigged or a forgone conclusion all year,<sup>648</sup> were acute enough to to spur large protest movements the end of 2011 and well into 2012, as discussed in Chapter 3. It is likely people who might otherwise not engage in protest, saw a danger to their own perceptions of how Russian society should be governed, the people banded together when their political values were threatened. In short, when faced with corruption and a lack of governmental trust, particularized trusters saw an *increase* in the importance of democracy over the Wave 5 results and were more closely aligned with the position of generalized trusters.

Finally, one must also consider it is possible Wave 5 was an outlier year, or perhaps it is really 2011 that is the outlier year in relation to the differences between particularized and generalized trusters. This is why the author cautions against too strong of interpretation into the conclusions reached here. It will be up to future research to attempt to falsify these findings.

### **Hypothesis 3.**

*H3* is upheld for both waves. Overall, these findings conform with the general and specific literature, indicating atomization leads to a reduction in democratic support. This is especially noticed when comparing other trusters in 2006, who were still on average supportive of democracy, to other trusters in 2011. The percentages of other trusters

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rope," *British Journal of Political Science*, 2005th ser., 35, no. 3, , <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092242>.

<sup>648</sup>Ellen Barry and Michael Schwartz, "Observers Detail Fraud in Russian Election Won by Putin," *The New York Times*, March 05, 2012, accessed July 01, 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/europe/observers-detail-flaws-in-russian-election.html>.

only dropped slightly from  $\sim 13\%$  to  $\sim 12\%$  between waves. As noted in the last section, other trusters saw a large drop in finding democracy to be important by  $\sim 24\%$  from Wave 5 to 6. This may present a concerning trend where other trusters may pose more of a threat to democracy than in Wave 5. These results may be explained when placed in context of the larger concern over the rise of extreme right attitudes across Europe and Russia.<sup>649</sup>

### **Control Variables.**

*Life Satisfaction* Life Satisfaction was the only control variable that was significant in both waves. What is interesting is in the descriptive statistics. between Waves 5 and 6, there was an increase in the percentage of Russians who were satisfied with their lives, which is ranked on a scale of 1-10, with 10 being the most satisfaction. For Wave 5,  $\sim 32\%$  ranked their satisfaction an 8 or higher, and  $\sim 45\%$  ranked it between a score of 5 to 7. For Wave 6, we see those who ranked satisfaction 8 or higher rose to  $\sim 37\%$  and 5 to 7 rose, as well, to  $\sim 49\%$ . At the same time we see a raw drop in support for democracy between Waves 5 and 6. Life Satisfaction is linked to market performance and incomes. Given Russia's economic performance was newly booming in 2005 and peaking in 2011, the raw results of satisfaction align with expectations. However when compared against support for democracy, the results are more interesting. As shown in Chapter 6, Wave 5 saw an increase of 0.16 on feelings of democratic importance for every  $\beta$  unit step in life satisfaction. Though Russians report to be happier in Wave 6, there is a drop in the effect this happiness has on democratic attitudes by an average of 0.07 points per increase in life satisfaction. While these results do not seem to go together, Inglehart's (2006) research shows this is a typical pattern in Russia; rises in happiness are related to economic conditions rather than political realities.<sup>650</sup> It will be interesting to compare these findings to a new regression analysis with Wave 7 results due out in 2019. In a recent report, the European Bank finds Russians have some of the lowest life satisfaction

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<sup>649</sup>Michael Allen Hansen, "Voting Radical Right in Europe: a Comprehensive Explanation for Vote Choice," PhD diss., University Wisconsin- Milwaukee, 2016, abstract, 2016, , <http://dc.uwm.edu/etd/1148>.

<sup>650</sup><https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1d0f/1c409f46040281bde732256586faf68e00d2.pdf>.

ratings today among the states categorized as 'in transition'.<sup>651</sup>

*Gender and Education.* Females were shown to have more support for democracy. The literature on this is mixed, as discussed in Chapter 5. However gender was not found to be significant in either wave. Further, the more education one had the more likely they were to support democracy, though this was only significant for Wave 5. Both of these results suggest there are other factors which transcended both gender and education which were more important.

*Age.* The results for age were mixed; for Wave 5 Age was found to be significant and showed as one aged, their support for democracy would decrease. By contrast, Wave 6 found the reverse: as one aged, one was more likely to support democracy than younger people. Mishler and Rose (2001) longitudinal research found, initially, older people were less likely to support democracy due to considerations regarding pensions and social safety net expectations that were part and parcel of the old regime (meaning before Gorbachev). However, the researchers' conclusions were, as time passed between the old regime and the new and more political knowledge was increased, these positive feelings would be transferred to the new regime. The findings of this research suggest that may have happened here.

