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# The End of Anarchy: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the States System

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The End of Anarchy: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the States System

by

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## **Abstract**

The basis of this thesis is that weapons of mass destruction will continue to proliferate and will inevitably - given enough time- be used against civilian populations repeatedly. As this occurs the opposition between support for international law and the power of the state will intensify. This will go on for some time and will, in all probability, become extremely destructive. Eventually, however, the states (and individual people) of the world will realize that the simultaneous existence of international anarchy and weapons of mass destruction runs counter to long term human survival. This realization will, very likely, lead people to eliminate anarchy, i.e. create a world government.

## **Introduction**

The problem discussed in this paper is whether the anarchy of the states system can continue to constrain and control the global threat posed by the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). I will attempt to show the long-term need for (reconsidering) the establishment of a world state to resolve today's most pressing threats, including the spread of WMDs. In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have addressed the logical and practical plausibility of a world state (Wendt, 2003; Craig 2008). Some, who have long supported global governance, or the vast network of state and non-state actors that form a governing framework without government, have begun to question whether today's increasingly pressing global threats have eclipsed the effectiveness of global governance (Bjola, 2010; Weiss, 2009). To deal with this issue I will discuss the effectiveness of various efforts to address these threats by influencing the behavior of states and other international political actors such as multinational corporations. These efforts include rational constraints to suppress war and its inevitability and the role of international law and international organizations, i.e. the United Nations (UN). The question I address is as follows: How do the current threats to human survival, in particular the spread of WMDs, underscore and expose the logical necessity for a world state (world sovereignty)?

To address this question, it is important to first assume that the preponderance of power still resides with states but that more states continue to delegate more of their authority. This may sound like an endorsement of global governance; however, such a

shift has done little to enhance governance authority and reorganize power. Decisions and laws have not emerged from global governance to reduce or eliminate these threats. Moreover, there needs to be a gradual recognition by peoples of the threat to their survival posed by the proliferation and probable use of WMDs. What this suggests is that the spread of democracy at the global level has had little effect on state behavior (Held and McGrew 1999; Roach, 2010). Eventually such proponents may recognize, as Jim Whitman puts it, that “our capacity to create hugely complex, intractable problems is advancing beyond the reach of our policy-making machinery and in some cases, our predictive capacity” (Whitman 114).

Still, there are challenges blocking the emergence of a world state. States will not voluntarily give up power to a world government (or part ways with their sovereignty) unless they think they must do so to avert a threat to their own preservation as sovereign states. This is particularly difficult in the United States (US) because American exceptionalism can lead to feelings of sovereign superiority. Not having other countries to which Americans can compare themselves prevents them from realizing United States strengths and weaknesses compared to other nations. American feelings of superiority will undoubtedly be a drag on the possibility of world state formation. A world government may be impossible without the support of the world’s only superpower.

American isolationism should not be confused with another challenge: globalization. It has led to the proliferation of technology that terrorist groups can use and that can easily travel sometimes without detection, across state boundaries. In essence the world is getting smaller. Technology has greatly altered how people relate to

each other. Anyone on earth who has access to the Internet, a television, even a radio is connected to the rest of the world immediately. Even though these technologies are taken for granted they have literally revolutionized relationships. The primary difference compared with the past is that people interact with others without any limitations on where they are physically located. This makes things more dangerous because it allows states and terrorist groups to plan an attack anywhere in the world without others being able to effectively respond to such an attack. In the following pages I will discuss why a sovereign world state could control this danger much more effectively than can the current system wherein sovereignty is divided among many states.

It is true that in a states system stopping proliferation completely isn't possible now or ever. This would not change even if states were paying attention to the consequences of proliferation. If all the states of the world were to fully understand and deal with the threat they are facing they would put greater pressure on international organizations like the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and they would increase their national intelligence surveillance efforts at the same time. However, I will show that greater attention devoted to the problem would not solve it but would allow states to keep abreast of the problem and be better prepared to address the worldwide shock that will accompany the nearly certain first use of WMDs against civilians.

Nonetheless, the lack of attention states have paid to this issue is rather surprising. It is difficult to believe that people in the future won't look back on this with astonishment. The inattention to WMDs and their proliferation is an example of the "timeless and universal" folly displayed by governments throughout history (Tuchman 6).

In considering how best to tackle the problem we should not ignore the logical and practical necessity of establishing a world government.

### **Argument**

The United Nations (UN) is often viewed negatively. It is viewed essentially as a failure—as a body designed to prevent war yet wars go on throughout the world. But the UN lies at the center of a process of change. The change is well under way. As WMDs proliferate and the likelihood of their use increases, states will begin to perceive the threat to their very existence. This will challenge the core realist assumption of state survival: state survival will be changed from political survival to human survival. Because WMDs cannot be controlled indefinitely by a system of states, behavior and attitudes will change. My argument, then, is that the establishment of a world state is a logical and practical necessity to resolve the inherent threat posed by the preservation of the state system and WMD proliferation. A world state would be able to unite peoples and enforce the rules and laws that are currently being violated and thereby undermining the credibility of a global governance framework. But states are being pulled apart from each other and becoming more militaristic. Many other states will notice this and long term dangers will be created. As more people notice how much more dangerous things are getting there will be an increasing awareness on the part of millions that there is, as one author put it, a "statistical certainty of a global thermonuclear war occurring as long as interstate anarchy and nuclear arsenals persist" (Craig 2003 132). For now, however, it is best that we work with the following idea in regards to establishing a world state: that



the inevitability of war can and should lead to the inevitability of a world state to resolve threats that could otherwise lead to globally destructive wars.

The best way to understand just why the uncontrollable threat of the spread of WMDs is inevitable is to look at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This treaty was created in 1968 and has had some success in deterring proliferation. The basic problem here is that anarchy creates a dynamic that makes continued proliferation inevitable. The NPT is a product of an anarchical world. The solution to this has been the creation of the states system which itself lacks coercive power. Its success depends entirely on the voluntary actions of states. As we will see, WMDs are not difficult to purchase or to create. When one state gets them others will also acquire them to maintain a balance of power. At the same time laws are being created to govern interstate relations. They are international in scope and reflect the interests, customs, and priorities of many different states. Agreeing on these laws encourages international consensus which strengthens the eventual possibility of a world government.

As sovereignty is the central concept in this thesis it is important to define. Sovereignty can be defined as the unquestioned and independent authority that is possessed by a state. This authority comes from the widely perceived legitimacy of the state. Efforts to erect a world state and construct a global sovereignty date back to the League of Nations and that era's excessive idealism. This idealism was shown in such actions as trying to outlaw war in the Kellogg-Briand Act. Realists claim that the League's failure was an indication of the inevitable failure of the idealism that spawned the organization in the first place. But what Realists do not take into consideration is that nationalism is just a stage in history and has been the cause of such failures.

Nationalism did not exist in anything like its current form before the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and it is already beginning to weaken. Realists do not take these changes into account (Craig 2003, 46). In fact, a basic tenet of realism is that all states are rational actors and that rational actors can be counted on to pursue their self-interest. Hence, Realists would predict that as states begin to focus more heavily on the dangers of anarchy their rationalism will lead them to pursue the self-interest of avoiding the catastrophic use of WMDs. My claim, though, is that the mounting threat of an attack will not lead states to pursue rational policies of self-preservation. Rather my claim is that the states system supports the instability or limits of this rationalist assumption and reveals the inherent and uncontrollable effects of the threat to state preservation.

Take the case of dropping two atomic bombs by the US on Japan in August of 1945. This event changed forever the nature of warfare and it created for the first time the very real possibility that people can end their own existence in a war. It would be all but impossible to think of a single historical event that would more quickly or completely increase states' concern over the need to control warfare as controlling warfare after Hiroshima meant possibly saving tens of millions of civilian lives.

In sum, international communication and travel have increased in scope and the percentage of all people that are affected by communication and travel has also increased. Two inventions particularly--TV and the Internet--have increased the forces of globalization. The Internet epitomizes how relationships have changed due to globalization. It connects people instantly all over the world without any spatial limitations at all. Control of the Internet has led and will lead to an increase in internationalism and a corresponding reduction in the power of states. I am arguing,

therefore, that the world is moving inevitably toward a need for a world state precisely because growing interdependence through technology and trade allows for and requires the emergence of a single, unified world sovereign. The reason for this is that nuclear weapons and other WMDs will continue to proliferate. Nations will continue to acquire WMDs as rival nations get them. Many non-national groups such as Al-Qaeda will work to get them. The growing and intractable tensions between these groups should make clear the long term hopelessness of the current states system. This should make the idea of a world government more widely held and respectable within political science and other fields.

