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Changes and Challenges in Diplomacy: An Evaluation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Dominican Republic

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Changes and Challenges in Diplomacy: An Evaluation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the
Dominican Republic.

by

Yudelka Santana Hernández

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
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and Reality

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my homeland in the hope that more and more Dominicans will rise to denounce and take action against the problems of patronage and corruption that face our Caribbean island. I dedicate this work to the hope that this scourge does not obscure the honesty of Dominicans interested in real social, political and economic growth of the nation.

“Let's work for and for the Homeland, which is to work for our children and for ourselves”.

“Let us work, let us work without rest...”.

Juan Pablo Duarte

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Thank you all for your valuable contributions,

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ABSTRACT

This research analyzes why diplomacy is failing in the Dominican Republic. In this thesis, I describe how Dominicans construct their foreign affairs, and the limitations that diplomacy has had in the country. In order to achieve these goals, I have analyzed official documents such as the 2013 and 2015 payrolls of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and legal documents including Article 146 from the Constitution, Organic Law 314 from 1964, and the Protocol of Transparency and Institutions. I argue that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Dominican Republic lacks seriousness and is characterized by the following variables: (1) patronage, (2) corruption, and (3) the systematic violation of Dominican law. The thesis emphasizes how these variables have had a tremendous impact on the exercise of diplomacy. The research analyzes the reaction of the Dominican state and its citizens and how the nation responds to criticisms by the international community. Dominican citizens think that the opinion of international media is a campaign against their country. The implications of this false public perception is an intense nationalism, and the government encourages this. The true problem, as this thesis demonstrates, is institutional weakness. The government uses intense and widespread nationalism to hide institutional weakness and state corruption. After exploring this dialogue between the government, citizens and international media, I move forward framing concepts such as soft power and new public diplomacy to reinforce the importance of listening to foreign publics. In addition I explain why the country needs to change the traditional approach to foreign affairs. The adoption of a new public diplomacy is required to establish credibility and the integration between state, citizens and international publics.

CHAPTER I

Changes and Challenges in the Dominican Diplomacy

Introduction

Diplomacy in the Dominican Republic has a lot of challenges. The constant conflict with Haiti and the accusations by the international community that categorize the nation as a racist country have force the Dominican Republic to proactively work toward cultivating a more positive reputation. However, I argue that in order to improve the nations' international reputation, the Dominican Republic has to address the internal weaknesses in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This internal evaluation would help in projecting a better image of the country. After the accusations of racism, the diplomatic reaction has been to invest money in improving the country's reputation by paying for public relations officials to explain the Dominican perspective (Thomas, 2015). The government, instead of trying to address the problems of patronage, corruption, and the failure to uphold the laws by the Ministry, looks for an easy solution. I evaluate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to analyze why diplomacy is failing in the Dominican Republic. First, I discuss what type of diplomacy Dominicans have been pursuing. What has made diplomacy remain retrograde in the face of global changes? I then analyze the variables of patronage, corruption, and "law and reality" in the Ministry.

I examine the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to identify the law's antagonism, specifically in regards to the role of public officials. One of the main issues in the institution is that officials are

not working to construct strong public diplomacy in the countries to which they are assigned. Consequently, the Dominican Republic has a questionable form of diplomacy, which is only implemented when the country receives international pressure. Former diplomat Bernardo Vega highlights that there are people who receive a paycheck as foreign consulate officers but who have never left the Dominican Republic (Reuters, 2014). The lack of seriousness in the exercise of these officials has damaged the reputation and effectiveness of the Dominican Foreign Service. Resolving this problem should be one of the first steps in achieving a new framework of Diplomacy.

There is a danger in believing that the international community is implementing a misguided campaign to discredit the Dominican Republic in terms of its relations with Haiti. Rather than focusing first on the Dominican Republic's relationship with its neighbors, this thesis focuses on reviewing what the Dominican Republic is doing in terms of public diplomacy. I hypothesize that the nation's negative reputation is due to the failure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Specifically, I argue that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have an effective or even workable international relations strategy because the diplomatic corps is not actually working in the countries where they are supposed to be. The local and international press has declared that the diplomatic corps in the Dominican Republic is an agent of "empty bottles" (Reuters, 2014). This term is used to describe public officers where the official receives a salary and does not attend to his or her duties.

This thesis highlights the importance of strong institutions in the development of diplomacy. I argue that negative international opinion could help Dominican officials to reframe a new diplomacy. Diplomacy should be viewed as a way to promote economic, political and cultural activities by the diplomatic corps, but also as a way of presenting the national agenda to

the foreign public. Transparency of the national institutions is key to being successful in this kind of diplomacy.

Importance of Study

In the Dominican Republic the international dynamic has been historically to develop a defensive diplomacy. Every time that the country is facing a challenge in the international arena, the executive and a group of Ministers meet to develop a public relations strategy which will appeal to the foreign public (MIREX, 2015). The country currently faces criticism around the world because of its racist policy towards people of Haitian descent. The Dominican Republic needs a different type of diplomatic approach to lead the country in building strategic international relations. Reforming the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could help the country live up to its full potential.

I argue the necessity of controlling patronage, corruption and the execution of the laws in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This reform is crucial to the consolidation of democracy. Failure to do so provokes a problem for diplomatic accountability.

This research highlights the importance of the reconstruction of Dominican international relations through employing *soft power* and *public diplomacy*. A solid external politics cannot exist if clear and feasible internal guidelines are not established. In this sense, the analyzed variables--patronage, corruption and the violation of Dominican law-- explain the institutional shortcomings that the country faces.

Patronage

Patronage affects the diplomatic body of the country. The election of officers by political patronage and cronyism creates a deficit of professionalism in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The situation generates collateral damage to professionals in the field, since the opportunities to

exercise the career turn out to be affected by lobbying and political influences. It is important to expand professionalism in state administration in order to reach strong policy decisions.

The patronage relationship between the government and political elites in state administration is also a problem that presidential, monarchic, and parliamentary systems all face. (Farazmand, 1997). The problem caused by patronage is that citizens begin to resent how the government uses the resources of the state. According to Farazmand, "...growing budget deficits and higher taxation, have caused major concern regarding the role of government in society in general and the role of the bureaucracy in particular" (Farazmand, 1997, p. vii). For this reason it is important to have qualified officials who can respond to the real challenges of the diplomacy, and, who can achieve accountability.

Corruption

The Dominican Republic, with a population of 10.41 million, has high levels of corruption. According to *Transparency International* Dominican Republic has more nepotism than Mexico, Colombia and Brazil (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2014).

Transparency International defines political corruption as "a manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth" (Transparency International, 2016). The payrolls of the institution of Foreign Affairs reflect how state administrators use their power to recommend families to the diplomatic corps. This action is a violation of the Dominican constitution and other laws.

Law and Reality

Latin American laws are based in Southern European legal tradition, specifically the *Siete Partidas* and the *Napoleonic Code*. According to Richard M. Morse, law in this context is often

understood as an ideal, or an utopian notion of how society *should* behave, rather than what the society *must* do. Morse stresses that “the *Partidas* were not so much rules for conduct in the Roman sense but rather medieval types of principles of proper conduct and of the well-ordered society and polity that approached the sanctity and status of being moral treaties.” (Wiarda, 1992, p. 214). Likewise, Morse emphasizes that the Napoleonic Code was not successful in the region because it proposed a worldview which was “anti-feudal and highly individualistic, while Latin America remained essentially a corporate-feudal arena.” (Wiarda, 1992, p. 217). In that sense, the adoption of ideas from both systems has contributed to an authoritarian and personalistic political culture.

Dominican institutions have a dichotomy between laws and reality; the Dominican state creates beautiful laws that politicians then violate for their own purposes. Bernd Reiter explains that laws in Latin American countries are created just to provide a framework for how a society should act, which is actually very far from how the society is ordered in the present. This type of state mentality developed from a heritage of colonization and rooted in legal idealism. As Reiter states, “legal idealism characterizes a system where laws are created and codified by elites, who take little interest and are indeed unfamiliar with the reality of the majority” (Reiter, 2013, p. 139).

Research Design and Methodology

In this thesis I have measured the variables of patronage, corruption, and the execution of law in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Dominican Republic between the years 1986-2015. I first observed the situation of the country in the summer of 2015 when the international media denounced the nation as racist, and the Dominican government defensively reacted. During this time, the government contracted public relations agencies to defend the country by implementing a national strategy to address media claims. This crisis led me to question why the government had to contract PR agencies when the Dominican Foreign Service is already supposed to fulfill this

function. I have examined the negative reports about the Dominican Foreign Service by the Dominican national media between 2013 and 2015. I identify that the headline “Dominican Republic’s ‘empty bottles’ diplomats under scrutiny,” published by Reuters in May 16 in 2014, had a powerful influence on Dominican public opinion. The importance of this claim by international media provoked a local media critique of the Foreign Service. Acento.com.do composed a series of documents where the media could obtain the 2013 payroll of all who were paid by the State Department. The article describes how political patronage (clientelism) and corruption tainted diplomacy. After analyzing this media coverage, I then compare the variable of corruption with the Corruption Perception Index 2014, by *Transparency International* and the United Nations Blue Book, which illustrate the quantity of Dominican diplomats in UN.

The documents published by Acento.com.do contain a list of names, and highlight the Foreign Service officials identities and how they received their appointments. The 2013 payrolls contain a list of Reformist Party (PRSC) members. It also contains a list of people recommended by the senator Felix Bautista, who was accused of corruption in 2012 for illegal construction contracts in Haiti, and who is one of the most corrupt politicians in the world according to International Transparency in 2016. Furthermore, I completed my own analysis of the 2015 Payroll where I discovered some irregularities. I identify a list of positions where the minimum wage is higher than the amount that officials are “earning”.

I then assessed historical documents in order to understand how the Dominican patronage system works. I evaluated how the exchange of favors was part of the Dominican transition to democracy. In order to measure corruption and the disconnect between law and reality, I examined primary sources such as the Dominican Constitution, the 1964 Organic Law, and two documents

from the institution “Citizen Participation¹” where I evaluate the measurement 7 and 9 concerning transparency in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I also interviewed the Dominican historian Mu-Kien Sang via email. Sang has written two books on foreign affairs “*The Dominican Foreign Affairs 1844-1961*” and “*The Dominican Foreign Affairs 1961-1974*,” both books cover a large period of the history of Dominican Foreign Affairs. Sang’s analysis correlated with the three periods that I identified as the most remarkable in the diplomatic history of the country: the Trujillo dictatorship, the transition to democracy under Joaquin Balaguer, and the period of globalization under Leonel Fernández.

I used all this data to assess the current and future state of Dominican Foreign Affairs. The data confirms the culture of patronage, corruption and the difference between law and reality that characterize Dominican institutions.

Concepts and Definitions

In this thesis, I discuss several concepts, such as “soft power strategy” by Joseph Nye. Nye offers a diplomacy model that explains impact on foreign public perception. As Jian Wang explains “Foreign public opinion is gaining ever more significance in forming an emerging globalized public and influencing international political process and outcome” (Wang, 2005, p. 91). In the case of the Dominican Republic, the declarations in the international media about racism in the country demonstrated that the Dominican authorities were alert to how their national reputation is constructed. The strategy of soft power in diplomacy provides a model for a coherent, coordinated

¹ Citizen participation is a non-partisan civic movement established on 31 October 1993, arising as a result of a process of reflection among citizens, to achieve from the participation of the civil society, respect for the will of the people in the electoral process to face the floating corruption and to strengthen the political institutions of the country.

and structured diplomacy rather than the creation of a defensive, or an impromptu diplomacy (Wang, 2005).

The basic distinction between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy is, according to Melissen that “the former is about relationships between the representatives of states, or other international actors; whereas the latter targets the general public in foreign societies and more specific non-official groups, organizations and individuals” (Melissen, 2005, p. 5). The Dominican Ministry of Foreign Affairs is challenged to leave the old traditional form of diplomacy and adopt “public diplomacy.” Wang describes public diplomacy as “not merely about advocating and promoting political and economic goals to the international public; it is, instead, about relationship building between nations and cultures through better communication” (Wang, 2005, p. 93).

Another concept I use in my analysis is patronage. That is, the remuneration for political favors between officials and citizens using state resources. Richard Graham points out that patronage has developed in Latin American countries through the activity of social and economic elites. Further, Graham stresses that people have accepted this political behavior and have not traditionally considered it to be unethical because “it was rooted in an ancient social system and ultimately in familial and interpersonal relationship built up over a long time” (Graham, 1990, p. 7). Patronage is also referred to as “political clientelism” and it has been a characteristic of many Latin American governments. The executive power is usually the incubator of clientelism. Presidents have used clientelism through their political campaigns to obtain votes by providing jobs to the people who supported them. In the case of the Dominican Republic, Joaquín Balaguer went to the streets a few months before the elections and gave food to people in the villages. In the case of this study, I highlight the high levels of clientelism by evaluating the payrolls of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and how political alliances were a principal factor in the spread of clientelism.

Wilfredo Lozano explains that the power of institutions in the Dominican Republic and in Latin America are related to states, social classes and elites. Lozano describes government as “the package of rules, formal or informal, which govern relations between different actors and organizations in the principal areas of social, economic and cultural life” (Lozano, 2010, p. 2). Government institutions in the Dominican Republic are characterized by lobbying and personal influences, and are thus weak.

The Dominican Republic has a myriad of laws; however, there is a lack of execution. The diplomat and lawyer Rafael Molina Morillo explains that the country has a collection of laws for everything, and it appears that the nation has high institutional consolidation. However, the main problem that the country faces is that “nobody fulfills them” (*Mis Buenos Días*, Morillo, 2004). Likewise, the former diplomat in United States and Canada highlights that the first people who violate the laws are public officials. Consequently, the nation has weak institutions.

Foreign Affairs-New York emphasizes that the problem with the rule of law is that, even though elites discuss the necessity of implementing the laws, they do not want to obey the laws. As Thomas Carothers stresses, “most Latin American governments have acknowledged the need for rule-of-law reform and are taking steps toward it, or at least proclaiming that they will. But judicial and police reform has run into walls of bureaucratic indifference and entrenched interests” (Carothers, 1998, p. 1). Additionally, Carothers argues that Latin American systems are full of corruption, cynicism, and impunity with a disparity in what the rule of law and legal institutions must be. Carothers describes that the rule of law has to be equal for everybody and that the judicial

system has to be autonomous and neutral without the manipulation of political and economic elites (Carothers, 1998).

In the book *Informal Institutions and Democracy*, Helmke and Levitsky (2006) describe the difference between informal and formal institutions in Latin America. The authors evaluate the effectiveness of institutions and explain that laws in Latin America are difficult to put into practice. The authors point out that the rule of law is not implemented because many legislators try to make profit rather than enforce the laws (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006) There is no clarity about the sanctions that exist in the Dominican Republic when a diplomat is not exercising his/her functions abroad, even though the Constitution condemns all forms of corruption in the organs of the state.

The culture of breaking the law is also problematic of the level of the Dominican citizen. Helmke and Levitsky compare the citizen's perception and the success of formal institutions, and analyzes that, "where formal institutions are effective, actors believe there is a high probability that noncompliance will be sanctioned by official authorities. Where formal rules and procedures are ineffective, actors believe the probability of enforcement (and hence the expected cost of violation) to be low" (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, p. 13). I have shown that there is a discourse between the rule of law and how states create laws to satisfy international legitimacy.

Organization of the Thesis

In chapter 2, I discuss how global changes and technologies provide a new perspective to ensure public diplomacy and the importance that a country actually pays attention to international public opinion. I analyze the relative position between states and diplomacy in the region. I then describe the difference between traditional diplomacy and the new public diplomacy. Experts agree that most Latin American nations follow outdated foreign affairs parameters and are retrograde in terms of soft power, especially where the state does not integrate local citizens and

foreign publics into its overall strategy. This chapter also discusses my interview with the Dominican historian, Mu Kien Sang, who stresses the difficulties of achieving soft power in the country. Sang provides historical arguments that are valuable in understanding Dominican international relations during the Trujillo dictatorship and the governments of Joaquin Balaguer and Leonel Fernández. In addition, I describe the reactionary diplomacy and the nationalist discourse that Dominicans have developed around foreign affairs.

In chapter 3, I point out that the government used a nationalist discourse against the international criticism to hide the weaknesses in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MIREX, 2015). I make the argument that there is a lack of seriousness in the institution because Foreign Service officers are not working in the places that they are assigned, and this creates weak diplomacy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Dominican Republic has been admonished for hiring surplus personnel. In 2014, the institution had 1,396 officials published on the payroll; however, in 2015 the minister of Foreign Affairs claims that 1,200 officials were removed. These and other irregularities highlight the urgency for true accountability in Dominican diplomacy.

Also in chapter 3, I analyze 3 variables: patronage, corruption, and the lack of adherence to the law. I show how alliances between political parties create patronage and how corruption affects the Ministry. I examine the MIREX payrolls from 2013 and 2015, where high levels of corruption and political clientelism were established. In this chapter, I also evaluate three documents concerning the Ministry and demonstrate how state governments and citizens have sometimes struggled to implement the laws. I argue that both the state and the citizens believe that the laws are pieces of paper that can be removed or adjusted when they want.

