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Shaping Climate Citizenship: The Ethics of Inclusion in Climate Change Communication and Policy

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by

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ABSTRACT

The problem of climate change is not simply scientific or technical, but also political and social. This dissertation analyzes both the role and the ethical foundations of citizenship and citizen engagement in the political and social aspects of climate change communication and policy-making. Using a critical discourse analysis of a policy recommendations drafted by the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact, I demonstrate how climate change policy documentation naturalizes a particular version of citizenship I call "climate citizenship." Based on environmental critiques of liberal and civic republican citizenship, I show how this "climate citizenship" would be more productive and ethical if based on theories of environmental citizenship rooted in an ecological feminist ethic of flourishing. This critique of current representations of citizenship in climate change policy offers a theoretically sound basis for future engaged work in rhetoric of science focused on policy-making.

CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

"The shape of the Anthropocene is a political, ethical and aesthetic question. It will answer questions about what life is worth, what people owe one another, and what in the world is awesome or beautiful enough to preserve or (re)create."

—Jedidiah Purdy, "Should We Be Suspicious of the Anthropocene?"

"...social and scientific revolutions have not always been liberatory, even if they have always been visionary."

—Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges" (p. 194)

Climate change is among our most pressing global problems. While predictions vary, scientists have argued that climate change will damage natural and human systems alike. Human systems are particularly vulnerable to "impacts from...climate-related extremes, such as heat waves, droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires" (IPCC "Summary," 2014, pp. 6-7). More locally, in southeast Florida, experts have projected such unsettling outcomes as a sea level rise of 9-24 inches by 2060 (SFRCCC "RCAP, 2012, p. 8). Of course, such specific projections are

constantly subject to revision as more data is gathered and models are refined. However much the specific predictions about climate change may shift, though, scientists continue to agree that it is happening, it is increasingly difficult to manage, and its impacts will disrupt the existing patterns of natural and human systems. Given this understanding of climate change, the scientific community—and, in burgeoning numbers, business, government, and military communities—agree that steps towards mitigation and adaptation must be taken. As anthropogenic climate change progresses, these needs become ever more urgent and extreme.

The problem of climate change is not simply a scientific or technical problem, however. Increasingly, experts from a variety of fields have investigated how the facts of climate change, the responses to it, and the discourses around it are entangled with political and social systems. Climate change scholarship has broken out of the field of climatology and entered arenas as diverse as economics (e.g., Mendelsohn & Neumann, 2004; Nordhaus, 1994; Stern, 2007), media studies (e.g., Gavin, 2009; Olausson & Berglez, 2014), women's studies (e.g., Alston, 2015; Salehi, Pazuki, Nejad, Mahmoudi, & Knierim, 2015), and political science and policy studies (e.g., Giddens, 2011; Lim, Spanger-Siegfried, Burton, Malone, & Huq, 2005; Rabe, 2004), among others.

The turn to such a variety of fields is a testament to the fact that policy decisions about climate change cannot be made from science alone. Certainly, the science matters. But, as Blue (2015) contends, "complications arise...when science moves from the position of *informing* public deliberation to *driving* and *delimiting* the options that are available for discussion" (p. 5). Such critiques of science as the primary, or even sole, arbiter of policy highlight the inadequacy of the technocratic policy model, which dominated mid-20th-century policy-making (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 239). As science and technology studies has shown us, scientific and technical

expertise does not provide infallibly good decisions, nor are those decisions guaranteed to succeed when imposed upon publics which played no part in the decision-making process. The challenge for policymakers is to adapt to this social and political reality, even as many of them still cling to faith in scientific and technical expertise as the source of all solutions.

Thus, much interdisciplinary climate change scholarship, while taking a variety of positions on technocratic expertise, focuses on the process of developing and implementing mitigation and adaptation policies. Two widely acknowledged impediments to adopting such policies—particularly in the United States—are 1) widespread public misunderstanding and skepticism about the existence of anthropogenic climate change, and 2) a lack of individual self-efficacy or a strong public will in favor of taking action (Gifford, 2011; Leiserowitz, Maibach, & Roser-Renouf, 2010; Reynolds, Bostrom, Read, & Morgan, 2010). (Of course, these two issues are not unrelated.) In response to these impediments, a relatively recent but large body of scholarship has focused on the role of communication in forwarding efforts to address climate change. A wide variety of scholarship falls under the heading of *climate change communication*, with scholars broadly interested in how individuals come to believe and act as they do in response to disparate sources of communication about climate change and related topics, such as extreme weather events, and how discourses around climate change shape public perceptions and policy-making processes. Given these broad foci, the "communication" in *climate change communication* primarily refers to communication to and with the public sphere (as opposed to the communication involved in the actual doing of climate science).

These discourses about climate change as well as the scholarship on this discourse share a common concern with what actions to take not only in response to climate change science but also in response to findings about the suasive effects of climate change communication on

citizens. The focus is on convincing people that climate change is real and motivating them to take action in response to this looming catastrophe. Exemplifying this focus, the headlines of a recent Yale Environment 360 interview reads, "How Can We *Make* People Care About Climate Change?" (Schiffman, 2015, emphasis added). I, too, am concerned about the urgent need to act on climate change. However, my concern for quick action is balanced against my concern for inclusive and ethical action. In service of exploring that difficult balancing act, this project analyzes both the role and the ethical foundations of citizenship and citizen engagement in policy-making.

I start with ethics rather than efficacy because I think the question of *what* we should do should precede the question of *how* we should do it. In other words, acting on climate change should not be a simple matter of rounding up the technical and scientific data, and then persuading the public to get on board. Rather, acting on climate change should start with the ethical question of what is good and for whom. Unsurprisingly, there are many answers to this question. Perhaps surprisingly, though, the underlying ethical premises involved in answering that question are rarely made explicit. Deciding what to do requires making ethical choices about what the future should look like, and who and what matters in the construction of that future. Unfortunately, the ethical frameworks driving such choices are often overlooked or implied, rather than made explicit. Thus, a primary goal of this dissertation will be to make implicit ethics explicit, enabling a critique of seemingly settled answers to the question of *what* we should do.

Given the enormity and the urgency of climate change, of course, the need to adopt environmentally beneficial actions is certainly important. In that context, it is understandable that climate change communication scholarship often jumps straight to the challenge of "how to get people to do environmentally beneficial things when their inclination is not to do them"

(Dobson, 2003, p. 1) glossing over the important ethical question of the good. However, much social scholarship about climate change, including communication scholarship, fails to account for the ethical dimensions of the ways policy makers create incentives, persuade, and coerce people to take environmentally beneficial actions. These ethical dimensions are entangled with issues of autonomy, community, and marginalization, as the effects of climate change are unequally distributed, and the responses to it invite certain voices into the conversation while leaving others out.

The intersections of ethics and environmental policy have previously been articulated in several fields, most prominently in environmental justice (see, for example, Agyeman, 2005; Agyeman & Bullard, 2003; Paterson, 2001) and ecofeminism (see, for example, Cuomo, 1998; Sandilands, 1999; Shiva, 2005). Moreover, often in pursuit of more just outcomes, many scholars have documented the unequally distributed effects of climate change, particularly on already marginalized populations, such as indigenous peoples (Cozzetto, et al., 2013; Lynn, et al., 2013; Maldonado, Koppel, Shearer, Bronen, Peterson, & Lazrus, 2013; Melillo, Richmond, & Yohe, 2014), women (Cannon, 2002; Nelson, Meadows, Cannon, Morton, & Martin, 2002), and the urban poor (Bartlett, 2008). Others have demonstrated that many of the most influential voices in the political debate are not these highly vulnerable populations, but those who stand to profit from inaction: oil companies and the politicians and scientists receiving donations or paychecks from them (Faber, 2008; Oreskes & Conway, 2011), conservative political parties making economic and philosophical appeals against regulation (Dunion & Scandrett, 2003), and the countries most responsible for the fossil fuel consumption that drives climate change (Rees & Westra, 2003).

Ethics thus enters the climate conversation in two ways: through the effects of climate change, and through our discursive and political responses to it. I am concerned with the latter. Who is authorized to talk about climate change and what they are authorized to talk about will have concrete material impacts on all people's lives. In the case of climate change policy, the conversation is largely about adaptation. Adaptation necessarily entails change, change that will have far-reaching effects on all citizens. Where people live, whether they have access to water, what mobility options are open to them, who prospers and who suffers as economic paradigms change: these are all open questions as cities, states, and countries attempt to grapple with climate change through policy. These are also ethical questions in that they require decisions about who and what matters. Those affected by climate change policy should be able to participate in the conversations about it, and include in it their concerns and their hopes for the good life—in short, their ethical commitments. Not only recognizing, but prioritizing, this simple fact is crucial to making democratic and just decisions about what to do about climate change.

"Climate Citizenship" and Ethical Critique

This dissertation examines how the discursive constructions in climate change policy naturalize invisible ethical choices about which effects matter and whose voices are included. To explore these ethical assumptions, I analyze the public documentation produced by the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact (SFRCCC), a governmental policy-making group overseeing mitigation and adaptation plans in four counties in southeastern Florida. I chose this site because of its reputation as a case of highly successful climate change communication that is widely taken as an "ideal" example for others to follow. The rhetorical analysis in this dissertation makes the currently naturalized ethical choices in this "ideal" case

visible for commentary and critique. More specifically, the rhetorical construction of citizenship in these documents contains an underlying ethical framework that privileges some ontologies of the citizen subject while marginalizing others. The focus on underlying ethical frameworks leads me to propose an alternative ethical framework in Chapter 4 that prioritizes inclusivity and the flourishing of all moral subjects, including citizens.

The rhetorical and ethical analysis in this dissertation develops the concept of "climate citizenship," which I introduce to identify the version of citizenship—its dimensions, rights and responsibilities—naturalized through the policy discourse. Like the "ideal reader" posited by reader response theory (Culler, 1975), climate citizenship is a rhetorical construct that authorizes the policy discourse and has a powerful if unacknowledged influence on the policy audience. This ideal climate citizenship is constructed through the rhetorical elements that delineate ways that citizens are imagined to be the participants in and beneficiaries of the SFRCCC policies. These elements include the adjectival and prepositional modifiers, common topoi and framing strategies, and rhetorical appeals that refer to or are applied to citizens or laypeople throughout the case documentation. In Chapter 2, I identify and interpret specific examples of these elements in order to show what kinds of citizenship the expert policy-makers actually had in mind—or did not have in mind—when creating these policies. Using critical discourse analysis, I connect the data and findings from my analysis of the SFRCCC documentation to a political theory framework that contrasts "thin," or relatively passive and unengaged, citizenship with a more active and community-oriented "thick" citizenship. I conclude with a rich description of the "climate citizenship" written into the SFRCCC documents: the rights citizens can expect, the responsibilities they have in return, and the level of participatory engagement extended (or not) to citizens.

Reconstructing the climate citizenship implied in these documents is a form of reverse engineering, determining what assumptions about citizenship underlie certain policies or the choice of certain turns of phrase. Following that reconstruction, in Chapter 3, I situate the SFRCCC's climate citizenship in relation to established theories of citizenship in political theory. This review of political theory forms the basis for my conclusion that climate citizenship can produce more productive citizen engagement by drawing from the tradition of environmental citizenship, rather than other citizenships, such as liberal and civic republican. Additionally, the adumbration of climate citizenship allows us to go a step further and make explicit the implicit ethical warrants underlying claims about what actions need to be taken. I take up this point in Chapter 4, where I advocate for adopting an ecofeminist ethic of flourishing (Cuomo, 1998) to guide our understanding of the shape and goals of environmental citizenship. While climate citizenship is not a stable concept with a single definition, the connections I draw among my single case study and the broader theoretical arguments about citizenship and ethics can support the use of climate citizenship as a heuristic tool guiding critiques of other climate change policies.

Thus, identifying the climate citizenship constructed in policy documents is not an end in itself. Rather, I see its purpose as enabling deliberate interventions into the role of citizenship in and the ethics of climate change discourse. I am certainly not the first to make a connection between climate change discourse and ethics. The argument about the need to intervene in the ethics of climate change communication and policy-making draws from existing conversations about ethics in climate justice, ecological citizenship, and feminist science studies. Each of these areas is firmly grounded in questions of inclusion. For example, theories of climate justice and ecological citizenship both stress the fact that already oppressed communities, such as the Global

South, are both more vulnerable to and less responsible for environmental degradation, even as Global South populations have little influence on Global North policies that might address such degradation (Dobson, 2003). Similarly concerned with inclusion, feminist science studies offers a long-standing critique of science's exclusion of women and naturalization of social systems of oppression (Gilligan, 1982; Harding, 1991; Schiebinger, 2004).

As a textual critique, this dissertation does not directly intervene in the policies it examines or the process by which they are formed. However, it does lay the groundwork for future direct intervention by establishing the value of rhetoric, a field whose close attention to language and context enables productive questioning of the norms naturalized through and glossed over by the seemingly neutral technical and scientific language that makes up much policy discourse in environmental arenas such as climate change. I tentatively lay out the possibilities for direct intervention in Chapter 5, based on a robust body of scholarship in technical communication and rhetorical risk communication which establishes the need for a richer understanding of public participation in policy-making processes.

Locating Climate Change Research in Applied Rhetoric of Science

In his 1997 introduction to *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science*, Randy Allen Harris defined rhetoric of science as "the analysis of scientific discourse by scholars whose primary allegiances are to the guiding notions of rhetorical theory, and who place their work in the tradition of others with those allegiances, some of whom invented those allegiances (p. xxvii-xxviii). By "scientific discourse," Harris exclusively meant the discourse of scientists talking to other scientists. Any talk about science outside of this bubble of expertise wasn't rhetoric of science. Almost two decades later, however, definitions of the field have expanded dramatically.

Leah Ceccarelli, writing in the encyclopedia of *Ethics, Science, Technology, and Engineering*, defines rhetoric of science as "the study of how people design arguments to advance claims about matters that involve science and technology" (2014, p. 621). Several important shifts happen between these definitions, but crucial for this project is the opening of the field to how "people"—not just scientists—argue about science and technology. Rhetoric of science has developed beyond its exclusive interest in internal scientific discourse, now embracing science communication with and by publics, as well as science communication with and by policy-makers. The 2015 Rhetoric Society of America seminar on rhetoric of science reflected this increased breadth, with participants working on analyses ranging from 19th-century science to popular television to public comments submitted online in response to governmental programs. Rhetoric of science has become a fitting disciplinary base for climate change communication scholarship, which—as noted above—typically investigates communication to, with, and by publics and policymakers.

Recently, a number of scholars have called for an engaged, trans-disciplinary, applied rhetoric of science (Ceccarelli, 2013; Condit, 2013; Condit, Lynch, & Winderman, 2012; Gottschalk Druschke, 2014; Herndl & Cutlip, 2013). In their articulation of a "praxiographical program for the rhetoric of technology, science, and medicine," Herndl and Cutlip argue forcefully that "RTSM will thrive if it builds interdisciplinary alliances, engages with our colleagues in science to help manage uncertainty and the threat of ecocide, and develops specific strategies and tools to put into practice our disciplinary intentions to make a difference" (2013). Borrowing their terminology, I call this new direction for the field "applied rhetoric of science." Climate change communication, a rapidly evolving practice with a cornucopia of stakeholders and incredibly high stakes, fits perfectly into the interdisciplinary research agenda intent on

making a difference suggested by these scholars. The idea of application and engagement has previous champions in rhetoric and technical communication, with scholars arguing that the field has a responsibility to engage with citizens and citizenship. In the foreword to Ackerman and Coogan's (2010) *The Public Work of Rhetoric: Citizen-Scholars and Civic Engagement*, Hauser (2010) claimed that "rhetoric's public work is the constitution of public life as we know it in a democracy" (p. ix). Focusing specifically on risk communication, Grabill and Simmons (1998) argued that both ethical and practical issues can be addressed by rhetoric and technical communication's thoughtful engagement with citizen participants. The calls for applied rhetoric of science mirror these calls in other areas of rhetorical scholarship.

Moreover, this is a kairotic moment for the discipline. Increasingly, scientists recognize the need for improved communication in order to foment public will and drive policy change. The summary of a 2011 article co-authored in *Physics Today* by a professional climate communicator and a Coordinating Lead Author for the 2007 IPCC report reads simply, "It is urgent that climate scientists improve the ways they convey their findings to a poorly informed and often indifferent public" (Somerville & Hassol, p. 48). In 2013, *Science* magazine reported that scientists attending a conference on climate change communication "generally agreed that climate scientists have a special responsibility to communicate—and convince the public and policymakers about—their work's deep implications" (Kintisch). The article goes on to explain that professional societies and conferences are scrambling to provide training for scientists underprepared to become public science communicators. This plea for more improved (and even simply *more*) climate change communication has become a mainstay of scientists' conversations about climate change, gelling into a topos in a variety of scientific forums. The conjunction of this articulated need with calls from rhetoricians for an applied rhetoric of science presents a

noteworthy opportunity to build "interdisciplinary alliances" (Herndl & Cultip, 2013). This dissertation is a step towards doing so, although it ironically is not itself applied; it is a textual study, unengaged with the stakeholders it studies. However, my intention is to articulate a place for rhetoric of science in climate change communication, and ultimately to use this work as a basis for informed engagement and alliance-building.

Understanding where rhetoric has participated in this interdisciplinary scholarship and articulating how it might do so in the future is a complex task. Climate change communication is a well-established and growing field, notable for its high level of multi- and interdisciplinarity. Research comes out of a wide variety of traditional scholarly fields, including media studies, communication, psychology, education, sociology, and anthropology. Climate change communication's relevance and significance is demonstrated by the recent establishment of academic organizations such as the Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, established in 2005, and the George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication, established in 2007. Professional organizations also promote the field; the International Environmental Communication Association, established in 2011, frequently publishes articles on climate change communication in its flagship journal, *Environmental Communication*. Other journals disseminating climate change communication research include *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, *Park Science* which released its first issue in 2010, and *Global Environmental Change*, published since 1990. Both of these journals regularly publish a multidisciplinary mix of scholarship ranging across the natural sciences, the social sciences, and humanities. Climate change communication literature also appears in outlets disciplinarily rooted in science (e.g., *Nature*, *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*) and communication (e.g., *Science Communication*, *Mass Communication and Society*). *Risk*

Analysis, *Environmental Communication*, *Climatic Change*, and *Science Communication* have all published special issues devoted to climate change communication. *Mass Communication & Society* put out a 2015 CFP for a special issue. Climate change communication scholarship exists as a recognizable, stand-alone academic space.

There is an incredible amount of work devoted to climate change communication, spread across the publications listed above, as well as other journals, conference proceedings, books, workshops, university courses, and even MOOCs. Defining the disciplinary homes of climate change communication would require an entire independent analysis, and is beyond the scope of the current project. Instead, my goals in locating climate change communication in the rhetorical scholarship are to determine 1) where rhetoric has extradisciplinarily entered the climate change communication conversation, and 2) what the disciplinary sites are from which an applied rhetoric of science, and a rhetoric of climate change specifically, has emerged and will emerge.

As to the first goal, the "communication" of climate change communication frequently does not draw from rhetoric. The two most prominent publishers of climate change communication scholarship, *Environmental Communication* and *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, demonstrate this. *Environmental Communication*, a quarterly journal published since 2007, has an impact factor of 0.817, which is relatively high for a communication-focused journal. *WIRes: Climate Change* has a higher impact factor, 3.415, and has been published quarterly since 2010. The higher impact factor likely results from the journal's interdisciplinarity and the fact that it exclusively publishes review essays, which are often more frequently cited than primary research articles.

To get a rough sense of who is publishing in these journals, I searched both journals using the keywords "climate change" and "rhetoric*" in conjunction. As is shown in Table 1,

while 179 of *Environmental Communication*'s article contain the phrase "climate change," only 97 of those articles contain the word "rhetoric." As an approximation of how many of those had a substantive commitment to the discipline of rhetoric, rather than it appearing simply as a throwaway term in the article, I identified those articles that used the word rhetoric in either the title, abstract, or list of keywords. This admittedly rough approach, and particularly the inclusion of the abstract in the search corpus, attempts to gauge the extent of the middle ground between those declaring their interest in rhetoric in the title and those that mention rhetoric only once or twice in the body text. This search yielded 28 articles. A little under a third of the articles on climate change in *Environmental Communication* use rhetoric as a primary analytic framework, and the majority of those articles are authored by communication scholars, who, of course, share with English a rhetorical tradition, but one with a markedly different canon and methodological approaches.

Table 1. Rough content and author affiliation analysis for two primary climate change communication publications. Search conducted 4/11/2016.

Journal	"climate change"	"climate change" & "rhetoric*"	"rhetoric*" in title, abstract, keywords
Environmental Communication	179	97	28
WIREs: CC	350	46	1

I have also summarized the results for *WIREs: Climate Change* in Table 1. This journal, unsurprisingly, has a higher number of articles mentioning climate change (350 in total); it's safe to assume every article published in the journal has climate change as a primary topic. Adding the keyword "rhetoric*" drops the search results precipitously to 46. Only one of these results has "rhetoric" in the title, and its author is in fact disciplinarily located in English rhetoric

(Walsh, 2015). Although there is a wide-ranging scholarly conversation about climate change communication in these spaces, it remains relatively untapped by rhetoric of science scholars.

A few rhetoric scholars, as well as scholars in technical communication have turned their attention to climate change communication. The recent publication of *The Troubled Rhetoric and Communication of Climate Change* (Eubanks, 2015) marks the most sustained entry yet into a rhetorical engagement with climate change communication. This literature is sparser in major journals, such as *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, *Technical Communication Quarterly*, and the *Journal of Business and Technical Communication* than that which takes environmentalism more generally as its topic. While it is possible that rhetoricians and technical communicators are publishing in extra-disciplinary fields, the dearth of in-field scholarship on the rhetoric of climate change reveals a gap which rhetoric of science and technical communication scholars are poised to fill.

To approximate how much close attention has been paid to climate change in rhetoric and technical communication, I conducted a keyword search of nine major journals, using the phrase "climate change." The results are presented below in Table 2. As with the journal review above, I distinguished between articles where "climate change" appeared in the full-text and where "climate change" appeared in the title, abstract, or keywords. The numbers are starkly different, suggesting that climate change is not a primary concern for many of the articles that do mention it but do not include it in their titles. An informal review of the keyword's uses in these articles shows climate change being deployed as an example of or analogy to the topic at hand, whether that's big data (Graham, Kim, DeVasto, & Keith, 2015), Habermas and public scientific controversies (Crick & Gabriel, 2010), or 19th-century epideictic speech about science

(Cutrufello, 2015). Climate change is clearly on rhetorical scholars' radars, but numerous opportunities for further investigation are available.

Table 2. Results of search for keyword "climate change" in 9 major rhetoric and technical communication journals. Search conducted 4/11/2016.

Journal	**"climate change"**	**"climate change" in title, abstract, or keywords**
Journal of Business and Technical Communication	8	0[1]
Journal of Technical Writing and Communication	6[2]	3
Philosophy & Rhetoric	16	1
Rhetoric & Public Affairs	9	3
Rhetoric Review	12	2[3]
Rhetoric Society Quarterly	6	0
Technical Communication Quarterly	17	2

The articles from these journals with "climate change" in the title, abstract, or keywords analyze a variety of climate change objects: the film, *An Inconvenient Truth*, and a theatrical multimedia presentation, the *Climate Change Show* (Spoel, Goforth, Cheu, & Pearson, 2009); interactive sea-level rise visualization technology (Stephens, DeLorme, & Hagen, 2015); the IPCC's climate change reports (Tutt, 2009; Walsh, 2010); public communication of climate science (Rademaekers, 2014); and the multidisciplinary work in climate change communication across science, risk, and technical communication journals (Cagle & Tillery, 2015). We see here

[1] One article title concerns sea-level rise, which is a concept closely linked to global climate change, so climate change is more central to this article than most others in which it is simply an example or analogy.
[2] Not all articles are available for full-text search through the SAGE journal interface; it is possible some articles that contain the keyword "climate change" in the body text were not captured in this search. Articles with the keyword "climate change" in the title were captured, however, as article titles are indexed in searchable PDFs.
[3] One article title contains the name of Al Gore's film about climate change, *An Inconvenient Truth*, suggesting climate change is more topical than illustrative in this piece.

that rhetoricians have made valuable contributions to the climate change communication literature across multiple fronts, but these contributions remain relatively scarce.

Having demonstrated the relative paucity of climate change communication in the rhetorical scholarship, I turn to my second goal in locating climate change communication in the rhetorical scholarship: tracing the disciplinary sites from which the nascent work in rhetoric of climate change has emerged. Although fewer rhetoric scholars have trained their attention on climate change communication specifically, there is a long-standing interest in environmental rhetoric, prompted by the publication in the 1990s of two influential books: Killingsworth and Palmer's (1992) *Ecospeak: Rhetoric and Environmental Politics in America* and Herndl and Brown's (1996) *Green Culture: Environmental Rhetoric in Contemporary America*. The former book argued that environmental rhetoric had reached an impasse because of its limited conceptions of nature and human relationships with nature. Through rhetorical analysis of a variety of texts, including nature writing and technical and policy documents, Killingsworth and Palmer carefully mapped the tensions that characterized environmental discourse at the time. Herndl and Brown's edited collection took a similarly broad view of the range of texts that inform environmental discourse, and included essays on landmark environmentalist texts, as well as case studies drawing from public, policy, and technical communications, and investigations of the historical and cultural influences on environmental debate, including activism and art.

At the time, this scholarship marked the first ventures into a new field: environmental rhetoric. The environment, however, had long been of central concern to many other fields. As Herndl and Brown wrote:

> "Discussions of environmental matters now not only occupy entire fields of study, but cross disciplinary boundaries and include the distinctly American genre of nature writing,

> several sciences, politics, economics, ethics, law, and spirituality. Despite this widespread concern, however, scholars have produced very few concentrated analyses of the rhetoric of these debates." (Herndl & Brown, 1996, p. 18).

Since then, interest in environmental rhetoric has spread, and the "widespread concern" identified by Herndl and Brown in 1996 has continued apace. In numerous disciplines, an interest in the natural world has led to the formation of highly active subfields institutionalized through organizations and publications. In political theory, the Western Political Science Association Conference Group on Environmental Political Theory brings together scholars tackling the thorny issues raised by the intersections of environment, policy, and politics. The thoroughly multi-disciplinary International Environmental Communication Association hosts the biennial Conference on Communication and the Environment and is run by an environmental studies scholar, Mark Meisner, whose research focuses on communication. MIT's book series in environmental philosophy publishes scholars from multiple fields who coalesce around philosophy as a primary orientation to environmental topics. Academia has clearly embraced the environment as a matter of concern.

As the multi-disciplinarity of the subfields cited above shows, one of the challenges of doing environmental work in the academy is that it does not always hew neatly to disciplinary, or even subdisciplinary, boundaries. This is equally true for rhetoric and composition scholars, whose work often addresses environmental issues without necessarily adopting the mantel of "environmental rhetoric" or climate change communication specifically. An example of this is the ecocomposition movement, a theory of literacy and writing pedagogy that draws from ecological concepts in support of a place-based understanding of writing. The use of ecological metaphors for writing dates to early work in composition by Richard Coe (1975) and Marilyn

Cooper (1986), and ecocomposition has been further established in the 2000s by Sid Dobrin and Christian Weisser's (2002) *Natural Discourse* and Dobrin's (2012) edited collection *Ecology, Writing Theory, and New Media: Writing Ecology.* In these works, ecology provides guiding concepts for better understanding the contexts and processes of writing. This strain of scholarship has been critiqued for its reliance on ecological metaphors over ecological materiality (Killingsworth, 2010), but it nonetheless represents a predominant way in which many rhetoricians, particularly those focused on composition and pedagogy, encounter the environment in writing studies.