It is of course natural to question why a world sovereign instead of other political arrangements is necessary. There are many reasons for this but part of the answer to this question comes from Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes most certainly was not a world state advocate. Nothing he ever wrote suggested a world state or anything that would remotely resemble a world state. But he provided excellent reasons why effectively dealing with security issues requires apolitical structure based on absolute authority. History has demonstrated he was wrong when he said that a state must have absolute authority to exist and avoid societal breakdown. But he was right that to deal effectively with security issues a state cannot divide its military. A functioning military will always have a chain of command that demands obedience from those who are lower on the chain to those who are higher. A military requires that one person make decisions while others follow. He thought that when power is divided those who held positions of authority would try to eliminate rivals so they could have all the power. Dividing power, therefore, created schisms that would lead to conflicts within the government as claimants to power

fought each other. He thought these conflicts would be so severe that they would destabilize the government and this could only be avoided by investing all power in the hands of a single individual. The relevance of this to a world state is that the kinds of security issues Hobbes wrote about are similar to the WMD security threats that now require the establishment of a single world sovereign. i

Occasional interstate warfare is the severe but still acceptable price people have been paying for centuries to maintain the states system. In the realm of international politics there is no enforcement mechanism or standing army (and legal force) to stop and prevent a state or non-state actor from using all of the power at their disposal to acquire and use WMDs; the global governance system relies on state cooperation and good will, which is usually in short supply. Undivided sovereignty would make the use of WMDs between nations no more likely than between two states in the United States. The divided sovereignty of the states system, I claim, is inherently unstable compared with the undivided sovereignty a world government would have.

## **Literature Review**

Global governance is a concept that lies between a world state and anarchy. (Murphy 1999). It is advocated by a host of scholars including neoliberal institutionalists and other theorists (Weiss, 2009; Slaughter, 2004; Hewson and Sinclair, 1999; Rosenau, 1995). Most argue that the global institutional framework is an evolving framework that is becoming increasingly flexible with the increasing role of non-state actors and the coordination of supra-institutions to regulate and resolve threats (Slaughter 2004; Etzioni, 2004). Others, as I have mentioned, have begun to question the current system and how

we should conceive of the best practical way of dealing with the mounting global problems such as climate change (Bjola, 2010; Weiss, 2009). Considering the idea of world government, Thomas Weiss, for instance, offers a constructive way of at least exposing some of the problems posed by cooperation and weak coordination under the current system of global governance.

Realists, however, argue that the threats posed by war can be constrained through rational structural constraints (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). They argue that in an anarchical environment states will routinely pursue their rational interest of power gain in order to further ensure their survival. For them, a world government would remove these constraints and lead to further destruction. Other realists, such as Michael Mandelbaum (2008), argue that a world government would have responsibility for too much territory, too many people and too many issues. E. H. Carr makes the old point in *The Twenty Years Crisis* that states have primacy in the international arena. Francis Fukuyama reminds us of the hopeful fact that liberal democracy is without a serious ideological rival in today's world, which means that a world state almost certainly would be democratic in nature.

Alexander Wendt (2003), however, makes the case that a world government is inevitable because it reflects an evolving pattern of power and authority being directed upward, and not simply horizontally. He also claims that the Hegelian concept of the need for recognition will foster this process, because it will give states and individuals a chance to compete with one another. And this competition, Wendt claims, will lead to a world state. Vaughn Shannon's rebuttal to Wendt criticized him for claiming a world state is inevitable. Shannon isn't opposed to the idea but he is claiming a world state is

not inevitable. Shannon claims that we have no way of knowing for sure if a world state will come into existence or not. His disagreement with Wendt is less political than philosophical. He says that there is no way of knowing this because there is no way of knowing what will happen. He isn't claiming that there are political forces that would stop it.

Finally, in his article "The Resurgent Idea of World Government", Campbell Craig (2008) shows that world state scholarship is beginning to increase and to be taken seriously among academics for the first time since the 1940s. His 2003 book *Glimmer of a New Leviathan* documents how the realists Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Neibuhr both came to believe in the necessity for a world government because of the influence of WMDs. Kenneth Waltz—a third realist—never took this position explicitly but, Craig claims, he was leaning in that direction. Craig's emphasis on the security issues of controlling WMDs as the primary reason for a world state is laid out in his analysis of the writings of these three thinkers.

## **Chapter 1:**

### **Reconsidering the Idea of World Government**

The idea of a world government did not begin with the advent of weapons of mass destruction (WMD's). Centuries before the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki people were advocating a world state. Dante viewed world government as a kind of utopia. Grotius is often referred to as the father of international law and he believed in the creation of a world government to enforce this law. A lot of visionary thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries such as H.G. Wells and Aldous Huxley found the idea attractive. One time Republican presidential candidate Wendell Wilkie wrote a book in 1942 on the idea titled *One World* (Craig 2003, 133).

The real impetus for world government, in my view, was the start of the era of WMDs in 1945. President Truman's decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan was the beginning of the process that makes a world government highly probable. For the first time in history people had created the ability to end their own existence in a war. And as I will try to show in this paper the divided sovereignty of the system of states simply cannot accommodate the existence of WMDs indefinitely.

Perhaps the first major attempt at truly shifting the power to make war from nations to an international body was the Baruch Plan. This plan was "presented in 1946 to the newly created United Nations (UN) Atomic Energy Commission by the US representative on the Commission, Bernard M. Baruch" (Bellany 128). Baruch tried to direct widespread international interest in the use of nuclear energy into peaceful

purposes such as the production of electrical power. This plan sought to establish international control over atomic weaponry. The failure of the plan "drew attention to the futility of expecting states to abandon interest in the military uses of nuclear energy" (Craig 2003, 133). The Baruch plan was created in 1946 when the US was the only nation in the world that had atomic bombs. For the plan to succeed the US would have had to hand over control of its atomic weapons to the UN and all other nations in the world would have had to give up pursuit of atomic weapons. This plan was presented in 1946 just as the US-Soviet Alliance forged in World War II was turning to Cold War rivalry. To say that this plan was idealistic and didn't fully take into account the political realities of the day is an understatement. To think that the US, the USSR, and all other nations would hand over control of the use of atomic weapons to the UN while the system of states was still unquestioned is ludicrous. Perhaps this is why the plan's author "quietly" intended the plan to fail (Craig 2003, 133).

The plan was a milestone in the world's march toward international sovereignty. It didn't explicitly call for a world government but it did call on nations to give up a major aspect of their offensive capabilities. Control of military power is part of Weber's famous and apt definition of a state as "the organization that maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence" (O'Neil 22). The world monopoly is key here. If the US and other nations of the world had relinquished a vital part of their ability to wage war to the UN they would have lost their monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. They wouldn't have lost their monopoly over the legitimate use of violence remaining to them. The Baruch Plan would merely have redefined what was the legitimate use of violence



from having the power to use atomic bombs to not having the power to use such weapons.

Rather, the Baruch Plan would have undermined nations monopoly over the legitimate use of violence because it would have meant that they could not pursue the acquisition of atomic bombs. This power would have been given over to the UN. Part of any realistic definition of having a monopoly over the legitimate use of force is the ability to unilaterally act to increase the amount of force available. The Baruch Plan would have imposed an authority above the nation preventing this from happening.

After only one year of existence we see a manifestation of the evolutionary character of the UN. A permanent official of the US Government proposed that the US and the other nations of the world voluntarily end their monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. This helps to illustrate how the UN is a big part of the current transitional phase in history. Just a year after Hiroshima it was clear to many people there was a need for the international control of WMDs that the system of states couldn't handle. And it was natural to look to the UN as it was the world's most prominent international political organization.

Shortly after Hiroshima Albert Einstein aptly summarized our current predicament when he said "the unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe" (Isaacson 490). Einstein's description of the birth of the atomic age applies perfectly to the world's current situation. Einstein did, however, have a significant advantage over us: WMDs were new when he made this comment so he had a world without WMDs with which to compare it.

We've been living with WMDs our whole lives so we rarely think or worry about them. This is a big part of the problem. People are largely ignoring WMDs so they underestimate them. They understand their danger but their containment isn't an issue that seems particularly important. The issue is out of sight and out of mind for most people. States and individuals are waiting for a crisis. Only fear will cause people to pay attention.

This is probably the reason so many calls for a world government were issued in the years just after Hiroshima before the Cold War made it clear this wouldn't happen. People were confronted for the first time with the reality that they could end their own existence in a war, and they were searching for a way out. Not knowing of a different situation breeds apathy. The fact that WMDs haven't been used in a war since 1945 breeds a recklessly over confident way of thinking. They have never been used in my lifetime, people think, so they never will. Another problem is the end of the Cold War. For decades the specter of a nuclear war seemed to revolve entirely around the US-Soviet rivalry. Even at this late date people throughout the world are still breathing a collective sigh of relief that the long anticipated war never occurred and that liberalism triumphed over communism. It's hard for most people to imagine the use of WMDs without a connection to national political rivalry. Most people's fears of WMDs are still linked to an end of the world Cuban Missile Crisis type scenario where much of the human race is wiped out in a day or two.

It has been well said by former US Senator Alan Cranston that "most people may tend to think with the Cold War over and the Soviet Union gone, the danger that these weapons will ever be used has receded. Unfortunately, that is not the case" (Cranston

13). The primary issue here is one of stability. The Cold War order was one of bipolar stability. There was always a threat of catastrophe but the chances of this happening declined enormously after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Both sides were able to get a look down the barrel and they realized their behavior was far too provocative. The successful resolution of this crisis was the real start of detente. It is no coincidence that the first major US-Soviet arms accord--the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty-- was signed just a year after this crisis was resolved. This was the end of the greatest period of risk.

The risk of an overnight apocalypse has receded. In reality "the sad fact is that it is more likely now that nuclear weapons will be used than it was during the perilous but more stable era of the US-Soviet arms race" (Cranston 13). Bipolar stability has been replaced by a situation where WMDs could be used by nearly any nation or terrorist group at any time. The chances of the world ending are remote but the possibility of WMDs being used are far greater now than they were during the Cold War. Both the US and the Soviet Union had in place effective systems limiting the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The near disaster of 1962 had instilled in both sides a cautiousness, a tolerance, and a decision to forgo needless foreign policy risks. The world was safer between 1962 and the end of the Cold War in 1991 than it was before the Cuban Missile Crisis or since the end of the Cold War. The situation was monopolized by nations with effective control systems over their WMDs as neither wanted to self-destruct.