In chapter 4, I conclude by describing the consequences of the institutional weaknesses of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I also explore some implications of this problem; the Dominican

state constructed a sense of nationalism in order to hide the internal issues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I identify the importance of listening to international public opinion and the role of citizen participation that would be required in order to obtain diplomatic accountability and accomplish soft power.

CHAPTER II

Dominican Foreign Diplomatic History

Introduction

Dominican foreign policy continues to have many shortcomings. In this chapter I analyze the historical context of Dominican diplomacy in order to scrutinize the principal factors that have damaged the institution. In the first part of this chapter, I stress how globalization has changed the Dominican perspective on diplomacy. The new challenges to diplomacy offer countries without military or economic power a way to impact foreign public opinion through the application of soft power. Before I focus on the history of foreign affairs in the Dominican Republic, I present a brief overview of Latin American diplomacy and the reasons some countries of the region continue to face problems. One reason why countries like the Dominican Republic do not achieve high levels of soft power is because of the weak relationship between diplomacy and the state. For that reason, I claim that in order to live up to the new challenges of diplomacy, the Dominican Republic has to evaluate how diplomats and executives are managing foreign policy.

In the second part of this chapter, I discuss the views of Mu-Kien Sang, who is an historian and an expert in Dominican international relations. Sang agrees with the analysis of the Dominican Republic's diplomacy as "defensive" and she describes the different periods in the history of Dominican foreign relations. She highlights four stages in the diplomatic history from the dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (1930-1961), through the government of Leonel Fernández's: *Dominican Liberation Party* (1996-2000, 2004-2012). At the end of this chapter, I

evaluate the last few years of Dominican diplomacy and discuss two instances where the national government implemented a reactionary diplomacy. This chapter seeks to unveil the changes that must be addressed in order to develop credible external relations in the Caribbean country.

The Development of a New Diplomacy

Global changes and technology have changed the conditions under which foreign relations are executed and developed, not only in the Dominican Republic but in all of Latin America. Mora and Hey (2003) analyze the diplomatic behavior in Latin American and Caribbean countries. They claim that one of the problems in Latin American and Caribbean foreign affairs is that the political culture in these countries allows for highly personalized administration, and also that the executive branch has a tendency towards authoritarian rule in foreign policy. Likewise, these authors find four spheres that together influence the effectiveness of the country's foreign policies: (1) the idiosyncrasies of individual presidents, (2) the role of the domestic political institutions, (3) the role of civil society organizations, and (4) the conflict between each state and the structure of international organizations (Mora & Hey, 2003).

Mora and Hey (2003) make several important observations; the first one is about the abundant presence of the United States in the foreign policies of Latin American states. In that sense, the strong imperialistic presence is not implemented by force; instead, it is reinforced by aid and U.S. development policy. The anti-communist ideologies established by the US have been replaced by "...economic matters... as the fulcrum upon which core influence is pressed on [Latin America]" (Mora & Hey, 2003, p. 9). Mora and Hey's second observation is that the presidents in Latin America designed a specific foreign policies agenda that highlights only national problems such as poverty, health and environmental difficulties instead of creating externally-oriented

foreign policies proposals. Moreover, another factor that the authors point out is the weakness of democracy and the institutions that affect the implementation of foreign policy in Latin American and Caribbean countries.

For all these reasons, many scholars urgently argue for a new concept of foreign policy. The new diplomacy seeks to integrate features of the old diplomacy with a new approach that integrates different actors of society to international audiences. It is no longer enough to promote a “message”, but rather weaker nations must build a relationship between domestic and international interests. .

Cull highlights a horizontal projection, which allows a multilateral integration between the state and others actors. In contrast to the old form of doing diplomacy that was conducted in a bilateral form only between the states, “public diplomacy is a two-way street: a process of mutual influence, whereby a state (or other international player) facilitates engagement between publics or tunes its own policies to the map of foreign public opinion” (Cull, 2010, p. 12).

Jan Melissen (2005) calls for a rethinking of diplomacy, and suggests that countries have a tension between traditional and new paradigms because the world has changed. Likewise, Melissen explains the importance of reorganizing diplomacy in such a way as to contemplate how people are more involved with global information technologies. These actions underline a transformation and a network approach in public diplomacy (Melissen, 2005, p. 29).




Figure 1. The Concept of New Public Diplomacy by Jan Melissen.
**Graphic provided by the student for the purposes of this study*

Melissen proposes to move to another form of diplomacy where the government makes a connection with public affairs, and puts away the traditional form where diplomacy, which was only between states. The network model not only includes a soft power approach, but also focuses on the dialogue with foreign publics through non-governmental agents to promote and developing, the promotion of human rights, the spread of democratic values, good governance and the role of the media in civil society (Melissen, 2005, p. 22).

The new diplomacy is extremely important because it integrates the use of soft power with civil society. Countries around the world can influence other countries without coercion or military interventions, but rather with persuasion. Melissen clarifies that people mistakenly believe that the role of soft power is only a mode of propaganda in other countries. But soft power is also the exercise of power over opinion in the international arena (Melissen, 2005). This new concept of

diplomacy is not only relevant for state-to-state relations, as it was in the past; this new diplomacy also involves relations between the state and other actors in society.

Another aspect of soft power is the state's credibility. Academics such as Craig Hayden (2012) examine the controversy around soft power in contemporary societies. Hayden formulates several questions to clarify any potential confusion about how to think about soft power and what its role is in international relations, and also to distinguish it from propaganda. Hayden points out that, “the simplicity of soft power’s basic notion relies on some unelaborated assumptions about what counts as influence, persuasion, and the supposed values of symbolic and cultural attributes in relation to power” (Hayden, 2012, p. 28). Hayden also stresses that the concept is not only a combination of persuasion and attraction, but also is an exploration of how nation-states behave and create their agenda to achieve credibility in diplomacy through strong communication (Hayden, 2012).

Dominican Foreign Affairs and Soft Power

The challenges to Dominican diplomacy lie in the need to achieve a better understanding of soft power. Given its lack of hard power, the Dominican Republic can only compete with other countries in terms of public diplomacy through the use of soft power. Even though the country has strong foreign relations in terms of economic and cultural relations, it has to evaluate its political values and foreign policies. Joseph Nye (2004) describes the three important sources of soft power. The author points out that soft power is not only used to achieve cultural impact with external constituencies, but that it relies on political values and formal foreign policies. A strong democracy and the values of human rights are tools that can help to accomplish soft power.

According to Nye (2004), soft power fails when a government is disinterested in others' opinions about its foreign policies. Another weakness in soft power comes from the incoherence of national and international policies, and/or the lack of credibility. These three factors are important for analyzing soft power in the Dominican Republic.

The Dominican constitution contains some articles that frame the importance of foreign policies within its the national politics. However, the laws are often violated and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has inadequate planning. Pablo A. Mariñez, sociologist and former ambassador in Mexico, explains that the foreign policies of the Dominican Republic have been passive and only enacted to protect its position in the international community. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is driven under international pressure or under decisions of the executive power (Mariñez, 2001). The defensive and reactionary foreign policies of the Dominican government today were implemented based on the 2010 Haiti Earthquake and the negative international reaction to the Dominican Republic's response.

The case of Dominican politics against Haiti is generally seen as a human rights failure. After the Haiti earthquake in 2010 the Dominican Republic implemented its bilateral relations with Haiti, and foreign affairs served as a collaborative path with the International Community. Even though the government prepared a plan for Haiti's reconstruction, the tense relationship between the nations continued. Diplomacy failed because it was a short-term government reaction that was designed to put the Dominican and Haiti relations in a better position in front of the international community. I am not arguing that the Dominican Republic did not contribute humanitarian aid towards Haiti, or that the Dominican contributions were not valuable in Haiti's reconstruction. However, what I claim is that the country's foreign affairs approach demanded more strategic and long-term diplomacy, not a reactive diplomacy.

The criticism from the international media that the Dominican Republic is a racist country, *should have* urged the country to pay attention to foreign public opinion. Nicholas Cull points out that the first step in public diplomacy is not to speak, but to listen --“the best public diplomacy begins with listening: systematically collecting and analyzing the opinion of foreign publics” (Cull, 2010). Instead of listening, the Dominican government began a counter-attack of a intensely nationalist discourse.

Philip Seib (1997) writes about how the media has a huge impact on foreign policy, explaining that this is a debate that permeates political communication. The debate is about who transforms the news: does the media shape the agenda of the government or do the policymakers transform the news? According to Seib, there is a semantic distinction between communication and politics. The news media impacts foreign policy, but other scholars claim that the media does not determine the response of the government to other countries (Seib, 1997, p. 139). The author clarifies and disagrees with theories which stress that the role of diplomacy “should not be subordinate to or transformed by public opinion” (Seib, 1997, p. xiii). On the contrary, Seib emphasizes that the stand of the news media has not changed and continues to affect the public opinion and the government’s decisions (Seib, 1997). Even though I am not describing the relationship between public diplomacy and the media, I argue that the media provides a challenge for Dominican diplomacy. However, in order to implement the new concept of public diplomacy Dominican government should first create a qualified Foreign Service staff. In order to do this they will have to dismantle the culture of patronage, corruption and illegality in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the following paragraphs, I highlight the reactive diplomacy and the weaknesses of the Dominican Foreign Affairs through a conversation with the Dominican historian Mu-Kien Sang.

A Brief Encounter with the Diplomatic History

The academic Mu-Kien Sang describes the history of Dominican diplomacy. My questions for Sang (in our virtual encounter) were geared towards Dominican soft power, and I wanted to know her perspective about diplomacy in the country. Sang argues that Dominican diplomacy has not acquired clear guidelines for soft power:

Dominican Foreign Affairs is characterized by the politics of the political parties that have predominated over national interests. The Foreign Ministry has a unique heritage that comes from the Reformist Party (PRSC) during the eight years of President Leonel Fernández's term (Liberation Party, PLD). This made the ministry an institution guided by personal interest. Clientelism and favoritism are two of the most serious problems in our diplomacy (Interview and translation conducted by the author, 4 February 2016).

Dominican diplomacy faces many challenges that I discuss in the next chapter. Likewise, Sang is concerned with four aspects in Dominican international relations: lack of professionalism, instability, lack of training in international politics, and policies defined in a personalistic way by the executive power.

Sang also described diplomacy during the Trujillo dictatorship and the presidency of Leonel Fernández. She explained that foreign affairs in the country had two significant periods:

The history of foreign policy in the Dominican Republic has changed a lot. I argue that before Trujillo, there was no real foreign policy by the Dominican State. During the 19th century, from 1844 to Trujillo, diplomacy in the country was only concerned with geopolitical interests, and not viewed as an opportunity for the Dominican state. For example, France, England, Spain and the United States were all competing for the market and for control of the Caribbean. These countries had

powerful consuls in the national territory; however, they only represented the international interests of those nations.

A true foreign policy was developed during the Trujillo dictatorship, where diplomatic representation increased. The dictator believed that he needed to have open policies. Nevertheless, the main purpose of Trujillo's strategy, in addition to seeking diplomatic representation, was his pursuit of espionage. For this reason the dictator designated key positions in the diplomatic corps for his right-hand men. Another clear element in the Trujillo international policy was the recruitment of people with a very high level of education. He recruited "la crème de la crème" of the Dominican intellectual class (Interview and translation conducted by the author, 4 February 2016).

Other academics point out that the foreign affairs of the Trujillo dictatorship occurred under the framework of the Good Neighbor Policy. The Good Neighbor Policy was active during the period between 1933 until 1943 when the United States modified its foreign policy in response to the rising threat in Europe. The new policy approach was framed around the idea of non-intervention and respect for other countries' domestic policies (Wood, 2010). This policy was exemplified when the dictator allied with Washington in its fight against Asian and European fascism. Trujillo's foreign policy was based on military and economic growth in the context of its alliance with the United States (Roorda, 1998). Likewise, Trujillo's international strategies were elaborated to protect national sovereignty. The idea of national protection was a way to justify gaining more control over Dominicans and concealing human rights violations during the regime. Roorda (1998) points out that "Trujillo's skillful handling of Dominican foreign relations allowed him to perpetrate his genocide of Haitian residents in the Dominican Republic in 1937" (Roorda,

1998, p. 4). This military alliance with the U.S helped him avoid being persecuted by the International Community for the Parsley Massacre. Trujillo manipulated the concept of “good neighbor” and manipulated foreign and domestic policies (Roorda, 1998, p. 89).

Among the foreign affairs actions of the Trujillo dictatorship was the creation of several important institutions: the diplomatic school, through the Organic law of 1964; the participation of the Dominican Republic in the United Nations; and several signature international agreements (Cadette, 2015). Nevertheless, the violations of the regime transcended the national level and the dictator was accused of conspiring to murder and kidnap the Venezuelan president Romulo Betancourt and the writer Jesús Galíndez in the United States (Cadette, 2015).

In my interview with Sang, the historian describes other periods of foreign policy. Sang points out that:

Another bright point of the Dominican foreign policy was, without doubt, the first four years of the Leonel Fernández government between 1996 and 2000. The country managed to break the inertia that the governments of Balaguer and the PRD had imposed (Interview and translation conducted by the author, 4 February 2016).

Dominican foreign policy has had many ups and downs, and it has always been strongly influenced by nationalism, which did not allow for improving relations with Haiti. Instead nationalism has gotten in the way of formulating a coherent approach towards the United States and the European Union. According to Mora and Hey (2003) the Dominican Republic has attempted to move from nationalism to globalization. The authors examine the international policies during Joaquín Balaguer’ (Reformist Party, PRSC) and Leonel Fernández’s (Liberation Party, PLD) governments. The Balaguer government was passive and isolated, triggering the attention of the international community, due to the human rights violations committed against

Haitians. Balaguer faced the accusations with a “sovereignty discourse.” Mora and Hey (2003) describe Balaguer’s international relations during the Cold War, explaining that:

Joaquín Balaguer flourished in this international environment since he was able to play to both domestic and international groups, satisfying the former by nationalist policies and economics and the latter by his staunch anticommunist position and by repressing the left. The end of the Cold War did not immediately affect much of official Dominican foreign policy since the isolationist, nationalist Balaguer remained in power until 1996, although changes occurred in the area of economics (Mora and Hey, 2003, p.105).

By contrast, the new president, Leonel Fernández, was focused on security, the empowerment of multilateral institutions, and his initiative of hosting important summits in the country. At least initially, though, Leonel Fernández contributed to the development of the Dominican foreign affairs.

Mora and Hey (2003) highlight that:

... During the Fernández government, for the first time in thirty-one years, the Dominican government allowed the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights to visit the country. Fernández also improved diplomacy with the government of Haiti. He visited Haiti, addressed the Haitian parliament, and engaged in warmer relations with the government of Haiti. At the same time, improved relations between Haitians and Dominicans may be made more possible by the increased importance of diasporic communities from both countries in the domestic politics of their home countries (Mora and Hey, 2003, p.115).

Contemporary Dominican foreign policies changed the relationship to Haiti. Even though the society is still dealing with racism vis-a-vis its neighbor, Leonel Fernández contributed to the development of Dominican foreign affairs.

Fernández made progress with regard to the Dominican response to international conflicts, but this was later criticized by the local media. Fernández, who has been called “the mediator,” helped to resolve some problems in other countries, such as the conflicts between Venezuela and Colombia, and the political crisis in Honduras. He also pushed the Dominican Republic to help in the reconstruction of Haiti after the earthquake in 2010. However Dominican public opinion accused Fernández of developing a personal diplomacy rather than a national diplomacy. Fernández was accused of pursuing his own interests over those of the country. Fernández formed a non-profit organization, the Global Foundation for Democracy and Development (GFDD), apart from his government. The organization is an international network, because it is located in the Dominican Republic, Washington and New York. His institution has been accused of receiving corrupt funds.

A Present Overview of Dominican Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has pursued the respect and recognition of the international community, forgetting its domestic problems. The question is: How can the country achieve pragmatism in diplomacy when it is dealing with serious institutional issues? Foreign relations should be geared not only toward improving international reputation, but also should involve listening to international voices. The ex-foreign minister, Carlos Morales Troncoso explained in the document "Our Foreign Relations" how the Dominican Republic has reached high levels of recognition through tourism and investment. However, these measurements of what has been

achieved by the Foreign Service are only attractive in terms of the country's economy. In terms of diplomacy, the country has not yet been strategic.

The Dominican Republic has expanded its foreign policy to other nations in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Importantly, Morales (2012) points out that the country has served as an intermediary to handle conflicts in the region and has succeeded in restoring peace in some nations (Morales Troncoso, 2012). However, recognition and diplomatic expansion are not equal to execution, credibility and communication. Although the former are important in diplomatic matters, it is not possible to gain recognition when the national politics are incongruent. The following figure highlights the different factors that are important to influencing other countries.

In 2015, the international community condemned the Dominican Republic's racist policy of revoking the citizenship status of Dominicans of Haitian descent. International black movements added to this 'destructive propaganda' according to the Dominican government. However, the accusation of racism raises the question: was this really a campaign to discredit the country, or was this criticism the result of the mismanagement of national and international policy? International relations experts highlight the importance of state credibility and listening in foreign policy, and they say that in order for a country to achieve soft power in public diplomacy, the relationship between credibility and coherence must be well-defined.