Since the 1990s, we have also seen scholars follow more closely in the footsteps of Killingsworth and Palmer (1992) and Herndl and Brown (1996), in whose work the environment is the central focus, while rhetoric functions as a lens or methodology for understanding it. As Herndl and Brown (1996) wrote, "familiarity with rhetoric and its analytic methods can help us understand the nature of our environmental debates and their outcomes" (1996, pp. 4-5). This centering of the environment is apparent in rhetorical scholarship that continues the tradition of close-reading influential environmental texts, such as the film *An Inconvenient Truth* (Johnson, 2009), Rachel Carson's environmental blockbuster, *Silent Spring* (Walker & Walsh, 2011), and articles from the widely-read national newspaper, the *New York Times* (Verhoeven, 2010). Recently, some scholars have also turned to the rhetoric of sustainability as a key concept within environmental rhetoric (Herndl, 2014; Mathieson, Stillman-Webb, & Bell, 2014). These works can be mapped onto the model of environmental rhetoric offered by Herndl and Brown, which distinguishes between poetic, regulatory, and scientific discourse about the environment (1996, pp. 10-12). Of course, as the authors point out, "these discourses are not pure" (1996, p. 12), but

the categories nonetheless help us identify broadly what discourses have proven of interest to rhetorical scholars.

A second root of current climate change communication in rhetoric is the scholarship on environmental discourse and risk in technical communication. Scholars have investigated how environmental concerns shape new areas and genres of technical communication, such as multimodal environmental writing (Whithaus, 2012), conservation writing (Johnson-Sheehan & Morgan, 2008), environmental impact statements (Dayton, 2002), and policy reports (Rude, 1997). Many others have continued the work of Miller and Katz (1996), whose analysis of a waste siting controversy in North Carolina led them to propose a "rhetorical model of risk communication" that embraces "productive ambiguity" (1996, p. 134) by pushing technical and institutional authorities to cede control of the mechanisms, content, and even purposes of dialogue in favor of more equitable and respectful dialogic engagement with publics affected by environmental issues. This argument belongs to a broad trend in technical communication of pushing back against uncritical obeisance to technoscientific expertise in order to further the democratic ideals of an engaged citizenry and responsive (and responsible) institutions.

To this same trend belong Grabill and Simmons' (1998) "Toward a critical rhetoric of risk communication: Producing citizens and the role of technical communicators" and Blythe, Grabill, and Riley's (2008) "Action research and wicked environmental problems: Exploring appropriate roles for researchers in professional communication." Both of these articles embrace participatory democratic ideals and offer similar answers to the question of how technical and professional communication scholars can support those ideals. Again, this support in part takes the form of rejecting top-down, expert-driven hierarchical models of decision-making; their goal is not to educate the citizenry in order to align their views with those of technical experts, but to

engage the citizenry in order to transform the decision-making and knowledge-producing processes entirely.

The ethos of technical communication as a field is intertwined with this commitment to democratic citizen engagement. Numerous works examine specific cases highlighting the tensions between technical experts, institutional authorities, and local citizens, often (though not always) with a skeptical stance towards the experts and authorities and a sympathetic view of the citizens. These cases include the Deepwater Horizon disaster (Frost, 2013), nuclear waste sites in the southwest (Tillery, 2003), the Aspen-EPA Superfund controversy (Stratman, Boykin, Holmes, Laufer, & Breen, 1995), and California's attempted use of pesticide against the light brown apple moth (Lindeman, 2013). These cases share a crucial feature: controversy. In much of the environmental scholarship in technical communication, then, tension between different environmental discourses is both already apparent and typically the primary object of study.

Tensions between technical and other discourses are not a new, or even newly noticed, phenomenon. In 1976, almost 40 years ago, speech communication scholar Phillip C. Wander used the increasing prevalence and authority of technical discourse as one reason driving his vision for a rhetoric of science. Wander observed that "symptomatic of the rise of the expert and the decline of the citizen in our society is the number of decisions which are made by committees of specialists" (p. 228). He linked this observation to the increasing exclusion of citizens from public policy deliberations, even on issues with major social causes and implications. The work of environmental technical communication has largely been in response to and resisting this exclusion.

Building on this prior work in rhetoric and technical communication, my work in this dissertation contributes to the scholarly effort to establish an applied rhetoric of science, with a

particular focus on climate change, which is currently under-theorized in rhetorical studies. The Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact (SFRCCC), the web of organizations, documents, and material realities at the heart of this study, functions perfectly as an example of decision-making by "committees of specialists," as it establishes both matters of fact and matters of concern in closed workshops led and attended mostly by governmental officials and academic experts. Certainly, the SFRCCC does acknowledge the value of public participation, noting that "the Compact Staff Steering Committee aggressively sought public input and feedback from December [2011] through March 2012" (SFRCCC, "A Region Responds," 2012). However, as rhetoricians' critiques of thin versions of public 'participation' have demonstrated, this particular form of engagement typically means public outreach, not participation. The decision-making process remains controlled by those pre-determined to have the appropriate expertise, and is free of the "productive ambiguity" endorsed by Miller and Katz (1996). In my work, I adopt rhetoric and technical communication's long-standing commitment to democratic ideals, as well as rhetoric of science's skepticism of the infallibility and reification of technoscientific expertise. In doing so, I align myself with a rhetorical tradition in which democracy, dialogue, and laypeople's determinations of their own best interests are valued as much as mandated timelines, bureaucratic procedure, and technical and scientific knowledge.

Thus, while there is a relatively sparse attention to climate change within environmental rhetorical studies, the field does offer my project a robust scholarly tradition and theoretical infrastructure supporting work that examines the ways the scientific and technical knowledge is engaged in public and policy deliberations. This tradition forces us to confront questions about expertise, the production of knowledge, political processes, and the nature of citizenship when science enters the political or policy area. To this list of questions, I explicitly add an

examination of ethics, rooting both the questions and their answers in specific ethical frameworks.

As I observed earlier, climate change communication often focuses on expediency, seeming to prefer pushing or manipulating citizens into already determined actions rather than including them in the decision-making processes about those actions. This focus presents an ethical problem, as these decisions are already somehow ethical, as is the choice to include or exclude people from them. My goal is to unpack the naturalized version of citizenship and the related ethics underlying the predetermined decisions informing climate change communication and research about it. The proposed concept of "climate citizenship" acts as the bridge between this critique and proposals for how to make the critique more broadly as well as how to act on it. Rhetorical analysis provides a model for such critique in existing environmental work that questions received values that do not uphold democratic ideals and respect for lay expertise.

Research Questions

This dissertation focuses on three primary research questions, which build on each other:

1. What version of citizenship is rhetorically constructed in this case?
2. What citizenship tradition(s) can produce the most constructive version of climate citizenship?
3. What ethical framework will yield the most inclusive and beneficial outcomes in the context of climate citizenship?

These research questions are addressed by a critical discourse analysis of policy documents produced by the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact, a widely lauded example of local attempts at climate change mitigation and adaptation.

The Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact

In 2009, four counties in Southeast Florida—Broward, Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Palm Beach—held a Regional Climate Leadership Summit. Following the Summit, in January 2010, governmental leaders from the four counties signed the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact (SFRCCC), committing to cooperative and coordinated regional efforts at climate change mitigation and adaptation. In the years since, the SFRCCC has undertaken a number of successful efforts at policy-making and advocacy.

As with any governmental organization, the SFRCCC has generated a large number of documents associated with their planning processes and policy implementation. On their public website, the SFRCCC makes many of these documents available, and sorts each document into one of six categories:

- Regional Compact as Ratified by the Counties
- Southeast Florida Regional Climate Action Plan (RCAP)
- RCAP Implementation Support Guidance Series
- Mayors' Climate Action Pledge
- Supporting Documents
- Workshop Documents

Altogether, there are 41 separate documents, with 23 PDFs and 18 slide decks. The Compact's most influential document is the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Action Plan (RCAP). It was published in 2012 and was formally committed to by all four counties by 2014. The RCAP gives 110 technical and policy recommendations targeted at a variety of mitigation and adaptation efforts, including reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The SFRCCC does not actually set

policy, so implementing these recommendations is up to the individual agencies and bureaucracies at the municipal and county levels. Local organizations decide when and how to implement the recommendations, depending on their specific resources, constraints, and existing processes for policy-making. The majority of the other documents produced by the SFRCCC provide guidance for or report on this implementation. What the RCAP provides is common ground and goals for these local organizations. Because of its centrality to the Compact's work, the RCAP is my analytic focus. Additionally the RCAP is suited to answering questions about citizenship because it is explicitly invested not only in technical policies, but also in public outreach and influencing the public's behavior.

This site is of particular interest because of its status as a widely acknowledged case of "successful" climate change communication and policy-making. In a 2015 Earth Day speech in the Everglades, President Barack Obama praised the SFRCCC as "a model not just for the country, but for the world" (Office of the Press Secretary, 2015). A 2013 post on the World Resources Institute blog describes the compact as "a powerful example of adaptation and building community resiliency" (Richardson, n.d.). In a show of endorsement, the Environmental Protection Agency points to the SFRCCC as an example of adaptation in the southeast (Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.). A variety of other organizations and news outlets, both local and national, have promoted the compact as an exemplary initiative. Given the widespread agreement about its success, the SFRCCC is perfectly situated to inform an investigation focused on the ways in which successful climate change communication generates a specific notion of ideal climate citizenship.

Overview of Chapters

This dissertation is a theoretical intervention into climate change communication and policy documentation. Each of the dissertation's chapters advances a stage in my argument, with the ultimate goal of examining how rhetoric can be an active force in pursuing more ethical policy-making in response to climate change. As climate citizenship is at the center of the argument, Chapter 2 presents a description of the methodology and the resulting analysis of the SFRCCC documents, then demonstrates how the findings help us construct a coherent picture of "climate citizenship." Chapter 3 locates this analysis in established citizenship theories developed by political theorists, and advocates for adopting a framework of environmental citizenship to generate a more productive version of climate citizenship for use in policy-making. Chapter 4 explores the ethical implications of climate citizenship and offers an ethical framework for policy-making based in ecofeminist ethics of flourishing. Chapter 5 concludes the overall argument, with a loose sketch of future research that applies the theory developed throughout this project. The following paragraphs describe these chapters in more detail.

Chapter 2 uses critical discourse analysis (CDA) to analyze the written discourse associated with the SFRCCC. Rhetorical scholars Huckin, Andrus, and Clary-Lemon (2012) define CDA as "an interdisciplinary approach to textual study that aims to explicate abuses of power promoted by those texts, by analyzing linguistic/semiotic details in light of the larger social and political contexts in which those texts circulate" (p. 107). CDA allows me to contextualize and read the SFRCCC RCAP in order to explain how climate citizenship is rhetorically constructed in this case. Using two contrasting versions of citizenship—thin and thick citizenship—the analysis shows how various moments in the text reveal underlying

assumptions about citizenship that firmly locate climate citizenship in a thin version of citizenship, which I link to traditions of liberal citizenship in political theory.

By reading in and through the documentation produced by the SFRCCC, I make explicit the formerly silent assumptions about what constitutes the good future as well as who should share in determining it and how. These assumptions are enthymematically implied by the unspoken warrants underlying the documents' appeals and arguments; by analyzing the appeals and arguments focused on citizens and their experiences, I unpack the enthymemes to reveal the warrants hiding below. This delineation of climate citizenship answers research question 1, which calls for a theory of the kind(s) of citizenship constructed and called forth by climate change communication that is deemed successful.

The second research question— what citizenship tradition(s) can produce the most constructive version of climate citizenship—is addressed in Chapters 3 and 4 by putting the analysis from Chapter 2 into conversation with political and citizenship theory and ecofeminist ethics, respectively. Chapter 3 traces existing connections between debates in political theory about the role of citizenship in environmental movements and concludes with a discussion of the promise of environmental citizenship in light of my findings about climate citizenship. Specifically, the argument demonstrates how the overwhelming liberalism of the SFRCCC's climate citizenship forecloses certain avenues for citizens to engage around environmental issues and policy-making. In contrast, the underlying philosophy of environmental citizenship opens up room for more active, interdependent citizenship.

In Chapter 4, I investigate the ethical bases for environmental citizenship, which have traditionally been rooted in feminist ethics of care. I advocate instead an ecofeminist ethics of flourishing as an alternative to both the ethical framework inherent to the climate citizenship

uncovered in Chapter 2 and to the ethical framework informing most theories of environmental citizenship. Through this analysis, I answer research question 3, "What ethical framework will yield the most inclusive and beneficial outcomes in the context of climate citizenship?" The goals of this chapter are twofold: first, to establish what types of citizenship and ethics are enabled and precluded by the affordances of climate citizenship in the SFRCCC; and second, to suggest that adopting and making explicit an ecofeminist ethic of flourishing will provide a more ethical and inclusive approach to policy-making.

To conclude in Chapter 5, I review the ethical and theoretical work of this dissertation and suggest its potential for extension in future empirical studies of policy-making and its involvement of citizens. While this project consists of textual analysis and theoretical intervention, critical discourse analysis' explicit concern for the larger social and political contexts surrounding discourse opens space for an ethical textual critique which is attentive to power structures and dynamics. This advantage, combined with the theories of citizenship and revised models of expertise that suggest a reliance on expediency and scientific authority is actually ineffective (Brown, 2009; Collins & Evans, 2002; Fischer, 2000), reveal the need to develop new ways of thinking about the purpose of climate change communication and the form it takes. The future work proposed in Chapter 5 will suggest actionable interventions based on the analysis enabled by the concept of climate citizenship. In drawing these connections and looking to the future, I provide this work's strongest response to recent calls for an engaged, trans-disciplinary, applied rhetoric of science (Ceccarelli, 2013; Condit, Lynch, & Winderman, 2012; Condit, 2013; Gottschalk Druschke, 2014; Herndl & Cutlip, 2013).

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CHAPTER 2: READING CLIMATE CITIZENSHIP FROM THE SOUTHEAST FLORIDA REGIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT'S "REGIONAL CLIMATE ACTION PLAN"

"...a key defining characteristic of citizenship, and what differentiates it most from mere subjecthood, is an ethic of participation. Citizenship is an active rather than passive status."

—Keith Faulks, "Citizenship" (p. 4)

The Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact

Southeast Florida contains some of the U.S.'s most iconic destinations: Miami Beach, the Everglades, Margaritaville, and the Florida Keys all loom large in the collective American imagination. The flora and fauna of the area are no less iconic. Alligators, palm trees, pythons, mangroves, flamingos, and thousands of other species and ecosystems form a lush environment in which it's easy for humans to feel like interlopers. As the effects of climate change become more pronounced, Floridians' relationships with their state's environment promise to become increasingly complex. For example, the over 3 million fishers (U.S. Department of the Interior et al., 2014, p. 7) who cast their lines in Florida waterways each year will see those ecosystems irrevocably change in response to salt water intrusion from sea level rise (SLR). Heat waves, changes to precipitation patterns, extreme storms—these and other results of climate change are

all also expected to affect Florida in the coming decades (Misra, Carlson, Craig, & Enfield, 2011).

Florida is in fact the state most vulnerable to climate change. Roughly five million Americans live fewer than four feet above high tide, and half of these people live in Florida. A 2012 census of the most vulnerable states, counties, and cities in the U.S. ranked five of Florida's counties in the top ten most vulnerable U.S. counties, and *seven* of Florida's cities also made it into the top ten list (Strauss, Tebaldi, Ziemlinski, 2012, p. 10). Low elevation alone puts much of the state at risk of health threats, property damage, and even loss of life due to SLR and storm surges. Among many others, possible risks include particle pollution affecting sensitive groups such as children, seniors, and those with pre-existing health conditions (Misra et al., 2011, p. 24), extreme weather events negatively affecting mental health (Florida Public Health Institute, 2014, p. 96), and wildfires causing damage to property and health alike (Misra et al., 2011, p. 24).

In January 2010, in response to these increasing threats from climate change, four counties in Southeast Florida—Broward, Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Palm Beach—entered into an agreement committing to cooperative and coordinated regional efforts at climate change mitigation and adaptation. This agreement, the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact (SFRCCC) followed a Regional Climate Leadership Summit held in 2009, at which government officials discussed concerns and possible responses to their counties' shared vulnerability. In the years since, the SFRCCC has undertaken a number of efforts at advocating and supporting policy-making focused on climate change mitigation and adaptation, which have been widely praised as successful by the press, academics, and politicians (Mooney, 2015). These efforts include lobbying at both the state and federal levels, conducting assessment

research in the region, and drafting white papers for local, regional, and national use in mitigating and adapting to climate change.

Importantly, the SFRCCC is not itself a policy-making body. Rather, it is "a voluntary and cooperative partnership among governing bodies," which include county and municipal governments, as well as associated agencies in Broward, Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Palm Beach counties (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. 1). As such, the SFRCCC does not dictate policy to its members, nor does it have any punitive powers should members not adopt or implement particular policies. Rather, the SFRCCC aims to "unite, organize, and assess" the areas under its purview in order to support existing organizations as they implement more locally targeted policies (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. vi).

As with any governmental organization, the SFRCCC has generated a large number of documents associated with its planning processes and policy implementation. On its public website, the SFRCCC makes many of these documents available, and sorts each document into one of six categories:

- Regional Compact as Ratified by the Counties
- Southeast Florida Regional Climate Action Plan
- Regional Climate Action Plan Implementation Support Guidance Series
- Mayors' Climate Action Pledge
- Supporting Documents
- Workshop Documents

The Southeast Florida Regional Climate Action Plan (RCAP), published in 2012 and formally committed to by all four counties by 2014 (SFRCCC, "Flyer," n.d., p. 1), is arguably the SFRCCC's most influential document to date. The majority of the other documents report on

assessment research supporting the RCAP or provide guidance and updates on its implementation. The RCAP provides 110 technical and policy recommendations targeted at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to existing and anticipated climate change-driven environmental changes. The implementation of these recommendations is up to individual agencies and bureaucracies at the municipal and county levels. Local organizations decide when and how to implement the recommendations, based on their specific resources, constraints, and existing processes for policy-making. The RCAP "provides a common integrated framework" which remains flexible enough to be effectively applied to differing economic, political, and policy contexts across the region ("RCAP," 2012, p. vi). In just a few years, the RCAP has seen significant evidence of successful implementation, with ten municipalities reporting in 2014 that they had implemented between 47 and 66 of the 110 RCAP recommendations (Moger, 2014, p. 7). Because of its centrality to the SFRCCC's work, I have chosen to focus on it in this chapter, using critical discourse analysis as a methodological lens. Because the RCAP is explicitly invested not only in technical policies, but also policies that engage in public outreach and influencing the public's behavior, this case is particularly suited to an examination of the connections (or lack thereof) between climate change policy and climate change communication.

In terms of lobbying, assessment research, and policy advocacy, the SFRCCC has been remarkably widely lauded, gaining widespread support in the region, as well as national recognition. A variety of other organizations and news outlets have promoted the compact as an exemplary initiative. In his Earth Day visit to the Florida Everglades, President Barack Obama called the Compact "a model not just for the country, but for the world" (Office of the Press Secretary, 2015). Its efforts have been positively profiled in the *Huffington Post* (Barksdale, 2015), the *Washington Post* (Mooney, 2015), the *Christian Science Monitor* (Struck, 2015), and

ThinkProgress (Valentine, 2014), among many others. The World Resources Institute blog called the Compact "a powerful example of adaptation and building community resiliency" (Richardson, 2013). In a show of endorsement, the Environmental Protection Agency points to it as an example of adaptation in the southeast (Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.).

By investigating such a successful policy example, I am taking a different approach than much of the rhetorical scholarship on environmental policy. Often, it is controversy, rather than consensus, which draws scholarly attention (see e.g., Frost, 2013; Lindeman, 2013; Richards, 2013; Stratman, Boykin, Holmes, Laufer, & Breen, 1995; Tillery, 2003). Controversy reveals underlying rhetorical conflict, even as it provides opportunities for positive intervention. Both are appealing to scholars who are interested in how discourse shapes policy and its material outcomes and who are invested in progressive, humanistic responses to technoscientific overreach. Such research does important work unpacking discursive constructions of environment, stakeholders, and scientific and social truths. Focusing solely on controversy would lead us to overlook important dimensions of policy, however; why a non-controversial policy-making effort may be considered successful can be just as instructive as why it is not. Moreover, successful policy—that which is acclaimed for its outcomes and enjoys relatively little to no backlash—is not itself immune to critique, whether affirmative or critical (or both). Such critique gives us insight into the various ideological assumptions that are naturalized through the policy, and may in fact help explain its success, even as they potentially give rise to ethical or other problems.

In explaining the success of the SFRCCC, law and psychology expert Dan Kahan (2015) praises it for gaining traction in a politically diverse climate, with both Republican and Democratic officials and citizens engaged in developing and implementing various Compact

initiatives. He notes particularly that the "process has been (will no doubt continue to be) lively and filled with debate, but at no point has it featured the polarizing cultural status competition that has marked (marred) national political engagement with climate science" (2015, p. 34). Kahan, who has worked with the Compact to assess their public communication, attributes this forward momentum to the Compact's coalescence around the question of what Floridians already know about living in a vulnerable climate, instead of focusing on the thorny (and typically partisan) wrangling about whether anthropogenic climate change is 'real.' Engaging Floridians in examining and applying what they already know involved a process of open meetings and forums, which Kahan contrasts to a passive "'messaging' campaign" (2015, p. 35). He reports that this process involved not just the official SFRCCC participants—the government, agency, and academic experts actually conducting scientific assessments and drafting Compact documents—but also "business, residential, and other groups in civil society" (2015, p. 35). The success, according to Kahan, is thus a result of engaging stakeholders beyond subject matter experts in the deliberation around regional climate change mitigation and adaptation.

These broadly attended open meetings and forums seem to function as "institutional space" where "users/citizens" (Grabill & Simmons, 1998, p. 437) are reported to be active participants in policy formation rather than passive recipients of pre-made policy. Such institutional space is not always available, and any attempt to provide it speaks to the Compact's desire to make their work inclusive and effective. An apparently inclusive process does not necessarily lead to inclusive policy, however. Questions remain about who exactly was recruited to participate in the SFRCCC process, how they were recruited, and what effects their participation actually had on the policy. A textual study like this one cannot answer these questions. What it can do, however, is compare the participatory inclusivity of the policy

documents themselves to the reported participatory inclusivity of the policy-making process. To make this comparison, I have chosen to analyze the SFRCCC RCAP through a framework based on two disparate versions of citizenship, rooted in the liberal and civic republican traditions, which provides a socially recognizable and powerful framework for understanding relationships between citizens and state institutions, such as the SFRCCC. The analysis demonstrates that, while the SFRCCC has been much praised for its inclusive process, the recommendations it makes in fact naturalize a disengaged and passive version of citizenship. In the next section I develop the political theory of citizenship which will allow me to argue that the RCAP does not live up to its promise, falling short of a robust understanding of citizenship.

One key consequence arises from the RCAP's inclusion of policy recommendations, rather than actual policy: it is difficult to determine the extent of the citizenship presumed in its discourse, and a full accounting of extent is beyond the scope of this project. Let me unpack what I mean by that. Critical discourse analysis provides a theoretical foundation for moving outside the text by attending to how discourse constitutes society and culture by virtue of being social action. In the case of policy, that discursive constitution is often directly apparent, as policy dictates material actions, as in the case of financial policy that sets interest rates or land-use policy that allows industrial development in some places but not others. These material outcomes of policy allow us to trace power, as the outcomes uphold certain ideologies or values while disregarding others: high interest rates may benefit the owners of capital rather than the laborers they employ, lax land-use policies may benefit industrial expansion rather than environmental activists, and so on. Using CDA to analyze the linkage between the discourse and the outcomes of policy lays bare the circulation of power and ideology.

However, the SFRCCC is not technically a policy-making organization. While they recommend policy, the actual implementation happens at a smaller municipal and county-wide level. In other words, the outcomes of the SFRCCC's documentation are mediated by local implementation. Thus, the SFRCCC's policy recommendations may be subject to multiple power dynamics and translated through a variety of ideological lenses. How the recommendations actually affect different citizens within the SFRCCC's four-county purview is a function of this process, and thus outside the scope of this project.

The following sections walk through the rhetorical analysis showing how the RCAP shapes climate citizenship. My analysis of the Regional Climate Action Plan draws out themes from both the language of the text and the appeals it makes to a variety of audiences. These themes construct a passive version of liberal democratic citizenship, in which citizens simply exchange "good" climate behavior for the outcomes pre-determined by the experts who developed the plan. I call this version of citizenship "climate citizenship" to indicate how it is specifically implicated in assumptions about how to solve global environmental problems and who is responsible for solving them.

Research Questions

This dissertation focuses on three primary research questions, which build on each other:

1. What version of citizenship is rhetorically constructed in this case?
2. What citizenship tradition(s) can produce the most constructive version of climate citizenship?
3. What ethical framework will yield the most inclusive and beneficial outcomes in the context of climate citizenship?

The first of these research questions is addressed here by a critical discourse analysis of policy documents produced by the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact.

Critical Discourse Analysis

To analyze the SFRCCC's Regional Climate Action Plan, I turn to critical discourse analysis (CDA), "an interdisciplinary approach to textual study that aims to explicate abuses of power promoted by those texts, by analyzing linguistic/semiotic details in light of the larger social and political contexts in which those texts circulate" (Huckin, Andrus, & Clary-Lemon, 2012, p. 107). Critical discourse analysis' explicit concern for the larger social and political contexts surrounding discourse opens space for an ethical textual critique which is attentive to power structures and dynamics. Moreover, this engagement with actual policy documentation responds to the critique that citizenship studies often deal mostly in abstraction, rather than examining up close "what social and political arrangements form the context in which it [citizenship] is practiced" (2000, p. 6). With its attentiveness to the circulation of power and ideology in discourse, CDA is perfectly situated to conduct such an examination.

My study provides a contextualized account of the naturalization of a very specific version of citizenship in climate change policy, allowing us to read the abstract theoretical work against what is happening on the ground in terms of citizenship. The analysis focuses on moments in the texts that reveal naturalized understandings of the four dimensions of citizenship, which I describe below: context, extent, content, and depth. I identify these moments through multiple close readings of the RCAP and the close analysis of thematic threads woven throughout it. Drawing together these threads and categorizing them into the citizenship schema I have borrowed from Faulks (2000) creates a robust picture of the version of citizenship

underlying the SFRCCC's policy recommendations. I call this localized version of citizenship "climate citizenship," in order to highlight how the abstract notion of citizenship is realized through the technical and social dimensions of climate change.

The delineation of climate citizenship answers research question 1, which calls for a theory of the kind(s) of citizenship constructed and called forth by this case of climate change policy-making and communication. Using CDA and rhetorical analysis gives us a way to sift through the discourse in order to discover how a model of climate citizenship is built and naturalized in the RCAP documents. Recent work highlights the tight conceptual connection between the field of rhetoric and the methodology of CDA. Huckin, Andrus, and Clary-Lemon (2012) note that "rhetoric and composition has always been concerned with the power of spoken and written discourse, in particular the ways in which language can be used to persuade audiences about important public issues" (p. 109), a concern echoed in CDA's attention to the interactions between the micro-level of language and the macro-level of social structures and institutions, interactions mediated by power and ideology. They cite a number of rhetorical studies that use CDA to investigate the wide-ranging topics of inequality, ethics, higher education, critical pedagogy, news media, and institutional practices. While the methodology remains less widespread in the discipline than more established humanistic and social science methods, it has gained a foothold by virtue of the clear relevance of its concerns to rhetorical research.