*Income* there was a very slight reversal this wave from last showing the more income one had the less they supported democracy, however this was still not a significant effect. This could be, as before, a result in the increase in the overall attitudes one had towards their income in as the economy was on the rise due to increased oil prices. Whether real or imagined, Russians perceived their economic standing had improved. *Immigrants* This wave saw an interesting drop in those who did not feel having immigrants as their neighbors should be a cause for concern over those who did: the previous were 0.12 less likely to support democracy than those who did not want immigrants as their neighbor, however, again, this effect was not significant. *Internet* The rate of internet usage was not found to be a significant factor, though this was largely expected for this wave. As discussed before, the more interesting aspect of this variable may not appear until the

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<sup>651</sup>"EBRD Transition Report 2016-17," EBRD, , accessed July 01, 2017, <http://www.ebrd.com/transition-report>.

next wave and may interact with age. These effects which are commonly used as controls when considering attitudinal variables have a flat and/ or non significant effect across this wave therefore other considerations must account for this phenomena.

### **IMPORTANCE OF THE FINDINGS.**

Previous literature has been unable or unwilling to grapple with the true nature of trust by focusing solely on one form of trust: generalized trust. The literature claims particularized trust can lead to the atomization of society, which is detrimental to democracy. However, atomization is the absence of trust in others. Particularized trust is based on trust in people you know. Atomization is the mirror negative of any form of trust. Therefore, conceptualizing a bankruptcy of trust with those who do trust does not follow logically. Creating a trust variable that captures the dynamic nature of trust relations is a key departure.

This research has tackled head on the elusive nature of trust in a manner that has allowed it to be more appropriately measured, reflecting as close an proximation to reality as is possible. This included the focus on the importance of particularized trust in relation to a society's attitudes towards democracy. This project also has taken a new approach to trust by removing 'atomized others' and giving them their own category separate from particularized trusters. Because this research has in mind the potential generalizability of the trust variable, the measure was constructed carefully to ensure it can be applied across divergent cases, as well as globally.

Since social trust is seen as the cornerstone to civil society and, in turn, liberal democracy, it is vital to have a true understanding of where countries stand on this important measure. If one aspect of a measure is incorrect, then the final result will be flawed. The new measure needed to be both more accurate to trust in the region, but also created in such a way it would be applicable in a more generalizable fashion. The author believes this has been accomplished here. As such, our previous held views of countries as not being trusting will have to change, and with it, our attitudes towards their prospects for democratization. This research is an important 'first step' in this process.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.

Of course, there is still much work to be done. Therefore, there are many avenues of further research one might consider in light of the findings here. *Encourage other surveys to add the particularized trust question.* First and foremost, this research hopes to encourage other surveys to include the particularized trust question. Adding the multidimensional variable, not only better accounts for the nature of trust, it also allows one to see patterns much more readily between the different levels of trust. This will allow for more accurate prediction of potential social problems, as seen here in the other category in Russia between waves, or track more detailed changes that might indicate more social openness in relation to democratic attitudes.

*Trust as the dependent variable.* The promise of this research would likely follow with trying to understand what affects changes in trust more directly. This is possible through examining trust through a Bayesian multinomial logistic regression. Having a multidimensional trust variable may permit a more contextual understanding of what changes in the economic, political, or social sphere may cause trust to rise or fall in each level. Having this ability will also help researchers who study trust in the comparative political context to make policy recommendations on how to improve social relations within a given country to foster greater levels of trust and discourage the potential harmful effects of atomized trusters.

*Trust by geography.* The author would also like to test this variable in relation to geography. How are those who are in more urban areas trust in relation to those in more rural? This will also help further identify more specific patterns that may occur by region within a given state, across different cities, or even when in closer proximity to other states or continents.

*Examine Trust in relation to authoritarian attitudes.* As Mishler, et al have pointed out, a reduction in trust can lead to acceptance of authoritarian attitudes. Given what has been seen in this case, it would be interesting to see how this applies here, as well as across Europe. Given the ground swelling of extreme right attitudes across Europe and



into Russia,<sup>652</sup> this is a logical choice for further inquiry.

*Testing for generalizability.* Another logical step would be to test this measure in other specific contexts, or more broadly to test for generalizability. Can this measure be utilized not only, say in the African context, but also in South America? Can we draw out patterns globally?

*Wave 7 in 2019.* Significant social and political changes in the region have taken place since Wave 6. As mentioned previously, we have seen the rise of extreme right parties in Europe buttressed, in part, by Vladimir Putin.<sup>653</sup> We have also seen the grassroots support for Alexey Navalny in Russia grow, particularly from the Russian youth. As discussed in Chapter 3, his ability to connect to the people has been unprecedented. His use of Internet tools, such as LiveJournal, Instagram, YouTube, Twitter, VK, has been unique. He has a team of dedicated workers who helped him to launch well-produced live news streams and videos on YouTube and pushes them to all platforms. His reach has spread across Russia, to include organizing Navalny HQ offices as far East as Vladivostok.<sup>654</sup> Despite his numerous arrests, he is seen as the only opposition to Vladimir Vladimirovich, though it is not likely he will be successful in the 2018 election. To what, if any, extent will these events effect trust and democratic support in Russia? Will any age group be more effected? Will there be regional or city versus urban changes?