In reaction to the international condemnation, the Dominican Republic began to rethink its foreign policies. The Dominican government reacted, and countered the accusations of racism and once again prepared a new public diplomacy strategy. The "Strategic Plan 2015-2020: The New Foreign Relations Politics" summarizes the intentions of a new diplomacy and recognizes the institutions' weaknesses in terms of its Haitians relations, and the Dominican Diaspora. The

current president, Danilo Medina, has claimed that the most important obstacles for Dominican public diplomacy goals are corruption and the lack of professionalism (MIREX, 2015). The proposal offers objectives and explains the new programs which will be used to achieve them. However, the new document ignores guidelines for how the programs will be executed. Once again, the Dominican government reacts, without deliberate planning.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the challenges to achieving a new concept of public diplomacy. Many governments in Latin America established a personalistic foreign policy and relied on weak democracies and institutions. Second, I highlighted the importance of a new framework for diplomacy that can be aligned with global changes. I argued that the new concept of public diplomacy, (which includes soft power) should not only be based on persuasion and cultural factors. It is essential for states to achieve credibility and interactivity between foreign publics and national publics.

Furthermore, I presented the voices of many scholars, including an interview with the Dominican historian Mu-Kien Sang who explained that Dominican diplomacy has critical weaknesses, such as the absence of planning, lack of professionalism and clientelism. I focused on the history of Dominican foreign affairs by the discussing three different periods: the Trujillo dictatorship, and the governments of Joaquín Balaguer and Leonel Fernández.

The Trujillo dictatorship can be said to have been the “enlightenment period” of Dominican diplomacy because the tyrant created the first diplomatic school, the organic law and he recruited a professional diplomatic corps. Nonetheless, terror and human rights violations is what the country got in return.

The second period I described was the government of Joaquin Balaguer, which only dealt with the creation of a nationalist discourse that segregated the country. However, in the government of Leonel Fernández, foreign affairs expanded, and the country achieved a respectable international reputation. The Dominican Republic hosted summits and handled different conflicts with other countries in the region, despite the accusations that Fernández created a highly personalistic diplomacy.

Lastly, I highlighted that in spite of these achievements, Dominican diplomacy is still passive and reacts only under international pressure. I stressed that a new form of diplomacy that includes soft power is urgently needed in the country because the government only reacts, and lacks a proactive strategy. An example of this is the recent creation of the “Strategic Plan 2015-2020,” a project that seems to be a favorable path toward a new diplomacy. However, in order to achieve the plan, the nation has to analyze the structural problems within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

CHAPTER III

A Political Introspection of how the Dominican Republic Constructed Foreign Policies

Introduction

“Dominican Republic has it all.” This is the slogan from the Tourism Ministry and it is intended to promote the island as a tourist paradise. While this campaign aims at presenting the beauty of the country’s beaches, mountains, and the friendliness of its people, it actually bears some deeper truth: the Dominican has indeed “everything,” from the most beautiful to the ugliest, and this slogan could as well point at those realities that are incongruent with the idea of “paradise.” The Dominican Republic has everything not only in terms of tourism, but also in terms of institutions. Importantly, the Dominican Republic has difficulty enforcing its own laws. In this chapter, I analyze the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an institution that impacts both national and international public opinion. Sticking with my metaphor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also *“has it all.”* In fact, as I will argue here, this Ministry has become an incubator of corruption, political clientelism, and impunity.

I examine patronage in the Dominican Republic’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I argue that the Dominican government is deeply implicated in patronage and personalistic clientelism. To prove this, I examine two payroll documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2012-2013 and 2015. Both of these documents evidence high levels of patronage.

I point out that another variable involved in the failure of diplomacy is corruption. The “Blue Book” of the United Nations reveals that the country has more UN delegates than Mexico, or Argentina or Brazil. Likewise, in the document *Corruption Perceptions Index 2014*, published

by *Transparency International*, the Dominican Republic ranks 115 in its overall governmental corruption, placing it behind other countries with much larger populations, such as Mexico, Brazil and Colombia.

I highlight that the main characteristic of most Dominican governmental institutions is not the creation of documents or more laws; it is the culture of law-breaking by politicians and citizens. Even though at times the creation of new projects seems to be a good initiative in the context of public diplomacy, in most cases there is a lack of execution. As a result, the distance between the law and reality is a serious problem in the context of diplomacy. Additionally, I assess the different laws that govern the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as Article 146 from the Constitution, the 314 Organic Law in 1964, and the Protocol for Transparency and Institution signed by the current Dominican president, Danilo Medina. In conclusion, I indicate the importance of having a resolution which provides more accountability and allows for more progress in diplomacy in the Dominican Republic.

Patronage in the Dominican Republic has restricted a new generation of professionals and in the process has damaged the promotion of external relations. Strong diplomacy implies the necessity of a government, which communicates with foreign publics in an attempt to “bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies” (Melissen, 2005, p. 12). The Dominican government needs to face the culture of patronage because of the negative impact it has on the foreign policies of the country. The assignment of jobs to an inexperienced candidate, only for him to acquire votes and personal connections, emphasizes patronage.

Electoral Coalition Building: The Beginning of Favor

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the result of vote donations for political favors and jobs. Alliances between the minority political groups with the majority political parties in the Dominican Republic have only reflected the culture of patronage in the country. This exchange of votes for favors and political positions fragments national institutions in general, and blocks the exercise of effective diplomacy.

The desperation for victory allows political party clientelism, and the Dominican Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a clear example of this. The Dominican economist and expert on international relations, Gedeon Santos describes Dominican foreign policy as reflecting the characteristics of “our underdevelopment, isolation and lack of institutional improvisation” (Santos, 2013, p. 1). Santos stresses that the foreign policy of the country has been formed primarily for the purpose of creating diplomatic jobs.

However, Santos also highlights that patronage in the Ministry came following the Trujillo regime, because during the dictatorship foreign policy had a consistent and aggressive role in the international arena (Santos, 2013). The main reason for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ lack of strong policies is corruption and political party clientelism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been a vehicle for power seekers who obtain their positions through personal and political connections.

Because of political ambitions and the desire to win elections, Dominican candidates started to form alliances between political parties. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs became a recruitment institution for politicians who formed strategic alliances to obtain jobs. Even though the Dominican Republic has more than twenty political parties, only three can be considered “major parties.” However, the three political parties: the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD),

Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), and the Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC) have made alliances amongst themselves to obtain power, and have fostered political patronage. Wilfredo Lozano explains that after the death of the three principal political leaders and founders of the three major parties (Juan Bosch (PLD), Francisco Peña Gómez (PRD) and Joaquín Balaguer (PRSC)), the political parties experienced transformation and party fragmentation (Lozano, 2010).

Lozano stresses that the party systems and the state have a relationship of “neopatrimonialism and clientelism performance” on the electoral structure (Lozano, 2010). One of the reasons these new parties donate their votes is because it has been difficult for them to obtain power through their own parties. Edward Gonzalez-Acosta defines vote buying as a strategy of political clientelism (Gonzalez-Acosta, 2008). Likewise, Acosta highlights that the bartering of votes and public resources and services is part of a system that reinforces subordination. As Acosta indicates, “the logic of clientelism, in essence is that the winner will favor those who supported him/her, and those that did not will find a ‘closed’ door when they go knocking for help” (Gonzalez-Acosta, 2008, p. 1).

In addition, Richard Graham (1990) explains that there is a similarity between generosity and power. Graham highlights that there is a relationship between rewards, loyalty and obedience in the political institutions that were implemented during the colonial period (Graham, 1990). Particularly in the case of the Dominican Republic, the patterns of patronage have not changed because new politicians do not have sufficient influence to gain power, and their votes are used for their own economic ends. As a result, “clientelism has replaced ideology as the organizing principle of party politics in the Dominican Republic, and the former Marxist left has also taken part in this. Several tiny leftist groups have formed electoral alliances with the PRD or the PLD, mostly in exchange for clientelistic favors” (Jana, et al., 2008, p. 28).

An example of electoral alliance is described by the Dominican historian Roberto Cassa in the article “Negotiated Elections,” he explains that the “Pact of Democracy” was a document that reduced Joaquín Balaguer’s term to two years and authorized a new process of elections in 1996. In that sense, the pact forced the end of the presidential term of Balaguer who had been in power for over twenty-two years. Secondly, the Pact of Democracy also altered the Dominican Constitution and proposed that in order to win the elections of 1996, the new candidate had to win 50 percent of the votes.

The confirmation of this treaty and the changes to the Constitution opened the doors for alliances and political fragmentation. Cassa explains that with the pact in 1996, Balaguer explored a new plan to leave the presidential seat without entirely giving up political power --“in the meantime, he prepared the greatest number of obstacles to prevent the predicted triumph of the PRD in 1996” (Cassá, 1997, p. 20). Balaguer prepared an alliance with the elected candidate Leonel Fernández from the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) because he opposed his own party’s candidate. Fernández won the elections in 1996 with the help of Balaguer, but his presidency was at the same time full of political commitments to the PRSC, including an agreement to hand over control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Patronage in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The culture of patronage in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is rooted in the alliance between the Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC) and the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD). The positions of the PRSC foreign ministers were the result of a political transition and clientelism. Carlos Morales Troncoso was the vice president between 1986- 1994 in the government of

Balaguer (PRSC). Subsequently, Morales Troncoso was also chancellor of the country during two periods: 1994-1996 and 2004-2014 during the Fernández (PLD) governments.

The following table represents the list of different chancellors of the Dominican Republic. The table shows that members of the *Reformist Party* (PRSC) managed the Foreign Ministry during the governments of the *Dominican Liberation Party* (PLD) after the Pact of Democracy, which established a strategic alliance.

Table 1. List of Dominican Chancellors

Government	Years	Chancellors	Political Party
PRSC	1994-1996	Carlos Morales Troncoso	PRSC
PRSC	1996	Caonabo Javier Castillo	PRSC
PLD	1996-2000	Eduardo Latorre Rodríguez	PRSC
PRD	2000-2003	Hugo Tolentino Dipp	PRD
PRD	2003-2004	Frank Guerrero Pratss	PRD
PLD	2004-2014	Carlos Morales Troncoso	PRSC
PLD	2014-Present	Andres Navarro	PLD

**Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study*

The table represents the years of political patronage after the alliance between Joaquín Balaguer and Leonel Fernández in 1996. Fernández won the elections with the collaboration of Balaguer and most of the ministers were from the PRSC party, with the exception of the four years when the *Revolutionary Dominican Party* (PRD) ruled. Fernández had a political commitment for fourteen years, and it was after the death of Carlos Morales Troncoso in 2014 and under a new mandate with Danilo Medina (PLD) that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs obtained a chancellor of his own political party.

The 2013 list of diplomatic corps employees in the Dominican Republic has 1,584 members. However, this data analysis is based on the 330 officials who were identified by name. I show here how patronage is evident in the 2013 payroll. The list shows that 105 State Department

employees were members of the *Reformist Party* PRSC, and that senator Felix Bautista recommended 101, including family members and political allies. And additional 85 of them were cousins, spouses and family members of civil servants and former presidents.




Figure 2. Officials Identified by Name in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acento.com.do, 2014)
**Graphic provided by the author for the purposes of this study*




Figure 3. Officials Identified by Name in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
**Graphic provided by the author for the purposes of this study*

These graphics show that in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is a culture of patronage with the exchange of political favors for votes. The 2013 MOFA payroll shows that 32% of the employees were from the Reformist Party (PRSC), and 30% of the employees were recommended by the Senator Felix Bautista, including not only his family members, but also of employees who supported the Dominican Liberation Party in New York. Twenty-six percent of the identified officials were recommended by civil servants and former presidents and 12% were registered on the list without salary.

In addition, the list below demonstrates the strategic partnerships and the exchange of votes for political jobs between the Reformist Party (PRSC) and the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) and in the Dominican consular service around the world.

Table 2. Part of the List of Reformist Officials in Embassies, Payroll 2012-2013 published by the digital newsletter, Acento.com.do, which has a tremendous impact on the Dominican public opinion. The media has a group of intellectuals, academics and experts who are well known as critical writers (Acento.com.do, 2014).

No.	NAME	POSITION	COUNTRY
1	VIRGILIO ALVAREZ BONILLA	AMBASSADOR BILATERAL COMMISSION	DOM. REP- PUERTO RICO
2	FLORENTINO CARVAJAL	AMBASSADOR BILATERAL COMMISSION	DOM. REP- PUERTO RICO
3	RICARDO ALBERTO ALMONTE	MINISTER COUNSELOR	CANADA
4	FRANCISCA MATILDE FRIAS	MINISTER COUNSELOR	ECUADOR
5	HERNANI ABRAHAM AQUINO	MINISTER COUNSELOR	NICARAGUA
6	DIEGO VALLEJO RAMIREZ	MINISTER COUNSELOR	NICARAGUA

**Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study (official list on Appendix)*

The table shows how electoral support can be seen in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The patterns of loyalty and obedience in relation to protection and support for political parties are signs of how patronage permeates Dominican institutions. Richard Graham explains the concept of positions as rewards, as the “conservative use of patronage”. This form of “prizes and rewards” has an impact on voters because it controls the voting process through manipulation (Graham, 1990, p. 93).

Similarly, the 2013 payroll of the Foreign Service shows that many personnel are family members, people recommended by senators and deputies, and people who have not had any diplomatic experience.

The document describes the position, wages, and reveals who they are and by whom the person was recommended to occupy a position within the institution.

Table 3. Part of the List Recommended by Ministers, Senators or Deputies in Embassies, Payroll 2012-2013. (Acento.com.do, 2014).

No.	NAME	POSITION/COUNTRY	OBSERVATION
1	CELESTE FRANCISCA JIMENEZ	CONSUL/CALIFORNIA, UNITED STATES	SISTER OF RADHAMES JIMENEZ, ATTORNEY GENERAL
2	JOSELYNE ROSARIO ROMERO	GENERAL-CONSUL/ARUBA	WIFE OF RAFAEL NUNEZ, FORMER PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESPERSON
3	VICENTE ALFONSO BENGOA ARAGUIZ	AUXILIARY/BARCELONA, SPAIN	SON OF VICENTE BENGOA, FINANCE MINISTER
4	YESSICA ALEJANDRINA SOSA GERMAN	AUXILIARY/BOSTON, UNITED STATES	DAUGHTER OF AMBASSADOR JOSE SOSA AND RECOMMENDED BY ALEJANDRINA GERMAN, FORMER MINISTER OF EDUCATION

Table 3 (Continued)

No.	NAME	POSITION/COUNTRY	OBSERVATION
5	CARMEN VIRGINIA CARDONA	GENERAL-CONSUL/CURACAO	DAUGHTER OF LIGIA AMADA MELO, MINISTER OF EDUCATION
6	ANDREA ALTAGRACIA MEDINA	GENERAL-CONSUL/ GUADALUPE	COUSIN OF DANILO MEDINA, CURRENT PRESIDENT OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
7	LUISA VIOLETA SANTANA JIMENEZ	VICE-CONSUL/MONTREAL, CANADA	RECOMMENDED BY LUIS MANUEL BONETTI, ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENCY (PLD)

**Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study (Official List on Appendix)*

Corruption in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Dominican government has much documented corruption within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The current president Danilo Medina signed an anti-corruption agreement with the international organization *Transparency International*. However, I demonstrate that all of the Dominican presidents have maintained a silent position vis-à-vis corruption for decades, and the nation is still plagued with corruption. One symptom of this is that the state positions are not given by merit. As a consequence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been an institution formed in a context of extreme corruption. The Dominican Republic is more corrupt than other countries with larger populations such as Colombia, Mexico and Brazil (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2014).

Another example of corruption within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is presented in the Blue Book of the United Nations where the Dominican delegation has 77 members, which is far greater than Argentina, which has 10; Brazil with 33 and Colombia which has 57 (United Nations, 2015).

This means that the Dominican Republic, with a total population of some 10 million, has seven times more UN diplomats on its payroll than Argentina, whose total population is some 46 million and more than double the number from Brazil, with a population of over 200 million people. In other words, in the Dominican Republic there is one UN diplomat for every 129,870 citizens, whereas in Brazil, there is one UN diplomat for every 6,060,606 Brazilians. UN diplomats are, however, just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Why, then, is the Dominican government spending so much of its (scarce) financial resources on diplomats?

High Levels of Corruption in 2013 and 2015 Payrolls

Another peculiarity of the payroll is the excessive wages garnered by some of the ambassadors. An example is the case of the journalist Cesar Medina, who earned \$480,000 USD, in 2012-2013 (Acento.com.do, 2014). Medina exceed by 16.67% the base wage of the president of the United States, Barack Obama which is USD\$400,000.00 per year (Kottasova & Pendergrass, 2015).

Table 4. The Best Paid in the Dominican Foreign Ministry, Payroll 2012-2013 (Acento.com.do, 2014).