## **Chapter 2:**

### **The Irrationality and Destructiveness of State Behavior**

An important manifestation of the irrationality of divided state sovereignty is genocide or the orchestrated perpetrations of serious international crimes. This begins with the idea that people can become detached from the crime and evil they commit. The central driver of this detachment is resentment and/or fear, which remains inherent in integral or dogmatic ideologies that can become embedded in notions of nation-state sovereignty, especially those that seek world domination. As I shall explore, irrationality is built into the undivided state or integral nation state (possessing pathological ideology); genocide is manifestation of this irrationality, underscoring the inevitability of more genocides (Kressel, 2002).

Take the case of Adolf Eichmann. As one of the primary administrators of the so called final solution, Eichmann was directly responsible for the deaths of millions of innocent people. After he was captured in South America in the early 1960's and transported to Israel to stand trial he was examined by several Israeli psychiatrists. Despite the fact that these psychiatrists must have hated Eichmann intensely, they found him "normal" (Bergen 41). He had none of the characteristics normally associated with criminality.

This is both chilling and inspiring. It is chilling to realize a "normal" person could descend to such depths of depravity. It would be comforting to know that someone who could do what Eichmann did must be a monster. But at the same time it's inspiring

to realize that so much evil is responsible by "normal" people who seem to believe they are just doing their jobs and following orders. It means that preventing future Holocausts might not be as difficult as the assumption of widespread evil suggests. It's a lot easier to get rid of one evil leader than it is to make sustained improvements in human moral functioning. Doing this is impossible. That ruthless individuals may be responsible for a lot more of the injustice in the world than is suggested by the assumption of widespread evil is also suggested by another paradox. "I am absolutely convinced," states Simon "that there is no great gulf between the mental life of the common criminal and that of the everyday upright citizen" (Simon 2). Again, this suggests the opposite --that "normal" people are instrumental in creating genocide and other terrible chapters in history. But a close analysis of this statement reveals the opposite. If there is "no great gulf between the mental life of the common criminal and that of the everyday, upright citizen" than why are there such extreme difference between people in how they act. What is probably going on is that what separates the good from the evil is how they deal with their mental life. A good person exerts self-control to prevent themselves from acting on these impulses. This self-control could result from conscience, compassion, or simply the person realizing that morally uninhibited behavior will land them in jail.

Simon's insight that evil is so widespread in human thinking therefore, ironically leads to a dichotomous view of human morality. Most people are basically good, and a few people are evil. "It feels more democratic and less condemnatory (and somehow less alarming) to believe that everyone is a little shady than to accept that a few human beings live in a permanent and absolute moral nightmare" (Stout 105). This black and white approach to good and evil may be more accurate than commonly believed. Thinking that

there are a few evil people and a lot of good (or at least not evil) people seems quaint, old-fashioned, and naive. Believing that such terrible scenarios as war and genocide aren't caused by the will of the majority of people also seems hypocritical and unfair. How could such horrors be explained in this way when thousands of people participated in them? And if the Israeli psychiatrists were right and Eichmann really was "normal" than wouldn't this mean that normal is evil or at least a lot closer to evil than frequently understood or acknowledged.

The best way to explain this is through obedience to authority. Stanley Milgram showed in his experiments that perfectly ordinary people will kill other people who have done nothing to so much as offend them simply because they are ordered to (Stout 63). This is obedience to good or evil, which can be interpreted as virulent and an unstable form of irrationalism. The average soldier isn't thinking about policy. They are hardly even aware of policy. They're just following orders and trying to stay alive.

I'm not saying that they're not going to think about policy. It's just that they have enough to deal with and think about in performing their duties as soldiers to look at the war they're involved in from a detached perspective and to see it as a whole, the way the leader of a nation could do. All they can see is the little piece of the war that is right in front of them. And this greatly limits their understanding. Thus, there is relatively little connection between the morality of the average soldier and the horrors committed by soldiers during a genocide. They are not thinking in terms of good and evil. People who are on the policy making level engage in that kind of thinking. Soldiers just follow orders. It's just that they have enough to deal with and think about in performing their duties as soldiers to look at the war they're involved in from a detached perspective and

to see it as a whole the way the leader of a nation could do. All they can see is the little piece of the war that is right in front of them. This greatly limits their understanding.

Hence, there is relatively little connection between the morality of the average soldier and the horrors committed by soldiers during a war or genocide. They are not thinking in terms of good and evil. People who are on the policy making level engage in that kind of thinking. Soldiers just follow orders. Obedience by ordinary people to a sinister authority is the real problem behind history's greatest atrocities.

Eichmann wasn't a foot soldier. He was in the Nazi SS and this was a military style organization demanding complete obedience of all its members. Obedience by a "normal" person like Eichmann to an evil person like Hitler explains travesties such as the Holocaust much more effectively than the assumption of widespread evil. Even if there is no great difference between the mental life of criminals and ordinary people there is a great difference in their behavior. The difference therefore between the average person and the criminal or irrational agent isn't so much what they think about. Rather, it is the uncontrollable circumstances of a siege mentality promoted by the state's perverse ideology that leads to a helplessness that informs the obedience to which I am referring. As one person put it recently in an article referring to "antiheroes" or helpless war leaders who commit murder: "We're not psychopaths. We don't act on it. But it's nice to see someone else getting away with it" (Deggans). Like the criminal inmate longing for escape from prison, many people long, on occasion for release from the shackles of conscience to escape their helplessness or lack of control over circumstances.

Irrational behavior is, on the other hand, such overweening obedience arises from the inability to effectively channel one's aggression. There is "considerable worldwide

inculcation of aggressiveness during childhood" though "there are variations in degree" (Segal 9). While aggression is partly learned, the fact that it is worldwide demonstrates its genetic roots. This is in line with the now commonly held assumption that aggression is inborn though the search for the noble savage will probably never go away entirely. This might be due to a romantic refusal to accept human nature as it is or it might be caused by the fact that the Rousseauian tradition has commanded so much support for so long (even if the noble savage idea didn't originate with Rousseau).

What often passes for a discussion of how not to control and deal with aggression is the old nature-nurture debate. Possibly the most dramatic and telling example of this is the Stanford Prison Study. Testing the human propensity toward aggression the researcher Philip Zimbardo designed an "experiment that randomly assigned normal, healthy intelligent college students to exact the roles of either guards or prisoners in a realistically simulated prison setting where they were to live and work for several weeks" (Zimbardo 20). To Zimbardo's surprise the guards became so abusive of the prisoners that the experiment had to be stopped early. There is something about a situation where one person has complete power over another that elicits extremely violent, destructive responses.

That this isn't confined to psychological studies was demonstrated a few years ago in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. This scandal was disgraceful and embarrassed the nation. But it was entirely predictable. US soldiers were given complete power over inmates in a prison. There was no oversight. It was a recipe for abuse. It was a failure of those in positions of authority in the army just as it was of the soldiers who perpetrated the abuse. Conditions were set in place that made this scandal likely if not inevitable.



The Stanford Prison Study and Abu Ghraib help remind us that certain situations elicit aggression from ordinary people who are suddenly equipped with unchecked power or prompted to use this power, in irrational, violent ways. The difference here between ordinary people and irrational people is that ordinary people usually engage in aggression only in a situation where one has absolute control over others. Brutal aggression is typical but is only typical under certain conditions.

As previously discussed, part of the problem with the control of WMDs is that people use their own values when they think about the future. Planning the annihilation of a major city with a WMD is so repugnant to most people that it doesn't occur to them that many people willing to plan such a catastrophe already exist and they probably are trying to do this right now. Psychologically, it is only a small step from flying airplanes into the World Trade Center to using WMDs against a US city.

In terms of the sources of irrational and violent behavior (in crisis situations): One final problem that is rarely discussed is the increase in size of the human race. Fighting a technical war takes the population, resources, and government of an entire nation. Using a nuclear bomb or other WMD requires only one person. Assuming that the percentage of people who would be willing to use a WMD remains relatively constant over time then as the human race increases in size there is an increase in the number of such people. This means there is a corresponding increase in the likelihood that the one person willing to use WMDs will get their hands on a WMD. This is analogous to comparing the homicide rate of New York City with Tampa. While the rates may be similar the number of homicides in New York City will be far greater because the population of New York City is eight million people while the population of Tampa is

less than 400,000. Thus the size of a population is relevant to the likelihood of a criminal act occurring. And this includes acts of terrorism.

### **Chapter 3:**

#### **Why Global Governance Persists and the World Isn't Ready Now**

In his book, *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World's Government in the 21st Century*, Michael Mandelbaum puts forward some excellent reasons why a world state wouldn't come into existence without WMDs: "a world government would, by definition, have responsibility for establishing order everywhere, and so would have to go about the task of supplying authority in the chaotic corners of the world" (Mandelbaum 199). The ability to supply order would fall naturally on the rich countries as they have greater resources to draw on. This would lead to resistance by the rich countries. This would particularly be a problem because the rest of the rich countries are democratic and therefore this resistance would be registered at the polls. If the rich countries were governed by authoritarian systems then their rules could command military support for these "chaotic corners." The majority of people in democracies can't see any direct benefit to this support and they will stand in the way of political leaders trying to do this. The fact that the people and not the leaders do the fighting would limit backing also. This lack of support would be especially pronounced because nothing arouses more popular opposition than sending troops into harms way.