Because critical discourse analysis posits that "the discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions, and social structures, but it also shapes them," the methodology is especially appropriate to a textual analysis working towards an understanding of the complex interrelationships between communication, policy, policy-making processes, and underlying

ideological assumptions of and about the people involved in both (Fairclough, Mulderrig, & Wodak, 2011, p. 357). While I am ultimately interested in policy-making processes, the CDA presented below is a theoretical intervention into climate change communication and policy. Scholars in science and technology studies who are concerned with materialism and ontology have theorized the value of documentation in creating a shared reality and establishing facts. In *Laboratory Life* (1986), Latour and Woolgar's account of an anthropological ethnography in a medical research laboratory, the authors draw attention to the role texts play in the construction of scientific facts. Playing the role of uninformed observer, they describe "a strange tribe who spend the greatest part of their day coding, marking, altering, correcting, reading, and writing" (p. 49). It is through this iterated process of transcription, they argue, that scientific facts are constructed. This view of constructedness stands in contrast to radical social constructivism, which has been critiqued for not allowing for any reality to exist outside of discourse. Following Latour and Woolgar's argument about the function of transcription, discourse constructs facts by mediating between our observations and interpretations of reality, and ultimately solidifying our interpretations into a series of conclusions we call "facts." Reality is not produced by discourse in any radical sense; rather discourse allows us to generate a shared understanding of the reality we observe. The talk and texts that surround a phenomenon work to determine its reality. As Latour puts it elsewhere, "a word replaces a thing while conserving a trait that defines it" (1999, p. 63). Words do not provide us with direct access to reality, but they do connect us in traceable ways to the realities we study. This claim underlies humanistic and social science research that takes discourse as its primary source of data. Discourse, therefore, provides a rich ground from which to develop theory out of a bounded rhetorical study.

Moreover, policy is a particular form of discourse that has recognizable concrete material effects. As a "social action" (Fairclough & Wodak, 1996, p. 27), discourse both constitutes the policy and shapes that policy's influences on the material world, even as the policy itself is shaped by the structures, institutions, and ideologies from which it emerges. Fairclough and Wodak (1996) delineate eight principles of CDA which inform this recursive relationship between discourse and the broader social and material world:

- CDA addresses social problems.
- Power relations are discursive.
- Discourse constitutes society and culture.
- Discourse does ideological work.
- Discourse is historical.
- The link between text and society is mediated.
- Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory.
- Discourse is a form of social action. (271–80)

Insofar as citizenship is a concept driven by history and ideology, it is an apt subject for CDA. While some theorists may define citizenship solely as a function of legal and social norms, expectations, and/or requirements, I think it is vital to investigate critically how any given version of citizenship is articulated and reified through discourse. Citizenship is a heterogeneous and abstract concept and any instance of its practical realization in policy or action will be selectively shaped by the peculiarities and exegency of a specific situation. This is the starting point for the analysis in this chapter: the ideologies underpinning the SFRCCC's policy recommendations both shape and are shaped by the version of citizenship that these policies assume for their local context. Tracing the contours of that citizenship is the first step towards

interrogating its value in addressing a global environmental crisis and evaluating its ethical ramifications.

Defining Citizenship

Citizenship is a fundamentally rhetorical concept. I mean this in two ways. First, an epistemological view of rhetoric tells us that the notion of citizenship—just as any other such abstract concept, including those in science, nature, the environment, democracy, and so on—is rhetorically constructed; it is conceptually shaped through discourse. Second, citizenship itself is rhetorically enacted. Histories of Western citizenship trace it to ancient Greece, where citizens of the polis built, governed, and defended their city-states through fulfiling numerous citizenly obligations, including military service, holding political and judicial positions, and participating in public deliberation and voting in political assemblies (Faulks, 2000, p. 16-17). From the start, citizenship and rhetoric were functions of each other: citizenship only possible through the study and use of rhetoric, and rhetoric receiving intense attention from pedagogues and scholars in support of citizens discharging their obligations to the polis. In Greece, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* provided guidance for political deliberation. In Rome, Cicero's *De Oratore* was primarily a lesson in public argument and deliberation, and for his interventions into Roman politics, he was put to death by the military and oligarchic despots.

Of course, modern citizenship looks very different from that of the Greeks and the Romans. Delineating the dimensions of modern citizenship is the first step to understanding and evaluating the specific version of that citizenship that is naturalized through the SFRCCC documents. I'll start by sketching a broad definition of citizenship, and then locating several contemporary scholars' analysis of modern citizenship within that broad definition. I conclude

with a description of the differences between two opposed versions of citizenship: thin citizenship—passive and rights-oriented—and thick citizenship—engaged and responsibility-oriented. I borrow the terminology from Bubeck (1995), drawing on both her and Faulk's (2000) articulation of it. As I further describe the thin and thick versions of citizenship, it will become clear that they closely resemble liberal and civic republican traditions of citizenship, respectively. I use the language of thin and thick here to reaffirm Bubeck's contention that

> The contrasts [between thin and thick] should rather be thought of as dimensions along which conceptions of citizenship vary, and between whose contrasting poles any kind of mixture may be found in conceptions of citizenship. The thinness or thickness of conceptions of citizenship is therefore a matter of degree on each dimension and of the overall number of thin or thick locations on these dimensions rather than a categorical question. Conceptions can also often be found to combine elements from both sides of the contrasts. (Bubeck, 1995, p. 3)

In other words, adopting the language of thin and thick prompts us to acknowledge the possibility of versions of citizenship being thinn*er* or thick*er*, pushing back against the impulse to align the enactment of citizenship in the real world with the abstracted versions of citizenship offered by political philosophies, such as liberalism and civic republicanism. This move follows Meyer's argument that "we would do better to consider directly when and how environmental concerns might resonate with citizens not whether or how they can be reconciled with a particular conception of 'liberalism'" (2015, p. 25), although I do return to theoretical constructions of citizenship in Chapter 3 in order to propose a normative shift from the current climate citizenship of the SFRCCC to a version informed by arguments in favor of ecological citizenship.

Turning back to defining thin and thick citizenship, the distinction between the two is crucial. It determines how citizens behave in relation to each other and the state, and what the bases for those behaviors are. Citizenship thus plays a vital role in determining how people respond to policy, such as that proposed by the SFRCCC, as well as how they interpret and react (or don't react) to climate change communication calling for both structural and individual change in hopes of mitigating and adapting to climate change. Given the potential for different versions of citizenship to yield different expectations, responses, and behaviors, I propose that identifying the version of citizenship naturalized in policy document can help us make better policy and make stronger connections between climate change communication and policy.

Citizenship is a complex concept with a long intellectual and political history, and tracing that full history here is outside the scope of the project. To understand the value of a rhetorical analysis of citizenship's embodiment in policy documents, however, it is crucial to establish a general understanding of citizenship: what it is, what it entails, and what the major contemporary debates about it are. To understand citizenship as more than a buzzword in line with *patriotism* or *neighborliness*, I turn to literature from political theory and citizenship studies.

Opening his argument advancing a post-modern, post-liberal citizenship, Keith Faulks (2000) claims that "citizenship has an almost universal appeal" (p. 1). This universality reminds me of Raymond Williams' observation of the term *community*, that "unlike all other terms of social organization (*state, nation, society*, etc.) it seems never to be used unfavourably, and never to be given any positive opposing or distinguishing term" (1983, p. 77). Community and citizenship both belong to a set of abstract concepts whose value, at least in democratic societies, are not disputed. Rather, dispute happens when we try to nail the abstraction down, to determine what citizenship looks like in action. In other words, citizenship is itself desirable, but the

desirability of particular versions of citizenship is a contentious political issue, perpetually up for debate.

Determining precisely what version of citizenship exists in any given polity means exploring two obvious features: 1) who can be a citizen, and 2) what rights and responsibilities are accorded to and expected of those citizens. To these dimensions of extent and content, Faulks (2000) adds context and depth. Context refers to what we might call *kairos* in rhetoric: the specific historical circumstances in which citizenship is rhetorically constructed and exercised. For example, the current refugee crisis in Europe necessarily shapes the conversation about who holds what status in relation to various political institutions, such as individual states and the European Union. Disturbing as it may be, the current refugee crisis in Europe is a *kairotic* moment, a timely rupture in the discourse creating opportunities for intervention in pursuit of more inclusive or exclusive definitions of citizenship. Faulks defines depth as the determination of how much commitment citizenship actually entails in terms of time, effort, money, and other investments, as well as the opportunity costs of those investments. As Gerald Hauser argues, participating in an emergent public requires a considerable degree of energy and many people choose not to participate in these *kairotic* opportunities to exercise their citizenship (1999). Thus, we can identify specific versions of citizenship by tracing them along these four dimensions: 1) extent, 2) content, 3) context, and 4) depth.

As for extent in modern liberal democracies (unlike, say, in ancient Athens), citizenship is broadly inclusive. Women of color, people with disabilities, people who don't own land, and other minority and disenfranchised populations can all—at least theoretically—be citizens. Boundary disputes, especially in the United States, about the granting of citizenship typically now focus on immigrant status, rather than markers of personal identity (although, of course, the

distinction between the two is often fraught, as can be seen, for example, in Arizona's passage of SB 1070). In the United States, many people fought diligently for this inclusive citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution established birthright citizenship, guaranteeing citizenship to anyone born on U.S. soil. Many civil rights movements since have worked towards ensuring the ability to exercise citizenship, such as the suffragette movement, which gained women the right to vote in 1920, the Civil Rights Movement, one of whose victories was the protection of African-American voters by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Disability Rights Movement, whose goals include social and material change ensuring accessibility to both literal and figurative public life for people with disabilities.

With politicians in the U.S. presidential race currently getting heated about immigration and birthright citizenship, the question of who can be a citizen can hardly be considered closed. Vitally, though, this question is now tied to nationality, rather than to membership in particular identity groups however slippery this distinction is. Moreover, many contemporary members of various identity groups remain excluded from full participation in the public sphere, and "a consideration of citizenship must also involve an examination of the conditions that make it meaningful" (Faulks, 2000, p. 2). Numerous scholars have taken up this examination, for example by theorizing the impact of group identity on citizenship (Young, 1990), analyzing how race, class, and gender have historically affected citizenship status and its associated rights and responsibilities (Kerber, 1997), and developing theories of "multicultural citizenship" (Joppke, 2002). The proliferation of debate around the extent of citizenship attests to the fact that we have yet to attain a fully inclusive version of citizenship. As Turner (1986) notes, however, we can acknowledge the increasing inclusivity of citizenship while continuing to critique threats to full exercise of citizenship by all members of society:

> Citizenship can be conceived as a series of expanding circles which are pushed forward by the momentum of conflict and struggle. This is not an evolutionary view of citizenship since these rights can also be undermined by economic recession, by right-wing political violence, by inflation and by the redefinition of social participation through the law. (p. xii)

This list of challenges to fully inclusive citizenship is incomplete (I would argue that identity-based analysis of oppression is its most glaring omission), but it is a starting point for thinking about how, even as citizenship becomes theoretically more inclusive as a result of social conflict, the distribution of citizenly rights and responsibilities across the polity may remain imbalanced.

The "content" of citizenship refers to the rights and responsibilities associated with it. As concepts of citizenship take root, so too do various beliefs about what rights citizens are owed, and what responsibilities they in turn have. Of course, the formulation of this sentence begs the questions of *by whom* citizens are owed rights and *to whom* citizens hold responsibilities. These secondary questions further distinguish forms of citizenship; in some cases the *by whom/to whom* relations exist solely between individual citizens and the state, whereas other conceptions of citizenship acknowledge broader relational networks, say among citizens as well as between citizens and the state. Through its philosophical roots in the development of the modern nation-state, modern citizenship draws both rights and responsibilities from the nation-state. The rights accorded by the state usually include three types of rights: "civil (free speech and movement, the rule of law), political (voting, seeking electoral office), and social (welfare, unemployment insurance and healthcare)" (Isin & Turner, 2002, p. 3). Responsibilities vary widely, but in modern liberal democracies such as the U.S., they are generally much less extensive than rights.

A third dimension of citizenship is context, which is unsurprisingly a term so broad it is difficult to pin down. Context includes, for example, the political and economic systems in which citizens participate (or, perhaps, from which they are excluded from participating). Context also contains a *kairotic* dimension. What is happening at any given moment in history—locally, regionally, nationally, or globally—can shift our conceptions and practices of citizenship. For example, the institution of a mandatory draft in the 21st-century United States would fundamentally change the contemporary responsibilities of citizenship. This is unlikely without a major threat to national security; without the right *kairotic* opportunity, this shift is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine.

The question of citizenship's depth encapsulates the previous dimensions of citizenship. Borrowing and adapting from several other theorists, Faulks (2000) posits two opposed depths: "thin" and "thick" (p. 10), a contrast he adapts from Bubeck (1995). Thin citizenship, recognizable in many contemporary Western countries as closely linked to liberal citizenship, draws on ideologies of the independent, self-determining subject, with protected rights but few reciprocal responsibilities. Thick citizenship, which bears a much stronger resemblance to the tradition of civic republican citizenship, contrasts with this approach, emphasizing interdependent relationships over independent subjectivities, and those relationships bring with them responsibilities as well as rights. Faulks offers Table 3, reproduced below, to highlight the primary differences between thin and thick citizenship.

Table 3. Thin and thick citizenship (Faulks, 2000, p. 11).

Thin Citizenship	**Thick Citizenship**
rights privileged	rights and responsibilities as mutually supportive
passive	active
state as a necessary evil	political community (not necessarily the state) as the foundation of the good life
purely public status	pervades public and private
independence	interdependence
freedom through choice	freedom through civic virtue
legal	moral

Thin citizenship, characterized by the attributes in the left column, is recognizably suited to contemporary liberal democracies in which freedom and choice are the utmost ideals. The state is charged, before all else, with protecting citizens' rights, independence, and freedom of choice. In return, citizens have relatively little responsibility; they can passively enjoy their rights, while the state stays out of their way. In contrast, thick versions of citizenship call for a more active citizenry that is motivated to engagement because of their place in the community, their morals, and their desire to embody civic virtues. The community, both in the private and public spheres, takes precedence over individual choice. These two versions of citizenship—thin and thick—loosely map onto the distinctions many political theorists make between Liberal and Civic Republican notions of citizenship.

In the following sections, I do this work of identification, delineating the shape of climate citizenship in the SFRCCC's Regional Climate Action Plan. I show how the RCAP treats each of

the seven characteristics of thin vs. thick citizenship outlined in Table 1, concluding that the document largely naturalizes 'thin' citizenship, with a few moments suggesting the possibility of 'thick' citizenship. This naturalization of thin citizenship leads to further analysis and critique in chapters 3 and 4 of the role climate citizenship plays in maintaining a problematic and ultimately unethical divide between climate change policy and climate change communication.

Reading Citizenship from the SFRCCC Regional Climate Action Plan

A critical reading of the RCAP, within the context of neoliberal democratic citizenship as the foremost version of U.S. citizenship, reveals that the document frames a prototypically thin notion of climate citizenship. As a reminder, thin citizenship is marked by

1. privileging of rights over responsibilities
2. passive rather than active exercise of citizenship
3. state as a necessary evil
4. purely public status
5. independence of individual citizens
6. freedom through choice
7. legal, rather than moral, justifications for action

The climate citizenship apparent in the RCAP displays all these characteristics to varying degrees, and each is discussed in turn in the following subsections.

This section analyzes specific examples from the text, which together work to naturalize a thin version of climate citizenship. I review the frames, appeals, and word choices in the text that speak to the seven characteristics of thin citizenship, highlighting along the way a few moments in the text that suggest the possibility of developing a thicker version of citizenship. Of

course, as with any application of a theoretical model to real-world discourse, my findings do not always neatly correspond to my analytic categories. Even when the text underscores the thin nature of the citizenship it naturalizes, for example through a focus on independent, rights-holding citizen subjects, mentions of communities and individual behavioral change suggest that buried in the text lies a secondary understanding of citizens as interdependent and responsible to others. My conclusions are not meant to smooth out these contradictory moments; rather, I show that the preponderance of discursive evidence points to the climate citizenship naturalized by the text as falling to the thinner, rather than thicker, side of the citizenship spectrum. Throughout my analysis, I deliberately point out the moments of rupture when the text breaks free of attempts to line it up neatly with the thin vs. thick theoretical model I use as the basis for analysis. Ultimately, though, because of the policy's predominantly thin climate climate citizenship, I argue that a reimagined climate citizenship will allow for better integration of climate change policy and communication in service of participatory policy-making.

The Privileging of Rights over Responsibilities: Policy Goals and First-Person Pronouns

The relationship—or lack thereof—between rights and responsibilities is a critical component of citizenship. A contrasting focus on rights versus responsibilities is often the primary distinction drawn between liberal and civic republican citizenship, respectively. In other words, understanding whether citizenship is primarily intended to grant and protect rights or to impose responsibilities is fundamental to understanding the relationships among citizens and the political institutions they interact with. I am particularly concerned here with how the RCAP promotes citizenly behaviors by developing certain relationships between citizens and its own

political work. To investigate the rights and responsibilities accorded to citizens by the RCAP, I turn to how its goals create possibilities for extending citizenship rights and its use of first-person to attribute responsibility to various groups.

The RCAP does not explicitly use the language of rights and responsibilities. However, it does advance claims about what it, as a political organization, intends to do for citizens and—to some extent—what citizens are expected to do in turn. Through the setting of specific goals for the region in light of climate change, the RCAP creates political justification for citizens to claim rights, as these goals are arguably intended to benefit all citizens equally and, if adopted by the SFRCCC's municipalities and counties, could be legally codified. Thus, while the goals do not yet extend formal citizenship rights, they do make a first step towards an equitable public good that has been "politically asserted as a universal right in the public domain" (Janoski & Gran, 2002, p. 14); in other words, they create discursive space for discussing the extension of citizenship rights to include the various protections from climate change promised by these goals.

The overall purpose of the RCAP can be summarized as the accomplishment of "goals [implementation of technical climate change mitigation and adaptation policy] while also serving to protect the assets of the region's unique quality of life and economy, guiding future investments, and fostering livable, sustainable and resilient communities." (SFRCCC, "RCAP," p. v). As a later subsection takes up the distinction between thin citizenship's assumption of an independent citizen subject and thick citizenship's emphasis on the interdependence of subjects, it is worth noting the use of the term "communities" here, which points to a recognition of the value of social ecologies, as well as positive economic or environmental outcomes. While the

RCAP as a whole appeals to independent citizens' self-interest, there are moments such as these that place these independent citizens within a larger interdependent context.

Returning to the analysis of rights and responsibilities, Table 4 lists the more specific goals that are associated with each of the RCAP's seven categories of recommendations.

Table 4. RCAP sections and associated policy goals.

Recommendation Category	**Goal**
Sustainable Communities and Transportation Planning	Sustainable Communities: "Reduce financial and physical losses in our building stock by reshaping where and how we build." (p. 14) Transportation Planning: "Reduce greenhouse gas emissions by planning, designing, and prioritizing walkable, affordable communities supported by sustainable multimodal transportation options." (p. 18)
Water Supply, Management and Infrastructure	"Advance water management strategies and infrastructure improvements needed to mitigate for adverse impacts of climate change and sea level rise on water supplies, water and wastewater infrastructure, and water management systems." (p. 27)
Natural Systems	"Implement monitoring, management, and conservation programs designed to protect natural systems and improve their capacity for climate adaptation." (p. 32)
Agriculture	"Ensure the continued viability of agriculture in Southeast Florida through policies which remove barriers to production, promote economic incentives, improve water reliability, and provide research on best management practices, thereby encouraging sustainable production in the face of a changing climate." (p. 35)
Energy and Fuel	"Increase renewable energy capacity and reduce consumption of electricity and fuel." (p. 36)
Risk Reduction and Emergency Management	"Provide a more resilient natural and built physical environment in light of climate change." (p. 40)
Outreach and Public Policy	Public Outreach: "Communicate the risks related to climate change and the value of adapting policies and practices to achieve resilience throughout the region." (p. 42) Public Policy: "Guide and influence local, regional, state and federal climate change related policies and programs through collaboration and joint advocacy." (p. 45)

These goals address two major concerns: first, life-sustaining necessities, and second, the basic building blocks for a good life that is more than simple survival. To the first category belong the goals for 1) sustainable communities, 2) water supply, management, and infrastructure, and 3) agriculture. These goals, respectively, address the basic human needs of shelter, water, and food. Moving beyond necessities, the remaining goals paint a picture of what constitutes the good life in a climate resilient future: a life with well-managed risks, ample energy, multiple transportation options, protected natural environs, and a political system that communicates with its constituents and advocates for them locally and at higher levels of government.

These various aspects of the future good life are not in and of themselves rights; they do not meet the criterion of being "*universalistic rights enacted into law and implemented for all citizens*" (Janoski & Gran, 2002, p. 14, emphasis in original). We are not all guaranteed equal amounts of water, food, or energy by the SFRCCC and its governmental partners. However, because of their enactment through policy, the RCAP's goals do suggest underlying, implicit rights. Wissenburg reminds us that

> rights, in the everyday legal sense of the words, are necessarily part of the output of any political system. There is no public transport without a right to travel on buses, no private transport without a right to travel, no social security without a right to claim, no elected government without a right to vote, no dictatorship without an exclusive right to govern. (1998, p. 18).

Thus the emphasis throughout the RCAP on what its goals will achieve—what life choices and resources it promises to protect and provide—reveals an equivalent emphasis on what rights citizens have to make those choices and use those resources. While the language of rights is absent from the document, the logic of rights pervades it.

In contrast, citizen responsibilities are all but absent from the RCAP. There is some general language calling for public "support" (SFRCCC, 2012, p. 12, 42) and the "collaboration of the public" (SFRCCC, 2012, p. 27). More specific responsibilities to be taken on by private citizens are harder to find; even more interesting is the difficulty of identifying who exactly the RCAP suggests holds certain responsibilities. To illustrate this point, I have collected examples of the RCAP's use of first-person pronouns, many of which are used in sentences claiming responsibility for climate change mitigation and adaptation action. The first-person pronouns seem to alternate between two primary referents:

- the Compact and various organizational partners and/or subject-matter experts (SMEs) involved in its assessment and recommendation-writing processes
- the entire Southeast Florida community

These shifting referents suggest an attempt at inclusivity, albeit one fraught with distinctions between experts and citizens. Among the 45 instances of first-person pronouns in the RCAP (including several uses in call-out boxes highlighting salient points every few pages) are also a number of suggestive pronouns with unclear referents. Table 4 categorizes 23 examples of the three different first-person pronoun referents in the RCAP.

Table 5. Examples of first-person pronoun usage categorized according to referent.

Referent	Use of First-Person Pronoun in Context
SFRCCC + SMEs and/or organizational partners	"The Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact was forged during the most difficult national economy since the Great Depression. *We* came together with purpose and quickly realized the value of sharing resources, expertise and information." (p. iv) "The success of the planning efforts thus far is a testament to the political leadership and staff dedication to Southeast Florida. *We* recognize that by combining *our* efforts and resources, *we* are in a better position moving forward. The Compact is at an important turning point. As each partner continues to implement different initiatives, at its own pace and within the context of each individual entity, these individual steps will lead to collective results for a more resilient region. Join *us*, no step is too big or too small." (p. 13) "While the initial regional vulnerability assessment completed by the Compact Counties for use in this Regional Climate Action Plan has yielded important new insights on regional risk, additional and ongoing analysis is required to further refine *our* current understanding and to monitor change in Southeast Florida's risk profile over time." (p. 40) "Join *us* on this journey and visit *our* website for more information, source documents and to view the Implementation Guide…" (p. 51)
SE Florida community	"Healthy oceans provide most of the oxygen in the air *we* breathe." (p. 31) "Yet, *we* are already experiencing more extreme weather conditions—from extreme rain to extreme droughts, from unseasonable heat waves to early cold fronts." (p. 39) "Recommendations aim to reduce idling and prepare *our* region for the shift to plug-in electric vehicles…" (p. 37) "A continued and expanded collaborative approach to these activities will be a cornerstone to implementing these recommendations that not only serve to reduce greenhouse gas emissions but will realize cross-cutting benefits of more livable and desirable communities within *our* region." (p. 18) "Much of the Compact's work up to this point has served to unite, organize, and assess *our* region through the lens of climate change in setting the stage for action." (p. v) "Many of the recommendations build upon best practices sprinkled throughout *our* region, such as regional collaboration on transportation planning and land use criteria that foster walkable and healthy communities." (p. vi)

Table 5. (Continued)

Referent	Use of First-Person Pronoun in Context
	"With the establishment of a Unified SLR Projection and the Preliminary Vulnerability Analysis, the picture of the likely future of *our* region is coming into focus." (p. 14) "Given these challenges, it is essential to identify practical solutions today to help mitigate the impact of climate change on *our* future water supply." (p. 26) "Recommendations also aim to reduce idling and prepare *our* region for the shift to plug-in electric vehicles." (p. 36) "*Our* individual and collective steps will result in a more resilient region." (p. 51)
Unclear	"This understanding of a likely future allows *us* to take action now to protect assets and invest wisely." (p. 14) "By taking specific action now, *we* may be able to manage *our* native flora and fauna without losing species diversity and without introducing potentially harmful species." (p. 31) "These 'lightly salty' estuaries can be biologically healthy habitats but *we* must ensure that other land uses, including drinking water supplies, are not threatened." (p. 32) "It will be incumbent on *us* to ensure that newly inundated areas are available for them [mangroves and seagrasses] to colonize." (p. 32)

Several trends are worth noticing. The passages that use first person to refer to the Compact and its partners are identifiable largely thanks to their specific references to these groups. These passages focus on organizational identity and purpose: responding to a crisis, the Compact and its partners have shared "resources, expertise, and information," they conduct "assessment" and "analysis," and they have a formal organizational presence on a website. The use of the phrase "join us" aptly illustrates how first-person sometimes operates exclusively in the RCAP; a group can only be joined if it is not already fully inclusive. Clearly, at points, the *we* of the RCAP refers only to a select group of citizens—specifically political officials and designated SMEs—in the Southeast Florida region.

However, at other points, the *we* reads as fully inclusive of all citizens. These instances are largely possessive ("*our* region," "*our* future water supply," "*our* individual and collective steps") with some in subject case ("the air *we* breathe," "*we* are already experiencing more extreme weather conditions"). I read these as inclusive, as it is unlikely that the RCAP authors would claim the region or its environment belongs to or affects exclusively those citizens directly involved with the SFRCCC. These inclusive uses of first-person pronouns function to create a shared connection to the region and experience of climate change. None of these uses, however, point to shared responsibilities.

Responsibilities appear in connection with first-person in the final category, where the referents are unclear. Each of these examples points to actions that must be undertaken in order to achieve the goals of the RCAP and develop resilience to climate change. Unlike in the first category, these examples do not closely follow specific references to the Compact or its partners. They appear in paragraphs making general claims about climate change and its effects on human and natural systems. This leaves open the question of *who* is actually responsible for taking action, managing native flora and fauna, ensuring that other land uses are not threatened, and ensuring new habitats for mangroves and seagrasses. The language's ambiguity means that it is unclear whether private citizens are being asked to take on this responsibility, as opposed to moments, such as one mentioned in the next subsection, where it is clear that citizens are being charged with behavioral change around "fuel efficient driving habits" and "sharing the road with bicyclists and pedestrians" (SFRCCC, "RCAP," p. 44). Indeed, the focus throughout the document on the contributions of SMEs and governmental partners to its recommendations and implementation suggests instead that in such cases of ambiguity, they are likely the primary referents charged with these actions.