	NAME	POSITION	COUNTRY	SALARY
1	CESAR MEDINA ABREU	AMBASSADOR	SPAIN-MADRID	USD\$480,000.00
2	PEDRO VERGES	AMBASSADOR	JAPAN-TOKYO	USD\$480,000.00
3	HANS DANNENBERG CASTELLANOS	AMBASSADOR	INDIA-NEW DELHI	USD\$414,000.00
4	LAURA FAXAS	AMBASSADOR	FRANCE-PARIS	USD\$384,000.00
5	RUBEN ARTURO SILIE VALDEZ	AMBASSADOR	HAITI-PORT-AU- PRINCE	USD\$360,000.00
6	VINICIO TOBAL URENA	AMBASSADOR	ITALY-ROME	USD\$360,000.00
7	MARIA GABRIELA BONNETI ROSSELLINI	AMBASSADOR	EGYPT-CAIRO	USD\$324,000.00
8	ALEXANDER DE LA ROSA	AMBASSADOR	ISRAEL-TEL AVIV	USD\$300,000.00
9	JOSE TOMAS ARES GERMAN	AMBASSADOR	JAMAICA-KINGSTON	USD\$264,000.00
10	ANIBAL DE CASTRO	AMBASSADOR	UNITED STATES- WASHINGTON	USD\$298,134.48
11	RENE BIENVENIDO SANTANA GONZALEZ	AMBASSADOR	GUATEMALA- GUATEMALA	USD\$221,040.00
12	JOSE OSVALDO LEGER AQUINO	AMBASSADOR	HONDURAS- HONDURAS	USD\$192,000.00

**Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study (Official List on Appendix)*

Corruption within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has created a huge hole in the country's budget. Dominican ambassadors earned more than Mexican ambassadors. According to the newspaper *Nacional* from Mexico in 2013, the Mexican ambassador in Spain earned USD\$145,113.36; 300% less than the Dominican ambassador (Agencia Reforma, 2013). Most Dominican officials earned more money than Mexican officials in 2013

Table 5. Wages of Dominican Ambassadors versus Mexican Ambassadors.

COUNTRY	DOMINICAN AMBASSADOR	MEXICAN AMBASSADORS
SPAIN	USD\$480,000.00	USD\$145,113.36
JAPAN	USD\$480,000.00	USD\$166,907.52
INDIA	USD\$414,000.00	USD\$108,209.88
FRANCE	USD\$384,000.00	USD\$133,837.32
ITALY	USD\$360,000.00	USD\$145,113.36
EGYPT	USD\$324,000.00	USD\$114,000.00
ISRAEL	USD\$300,000.00	USD\$115,861.80

**Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study*

The Mexican list was reported not only by the Mexican media, but also by the Mexican Treasury Department and published in 2015, because local Mexican media reported that the ambassadors from most countries earned more than the country presidents where they are located in many cases. However, it is still not clear why Dominican ambassadors earned more than the Mexican ambassadors. Mexico has more impact in the international community than does the Dominican Republic (Treasury, 2015).

Another list that the media collected is the list of the people who the senator Felix Bautista recommended to work in the institution. The list points out that the senator recommend 101 people to be part of the Dominican consulate. Most of the members are from the PLD Political Commission in New York, and/or family members of the senator.

Table 6. Recommended by the Senator Felix Bautista, Payroll 2012-2013 (Acento.com.do, 2014).

No.	NAME	POSITION/COUNTRY	OBSERVATION
1	IRMA BAUTISTA	GENERAL CONSUL/CANARY ISLANDS, SPAIN	SISTER OF FELIX BAUTISTA
2	VANTROI ILIENOV PENA	VICE-CONSUL/CANARY ISLANDS, SPAIN	NEPHEW OF FELIX BAUTISTA
3	CARLOS GONZALEZ	VICE- CONSUL/PANAMA	KARINA'S HUSBAND (FELIX BAUTISTA)
4	MILEDIS MARTINEZ	VICE-CONSUL/PUERTO RICO	COUSIN OF FELIX BAUTISTA
5	CARLOS MANUEL SANCHEZ ASENSIO	VICE-CONSUL/SAINT MARTIN	RECOMMENDED BY FELIX BAUTISTA
6	GUILLERMO DE JESUS ANGELES	VICE-CONSUL/SEVILLE	RECOMMENDED BY FELIX BAUTISTA
7	TERESITA PENA	VICE-CONSUL/PUERTO RICO	RECOMMENDED BY FELIX BAUTISTA
8	ARISTIDES BAUTISTA	VICE-CONSUL/PUERTO RICO	FELIX BAUTISTA'S BROTHER
9	LUZ DEL CARMEN RAMOS PUJOLS	VICE-CONSUL/PUERTO RICO	RECOMMENDED BY FELIX BAUTISTA'S BROTHER

**Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study (Official List on Appendix)*

Felix Bautista is accused by International Transparency of illegally obtaining funds from the state. The organization through the campaign “Unmask the Corrupt” points out that the senator obtained a personal fortune through “money laundering, abuse of power, prevarication and illicit enrichment” (Transparency International, 2016). The detection of irregularities and corruption in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by international and national media have forced the Dominican

government to reorganize the problems associated with diplomats' payrolls and make a significant reduction in wages in the diplomatic corps in 2015, but not in the total number of employees.

Ghost Payroll: No-Show Jobs

The government is not dealing with diplomatic corruption; however, the minister Andrés Navarro recognized that “diplomats do not work, but continued to receive a wage” (Reyes, 2015). Similarly, the minister points out that in 2015, 1,200 positions were removed, but during the research I found that the goal has not been fulfilled. In 2012, the Dominican Foreign Ministry had 1,163 officials. In 2013, the Foreign Service had 1,584 member; in 2014 1,396; in August 2015 1,436 and in February of 2016 1,416 officials.




Figure 4. Amount of Members in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013-2016 (Santana, 2016).

**Graphic elaborated by the author, 25 March 2016*

The graphic shows that after the scandal in 2013, there was only a reduction of 188 officials. However, the following years their numbers increased again. What is most notable is that in September of 2015, the foreign minister Andrés Navarro communicated again that 400 consuls' positions were removed because the country had “inflated missions of staff and other problems” (Moreno, 2015)”. This statement indicates that there is an empty discourse, because the 400

officials or the 1,200 positions never were removed according to the 2016 payroll. Instead, the 2016 payroll has 16 more members.

Additionally, I found that the new payroll in 2015 raises many questions regarding the new salaries. Examples of this are the low wages for an auxiliary in Belgium, Spain, Italy or Boston, who earns \$920.00 dollars per month. This amounts to \$11,040.00 per year, which is under \$15,080 per year – the minimum wage for a full time worker in the United States (Center for Poverty Research, 2015). In a phone interview, Laury Sánchez (who works in the Department of Human Resources in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Santo Domingo) explains that “auxiliary” positions are granted by administrative and decree forms, and that they work regular hours. The Dominican Consulate in New York works from 9:00 am to 3:30 pm, while the Consulate in Boston works from 9:00 am to 6:00 pm (Santana, 2016).

Table 7. Auxiliary Positions, Foreign Affairs Payroll 2015

NAME	POSITION	CONSULATE	SALARIO
ANTOLINA DISLA GARCIAS	AUXILIARY	DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN AMBERES,BELGICA	USD\$11,040.00
GERALDO DE JESUS GUZMAN RAMIREZ	AUXILIARY	DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN ATHENS,GREECE	USD\$11,040.00
MINERVINA MATILDES FLORIAN FERRERAS	AUXILIARY	DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN BARCELONA, SPAIN	USD\$11,040.00
CRISTINA ALTAGRACIA GONZALEZ HERNAND	AUXILIARY	DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN BOSTON, UNITED STATES	USD\$11,040.00
SOLLY PATRICIA DURAN OVALLES	AUXILIARY	DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN BOSTON, UNITED STATES	USD\$11,040.00
SIRIACO CABRERA RODRIGUEZ	AUXILIARY	DOMINICAN CONSULATE IN FRANCKFURT, GERMANY	USD\$11,040.00

**Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study*

The salaries could express political favoritism. The 2015 payroll, while highlighting a reduction in wages, also point out the inferior wages in cities such as Boston, Athens and Madrid.

The new reduction of these wages in 2015 does not propose an improvement in political clientelism. In contrast, the low remuneration can lead to the conclusion that officials are not working in the countries where they should be exercising diplomacy. The former Dominican ambassador to Washington reveals that the “United States and Spanish consular officers received paychecks and never left the country” (Romero, 2014, p. 1).

The Ministry has been listed as an institution whose employees have been termed "empty bottles" that rely on nepotism and cronyism, a perspective, which has damaged the reputation of diplomacy.

Another example of corruption in the 2015 payroll is how counselors in the Dominican embassy in London have the same position and different salaries and representation expenses.

Table 8. Counselors’ Positions, Foreign Affairs Payroll 2015

RELINDA VASQUEZ ALMONTE	COUNSELOR	DOMINICAN EMBASSY IN LONDON	1,600.00	1,600.00
JOSUE ANTINOE FIALLO PORTORREAL	COUNSELOR	DOMINICAN EMBASSY IN LONDON	3,000.00	6,500.00
MARIA CAROLINA DIONISIA CASTRO DIAZ	COUNSELOR	DOMINICAN EMBASSY IN LONDON	1,600.00	2,600.00
ARALIS MERCEDES RODRIGUEZ COLLADO	COUNSELOR	DOMINICAN EMBASSY IN LONDON	1,600.00	3,212.00

**Table provided by the author for the purposes of this study*

This table shows a wage variation between officials and suggests that even though the Ministry reduced the wages, the institution does not have a standard wage for the same position (MIREX,2015).

Rosario Adames (2012) demonstrates that many Dominican diplomats spend most of their time in the Dominican Republic. In many embassies and consular offices, delegates are only present sporadically and in some places they are asked not to show up at all because they have no space to seat them. Adames highlights that “it is common for ambassadors to have spouses, children or other relatives appointed as diplomatic or consular servers in the same country where they are accredited” (Adames, 2012). The risk of nepotism generates discrimination and does not open the doors for professionalism in the state institutions.

The Struggle between Law and Reality

“ I believe that we are acting, thinking, conceiving and trying to
go on making not a real country, but one of paper.
The Constitution, the laws... everything... is magnificent,
everything on paper. It has no connection with reality”
(Gabriel García Marquez, quoted in Reiter 2013, p. 142)

Among the reasons that the DR has failed in diplomatic matters is also the breach of laws that violate existing documents such as the Article 146 in the Dominican Constitution, the “Protocol of Transparency”. The second reason is the lack of interest in implementing a “new Organic Law” in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that could facilitate better public diplomacy. The existing Organic Law was created in 1964 and was not changed until 2011. Bernd Reiter (2013) explains that when elites come to benefit from their positions, society begins to lose their trust in the political system, because politicians do not represent the interests of the citizens. Instead, politicians govern to satisfy their own interests rather than what the people need. Reiter stresses, there are “...tensions and contradictions, and on the ways different people and groups have sought to uphold and defend their citizens” (Reiter, 2013, p. xvi). In Dominican Republic the laws are placed aside.

Dominicans politicians perceive the laws as largely rhetorical. The tendency of certain Dominican politicians to change the laws at their convenience is the product of a political heritage from Joaquín Balaguer. In that sense, the path from dictatorship through a democratic regime in Dominican Republic was incomplete and has affected how Dominicans perceive their institutions. Ana Liberato (2013) examines how Joaquin Balaguer is still remembered in the Dominican society through his “authoritarian pedagogies” (Liberato, 2013).

The phrase that Balaguer used about the Constitution (that it is just “a simple paper”) had a tremendous impact on the political behavior of both elites and citizens for years afterwards. As Liberato points out, “the way Dominican society deals with its past affects...their moral authority and how [the society] struggles for transparency, accountability, inclusion and greater justice and human rights develop in the country” (Liberato, 2013, p. 8). Moreover, Liberato stresses that the consequences of Balaguer’s legacy have had repercussions for the practice of citizenship and their confidence in democratic institutions. Equally important is the analysis of the double discourse of Balaguer when politicians refer to the laws. The sociologist Rosario Espinal establishes a comparative analysis in the political mentalities of the dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo and Joaquín Balaguer. The author points out that both leaders proclaim the law and the exercising of the rules, and modify laws according to their own benefits (Espinal, 1994).

The relationship between law and reality in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also explained by the minister Andrés Navarro, who emphasizes, “the problem of the Dominican Republic is not resources, but institutions” (Pina, 2014, p. 1). This statement underlines that the national government has a clear position on the problem, but the political rhetoric is stronger than the execution.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has laws that reinforce the importance of a diplomatic career; however, the reality is that the laws concerning the exercise of their functions in the Foreign Service are far from reality. Bernd Reiter (2013) highlights that laws in Latin American countries are created to obtain recognition with foreign audiences. Reiter discusses that “by passing beautiful laws and signing international conventions that are then either not enforced, or actively violated, the...government is able to garner international legitimacy and thus substitute it for democratic internal legitimacy” (Reiter, 2013, p. 142). The reality is that laws are established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but then the government ignores the laws and the internal problems and bolsters a national discourse that leads the country to present itself as a victim of foreign attacks. The laws are not applied or they are changed, following the needs and wishes of those in command.

The contradictions between law and reality in Dominican Republic, particularly in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, become apparent upon examining three important documents: Article 146 of the Constitution, the Organic Law in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Protocol of Transparency. These legally-binding documents all outline the way foreign policy should be implemented. I scrutinized the content of these legal documents and found that there is a large gap between what Dominicans have in the way of legal protection, and what the officials are executing in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Evaluation of the Laws that Govern the Foreign Office

Article 146

The Dominican Constitution provides the legal basis that governs all of its public institutions. The Dominican Constitution condemns all forms of corruption in the organs of the state. Likewise, the law specifies that there are sanctions for any person who removes public funds or obtains economic

benefits from the state. The law clearly establishes sanctions for corruption and indicates penalties such as the “civil degradation and restitution of its functions” (Dominican Constitution, 2011).

Article 146.-Prohibition of corruption. It is condemned all form of corruption across the organs of the State. In consequence: 1) shall be punished with the penalties that the law determines, any person that subtracts public funds or that because of their positions within the organs and agencies of the state, its dependencies or institutions, get for himself or for a third party economic gain; (2) in the same way will be punished the person who provides advantages partners, family,close friends, friends or related; Constitution of the Dominican Republic 84 (3) it is mandatory, in accordance with the provisions of the law, the affidavit of assets of the public servants, who corresponds always test the origin of their goods, before and after duties or at the request of the competent authority; (4) it will be applied to persons convicted of crimes of corruption, without prejudice to other penalties provided for by law, the penalty civic degradation, and is required for appropriate restitution unlawfully (Dominican Constitution, 2011).

In the Dominican Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been an institution that the government uses to benefit a group of people who contributed to the campaigns of elected officials. Some diplomats benefit themselves from their duties and establish business relationships in other countries for their own benefit. Article 146 is clear when it points out that the consequences of patronage “will result in punishment of the person who provides advantages to partners, family, close friends, friends or related” (Dominican Constitution, 2011).

One example of how Article 146 is violated is found in the 2013 payroll and the recent case of the Dominican diplomat in United Nations, Francis Lorenzo, who was arrested and accused of participating in an international corruption scandal. The scandal involves other diplomats, including the former president of the General Assembly John Ashe (CNN, 2015). However, the penalties for the diplomat Francis Lorenzo continue in a limbo. Some Dominican organizations have demanded that he be ordered to return 100% of his personal wealth to the state. According to the Dominican activists for the “Country Alliance” in New York, the case of this Dominican diplomat highlights the importance of establishing the rule of law in the diplomatic and consular corps, extracting all the officials without functions and designating persons for their merit and capacity, not for their political militancy (Nuevo Diario, 2015).

Organic Law 314 and the New Law in 2011

Organic Law 314's an obsolete law that outlines a traditional form of diplomacy instead of a new diplomacy. For more than 45 years, the Foreign Ministry was ruled by the same law without any transformation or revision. The Ministry law has not changed since 1964 and this reveals a diplomatic stagnation, a limited interest of the executive power to regulate and supervise the law, and the legal heritage of Balaguer in Dominican politics. Secondly, the proposal of the New Organic Law bolstered in 2011 was approved by the Chamber of Senators in 2012, but it is still's waiting for the support of the Chamber of Deputies. The local newspaper *Diario Libre* (2015) reported that even though the chamber approved other important laws, the new Organic Law remains awaiting approval (*Diario Libre*, 2015).

If and when it is ratified, the new Organic Law will allow for some improvement. An example of this is in article 56, which establishes a "Career Council" that will evaluate and dismiss any diplomats who the council demonstrates as incompetent in the exercise of their functions. The new law creates the council; however, the old document in article 27 establishes that the expulsion of a diplomat must be due to 'serious offenses'. And it remains unclear in both laws who determines what the severe violations will be, and who will determine when they are committed. (MIREX, 2016)

Article 56. 1) Abandonment of their duties 2) By Criminal Conviction 3) Incompetence in the exercise of their functions 4) Qualified deficient in three successive qualifications 5) Proven inappropriate behavior. Note: The Career Council is who will establish an objective investigation of the imputed facts (House of Representatives, 2011).