This is related to what is or will be the biggest obstacle to a world government. This is the change in the pattern of economic redistribution that would occur in a global state. Taxing the rich to give to the poor would shift from taxing the rich in the rich world to give to the poor in the rich world to taxing the rich in the rich world to give to

the poor in the Third World. The chasm that separates the rich in the rich world and the poor in the Third World is enormous.

Hence, the people who benefit the most from the current situation are the affluent in the wealthy countries. They have more political power than any other group of people in the world and will be able to resist changes to the international political structure much more effectively than their tiny percentage of the human population would suggest. It will require a tremendously powerful set of political dynamics to get this small but influential number of people to give in to this new arrangement. This won't happen until they realize that not doing this would be even worse than doing this. That will require some extremely strong persuasion.

That the distance between where the world is now and a world state is vast is made manifest by a simple fact: in the twentieth century "no government seriously contemplated the ultimate formal surrender of sovereignty for the purpose of creating a world government" (Mandelbaum 197). It is not on anyone's agenda. No one is thinking about this as most people are still too busy celebrating the triumph of liberalism in the Cold War. This triumphant mood has only been slightly qualified by the war on terror and it is part of the problem as well. It helps keep people focused on the present. During the Cold War it was natural to think about the future of US-Soviet relations. The tensions of the Cold War created anxiety and anxiety naturally drives people to focus on what is coming next. Fearing the future causes people to think about the future. Now people think they've got it easy. There doesn't appear to be anything to fear. People are locked into the present. Thinking about future political changes seems painless, as such changes would be minor.

As Hedley Bull put it: "The advocate of world government can show his scheme to be feasible as well as desirable only by admitting that international relations do not resemble a Hobbesian state of nature: that in it covenants without the sword are more than words" (Bull 263). Here is a succinct, accurate explanation of why the world isn't ready for a world government. What Hedley Bull is not anticipating, however, is the growing world-wide recognition of the dangers of WMDs. When enough people are scared they will start looking for an exit from their predicament.

When they realize other people all over the world are doing the same thing, they will have a covenant without the sword that is worth far more than words. The covenant they will have is self interest. All people will know that they share with all other people a vitally important interest in controlling WMDs. My argument is that a world government will probably emerge because the states system isn't equipped with the resources to control WMDs. Anarchy creates an opportunity for any terrorist group or nation who can acquire a WMD the opportunity to use one. This is just another way of saying that anarchy reigns in international affairs at the same time that WMDs exist. This isn't based on projections of how the UN or some other institution may change over time. My guess is that the UN will play a vital role in this process. As the world's most prominent international political organization, it is the natural place for people looking to escape the fears they will feel when the international situation heats up.

The issue that needs to be addressed, then, is whether the UN can adapt to the changing political realities. The author, Paul Kennedy addresses UN reform in his book *The Parliament of Man*. The first approach he mentions is the "clean out the stables" approach. (Kennedy 247). It isn't surprising that this kind of opposition is so prevalent

in the US considering the fact that we're too rich to benefit from the economic and programs of the UN and we're too powerful to need the UN to defend us. One usually realizes they are hearing this sort of approach when the UN is called a debating society or something similar to that. It's based on a lack of recognition that sovereignty is shifting away from nations.

Another approach Kennedy alludes to is one he calls a middle position. This position doesn't seek to diminish the UN but "sets to enhance its capacities and effectiveness, thus boosting its position in the eyes of governments and publics" (Kennedy 248). Such a change in public opinion is probably necessary. The late Charles de Gaulle frequently referred to the UN as "the thing" (Weiss 253). Of course, he meant this disparagingly. Even still, he made a serious point with which even UN supporters could agree. The UN is not a state. It isn't any kind of entity that has sovereignty. As previously noted it has power but this power is contingent on the will of separate and often antagonistic states.

To really understand the role of the UN in this it is important to not think of it in dichotomous terms. In other words, it is important not to think of the UN as either a completely politically impotent international debating society or as a genuine world sovereignty. That it is not the former was demonstrated earlier in this paper by the simple fact that every nation of the world wants to be a member of the UN. Why would every single nation in the world care whether or not it belonged to a debating society? Nations deal in power and the UN must have some or else this wouldn't be true. But it's not a world sovereignty either. Wars still occur. There is only one way, therefore, to make sense of the extremely complex and ambiguous question of what is the UN? And

that is to try to place the UN somewhere on the continuum between these two obviously false extremes. The UN has power--real power. But the UN opposes war yet wars are common.

An interesting illustration of this paradox was provided by the run up to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. France and other nations in the world opposed the invasion saying the US wasn't threatened by Iraq. The Bush Administration launched a full-scale effort to win UN backing. They used both lobbying of the UN and a public relations campaign to try to get the UN to support them. Conservatives both inside and outside the Administration did all they could to get UN backing. Yet, at the same time they claimed the UN was powerless. My use of the term "debating society" comes from a Republican Senator who used this to describe the UN during this period. This paradox of the UN being both a viable political institution and a mere debating society is at the heart of the UN's current process of development. The world is committed to the current political configuration. It won't and can't give up the UN. There is a need for both.

This is similar to biological evolution. If one were to look at the long line of the evolutionary predecessors of people they would realize that each stage of evolution incorporates the stage that preceded it. And it was a precursor to the next stage. Each stage appears to be separate but is really part of one vast developmental process. Living in the present makes each stage seem eternal. What applies to biological evolution, applies to political evolution. What appears static in the present is really fluid in the long term. The UN only fully makes sense when viewed in this way. It is a step in between the states system and that which the states system will evolve into. This explains the

awkwardness of having two systems at once; a system based on nationalism and a seemingly contradictory system of internationalism as well.

Paul Kennedy's book suffers from this short-sightedness. He advocates reform of the UN but he doesn't realize the whole system will need to be changed to maintain indefinite human survival. He never deals with the issue of how the UN will be able to reach closure on WMD proliferation. He is examining a stage of political evolution while forgetting that evolution is occurring. His thinking is stuck within the confines of the present system.

Alexander Wendt deserves credit for contributing to the world state movement in IR scholarship. He accurately mentions that one factor leading to this new state is the destructiveness of WMDs. But he is mistaken in over-emphasizing the "struggle for recognition" as part of why a world state will develop (Wendt 493). People are willing to pursue their struggle for recognition within the confines of a single nation when there exist such obstacles to a world government. The resistance to a world state is and will for some time be enormous. The struggle for recognition by itself will have relatively little effect in altering this struggle for recognition--people national governments giving up some of their recognition/prestige--these are the prime of resistance in addition to the resistance rich people have to redistributing wealth to the Third World.

Vaughn Shannon accurately points to another flaw in his thinking--his misuse of the word "inevitable." By saying a world state is inevitable, he is making a claim that cannot be supported. No one knows with certainty what the future holds. Not only does such a claim invite ridicule, it forecloses all other possible scenarios. This is why I refer to a world state as being merely probable. I can't see any other acceptable long term



alternative but the repeated failures of prediction of so many political analysts should create a slight hesitancy in making forecasts. No one knows the future with certainty.

Another problem with Wendt's "struggle for recognition" being a major factor in the impetus for a world state is similar to the problem of resistance wealthy people in the First World will put up to having their money redistributed to the disadvantaged elements in the Third World. The problem is that the people who would have to participate as key players in this process are the people who work for the very national governments that would be reduced in power or cease to exist if a world state is created. Their prestige, their name and their struggle for recognition is tied to the governments whose sovereignty this new political order would displace. This will create additional resistance on top of the resistance created by fears of economic redistribution.

Wendt maintains that WMDs are a factor in the formation of this proposed world state but he dwells almost exclusively on the struggle for recognition . He never explains precisely why the forces of this struggle for recognition are so strong that they will overcome the vast resistance to a world state that exists. In fact he creates the impression that the whole process will be smooth, easy and virtually automatic and he hardly mentions that there will be problems along the way. WMDs, and their increase in destructiveness, is listed as paramount to the process but Wendt never explains exactly how this struggle for recognition relates to the control of WMDs. Are those two factors separate and unrelated? When people begin to react to the fears the proliferation or use of WMDs will create, will this lead to a greater degree of the struggle for recognition? The struggle for recognition will spur the creation of a world government but it will only do this after it becomes obvious to the majority of people that human survival hinges on this.

And even then the struggle for recognition will be at most a secondary and less important variable while the quest for security is paramount. That people have a hierarchy of needs with biological survival ahead of the struggle for recognition is indisputable. Yet Wendt ignores this.

As Daniel Deudney puts it "For the foreseeable future, and perhaps forever, the physical survival of vast numbers of human beings, and much of the nonhuman life on earth, rests upon the adequacy of the system to restrain the large-scale use of nuclear weapons" (Deudney 245). In this statement Deudney puts forward the primary reason a world government is so likely. How the people and nations of the world will go about maintaining security is the one issue on which the possibility of a world government hinges. All other factors supporting the possibility of a world government are of secondary importance to the one. Only this issue will force people to confront the fact that a system of divided international sovereignty cannot —that is a system of states-- cannot last indefinitely without catastrophe.