The responsibility for addressing climate change appears to rest with people acting in official capacities, not with private citizens fulfilling responsibilities even as they enjoy the rights guaranteed by that fulfillment. Thus, the climate citizenship naturalized through the RCAP emphasizes the broad rights implicit in its goals over the responsibilities required to achieve those goals. This privileging of rights over responsibilities is a hallmark of thin citizenship.

The Passive Exercise of Citizenship: Naturalizing Passivity through Public Outreach

The second characteristic of thin citizenship is its passive, rather than active, exercise. This passivity is highly apparent in the RCAP's climate citizenship, and is exemplified in its section on "Public Outreach." This section opens with the claim that "the best planning efforts in the world will not be implemented or reach their full potential without the support of the public" (SFRCCC, 2012, p. 42). As becomes clear, however, support is envisioned as passive reception of information produced by the SFRCCC and its partners. Tellingly, the goal associated with public outreach is to "communicate the risks related to climate change and the value of adapting policies and practices to achieve resilience throughout the region" (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. 42). This goal recalls the oft-critiqued practice of one-way science and risk communication, which relies on a knowledge deficit model and which does not reliably lead to behavioral change (Cagle & Tillery, 2015).

The specific recommendations associated with this goal confirm the RCAP's limited definition of public outreach as one-way communication. For example, the recommendations ask policymakers to

- "provide outreach to residents, stakeholders and elected officials on the importance of addressing climate change adaptation and preparedness,"
- "develop and carry out outreach/educational programs to increase public awareness,"
- "provide education and improve communications on energy conservation and available technologies,"
- "modify existing and encourage new public outreach, education and messaging programs...to create awareness about the impacts of climate change on the environment,"
- "initiate a regional public education campaign to educate residents, business owners, and policy makers on the merits of preserving open land,"
- "develop early warning systems and social media applications to both inform residents and visitors of extreme high-tide events and to raise overall awareness on sea level rise and climate change issues," and
- "Develop strategies to promote fuel efficient driving habits, including anti-idling practices, and to raise awareness of rules and safety practices for sharing the road with bicyclists and pedestrians" (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, pp. 42-44).

These moves towards public outreach contain a lot of education, messaging, and awareness raising, and call for very little action on the part of citizens themselves. Citizens could easily participate in this version of public outreach without doing more than turning on their TVs or opening an app on their smartphones. Certainly, the hope in the case of some of these recommendations is that the SFRCCC's messaging will lead to changed behaviors around energy consumption, driving patterns, and the like, but the citizen's role in relation to the SFRCCC's

political work remains passive as long as they are positioned simply as the recipients of messaging who may or may not respond to that messaging. In fact, out of eleven broad public outreach recommendations, the only ones that call for more than passive acceptance of, and in the best-case scenario slight behavioral change in response to, official communications are the development of "volunteer opportunities" and the establishment of a group for "connecting farmers with local users" (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, pp. 43-44).

To be a citizen of this region participating in the SFRCCC's public outreach, then, is to be passive. While the text does offer opportunities for action to citizens, such as with changing driving habits, this action is limited in scope compared to the multiple ways in which citizens are imagined to be audiences simply taking in messaging or education at the other end of a one-way communication process. Moreover, the climate citizenship here does not require active engagement with policy or with the actual mitigation and adaptation responses. The passivity of climate citizenship further solidifies its characterization as a thin version of citizenship.

State as a Necessary Evil: A Possible Entry Point for Thick Citizenship

Thin versions of citizenship typically regard the state as a necessary evil, focusing on limiting its scope rather than turning to political communities of various sorts "as the foundation of the good life" (Faulks, 2000, p. 11). This thin understanding of the state's role is not advanced in the RCAP; it is in fact treated as the primary actor capable of effectively addressing climate change in Southeast Florida. This is not a surprising observation, given that the RCAP is a governmental document, produced by governmental representatives.

The RCAP's support for governmental policymaking is, however, tempered by its repeated emphasis that its recommendations are not unilateral injunctions. Instead, the RCAP

claims that the SFRCCC "respect[s] the diversity of the region and the autonomy of the many governing bodies" (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. 1). The state in these documents, then, does not consist of an all-encompassing nation-state, but is rather a set of highly local political institutions, operating at the municipal and county levels. Indeed, the RCAP underscores this distinction between praiseworthy local politics and higher-level governmental politics: "The Compact has enjoyed stable, bipartisan political support since its initiation in 2009 despite the swings in the political salience of global climate change observed over this time in state and federal political dynamics" (SFRCCC, 2012, p. 49). While state and federal politics may be suspect, the Compact—operating at a smaller regional scale—declares itself successful at gaining and retaining productive governmental support.

Thus, the SFRCCC walks a fine line in the RCAP. It positions itself rhetorically as a champion of the region that will "protect the assets of the region's unique quality of life and economy, guiding future investments, and fostering livable, sustainable and resilient communities" ("RCAP," 2012, p. v). This positioning rejects any qualifications that, as a state organization, the SFRCCC's contributions are a "necessary evil"; they are to be interpreted as an unqualified good. However, this positive view of the state is reserved for local iterations of the state; the broader state and national political contexts are not mentioned in the RCAP beyond the previous quotation. In terms of the potential for a thick, engaged climate citizenship, then, the relationship between the RCAP's climate citizenship and the state is promising. Rather than suspiciously eyeing all political intervention for overreach, the climate citizenship of the RCAP would have us differentiate between higher-level governmental bodies and the formal political institutions closer to home. This distinction may provide a way to develop the political communities that characterize thick citizenship, instead of following thin citizenship in

establishing a necessary, but not all too desirable, state.

Purely Public Status: The Many Faces of the Public

Analyzing thin and thick citizenship also requires understanding the spheres in which citizenship is presumed to operate. To investigate the RCAP's conceptualization of citizenship as a purely public, or both public and private, practice, I turn to the actual images the document provides of people engaged in a variety of activities throughout the Southeast Florida region. These photographs in fact provide a mixed picture of citizenship's involvement in the public and private spheres; they show people in official public capacities, they show people in public but engaged in private activity, and they show people with non-political relationships to each other. This combination suggests a thicker version of citizenship than is apparent in the analyses of other citizenship characteristics. Citizens' private actions do matter, these pictures imply, and there are also public roles that need to be filled to effectively address climate change.

To demonstrate this conclusion, I'll review a few of the photographs from the RCAP. In subjecting these images to critical discourse analysis, I follow Gunther Kress' (2009) social-semiotic approach to multimodality, which posits that "all signs in all modes are meaningful" (p. 59). Just as the text of the RCAP can reveal what form of climate citizenship the SFRCCC is advancing, so too can the images give some insight into that citizenship. Because liberal democratic citizenship is typically extended to only humans, I focus here on pictures that contain people. Exactly 50%—18 of 36—of the photographs on the covers of the RCAP and in the report itself meet this criterion.

Of course, pinning down a definitive distinction between private and public is a difficult endeavor, with a long and contested history in political theory, feminist theory, and other fields.

An easy distinction would be between ostensibly private spaces, such as the home, and public spaces, such as a governmental building. Where one draws the line between private and public is of course never a neutral choice. Take, for example, economic activity; calling it private or public already commits one to an ideological position that views the economy as either made up of multiple private (and most likely some state) actors or as a public institution which cannot be understood solely through the actions of private individuals. Given this complexity of determining private and public, it is vital here for me to be transparent about how I am drawing the lines: I suggest that a useful criterion for distinguishing between public and private is a consideration of the actions individuals are engaged in, as this approach highlights citizenship as activity rather than legal status or possession. This approach also has the benefit of not overlooking obviously public citizenship behaviors, such as contacting congressional representative or drafting a public petition, simply because these endeavors might be undertaken in seemingly private spaces, such as my kitchen table. Given my concern for action rather than location, I looked to distinguish between private and public by considering whether activities in the RCAP's photographs appear to be undertaken in an official capacity or to be associated with a citizen's imbrication in a public institution, such as a school or the SFRCCC itself.

Of the 18 pictures with people, ten show people engaged in public activities according to this rubric, and eight show people engaged in private. Examples of public activities include members of the SFRCCC posing for the camera, children in matching uniforms gathered around an outdoor solar installation while adults in the background film the event, and people performing various kinds of labor, such as selling produce, conducting underwater scientific research, and using industrial equipment to respond to urban flooding. Private activities include a woman drinking a glass of water, two young women using a laptop and smartphone while riding

the bus, a woman and a child strolling on the beach, and a casually dressed man and two children happily riding their bicycles.

These photographs are clearly selected for their relevance to specific portions of the RCAP. For example, the group of cyclists is pictured in the section on transportation planning, while the scuba diver hovering over a coral with scientific equipment is pictured in the section on natural systems. As I noted previously in my discussion of rights and responsibilities, private citizens are not tasked with responsibility for taking specific actions in response to climate change; instead that responsibility seems to fall to public officials. These images tell a somewhat different story, however. The officials and people acting in public capacities show up in the photographs, but so too do individuals seemingly just going about their everyday lives. Perhaps, then, the RCAP opens the possibility for a thicker version of climate citizenship that makes citizenship a part of private, as well as public, life.

Independence of Individual Citizens: Rational Actors and the Economic Frame

Thin citizenship emphasizes independence over interdependence, drawing from an ideological frame that treats subjects as fully autonomous and self-reliant. This frame has been subject to critiques from feminists and others, who argue that this idea of subjectivity obscures structural impediments to the individual enjoyment of rights as well as social influences and constraints on the development of individuals (Cuomo, 1998). Instead of understanding subjects as interdependent social creatures, this theory of citizenship assumes—for the purposes of exercising liberal citizenship—people to be independent actors consistently applying hyper-rationality to our various life choices. Following Val Plumwood, Cuomo argues that "such rational agents are assumed to be self-interested egoists whose natural propensities are best

expressed and encouraged in market economies" (1998, p. 96). The idea of independence as a key trait of citizenship helps grease the wheels of capitalism; its logic relies on rationality and self-interestedness as primary motivations for action.

Thus, the SFRCCC RCAP's adherence to and heavy emphasis on a capitalistic economic frame reveals its understanding of climate citizenship to include independent—not interdependent—citizens. It is not simply the presence of this frame, but its sheer prevalence that shows the document's repeated insistence on treating readers as rational subjects making rational, self-interested choices. The language of economics appears on almost every page of the document. While the word *citizen* does not appear even once, the word *economic* appears 27 times in its 51 main body pages. At one point, residents are even identified with the appellation *consumer* (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. 27). Economic appeals are used to warrant—among many others—recommendations for revisions to development regulations, the expansion of transportation options, the evaluation of water supply assessment work, the preservation of marine ecosystems, the development of sustainable agriculture, and investment in renewable energy. In fact, economic growth is cited as a justification for the existence of the Compact itself:

> To prepare Southeast Florida for the likely impacts of sea level rise estimated by the vulnerability assessment, cooperation is vital, not only among the Compact Counties, but also among the municipalities, local, regional, state and federal agencies serving the region. Strengthening this regional effort will be critical in order to coordinate public policies and adaptation measures *that ensure the region's sustainability and economic growth*. (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. 10, emphasis added)

While the mention of cooperation does suggest an acknowledgment of interdependence, it's important to note that the cooperation in question is among institutional actors, not individual

citizens. The role of individual citizens is instead implied by the multiple appeals to economic incentives, which together create a frame through which climate change is presented largely as a risk to the bottom line, and thus worthy of concern for the independent citizen whose self-interest is economically motivated.

Of course, ecosystems and built environments may take damage in the wake of climate change's effects. The RCAP frequently mentions the possibility of such damage. But these damages can always be calculated in terms of dollars and cents. I'll illustrate this point using a relatively lengthy excerpt from the RCAP's section on assessment of risk from sea level rise (SLR):

> All of the Compact Counties are vulnerable to SLR. However, the degree and extent of potential impacts vary across the region due to differences in land elevation and geomorphology. The southernmost counties are expected to experience the greatest direct impacts, with lessening impacts as one travels northward. Nearly 80 percent of the lands potentially affected regionally in the one-foot scenario are conservation lands, especially coastal wetlands. Low lying natural systems made up of buttonwood, mangrove, scrub mangrove, and herbaceous coastal saline and freshwater wetlands are significantly impacted in all SLR scenarios. *The upper estimate of current taxable property values in Monroe, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties vulnerable in the one-foot scenario is $4 billion with values rising to more than $31 billion at the three-foot scenario. The greater values reflected in the financial impacts are coastal residential properties with ocean access and high taxable value.* (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. 9, emphasis added)

While we should certainly be concerned about conservation lands, the last word goes to taxable property. The high dollar figures are startling, impressing upon the reader the high stakes

involved in climate change mitigation and adaptation. As rational actors, we should respond to the financial risk presented by these numbers, particularly if we happen to own some of that taxable property or benefit from the taxes paid on those properties.

This move, to start with a description of risks or recommendations and then reframe them in economic terms, recurs throughout the RCAP (SFRCCC, 2012). A call-out box assures us that "this understanding of a likely future [at risk of SLR] allows us to take action now *to protect assets* and *invest wisely*" (p. 9, emphasis added). Risk planning is not about protecting human life and health, but rather should focus on "discourag[ing] new development or post-disaster redevelopment in vulnerable areas to reduce future and *economic losses*" (p. 16, emphasis added). Transportation planning should double down on "the desired achievement of greenhouse gas emissions reductions and enhanced resilience to climate change," but—without any acknowledgement of the potential conflict between these directives— "*projects that enhance economic vitality* should also be given priority, such as projects and service expansions along transit-oriented corridors and those that improve connections to major airports and seaports" (p. 19, emphasis added). Examples like these of economic framing abound; I could easily list several dozen more.

It is this frame which points most clearly to independence as a feature of climate citizenship. In defining the work of framing, Benford and Snow write that it is "an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction" (2000, p. 614). The reality being constructed by the RCAP's emphasis on an economic (as opposed to health, environmental, security, etc.) frame for understanding and reacting to climate change is a reality in which citizens are rational actors responsive to market forces; in other words, they act independently within the framework of a citizenship that ignores their

interdependence. In contrast, an interdependent approach would have to recognize the ways in which we could be more driven by our commitment to our social networks and communities than a desire to save or make money. This is a thin citizenship, further removing climate citizenship from the thickness required for a truly active, participatory citizenry.

Freedom through Choice: The Case of the "Choice Rider"

The sixth marker of thin citizenship is the derivation of freedom from choice rather than from civic virtue. The individual's ability to freely choose without interference from others trumps any obligations to the community. The RCAP is replete with language about choice. Agricultural "growers/land owners" will hopefully respond to "incentives" (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. 36) encouraging them to make environmentally friendly land management decisions; they will not be prohibited from practices that worsen the effects of climate change. "Monetary and non-monetary incentives" should also prompt private citizens making transportation options to select "electric or other alternative fuel vehicles" (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. 38). Citizens can get involved in public outreach through "*volunteer* opportunities to create awareness about the impacts of climate change on the environment" (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. 43, emphasis added). Of course, none of these measures is intrinsically a bad thing. They could in fact have extremely positive outcomes in terms of climate change resilience, greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions, and individual engagement around climate change. However, the repeated focus on choice over civic obligations coalesces into a version of citizenship in which the existence of individual choice takes precedence over the needs of the community. In that, this characteristic of thin citizenship is inextricable from the focus on independence over interdependence discussed in the previous section.

Perhaps the most obvious example of choice trumping civic virtue in the RCAP comes in its emphasis on "choice riders" (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. 23). These "choice riders" are private citizens who choose to use public transportation and "who might otherwise drive to work" (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. 23). In its introduction to the "Transportation Planning" section, the RCAP emphasizes the importance of changing individual citizens' behavior in order to achieve GHG emission reduction goals. According to the report, overall transportation in the region accounts for 45% of GHG emissions, and the majority of those transportation trips are "taken for family and personal purposes in single occupancy vehicles" (SFRCCC, 2012, p. 18). However, despite the clear harm done by citizens' current transportation choices, those choices are to remain open to them. The SFRCCC does not recommend directly curtailing citizens' freedom to contribute to climate change by making frequent drives in inefficient vehicles.

Instead of curtailing choice, the SFRCCC recommends promoting alternative transportation choices. In part, this is to be accomplished through material changes to the built environment, including denser urban development and increased investment in safe, convenient, and reliable public transportation. Even with these changes to the available transportation options, however, citizens may choose to continue driving personal, single occupancy vehicles. Interestingly, the RCAP does not appeal to civic virtue in order to make this choice less appealing. Rather, the emphasis remains squarely on individuals making individual choices. Choice riders should be attracted to public transportation by campaigns that "focus on making riding transit 'cool'" (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. 43). Here, it is worth noting that the SFRCCC's appeal to "coolness" opens space for citizen motivation as more than economic self-interestedness; instead, we might be motivated by shared cultural values, which include being perceived as or feeling "cool." In terms of the RCAP's version of freedom, though, whatever

their motivation, choice riders can be assured that their access to choice trumps civic virtue. No mention of individual responsibility for abating communal harm appears in the RCAP's discussion of transportation planning. Instead, individuals have the freedom to choose based on personal priorities, which will hopefully include being 'cool.' Thus, climate citizenship continues to align with prototypically thin citizenship.

Legal Justifications for Action: Policy by Any Other Name

The final characteristic of thin citizenship to be compared to the climate citizenship of the RCAP is the use of legal, rather than moral, justifications for action. Of all the characteristics of citizenship, this is the most difficult to trace in the RCAP. Neither the legality nor morality of actions is proffered as a consideration, let alone a justification for those actions. As previously noted, the RCAP deploys an economic frame to warrant its promotion of climate change mitigation and adaptation policy. Within that economic frame, citizens and policymakers are expected to be motivated by financial self-interestedness, not by fear of legal retribution or moral failings.

Legality does crop up in the document, however, in its recommendations for continued work on public policy. For example, following the Compact's success in its efforts to have "Adaptation Action Areas" recognized by state law, the RCAP recommends "urg[ing] Congress to provide recognition of an 'Adaptation Action Area' designation in federal law" (SFRCCC, 2012, p. 47). While legality does not justify policy, its usefulness to policy underscores this and similar recommendations for legislative action. Any usefulness morality might provide is not addressed anywhere in the document.

Given thin citizenship's prevalence in liberal democracies where independent individual

choice reigns supreme, this lacuna makes sense. The idea of "legislating morality" is repugnant to many U.S. citizens, often for very good reasons, including the separation of church and state and the need to protect minority groups against discrimination and oppression. The climate citizenship of the RCAP shares this avoidance of morality as an issue relevant to the exercise of citizenship and the enactment of policy. While there may be good reason for this, that avoidance further places climate citizenship in the camp of thin, rather than thick, understandings of citizenship.

Conclusion

This critical discourse analysis of the SFRCCC's RCAP through the lens of citizenship in the context of a liberal democracy leaves us with some interesting insights. I can now comfortably identify the climate citizenship of this document as largely thin in terms of depth; it is a version of citizenship that requires very little of citizens, while offering them rights, choices, and independence in return. A primary assumption in political theory and citizenship studies is that the framing of citizenship has consequences. Different versions of citizenship, such as thin versus thick, will yield different outcomes, especially in terms of citizen engagement. As policy discourse encodes whatever specific version(s) of citizenship policymakers envision, it naturalizes that citizenship, opening up some paths to citizen action and engagement, while foreclosing others. For a problem like climate change, which affects everyone and will require concerted communal effort to address, policy's rhetorical construction of climate citizenship is of vital importance.

Importantly, the designation of thinness is not a judgment that this version of climate citizenship is inherently bad. In fact, it is the modus operandi for contemporary Western liberal

democracy, and it can be a very effective system for expanding citizen rights and protecting a variety of moral choices. However, a number of critiques have been leveled against both liberal democracy and the citizenship it offers. These critiques include persuasive arguments from environmental political theorists about the challenges of addressing environmental crises such as climate change from within these political frameworks. These arguments allow me to contextualize and evaluate climate citizenship, concluding that the thinness of the climate citizenship found here is troublesome, as it gives citizens a pass to be inactive and self-centered in the face of grave danger. Moreover, the thinness of the climate citizenship it naturalizes creates an internal tension between the reification of passive citizenship and the policy's claims to be explicitly concerned with citizen input and engagement. Easing this tension requires a reimagined version of climate citizenship, which I propose in the next chapter can be informed by political theorists' development of ecological citizenship.

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CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS: WHY CITIZENSHIP MATTERS

"Indeed, given the high stakes in how a society conceives of citizenship, any particular formation...is readily contestable."

— Peter H. Schuck

In his critical analysis of technocratic policymaking, *Citizens, Experts, and the Environment*, Fischer speaks to the idealistic democratic impulse underlying efforts at improving public participation: "Citizen participation is the raison d'être of democracy. Not only does it give meaning to the term, but it plays an important role in legitimating both policy formulation and implementation" (2000, p. 259). In the U.S., public participation has been of particular concern to environmental policy-making, following the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969, which—while not requiring widespread public participation—did call for regular national-level consultation with a Citizen's Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality (National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1969). The role of public participation in environmental decision-making was further emphasized by its regulatory codification, such as the 1973 implementation of guidelines for public participation in water pollution control programs (US EPA, 2015).

Despite these overtures towards including citizens in policy-making, the cornucopia of ongoing research on public participation suggest that there is much room for improvement.

Numerous scholars studying scientific and technical policy-making, whether in rhetoric of science, technical communication, science and technology studies, or other related fields, have taken up the question of how to increase and improve public participation in policy deliberation about scientific and technical issues. These investigations stand in opposition to policy-making models which rely on a linear process in which deliberation by experts precedes communication with the public, making them passive recipients rather than active participants. In contrast, arguments in favor of participation presume citizens should have meaningful opportunities to affect at least the outcomes, if not also the process itself, of policy-making.

A strong strain of support for inclusive public participation in political and policy deliberation runs through our field. Focusing specifically on risk communication, almost twenty years ago, Grabill and Simmons (1998) argued that both ethical and practical issues in policy-making can be addressed by rhetoric and technical communication's thoughtful engagement with citizen participants. This position pushes back against prevailing models of one-way communication from experts to publics in the context of scientific and technical issues. Others have followed suit, working through, for example, the possibilities for citizen participation across social media networks in cases of disaster communication (Ding & Zhang, 2010; Potts, 2014), the challenge of engaging workers in workplace safety technical communication processes (Evia & Patriarca, 2012), and the effect of gender roles on citizen participation in public debates (Petit, 2001). There is general agreement in rhetoric of science and technical communication that broader citizen participation, including in policy-making, is a desirable goal inspired by democratic ideals. This premise is shared by writers on deliberative democracy, who see inclusive deliberative political mechanisms as the most promising path towards a just society (Eckersley, 2005; Gutmann & Thompson, 2009; Hauser & Grim, 2004)

I agree with this emphasis on citizen participation, for two specific reasons: engaging citizens through policy decision-making, rather than communicating at them after decisions have been made, yields more efficacious and more ethical outcomes. However, calling for citizen engagement first requires a thorough understanding not only of what we mean by engagement—which has been the focus of much STS, rhetoric of science, and TC scholarship—but also of what we mean by *citizen*. As Chapter 2 established, beyond the explicit roles offered to citizens by specific policies, the policies themselves can naturalize different versions of citizenship, some of which are more amenable to participatory engagement than others. Recognizing the variability of opportunities for engagement offered by different types of citizenship suggests that the *citizenship* qualifier should receive as much attention as the nominal *engagement*.

In this chapter, I investigate the *citizenship* of public participation by analyzing the tension between efforts to engage citizens and documentation that discourages active engagement (whether intentionally or not). The disconnect I diagnosed in the previous chapter between a policy's calls for participation and the same policy's naturalization of a passive, non-participatory climate citizenship is an example of this tension. Furthermore, this conflict has largely gone unexamined in the literature on participation, which typically focuses either closely on specific policy processes or broadly on political theory, without connecting the two. My goal here is to unpack precisely why the specific climate citizenship we saw at work in the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Compact's Regional Climate Action Plan (SFRCCC RCAP) in Chapter 2 can be detrimental to efforts to create spaces and processes enabling inclusive public participation. The naturalization of passive climate citizenship within policy documentation undermines any calls that same documentation makes for citizens to be active participants in addressing scientific and technical policy problems. Moreover, passive climate citizenship

reinforces the very disconnect between policy-making and communication that so many policy and rhetorical scholars have called for us to bridge. Heeding this call thus requires us to take the question of citizenship seriously and understand how different versions of citizenship inexorably lead us to vastly different possibilities for inclusive participation in policy-making.

To that end, I begin this chapter by providing an overview of the two traditional strains of citizenship that are the focus of much political theory and citizenship studies: liberal citizenship and civic republican citizenship. I also lay out how each of these citizenship traditions poses challenges to the development of environmentally sound policy. The next section summarizes the work of environmental political theorists who have proffered the concept of "environmental" or "ecological" citizenship as a response and an alternative to the limitations of liberal and civic republican traditions. While environmental citizenship is not without its own critics, it does offer new approaches to citizen participation that shed light on the problem of disconnected policy-making and communication that I am addressing here. With that in mind, I close the chapter by considering how environmental citizenship could inform a more productive version of climate citizenship. Given that potential productivity, my conclusion also offers concrete examples of how the climate citizenship of the SFRCCC would manifest differently within its documentation were policy-makers to approach their policy recommendations from within a framework of environmental citizenship, which more closely aligns with thick citizenship, rather than the thin climate citizenship we currently find there.

Two Primary Citizenship Traditions: Liberal Citizenship and Civic Republican Citizenship

To better understand how the potential for participatory environmental policy-making hinges on citizenship, I describe in this section two primary types of citizenship which have long

been central to Western debates about citizenship: liberal and civic republican citizenship. Citizenship as a concept allows us to theorize the relationship of the individual, who possesses particular attitudes, with broader political communities and institutions, which may or may not support the expression of those attitudes. Theorists working in citizenship studies have identified a number of types of citizenship, tracing their historical roots and producing typologies along varying axes (see e.g., Heater, 1999; Reisenberg, 1992; Turner, 1990). Two citizenship traditions, liberal and civic republican, consistently reappear throughout this literature, even as other types of citizenship—such as environmental, cosmopolitan, postcosmopolitan, and diasporic, among others—are proposed as alternatives. In her thorough review of scholarship on environmental citizenship, Gabrielson notes that citizenship studies "is dominated by" these two traditions (2008, p. 430). Because of their ubiquity as objects of analysis, liberal and civic republican citizenship have been central to developing conversations about citizenship within the subfield of environmental political theory, so I begin here with an overview of the two traditions. They are both, as Dobson warns, "evidently complex and contested terms" (2003, p. 39), but I hope to provide a fair reading of their general use, in order to establish why they have been broadly rejected as suited to addressing environmental problems.

In the scholarship on liberal and civic republican citizenship, both types have been thoroughly critiqued from a variety of angles, including by environmental political theorists for their shortcomings in the face of pressing environmental ills. These critics posit that questions such as who is responsible for environmental ills and what policy mechanisms can be used to address them have very different answer sets depending on the specific theories of citizenship used to answer them. Many, though certainly not all, environmental political theorists have concluded that neither liberal nor civic republican citizenship can adequately support political

efforts at ensuring environmentally beneficial outcomes. Following the subsections overviewing each type of citizenship, I review the critiques offered of it by environmental theorists, organizing my analysis to respond specifically to the four characteristics listed in Table 3.1. My exploration of liberal and civic republican citizenship, as well as their inadequacy for addressing large-scale, complex environmental problems, provides a basis for then delving into the development of a new version of citizenship, alternatively called "environmental," "ecological," or "green" citizenship.[4] While this proposal is not without its critics, it does have potential to overcome the tension between a policy document's calls for action and that same document's naturalization of a passive citizenry that I identified in Chapter 2. I pursue this idea in this chapter's conclusion.