Another problem with this new council is that it does not specify who should carry out the evaluations. To be effective, different groups of the Dominican society should be involved, not only politicians. Citizens need to demand a more thorough execution of the law and clarity about how the government spends its money.

The Press and Law Foundation requests that the executive impose drastic sanctions against diplomats who refuse to produce a declaration of assets as mandated by the law, because this situation affects the image of the country and the government (7 días.com.do, 2015). Bernd Reiter (2013) argues that the changes in the legal frameworks do not transform social realities, but only add a promise of change (Reiter, 2013). As Reiter stresses, “weak states are weak because they lack legitimacy and thus cannot count on the compliance of their citizens, thus making it costly to enforce the rule of law and order” (Reiter, 2013, p. 184). However, in some of the cases it is not a lack of resources, but the misuse of the resources for the benefit of political leaders. The next document that I discuss is an example of how the state’s resources are being used for the interests of political elites, thereby increasing patronage and corruption. In addition, I analyze how the presidential candidates forget about laws and leave aside the commitment to implement them.

The Protocol for Transparency and Institutions

The Protocol for Transparency and Institutions is a document in which the current Dominican president Danilo Medina has pledged to comply with in order to regulate the role of public officials. Among the various items that make up the Protocol are some articles concerning diplomatic functions. The document suggests that the regularization of jobs abroad, and the elimination of job duplications in public administration are presidential priorities. When the current president Danilo Medina was a presidential candidate in 2012, he signed the “Protocol for Transparency and Institutions.” He promised to eliminate political clientelism and guarantee a professional diplomatic corps career; however, the leader failed to remember this once he was in office. Instead, the new president Medina acted as the previous presidents, and when he won the elections did not make the promised changes. The new representative of the executive power could not disarm the historic political patronage that defines the Dominican Foreign Ministry.

The document signed by the President in 2012 failed in two important ways. The first failure is regarding measurement 7, which highlights the granting of unnecessary jobs that increase the national budget (Citizen Participation, 2012)

Measure 7. “To sponsor the elimination of overlapping job responsibilities across the many organs of public administration, by suppressing the excedent institutions and recurring, when necessary, to the support of the National Congress for legislative changes required to consolidate bodies that meet similar functions or overlapping ones and in this way contribute to the eradication of patronage, a pernicious form of corruption” (Citizen Participation, 2014, 15).

Likewise, Measure 7 stresses clearly that the executive needs to eliminate corruption and patronage in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The new President chose to continue exchanging positions for political commitments.

Another priority that the executive promised in the Protocol was to select a professional diplomatic corps. Measurement 9 requires that the regularization of jobs abroad have to be a priority for the executive. (Protocol for Transparency and Institutions, 2012).

Measure 9. Ensure, in the same way, that the Foreign Service of the Dominican Republic will journey in the way of the professionalization of the diplomatic and consular functions. It will constitute a priority to support the diplomatic career and the rationalization of the designation outside” (Citizen Participation, 2014, 15).

According to Participación Ciudadana (Citizen Participation) the Government has not fulfilled these measures. The year 2013 was the first year of monitoring the measures and it was found that 63% of the time the measures were broken, and 27% of the time they were in the process of being broken. On the other hand, the second assessment shows a setback in the implementation of the measures, as 77% have not been fulfilled, and only 22% are in the process of being fulfilled. The first survey reflected that just one measure was accomplished; however, in the second monitoring none of the measurements were fulfilled completely (Citizen Participation, 2014)

Professionalism, Accountability and a New Public Diplomacy

The organization *Participación Ciudadana*, or “Civil Participation,” emphasizes that in the country, there is a lack of professionalism in the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Likewise, the organization claims that the Ministry has been characterized by political favoritism and patronage. In the analysis, the NGO points out that the Dominican Republic will never have a professional foreign service if the government does not dismantle the culture of exchange votes for favors (Pimentel, 2014).

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, payrolls in 2013-2014, ministers and politicians recommended some of the appointed diplomats. These officials had obtained the positions for past political favors (Acento.com.do, 2014). The consular payroll from 2013-2014 does not present a picture of professionalism in diplomacy. On the contrary, the payroll highlights that 26% of the officials were recommended by ex-presidents, senators, and deputies from the current political party (PLD).

In addition, 32% of the diplomats were from the Reformist Political Party (PRSC). This shows the effects of the strategic alliance between PRSC and PLD. And 30% of the employees were still recommended by the Senator Felix Bautista. Likewise, 5.93% of the officials are receiving their money from other government offices, or they do not have a listed salary because they have not actually occupied the position (Acento.com.do, 2014).

Accountability in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a necessity that can only be realized with the pressure of the citizens. Ali Farazmand points out that accountability is possible when public institutions have elements of control and professionalism, because a qualified professional is concerned with social needs. The author highlights that, “professionalization introduces task performance, efficiency, effectiveness, objectivity, integrity, identity, and cohesion” (Farazmand,

1997, p. 309). The weakness in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been a lack of professionalism; however, the efforts to make the institution more professional clash with the actions of the political authorities.

The Dominican Republic is not the only country in Latin America to confront this problem. Mexico also has difficulties. The diplomat Enrique Hubbard Urrea stresses that career diplomats confront a lot of bureaucracy in order to receive a position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mexico. A professional has to fill out an application, which is then analyzed by an official, followed by the Foreign Minister. However, those who have political connections do not fill out an application at all (Urrea, 2012).

Accountability seems to be a hard political commitment to achieve. Farazman suggests different approaches to developing accountability in order to obtain a more credible public service corps. He points to various approaches of “*managerial-organizational*,” where the institutions need to be well organized with clear definitions of the functions of each position. In this type of approach, every official has to understand the responsibilities of everyone and follow the organizational system (Farazmand, 1997).

The second approach he introduces is called “*political means*,” which highlights the legislative oversight, budgetary control, and rotation in office to reduce the risk of misrepresentation of public interest, amassment of power. Also important are representation and public participation, whistleblowing, sunshine laws, and an effective organizational and managerial approach. The third approach that the author advocates is the “*legal path*,” which helps to protect the constitutional rights of every citizen. Likewise, Farazman concludes that the cultural approach uses the element of ethics as a valuable form of education through academic, religious or secular entities to promote consciousness (Farazmand, 1997, p. 303). However, these forms of

accountability are difficult to apply when a country does not implement the laws and has higher levels of patronage and corruption that are deeply rooted in political culture.

On the other hand, some academics call attention to the Foreign Ministries around the world and explain that only a small group trains their personal candidates to be players in the transnational network. However, the new structure of diplomacy is not to serve as a cultural agent. An agent of diplomacy should not focus solely on signing economic contracts as the Dominican Republic has been doing. As stated by Melissen, the role of diplomacy

... is not only 'art' and 'culture, but also communicating a country's thinking, research, journalism and national debate. In this perspective, the traditional areas of cultural exchange become part of a new type of international communication and the growth of public diplomacy becomes a reaction to the close connection between cultural, press and information activities as a result of new social, economic and political realities (Melissen, 2005).

Experts in international relations suggest that the new form of diplomacy need not only have an integration between the civil societies in other countries, but that the embassies should contain experts in foreign relations that go beyond political patronage, as well.

Diplomacy has changed over the years and it is important that a country formulates national politics, communicates ideas, and listen the foreign publics to control these changes. Before a Foreign Ministry can begin a training process, it needs to address issues of corruption and patronage within the organization. In that sense, the use of diplomacy for personal purposes in some countries has been criticized by many academics.

Conclusion

I explained in this chapter how patronage, corruption and the gap between laws and reality affect the Dominican Republic's foreign policy. I also point out that in order to develop a New Public Diplomacy, the Dominican Republic needs to listen to foreign publics. By examining of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the country, I highlighted the characteristics of patronage between the current government and political parties. I evaluated the history of patronage in the institution and how these elements disturb the relationship between the Dominican Republic and external publics. Another complication is the corruption in the Payrolls of the Ministry in 2013 and 2015, where a diplomat in the U.S earned more money than the U.S. president. I also presented some statistics that placed the Dominican Republic as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.

I also evaluated how these public officials are breaking the laws of the country with impunity. Even though these laws stressed that there needs to be a "limited and necessary" group of people in the diplomatic corps, media and public opinion show that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an institution full of 'empty bottles,' and the country has more people in the diplomatic corps than other countries which have much larger populations such as Mexico, Argentina and Brazil. Diplomats break the laws without e regulation or accountability.

I also evaluated some legal documents such as the Dominican Constitution, the Organic Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Protocol of Transparency and Institution. I evaluated that there are some problems in the enforcement of the 314 Organic Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. First, I discovered that the Ministry has been governed by an obsolete law since 1964, and even though some political elites proposed a new one in 2011, the Chamber of Senators has yet to approve it. This implies a delay in the creation of a new framework for public diplomacy in the Dominican Republic. However, it is not only a diplomatic stock with other countries in the field of trade and cultural exchange, but also an institutional stagnation, which has not allowed the Dominican Republic to handle diplomacy professionally. Likewise, the institution has many diplomats who are not exercising their jobs abroad. This implies that the country has high levels of corruption and political clientelism.

The old Law 314 specifies sanctions for diplomats who are not exercising their jobs; however, the new law created in 2011 puts the emphasis on dismissal of any diplomats who are violating this law. Making a comparative analysis between the two laws, I found that the new one does not offer much guidance on how the law is going to sanction those in violation. However, the new law has some improvements in terms of regulations to evaluate the role of diplomats overseas like the Diplomatic and Consular Council, even though, it is not clear who the actors are that are going to be involved in the Council. Despite the fact that the Ministry has experienced small improvements, it continues to face widespread corruption and political clientelism.

I also evaluated the Dominican Constitution, specifically Article 146, and the Dominican Republic Protocol of Transparency and Institutions (Johnson and Reynolds, 2008). In these documents it can be seen that the Dominican Republic has clear positions about the importance of transparency in institutions, and the law condemns any act of corruption. However, I also presented evidence to illustrate how the government violates the law as do the citizens.

I argue that one of the main reasons for this gap between law and reality is rooted in the time of the former president, Joaquín Balaguer. Balaguer actually claimed that the constitution was “just a piece of paper”. Despite the many problems with his regime, the majority of the Dominicans saw his 22 years in power as the standard way of doing democracy in the Dominican Republic. The legacy of Balaguer’s ideologies framed how Dominicans perceive the law. The common attitude about breaking laws is not only evident in the state, but also in different levels of the society, where citizens also violate laws with impunity. Nevertheless, I state the importance of citizen participation to be more active in disarming patronage, corruption and the breaking of laws. In order to acquire a new concept of public diplomacy, the Dominican government and its citizens must leave behind the nationalist discourse and listen to international public opinion.

CHAPTER IV

The Role of Government, Citizens and International Publics

Conclusion

This thesis explains that Dominican diplomacy faces internal challenges in developing a new framework for foreign affairs. This thesis demonstrates that soft power has not been achieved by the Dominican government, in spite of the fact that the country has cultural programs around the world. Soft power and the new concept of public diplomacy can only be achieved by an integrated strategy that includes: the government, local citizens and international public opinion.

This research explains the reasons behind the Dominican Republic's failing diplomacy. I defined three problems in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that reinforce this inheritance: patronage, corruption and legal idealism. I described how the weakness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs leads to disrepute. In my interview with Mu Kien Sang, she described the complications in Dominican diplomacy. Likewise, other academics have denounced corruption and political clientelism in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. International and domestic public opinion not only reveals the institutional weakness of the Ministry, but also provided an internal discussion in academia about the current state of Dominican diplomacy.

Furthermore, I evaluated different variables such as patronage, corruption and legal idealism in several important documents pertaining to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Patronage is demonstrated through the exploration of the alliance formed by the Reformist Political Party and the Liberation party, which led the first to take control of the Ministry. According to the document, *"Political Culture of Democracy in the Dominican Republic, 2014"* conducted by the

United States Agency for International Development, the Latin American Public Opinion (LAPOP), and Americas Barometer, 37.1% of Dominicans expressed that they received a patronage offer during campaign elections. The D.R. has higher levels of political clientelism than Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela.

The 2013 Ministry payroll highlights that political clientelism and corruption are part of how the government is conducting diplomacy. Next to each official name on the 2013 payroll there is also a description of who that person is and by whom they were recommended. The documents highlight a large number of people from the *Reformist Party* and a large group of people personally recommended by Senator Felix Bautista, who is accused of high levels of corruption by *Transparency International* (Transparency International, 2016). Another case of corruption is the Ambassador to Spain, Cesar Medina, who earned \$ 40,000 USD per month, more than the base salary of the United States president. The 2015 payrolls published by the Dominican Ministry of Foreign Affairs still contain many irregularities, even though the government reduced the salaries drastically (MIREX, 2015). Additionally, the Dominican Republic has more permanent officials in the Blue Book of United Nations than any other nation in the region. A survey by USAID in 2008 found a gap between corruption in institutions and victims of corruption in the country. Only 16.3 % of the people in the survey reported they were victims of corruption, in contrast to the 45.9 % who declared corruption in the state. The survey implies that many people who are guilty of bribery do not categorize themselves as corrupt (Morgan, et al., 2010).

The third variable that I tested is the theory of law and reality. To do this, I assessed three main documents. The documents are the Dominican Constitution specifically article 149; the Organic Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is from 1964; and the Dominican Republic Protocol of Transparency and Institutions. Article 149 condemns any type of corruption by state

officials; however, impunity remains the norm in the Dominican state. In these documents, it can be seen that the Dominican Republic has clear legal positions about the importance of transparency and condemns any act of corruption. The Protocol of Transparency highlights that measurements 7 and 9, which concern the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a diplomatic career, are not fully completed by the president. This confirms that there is a difference between the reality that the country is experiencing and the legal requirements.

Policy Implications

This study reflects how the weakness in the Dominican Ministry of Foreign Affairs implies concrete problems for the exercise of diplomacy as well as for democracy. The lack of compliance with the laws, the shortcomings of the executive and the unwillingness of civil society to demand accountability from the government in the face of patronage, corruption and the absence of rule of law have provoked a diplomatic calamity. The Ministry has been ruled a patronage system with an obsolete law. The Organic Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created from 1964, during the Trujillo dictatorship. The Dominican government never changed its foreign policy even though the country has undergone a democratic transition. Only an active citizen movement can provoke changes.

Even though the Dominican state has made some changes in 2015, the data that I present can be used for further policy changes. Furthermore, my study indicates that citizen participation is vital for change to happen. Jurgen Habermas (1996) argues that in order to solve the problem of rule of law in modern societies, states need social integration to have a better application of democracy. Habermas explains that modern law framed subjective laws that do not consider the demands of the society. Moreover, Habermas proposed a discursive theory to alleviate the existing problems between facts and norms. Habermas stresses the important role of public discourse in

democratic institutions (Habermas, 1996). However, in order to have citizen participation, individuals need to know the difference between rights and duties.

In the case of Dominican Republic, social integration has shown some improvements in the past years; however, there is still a long way to go to achieve citizen participation. Even though there are many social movements who protest against the system, I identify two problems in Dominican society. The first obstacle is the pessimistic social atmosphere where citizens do not want to be involved in political and social change because they consider protesting to be an ineffective way to influence corrupt politicians. Carmen Beatriz Ruíz (2007) points out that countries lose legitimacy when citizens lose confidence in the lawmakers. Ruíz stresses that there is a "... huge gap between discourse and practice; the imbalance between rights and duties; the authoritarian practice of viewing civic processes as homogenizing initiatives" (Tulchin & Ruthenberg, 2007, p. 213). Ruíz suggests that to recover laws and institutions, countries must develop social networks to integrate different sectors of the society to control and monitor public institutions (Tulchin & Ruthenberg, 2007).

Countries that achieve an integration between the state, citizens and international constituencies could achieve successful soft power. These kinds of regimes change the traditional paradigms of diplomacy. The international accusations triggered a nationalist discourse between citizens. Rather than leveraging this opportunity, the Dominican government used this discourse to distract attention away from the weaknesses of the state. If the country does not change its policy towards diplomacy and continues maintaining the system of patronage, corruption, and elite control, the diplomatic image of the country will not improve.

Possible Future Research

The Dominican Republic has not been studied much in terms of foreign affairs. The Dominican Republic has strong foreign relations with the United States. G. Pope Atkins and Larman Cutis (1998) explain that the U.S relationship with the Dominican Republic involves many features including;

establishing receiverships and forming banking consortia; landing troops and organizing military occupations; recognizing or refusing new governments; granting or refusing to provide foreign assistance (economic, military, and technical); supervising elections; supporting dictators; and promoting democracy and development (Atkins & Wilson, 1998, p. 1).

The bilateral relations that these countries have developed over the years are highly debated in academia. In this thesis, I hope to transform the discourse of traditional (mostly bi-lateral) diplomacy that only involves interventions, economic treaties and cultural exchanges by introducing the new concept of public diplomacy and soft power to the analysis of the Dominican Republic. Nevertheless, this research measures the relationship between diplomacy and the institutions of diplomacy, and there are other topics that could add significantly to this research.