Concerning this issue, Deudney states, "Arguments about the relationship between nuclear weapons and the state system fall into five broad groups, which I label classical nuclear one worldism, nuclear strategism, automatic deference statism, institutional deterrence statism, and federal-republican one worldism" (Deudney 245). The first view, classical nuclear one worldism is based on the "simple argument that the size of state viability has shifted: nuclear weapons have pushed states from the moderate and tolerable vulnerability of a second anarchy into the intolerable vulnerability of first anarchy, and in this situation security can only be obtained through the erection of a larger, all-encompassing world government" (Deudney 246).

One evident problem with this is that it doesn't appear to fit the conditions of international politics. The behavior of states has not changed substantially since the beginning of the era of WMDs in 1945. If this now proves to be correct, it will be based on future changes that have been predicted by IR theorists like Deudney and Alexander Wendt. The accuracy of this thesis rests completely on greater numbers of people throughout the world-- both political leaders and ordinary citizens-- coming to understand the dangers of the current system. Unless and until this happens this theory is impossible. Fear is the great motivator of states necessary to end the current system.

"The second position, nuclear strategism, holds that the advent of nuclear weapons makes no decisive break in world politics and observes the behavior of states to be largely the same before and after their arrival" (Deudney 246). Essentially, this theory is a description of the status quo. Conflict is an endemic and unavoidable part of the system. Nuclear strategism predicts that nations seeking security in a nuclear world will prepare for a variety of options involving the use of nuclear weapons. The advent of the nuclear age didn't change anything. It was at this time that the Baruch Plan was prepared. To fully understand the reasons for this plans failure it is necessary to take a look at the thinking of Thomas Hobbes.

Hobbes is one of the most influential political theorists of all time. This is truly amazing considering that Hobbes' philosophy has been spectacularly unsuccessful. His primary contention was that political power was indivisible. He claimed that divided power invariably led to destabilizing power struggles. All authority had to be invested in one person--a monarch or some other type of authoritarian leader. At the time of his writing the English parliament was showing that Hobbes was mistaken by taking power

away from the king. The failure of his system was even more obvious a century later when the US Government was founded with a constitutional system that divided power between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Every democratic nation in the world is a testament to his failure. Yet, he is still widely read and highly regarded. The reason for this is that he does an excellent job of describing military power. Military power cannot be divided. If it was divided we would end up with absurd scenarios like one governmental authority trying to fight a war with ground troops while another authority was using the air force to drop bombs on the area occupied by the ground troops. There must be unity of military command for a state to not be completely dysfunctional.

For there to be a viable world government it will have to have a monopoly on the use of force. Political power has already begun to shift away from nation-states. This doesn't alter the fact that the UN and other international organizations are still entirely subservient to nation-states. Nations need the UN but they have not transferred their monopoly of the use of force to it. And it will take considerable change for them to do this.

Different governments share power with other governments. Power is divided successfully between state, county, and city, governments and the national government in the US and between the governments of the nations of the world. But for a state to be a state, that is to function at all without completely breaking down--it has to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its territory. The tremendous success the US and many other nations have had in dividing power has confused many people

about this. Divided power has led many people to falsely believe that military power is divisible.

This is particularly true of the left. Liberals see that political power has been successfully divided. This leads them to falsely assume that military power can be divided as well. This belief also leads them to overestimate the efficacy of the UN and it instills other false ideas such as thinking that the UN is autonomous and does not owe its existence to the voluntary decisions of the US and other states.

Conservatives understand this. But the mistake conservatives make is believing the UN is politically irrelevant. They're not aware that the UN has real power. It has real power even if this power has been given to it voluntarily.

The third and fourth answers to the nuclear-political question are the "two varieties of deterrence statism, and they emphasize the stabilizing effect of deterrence. The basic argument of deterrence statism is that nuclear weapons have significantly altered the behavior of states by making war between nuclear armed states prohibitively costly" (Deudney 247). The first one is automatic deterrence statism and this is based on the notion that the use of nuclear weapons or other WMDs can be avoided by maintaining extensive nuclear forces in order to deter nuclear use.

The second version of deterrence statism is institutional deterrence statism and it emphasizes that deterrence of the use of WMDs has "institutional prerequisites" (Deudney 247). It places great importance on internal institutions of the state in "perfecting deterrence" and views interstate arms control as an important process through which states communicate to one another their recognition of the nuclear facts of life and their political relations and force structures in order to reduce the possibilities of nuclear

war or use" (Deudney 248). This position accurately recognizes that deterrence isn't based entirely on policies pursued by the political leadership of nations. It involves adjustments internal to the society, as well.

Deterrence statism in both its forms is an excellent short term strategy and it closely resembles the basic strategy of deterrence pursued by the US during the Cold War. It was the best strategy under the circumstances. A nuclear era requires the establishment of an institutionalized commitment to deterrence. This prevented a war between the US and the Soviet Union. It was practical and effective. The primary reason it worked was that most people had not thought far enough ahead. As this forces most people to focus on the present and they were not dealing with the fact that the inevitable power of WMDs and their increase in destructive power made the system of states impractical in the long term.

Deterrence statism was the lesser of all possible evils. It took a chance on nuclear war but only a chance. If this chance hadn't been taken than there would have been no deterrence to Soviet expansion. It was a compromise on the part of the US between caving in and taking provocative actions that would lead eventually to nuclear conflict. It worked in ending the Cold War to the favor of the US and the west.

Deterrence statism, however, isn't just a Cold War policy. The idea behind deterrence statism works against any and all manner of potential US adversaries. Whenever the leader of a foreign nation that is hostile to the US realizes that provoking or attacking the US would bring down on itself formidable retaliation than deterrence statism is working.

The problem with deterrence statism is that it can't last indefinitely. It is a short

term solution that Americans believe can be safely extended indefinitely. Eventually the power gap between the US and other nations will narrow. Other nations will acquire and stockpile WMDs. Perhaps even more urgent and is the issue of the issue of malevolent non state actors (MANGOS) (Deudney 259). When an Osama bin Laden or a Timothy McVeigh get control of WMDs there will be no way to track them because they're not leaders of nations with defined geographical boundaries. The only reason the US was able to retaliate militarily for the 9-11 attacks was because Afghanistan was unwilling to hand over Osama bin Laden even though he was not working through a national government to orchestrate these attacks. Otherwise our "retaliation" would merely have been Osama bin Laden's (if we had caught him) criminal prosecution as it was for Timothy McVeigh. MANGO's are particularly dangerous because often times the only retaliation against them is prosecution. They can hit the US but there will be no way for the US to hit back when they acquire WMDs. This is particularly true in cases like McVeigh when the MANGO is an American.

"The final position, federal-republican nuclear one worldism is much less developed and unrecognizable" (Deudney 247). Like nuclear one worldism it holds that WMDs have made the statist approach to providing security ineffectual, and that continual security in an era with WMDs requires the "establishment of an institutionalized division between territorial units and nuclear capability." Instead of either the continuation of interstate anarchy or the establishment of a world state, a federal-republican federation of strong mutual restraint is needed to provide security" (Deudey 247).

There is one basic problem with this theory. It doesn't grant to the international

body it proposes creating a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Unless this body has such a monopoly it isn't understanding this.

Again, psychological projection is the problem. What would I do? This is the question people ask. But the answer they get is that they wouldn't start a war or a genocide or use WMDs. But what most people would do has not been the issue. It's what members of the sociopathic fringe all societies have that's the issue. The monopoly on the legitimate use of force has to be a monopoly for there to be unity of command. And as previously demonstrated, unity of command is necessary for the state (world state or nation-state) to not be completely dysfunctional and break down. Political power can be effectively divided between a world state and the nations of the world but military power has to be unified. These two forms of power should not be confused.



## **Chapter 4:**

### **Proliferation and Public Opinion**

To really understand the theory being advanced in this paper, it is necessary to go through the possible scenarios as they unfold step by step, bearing in mind that I'm making no claim about when this proposed world state is likely to develop. It could occur either twenty or thirty years or it could take a century or longer. Time is the one aspect of this theory that is most difficult to predict and it forms no part of this thesis. I agree with Alexander Wendt that the stages leading to a world state do not depend on a specific time frame. There are too many unknowns to predict how long the route from anarchy to a world government might take.

The first stage in this likely progression is the continual proliferation of WMDs. That WMDs will continue to proliferate is obvious and wholly uncontrollable. Many states that don't have them will seek them and in some cases will acquire them. As these weapons proliferate the states will increase efforts to acquire them and will also in some cases, succeed. Over a matter of five or ten years or 20 years or maybe as much as 50 years--there will undoubtedly be a large increase in the number of states with WMDs. This process will continue indefinitely.

The NPT will probably slow down this process but it has no way of stopping it for "the striking reality is that there is no central authority" (Weiss 2010, 29). It comes as no surprise that the attempted enforcement of this treaty has led to the "relatively spotty success of non-proliferation efforts" (Cabrera525). It is not difficult to imagine that many

other states will be able to come into possession of WMDs if and when they decide to seriously pursue them. The US accomplished this feat in 1945. Other states can't be that far behind.

It is true that continued proliferation will probably lead to increased policing by the UN and that in time this process will be supported by a US alarmed out of its traditional isolationism. Even in the unlikely event that the US were to fully commit itself to combating non-proliferation it would run into some very powerful obstacles. The first of these, no doubt, is power. The US is the world's only superpower in this post Cold War world and the US accounts for only five percent of the world's population and about one quarter of its economy. This is a far cry from anything that could be accurately called a world hegemony. We are in a unipolar world only to the extent that the US is the world's only visible power not that we can control the actions of all or even most of the world's some two hundred states.