In addition to liberal and civic republican citizenships' centrality in political theory, liberal and civic republican citizenship are also of particular interest because of their close relationships to the thin and thick citizenships, respectively, that provided the analytic framework for Chapter 2. While thin and thick citizenship do not map perfectly onto all theoretical formulations of liberal and civic republican citizenship, they do share multiple important points of contrast (Bubeck, 1995, p. 3). In the concluding section of this chapter, which provides recommendations for discursively reshaping the climate citizen of the Southeast Florida Climate Change Compact's policy recommendations, I will highlight moments of connection among my overviews of citizenship theory and the seven dimensions of difference between thin and thick citizenship I explored in Chapter 2. In reviewing this material, though, it's important to note Bubeck's warning that the practice of citizenship in real contexts often falls along a continuum

[4] In the section on environmental citizenship, I briefly gloss the distinctions between adjectival modifiers for environmentally savvy citizenship (which include *environmental*, *ecological*, and *green*), but will generally use "environmental citizenship" as a catch-all term for these closely related concepts.

between the clear extremes distinguished in the theory, and this same warning applies to examples of liberal and civic republican citizenship.

I have chosen to focus here on several specific issues taken up by the citizenship literature. First, along with identifying liberal and civic republican citizenships' basic principles, I describe them along a contrast that occupies much attention in the citizenship literature: the varying roles of rights and responsibilities. Second, following Dobson's critique of focusing on rights versus responsibilities as overly simplistic, I address the additional three dimensions along which Dobson characterizes citizenship. These dimensions are listed in Table 6, which is a heavily modified version of Dobson's own table (2003, p. 39). It provides a focused and useful overview of the specific citizenship characteristics that create challenges and opportunities with which environmental political theorists must contend. I will address each characteristic below, drawing from multiple theorists to explain it within the context of liberalism and civic republicanism, as well as responses from environmental political theory.

Table 6. Two Types of Citizenship.

Characteristics	**Liberal**	**Civic Republican**
Rights vs. Responsibilities	Emphasis on rights/entitlements	Emphasis on duties/responsibilities
Public and Private Spheres	Strict divide between spheres	Strict divide between spheres
Virtues and Values	Virtue- and value-neutral	Shared virtues necessary for common good
Legitimating Institution	Territorial state	Territorial political community

An important point to note in this tabulation of the two types is that they have both shared and contrasting characteristics. Analyses of both the differences and similarities between liberal

and civic republican citizenship have been the subject of much work in political theory, with some theorists drawing a sharp line between them, while others, particularly those advocating for alternative conceptions of citizenship, emphasize the points of overlap between the two. The most common approach to distinguishing liberal and civic republican citizenship can be seen in Smith and Pangsapa's contention that whereas liberal democracy understands citizenship "in terms of civic or social rights," civil republican citizenship highlights the importance of "participation as a civic duty and a route to personal fulfillment" (2008, p. 38). Others, however, have troubled that distinction, often in service of demonstrating how they both are inadequate to achieve particular outcomes, such as sustainability (Dobson, 2003; Nash & Lewis, 2006; Sellers, 1998; Terchek, 1997). As is clear from the table, there are a number of salient points of contrast and overlap between the two concepts.

Liberal Citizenship and Critiques from Environmental Political Theory

Liberal citizenship is generally considered to be the prevailing mode in the contemporary United States, in line with this state's characterization as a liberal democracy (Sandel, 1996, p. 6). In its content, liberal citizenship draws on a set of shared values that also inform liberal state governance. Of course, these values will be somewhat differently defined and emphasized across various scholars' work.[5] Moreover, not only may specific conceptions of shared values shift, so too may theories of how best to work towards them. As Schuck (2002) puts it, "almost all mainstream political discourse in the USA, regardless of the speaker's party, proceeds as if the traditional values of individual freedom, autonomy, consent, and limited state power were universally embraced, with the only differences being the means for achieving them"

[5] See Meyer (2015), pp. 27-31, for a discussion of the difficulty of pinning down a single definition of liberalism and the dimensions along which conceptions of it differ.

(p. 132). Nonetheless, the liberal conception of citizenship generally coheres around shared responses to specific historic challenges such as increased attention to the individual as the basic social unit, the rise of egalitarian political philosophy during the Enlightenment, and the growth of pluralistic societies.

Table 7 reproduces the characteristics associated with liberal citizenship, first listed in Table 6.

Table 7. Characteristics of Liberal Citizenship.

Characteristics	**Liberal**
Rights vs. Responsibilities	Emphasis on rights/entitlements (contractual)
Public and Private Spheres	Strict divide between spheres
Virtues and Values	Virtue- and value-neutral
Legitimating Institution	Territorial state

The remainder of this subsection explains and analyses these characteristics, then provides a brief review of how environmental theorists have responded to the four characteristics of liberal citizenship; some theorists attempt to incorporate these characteristics as useful to environmental goals, while others critique them as impediments to the accomplishment of environmentally beneficial political action. I tend to side with the latter group. Eckersley (2004) summarizes nicely the environmental critiques of "the 'democratic deficits' of the liberal democratic state" (p. 14), noting that they focus not only on the state's functioning, but also its underlying liberal principles. It is worth quoting at length:

> The liberal state is regarded by many green political theorists as suffering too many democratic deficits to be able to respond to ecological problems in a reflexive and

> concerted manner. This critique is directed not only to the instrumental rationality of the 'administrative state' but also to the *liberal* character of its democratic regulative ideals, which are seen as inhibiting the protection of public goods such as the environment. (Eckersley, 2004, p. 14, emphasis original)

Eckersley's argument, as well as that of many other theorists (Dobson, 2003; Goodin, 1992; Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992), is that liberal ideology is fundamentally incompatible with the pursuit of engaged environmental discourse in service of a sustainable society. This incompatibility results from several of liberalism's most central characteristics.

Emphasis on rights/entitlements. An emphasis on liberty characterizes liberal citizenship, yielding a corresponding concern for individual rights. Enlightenment political philosophy, particularly John Locke's theories of the rational individual and property rights and John Stuart Mill's championing of self-interest and liberty as the foundational to social progress, provided a crucial theoretical foundation for these aspects of liberal citizenship (Schuck, 2002). As the name suggests, liberal citizenship has at its heart a concern for liberty, where liberty is the mechanism by which citizens are free to live self-determined lives based on their preferences relatively free from state interference. Rights are the codified principles by which these preferences are exercised and protected. As Wissenburg puts it, suggesting that rights serve this function even when they exist within non-liberal contexts,

> there is no public transport without a right to travel on buses, no private transport without a right to travel, no social security without a right to claim, no elected government without a right to travel, no dictatorship without an exclusive right to govern. (1998, p. 18)

The challenge for liberal theory then becomes the adjudication of conflicting rights and preferred life choices. We see this adjudication of rights at work, for example, in cases of pollution. What right does a property owner have to release pollutants into the environment on their own property when those pollutants do or might have negative ecological effects that spread beyond the bounds of that property? Liberal theory also must contend with self-determined life choices that conflict; this challenge is the basis for contemporary legislative and judicial decisions that must balance the individual's free choice against social well-being, as when drivers are legally required to ensure that their cars meet emissions standards.

Given these primary characteristics of liberal citizenship, it is no surprise that theorists frequently call attention to its emphasis on rights, which are necessary to protect the autonomous individual's claim to their good life free from state interference (Faulks, 2000; Heater, 1999; Wissenburg, 1998). Ideally, an expansion of rights—more rights to more people—offers both protection and increased opportunities for the performance of civic duties to oppressed groups (MacGregor, 2006). This observation raises another point: the role of responsibilities, often presented in relation to rights as the other side of the coin, in liberal citizenship. Liberalism's emphasis on rights has been accompanied by a concomitant de-emphasis on duties, which I explore below in my discussion of liberal citizenship's virtue-free nature. Historically, liberalism's increasing influence on political theory and the actual political process meant that "much of the twentieth century was taken up with the specification of entitlements and rights while the other side—obligations, duties, and responsibility—was neglected" (Smith & Pangsapa, 2008, p. 249); our liberal concern for rights far outweighs attention to responsibility.

Liberal citizenship's emphasis on rights has been a double-edged sword for environmental political theorists. On the one hand, emphasizing rights diminishes the

responsibilities citizens may have for protecting the environment. On the other hand, a system which venerates rights contains possibilities for extending those rights to the environment in service of its protection. As to the former concern, it is a negative critique of an absent quality in liberal citizenship; in other words, it is not so much that the emphasis on rights is itself problematic. Rather, circumscribing the citizen's role to a private consumer whose primary political activity exist in the exercise of rights means that liberal citizenship precludes opportunities for political engagement through the exercise of duty, and without engagement with public duties, there is no room in liberalism for the development of a conception of the "public good" which can include just environmental outcomes across all citizens. This means in turn that self-interested liberal citizens have no politically derived motivation to make environmentally sound decisions that do not benefit them personally. The emphasis on rights is thus part of a larger problem critiques of liberalism have identified: the inability of self-interest as a primary motivation to yield broadly just and beneficial outcomes across society, whether those outcomes are in the environmental or some other arena.

The latter point about the opportunities liberalism offers to extend rights in environmentally beneficial ways has given some theorists occasion for much great optimism, however. In her recent review of environmental citizenship scholarship, Gabrielson (2008) cites multiple theorists who have seen in liberalism the potential for expanding both the subjects and the contents of rights. Historically, only rational human beings have been included as rights-holders. As an example of how environmental concerns can expand that scope, however, Gabrielson cites Christoff's (1996) argument in favor of including animals and future generations as politically protected subjects, who should share equally in the rights enjoyed by current citizens. As for the expansion of the contents of rights, Gabrielson turns to Dean's (2001)

incorporation of rights to "fresh air and clean water" (Gabrielson, 2008, p. 431), as well as Faber's (1998), Bullard's (2005), and Agyeman's (2005) arguments incorporating social justice and sustainability through an expanded understanding of rights as fundamental to addressing environmental injustices. Despite this apparent value of liberalism's emphasis on rights though, Gabrielson notes that some see it as insufficient to address environmental problems, as its underlying commitments "embod[y] the instrumental rationality, anthropocentrism, and economic expansionism largely responsible for environmental degradation" (2008, p. 321). Among others, these commitments include the remaining characteristics of liberalism to be addressed from an environmental perspective, and the virtue- and value-neutrality of liberalism is of particular interest to those critiquing instrumental rationality and anthropocentrism in particular.

Strict divide between public and private sphere. For liberalism, the protection of an individual's interests and preferences requires the maintenance of a strict divide between the public and private spheres. The question of the distinction between the public and private spheres is complex and widely debated; broadly speaking, in liberal theory, the public sphere is the political space outside the home and outside work where citizens take actions such as voting, and it is highly restricted by liberalism's elevation of independent individuals over interdependent communities or the common good. Citizenship itself is bracketed into that restrictive space, making all the actions, decisions, policies, and institutions of the private decidedly non-political. Instead of political concerns shaping the private realm, "in liberal theory, market interactions and the pursuit of personal interest characterize the private realm" (Faulk, 2000, p. 59). In summarizing liberal theory, Meyer concurs that there has been a constriction of "the public

sphere of democratic politics in favor of the private sphere of economic preferences and narrowly self-interested action" (2015, p. 34). This state of affairs is a natural outgrowth of liberalism's focus on individuals and their rights.

Green political theorist John Barry notes that "it is a commonplace observation that for the most part, modern citizens in Western democracies are private citizens, detached or alienated...from politics and the public sphere, and concerned with the private spheres of employments...and the family" (2006, p. 36). Barry turns to Kymlicka and Norman (1994) for an explanation of this contemporary state of affairs, which is quite distinct from historical notions of a robust, publicly engaged citizenship. Kymlicka and Norman argue that the turn must be understood not simply as a hollowing out of the public sphere, but also as a concomitant enrichment of the private sphere. In other words, modernity has brought a fundamental cultural shift in the social locations from which we derive personal satisfaction and meaning; we now flourish in the private, rather than the public sphere.

Anecdotally, this diagnosis rings true. Particularly in contemporary U.S. culture, we are frequently exhorted to "work on ourselves": to get out in nature, to exercise, to learn a craft, to create projects to showcase on Pinterest, to live the curated life we can share on social media in order to advertise our personal fulfillment. While this may sound cynical, I don't believe this approach to one's private life is purely about selfishness. Accusations of selfishness or navel-gazing ignore the meaningful relationships that are built through those activities in that sphere. Given the deep fulfillment many *do* find in their private lives, simply exhorting people to exchange private for public engagement is impractical. What is required instead is a nuanced way to talk about precisely how the public sphere has been impoverished (or not) without casting the private sphere in the role of villain.

And, in pursuit of beneficial environmental outcomes, it is vital that we have these conversations. However productive the private sphere may have become in terms of personal fulfillment, it remains an environmentally dangerous place. It is in the private sphere, where many citizens lives primarily take place, that many environmental harms originate: from the cars we drive to the houses we inhabit to the reusable bags we forget to take to the grocery store, our private decisions add up to much more than simple individual preferences, at least in terms of environmental impact. By encouraging the isolation of these decisions from the political arena, liberal citizenship dilutes our ability to address the multitudinous causes of environmental ills. As Eckersley succinctly puts it,

> liberal democracies continue to construct decisions to invest, produce, and consume as essentially private matters, unless such decisions can be shown to cause direct and demonstrable harm to identifiable agents (which is never an easy matter). This construction serves to depoliticize decision making in the very domains that generate diffuse yet cumulative ecological impacts. (2004, pp. 241-42)

The strict divide between private and public thus puts a number of environmentally destructive activities which are in vital need of shared public attention outside the realm of policy and regulation. Liberal citizenship gives us no avenues for turning that public attention to private affairs, which are neatly cordoned off into a separate sphere.

Virtue- and value-neutral. Given the previous discussion of rights as a protective measure for a plurality of citizens' private preferences, it is not surprising that a defining feature of liberalism is that it cannot regulate the values and preferences of individual citizens (Wissenburg, 1998). This means the liberal state must be morally neutral, making liberal

citizenship itself value-neutral, as values cannot be required of or imposed on citizens; to do so would be to infringe on the individual's right to self-determination. Such infringement is unacceptable according to liberal principles; freedom itself is defined as the ability for the individual, a rational, autonomous subject motivated by self-interest, to pursue her individual preferences for the good life (Sandel, 1998, p. 5). This subject "counts for more than anything else because she is the source of acknowledgment of all values" (Wissenburg, 1998, p. 12). Values, then, come from the individual, not the state or other political institutions, and liberal citizenship provides a structured relationship between individuals and political institutions that supports—and, when necessary, minimally regulates—the pursuit of whatever vision of the good life those values create. Asking citizens to adopt externally-determined values would threaten the individual's agency within this relationship. Faulks notes that one crucial outcome of such heavy emphasis on individual autonomy is a skeptical view of community, as a community might "seek to impose obligations upon the individual that constrain or contradict his or her self-interest" (2000, p. 57). Crucially, in liberal citizenship, such constraints would threaten not only an individual's personal preferences, but liberty itself.

In his painstakingly argued exploration of the potential for a "greening" of liberalism, Wissenburg concludes that liberalism's commitment to value-neutrality precludes any engagement with deep-green ideological principles. He asks a key question that guides much of the debate specifically about liberalism and environmentally committed citizens:

> But can the liberal state produce such citizens without violating its commitment to value neutrality? If it is true that 'a greener liberalism will have to define more clearly what kind of sustainability, what kind of world, it aims for' (Wissenburg 1998: 81), then will

> this not commit it irrevocably to a determinate view of the good life, and will it not, at this point, no longer be a liberal state? (2003, p. 158)

While maintaining a concern for the environment, Wissenburg's primary commitment remains to liberal democracy, which he sees as best positioned to protect individual liberty and the pursuit of individual life plans. Wissenburg does see green potential in his proposed "restraint principle," which would require that

> no goods shall be destroyed unless unavoidable and unless they are replaced by perfectly identical goods; if that is physically impossible, they should be replaced by equivalent goods resembling the original as closely as possible; and if that is also impossible, a proper compensation should be provided. (1998, p. 123)

The restraint principle rests on the idea that enabling value plurality among citizens necessitates maintaining as many natural resources as possible with which citizens can exercise their preferences. If one's idea of the good life involves whitewater kayaking, the natural goods necessary for that (i.e., stretches of whitewater river) should not be destroyed (unless unavoidable, etc.).

Eckersley (2004) highlights how radical this proposal of limits on resource consumption is in relation to the Lockean roots of liberalism in absolute property rights. Nonetheless, the inclusion of the possibility that natural resources may be destroyed in return for "proper compensation" reveals Wissenburg's hesitance to ascribe any value to the environment outside of its instrumental use to human ends. This hesitance results from his commitment to value-neutrality; ascribing intrinsic value to nature would commit the liberal state to a particular ideological view that might impede the pursuit of individually held preferences. This commitment would lead to precisely the "determinate view of the good life" that Wissenburg

argues would undo the liberal state. But, as Eckersley and others argue, without protections for nature that are motivated beyond its instrumental use, political mechanisms are not suited to erring on the side of caution when the question of what counts as "unavoidable" destruction means.

Territorial state. Traditionally, citizenship, whether liberal or otherwise, is understood to be conferred and protected by the state, which at a minimum comprises a geographical territory and governing structures. Despite the growth in the number of supranational organizations throughout the twentieth century, the state has remained central to the determination and practices of citizenship, as the responsibility for holding citizens accountable to legal rules and obligations is largely reserved for states (Schuck, 2002, p. 136). Moreover, the contractual nature of liberal citizenship, in which states guarantee rights, domestic safety, or other benefits in return for citizens' agreement to fulfill responsibilities or have some rights curtailed ensures that the state plays a necessary role in the construction and maintenance of liberal citizenship. As the legitimating authority for citizenship, the state occupies much scholarly attention in citizenship studies and environmental political theory. Not only the liberal state specifically, but the very formation of nation-state, of whatever stripe, has been questioned or outright rejected by environmental political theorists who doubt the state's suitableness for addressing environmental ills that fail to respect human-made national borders or are caused by neoliberal globalization practices (see e.g., Conca, 2000; Dobson, 2003; Dryzek, 1992). I will discuss this rejection of the state further below; the point here is simply that states are understood, theoretically and in practice, to comprise bounded geographic territories. This understanding reflects Weber's sociological definition of the state as "a human community that

(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force *within a given territory*" (2009, p. 78, emphasis added). These ties among citizen, state, and territory mean that liberal citizens with a contractual relationship to a particular state are also bound to the territory that makes up the state. And importantly for ecological issues that do not respect state boundaries, liberal citizens' responsibilities are similarly restricted to the territory of the state.

The territoriality of the liberal state presents a particular challenge to environmental political theorists, given that "neither environmental problems nor environmentalists respect national borders and the principle of state sovereignty, which assumes that states ought to possess and be able to exercise more or less exclusive control of what goes on within their territories" (Eckersley, 2004, p. 4). Territoriality may in fact be among the most obvious concerns for any attempt to graft environmental issues onto political structures. It raises the question of where citizenship is rooted, both metaphorically and geographically, by drawing our attention to the mismatch between the geographic scope of citizenship and the geographic scope of environmental problems, particularly global ones like climate change. To some extent, this is a larger-scale version of the question of property rights implicated in Wissenburg's restraint principle. The notion that the territorial state is an inappropriate institution for addressing border-crossing environmental issues has led many environmental political theorists to outright reject the state in favor of other, trans-national forms of political organization (see e.g., Conca, 2000; Dobson, 2003; Dryzek, 1992).

A few theorists, however, such as Eckersley (2004), are willing to push back against this rejection. Eckersley, in proposing the normative possibility of a post-liberal green democratic state, argues that we must reckon with states, as they are not in any apparent hurry to become politically irrelevant. Given that, critical political ecology—the activist theoretical framework

from which Eckersley operates—must acknowledge that "any green transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be state-dependent" (Eckersley, 2004, p. 5). Her defense of the state as a site of political transformation does not extend to a defense of the *territorial* state as the ultimate unit of political action or the determinate boundaries of community and citizenship, however. Rather, Eckersley envisions the state as one layer of community within multiple transnational communities brought together by shared ecological concerns. Given this more fluid approach to how ecological stakeholders might be recognized as belonging to a community, Eckersley sees the potential for transformation of existing territorial nation-states' political mechanisms in order to enable them to account for communities that extend beyond national borders because of shared transboundary environmental threats. Whether or not the state remains part of the green equation, though, it seems clear that territoriality cannot be maintained as an ideological pillar in the face of environmental issues that traverse territorial boundaries.

Civic Republican Citizenship and Critiques from Environmental Political Theory

As with liberal citizenship, civic republican citizenship has a long history, of which a full accounting is beyond the scope of this chapter. In fact, civic republicanism's history predates by many centuries the commonly agreed-upon origins of liberalism during the Enlightenment. Many scholars trace the republican tradition to the political traditions of classical antiquity (Rahe, 1992; Sellers, 1998), where citizenship developed in the context of the Athenian polis (Faulk, 2000, p. 15). Throughout its long history, civic republican citizenship has taken a diversity of forms, meaning that offering any singular definition would be an oversimplification. A recent revival of interest in civic republicanism has added to that diversity, complicating the

task of boiling it down into an authoritative description (Dagger, 2002, pp. 152-54). My task here, then, is a fraught one, which I approach by focusing on the same characteristics I explored for liberal citizenship, in anticipation of the environmental critique of both. There are multiple aspects of civic republican citizenship which will thus go unaddressed, at least directly, such as the question of whether or how active political participation develops moral character and public-mindedness. What is lost in breadth by not providing an exhaustive overview, I hope will be gained in depth by preparing the ground for the question of the relationship of civic republican citizenship to the environment.

Table 8. Characteristics of Civic Republican Citizenship.

Characteristics	**Civic Republican**
Rights vs. Responsibilities	Emphasis on duties/responsibilities (contractual)
Public and Private Spheres	Strict divide between public and private sphere
Virtues and Values	Shared virtues and values necessary for common good
Legitimating Institution	Territorial political community

Similarly to liberal citizenship, environmental political theorists have seen both promise and peril for the environment in the tradition of civic republican citizenship. The latter is perhaps a more obviously comfortable fit, as republicanism emphasizes community and the common good over individual rights. While some theorists do argue that the common good necessarily includes the environment (Curry, 2000), the question of whether civic republican citizenship is best suited to achieving that common good remains a contested one. Much of the contestation

centers on the specific characteristics of civic republican citizenship I now take up, and the idea of the "common good" is a recurring thread throughout them.

Emphasis on duties/responsibilities. In contrast to liberal citizenship, civic republican citizenship emphasizes the performance of public duties and responsibilities over the private and political exercise of rights (Peterson, 2011, p. 58). Certainly, we could list duties expected of citizens within liberal democracies: paying taxes, serving on juries, voting, and obeying laws all spring to mind. Two features of this list of expected duties are worth noting, however: first, they are all actions that citizens are explicitly called to do—tax deadlines come around, the jury summons lands in the mailbox, voting day arrives, traffic signs exhort us to come to a complete stop. Second, the list quickly runs dry; certainly citizens can get involved in other ways (attending city council meetings or volunteering for a political candidate come to mind), but these actions are seen as above and beyond the *expected* duties. Civic republican citizenship encompasses a much wider range of citizenly duties, and, importantly, it expects that citizens will be active in seeking out and fulfilling those duties (Dagger, 2002, p. 150). This means that fulfillment of duties is not a binary, as it is for liberal citizenship, in which you've either checked off the tasks on your short list of responsibilities or you haven't. Rather, civic republican citizenship allows for active participation to happen along a scale; one can be more or less active, with the expectation that a 'good' citizen falls more towards the active end of the scale, no matter what particular form their activities take.

Additionally, this encompassing approach to duties associates their fulfillment with civic virtue. Under civic republicanism, citizens are expected to take responsibility and participate politically as an expression of public-minded virtues, not because they fear the threat of legal

sanctions. Taking the case of paying taxes as a duty, the difference between the two motivations becomes clear. Liberal citizenship, with its emphasis on individuals' rational self-interest, would likely lead to many citizens not paying taxes if they were not subject to legal reprisal for doing so. Unless those taxes arguably contributed directly to a citizen's welfare, there would be no motivation for paying them. Civic republican citizenship, however, presumes that we fulfill duties not solely out of self-interest, but also out of a virtuous interest for the public good. Civic virtue is the motivating mechanism, as it is the "disposition to further public over private good in action and deliberation" (Burtt, 1990, p. 24). The main point here is that the duties of civic republican citizenship are not imposed top-down by political and legal institutions; rather they are taken up by citizens who see fulfillment of their duties as a valued expression of civic virtue.

Civic republican citizenship's emphasis on duties and responsibilities arises from the centrality of the public or common good in the tradition. When we share in a common good, we share a responsibility for working towards it. In environmental terms, this may mean, for example, taking steps to "restrain excessive self-interest and its environmentally detrimental effects" (Gabrielson, 2008, p. 434). Thus, civic republican citizenship seems to present a ripe opportunity for forwarding environmental goals that require active citizen engagement and a concern for shared goods, such as a healthy environment. Curry defends the inclusion of the environment in the idea of the common good by defining it as "both that which is needful to all for each person to live, within the existential limits of life itself a fully human life; and that which can only be generated, in effect, by all together" (2000, p. 1061). In other words, only by emphasizing duties over rights can we together generate the healthy environment required for all to live fully, as an emphasis on rights does not guarantee protection against individually self-interested behavior that harms the broader environment.

However, the emphasis on duty raises concerns for advocates of fairly distributed access to and engagement with citizenship. In a materialist critique of duty-based approaches to connecting citizenship and the environment, MacGregor asks the crucial questions, “What kind of subject would one have to be to fulfill the expectations of the good environmental citizen? And what are the assumptions that underpin the constructions of such an ideal subject?" (2006, p. 105) The answers to these questions, given prevailing social conditions, are not heartening. Tasking citizens with more duties (including lifestyle changes that accompany the spillover of public political concerns into the private sphere) requires of them more time and effort, two resources which are historically unequally distributed between privileged and oppressed groups, such as men and women or white citizens and citizens of color. Intersectional feminist theory adds the insight that this unjust distribution is compounded for those whose multiple axes of oppression render them invisible in analyses of justice (Crenshaw, 1991), strengthening the potential that an active environmentally-driven citizenship, like the historically exclusive civic republican citizenship, will be a subject position only accessible to the privileged. MacGregor argues, therefore, that simply shifting focus from rights to duties is an unrealistic panacea that does not account for the importance of rights in creating more equal social and economic conditions or for the need for duties to be contextualized by material conditions. Faulks echoes this sentiment, explaining that “to increase responsibilities without addressing the barriers to their fulfilment would only lead to greater social inequality. Enhancing the content of citizenship means addressing rights and responsibilities as reciprocal ideas” (2000, p. 106-107).

Strict divide between public and private sphere. This emphasis on duties in civic republican citizenship is intertwined with its demarcation of the public sphere, where duties are

performed in service of the public good, from the private sphere. Civic republican citizenship shares this demarcation of public and private with liberal citizenship; however, whereas in liberal citizenship this divide protects the private sphere from political overreach, in civic republican citizenship the divide serves to elevate the public sphere, the social space of "public service, citizen participation, loyalty to the community, and activity for the common good" (Barry, 2006, p. 37). This elevation of public over private is apparent in the historical form republican citizenship took in ancient Greece, where any citizen who focused on private concerns over and above public duty was shirking their obligations and therefore subject to censure (Dagger, 2002, p. 149). The emphasis on duties, performed out of civic virtue, combined with the very public nature of these duties, reveals a deep chasm between liberal and civic republican citizenship in terms of their basic unit of concern; in liberalism, it is the individual, whereas in civic republicanism, it is the public, the shared political community. As Heater puts it, "the republican style of political thinking places great emphasis above all on the necessity for the state and its citizens to be a community, an organic society, not merely a collection of individuals" (1999, p. 55). While communities can certainly form in private civil society, outside of political concerns, the development of a community that includes the state requires a robust public sphere.