Race and diplomacy in the Dominican Republic is an important aspect to be analyzed, due to the human rights violations and the proximity with Haiti. The document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Arquitectura Diplomática” emphasizes the aspect of race and the creation of programs; however, it doesn’t point out how these development programs can be accountable. As I point out in this study, accountability and credibility are important to achieving soft power.

Another area for future research could be how Dominicans can achieve soft power and structure new forms of accountability in diplomacy. Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico have been

able to achieve a form of cultural impact around the world. Craig Hayden presents evidence about how Venezuela promotes soft power through the manipulation of the media with the political participation on television and a socialist discourse with a “counter hegemonic” ideology. Hayden highlights that Venezuela conceived its foreign policies with the assumptions that a mediated communication can impact other countries and awake the vulnerability of international publics.

Moreover, these soft power discourses have many implications for the economic relations with other countries and private industry. Venezuela has had a strong influence over the Latin American region with the provision of oil and the formation of strategic alliances (Hayden, 2012). Another example of soft power is how Japan projects itself as a peaceful country and tries to bury the historical legacy of World War II. Craig Hayden (2012) analyses the Japanese strategy of soft power with the establishment of some programs around the world such as cultural diplomacy, international broadcasting services, and development aid and investment. These examples of soft power can serve as examples to the Dominican Republic in pursuing its own diplomatic strategies.

I believe that in the case of Dominican Republic a better form of soft power is not best pursued through these kinds of cultural activities or broadcasting services, but rather I think the nation should focus on two points: institutional credibility and human rights. However, as I pointed out earlier, these goals are dependent on a strong integration between the Dominican government, citizens and international publics.

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
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Authorization Approved by Fausto Rosario Adames to use the 2013 MOFA Payroll by the Media Acento.com.do



Appendix B: Official List of the identified Diplomats in the Dominican Consulates in 2013. (Acento.com.do, 2014).The author of this research only removed the diplomats ID numbers and photos.

DESIGNACIONES POR DECRETO			
CONSULADO			
NOMBRES	RANGO	EDAD	DECRETO
ESTADOS UNIDOS - SAN FRANCISCO DE CAYAMA, EE.UU.			
1. FRANCISCA JIMENEZ	CONSUL	30.00	T. NO. 631-08 DEL 13-10-08/ HERMANA RADHAMES JIMENEZ
REINO DE LOS PAISES BAJOS - HOLLANDA			
2. HERNANDEZ PEREZ	CONSUL	30.00	T. NO.1317-04/ PRESIDENTE DEL PLD EN HOLANDA
3. JOSEPH LUIS HIDALGO JIMENEZ	CONSUL	30.00	T. NO 559-07/ HIJO BERTHA JIMENEZ-PINA RORIBIO
ESTADOS UNIDOS - SAN FRANCISCO DE CAYAMA, EE.UU.			
4. ROSARIO ROMERO	CONSUL GENERAL	30.00	T. NO. 526-08 DEL 10/09/08 / ESPOSA RAFAEL NUNEZ
5. ESMERALDA CROES	CONSUL	30.00	T. NO. 196-11 DEL 24-03-11 / DANILO PEREZ-LEONEL NUNEZ
ISLAS CAYMAN - BARBUDAS			
6. MELITON PIMENTEL	CONSUL	30.00	T. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ ADRIANO HERRERA/ COMISION PLD-PORTORRICO
FRANCIA - ESPAÑA			
7. TOMAS PEREZ GAUTREUX	CONSUL	30.00	T. NO. 533-07/ HIJO DE TAINA GAUTREUX Y DE JOSE TOMAS
8. ALFONSO BENGOA ARAGUIZ	CONSUL	30.00	T. NO. 113-09/ HIJO DE VICENTE BENGOA

9	BIDO CAMILO	AR	.00	T NO. 604-08 DEL 30-09-08/ HIJA DRA. CAMILO/MARGARITA O
0	MERCEDES ABREU CAMPUSANO	AR	.00	T. NO. 135-12 DEL 22-03-12 / GENERAL CAMPUSANO/ PALACIO
	N, MASSACHUSSETS,-ESTADOS S			
1	INO HERRERA CABRAL	ONSUL	.00	T. NO.220-06/ ALEJANDRO HERRERA
2	IE ALEXANDER FRIAS MOLINA	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 188-12 DEL 17-04-12/ CONSULTORIA JURIDICA
3	RA ROCHET BRITO	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 591-10/ EX -ASISTENTE JURIDICO PALACIO
4	A ALEJANDRINA SOSA GERMAN	AR	.00	T. NO.1393-04/ HIJA DEL EMBAJADOR JOSE SOSA- NDRINA GERMAN
	A- COLOMBIA			
5	ARLOS MARTINEZ FERNANDEZ	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 664-08 DEL 21-10-08. / HIJO DEL CONSUL Y PRIMO ONEL FERNANDEZ
	AS-VENEZUELA			
6	LBERTO GUERRA	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 456-11 DEL 03-08-11/ MARIA KASSE
	AO- ANTILLA HOLANDESAS			
7	N VIRGINIA CARDONA	L GENERAL	.00	T. NO. 413-08 DEL 29/08/08/ HIJA DE DOÑA LIGIA MELO
8	N ALTAGRACIA PERALTA O	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 135-12 DEL 22-03-12 / DAMARIS-DON ABEL
9	LISA BENGOA SORIANO	ONSUL	.00	T. NO.386-10 DEL 29-07-10/ VICENTE BENGOA
	GO-ILINOIS, ESTADOS UNIDOS			
0	PATRICIA RIVERA TORRES	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 520-08 DEL 10-09-08/ HIJA SR. RIVERA- INDUVECA
	FURT-ALEMANIA			
1	FERNANDO JIMENEZ CORDOVA	ONSUL EN FRANKFURT	.00	T. NO.137-12 DEL 22-03-12/ HIJO DEL CONSUL CESAR IO JIMENEZ
	A-ITALIA			

22	MARIENA ABUD REYNOSO	CONSUL	.00	T. NO. 301-11 DEL 12-05-11/ HIJA DE LA EX- EMBAJADORA ANA REYNOSO
	LUPE, DEPARTAMENTO DE ULTRAMAR			
23	ANA ALTAGRACIA MEDINA GUEZ	CONSUL GENERAL	.00	T. NO. 346-11 DEL 02-06-11/ PRIMA PTE. DANILO MEDINA
24	ANA ROSA ROSADO ARIAS	CONSUL	.00	T. NO. 346-11 DEL 02-06-11/ CONSUL ANDREA MEDINA
25	AUGUSTO CUEVAS NILLA	CONSUL	.00	T. NO. 261-12 DEL 22-05-12/ ESCOLTA CAMPAÑA DE PTE. DON MEDINA
	BERGAMO- ALEMANIA			
26	DESAR GARABOT	CONSUL	.00	T. NO. 675-10/ EURI CABRAL-PERIODISTA
	BERMUDA, KINGSTON			
27	ALVARO RAFAEL SANTANA POLO	CONSUL	.00	T. NO. 160-11/ FELIX VASQUEZ- SENADOR
28	ANITA E. LUGO FERNANDEZ	CONSUL	.00	T. NO. 409-11 DEL 04-07-11/ SOBRINA PTE. LEONEL MENDEZ
	BERMUDA- HAITI			
29	ALVARO TOMAS CALDERON MAUSIAN	CONSUL	.00	T. NO. 698-08 DEL 27-10-08, CONSUL EUNICE JIMENO
30	ALVARO LEONEL PEREZ SANCHEZ	CONSUL	.00	T. NO. 580-05/ HIJO DE JUANA SANCHEZ
31	ANITA ELAINE MORA DE NUÑEZ	CONSUL	.00	T. NO.724-11 DEL 26-11-11/ DON ABEL
	BERMUDA-ESPAÑA			
32	ALVARO OSCIO ESCOTO HERNANDEZ	CONSUL	.00	T. NO. 620-11 DEL 14-10-11/ HIJA DE MAYOBANEX
33	ALVARO YOCASTA FELIZ	CONSUL PARA IMPLEMENTACION DEL AREA DE GESTION CONSULAR	.00	T. NO.115-11 DEL 3-03-11 / MARCOS CROSS
34	ALVARO DE JESUS PINEDA FELIZ	CONSUL, ENC. DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE PRENSA	.00	T. NO. 334-09 DEL 28/04/2009/ MELTON PINEDA
35	BONETTI	CONSUL	.00	T. NO. 223-11 DEL 13-04-11/ LUIS MANUEL BONETTI
36	ALVARO O. A. BENGOA ARAGUIS	CONSUL	.00	T. NO. 496-05/ HIJO DE VICENTE BENGOA

87	MORA GARCIA	AR	.00	T. NO. 284-07/ HIJA DE JORGE SEVERINO (MINISTRO DE DEFENSA)
	CANARIAS- ESPAÑA			
88	NTE SANTOS MERCEDES	ONSUL EN ISLAS CANARIAS	.00	T. NO.617-10 DEL 06-11-10/ MARCOS CROSS
89	IVELISSE ALONZO LA PAZ	AR EN ISLAS CANARIAS	.00	T. NO.617-10 DEL 06-11-10/ MARCOS CROSS
	ISLA - FRANCIA			
90	ALTAGRACIA PEGUERO Z	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 455-07/ HERMANA HECTOR PEGUERO MENDEZ
91	LINA RIVERA	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 45-11 DEL 08-02-11/ LAURA FAXAS
	ITALIA			
92	RO APONTE DISLA	ONSUL	.00	T NO. 658-05/ ESPOSO MERCEDES BRITO/ CONSUL DE ITALIA
93	IG MANUEL PUIG HERNANDEZ	AR	.00	T. NO. 223-11 DEL 13-04-11/ HERMANO GERENAL PUIG ZADA)
	PUERTO RICO ESTADOS UNIDOS			
94	TEFAN BOSCH	L	.00	T. NO. 779-09 DEL 21-10-09/ NIETO DE JUAN BOSCH
95	A ISABEL JIMENEZ BOSCH	ONSUL	.00	T NO. 1386-04/ NIETA DE JUAN BOSCH
96	ELENA RAMIREZ SANTANA	ONSUL	.00	T NO. 375-09/ RAFAEL ALBURQUERQUE
97	OTTE FERNANDEZ BAEZ	ONSUL	.00	T NO. 266-10/ SOBRINA PTE. LEONEL FERNANDEZ
	REAL - CANADA			
98	VIOLETA SANTANA JIMENEZ	ONSUL EN MONTREAL	.00	T. NO.97-10 DEL 03-08-10 / LUIS MANUEL BONETTI
99	CARLOS CABRAL GARCIA	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 727-08 DEL 29-10-08 HIJO FRANK CABRAL
100	IN ESPERANZA MINIER	AR	.00	T. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ ESPOSA PAULINO- CHOFER PTE. MENDEZ/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
101	LA MARIE RODRIGUEZ BUSTO	AR	.00	T. NO. 322-07/ HIJA ASISTENTE FRANCISCO JAVIER

FLORIDA, ESTADOS UNIDOS				
ERICA				
52	LEE BLANDINO CASTILLO	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 754-08 DEL 17-11-08/ ESPOSA PROCURADOR RADHAMES EZ
53	ERNESTINA PEÑA SURIEL	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 69-09/ LUIS MANUEL BONETTI
54	ROSA ZELLER BARROUS	AR/HONORIFICA		T. NO. 220-08/ LUIS MANUEL BONETTI
55	ETH DEL C. DE JESUS LORA OW	AR	.00	T. NO.223-11/ DON ABEL
56	BLANDINO	AR	.00	T. NO. 762-08 DEL 24-11-08 / PROCURADOR RADHAMES EZ
57	ANUEL HERRERA	AR	.00	T. NO. 486-06/ ADRIANO HERRERA
LEANS--ESTADOS UNIDOS				
58	TE JOSEFINA MARTINEZ MUÑIZ	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 113-09 DEL 14-02-09/ ESPOSA JOEL LANTIGUA
59	CO AUGUSTO ANTUN NDEZ	ONSUL	.00	T. NO 256-11 DEL 25-04-11/ HIJO QUIQUE ANTUN
60	SOSA CAMPUSANO	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 222-11 DEL 13-04-11/ ALEJANDRO HERRERA/DON ABEL
ORK--ESTADOS UNIDOS				
61	ERNANDO RODRIGUEZ SANTOS	AR	.00	T. NO. 675-10 DEL 01-12-10 / EURI CABRAL
62	ROSA CAMPUSANO	AR	.00	T. NO. 134-110 DEL 08-03-11/ GRAL. CAMPUSANO (PALACIO)
63	N OLGA CASTILLO BURGOS	AR	.00	T. NO. 760-08 DEL 24-11-08/ HERMANA OSCAR CASTILLO/ PTE. FERNANDEZ
O D.F				
64	NA DEL CARMEN VASQUEZ N	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 500-05/ ALEJANDRINA GERMAN
LICA CHECA--RUSIA				
65	CAMACHO DE COHEN	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 174-11 DEL 18-03-11/ MADRE DE MICHEL COHEN
JANEIRO--BRASIL				

66	JILLO CLIME RIVERA	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 532-09 DEL 24-07-09/ HIJO EMBAJADOR END. ASUNTOS ARIBE
	IA--PANAMA			
67	ILA DESIREE PUJOLS	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 34-09 DEL 17-01-09/ ESPOSA ALBERTO PEÑA *EX TARIA TEMO.
68	D BERMUDEZ	ONSUL	.00	AD. ADMSMIAMI. OFIC. NO.8907 DEL 17-09-09 HERMANO O BERMUDEZ
69	N MATOS ACOSTA	ONSUL	.00	T. NO.637-10 DEL 15-11-10/ VICTOR SANCHEZ
70	N MILADY SANCHEZ ROSARIO	AR	.00	T.NO.785-09 DEL 26-10-09 / HERMANA VICTOR SANCHEZ
71	ANDRES SOLIS NOVAS	AR	.00	T. NO. 223-11 DEL 13-04-11/ VICTOR SANCHEZ
	O PRINCIPE - HAITI			
72	CESAR DE LOS SANTOS SOLIS	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 176-11 DEL 18-03-11/ EX-DIR. COM. ZONAS ERIZAS/ AGREGADO
	AN- PUERTO RICO--ESTADOS S			
73	YS MIOSOTIS ARIAS	ONSUL	.00	O DESIGNACION DECRET. NO.501-10 DEL 31-08-10/ MIGUEL
74	SKA DE LEON SANTIAGO	AR CONSULAR	.00	NO. 617-11 EL 14-10-11 / DAMARIS/ DON ABEL
75	EL LISTER VILLAVIZAR	AR CONSULAR	.00	T. NO. 724-08 DEL 29-10-08/ OCTAVIO LISTER- EMB. PANAMA
	ULO- BRASIL			
76	ADES GEOMAR GARCIA ROJAS	L	.00	T. NO.,675-10 DEL 1-12-10/ PERIODISTA
77	IA CONCEPCION MARTINEZ ARD	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 71-05/ ALEJANDRO HERRERA
78	ILVANA HERRERA PLACENCIA	AR	.00	ANDRO HERRERA
	ARTEEN--ANTILLAS DESA			
79	IA AURORA MARTI MACEO	ONSUL	.00	T. NO.254-11 DEL 25-04-11 / ARISTIPO VIDAL
80	VIRGINIA ROJO VIDAL	ONSUL	.00	T. NO.254-11 DEL 25-04-11/ ARISTIPO VIDAL

	A- ESPAÑA			
81	NDRA GUTIERREZ DIAZ	L GENERAL	.00	T. NO. 54-08 DEL 18-09-08/ HIJA EUCLIDES GUTIERREZ
82	AHMED SERULLE AYBAR	AR	.00	T. NO.499-11 DEL 19-08-11/ HIJO ELIAS SERRULLE
	CIA - ESPAÑA			
83	DA EVELYN DE LOS SANTOS GUEZ	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 134-11 DEL 08-03-11/ HERMANA NILDO DE LOS SANTOS
84	R DE LA CRUZ	AR	.00	T. NO. 181-09 DEL 10-03-09/ F. GARCIA VALENTIN
	H - SUIZA			
85	LL MARIANO ZORRILLA	ONSUL	.00	T. NO. 514-08 DEL 10-09-08 / PRIMO DE CRISPIN

Appendix C:. Senator Felix Bautista. Unmask the Corrupt (Transparency International, 2016)

The screenshot shows the 'Unmask the Corrupt' website interface. At the top, a navigation bar includes 'HOME', 'VOTE', 'CASES' (highlighted), 'DISCUSS', 'TIMELINE', 'WHAT'S HAPPENING', 'DONATE', 'LOGIN', and 'SIGNUP'. Below the navigation bar is a red call-to-action banner: 'Join us NOW to take action against the grand corrupt. Click on REMIND ME to receive notifications when new actions are ready.' The main content area features two profile cards. The first card is for Ricardo Martinelli, titled 'RICARDO MARTINELLI AND CRONIES', 'Former President of Panama and his close allies'. It lists two bullet points: 'Allegedly diverted US\$100 million from citizens' and 'Violated basic human rights of children'. It shows '10166 VOTES' and a 'TAKE ACTION NOW!' button. The second card is for Felix Bautista, titled 'FELIX BAUTISTA Dominican Republic Senator'. It lists two bullet points: 'Allegedly enriched self with millions in state funds' and 'Political connections appear to make him untouchable'. It shows '9786 VOTES' and a 'TAKE ACTION NOW!' button. Both cards include 'FIND OUT MORE' and 'DISCUSS' buttons.