Lack of power, however, is far less important than the way in which the problem of proliferation manifests. The power of the US allows us to assemble vast military resources to strike at identified targets like Afghanistan and Iraq. It does not grant us the virtual omniscience to know what's going on nearly everywhere in the world. Only this knowledge would allow us to fully and effectively combat proliferation. There are far too many ways for proliferation to occur for it to be contained indefinitely.

Proliferation occurs wherever one person in one state is given (or steals) information on constructing or buying WMDs by one other person in another state. There are for practical purposes an essentially unlimited number of ways for this to occur. The US simply does not have even a small fraction of the resources necessary to

prevent this largely invisible process from occurring. This is even more true now as most Americans are oblivious to the approaching dangers. Proliferation isn't an issue many people or politicians are concerned with. The 9-11 terrorist attacks did not fully alter most Americans' feelings of post Cold War invincibility. These attacks are still largely viewed as an isolated episode. Rarely do Americans worry about how long it will take for terrorists of the 9-11 variety to acquire WMDs.

Proliferation will occur. And this will cause more proliferation as states try to balance the power of states that have already acquired WMDs. At first these processes will be viewed as local problems like the already mentioned nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan several years ago. Few people in this part of the world worried very much about this near miss because they saw no self interest in it. It was viewed as someone else's problem. In a sense this was true but it illustrates a dangerous phenomenon. The problem here is that people still view incidents like this as being disconnected and episodic. They are not being viewed as part of the one basic process of proliferation. This will go on for some time.

Seeing WMD proliferation as disconnected and episodic and not a common human problem is a far bigger issue than can be easily understood. It prevents states from working together to stop proliferation. And it prevents most states from realizing they have an interest in the proliferation of WMDs into areas of the world far removed from them. States are still thinking about specific threats like the USSR worrying about the US or Pakistan responding to India. The rate of proliferation will increase significantly when they begin to see the problem in a more general fashion and they realize WMDs can be acquired by any state or terrorist group and used anytime.

This thinking was effectively illustrated in one of the books I researched for this thesis. The author concluded that the NPT had been relatively successful because only India--the world's second most populous state--had acquired nuclear weapons between the creation of the NPT in 1968 and the time the book was written in 1984 (McGrew 3). The continued survival of hundreds of millions of people depends on deterrence. And as "Martin Amis notes, 'the trouble with deterrence is that it can't test out the necessary timespan, which is roughly between now and the death of the sun'" (Craig 2003 xvii). Like so many people this author was using an absurdly limited time frame with which to judge the success of the NPT.

Eventually, however, human thinking will go through what is, in effect, a paradigm shift--too many near misses (or uses) of WMDs will occur in too many far flung corners of the world in too short a time. The intense and nearly constant media attention given to these incidents will eventually break down human thinking and cause people to reframe how they think about the issue. No longer will people see these events as isolated. They will accurately be reformulated from being seen as terrible but isolated incidents to being separate parts of the one issue of how humanity will be able to avoid self-destruction. People all over the world who have no direct or material interest in the well being of India or Pakistan, or Israel, or any other part of the world into which WMDs have proliferated or will eventually proliferate will start seeing themselves as tied to the problem.

This shift in thinking will be a political and psychological tipping point. People all over the world will begin to feel insecure. As the dangers of WMDs are realistically confronted by most people for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 or the

Reagan arms buildup of the 1980s fear will spread. And as fear spreads states will become increasingly preoccupied with survival. In this case survival will be physical rather than political. As this tipping point is reached most people will begin to see the long term hopelessness created by anarchy and WMDs existing simultaneously.

However, there will be a crucial difference as this new tipping point is reached. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Reagan arms buildup were tied to a Cold War that made far reaching political change impossible. The Cold War created the possibility of a dangerous conflagration but it also rested on a bipolar division of international power that was largely immune from change as long as the Soviet bloc existed. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its satellites it's fair to say that, if not completely triumphant, liberalism certainty is the standard by which all political systems are measured. And that it is without a serious rival in winning over the hearts and minds of the worlds masses.

The end of bipolarity is a major step forward for the possibility of a world government. The great difference between the international system prevailing during the 1940s and the "system in our own time is that the chances of attaining some form of world government have been radically enhanced by the end of the Cold War and emergence of a unipolar order." (Craig 141). Very few, if any, states would be ideologically opposed to liberal democracy. There are only a handful of communist states on earth. Obviously, this by itself is not enough for a world government. But this does remove a nearly insuperable barrier to worldwide compromise. And combined with the security threats that will emerge as a result of WMDs, this factor will be a major step forward for the possibility of world government. It should be borne in mind that "this condition...will not last forever" (Craig 2003 141). The emergence of a serious

ideological rival to liberalism could return the world to the same situation it was in during the Cold War. Writing during the cold war in 1977, Hedley Bull anticipated the importance of ideological homogeneity to world-wide consensus when he wrote that "the exponents of political ideologies frequently maintain that the triumph of their doctrines throughout the states system as a whole would, in addition to conferring other benefits, eliminate or reduce the sources of war and conflict, and lead to a more orderly world" (Bull 243).

The psychological tipping point that will be reached will lead to an international scramble for WMDs. States will feel threatened and will begin to act in the way fear encourages. Their actions will be dictated by a degree of selfishness and shortsightedness unusual even for the system of states. Whether their acquisition of WMDs will lead to their rivals acquiring them or to several states in their region acquiring them and whether this will weaken their long term security position is not what they will focus on. Their fear will be strong enough that their objectives will be focused solely on getting WMDs.

Unfortunately this is what many other states will be doing. This process will prove an old belief to be a myth. The myth is that nuclear weapons and other WMDs are hard to acquire. In fact, many countries could acquire nuclear weapons or other WMDs if they really invested the time, money, and resources to do so. However, it has been noted that "most nations today have a cadre of well-educated scientists who could, with a dedicated effort, master the mysteries of the atom bomb" (Bailey 8). Duplicating today what the US did nearly seventy years ago in 1945 would not be particularly difficult with today's scientific knowledge. This is particularly true if the states were large and rich and they had extensive scientific resources to draw on--Germany, for example, or a Japan

acting in violation of its World War II treaty commitments. However, even for smaller states duplicating what the US did in 1945 is not that far out of reach.

This point was brought home quite vividly nearly half a century ago in 1964. Officials at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory conducted an experiment where they chose “a couple of young postdoctoral physicists ‘out of the sky’ to design a nuclear weapon” (Jenkins 40). With no access to classified information they were able to create a design for a bomb that “computer simulations and a murder board of experienced weapons designers concluded” would work (Jenkins 40). The two of them did this in just twenty-eight months. There is no reason to think it would be difficult for the same thing to happen today particularly when one considers that there existed a lot less scientific knowledge in 1964 than today.

It is also true that simply buying WMDs—or the knowledge necessary to create them—isn’t very hard. As one author noted “virtually all forms of advanced technology, from computers to pharmaceuticals to weapons of mass destruction are available—at a cost—around the world” (Miller 163). This is just another reason to think that the number of nuclear nations is only small because states aren’t pursuing WMDs. This can change quickly. And when this point is reached the tempo of proliferation will significantly increase. Thinking only of their immediate security interests, rich, powerful states will have relatively little trouble getting WMDs. Smaller, poorer, states will also acquire WMDs though primarily in a slower fashion.

The question referred to earlier---what exactly is the UN? -- will become urgently relevant. The NPT has done a reasonably good job at preventing proliferation. But it has done so with the consent of the states on whose existence it depends. When states no

longer see compliance to be in their self-interest, then the lack of a central authority will become painfully and obviously evident. The fact that the NPT has garnered significant, though incomplete, success can dangerously be misinterpreted in dichotomous terms. One dichotomy--the right is denied its usual portrayal of the UN as irrelevant in regards to the enforcement and relative effectiveness of the NPT. So the left, it would seem, must be justified in thinking of the NPT, the UN, and international law as sovereign. This places faith in a treaty whose successes are contingent on state interests and can be easily overturned. It fools people into thinking of the NPT and the UN as a possible long term solution to the problem posed by anarchy and WMDs. The NPT has encountered success but its success is based on a house of cards--the illusion of international sovereignty. And this house of cards will last only as long as the states supporting it feel unthreatened.

At this point understanding the nature of the problem is helped greatly by reframing the problem and dividing the human race into two groups. The first group are those people who do not have access to WMDs. These people include nearly everyone in the world right now. All US citizens fall into this group currently except one person--President Obama. The same is true in the other states that belong to the nuclear club--the UK, France, Russia, China and so on. Something like 99.999% of all people in the world belong to this group.

Currently, the second group consists of the primary political leaders of nuclear states. President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron in the UK and so on. Numbers are hard to come by depending on the exact political structure of states in the nuclear club but



it is unlikely that the sum total of the members of group two currently exceed twenty people.

Continued human existence depends on the members of group two continuing to decide voluntarily not to use the WMDs at their disposal. The chance that any one person in this group will use WMDs is extremely remote. The chance that every member that belongs to this group or that will ever belong to this group will always continue to forsake the use of WMDs forever is effectively nothing. Thus, we are left literally waiting for someone in group two to use WMDs and we can only hope that their use will occur in a part of the world that we don't inhabit.