Whereas liberal citizenship privileges the private sphere and civic republican citizenship privileges the public sphere, they share an environmental critique based not on their emphases, but rather on the very division between private and public that they codify. Private behavior often drives environmental degradation, so its exclusion from political debate is an untenable impediment to dealing with the root causes of harm to the environment.

Some environmental political theorists who draw inspiration from civic republican citizenship, however, see the "common good" of civic republicanism as offering an opening that

is lacking in liberalism for the private sphere to become a space of political environmental concern. Historically, for those men fortunate enough to enjoy citizenship in classical contexts, citizenship "permeated all aspects of life in the polis," meaning that one's individual actions were inseparably bound up with the public virtues and duties of citizenship, as this citizenship ideology placed the common good at the center of political and social life (Faulk, 2000, p. 16). So, while there was a private sphere occupied by women, children, slaves, and other non-citizens, the citizen's public life included their private actions. This multi-dimensional view of the citizen raises the hope for environmental political theorists endorsing a civic republican conception of citizenship that it can create the conditions for "the creation or cultivation of such [environmental or sustainable] citizenly virtues and behavioral changes" (Barry, 2006, p. 28). Moreover, even if environmentally beneficial virtues and behavioral changes do *not* take hold in individual citizens' ways of living, however, civic republicanism's emphasis on the public sphere may provide the opportunity for endorsing environmental good over individual choice. Curry takes this stance—that the common good of republicanism can outweigh private preferences—arguing that "where there are conflicts between public duties and private virtues, the latter must give way, or else both decline together" (2000, p. 96). On the question of the public and private spheres, then, civic republicanism in its most traditional form rightfully takes much critique for its exclusivity, but may hold some promise for the inculcation of environmental concern among citizens and the adjudication of tensions among private claims and the public good.

Shared virtues and values necessary for common good. The very idea of a common good presupposes a role for values, as any attempt to conceive of the good is a value-driven ethical project. Before continuing down this line of thought, I'd like to briefly distinguish

between values and virtues, such as the civic virtue that's already been examined from several angles. A virtue is a character trait that one has; it is a disposition to act a certain way in order to achieve beneficial ends of whatever kind. Connelly notes that for Aristotle, the appropriate end for virtuous behavior was "eudaemonia," or human flourishing, but argues that virtues can have other ends, such as environmental protection, that also contribute to the common good (2006, pp. 50-52). Values, on the other hand, are not character traits, but rather expressions of that which we care about; they are the source of the preferences so dear to liberal citizenship. I can *have* the virtue of wisdom, while I *value* the just outcome of wise decisions. In other words, the centrality of virtue—specifically civic virtue—in civic republican citizenship does not necessarily lead to the need for civic republican citizenship to rely on shared values.

What the need for shared values, in addition to the shared virtue of civic responsibility, does follow from is civic republicanism's focus on "the common good." In order to pursue a common good, citizens must be able to generally agree on what that good is, which seems a tall order in the fractured political climate of the contemporary US. In the classical tradition, however, the relatively small scope of the body politic would have better enabled Aristotle's goal of citizens being able to "know one another's characters" (qtd. in Heater, 1999, p. 45), facilitating the development of shared values through education and public participation. Contemporary civic republican theorists do not enjoy the benefit of such personal bonds across citizens. Nonetheless, many argue that for civic virtue to flourish in support of participatory political practices, citizens must develop not only the character traits that drive them to participate, but also the values that make such participatory political practices preferable to other forms of government. Drawing in the ethical dimension to this concern for values, Sandel writes, "Insofar as certain dispositions, attachments, and commitments are essential to the realization of

self-government, republican politics regards moral character as a public, not merely private, concern. In this sense, it attends to the identity, not just the interests, of its citizens" (1998, p. 25). The contrast between liberal and civic republican citizenship is clear. The former takes individuals as the source of values, and citizenship is the framework through which rights protect the plural preferences derived from those values. Any political attempt to shape values is a betrayal of the liberal contract between state and citizens. Civic republican citizenship, however, actively shapes its citizens in order to motivate and equip them to act for the common good; at a minimum, citizens should value civic virtue itself.

The importance of shared virtues and values in civic republicanism for achieving the common good is directly related to this point about the possibility for shaping citizens to be environmentally aware and to behave in environmentally conscious ways. For liberal citizenship, such active political preference formation is out of the question; value can only be derived from citizens, and the political process can only respond to the citizen as an individual with fully- and privately-formed preferences (Wissenburg, 1998). In contrast, civic republicanism provides the opportunity for shaping values through education and social conditioning, and these values can be inclusive of environmental concerns. Barry certainly takes this position, as evidenced above, in his avowal that " the greening of citizenship is an attempt to encourage and create an identity and mode of thinking and acting, and ultimately character traits and dispositions that accord with the standards and aims of ecological stewardship" (2002, p. 145). Gabrielson (2008) highlights this tendency towards promoting the character-shaping potential of civic republicanism in Barry's work, following her summary of his work with the critique that it risks exclusionism by putting citizenship in service of ecologism, thereby leaving out of citizenship those who don't ascribe to environmental ideals. Civic republicanism's openness to shared values in service of

the common good may thus be also of service to environmental goals, but it remains, according to Gabrielson and other critics, an imperfect model for creating both an environmentally-oriented and fully inclusive political system.

Territorial political community. Like liberal citizenship, civic republican citizenship is tied to specific geographic territories. This characteristic has its origins in the Greek polis, where "the notion of citizenship rights had a very circumscribed significance, being the status of (rational) property owners who had certain public duties and responsibilities *within the city-state*" (Turner, 1990, p. 202, emphasis added). Although liberal and civic republican citizenship share the constraint of territoriality, they can be distinguished by the role territoriality plays in determining the content of citizenship. Dobson (2003) argues that territoriality matters differently for the two types of citizenship because of their disparate emphases on rights and duties. For liberals, as previously noted, the territory is a feature of the state, which contractually guarantees citizens' rights. On the other hand, for civic republicans, the territory occupied by the political community is the space from which civic duties arise. A civic republican citizen might deliberate, for example, about fracking policy in a specific political community, but if it is not *her* community, then that deliberation does not count as the discharge of civic duties. I distinguish here between the state as relevant to liberalism and the political community as relevant to civic republicanism, as civic republican citizenship suggests the possibilities of relationships among citizens and between citizens and political institutions of varying scope. Only (or primarily only) the state can guarantee rights, which is the main concern of liberalism, but the duties so central to civic republican citizenship can arise at the level of the neighborhood, city, county, and so on.

As to the question of the location of a legitimating political institution, the same critiques of liberalism's roots in territoriality apply to civic republicanism's roots. If anything, civic republican citizenship may be even more closely tied—at least historically—to place, as the ideology's emphasis on community has traditionally referred to a community bound together by their existence within a geographically bounded space, such as the polis of ancient Greece. This connection to place can be both boon and challenge for those advancing environmental causes. While challenges arise when environmental harms escape the borders of a place, place can also be a powerful emotional connection through which citizens are motivated to care about and respond to environmental ills. Gabrielson (2008) identifies place as a major concern throughout attempts to draw together civic republican citizenship and environmental concerns; she points, as an example, to Reid and Taylor's (2000) argument that any broader environmental awareness on the part of the citizen is rooted in that citizen's contextualized and embodied experience of local place (2008, p. 434). Thus, like rights for liberal citizenship, territoriality—the connection of the political community to geographic space—presents environmental political theory with a dilemma. It can circumscribe possibilities for political culpability when environmental harms transgress the boundaries of political communities, but it can also provide a powerful motivation for political communities to engage with environmental harms at all.

Environmental Citizenship as an Alternative to Liberal and Civic Republican Citizenship

Given widespread dissatisfaction with the potential for either liberal or civic republican citizenship to enable us to address non-territorial, temporally distant, and inequitable environmental ills, an alternate set of citizenship theories has emerged focused squarely on the question of how citizens and the environmental problems they both cause and face can be

ameliorated. In my term "climate citizenship," green political theorists will hear an echo of this grouping of citizenship theories, which are variously referred to as environmental, ecological, sustainability, or green citizenship. These are, broadly speaking, normative theories, whereas my concept of climate citizenship is descriptive, yielding different content when applied to a variety of specific policy contexts. The normative theories, however, provide us with a benchmark for evaluating the outcomes of descriptive studies, such as my own. To that end, I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the development of environmental (and related versions of) citizenship, then use that new potential version of citizenship to briefly re-imagine how the climate citizenship of the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact (SFRCCC) could have shaped its documentation in the Regional Climate Action Plan (RCAP).

As environmental critiques of both liberal and civic republican demonstrate, environmental citizenship provides an opportunity to develop a normative ideal that draws from them even as it transcends the challenges they pose. Thus, it presents an opportunity to consider what policy might look like if written in the context of an active citizenship working towards a conception of the common good that includes beneficial environmental outcomes. Environmental citizenship is itself a contested concept, but typically, its proponents advocate extending moral consideration to non-human animals, or even non-human non-animal entities, the promotion of citizen responsibility for sustainability, and active, engaged citizenship practices. Theorists do differ on many points in their conceptualizations of environmental citizenship, of course; some advocate a place-based green citizenship, while others elevate global cosmopolitanism as a basis for citizenship. Here I present environmental citizenship as proposed by van Steenbergen (1994) and Dobson (1995), some of its earliest proponents, and also briefly gloss some of the major critiques leveled against their versions of environmental citizenship.

These critiques, in part, will set the stage for my discussion of the ethical bases for environmental citizenship in the next chapter.

Part of why there is much variety across theorizations of environmental citizenship is that there is no *a priori* reason that the environment and political theory should have a relationship with each other, let alone an *a priori* reason for any particular relationship between the two. Rather, the environment becomes a political object (or even actor) as soon as political theories identify a place for the environment within their conceptions of the state, of governance, of citizenship, and so on.[6] The theoretical turn to engaging the environment as a crucial element of political theory has yielded the subfield of "environmental political theory," which Meyer describes as "broaden[ing] that already wide horizon [of the human political community] to the entire nonhuman world within which this political community is embedded" (2015, p. 11). This field, Meyer is careful to note, does not share a universal ideological framework or critical and activist commitment (p. 10); the adjectival modifier *environmental* is not to be confused with the common activist term *environmentalist*. Given this variance among theorists' approaches to their work, it is not surprising that the concept of environmental citizenship also varies widely.

The case for including the environment in conversations about citizenship is made, in part, by calling attention to the pressing nature of environmental problems. Once we agree that polluted waterways, smoggy air inversions, microplastics proliferating the ocean, and other causes of environmental degradation must be addressed, the next question naturally becomes how to address them. Many approaches have been proposed, from ecological modernization (see

[6] Certainly, there are those, particularly in philosophy and ethics, who argue that nature's intrinsic value at least guarantees it a role as a moral agent (see e.g., Attfield, 1983; Bunyard & Morgan-Grenville, 1987; Johnson, 1991). The debate about how to attribute value to nature is outside the scope of my argument here, however; my point simply is that any political understanding of the environment cannot stand apart from the theoretical perspective in which it is embedded.

e.g., Friedman, 2008; Maarten, 1995) to environmental utopianism, advanced for example by bioregionalists, who would have us organize in drastically new political and social ways (see e.g., Sale, 1985). At the heart of these proposals, though, is the political question of how society should be organized in order to enable and support the specific approaches being championed. As Dobson puts it, “the political and social options available are narrowed down by recognizing, first, that some ways of life are more sustainable than others, and, second, that some institutional forms are more likely to deal effectively with environmental problems than others" (2007, p. 66). The field of argumentation then shifts to which ways of life and institutional forms are best suited to “deal effectively” with the environmental crises at hand.

In answer, some environmental theorists, such as Naomi Klein (2015), have turned to exclusively structural solutions. This turn appeals to common sense: If the goal is simply to generate beneficial environmental outcomes, why not just legislate or incentivize behavior leading to those outcomes? In response, though, Dobson and Bell (2006) argue that political coercion is insufficient to produce long-term solutions to environmental problems. Although they acknowledge the role of governmental nudging through fiscal policy in order to encourage "self-interested rational actors" to behave sustainably (2006, p. 1), they assert that this is at most a necessary, but not sufficient, form of intervention. In making this claim, they name two specific concerns: 1) self-interest is not exclusively limited to fiscal concerns, and 2) motivating behavioral change is valuable, but behavioral change is not necessarily accompanied by attitudinal change. In regards to the latter concerns, they point out that "there would be nothing necessarily odd or inconsistent in changing our behavior in respect to the consumption of plastic bags without that change of behavior 'overflowing' into a more general change of attitude as far as waste and pollution are concerned" (Dobson & Bell, 2006, p. 3). In other words, certainly, we

can design certain nudges to motivate specific behaviors, but without a meta-understanding of the reasons for the behavior, the consumer may never even think to transfer the behavior to other realms, let alone be motivated to do so.

Once attitudinal orientation is admitted as an object of political concern, we enter the realm of citizenship, which is generally focused on the relationship of the individual, who possesses particular attitudes, with broader political communities and institutions, which may or may not support the expression of those attitudes. If we adopt environmentally beneficial outcomes as a valid goal for the state to pursue, as is possible under civic republicanism and marginally possible under liberalism, it becomes clear that such outcomes are more achievable if individual citizens possess attitudes that support them. The challenge then becomes one of how to motivate individuals to adopt environmentally-oriented attitudes and how to develop structures and mechanisms that enable them to engage politically with environmental issues.

Within environmental political theory circles, a solution to this challenge has been proposed: a bottom-up change in individuals' relationships with society, the political system, and the environment, driven by a change in citizenship. This change is an attempt to form new types of citizenship, alternately labeled "environmental" (Dobson, 2003; Dobson, 2006), "ecological" (Christoff, 1996; Dobson, 2003; Smith, 1998), and "green" (Dean, 2001) citizenship. Further supporting the idea that citizenship can provide a different approach than coercive structural change, Smith and Pangsapa assert the connection between this normative type of citizenship and citizens' engagement with environmental values and attitudes, whether they agree with them or not. Smith and Pangsapa write, "Above all else, ecological citizenship is grounded through citizens understanding the reasons for change rather than obeying a set of instructions or responding to financial incentives in a utilitarian model of action" (2008, p. 49). Whatever its

particulars, this feature distinguishes environmental citizenship, particularly from mainstream liberal proposals for solving environmental problems, which includes many (unquestioned) calls for ecological modernization.

Gabrielson (2008), for example, questions the narrative that would have us choose between an ancient tradition of civic republicanism and a modern tradition of liberalism. She identifies a narrative within citizenship studies that "begins with a once rich and robust ancient public sphere directed towards the good life, which was privatized in modernity and now, as evidenced in security, consumerist and green discourses, is directed towards the maintenance of mere life alone" (2008, p. 429). Rather than taking this narrative at face value, however, Gabrielson argues that it is a "specter" that yokes us to classical and modernist versions of citizenship, preventing us from developing new normative conceptions of environmental citizenship rooted in postmodern perspectives.

So what is this environmental citizenship that may hold such promise for developing robust democratic traditions capable of tackling environmental challenges? In an early attempt to bring together citizenship and the environment, van Steenbergen (1994) proposed that ecological citizenship could be understood as a fourth version of citizenship, adding to the three versions previously proposed by Marshall (1973): civil, political, and social. In his account, ecological citizenship develops out of three approaches, each advanced by a variety of theoretical and social movements. These approaches respond directly to several of the problems and opportunities environmental theorists have identified with regards to the liberal and civic republican traditions. The first approach Marshall identifies is the attempt to expand rights beyond the human moral community, which reflects efforts to use the affordances of liberalism to protect non-human animals and the environment. Second, moves to broaden citizen responsibilities to include

responsibilities to nature reflect efforts to use the affordances of civic republicanism to the same end. And finally, the development of global environmental movements reveals the need for ecological citizenship itself to be global, in contrast to the traditionally bounded territoriality of liberal and civic republican citizenship. For van Steenbergen, each of these overlapping approaches yields opportunities for developing a global ecological citizenship, which he stresses is "an all-inclusive category based on equal rights for all living creatures" (1994, p. 151). Despite the emphasis on rights in this categorization, van Steenbergen acknowledges that he sees the most potential for ecological citizenship in an extension of responsibilities, based on a renewed understanding of human interconnectedness with nature. In this, though not explicitly, van Steenbergen aligns himself with civic republican revivalists.

This early exploration of possible connections between citizenship and the environment has been greatly bolstered in the following years by much more detailed analyses. Perhaps the most influential is Dobson's work, particularly his book *Citizenship and the Environment* (2003). In Dobson's view, environmental citizenship takes inspiration from, but still transcends, more mainstream citizenship traditions, specifically liberal, civic republican, and cosmopolitan citizenship. In Dobson's words, environmental citizenship:

> ...draws on various traditions of citizenship to develop a more intersubjective, community-based account of the rights and obligations of individuals in connection with sustainability. Thus liberal citizenship supplies the idea of environmental rights for citizens, such as the right to environmental space. The republican tradition provides an account of the obligations that environmental citizens might have, as well as the idea that citizenship is about contributing to the common good in addition to exercising one's

> own rights as a citizen...Environmental citizenship borrows the idea of transnational citizenship from the cosmopolitan tradition. (2007, p. 134)

In addition to drawing ideas about rights, responsibilities, and transnationalism from existing citizenship traditions, Dobson's ecological citizenship relies on the concept of ecological footprints to make sense of how these features might be understood. Our ecological footprints can infringe on others' rights to a healthy environment, so we have an obligation to ensure our footprints are sustainable, not only for ourselves but also for those distant in space whom our footprints might negatively affect (Dobson, 2003, p. 118-19).

Dobson's is not the definitive account of environmental citizenship, however; such an account is elusive, as green theory and citizenship theory have been put into conversation in such a variety of ways (Dean, 2001). It does, however, provide a deep engagement with the characteristics of citizenship I am concerned with here: rights and responsibilities, the public and private spheres, the limitations of territoriality, and the role of virtues and values. In their more recent exploration of ecological citizenship and social justice, Smith and Pangsapa draw in the first three of these characteristics, articulating ecological citizenship as "a new 'politics of obligation' that questions the theoretical boundary between public and private spheres and undermines their institutional embodiments of the state and civil society that remain so central to liberal thinking" (2008, p. 80). The role of virtues and values is even more fundamental to their project, which considers how virtue ethics can bridge the seeming divide between environmental issues and social injustice. This connection is, broadly speaking, an attempt to articulate how politics and ethics implicate each other, and the problems of each cannot be solved from above by the other—both are required. The inclusion of ethics supports the reinjection of "virtues" into the conversation as a basis for thinking about citizenship obligations.

Some substantive critiques have been offered of Dobson's account, such as Gabrielson's observation that if the primary obligation of environmental citizenship is to ensure the sustainability of one's own ecological footprint, it creates a system of "asymmetrical obligation" in which the emphasis remains on autonomous individuals (2008, p. 439). She cites Latta, who charges the theory with elitism:

> The economically (and ecologically) powerful are the political agents of Dobson's ecological citizenship, while those on the other side of unequal material relations remain passive counterparts, objects of an imperative for ecological distribution instead of active citizens in the reconfiguration of global futures. (2007, p. 384)

This critique draws attention to a strong theme that runs throughout the scholarship on environmental citizenship: the desire to integrate environmental citizenship and active democratic engagement. Agyeman and Evans (2006), for example, distinguish between "narrow focus" civic environmentalism and "broad focus" civic environmentalism, where the former maintains an individualist passive version of citizenship and the latter, by drawing in economic and social—as well as environmental—justice, emphasizes active citizenship as a necessary condition for political transformation sensitive to citizens' interdependent subject positions (see p. 190 for a table detailing the contrasts between these foci). Gabrielson is similarly concerned with the need for environmental political theorists to pursue the intersections of the environment and citizenship as "the window of opportunity for democratic action narrows" (2008, p. 441-442).

In this call for an active citizenry, we see a trace of civic republicanism citizenship's emphasis on the fulfillment of duties in the public sphere. As previously noted, it certainly seems a much more comfortable fit with attempts to politicize the environment than does liberal

citizenship. For many theorists, though, environmental citizenship is a separate concept, with some overlap to be sure, but also with definitive differences. Although many questions remain unsettled in regards to environmental citizenship (and will likely never be fully settled; thus is the nature of theory), it is nonetheless a valuable concept for returning to the issue explored in Chapter 2 of thin and thick citizenship's naturalization through policy documentation. In the following section, I connect the idea of thin vs. thick to this chapter's comparisons of liberal, civic republican, and environmental citizenship, then conclude by discussing how a commitment to thick environmental citizenship can reshape how policy is written and embed a more productive version of climate citizenship in policy documentation.

Environmental Citizenship's Potential Influence on Climate Citizenship

Unsurprisingly perhaps, given the general characterization of the US political system as steeped in liberal ideology, the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact's Regional Climate Action Plan (SFRCCC RCAP) currently aligns with a fairly liberal democratic political system. This is apparent in the results of the critical discourse analysis, which show a heavy emphasis on thin citizenship, highlighted in Table 9. The characteristics of thin citizenship that are naturalized in the RCAP align it with multiple key characteristics of liberalism citizenship. Rights are privileged over responsibilities, yielding a passive citizenry. A view of citizens as independent subjects is fundamental to liberalism's focus on liberty as a matter of free choice, minimally constrained by relationships among citizens and with the state. This emphasis on choice necessitates the maintenance of value neutrality, so citizens can pursue their own preferences free from obligations to the common good. The overlaps are clear, and

environmental political theory's critiques of liberal citizenship thus apply equally to thin citizenship.

Table 9. Thin and thick characteristics of climate citizenship in the SFRCCC RCAP (Faulks, 2000, p. 11).

Thin Citizenship	**Thick Citizenship**
rights privileged	rights and responsibilities as mutually supportive
passive	active
state as a necessary evil	political community (not necessarily the state) as the foundation of the good life
purely public status	pervades public and private
independence	interdependence
freedom through choice	freedom through civic virtue
legal	moral

On the other side of the table, as Bubeck (1995) notes, thick citizenship shares much in common with civic republican citizenship. Given the multiple ways in which the civic republican tradition can deter truly inclusive responses to environmental problems, I posit that, in cases of environmental policy-making at least, thick citizenship can be more productive when treated as a version of environmental citizenship than civic republican citizenship.

To make this point, I'll provide two examples of thick citizenship characteristics absent from the RCAP in order to imagine how the document may have differed were its naturalized climate citizenship purposefully based on environmental citizenship. I'll first discuss the characteristic "freedom through civic virtue," then turn to "interdependence," both of which the RCAP currently does not engage as meaningful citizenship characteristics. Instead, as discussed

in Chapter 2, the RCAP's emphasis on "choice riders" highlights the value placed on choice as an approach to securing citizens' freedom. The goal is to make public transportation "cool," in order to attract riders who have other choices, such as personal or family cars. This approach speaks to liberalism's need to maintain a plurality of choice in order to allow citizens to pursue varied, independently held preferences. State constraint of those choices, such as—in an extreme case—by banning car use altogether, would be decried as an unconscionable attack on freedom. The strategy of "cool"-ifying public transportation carefully navigates between liberalism's twin pillars of freedom and value-neutrality. *Not* restricting choice maintains freedom, while making public transportation cool doesn't look to directly shape citizens' preferences, but rather to make *this* particular choice more attractive, given what the policy makers assume to already be true about citizens' preferences.

In contrast, a civic republican approach to how citizens make personal transportation choices would be much less concerned with individuals and their right to act on private preferences. Instead, an RCAP shaped with civic republican citizenship might ask citizens to set aside their personal preferences should the common good call for it. This last caveat, though, the question of whether the common good calls for it, draws our attention to the need for a specifically environmentally inflected understanding of thick citizenship. Civic republican citizenship may give us useful language and traditions for inviting citizens into the policy-making process, for example by turning to civic virtue as a motivation for action. But environmental citizenship provides the lens through which virtue, interdependence, interconnected rights and responsibilities, and other features of thick citizenship can respond to specifically environmental concerns, such as the non-territoriality of environmental harms or the ways in which private behavior drives environmental degradation.

Similarly, interdependence as a citizenship characteristic could be written into the RCAP in support of environmentally beneficial outcomes. In Chapter 2, I analyzed how the overwhelming prevalence of an economic frame in the RCAP reveals the document's investment in citizens as independent rational actors. This is a standard feature of liberalism, with its emphasize on maximizing free choice and downplaying how individuals are actually interrelated and interdependent in ways that complicate our decision-making calculus as citizens. Our interdependence, in other words, means that sometimes we make choices not as economically-motivated, self-interested rational actors, but as community members, family caregivers, dependents, parts of ecosystems, and so on.

An environmental thick citizenship would prompt the inclusion of more varied frames in the RCAP that could appeal to this variety of interdependent relationships we are all enmeshed in. For example, discussion of sea level rise (SLR) in the RCAP are often accompanied by reference to land values, as when the RCAP reads,

> The upper estimate of current taxable property values in Monroe, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties vulnerable in the one-foot scenario is $4 billion with values rising to more than $31 billion at the three-foot scenario. The greater values reflected in the financial impacts are coastal residential properties with ocean access and high taxable value. (SFRCCC, "RCAP," 2012, p. 9)

This emphasis on high-value resident properties may, in fact, appeal to the owners of those properties and their desire to protect their economic investments. Such an appeal would be right in line with liberalism's expectation that individuals respond rationally to rational inputs. But what of the property owners who are less concerned with economic investment than with their family's historic connections to the Florida coast, where they have canoed and fished for

generations? Or the non-coastal residents who would rather see these properties devalued so more beachfront in the area would be publically accessible? In light of these and other audiences, the narrowness of the economic frame becomes apparent—its target audience is a small sliver of independent actors whose top concern is property investment values. Encouraging a broader set of citizens to buy into the policy requires different frames that acknowledge their interdependent relationships with each other and with their local environments.

Conclusion

I began this chapter by calling attention to the tension between calls for active citizen participation in policy-making and policies that naturalize a passive version of citizenship. In the case of the RCAP, this passive version of citizenship becomes a mechanism by which citizens are deterred from engaging actively with climate policy, leaving us with a version of climate citizenship that keeps policy-making in the realm of experts and relegates citizens to the role of passive audience for public communication of previously determined policies.

My goal here was to explicate the three main normative theories of citizenship that are available to us in considering which kinds of citizenship are at work in this process, as well as which might enable us to better achieve our goal of integrating environmental policy-making and communication practices. As analyses from environmental political theorists show, liberal and civic republican citizenship are not up to the task; multiple of their defining characteristics limit their ability to motivate citizens to engage with the complexities and boundary transgressing nature of environmental challenges. Instead, if the thick citizenship of Chapter 2 is to be productively put to use in shaping better climate citizenship, it must be informed by the burgeoning theories of environmental citizenship.

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CHAPTER 4: ADOPTING AN ETHIC OF FLOURISHING AS THE BASIS OF THICK ECOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP

"Ethical theory, in particular, ought to help us negotiate our personal, social, and institutional relationships."

—Chris Cuomo, 1998, p. 2

Accepting climate change as a looming and urgent problem prompts urgency in our responses to it. We need to curb CO2 emissions, we need to adapt infrastructure, we need to promote sustainable lifestyles. And we need to do it now. This much seems obvious.