UNMASK THE CORRUPT HOME VOTE **CASES** DISCUSS TIMELINE WHAT'S HAPPENING DONATE LOGIN SIGNUP

Join us **NOW** to take action against the grand corrupt. Click on **REMIND ME** to receive notifications when new actions are ready.

RICARDO MARTINELLI AND CRONIES
Former President of Panama and his close allies

- Allegedly diverted US\$100 million from citizens
- Violated basic human rights of children

FIND OUT MORE DISCUSS

10166 VOTES

TAKE ACTION NOW!

FELIX BAUTISTA
Dominican Republic Senator

- Allegedly enriched self with millions in state funds
- Political connections appear to make him untouchable

FIND OUT MORE DISCUSS

9786 VOTES

TAKE ACTION NOW!

Appendix D. List of the Dominican Foreign Service (Citizen Participation, 2014).

PAÍS	CONSULAD	EMBAJADA	TOTAL
Alemania	1	1	31
Antigua Barbuda	1	-	10
Antillas	1	-	14
Argentina	-	2	20
Aruba	1	-	10
Austria	-	1	15
Bélgica	9	1	23
Brasil	1	2	43
Canadá	2	3	59
Chile	-	2	20
China	-	1	12
Colombia	6	2	32
Corea	-	4	4
Costa Rica	-	2	26
Cuba	5	2	29
Curazao	1	-	10
Ecuador	-	1	19
PAÍS	CONSULADO	EMBAJADA	TOTAL
Egipto	-	7	7
El Salvador	-	1	10
Emiratos Árabes	1	2	3
España	9	2	119
Estados Unidos	2	3	247
Francia	1	1	29
Grecia	6	-	6
Guatemala	-	1	19
Honduras	1	1	19
India	-	9	9
Inglaterra	-	1	15
Italia	1	3	49
Irán	-	2	2

Israel	-	5	5
Jamaica	11	2	31
Japón	6	1	16
Marruecos	-	6	6
México	5	2	26
Nicaragua	-	1	18
Panamá	2	3	58
Paraguay	-	9	9
Perú	-	1	13
Portugal	-	2	21
Puerto Rico	4	-	42
Qatar	-	2	2
República Checa	3	-	3
República	-	4	4
Rusia	-	1	12
Suecia	-	6	6
Suiza	6	6	12
Trinidad y Tobago	-	1	16
Uruguay	-	1	18
Venezuela	1	2	32
SUBTOTAL	5	684	1261
FAO		5	5
Misión Austria		3	3
OEA		4	43
Suiza		1	1
ONU		7	77
UNESCO		6	6
SUBTOTAL		1	135
TOTAL	577	8	1396

Appendix E: Official List of Staff recommended by the Senator Felix Bautista in 2013. (Acento.com.do, 2014). Note: the Author of this Research only Removed the Diplomats ID Numbers and Photos.

CONSULADOS - RECOMENDADOS POR FELIX BAUTISTA			
	NOMBRE	RANGO/PAIS	OBSERVACION
1	RAMON EMILIO REYES	AUXILIAR EN RIO DE JANEIRO-BRASIL	DECRET. NO. 6-9/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
2	MELVI TRINIDAD	AUXILIAR EN RIO DE JANEIRO-BRASIL	Traslada desde Ny. COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
3	JUAN BAUTISTA ALONZO DE LA CRUZ	AUXILIAR EN AMBERES, BELGICA	DECRET. NO.182-09 DEL 10-03-09/ COMISION PLD- NEW YORK
4	DAMIAN MEDINA	AUXILIAR- EN ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA	DECRET. NO.4-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
5	JUAN ANTONIO HERNANDEZ PICHARDO	AUXILIAR- EN ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA	DECRET. NO.182-09 DEL 10-03-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
6	RAMON HERIBERTO PICHARDO	AUXILIAR EN ATENAS-GRECIA	DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
7	GERALDO DE JESUS GUZMAN	AUXILIAR EN ATENAS-GRECIA	DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
8	ABIGAIR RODRIGUEZ	AUXILIAR EN BELLADERE-HAITI	DECRET. NO.8-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
9	CARLOS JOSE ESTEVEZ SANTELISES	AUXILIAR EN BELLADERE-HAITI	DECRET. NO.8-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK

10	ANA GUILLERMINA NUÑEZ	AUXILIAR EN BOSTON	DECRET. 662-08 DEL 21/10/08/ FELIX BAUTISTA
11	MARTA JULIA DE PEÑA ROBLES	AUXILIAR EN CURAZAO	DECRET NO.182-09 DEL10-03-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
12	TOMAS GUZMAN RAMIREZ	AUXILIAR- EN HAMBURGO-ALEMANIA	DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
13	ANGELIN ESPERANZA MINIER	AUXILIAR EN MONTREAL-CANADA	DECRET. NO. 6-09 ESPOSA PAULINO-CHOFER PTE. FERNANDEZ/ COMISION PLD-NY
14	REBECA MEDINA	AUXILIAR EN MONTREAL-CANADA	COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
15	RODOLFO FURGENCIO	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
16	RAMON ALFONSO RODRIGUEZ	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	TRASLADADO ADMS.. 9715 DEL 13-04-10/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
17	FELIX MANUEL LEDESMA MELO	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
18	RAMON ELADIO FERNANDEZ	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
19	NOEMI MORENO	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
20	OSCAR MEREJO	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO.4-9 COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
21	RAFAEL ANTONIO SANCHEZ VILLANUEVA	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
22	RICARDO ANTONIO DE JESUS BURROUGHS BATISTA	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK

23	JUAN ALEXIS HERNANDEZ SANTANA	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
24	EDWIN ABREU	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
25	APOLINAR RONDON	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
26	RAFAEL MARCELINO RODRIGUEZ MARTINEZ	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
27	JUAN ANTONIO ALBA MARTE	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
28	MANUEL SUERO	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
29	FRANCISCO A. FERNANDEZ	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
30	ARMANDO MELO	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
31	VICTOR RIVERA	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
32	AGAPITA PEREZ	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
33	RITA M. ESTRELLA DE CONIL	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
34	HECTOR TRONCOSO	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
35	ALFONSO POY	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK

36	MARIA DE LOS ANGELES MAÑON	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
37	XIOMARA PAYANO	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 21-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
38	JOSEFINA JIMENEZ	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 21-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
39	FELIPE FELIZ	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 21-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
40	FRANCISCO SOLER	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 21-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
41	YAZMIR ALTAGRACIA PUJOLS CASTILLO	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	.DECRET. NO. 182-09 DEL 10-03-09 // COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
42	ANDREA JACQUELINE PERALTA ROJAS DE MEJIA	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	PROCESO DE PENSION- COMISION PLD-NY
43	FRANCISCA GRISELDA BATISTA	AUXILIAR EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
44	ELIA GARIN RIVERA ALVAREZ	AUXILIAR EN SEVILLA- ESPAÑA	DECRET. NO.3-09 DEL 07-01-09/ FELIX BAUTISTA
45	NELSON COLLADO	AUXILIAR EN TOKYO-JAPON	DECRET. NO.8-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
46	LOURDES FERNANDEZ	AUXILIAR-MARSELLA-FRANCIA	DECRET. NO. 4-09 DEL 07-01-09// COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
47	FREDDY B. GARCIA PEÑA	CONSUL EN VALENCIA	DECRET. NO. 495-11 DEL 19-08-11 SUST. A FRANK BENCOSME/ FELIX BAUTISTA
48	IRMA BAUTISTA	CONSUL GENERAL- ISLAS CANARIAS-ESPAÑA	DECRET.NO.306-09 DEL 22-04-2009/ HERMANA DE FELIX BAUTISTA
49	TAMAYO JUAN SALVADOR TEJEDA VENTURA	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET NO. 4-09/ COMISION PLD-NY

50	MARINO DEL ROSARIO GUERRERO	VICECONSUL EN AMSTERDAM, HOLANDA	DECRET. NO 6-09 / COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
51	RAFAEL DANUBIO GARCIA	VICECONSUL EN ANSE A PITRE, HAITI	DECRET. NO. 503-10 DEL 31-08-10/ FELIX BAUTISTA
52	NELSON MELITON PIMENTEL	VICECONSUL- EN ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA	DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ ADRIANO HERRERA/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
53	GUARIONEX SANCHEZ	VICECONSUL EN ARUBA	DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
54	MILTON GERMAN HERRAND	VICECONSUL EN ATENAS-GRECIA	DECRET. NO.193-09 DEL 10-03-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
55	HECTOR PILARTE	VICECONSUL EN ATENAS-GRECIA	DECRET. NO. 4-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
56	CAROLINA RODRIGUEZ DIAZ	VICECONSUL EN BARCELONA	DECRET NO. 662-08/ FELIX BAUTISTA
57	FRANCISCO TAVERAS GUZMAN	VICECONSUL EN BOSTON	DECRET. NO. 91-07/ TIENE DECRET NO. 4-09 DE EMBAJADA/NO HA TOMO P./ COMISION PLD-NY
58	DOMINGA BERIGUETE	VICECONSUL- EN CABO HAITIANO	DECRET. NO.99-09 DEL 09-02-09/ FELIX BAUTISTA
59	YORFI CRISTOBAL BENCOSME GRULLON	VICECONSUL- EN CABO HAITIANO	DECRET. NO.458 DEL 19-08-10 FELIX BAUTISTA
60	JOSE MANUEL OVALLES MEJIA	VICECONSUL EN COLOMBIA	DECRET. NO. 259-11 DEL 25-04-11/ FELIX BAUTISTA
61	WELLINGTON GERMAN CASANOVA CASTILLO	VICECONSUL EN CURAZAO	DECRETO NO.182-09 DEL 10-03-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
62	HECTOR HIDALGO	VICECONSUL EN FRANKFURT-ALEMANIA	DECRET. NO. 08-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK

63	CARLOS EUSEBIO MERCEDES	VICECONSUL EN FRANKFURT-ALEMANIA	DECRET. NO. 06-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
64	JORGE ANT.GARCIA PAREDES	VICECONSUL EN FRANKFURT-ALEMANIA	DECRET. NO.182-09 DEL10-03-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
65	SALVADOR A. PEREZ	VICECONSUL- EN HAMBURGO-ALEMANIA	DECRET. NO. 6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
66	VANTROI ILIENOV PEÑA	VICECONSUL EN ISLAS CANARIAS-ESPAÑA	DECRETO NO. 306-09 DEL 22-04-09/ SOBRINO DE FELIX BAUTISTA
67	SALVADOR ORTIZ	VICECONSUL EN JAMAICA	DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
68	ROBERTO MORENO	VICECONSUL EN MADRID-ESPAÑA	DECRET. NO. 707-08 DEL 29-10-08 / FELIX BAUTISTA
69	HECTOR LOPEZ	VICECONSUL EN MEXICO	DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
70	RAMONA DELEIDY FELIZ FILPO	VICECONSUL EN MIAMI	DECRET. 662-08 DEL 21/10/08/ FELIX BAUTISTA
71	GERMAN DE LEON RODRIGUEZ	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET.1249-04, TIENE DECRET NO. 4-09 DE. EMBAJADA /NO TOMO P. COMISION PLD-NY
72	PABLO GARCIA TEJADA	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. 1382-04, TIENE DECRET NO. 4-09 DE. EMBAJADA /NO TOMO P. . COMISION PLD-NY
73	DIONICIO VENTURA	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO.23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
74	ERNESTO GONZALEZ	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO.23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
75	CECILIA SANTANA DE BAEZ	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO.23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK

76	DAVID CORDERO	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
77	VICTOR ACOSTA HIDALGO	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
78	VICTOR COMPRES	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO.23-09 DEL 07-01-09 // COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
79	FRANCISCO ROBLES	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION PLD- NEW YORK
80	HILARIO TAVERAS	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION PLD- NEW YORK
81	JOSE FRANCISCO JIMENEZ REYES	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 22-09 DEL 07-01-09 / COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
82	BALTASAR FIGUERO SIERRA	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
83	JOSE SANTANA	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
84	GREGORIO MALENA	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO.23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
85	GEOVANNY AUGUSTO RODRIGUEZ MARTINEZ	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
86	PEDRO P. ZORRILLA	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO. 23-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
87	CARMEN GERMOSEN FELIPE DE DEAN	VICECONSUL EN NEW YORK	DECRET. NO.131-09 DEL 19-02-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
88	SANDY JOSE TAVERAS	VICECONSUL EN PANAMA	TRASLADADO ADMS. SAINT. MARTEEN OFIC. NO. 6071 DEL 04/08/09/ FELIX BAUTISTA
89	HECTOR MAYOBANEX PEÑA B.	VICECONSUL EN PANAMA	TRASLADADO ADMS. DESDE SUIZA OFIC. NO.20214 DEL 23-06-10/ FELIX BAUTISTA

90	CARLOS GONZALEZ	VICECONSUL EN PANAMA	DECRET. NO. 147-11 DEL 15-03-11/ ESPOSO KARINA (FELIX BAUTISTA)
91	COLOMBINA READ ROA	VICECONSUL EN PUERTO PRINCIPE-HAITI	DECRET. NO. 537-08 DEL 12-09-08/SUEGRA DE CRISPIN/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
92	EMILIANO PEREZ ESPINOSA	VICECONSUL EN PUERTO PRINCIPE-HAITI	DECRET. NO. 240-10 / / FELIX BAUTISTA
93	MILEDIS MARTINEZ	VICECONSUL EN SAN JUAN-PTO-RICO	DECRETO NO. 391-08 DEL 25/08/08 / SOBRINA FELIX BAUTISTA
94	CARLOS MANUEL SANCHEZ ASENSIO	VICECONSUL EN SAN MARTEEN	DECRET. NO. 147-11 DEL 15-03-2011/ FELIX BAUTISTA
95	GUILLERMO DE JESUS ANGELES	VICECONSUL EN SEVILLA	DECRET. NO.662-08 DEL 21-10-08/ FELIX BAUTISTA
96	JUAN GUERRERO	VICECONSUL EN TOKYO-JAPON	DECRET. NO.6-09 DEL 07-01-09/ COMISION PLD-NEW YORK
97	ABRAHAM MEJIA	VICECONSUL EN VALENCIA	DECRET NO. 662-08 DEL 21-10-08 (MILANO)/ FELIX BAUTISTA
98	JUAN RAMON DURAN	VICECONSUL EN ZURICH-SUIZA	DECRETO NO. 707-08 DEL 29-10-08 / FELIX BAUTISTA
99	TERESITA PEÑA	VICECONSUL-MAYAGUEZ-PTO.RICO	DECRET NO.637-09 DEL 25-08-09/ FELIX BAUTISTA
100	ARISTIDES BAUTISTA	VICECONSUL-MAYAGUEZ-PTO.RICO	DECRETO NO. 391-08 DEL 25/08/08/ HERMANO FELIX BAUTISTA
101	LUZ DEL CARMEN RAMOS PUJOLS	VICECONSUL-MAYAGUEZ-PTO.RICO	DECRETO NO. 710-08 DEL 29/10/08/ ARISTIDES BAUTISTA-HERMANO FELIX BAUTISTA

Appendix F: Official List of Staff from the Reformist Party (PRSC) in 2013. (Acento.com.do, 2014). Note: The Author of this Research Only Removed the Diplomats ID Numbers and Photos.