Another point to consider is that, as previously mentioned sociopathy is frequently unrecognized. Being the absence of something, rather than something, sociopathy allows those who suffer from this condition to disguise their nature. With enough cleverness and effort it is easily possible that a person lacking moral boundaries could come into control of a nuclear arsenal. Obviously almost no one would have a greater incentive to disguise their nature than a politician lacking moral boundaries who wants to be head of state.

When added to this the list of other problems that could lead a national political leader to use WMDs such as mental instability, faulty military intelligence, or just plain poor judgment then this just reaffirms the point. The use of WMDs is inevitable. And their use over and over after that--again given unlimited time--is also inevitable.

Few vestiges of the utopianism that was so wide spread at the time of the founding of the League of Nations still exists. But denial never goes out of style. Today people are dealing (or not dealing) with the WMD threat by not thinking about the danger

they are in. Or they are so fixed in the present that what happens five, ten, or twenty years down the road doesn't concern them if they think about it at all. This denial is similar to the mind-set that led the British politician Lord Cecil to declare in 1933 that " 'there has scarcely ever been a period in the world's history when war seems less likely than it does at present' " (Carr 36).

This response is similar to the international response to the environment. Each year is hotter than the previous one. Large quantities of ice in the globe's northern regions are melting, raising the ocean level and threatening massive inland flooding. The scientific community has reached a nearly unquestioned consensus that global warming is real. Yet, each year humanity sets a new record for carbon emissions.

The danger will become particularly acute when terrorist groups come into possession of WMDs. It's true that a ruthless or psychologically unstable individual could become the primary leader of a state in the nuclear club. While this is inevitable eventually the chance of this happening in the short term is unlikely. Most political leaders--particularly in democracies aren't crazy, stupid, or evil. Crazy, stupid, or evil people usually do or say something or act in ways that make them unelectable. Poor judgment of the sort that was the hallmark of the George W. Bush administration is possible, but even Bush wasn't stupid as intelligence is conventionally defined.

Terrorists, of course, will fit a very different psychological profile. Nearly all of them will be sociopathic, unstable or highly predisposed to the kind of thinking that fosters blind fanaticism. Their membership in a terrorist group already sets them apart from most people, particularly most people who are capable of attaining the heights of leadership in a stable, functioning democracy. Their motives for acquiring WMDs

almost certainly will be to use them. A state could be motivated to acquire WMDs to use as deterrence like the US during the Cold War. A terrorist group, however, is without geographic boundaries or clearly defined populations like a state. There is nothing to strike back at. Had it not been for the sheltering of Osama bin Laden and other members of al-Qaeda, the US would have had a grievance but nothing to strike after 9-11.

President Bush would have been left trying to placate public anger by the occasional capture of terrorists spread out over much of the world. This would have made the US appear powerless and ridiculous. Our nearly automatic takeover of Afghanistan in the weeks following 9-11 did much to restore US credibility but this is only because we had a return address on the 9-11 attackers. An attack on the US by terrorists acting completely free of a state would be a public relations nightmare. A nightmare but again, with enough time, an inevitability.

After 9-11, states still underestimate terrorism. The states system is so old that it is natural to focus on interstate warfare and to ignore the possibility of terrorism. One author said it best when he claimed that “terrorism seems sporadic, nonsystemic, and while of great interest and pain upon its occurrence, of little lasting effect” (Bergesen 227). Centuries of living with the states system makes it difficult for most people to think about terrorism very much unless a terrorist attack (like 9-11) has recently occurred.

It should be noted that there is at least in theory, an extremely remote possibility of enough near misses of the use of WMDs like the Cuban Missile Crisis to scare people into understanding and accepting the dangers they are facing. If enough new misses like this are combined with the popularization of the world state scholarship going on in IR

currently, people might come to their senses, realize their survival interests are threatened and create a world government without the use of WMDs.

Infinitely more likely, however, is the actual use of WMDs. Someone, somewhere in the world, with control of WMDs, will find themselves in a position that seems to them to warrant their use. And they will use them. Millions of people will be killed. The media will carry horrid images of death and suffering to TV screens all over the world, 24/7. If there is no immediate retaliatory use of WMDs against the original aggressor then the world will eventually breath a collective sigh of relief that the incident is over, offer aid to the survivors, and get back to their lives as they largely were before the incident.

There will, however, be a shift in thinking. People will be alarmed and at least partially shaken out of the obliviousness they are currently directing toward the issue of WMD proliferation. The horrors seen on TV will remain a permanent reminder of the dangers they are facing. These images will not be forgotten and will be a factor in any future policy discussions regarding WMDs. The WMD threat is currently an abstraction to most people but at this point it will become concrete.

This shift in thinking will have domestic political repercussions. There will be a great intensification of the old opposition pitting nationalism against internationalism. Presumably, the left will respond with a call to strengthen international institutions like the UN and the right will call for an increase in patriotism and military preparedness. In the early stages of this process the right will win out. The widespread fears people have will result in an almost automatic increase in military power and nationalism. Resorting

to military force is just too ingrained in most people and will be a natural response to their fears. Most people won't know of any other way to respond.

This phase of history will be chaotic and terrifying. For the first time in history people all over the world will become conscious of the dangers of WMD proliferation without the backdrop of bipolar stability. The desperate and widespread acquisition of WMDs will resemble a Hobbesian war of all against all. There will be virtually no possibility of an overnight apocalypse resembling the Cuban Missile Crisis. But this threat will be replaced by the threat of WMDs being used almost anywhere in the world almost anytime. Things will seem out of control. Despite the fears the Cold War inspired in millions of people, the Cold War was not chaotic, out of control. This era will be.

While the chaotic reaction to this tipping point will be occurring, there will be other people taking a longer range view. They will notice that while their state is blindly pursuing WMDs nearly every other state is doing the same thing. Those able to take this view will understand the futility of so many states trying to acquire WMDs at the same time. This will force large numbers of people to begin looking for a way out of the predicament anarchy and WMDs create.

It is at this point the fact that “the idea of world government is returning to the mainstream of scholarly thinking about international relations” will become politically relevant (Craig 133). The fact that influential scholars like Alexander Wendt and Daniel Deudney have written influential pieces advocating the idea of world government will impact policy makers. In the same way that liberal theorists like Locke and Rousseau preceded liberal democratic leaders like Washington and Jefferson, the world state

movement in IR creates an intellectual justification for future action. This belies the myth of the Ivory Tower as irrelevant and shows that intellectuals are participants in the "real world". A paradigm is created by thinkers and it eventually filters down into mainstream society where eventually it is mistaken for common sense. Thinkers like Deudney and Wendt are actors in the unfolding drama and not just bystanders. They are playing an essential role.

The initial role they will play is to counter public skepticism. The idea of a world government is currently viewed by most people--particularly Americans-- like the League of Nations - a well meaning but misguided refusal to accept the realpolitik. Currently this is true but IR's world state scholarship is one of the first steps in the movement towards a world government. The idea is beginning to circulate and it has received eminent intellectual support. Until people get scared this won't have much impact but when increasingly large numbers of people begin to understand the problem they have, this scholarship will start to be taken seriously. The spread and use of WMDs will force people to look at the situation the entire world is in. And for the first time since the 1940s many people will be forced to acknowledge the hopelessness WMDs and anarchy create. This tipping point will create another change as well. This change will involve how people think of "they" and "we". Currently, "they" means people in distant parts of the world whose well being and safety have no direct bearing on the US. This includes the Chinese, Russians, Indians, and Pakistani's. And "we", of course, refers to Americans.

As this tipping point is reached people will reframe how they view "we" and "they". They will be transformed into the members of group two. People all over the

world will increasingly be seen as members of group two and "we" will be everyone else. This will be a critical and decisive break from all of history. For the first time nearly all people in the world will see themselves as "we" and nothing creates solidarity more fully or quickly than mutual self-interest. The US alliance with the USSR during World War II, when both states had a common enemy, demonstrated just how powerful this force can be.

This mental reframing will happen slowly at first. A few politicians on the left guided partly by academic writings. This will have relatively little impact on international popular opinion and even less impact on the behavior of states but it will have a snowball effect. As more and more people are forced to consider the issue, they will see the hopelessness of the current situation.

At the same time the right will begin to react to this movement with the previously mentioned return to nationalism. This will be an intensification of the old tension between internationalism and nationalism and it will go on for some time. The pro world state forces will be countered not only by appeals to patriotism but also the insistent claims that it can't work. This opposition will go on for some time.

Meanwhile, more WMDs will be used and more people will begin to see the use of WMDs as a common human problem and not one that is limited to specific regions and states. The world state movement of the 1940s will return with an urgency but there will be a couple of crucial differences. First, there will be no Cold War to prevent broad international compromise. Second, and most importantly, the thought of the use of WMDs won't be something that people have to worry about until decades into the future. It will be an immediate, contemporary threat. Ideological compatibility combined with

the increasingly obvious threats to worldwide human survival will invoke a question that forms the crux of this thesis. And that question is what is the greater determinant of human behavior--survival instincts or allegiance to the state system? Belief in the continuance of the state system and human survival rests on the idea that WMDs won't proliferate and get used. Allowing for a large enough time frame, this idea is silly. Anarchy unavoidably means that they will. Nothing stands in the way of this. Facing up to this requires the simple use of a rationality that is not tied to any political or philosophical commitments. Thus, WMDs will proliferate, almost certainly get used, and millions will die. The increasingly fevered debate between nationalism and internationalism will make the dangers that WMDs and anarchy together pose obvious to all. A new form of consciousness will begin to emerge as people begin to see themselves as part of the same endangered life form. This will not involve any kind of unprecedented kinship among the world's different racial, cultural and national groups. Rather, it will be that, for the first time in history, all people in the world will be aware of having a common survival interest that WMDs threaten. It would be like a Cuban Missile Crisis without the Cold War ideological rivalry.