Hidden behind that obvious urgency, however, are the sticky questions of *how*. How should we curb CO2 emissions? How should we adapt infrastructure? How should we promote sustainable lifestyles? And in these questions are embedded equally urgent ethical questions. Ethics are the philosophical systems by which we guide our moral decision-making, and any interrogation of the social question of how we should act is inherently moral. And importantly, all politics is suffused with ethical choices. When making policy, it is impossible to be outside of ethics, because policy is a process of making choices about what should happen and how people should live their lives and be affected. In turn, ethics themselves are always political, given that beyond being an abstract system of judgment, they are a framework by which we make decisions within our lived realities, which are always shaped and constrained by the institutions and communities in which we are already embedded. As ecological feminist Chris Cuomo puts it,

"Ethics, values, and moralities, are always political—they express, influence, and respond to power that is economic, governmental, discursive, symbolic, and born in social relations" (1998, p. 56). As such, when we examine political constructs like citizenship and political discursive products like policy documentation, the choice to address or ignore ethics is just that: a choice. I choose to address ethics in service of developing an ethically sound version of the thick ecological citizenship I called for in the previous chapter, in acknowledgment, in part, that citizenship has often been unethically exclusionary and had unequal outcomes for both humans and non-humans.

I begin the chapter with an explication of how ethics are imbricated in citizenship and policymaking through the inextricability of both of these from virtues and values. I then turn to the primary ethic explicitly discussed by green political theorists in relation to ecological citizenship: an ethic of care. Following a brief description of this ethic, I break down its shortcomings as a basis for citizenship, and turn instead in the final section to my alternative proposal: an ethic of flourishing. I conclude with a meditation on why these crucial questions of ethics warrant a turn away from potentially quicker technocratic policy-making processes.

In Defense of Virtues and Values

Given the centrality of ethics to political questions, I want to first defend the notion of bringing virtue and value into the conversation. All political systems, even those, such as liberalism, which claim to be value-neutral and virtue-free, are based on some idea of what values will allow us to build the best framework to support citizens' efforts to live the good life. As discussed in Chapter 3, liberalism claims to be value-neutral by virtue of it not imposing values on citizens; they are all free to value different things, and it is the task of the political

system to protect that plurality of choice. However, through its ontological orientation towards its subjects, that very approach to political theory itself already has hidden values embedded in it. Liberalism's claim to value-neutrality rests on the clever obfuscation of the fact that its assumption of a rational, autonomous subject, making choices purely out of self-interest is itself a value-laden approach to political structures. While these rational, autonomous subjects may be free to value various things, the political system they are operating in values them for their rationality and autonomy. Emotion, motivation out of concern for others, interdependent relationships--these and other characteristics of the non-liberal subject are simply not valued in liberalism. In order to maintain the appearance of value-neutrality, however, liberalism naturalizes its concern for rationality and autonomy in order to present them as an inevitable, essential part of human nature. In other words, liberalism's appearance of value-neutrality involves a tautological move: liberalism values rationality and autonomy, but because liberalism cannot value some things over others, humans must naturally be rational and autonomous, so these traits are not values prized by liberalism, but simple facts of human nature.

We see this move in the naturalization of a liberally inflected climate citizenship in the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact's (SFRCCC) Regional Climate Action Plan (RCAP). Chapter 2's analysis showing the RCAP's overall discursive preference for thin over thick citizenship demonstrates that this policy document is the result of a series of choices about who citizens are and what motivates them; the very fact that an alternative climate citizenship is possible evidences the value-laden nature of the climate citizenship that eventually does emerge from the documentation. Policy is, of course, also a series of choices about what to do in the world: what infrastructure to build, adapt, and let go to seed; how to maintain and change transportation systems; which ecosystems should be protected and how; and so on. These

choices are a result of expert-driven deliberation about best outcomes for the broader community and environment, meaning that even as the liberal thin citizenship of the SFRCCC doubles down on values like free choice and independence, the policy itself sets constraints on what the good life might look like for the supposedly free and independent citizens in that community.

In other words, making policy decisions, even about highly technical and scientific issues, do not simply involve determinations of "matters of fact," but also must grapple with deeply entrenched "matters of concern" (Latour, 2004). I am certainly not the first to make this observation. In the specific case of sustainability policy, such as that proposed by the SFRCCC, Dobson (2003a) rejects outright the idea that definitions of and paths to sustainability can be determined purely scientifically. His rationale is that different actions will have differing consequences among humans and non-humans, so determining what sustainable actions to take is a matter of determining how to distribute those consequences. This decision is, by definition, non-scientific. As Dobson puts it, "deciding which elements 'matter' is itself a normative as well as a scientific affair" (2003a, p. 147). And in being normative, it is also already ethical.

A specific example might be in order to illustrate this claim. Dobson (2003a) makes his point by observing that policy-makers, while not denying the normative component of sustainability, typically do not recognize its centrality. His analysis of several policy documents shows that throughout, normative assumptions are implied, but not stated outright. For example, the *Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters* (1998) contains sustainable development objectives with implied normative goods that could in fact be understood as being in direct conflict. Dobson's example is the possible conflict between an objective of "maintaining high and stable levels of economic growth and employment" and an objective of "rivers of good or fair quality";

clean-up of a chemical spill into a river would boost economic activity (Dobson, 2003, p. 150). Here, Dobson is making several claims quite similar to my own: 1) environmental policies, such as those focused on mitigating and adapting to climate change, cannot be addressed through purely technical or scientific means; and 2) policy documents often contain unrecognized normative assumptions about what is good. Dobson's conclusion is, in part, that pretending these are purely techno-scientific measures prevents us from seeing potential conflicts, like the one listed above, and also that the obscuring of values prevents the government from meeting its "obligations to citizens" (Dobson, 2003, p. 157). He firmly concludes that meeting these obligations would require policy documents to "surely contain explicit and systematic reference to the values present in 'facts'" (2003, p. 157). This call for making the normative explicit is somewhat beyond the scope of my argument for examining and evaluating climate citizenship in policy documentation, but it does highlight the centrality of value to all policy.

A potential response to this often unrecognized role of values in policy-making would be to insist on allowing citizens to inject their own values, freely and independently held, into the policy-making process. To some extent, this response reflects arguments from proponents of citizen participation that purely technocratic policy-making prevents citizens from reflecting on and shaping how policy might express their own best interests (Fiorino, 1990). But, as Fiorino and many other proponents of citizen participation have observed, we cannot be satisfied with simply asking citizens to share their views in the context of policy-making. We must also be concerned with the next steps: how do we move from more voices being included in the policy-making process to a policy finally being made? In response to this question, I offer a critique of the idea that a liberal framework for policy-making can simultaneously acknowledge the

importance of values held by individual citizens and maintain that policy outcomes are the result of a value-neutral process.

My critique derives from the observation that actual, not ideal, policy-making involves stakeholders and citizens occupying a wide variety of social locations. Under the logic of liberalism, the animating ideology of thin citizenship, a deliberative process inclusive of citizens creates a level playing field on which citizens are equally able to share and debate their values in order to arrive at a policy solution that represents a compromise among them. This view of inclusivity, however, rests on a problematic assumption about the relationships among values, citizenship, and policy-making; specifically, the assumption that inclusivity is simply a matter of opening up the deliberative process ignores material realities that both shape citizens' values and create unequal access to and influence in policy-making. Eckersley (2004) takes up this point in her critique of the unrealistic assumptions underlying liberal political processes, which is worth quoting at length:

> Liberal pluralism--in its blindness to gross disparities in social power and communicative competence--asks that all players be equally tolerant of one another and prepared to compromise and live with the outcomes that are negotiated and mediated through the policy-making and law-making procedures of the state. Liberal democracies are thus defended as providing a fair means of reconciling competing preferences, *as if* all preference holders are equally well placed to articulate and assert those preferences. (pp. 99-100)

In other words, by bracketing off value as simply something that citizens bring to the deliberative table to be debated and compromised on, recommendations for inclusive policy-making that don't account for differential access to and influence at that table *do* end up elevating some

values over others. This is the danger of pretending that a political framework and policy-making process can be value-neutral; this assumption prevents us from seeing the ways that values are disparately included or excluded from that framework and process.

Instead, attempts to include citizens in policy-making must account for the material, discursive, and ideological contexts shaping citizens' ability to be included and to matter in the process once they are included. In part, this realization requires us to consider the logistics of inclusive policy-making: when organizing citizen juries, citizen review panels, public hearings, and so on, it is vital to attend to questions like whether meeting times and locations are accessible to citizens who, for example, work non-standard hours or who rely on public transportation.

But this issue is theoretical as well as logistical. Values enter the policy-making process not only through the preferences that citizens bring to it, but also through the ideologically driven ontological premises that allow us to recognize the need for policy to be made and to decide how to respond to that moment of need. These ontological premises, as discussed above, are inherent to any political ideology, whether liberalism, civic republicanism, ecologism, or any other. As Cuomo asserts, "given the project of feminist environmental ethics, it becomes increasingly necessary to enunciate clearly the ontologies within our ethics, and the ethical implications of our beliefs about being" (1998, p. 42).

The take-away here is that all political systems, whether their proponents admit to it or not, promote some values to the detriment or exclusion of others. This is an inescapable social fact, inherent to the project of governance and policy-making. Given that values cannot be divorced from policy-making, we must then turn to the question of which values will best help us make policy and govern in ways that yield our desired outcomes. This question is not necessarily

teleological; desired outcomes may not be a matter of what end we want to achieve, but rather what process we want to engage in in order to govern, make policy, and build our shared society. A commitment to inclusive democratic decision-making is, for example, a commitment to a particular process by which we make deliberative choices as a society. It is also a choice with ethical ramifications. If we profess to support inclusion, but do not account for our ideological positioning, such as within a liberal framework, or our actual processes include and exclude various voices and values, we have made an ethical choice about who and what is morally relevant to our policy-making, even if that choice goes unrecognized or unacknowledged.

Given that ethics animate policy-making and its relationship to citizenship, I have an obligation to explicitly and critically evaluate the ethical frameworks underlying my recommendation to adopt ecological citizenship as a more productive basis for climate citizenship in policy. To that end, I'll first review and critique the theoretical turn to ethics of care (Dean, 2003; Dean, 2001) by ecological political theorists, then offer the alternative framework of an "ethic of flourishing," developed by ecological feminist Chris Cuomo (1998).

Ethical Challenges to Ecological Citizenship

As discussed in Chapter 3, the question of what precisely ecological citizenship is is not a settled one. The need to determine its possible form and features has inspired a robust debate among political theorists. This debate includes attention to both the distribution of citizen duties and ecological citizenship's ethical dimensions. Here, I'll examine closely two specific views of how ecological citizenship should warrant its claims to certain responsibilities for citizens and to ethical premises underlying those claims, in order to frame my own argument for embracing a new ethic, an ethic of flourishing, in re-imagining climate citizenship as a targeted application of

ecological citizenship. The version of ecological citizenship I begin with is Dobson's (2003a), which is a well-articulated and tightly argued concept whose most defining feature is obligations that individuals have to each other to live sustainable lives by regulating their ecological footprints. Through this focus, Dobson shares a primary concern with Dean, for how citizenship can enable "the just distribution of scarce resources" and help us "negotiate the basis for human interdependency" (Dean, 2001, p. 490). Attending more closely to ethics than does Dobson, Dean advocates achieving these goals by adopting an ethics of co-responsibility and care.

Unequal Distribution of Responsibilities

As to the question of how citizenly obligations are assessed and distributed, Dobson turns to the concept of the ecological footprint: a measurement of the extent of our use of natural resources. In doing so, Dobson sees the strength of his project as partly lying in its insistent materialism (2003a, p. 110). In this, it is distinguished from "idealist" projects that work from "first principles" like ideal speech communities or ontologies of embeddedness in nature in order to deduce citizenship. Certainly, given that the problem space is environmental, Dobson is right to attend to the actual constraints materiality places on citizens to live in ways that allow for just and sustainable access to natural resources. Unlike many other theorists, Dobson does not premise his argument on claims to moral status for non-human animals, ecosystems, other other elements of nature. Rather, Dobson is avowedly anthropocentric, claiming the mantel in part for its "expedience" (2003a, p. 112). Materiality and anthropocentrism, he asserts, allow him to develop a concept of ecological citizenship that is appealing even to those who may not be concerned with harm to nature or want to ascribe moral agency to any non-humans.

However, while Dobson does begin with a consideration of how citizenship is enacted in a material context, his analysis of materiality goes no further, nor does his analysis of citizenly obligations account for how our contexts differ beyond the material, as our social locations are determined by identity, institutions, power, and so on. Dobson in fact explicitly turns away from taking a closer look at how citizens, within their specific contexts, might meet their citizenly obligations. He writes, "simply put, then, the principal ecological citizenship obligation is to ensure that ecological footprints make a sustainable, rather than an unsustainable, impact. Exactly what this means in terms of individuals' daily lives is not something that can be discussed here, and I do not propose to outline a manifesto for 'green living'" (Dobson, 2003, p. 118-19). Not wanting to propose a manifesto for green living is certainly understandable; to do so would likely even be misguided, as a manifesto, through its very generality, would not address the problem of differential social locations that I am calling attention to.

But in avoiding the question of how the ecological citizen's obligation to "ensure that ecological footprints make a sustainable, rather than an unsustainable, impact," Dobson avoids addressing a crucial issue in his argument about who owes whom obligations. Throughout Dobson's theoretical development of ecological citizenship, the charge to make a sustainable impact is generalized to mean that people in the Global North are obligated to pare back their ecological footprints, while people in the Global South are owed a more just distribution than currently exists. The disparity in access to resources and beneficial environmental outcomes between the Global North and South certainly exists and is well-documented, so Dobson is not wrong to gesture towards it. Moreover, his articulation of the ecological citizen's obligations can apply to all citizens whose footprints are unsustainable, no matter where they live.

However, generalizing these obligations to accrue to all with unsustainable footprints fails to account for citizens' unequal abilities to meet these obligations. In other words, Dobson's accounting of what citizens *should* do to sustainably use natural resources ignores the key question of what citizens *can* do, given their specific social locations. One of the most talked about constraints on what citizens *can* do is socioeconomic status; even as they are more likely to experience environmental degradation in their everyday environments, low-income citizens are also less likely to have access to or resources to purchase sustainable options for food, housing, and transportation (Holdsworth, 2003). We cannot obligate all citizens to equally ensure their ecological footprints are sustainable when some have far more ability to do so in ways that maintain their quality of life than others. Take, for example, changing one's transportation and consumption habits as a path towards meeting ecological citizenship responsibilities. Citizens do not make choices about how to live their lives, whether sustainably or unsustainably, in a vacuum. Rather, they are constrained by the options that are available to them—for example, do they have access to a type of transportation that allows them to move around sustainably? Citizens are also further constrained by the complex and multiple systems in which their lives are enmeshed—for example, are poor US citizens living in food deserts and eating cheap mass-produced food made with unsustainably harvested palm oil not fulfilling their citizenship obligations?

MacGregor (2006b) makes a similar point about the lack of attention to material and systemic constraints in ecological citizenship theory. She lists three specific ways in which this scholarship overlooks major issues, many of which have been highlighted or can be explicated by feminist theories of justice and equality. She writes that ecological citizenship, in its currently theorized form, involves "a paradoxical coupling of labor- and time-intensive green lifestyle

changes with increased active participation in the public sphere, silence on questions of rights and social conditions that make citizenship practice possible, a failure to acknowledge the ways in which injunctions to make green lifestyle changes (as expressions of good ecological citizenship) dovetail into neoliberal efforts to download public services to the private sphere" (2006b, p. 102). Each of these critiques speaks to specific material conditions encountered by citizens and how they make some ecological citizen's burdens unjustly greater than others.

Equality is not just a matter of resource distribution. It is also a matter of justice. Dobson recognizes this in his detailed consideration of the compatibility of social justice and environmental sustainability, where he describes social justice as concerned with "the fair distribution of benefits and burdens" (2003b, p. 89). But the objective of fair distribution is imperiled when a citizenship framework does not attend to the ways that power and structural oppressions affect how people live. Citizens' ecological footprints are not solely a product of their rational, unconstrained choices, so justly placing obligations on them to live sustainably requires also working to make their social contexts more supportive of sustainable living for all, no matter their socioeconomic status, race, gender, disability status, or other characteristics.[7]

Unequal Distribution of the Burden of Care

The problem of just distribution of obligations--in addition to resources--represents the first major ethical challenge to my proposition of reframing climate citizenship through the theoretical concept of ecological citizenship. The second ethical challenge, which can be

[7] In fact, the complexity of this project, the difficulty of making structural change, and the "naive" reliance on individual citizens to make rationally motivated sustainable choices leads some theorists, such as Agyeman and Evans, to reject environmental citizenship entirely (2006, p. 201). Agyeman and Evans propose environmental justice as an alternative path to sustainability, arguing that justice is a much more politically efficacious starting point for motivating change.

understood as a specific application of the first, arises from the valorization of "care" as a civic virtue that can motivate citizens, ecological or otherwise, to interdependently build inclusive approaches to negotiating citizen rights and responsibilities. This civic virtue has the advantage of being rooted in lived social experience, so that it might resonate more with citizens than abstract notions of ideal citizenship behavior. As environmental political theorist Hartley Dean puts it, "inclusive relationships are achieved in the context of specific social networks of care and responsibility and cannot be created by ascribing rights and responsibilities" (2001, p. 502). Notably, Dean's (2001) argument for connecting green moral discourse to everyday action as well as Dobson's (2003a) conceptualization of ecological citizenship draw explicitly from feminist theories of an ethic of care. However, in an extended argument connecting ecofeminism and ecological citizenship, feminist and environmental political theorist Sherilyn MacGregor notes the interest in care by these two scholars, but critically observes that "their treatment of care lacks a critical assessment of the kinds of cultural, social, and economic changes that will be needed if it is to be politicized, de-feminized, and de-privatized" (2006a, p. 95). Without such critical assessment, their centering of care is open to the sharp critiques and careful explication the concept has borne from feminist scholars.

First introduced by Carol Gilligan (1982) and extended by Nel Noddings (1984), the idea of an ethic of care offered a feminine alternative, grounded in psychological studies of moral development, to historically male ethical theory which privileged universal rules and rational, autonomous moral subjects. Care ethics, in contrast, emphasized contextual decision-making sensitive to relationships and responsibility for the care of others, which purportedly were considerations more likely to shape women's moral decisions, whether because of nature or socialization. In the decades since, this theory has faced challenges from feminist scholars who

charge it with essentializing and stereotyping gender, erasing the varied intersectional oppressions experienced by different women, and inadequately accounting for the labor involved in caring (see e.g., Hoagland, 1992; Moody-Adams, 1991; Warren, 1999).

As noted by MacGregor (2006a), care ethics have been especially central to ecofeminist theorization of women's connections to nature and their political engagement on environmental issues. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that environmental political theorists, with their shared concern for combating environmental degradation, have picked up on the potential for care to shape a new orientation towards human-nature relationships. Unfortunately, while adopting the language of care, they have not been equally attentive to the dangers associated with it.

Dobson writes about care as a secondary virtue of ecological citizenship following from its primary virtue of justice; we are motivated to care, he argues, by our desire for justice (2003a, pp. 132-33). Care functions, for Dobson, instrumentally: "care (and compassion) will in some circumstances be the secondary virtues required for exercising ecological citizenship's first virtue, which is (distributive) justice" (2003a, p. 134). Moreover, because of its historical association with the private sphere, tying care to citizenship creates a bridge between the private and the public spheres. This is a crucial move for Dobson, as the centrality of the ecological footprint to his conception of ecological citizenship means he must account for activity in both public and private spaces; my ecological footprint is produced by my use of energy to drive to the public voting booth as well as to cool my private home. In other words, care enables Dobson to theorize a politically agentive ecological citizenship that is rooted in the individual ecological footprint, no matter how, where, or when that footprint is produced.

Dobson also notes Dean's (2001) attention to the instrumental value of care. Dean advocates an eco-socialist citizenship that links human emancipation with ecologically beneficial

outcomes. This version of citizenship chafes under strictly contractual understandings of citizen rights and responsibilities, as it requires attunement to actual conditions of oppression, as opposed to universal ideals. In support of this attunement, Dean proposes adopting an ethic of co-responsibility that allows rights and responsibilities to be negotiated in service of a shared responsibility to each other. Recognizing that this is still a rather abstract ideal, Dean offers the ethic of care as "the crucial link between an abstract principle of co-responsibility and the substantive practice by which we continually negotiate our rights and duties" (2001, p. 502). Care thus becomes the attitude we can use in our everyday lives to think through and act on our co-responsibilities.

This focus on instrumentality allows both Dobson and Dean to skip over the critical questions of how carework is done and who is responsible for doing it, both key points of weakness in the theory which have been highlighted by feminists and ecofeminists. While Dean does, at least, acknowledge that "some feminists remain sceptical of the essentialist claim that women are somehow closer to Nature and that caring feminine values are of an inherently higher moral order than dominating masculine ones," he quickly dismisses these concerns by claiming that "they none the less define an ethic of care that should become the property of men as well as women" (2001, p. 502). This caveat does reflect some ecofeminist positions and could represent a way towards more justly distributing the currently unequal burdens of care, which is gendered and raced such that women and especially women of color are held far more responsible for the actual activity of caring. What neither Dobson nor Dean engage in, however, is this very idea of care as activity.

MacGregor distinguishes between care as an attitude and care as an activity; the former can be summed up by the less gendered notion of "caring *about*," while the latter is the highly

feminized work of "caring *for*" (2006a, pp. 58-59). Dobson and Dean would have the ecological citizen care about just environmental outcomes, but spare no explicit thought for who bears the responsibility of caring for them. Implicitly, the burden Dobson places on the ecological citizen to create a sustainable ecological footprint can be understood as an obligation to care for one's environmental impact and potential harm that may do to other humans. If this is the case, though, Dobson praise of care as a virtue by which to uphold justice is subject to the same critique I previously made of distributing responsibilities among ecological citizens without attention to their social conditioning and positioning by and in interlocking systems of oppression.

There may be ways to overcome the problems associated with care as a basis for ecological citizenship, but neither Dobson nor Dean acknowledge these problems, let alone offer solutions to them. In her exhaustive analysis and critique of care as a basis for environmental political engagement, MacGregor (2006a) concludes by rejecting it altogether in favor of developing political subjectivities, particularly for women, that are transformative rather than tied to suppositions about women's current ways of being in the world. Even if the burden of care were to be more equally distributed among privileged and unprivileged citizens, MacGregor argues, there is danger in treating care as a traditionally feminine practice, largely because that understanding of care often assumes that women's most important experiences occur in the context of caregiving. Such an assumption may preclude seeing caregiver subjects as also political subjects whose knowledge derives from more than their experiences as caregivers. MacGregor's argument rests on her observation that ecofeminist celebrations of care rely on a slippage between ontology and epistemology; because of who they *are* as carers, women can *know* in particular ways. The danger for MacGregor lies in the acceptance of "'what' women are, under current and entirely problematic conditions, while closing off a discussion of 'who'

women might become as citizens in a radically democratic, non-sexist, and ecological society" (2006a, p. 80). By questioning ecofeminists' reliance on the experience of care to warrant their claim to a distinctly feminine epistemology, MacGregor reminds us that progressive ecological and democratic ideals are likely not best served by an ethic that not only disproportionately burdens the oppressed, but is also grounded in assumptions that place gendered limitations on the roles various citizens can occupy in the public sphere.

This critique of care's role in ecological citizenship theory is especially important, as in environmental political theory, "in all but a few cases the only time feminism or ecofeminism is mentioned is in relation to care ethics, giving the impression that this is the only contribution these rich bodies of theory might make to the conversation" (MacGregor, 2006a, p. 96). Bringing feminist critiques such as MacGregor's to the table pushes environmental political theorists to grapple with the problematic assumptions embedded in their uncritical adoption of care ethics in service of ecological citizenship. That "most green political theorists of citizenship work from a definition of citizenship that speaks volumes about their commitment to participatory democracy at the same time as it reveals their assumptions about the organization of socially necessary work" (MacGregor, 2006b, pp. 105-106) opens them to the ethical charge that their theories are exclusionary of and burdensome to the already oppressed, a charge which ethics of care is hard pressed to answer. Feminist ethics have much more to offer environmental political theory, and I'd like to begin filling the lacuna MacGregor observes by offering an alternative feminist ethic, which addresses directly the need to distribute both burdens and benefits justly among citizens while also allowing the potential for developing and growing new political subjectivities: an ethic of flourishing.

Ecological Feminism and An Ethic of Flourishing

Like MacGregor, Chris Cuomo (1998) rejects care ethics as a meaningful framework for ecofeminism. Where MacGregor shifts away from ethics to focus on the politicization of the gendered subject, however, Cuomo stays firmly focused on ethics, offering an ethic of flourishing as a fully developed alternative. To distinguish herself from ecofeminists guilty of essentializing and romanticizing women and their labor--through care ethics as well as other arguments--Cuomo takes on the mantle of "ecological feminism" and describes the primary difference as a concern not with objects of oppression, a focus that can shade too easily into essentialism, but with the systems of oppression through which those objects, whether human or non-human, experience oppression (1998, pp. 5-7). This focus on systemic oppression demonstrates the promise of ecological feminism, and its attendant ethic of flourishing, to provide a theoretically sound ethical framework for re-imagining an ecological climate citizenship that combats unjust distribution of burdens and limitations on the political subjectivities available to oppressed citizens. In this section, I first summarize Cuomo's approach to ethics, which includes a strong critique of traditional ethics and some strains of feminist ethics, and her starting point for developing an ethic of flourishing: four fundamental claims about ethics, ontologies of humans and nature, and the effects of oppression. I then lay out what an ethic of flourishing entails and discuss its relevance to the project of developing an alternative climate citizenship that draws from existing concepts of ecological citizenship but addresses their ethical problems, previously discussed in this chapter.

Ethics as Contextual, Interdependent Practice

To frame her argument, Cuomo positions ethics not as a universal system of rules, but as a "technical practice," which "carries connotations of thoughtful agency and of the potential for change and controversy regarding how one ought to act in social contexts" (1998, p. 5). This positioning allows Cuomo to trouble "the line between theoretical and applied ethics," which she writes "is far more permeable than philosophers generally acknowledge, and only through constant dialogue with applications and real ethical problems can ethical and political theory be made relevant. I argue for ethics at the crossroads of ethical and political theory and practice, and for the practical importance of radical philosophy" (1998, p. 10). Locating herself at this crossroads allows Cuomo to place concern for ethical practice and actual material context at the center of her ethics. This centering in turn opens the theory-building work of ecological feminist ethics to a plurality of experiences and viewpoints, which is critical in order for this theory to address the wide variety of intersecting oppressions that challenge subjects, whether human or non-human, ability to flourish.

Cuomo also insists on acknowledging the fundamentally interconnected nature of subjects, arguing that "ecological feminists see human ethical and political agents as primarily, necessarily, and intrinsically social, in a broad, ecological sense. In addition, ecological feminists conceive of human selves as social and as ecological, as necessarily and significantly participating in/as nature as well as human social reality" (1998, p. 100). This interdependence, importantly, is not between fixed and self-evident versions of self, society, and nature. Rather, it is further complicated by the constructed nature of these concepts and the need to question appeals to their "self-evident" nature (Cuomo, 1998, p. 92). Taking this approach enables Cuomo to reject the problematic essentialism that has dogged much ecofeminist theory, as well as

environmental ethics and political theory that fails to reflect on its own ontological and epistemological assumptions about nature (Cuomo, 1998; Gabrielson, 2008). In other words, ecological feminism's view of humans as enmeshed in mutable social and ecological systems with porous boundaries allows the theory to avoid reifying nature as separate from the social and the human as well as to avoid basing its ethics on essentialist conceptions of humans as fully independent and rational agents.