		DESIGNACIONES POR DECRETO EMBAJADAS PRSC	
NO.	NOMBRE	CARGO	PAIS
1	VIRGILIO ALVAREZ BONILLA	EMBAJADOR, DIRECTOR EJECUTIVO - COMISION Mixta BILATERAL REP.DOM- PTO- RICO	
2	FLORENTINO CARVAJAL SUERO	EMBAJADOR-COMISION Mixta BILATERAL REP.DOM- PTO- RICO	
3	RICARDO ALBERTO ALMONTE ARIAS	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	CANADA
4	FRANCISCA MATILDE FRIAS VARGAS	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	ECUADOR
5	HERNANI ABRAHAM AQUINO HERNANDEZ	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	NICARAGUA
6	DIEGO VALLEJO RAMIREZ	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	NICARAGUA
7	VINICIO DE JESUS GRISANTY HERNANDEZ	MIINISTRO CONSEJERO	JAPON
8	IGNACIO GONZALEZ FRANCO	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	HONG KONG
9	ALFREDO GONZALEZ SEGURA	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	HONDURAS
10	ANTONIO VALENZUELA	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	HONDURAS
11	FERNANDO ANTONIO NUÑEZ	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	ECUADOR
12	GERARDO GUEMEZ MERCADO	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	COSTA RICA
13	RENE LEONIDAS DE LOS SANTOS CASTILLO	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	PANAMA
14	JOSE NICOLAS DIEGUEZ STEFAN	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	MISION ONU-SUIZA
15	MERCEDES GONZALEZ DECENA	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	PANAMA

16	MIGUEL BOGAERT MARRA	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	PARAGUAY
17	JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ VELASQUEZ	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	PERU
18	AMADO JOSE RAFUL	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	HONG KONG
19	JORGE MANUEL DARGAM ESPAILLAT	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	PARAGUAY
20	DENNY SUAZO MESA	MINISTRA CONSEJERA	PARAGUAY
21	RAWEL DIOLVANNY MINAYA FIGUEROA	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	HOLANDA
22	GUSTAVO ADOLFO MARTINEZ BOGAERT	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	HOLANDA
23	GILBERTO VALDEZ	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	PARAGUAY
24	RAFAEL VASQUEZ	MINISTRO CONSEJERO Enc.Seccion Consular	RUSIA
25	AMERICO BOGAERT	MINISTRO CONSEJERO	INSPECCION
26	XIOMARA INMACULADA VALERIO DE NAZIR	CONSEJERA	PARAGUAY
27	HECTOR RAFAEL DE MARCHENA GONZALEZ	CONSEJERO	HOLANDA
28	CLAUDIO MANUEL ALBURQUERQUE CASTRO	CONSEJERO	TAIWAN
29	PELEGRIN ALFREDO CASTILLO ARISTY	CONSEJERO	ITALIA
30	DANTE ALFONSO MENDEZ	CONSEJERO	NICARAGUA
31	JOSEFINA ALTAGRACIA TEJADA	CONSEJERA	NICARAGUA
32	JUAN ALBERTO MERCADO	CONSEJERO	MISION ONU-NY
33	ANGEL SILVIO CAMPUSANO VASQUEZ	CONSEJERO	NICARAGUA
34	LEONARDO ANTONIO REMIGIO PICHARDO	CONSEJERO	ARGENTINA

35	EYMI JIMENEZ HIROMITSU	CONSEJERA	ARGENTINA
36	WENDY GOICO	CONSEJERA	BELGICA
37	FRANCISCO J. ALVAREZ BRACHE	CONSEJERO	CANADA
38	JOVANNY ALMONTE DE LOS SANTOS	CONSEJERO	CANADA
39	ALBERTO J .BOGAERT. MOREL	CONSEJERO	CANADA
40	CAROLINA ESTHER HERRERA ALVARADO	CONSEJERO	CANADA
41	MARCOS ANTONIO DE JESUS ROSA	CONSEJERO	COLOMBIA
42	ERICK AUGUSTO BERNARD MATEO	CONSEJERO	ECUADOR
43	JOSE DE JESUS ALVAREZ	CONSEJERO	ESPAÑA
44	LUCY CAROLINA SANCHEZ GUERRERO	CONSEJERA	ESPAÑA
45	NELSON FORTUNA	CONSEJERO	WASHINGTON
46	LEON ARMANDO PATIÑO CACERES	CONSEJERO	OEA
47	MARINO EMILIO CACERES B.	CONSEJERO	MARRUECOS
48	EDUARDO CINTRON	CONSEJERO	EMIRATOS ARABES UNIDOS, ABU DHABI
49	SILVIO DEMORIZI	CONSEJERO	GUATEMALA
50	GRETTER SOCIAS OGANDO	CONSEJERA	HAITI
51	JOHANNA MARITT HERNANDEZ SOLIS	CONSEJERA	HONDURAS
52	LEONORA ZACARIAS METZ	CONSEJERA	HONDURAS
53	MANUEL ALFARO RODRIGUEZ	CONSEJERO	INDIA

54	MARCIA ARELIS VASQUEZ SOLANO	PRIMERA SECRETARIA	ISRAEL
55	DANI MARIELA JIMENEZ GENAO	PRIMERA SECRETARIA	MISION OEA
56	DAMARIS MISOLINA CANELA CORPORAN	PRIMERA SECRETARIA	MISION OEA
57	MARITZA CALDERON MATEO	PRIMER SECRETARIO	MISION ONU-NY
58	TOMAS HERNANDEZ LATORRE	PRIMER SECRETARIO	CHILE
59	JOSE FRANCISCO GERONIMO METIVIE	PRIMER SECRETARIO	PARAGUAY
60	ROBERTO VARGAS CORDERO	PRIMER SECRETARIO	HAITI
61	ANNA BELLE KOSZEWSKI CALCAGNO	PRIMERA SECRETARIA	RUSIA
62	ALEXANDER PEREZ CARRASCO	PRIMER SECRETARIO	WASHINGTON
63	FRANCES FLORENTINO LARA	PRIMERA SECRETARIA	RUSIA
64	ANNY PAOLA ALMONTE QUEZADA	PRIMER SECRETARIO	CANADA
65	SILVIA GONZALEZ SIERRA	PRIMERA SECRETARIA	NICARAGUA
66	FREDDY ORLANDO ROA TERRERO	PRIMER SECRETARIO	LONDRES
67	GREGORIO MEGDIEL POLANCO PEÑA	PRIMER SECRETARIO	LONDRES
68	FIOR D ALIZA CABRERA ROMERO	PRIMERA SECRETARIA	NICARAGUA
69	EUGENIO ANTONIO PEREZ PEREZ	SEGUNDO SECRETARIO	ECUADOR
70	VALERIO BELLO ROSARIO	SEGUNDO SECRETARIO	TAIWAN
71	PASCUAL BAEZ DIAZ	SEGUNDO SECRETARIO	HONDURAS
72	FELIX PEÑA	TERCER SECRETARIO	HONDURAS

73	HECTOR JULIO FRIAS	TERCER SECRETARIO	WASHINGTON
74	SAMUEL NINA DOÑE	AGREGADO CULTURAL	CANADA

	DESIGNACIONES POR DECRETO CONSULADOS PRSC		
	NOMBRE	CARGO	PAIS
1	JOAQUIN BALAGUER,hijo	CONSUL GENERAL	NEW ORLEANS
2	ENRIQUE RICARDO PEYNADO	CONSUL GENERAL	HONDURAS
3	GUILLERMO J. ESTRELLA GABRIEL	CONSUL GENERAL	TORONTO
4	PRINCE ANTONIO NOGUERA GIL	VICECONSUL	ARUBA
5	DENISE BULOS BARCELO	VICECONSUL	BOSTON/WASGHINTON
6	MARCOS VINICIO PAREDES SALCEDO	VICE-CONSUL	CHICAGO
7	GERARDO RAFAEL DE JESUS MALKUM PARADA	VICECONSUL	HAMBURGO
8	CLAUDIO MANUEL MARRA PEREZ	VICECONSUL	JAMAICA
9	CARMEN ROCIO PELLERANO NADAL	VICECONSUL	MIAMI
10	FEDERICO AUGUSTO ANTUN HERNANDEZ	VICECONSUL	NEW ORLEANS
11	RAUL ALBERTO NEGRON MORALES	VICECONSUL	NEW ORLEANS
12	CLAUDIO ERNESTO EUSEBIO ALBURQUERQUE	VICECONSUL	NEW YORK
13	PAMELA MARRA M.	VICECONSUL	NEW YORK
14	PASCUAL RAMIREZ	VICECONSUL	NEW YORK

15	CARLOS ANDRES LORA JAVIER	VICE-CONSUL	NEW YORK
16	OSIRIS MANUEL FERNANDEZ SOLANO	VICECONSUL	PANAMA
17	TOMAS EMILIO NUÑEZ CASTILLO	VICE-CONSUL	PANAMA
18	EDUARDO MORALES GOMEZ	VICECONSUL	MIAMI
19	NELSON BALCACER	VICECONSUL	PUERTO RICO
20	JORGE NOEL LOPEZ	VICE-CONSUL	SAN MARTEEN
21	MILAGROS HILARIO LIZ	VICECONSUL	COLOMBIA
22	GLORIA ALEXANDRA CARPIO GONZALEZ	AUXILIAR	MONTREAL
23	LEONARDO GIL	AUXILIAR	NEW YORK
24	SIRIACO CABRERA RODRIGUEZ	AUXILIAR	MADRID
25	CRISTINA NEGRON MORALES	AUXILIAR	CALIFORNIA
26	MYRNA GRULLON	AUXILIAR	MAYAGUEZ
27	TESS BEMPORAT PAIEWONSKY	AUXILIAR	MONTREAL
28	JONNY ALEJANDRO PEREZ LOPEZ	AUXILIAR	ANTIGUA Y BARBUDAS
29	LOURDESJASEL ARAMA VERGES PEREZ	AUXILIAR	HAMBURGO
30	CESAR AUGUSTO SANTAMARIA REYES	AUXILIAR	PANAMA
31	ALEXIS PEREZ CARRASCO	AUXILIAR	ESPAÑA

Appendix G: Official and Complete List of the Best Paid in the Dominican Foreign Affairs, Payroll 2012-2013 (Acento.com.do, 2014).

		DESIGNACIONES POR DECRETOS	
		EMBAJADAS	
	NOMBRES	RANGOS/CARGOS	DOTACION R.
	ALEMANIA: BERLIN		
1	RAFAEL CALVENTI	EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENC.	25,600.00
	ARGENTINA:--BUENO AIRES		
2	GUILLERMO PIÑA CONTRERAS	EMBAJADOR EXT. PLENIPOTENCIARIO	17,594.50
	BRASIL:--BRASILIA		
3	HECTOR DIONISIO PEREZ	EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	25,000.00
	BRUSELAS, BELGICA:		
4	ALEJANDRO CESAR AUGUSTO GONZALEZ PONS	EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO SUST. A FEDERICO CUELLO	31,000.00
	CANADA:--CANADA		
5	JOSE DEL CARMEN UREÑA ALMONTE	EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	27,800.00
	CHILE:--SANTIAGO DE CHILE		
6	PABLO ARTURO MARIÑEZ ALVAREZ	EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	25,000.00
	COLOMBIA:--BOGOTA		
7	HECTOR GALVAN SUZAÑA	EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENC.	30,000.00
	COREA:--SEUL		

8	GRECIA PICHARDO	EMBAJADORA	33,737.00
	CUBA:--HABANA		
9	JOSE MANUEL CASTILLO	EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLEN. /SUST A DANIEL GUERRERO	26,200.00
	ECUADOR:--QUITO		
10	VICTOR REYNALDO LORA DIAZ	EMBAJADOR	18,700.00
	EL SALVADOR:--SAN SALVADOR		
11	VICTOR MANUEL SANCHEZ PEÑA	EMBAJADOR	12,405.00
	ESPAÑA:--MADRID		
12	CESAR A. MEDINA ABREU	EMBAJADOR EXT Y PLENIPOT	40,000.00
	ESTADOS UNIDOS DE NORTE AMERICA(WASHINGTON)		
13	ANIBAL DE CASTRO	EMBAJADOR EXTRAODINARIO Y PLEN.	24,844.54
	EGIPTO - CAIRO		
14	MARIA GABRIELLA BONETTI ROSSELLINI	EMBAJADORA EXTRAORDINARIA Y PLENIPOTENCIARIA	27,000.00
	FRANCIA:--PARIS		
15	LAURA FAXAS	EMBAJADORA EXTRAORDINARIA Y PLENIPOTENC.	32,000.00
	GUATEMALA:--GUATEMALA		
16	RENE BIENVENIDO SANTANA GONZALEZ	EMBAJDOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	18,420.00
	HAITI:--PUERTO PRINCIPE		
17	RUBEN ARTURO SILIE VALDEZ	EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	30,000.00
	HONDURAS:--HONDURA		

18	JOSE OSVALDO LEGER AQUINO	EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	16,000.00
	INDIA		
19	HANS DANNENBERG CASTELLANOS	EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPONTEN	34,500.00
	ISRAEL:--ISRAEL		
20	ALEXANDER DE LA ROSA	EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPONTEN	25,000.00
	ITALIA:--ROMA		
21	VINICIO TOBAL UREÑA	EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	30,000.00
	JAMAICA, Kington		
22	JOSE TOMAS ARES GERMAN	EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	22,000.00
	JAPON:-TOKYO		
23	PEDRO VERGES	EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	40,000.05
	LONDRES, INGLATERRA		
24	FEDERICO ALBERTO CUELLO CAMILO	EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	30,000.00
	MARRUECOS		
25	FRANCISCO A. CARABALLO	EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIP.	33,000.00
	MEXICO:--MEXICO		
26	FERNANDO PEREZ MEMEN	EMBAJADOR EXTRAOR. Y PLENIP.	11,895.30
	NICARAGUA: MANAGUA		
27	LUIS JOSE GONZALEZ SANCHEZ	EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPONTECIARIO	22,000.00
	PANAMA:--PANAMA		
28	OCTAVIO ALFREDO LEON LISTER HENRIQUEZ	EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	25,000.00
	PARAGUAY: PARAGUAY		
29	MARINO BERIGUETE	EMB. EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIP.	28,000.00

	PERU:--LIMA		
30	RAFAEL JULIAN CEDANO	EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPONT.	12,690.90
	PORTUGAL:--LISBOA		
31	JAIME DURAN HERNANDO	EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	18,000.00
	QATAR		
32	HUGO GUILIANI CURY	EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	38,000.00
	REINO DE LOS PAISES BAJOS (HOLANDA)		
33	LUIS ARIAS NUÑEZ	EMBAJADOR EXT. Y PLENIPONT.	30,000.00
	RUSIA		
34	JORGE LUIS PEREZ ALVARADO	EMBAJADOR EXTRA. Y PLENIP.	30,000.00
	SANTA SEDE: ITALIA--ROMA		
35	VICTOR GRIMALDI	EMBAJADOR EXTRA. Y PLENIP.	24,391.00
	SUECIA:--ESTOCOLMO		
36	MARINA ISABEL CACERES	EMBAJADORA EXTR Y PLENIPOTENCIARIA	26,500.00
	SUDAFRICA		
37	RAUL FERNANDO BARRIENTOS LARA	EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	30,000.00
	SUIZA:--SUIZA		
38	TERESITA MIGDALIA TORRES GARCIA	EMBAJADORA EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	25,000.00
	TAIWAN --CHINA		

39	RAFAELA ALBURQUERQUE DE GONZALEZ	EMBAJADORA EXT. Y PLEN.	33,000.00
	TRINIDAD & TOBAGO:		
40	JOSE SERRULLE RAMIA	EMBAJADOR EXTR. Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	22,000.00
	URUGUAY--MONTEVIDEO		
41	DANIEL GUERRERO TAVERAS	EMBAJADOR EXTRAORDINARIO Y PLENIPOTENCIARIO	21,447.60
	VENEZUELA--CARACA		
42	ADONIDA MEDINA RODRIGUEZ	EMBAJADORA EXT. Y PLEN.	30,000.00
		(SEDE: GINEBRA,SUIZA)	
	MISIONES PERMANENTES EN ORGANISMOS INTERNACIONALES		
43	ROSA MARGARITA HERNANDEZ CAAMAÑO	REPRESENTANTE PERMANENTE ANTE LA UNESCO	32,000.00
	MISION PERMANENTE ANTE LA ONU:	NEW YORK	
	ORGANISMO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS: (SEDE: GINEBRA, SUIZA)		
44	DR. HOMERO LUIS HERNANDEZ SANCHEZ	EMBAJADOR REPRESENTANTE P.	18,000.00
45	ANGIE SHAKIRA MARTINEZ TEJERA	EMBAJADORA ALTERNA	18,000.00
46	ELIO PACIFICO	EMBAJADOR ALTERNO	12,000.00
	ONU- ANTE LA ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL		

	DEL COMERCIO (OMC): (SEDE: GINEBRA, SUIZA)		
47	LUIS MANUEL PIANTINI MUNNIGH	EMBAJADOR REPRESENTANTE ANTE LA OMC	25,000.00
48	CLAUDIA HERNANDEZ BONA	EMBAJADORA ALTERNA ANTE LA ORG. MUNDIAL DEL COMERCIO (OMC)	13,900.00
49	EDWARD ANIBAL PEREZ REYES	EMBAJADOR ALTERNO ANTE LA OMC	10,000.00
	MISION PERMANENTE ANTE LA OEA:	WASHINGTON	
50	ROBERTO BERNARDO SALADIN SELIN	EMBAJADOR REPRESENTANT PERM.	25,800.00
51	JIOVANNY F. RAMIREZ MARTINEZ	EMBAJADOR ALTERNO	10,000.00
52	RUDDY GUILLERMO SANTANA SILVESTRE	EMBAJADOR ALTERNO	10,000.00
53	VICTOR TIRADO	EMBAJADOR ALTERNO	7,500.00
	MISION PERMANETE ANTE LA FAO	SEDE ROMA - ITALIA	
54	MARIO ARVELO CAAMAÑO	EMBAJADOR	26,580.00
	VIENA, AUSTRIA		
55	RAMON QUIÑONEZ	EMBAJADOR REPRESENTANTE PERMANENTE	26,580.00
56	MICHELLE COHEN	EMBAJADORA ALTERNA	13,900.00
57	ROXANNA ALTAGRACIA DE LOS SANTOS PIANTINI	EMBAJADORA ALTERNA	12,000.00
58	GILKA YVELISSE MELENDEZ FERNANDEZ	EMBAJADORA ALTERNA	13,000.00