As I said before timing is the one aspect that can't be predicted. This debate between nationalism and internationalism will give birth to a synthesis. But when and how this occurs is difficult, if not impossible, to predict. There are numerous unknown factors that could speed up or slow down the process but as long as both anarchy and WMDs exist it is only a matter of time before they are used. And only a matter of time before they are used again and again after that. Creating a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence is the only way people have ever been able to control aggression enough



to make life tolerable within a state. Interstate warfare, despite its horror, was a problem that could be accepted as a condition of living with the states system. The advantages provided by the states system outweighed the disadvantages of occasional warfare. This ended dramatically with the advent of WMDs. But people have been living with WMDs without their being used for so long that they are taken for granted. And people are particularly prone to underestimate their dangers because they still tend to associate the dangers of WMDs with a Cold War that has already ended.

The fact is that interstate warfare has only been tolerable because WMDs have not been used since 1945. It is only a matter of time before they are used. And it is only a matter of time after that until they are used again and again. The use of WMDs is inevitable. The only way people have found to control aggression is the establishment of an organization that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. There are no exceptions to this and, barring unforeseeable advancements in human moral functioning, there never will be. This includes the UN, global governance, and any other form of internationalism. They do not create a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and so they leave open the inevitable and repeated use of WMDs. Their occasional effectiveness should not be misinterpreted as a monopoly on violence and history has demonstrated that such a monopoly is the only way to control aggression.

It should be pointed out that not believing in the eventual formation of a world government means believing that separate and often antagonistic political entities both states and terrorists groups--that have (or will have) the capacity to kill hundreds of millions of people can coexist peacefully indefinitely. This is the basic reason I think the human race is probably within view of two and only two alternatives--world government

or annihilation. Neither may happen soon but there is a direct and obvious pathway from where the world is now to one of these two destinations. I am unable to conceive of a third possibility.

One final problem is what has been called the “reification of anarchy: the odd idea that anarchy is some kind of cosmic material force that cannot be overcome (Craig 173). Living with the states system for so long and understanding the difficulties of creating a world government when states don’t realize their physical survival is at stake makes anarchy appear immutable. To this I will only say that thinking massive structural change isn’t possible is, as previously noted, completely ahistorical. Anarchy, like the states system, is part of the current phase of history and its undoubted durability should not be confused with thinking that states and people value the status quo over elimination.

Undoubtedly the best argument against a world government, however, is the sheer number of entirely reasonable people--particularly IR experts--who don't think a world government is likely. I have taken the rather unusual approach in this paper of conceding that I don't know what is going to happen with certainty. The predictive failures of Hobbes and Marx and many other renowned thinkers should give one a certain trepidation in making predictions. For as Yogi Berra observed, "it's tough to make predictions, especially about the future" (Behe 206). I refuse to make the same error that Vaughn Shannon called Alexander Wendt down on and claim that a world government is inevitable. I don't know what will happen for sure and such a claim would be incomplete without at least some discussion of the ancient philosophical issues of fate, freewill, and determinism. I do believe, however, that there are two significant cognitive blocks to

understanding and either intelligently agreeing or disagreeing with this theory. First, one has to think in a virtually time unlimited frame of mind. The beginning of this process could be within ten years. Or it could be over a century. It is crucial to free oneself of being locked into the present that most political analysis is based on. The possible formulation of a world government will be measured in decades and centuries not months and years.

Tied to this is the need to acknowledge the great capacity people have for change. Sixty years ago, not long at all in historical terms, racial segregation was widely practiced and women were kept almost exclusively out of the professions. Is there any reason to think that the deep seated opposition people have to a world government couldn't change as much in a comparable period of time particularly as more and more people are forced to focus on the hopelessness of anarchy. It is natural to assume that the future will be largely a continuation of the past even though history holds no justification for this view. It is just the way the mind works.

Second, and similar to this, one has to be able to engage in an act of imagination. It requires imagining a world vastly different from the way it is today. And vastly different from the way it has ever been. A world without interstate warfare seems just too "pie in the sky" to most people. I suggest that if you engage your imagination, and continually ask yourself what happens next?, you will find that you can imagine this occurring, whether you agree that it will or not. And this does not require the sacrifice of sound judgement.

Naturally, one wants to know what kind of government this world institution will be. At the current time I think it is fair to say that liberal democracy is without a serious

rival. It is possible, though far from certain, that this situation will last and that liberal democracy will not turn out to be merely another stage in humanity's political evolution. Liberal democracy serves the interests of all voters--the vast majority of people--and so it has a built-in security system. Any form of authoritarian or totalitarian state operates under the threat of a frustrated majority.

The issue of how to convince people to create a world government--paramount as that would seem--isn't really as important as it appears. In today's world there is no chance of a world government. People are divided by state membership, culture, race, wealth, and on and on. It is only after they fully realize and accept the hopelessness of anarchy and WMDs--particularly if they've been forced to watch gruesome scenes of human carnage caused by WMDs on TV that they will confront the problems described in this paper.

One important thing to bear in mind is the importance of separating two processes. The first process is the essentially inevitable proliferation and use of WMDs. As I've stated, I don't think anyone who realistically thinks about this doubts that WMDs will continue to proliferate and will get used eventually.

The second process is the effect this will have on widespread thinking about the possibility of world government: "Ever since I was a student, fifty years ago, references to world government or world community were dismissed as sheerly rhetorical, meaningless phrases or, worse, as naively idealistic" (Etzioni vii). It is natural to begin thinking about WMD proliferation with the a priori assumption that because people wouldn't agree to a world government today they will never agree to it, that bringing billions of people into the knowledge that their survival hinges on the elimination of

anarchy will change anything though it clearly would have an enormous impact. One keeps reaffirming that people are opposed to world government and this blinds one to the obvious and powerful effect survival instincts have on political behavior. To really understand this theory it is necessary to pretend that this paper is not leading to the probable creation of a world state. Otherwise, thoughts of the "it will never work" variety blind the reader to the obvious and tremendous capacity for change history shows people have. Only after one accepts that WMDs will continue to proliferate and get used should one consider how most people will react to this. Then the question they need to ask themselves is what are people more motivated by---physical survival or maintenance of a political status quo that history has repeatedly demonstrated to be in a state of constant change?

One final word on the probability of this government lasting. The best way to understand this is to look at prohibition in the 1920s. Each year the US pays a staggering price for the legalization of alcohol through drunk driving fatalities and the various ills associated with alcoholism. But no one suggests that alcohol be banned because everyone knows it was tried during the 1920s and it didn't work. The same process will support this new government. People will realize that returning to the anarchy of the states system would mean a return to the conditions that make the use of WMDs inevitable. The opposition to a world government is strong but not nearly that strong.

## **Conclusion**

This paper's thesis is based on a simple idea. Simple but widely denied and almost universally ignored. The idea is this: WMDs and indefinite anarchy are a combination that insures "unparalleled catastrophe" as Einstein put it, with the essential certainty of a natural law. The writer Jonathan Schell put it best: "a holocaust not only might occur but will occur-- if not today, than tomorrow; if not this year, than the next" (Schell 183). This isn't a nightmare scenario of which only the overheated imagination of an Edgar Allan Poe could conceive. It is a realistic prudent and quite frankly obvious understanding of what anarchy means.

Why can't the UN, the NPT, or global governance save us? Because, despite unquestioned power, they lack the one and only ingredient that history has demonstrated is necessary to pull humanity out of the state of nature. That ingredient is the establishment of an organization that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. In this case that organization would have to be global.

Agreement or reasonable disagreement with this thesis rests on the elimination of a few cognitive blocks. These include a focus on the present or on only the near future that nearly all political analysis encourages, and an understanding of people's capacity to alter their political values when their survival is threatened. This last point is particularly difficult for nearly all current writers on world government. Even supporters of the idea seem to think that people won't change or to ignore the possibility altogether. But the human capacity for change is an indispensable part of this process.

And it is the only reason world government is possible in the future but isn't now.

Will there be a world government? I think so but I freely admit I don't know for sure. Personally, I can't think of another long term alternative except for human annihilation. I have deliberately avoided any claims of inevitability other than the use of WMDs given continued anarchy. That is just too obvious to ignore.

In parting I'd like to point out just one thing. I think it can be said that, notwithstanding unavoidable imperfections, this paper is rational. It contains no adolescent naïveté, unjustified faith in human benevolence, or what E. H. Carr called the “nemesis of utopianism” (Carr 36). This thesis rests entirely on the states of the world doing what they've always done which is pursuing their self-interest. A rational paper advocating belief in the probable eventual formation of a world government can only mean such a belief is no longer to be thought of as the preserve of lunatics. This is undoubtedly part of a major shift. The coming years and decades will see an increase in the tempo of world state scholarship. Hopefully, like this paper, this can be done without the sacrifice of political realism.

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