Moreover, raising questions about these assumptions shifts the grounds of debates about environmental ethics beyond the realm of simply extending the moral community. With interlocutors from ethics, feminism, animal law, and other areas, the scholarship on this issue is too extensive to fully review here. The key idea from this scholarship that many have advanced is that reducing oppression of both humans and nature simply requires extending moral status to them in order to create grounds for also extending them rights of protection. Cuomo embraces this need to broaden the moral community, but underscores the need to go further, in order to overcome the danger of extending existing ethics without addressing problematic assumptions they bring along in their wake. Cuomo cites liberally inflected ethics as an example of an existing ethical framework that needs more work than extension alone can provide, as its ethics are rooted in "beliefs in atomistic selves and rights" that Cuomo has already rejected as inaccurate reflections of humans' situatedness in interdependent social and environmental contexts (1998, p. 44). Committing herself to the development of a new ethical framework in service of ecological and social flourishing, Cuomo argues that "radical environmentalisms calling for the replacement, not just the extension, of given ethical norms...do not take for granted the sufficiency of given moral and political institutions as bases for ecologically sound practices and values" (1998, p. 18).

This discussion gives us a fairly clear picture of the major premises Cuomo has rejected in building her theory of ecological feminism, but what of the premises she accepts? Cuomo acknowledges that to build ethical theories requires making choices that themselves cannot be pre-justified: "any ethic has value-laden starting points, and in the end an ethicist must simply either lay out or assume her own" (1998, p. 45). As a basis for her value-laden starting points, Cuomo lays out four claims about the interrelationships of humans, nature, and oppression that her ethic must account for:

1. Ethical systems that devalue the "feminine or natural" must be revised or rejected in favor of taking "excluded beings or groups seriously as morally relevant" (1998, p. 38).
2. Materially speaking, harm to nature disproportionately harms the already oppressed and unprivileged (p. 38-39).
3. Both "'woman' and 'nature' are socially created concepts," which can refer to a wide variety of "beings and objects" (p. 39).
4. Building new ethical choices must be attentive to the problematic roots of older ethical systems, and anything taken from them must be emancipatory in current contexts, with attention to the intersectionality of oppressive systems (p. 39).

Moving forward from these claims, Cuomo takes as her primary starting point "an assertion of the value of our lives, our communities, and nature," which she explains refers to "persons who possess and inhabit particular, social, political, and historically-loaded identities which can only be possible and meaningful in the context of other persons and 'natural' communities and environments" (1998, p. 47).

To strengthen this claim to value, Cuomo points to our emotions as representing our ability to attribute value to things, but is careful to note that an ethical system must enable ethical

relationships even between beings which have no, or even negative, feelings for each other (1998, p. 50). In other words, feelings may help us understand that value exists, but ultimately the claim that "our lives, our communities, and nature" have value is Cuomo's laid-out starting point. In pursuing the claim to value for these objects, Cuomo acknowledges that "to assume that ethics matter, or that normative matters are and ought to remain meaningful in discourses, political communities, and material practices, is to commit oneself already to some basis upon which it is arguable that something is better than something else" (1998, pp. 45-46). With that caveat in place, she makes two further claims about the starting points for ecological feminism: first, being alive is a sufficient condition to qualify for consideration as a moral being, and second, human well-being and flourishing are irrefutable goods which in turn underscore the necessity of ecological flourishing. The first claim is Cuomo's nod to the need to broaden the moral community. The second is the heart of what it might mean to make ecological feminist ethical choices in practice, so let us turn now to what flourishing means.

What It Means to Flourish

To begin moving towards a positive conception of flourishing, Cuomo first lays out ecological feminism's conception of the good, which I quote here at length:

> "It [the good] should be applicable, at least in a very basic way, to a variety of sorts of entities, including human individuals, human groups and communities, nonhuman sentient individuals, species, and ecological communities. It should be useful for thinking about the interests of technologically and linguistically advanced beings, as well as plant life and systems of organic and inorganic matter. It should be *naturalistic*—grounded in (though not necessarily identical with) facts about people, societies, animals, and

ecosystem processes—but should not be *teleological*—based on the assumption that there exists a determinate final end to which things and process inevitably aim. (1998, p. 63).

While this discussion of the good does not provide a straightforward definition of it, it operates as a sort of functional definition, telling us what the good should do and how and to whom it should apply. The avoidance of naming a particular outcome or set of outcomes as the definitive version of the good is a purposeful move to avoid taking a teleological view of nature. Providing this functional definition, however, leads Cuomo to emphasize flourishing, as, in order for us to even have the capacity to value the entities listed here in a way that honors those entities' life process, flourishing is an ethical implication. Practically speaking, nonhuman flourishing is necessary to human flourishing, and human flourishing is a precondition for ethics "to get off the ground at all" and for commitments to value moral beings' good to be met (Cuomo, 1998, p. 63).

That question of other beings' value raises the spectre of the longstanding debate in ethics over instrumental versus non-instrumental (or essential) value. Cuomo strikes a careful path down the middle of this debate, arguing that "ethics that begin with flourishing capture the sense in which instrumental and noninstrumental value are often enmeshed," as attending to both our own flourishing as well as that of others calls on our sense of both instrumental and noninstrumental value (Cuomo, 1998, p. 64). In fact, the two are perhaps less distinct that commonly assumed, as granting noninstrumental value to the flourishing of others "may ultimately serve one's flourishing, or the flourishing of one's own community or species" (Cuomo, 1998, p. 65). The boundaries between instrumental and noninstrumental are porous, and the complexity of social and environmental systems and processes means that we cannot always know or predict the results of our valuing an entity for one reason or the other. Given that, we should err on the side of more valuing rather than less, considering that "although valuing people

and communities for instrumental reasons is not bad in and of itself, this sort of valuing is not sufficient to prevent exploitation, or to disrupt a one-dimensional understanding of other persons and communities" (Cuomo, 1998, p. 65). This call to move past the debate recalls the green political theory's interest in the precautionary principle, with the added dimension of the need to account not just for the negative potential for harm but also for the positive potential for flourishing. Cuomo suggests the latter when she describes as "promising" the idea of "assessing actions, practices, institutions, attitudes, and values in terms of their impact on ecological and human flourishing" (1998, p. 65). This point is of particular interest in the context of my argument about citizenship, and I will return to it in the conclusion to this chapter.

In terms of what it might actually mean to flourish, Cuomo begins with Aristotle's idea of *eudaimonia*, which she writes "refers to the achievment [sic] of the best of what it means to be human" (1998, p. 66) and its attendant concern for virtues. She rejects most of his underlying assumptions, which would require us to conclude that there is a singular definition of a moral agent and moral object that are distinct from the kinds of flourishing experienced by other entities. Aristotle's attempt to define excellence in being human, unsurprisingly, rested on a universalist assumption of rationality and its exercise as the highest good in service of other virtues. Of course, however, such universalist approaches not only erase difference among humans, but also conveniently material contexts which privilege those with the time, leisure, and recognized ability to practice excellent rationality--in other words, not women, not slaves, not any number of other oppressed groups. Clearly, Aristotle's version of flourishing cannot be adopted by ecological feminism. From Aristotle, though, Cuomo does rescue one valuable idea, which is that "anything that possesses characteristic activities or qualities has the theoretical capacity to exist with health and integrity" (1998, p. 69). This is not to say that characteristic

activities or qualities accrue universally to every entity within whatever categorizations we make, but that individual entities possessing these, whatever they may be, are entitled to flourish.

At this point, Cuomo has rejected one conception of flourishing, but established a baseline for what entities *can* flourish, which underlies her theorization of *how* they can flourish. Expanding on the idea of an entity possessing characteristic activities or qualities, Cuomo introduces the concept of "dynamic charm," which is an entity's "diffuse, 'internal' ability to adapt to or resist change, and its unique causal and motivational patterns and character—that renders it morally considerable, and that serves as a primary site for determining what is good for that being or thing" (Cuomo, 1998, p. 71). In other words, dynamic charm as a concept allows us to give multiple entities moral consideration based on their specific, even if mutable, "character" and activities, and the need to create conditions that allow for the flourishing of this dynamic charm serves as a guideline for ethical decision-making. The inclusion of the term "dynamic" here highlights Cuomo's ecological feminist commitment to respecting the capacity for change and the mutability of not only things but also the conceptualization of things. Based on this idea that entities can have "character without being reduced to some human-imposed essence which does not change," Cuomo proffers a definition of flourishing: "Generally speaking, an entity is able to flourish when its dynamic charm, through change and readjustments, remains sufficiently integrated and stable—not static—to persevere and thrive" (Cuomo, 1998, p. 73). In other words, an ethic of flourishing warrants both the avoidance of harm to moral entities (allowing them to "persevere" as integrated and stable objects) and the attention to resource distribution, social and ecological contexts, and so on that support growth and unforced change (allowing moral entities to "thrive" as they change and readjust).

And here we return to the question of how ethics can guide our conceptions of citizenship. Building a version of ecological citizenship with this particular understanding of an ethic of flourishing as the foundation forces us to face how the assumptions we make about what citizenship is and what it entails do or do not encourage flourishing. Cuomo calls for "attention to consequences, and assessments of which actions and institutions are likely to produce and contribute to flourishing" (Cuomo, 1998, p. 75). If we return to the schematization of different types of citizenship offered in Chapter 3, it becomes clear that some may be more amenable to promoting inclusive flourishing than others. Liberal citizenship, for example, because of its emphasis on rationality as a basis for agency and moral status makes little room for us to consider the necessary conditions for the flourishing of non-humans without instrumental value to humans. An ecological citizenship that asks citizens to care for the environment by making their ecological footprints sustainable lacks a critical view of how this footprint represents more than just autonomous humans acting on the environment in ways that may prevent its flourishing. Rather, taking flourishing as the starting point for *all* entities—citizens and non-citizens, humans and non-humans—reveals the ecological footprint to be a product of enmeshed social and natural systems whose interconnectedness means that the flourishing of environmental entities is inextricably related, in a variety of ways, to the flourishing of humans and social systems. Flourishing, as opposed to care, points us toward complexity, mutability, and non-linear relationships that go beyond simple relationships based on human responsibility for caring for other humans and non-humans.

While this is a fairly abstract argument, it has very real consequences in terms of lived reality. What kinds of citizenship are imposed on (or, more positively, offered to) us through naturalization in discourse (such as policy documentation) matters, as the kinds of citizenship we

are exposed to contribute to our attitude formation and actions—attitudes and action that may cause environmental harm or create circumstances of flourishing, or any number of other outcomes. Ecological feminist ethics can help us name and solve this issue of naturalized citizenship warranting actions and attitudes we may or may not want to promote. Ecological feminist ethics "consider the ideological and material sources and manifestations of problematic attitudes, and offer plausible alternatives" (Cuomo, 1998, p. 61). Citizenship is one of the ideological sources we need to consider.

While the moral agents of an ethic of flourishing are not all citizens, all citizens are moral agents and their understanding of what it means to engage in citizenship is not just a matter of fulfilling contractual responsibilities, but of attending to our ethical obligations to other moral agents as we make decisions, whether on climate change policy or any other issue under deliberation. Yet, many theories of citizenship skirt ethical questions, preferring to appeal to contextual rules of law and universal rules of justice, while ethics and morality are subsumed to the personal. As I previously argued, however, citizenship is never outside of ethics; it is never value-neutral. And the values espoused by Cuomo in support of an ethic of flourishing bring together not only a desire to eliminate ecological degradation, but also an endorsement of creating conditions in which humans and non-humans can flourish through a recognition of their materiality and interdependence, the contextual practice of ethics, and the need to acknowledge and work against systems of oppression that unequally allow for flourishing.

In Chapter 3, I called for a thick, engaged ecological citizenship that could more effectively address environmental problems than the current version of thin climate citizenship apparent in the SFRCCC policy recommendations. Writing this thicker citizenship into policy documentation would ease the tension between calling for citizen participation and support, and

then placing citizens in the passive role of audience, simply waiting to be persuaded by the public messaging that inevitably follows the policy. But this call for thick, engaged ecological citizenship must be attentive to the ethical implications of charging variously privileged people with the task of caring for each other, their communities, and their environments. As my analysis of an ethic of care as the basis for ecological citizenship here shows, simply calling on people to care as an ethical duty passes the buck on addressing these ethical implications and their often unjust distribution of burdens. Turning instead to an ethic of flourishing both highlights the systemic oppression that yields this unjust distribution and provides a process-oriented approach to addressing it in ways that value people, communities, and nature, not abstractly, but as they are in the messy contexts of material reality. In the case of Southeast Florida, for example, an ethic of flourishing prompts us not to simply call on all citizens to care for the environment by addressing their unsustainable ecological footprints. Instead, centering flourishing requires us to consider what systemic circumstances may be putting citizens in the position of making unsustainable choices. For example, for citizens to flourish, they must have access to food, shelter, education, medical care and other resources. If physically getting to these resources requires the use of a car because of inadequate public transportation infrastructure, then no amount of impugning citizens to simply *care* more about their environmental impacts will matter. Flourishing allows us to balance calls for individual action and responsibility with systemic constraints on individuals.

The argument for a more just ethical framework for thick ecological citizenship helps us find ethically defensible ways to promote citizen participation and burden citizens with responsibilities. This process takes time, as does the process of participation and deliberation about responsibilities. When we're facing pressing questions like climate change, taking the time

to slow down and think about the ethical implications of our political choices might seem counterintuitive. I want to affirm, however, that it is important to do the theoretical work of determining what kinds of ethics we want in order to make our responses to such enormous problems thoughtful and beneficial for all. A quicker technocratic approach that leaves decision-making to the experts could possibly yield outcomes that maximize human and non-human flourishing. However, as Cuomo observes, "it is not logically impossible that attempts to address social and environmental problems which are not mindful of the depth of the interrelatedness of oppressions, might result in *improved* practices and institutions. These practices cannot, however, result in sufficiently significant, long-term shifts away from underlying oppressive and exploitative ideologies and modes of interaction" (1998, p.92). Every discursive construction of climate citizenship further reifies whatever ideology animates it, and even if a specific policy outcome enables flourishing, if it reifies harmful ideologies, such as thin liberalism, it ultimately harms our ability to increase flourishing by combatting systems of oppression, leaving us with the potential for a short-term gain in flourishing at the cost of a long-term loss in systemic flourishing. Citizenship is thus beholden to the ethics, whether conscious or not, that underlie it. And, as "ethics is always about ideals—as much about what we aspire to do or be as it is about who we actually are" (Cuomo, 1998, p. 5), we would do well to ensure that policy's climate citizenship draws on ideals that maximize our flourishing in the short- and long-term.

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CHAPTER 5:

CONCLUSION

"The way we define citizenship is intimately linked to the kind of society and political community we want."

—Chantal Mouffe, 1992, p. 2

I began this project with the gnawing sense that all was not right in the world of climate change communication. After much careful reading, I narrowed my sense of unease down to the realization that much of the scholarship seemed to accept a model of communication as manipulation, without attending to its deliberative possibilities. Admittedly, this is a broad generalization, but reviewing the scholarship on framing (see e.g., Aberra, 2012; Foust & Murphy, 2009), cultural cognition (see e.g., Kahan, 2015), and mass media measurements of audiences' responses to public outreach campaigns, imagery, newspaper articles, and the like (Lorenzoni, Leiserowitz, de Franca Doria, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2006; Stamm, Clark, & Eblacas, 2000) reveals a clear interest in finding communicative strategies that can pitch the message of climate change just so in order to gain buy-in from uninterested or skeptical publics. This research says little, however, about soliciting people's views or engaging in deliberation to arrive at new ideas about climate change distinct from those originally held by either party in the one-way communication process. This approach is of a piece with Dobson's observation that attempts to generate beneficial environmental outcomes—whether through communicative

persuasion or, in the example he provides, financial incentives—are often a matter of "how to get people to do environmentally beneficial things when their inclination is not to do them" (2003, p. 1). By contrast, Dobson's argument is that strategies such as ecological citizenship that allow individuals to develop long-term, internal motivations to "do environmentally beneficial things" are more effective ways to build a sustainable society.

Given the urgency of the threat posed by climate change to human and natural systems, Dobson is right to be concerned with efficacy. To that focus, as well as his interest in citizenship, I add an explicit concern for ethics. What does it mean, ethically speaking, to treat other humans as subjects for experimentation with climate change messaging until we hit on the precise message that will lead them to agree with us? Of course, this question is at the heart of all persuasion. When engaging rhetorically with others, if our sole purpose is persuasion, we have chosen to take a stand and presume that we are right, others are wrong, and therefore they should agree with us. This is precisely the stance advocated by Eubanks in relation to climate change. He asserts,

> When it comes to climate change, the notion of endless debate seems to be not just dissatisfying but also dangerous. Some arguments must get settled. Some arguments need to be settled the correct way. Straightforward victory-seeking argumentation would seem to be the right tool for the job. (2015, p. xi)

Crucially, Eubanks is concerned with settling the argument the "correct way" in terms of gaining widespread agreement that climate change is happening and that we must do something about it. As to what that "something" might be, he offers no proposals.

It is in this space of what we actually *do*, once we decide something must be done, that I take up my argument about climate citizenship. I have chosen to focus on policy, as, in relation

to climate change, policy makes up much of the discourse on what we should do, and it is also one of the discourses in which there are calls to move beyond the one-way communication model that gave me such unease as potentially manipulative or technocratic. The technocratic impulse in climate change policy can seem appealing, given the urgency of the threat that leads Dobson to focus on efficacy. But, as I will discuss in the final section of this chapter, leaving decision-making solely in the hands of experts without including the publics who will be affected by those decisions can actually be an ineffective approach. Thus, my motivating concern throughout is how citizenship, both as a concept naturalized in policy documentation and an idea that animates and enables various relationships among citizens and political institutions, can support participatory, non-technocratic approaches to policy-making.

Throughout the argument, I have attempted to address both what an effective and what an ethical climate citizenship might look like. I offer the lens of citizenship not as *the* solution to the looming danger of climate change, but as one solution that can help us decide what to do in ways that both combat the danger and challenge us to articulate and defend the ethical bases for our decisions. To underscore this point, I'd like to briefly review the arguments I have made to establish the idea of climate citizenship, to illustrate an ineffective version of it, and then to propose an alternative version informed by an ethical framework rooted in a commitment to flourishing for all moral subjects.

The Case for an Ecological Climate Citizenship Rooted in an Ethic of Flourishing

To begin, I established the exigency for applied work in rhetoric of science and argued that climate change communication both presents an opportunity for doing such work and can be meaningfully connected to existing rhetorical and technical communication scholarship. While

the following policy analysis and theory-building do not respond directly to calls for applied rhetoric of science, they form the basis for future applied work, which I will discuss as a conclusion to this chapter. It is through policy-making that I see an especially fruitful opportunity for communicative engagement, as it is a process that can invite communication both during and after. However, the distinction between communication during climate change policy-making and after the policy has been made is important. Although of course policies should be shared with publics after they have been established, scholars in multiple fields, including rhetoric, technical communication, and deliberative democracy, also emphasize the value of engaging citizens with the actual making of policy.

If we accept the argument that citizens should be engaged in policy-making, then we must turn our attention to how to productively support this goal. While many address this need by examining the specific mechanisms by which citizens are invited into the process, my argument underscores the importance of considering how not only the policy-making process itself, but also how the discursive products of that process create inclusivity and opportunities for deliberation. To this end, in Chapter 2, I analyzed a core policy recommendation document produced by the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact (SFRCCC), a widely praised example of a bipartisan policy-making group working to mitigate the causes of and adapt to climate change. My goal was to explore how the construction of citizenship itself might support or undermine stated goals of creating inclusive policy-making processes.

To elaborate on the variety of potential constructions of citizenship, some more productive than others in achieving this goal, political theory provides a rich tradition of citizenship studies, which offers well-developed theories of citizenship aligned with a variety of ideological and cultural frameworks. My engagement with this scholarship on citizenship

provides one of my major contributions to the project of applied rhetoric of science. When applied rhetoric of science involves political institutions, and especially their interactions with publics, citizenship becomes a key mechanism by which the institutions and the publics view and engage with each other. Rhetoric and its subfields have adopted the terminology of *citizen* and *citizenship*, as evidenced, for example, by the 2016 Association of Teachers of Technical Writing theme of "Citizenship and Advocacy in Technical Communication" (ATTW, 2016). However, when we talk about citizenship in rhetoric and technical communication, the concepts of "citizen" and "citizenship" are sometimes taken as self-evident and fixed. This is especially true if we consider only their legal definitions within particular historical and geopolitical contexts. In terms of the much messier reality of what it means to be a citizen and to exercise citizenship outside of legal constructs, we need to specify what kind of citizenship we have in mind. As policy is written, it will inevitably naturalize some version of citizenship, as we saw in the case of the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact. Failing to specify what kind of citizenship should be written into such documents is a failure to address potential problems posed by that citizenship and to purposefully invoke versions of citizenship that will support policy goals. Moreover, as political theorist, Robert Shuck puts it, "Indeed, given the high stakes in how a society conceives of citizenship, any particular formation...is readily contestable" (p. 131). And if forms of citizenship are contestable, then applied rhetoric of science has the opportunity to contest problematic forms of citizenships and promote others. If, for example, we choose to engage with science in public and political spheres in order to promote environmentally beneficial outcomes, it is vital for us to question discourse that underwrites disengaged versions of citizenship that tacitly promote self-interest over communally motivated action.

This need to be attentive to the different forms citizenship can take becomes especially clear in light of my analysis of the climate citizenship naturalized through the SFRCCC policy documentation. The analysis showed that the SFRCCC Regional Climate Action Plan (RCAP) naturalizes a thin version of citizenship, which Bubeck (1995) maps closely on to the rights-oriented, independent subject of liberalism. While some moments in the text ~~evoke~~ thick citizenship, which Bubeck connects to the more responsibilities-oriented community member associated with civic republicanism, the document overall orients itself towards citizens as passive recipients of the policies' benefits or only semi-active respondents to the few responsibilities, such as changed driving habits, that the policy recommendations call for.

This finding that the SFRCCC's climate citizenship is primarily thin in nature has profound implications for any ostensible goal of creating inclusive policy processes that involve citizens before all policy decisions have been made. There is an inherent tension created by the act of saying we want citizens included but then creating policy that forwards an inactive version of citizenship. In order to overcome this tension and to make deliberate choices about how we can best understand and write climate citizenship in policy, we need to take seriously the questions of 1) what citizenship should look like in order to achieve sustainable outcomes, and 2) what ethical basis will allow citizens to fully exercise, enjoy, and flourish in the context of their citizenship? I addressed these questions in Chapters 3 and 4, taking up citizenship theory and ecological feminist ethics, respectively.

Inclusion is an ethical imperative for policy because of policy's capacity for creating tangible material effects in terms of quality of life and available options for living the "good life." In pursuit of inclusion, I propose reimagining the thin climate citizenship of the SFRCCC as a thicker climate citizenship based on the citizenship framework proposed by proponents of

ecological citizenship (see e.g., Dean, 2001; Dobson, 2003). But inclusion takes time. It is much more efficient to simply hand the decision-making reins over to a small group of experts, thereby limiting the number of voices to be accounted for during decision-making. In the case of a pressing environmental issue like climate change, there is an urgency to address the problem that may make this more efficient approach all the more appealing. However, the elevation of efficiency is an ethical choice that may preclude the conditions for widespread flourishing of moral subjects. In this critique of efficiency as a primary, or even sole, ethic, I follow Katz (1992), who argued that the ethic of efficiency which underlies Western technical communication threatens truly deliberative rhetorical processes by "replacing the democratic decision-making process with *techniques* of persuasion and audience adaptation calculated to serve their own end only" (1992, p. 271). This is the very weakening of inclusive communication and policy-making that first gave me pause when reading climate change communication scholarship. Moreover, turning to technocratic decision-making in the name of efficiency may well be an impractical choice in that it precludes opportunities for citizens to both strengthen policy and increase its legitimacy, leaving climate change communication in the tenuous position of attempting to persuade citizens to buy into policies which may not speak to their concerns or wield any influence over their decision-making. It is to this question of the instrumental reasons for adopting an ecological climate citizenship based on an ethic of flourishing that I turn next, in order to briefly sketch a role for applied rhetoric of science in developing policy-making processes that adhere to the principles of deliberative democracy.

Future Research: Applying the Abstractions

The analytic work of this project has diagnosed the problem of the tension between calls for participatory policy-making and policies that naturalize thin climate citizenship, and suggested a version of citizenship and an ethic that could dissolve this tension. The project remains pure critique, however, unactualized. So, what then? As Latour (2004) suggests, critique has run out of steam, so I am not satisfied to stop at critique. Doing so risks offering up this work to the same fate Latour describes critical theory as having enjoyed: "a certain form of critical spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target" (2004, p. 231). He is here concerned with critical theory and science studies' undermining of realism, and the subsequent use of criticism and relativism to cast doubt on the existence of climate change, the perpetrators of terrorist attacks, and other matters of fact, which those who doubt them can now safely dismiss or respond to in unproductive ways.

I, too, worry about undermining efforts at climate change communication without creating productive alternatives. To this end, I have proposed normative revisions to the thin version of climate citizenship which I have critiqued. For those normative proposals to be meaningful beyond a theoretical context, however, requires application. To that end, this work can productively inform participatory research with policy-makers who are open to engagement with citizens during their process. As previously mentioned, such engagement is all too often paid only lip-service, in part because of legal requirement, such as the EPA's mandate to open their Environmental Impact Statements to public comment (EPA, 2015). As demonstrated with the SFRCCC documentation, the claim to desire engagement does not necessarily translate to discursive moves within policy that reaffirm that desire.

Therefore, I propose to use this theoretical work as a basis for interdisciplinary and participatory applied rhetoric of science research with policy makers. Ideally, this research would work from the conclusions of social studies of expertise and science and technology scholars who argue that a reliance on expediency and scientific authority is broadly ineffective (Brown, 2009; Collins & Evans, 2002; Fischer, 2000), highlighting the need for more than lip-service to citizen engagement. Fiorino (1990) forwards three separate arguments in favor of increased citizen participation: first, the substantive argument that citizens may in fact make better and more informed judgments than experts; second, the normative argument that technocracy conflicts with democratic ideals, and third, the instrumental argument that participation increases public confidence in policy decisions (pp. 227-228). Smith and Pangsapa further note the role participation plays in enrolling citizens into politically concerned and active publics:

> [A]n awareness of social and environmental injustices is not enough in itself. Not only do we need to identify how they exist side by side, in some cases making the effects of each worse, we also need to recognize that the promotion of environmental responsibility depends on broad-focus civic engagement strategies that translate the affected constituencies into stakeholders in the decisions that affect their lives. (2008, p. 6).

Based on these strong arguments in favor of truly meaningful citizen participation, policy-makers would be well-served by critically evaluating and improving the mechanisms they provide for such participation.

Evaluating and improving mechanisms for participation alone is not enough, however, as long as the animating ideologies of any given policy naturalize versions of climate citizenship which push back against such participation. Thus, the work here can support policy makers'

reflection not only on the logistics of how they talk *with* citizens, but also the underpinning assumptions of how policy talks *about* citizens. Scholars and policy makers must rethink concepts such as thin climate citizenship which naturalize passivity and frustrate the desire for more inclusive policy processes. A normative ethics of citizenship can bolster more participatory policy-making processes and help us close the gap that so often separates climate change policy and climate change communication. Rather than a two-stage process in which we form policy and then communicate it to the public, we must embrace processes in which the two can work in tandem to help us ethically and effectively respond to the looming dangers of climate change.

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