## CONCLUSION.

The main goal of this research was to create a new measure that would more accurately reflect the nature of how human being trust. Chapter 2 reviewed the the background to the relationship between citizens and the state, as well as a review of the general

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<sup>652</sup>Michael Allen Hansen, "Voting Radical Right in Europe: a Comprehensive Explanation for Vote Choice," PhD diss., University Wisconsin- Milwaukee, 2016, abstract, 2016, , <http://dc.uwm.edu/etd/1148>.

<sup>653</sup>Fredrik Wesslau, "Putin," ECFR, October 19, 1970, , accessed July 01, 2017, [http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_putins\\_friends\\_in\\_europe7153](http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_putins_friends_in_europe7153); Mike Lofgren, "Trump, Putin, and the Alt-Right International," *The Atlantic*, October 31, 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/10/trump-putin-alt-right-comintern/506015/>; <https://imrussia.org/en/analysis/world/2500-putinism-and-the-european-far-right>

<sup>654</sup>"Navalny's campaign headquarters opens in Khabarovsk," Navalny's campaign headquarters opens in Khabarovsk - Interfax, May 13, 2107, , accessed July 01, 2017, <http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=753761>.

literature. This helped expose the hyper-focus on Western notions of institutional and social formation with little cultural context. Chapter 3 provided the reader with an extensive background into the post-Communist, and in particular, the Russian case given its dominance over policy and institutions over most of the past century. The region and Russia specific literature still emphasized a focus on generalized trust and eschewing particularized trusters as atomizing. However, Chapter 4 provided us with the theoretical framework for the construction of a new trust variable that could better capture the nature of trust itself. We were reminded we are not one sort of truster or another, but rather more complex being who rely on an array of trust occurring at all levels to some degree or another, all simultaneously. Chapter 5 offered the reader an the explanation of the methodology employed here. It was noted, for the region, the RE HLM method would best potentially capture concerns around endogeneity, especially when combined with Bayesian inference with small  $M$  concerns. The ordinary least squares linear model was utilized in the Russian case. And, in Chapter 6, we found the results of this work, with a discussion, here in this Chapter.

There are three main points of interest the author would like taken away from this research. First, this project has focused on the creation of a new trust measure that would more accurately reflect on how human beings trust. The author believes, at the very least, this has been accomplished through the creation of a multidimensional that has a separate category for atomized trusters. This will allow researchers the ability to see changes to the different levels of social trust at a glance to better predict potential conflicts in social and political issues. Because trust is seen as an important indicator to democracy, getting this measure right matters. As discussed previously, perceptions drive action, and form reality. For example, if those in a position of global power, such as the IMF, or World Bank have the wrong perception of a social situation in a nation, this could have a direct impact on how a developing country is, not only monetarily supported, but also directed to make reforms.

Second, the author has shown support for Khodyakov's (2007) "Strong' Weak" state model. It has held true for both the region and in the specific Russian case. While how

one feels about their government and institutions has a direct impact on how they feel for democracy overall, it does not directly impact trust at the individual levels when thinking about democratic support. These are independent events. As such, the Institutional position may have to be reevaluated given the limitations of this project and additional research. This also leads into the notion that particularized trust is not especially atomizing, or even necessarily exclusionary. In both waves, the inclusion of immigrants had no impact on the models what so ever, suggesting other post-materialist considerations for particularized trusters, or the possible influence of the extreme right on atomized trusters may be at play.

Finally, while cultural considerations related to the legacy of Communist rule may have some lingering effect on how society deals with perceived ineffective or corrupt institutions, this is in no way a fixed condition. The author agrees with Mishler and Rose (2001) that political knowledge and increased time and experience with effective institutions will have a beneficial impact on how society perceives democracy overall. The case of Poland, as discussed earlier, may be an example of this. However, given the current state of political flux in Poland towards the extreme right<sup>655</sup>, more research will need to be done in this regard.

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<sup>655</sup>Michael Allen Hansen, "Voting Radical Right in Europe: a Comprehensive Explanation for Vote Choice," PhD diss., University Wisconsin- Milwaukee, 2016, abstract, 2016, <http://dc.uwm.edu/etd/1148>.

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APPENDIX

BAYESIAN RE HLM DIAGNOSTIC PLOTS




Figure 5: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects:Intercept. Wave 5.




Figure 6: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: CPI. Wave 5.




Figure 7: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Particularized Trust. Wave 5.




Figure 8: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Particularized TrustxCPI. Wave 5.




Figure 9: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Other TrustxCPI. Wave 5.




Figure 10: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Other Trust. Wave 5.




Figure 11: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects:Intercept. Wave 6.




Figure 12: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: CPI. Wave 6.




Figure 13: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Particularized Trust. Wave 6.






Figure 14: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Particularized TrustxCPI. Wave 6.




Figure 15: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Particularized TrustxCPI. Wave 6.




Figure 16: Bayesian Group-level Random Effects: Other Trust. Wave 6.