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Review by Edward J. Hagerty
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Originally published in 2009, Capital of Spies succinctly describes the long history of espionage in Berlin. It touches on each of the foreign and German intelligence services operating in that city and throughout Germany during the Cold War. As such, it fills a niche and provides a solid introduction to those agencies, their functions, and some notable operational achievements and setbacks. Moreover, according to the authors, the book has grown between its original publication and this latest English translation with the addition of material flowing from newly discovered or recently declassified sources, and from contemporary witnesses who have since come forward to tell their stories.

Author Bernd von Kostka is a political scientist and historian specializing in Nazi and Cold War subjects. He has worked at the Allied Museum in Berlin since 1994 and is the author of two other Cold War studies. Sven Felix Kellerhoff, an historian and journalist, has been Chief Editor of Contemporary and Cultural History for the German newspaper Die Welt since 2003. He has written nearly thirty books specializing in the National Socialist and Cold War periods. Capital of Spies was expertly translated by Australian historian Linden Lyons.

The authors divide their work into two parts. The first deals with foreign intelligence services in Berlin and was written by von Kostka; the second addresses the German intelligence services and was written by Kellerhoff. Kostka traces the rise of tensions between the Soviets and Allied occupiers from the 1948 Soviet blockade and the implementation of the Berlin Airlift. That, and the 1949 partition of Germany into two states, propelled East/West cooperation to a decisive end and necessitated an increase in intelligence and espionage activities. Much effort and time was expended over the next decade or so in interviewing the over 2.5 million refugees who fled the East and brought information of value to the Allies. Some
refugees were even persuaded to return to the East as agents of western intelligence services. Despite such a wealth of information, the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 was a surprise that compelled a comprehensive revision of western intelligence methods. The sudden halt to easily accessible human intelligence sources led to an increasing use of intercepts of communications, signals, and electronic data.

Kostka describes the transition to technological means of intelligence gathering and the consequent importance of the listening station built on the mound of wartime rubble known as Teufelsberg, as well as several other sites around the city. Though sources do not definitively indicate what impact the intercepts had, one indicator of their value was that a prestigious award from the US Department of Defense recognizing significant contributions to US cryptologic efforts was awarded to the Teufelsberg field station four times between 1973 and 1989.

In another interesting segment, Kostka covers the construction and discovery of a spy tunnel that was begun in 1954 and stretched underground into East Berlin. A team of British and American experts tunneled into the Soviet sector to the point where they could tap into two long-distance telephone cables. The plans for the tunnel were divulged to the KGB by George Blake, a Dutch double-agent working with the British. To protect that agent, the Soviets were compelled to wait for a suitable time to make an “accidental” discovery of the phone taps, which occurred in April 1956. Still, in the short time it was operational the tunnel provided a treasure trove of intelligence information to the Allies. As for Blake, he was betrayed by a defector in 1961, tried in Britain, and sentenced to over forty years in prison. Curiously, he escaped in 1966 and eventually made his way to Moscow where he lived until his death in 2020.

Blake was not the only double agent passing secrets to the Soviets, and Kostka covers several other prominent examples of both British and American turncoats. Among the American spies was James Hall, who worked for the KGB and the Stasi. In the latter relationship he was assisted by a talented mechanic at a US Army vehicle repair facility who was working undercover for the Stasi and who passed Hall’s information to his handlers. The duo was eventually exposed after several years of success passing many thousands of documents. Hall served twenty-two years at Leavenworth before his release in 2011. Jeffrey Carney was a
young Air Force radio intelligence specialist who volunteered his services to the Stasi in 1983 and took advantage of the lax security procedures in his workplace to pass documents to his handlers. His goal was to live in East Germany, which he was permitted to do in 1985 while he continued to work for the Stasi evaluating intercepted telephone calls from West Berlin. Carney remained in Berlin after the wall fell in 1989, and agents from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations finally caught up with the traitor eighteen months later and secretly spirited him back to the US for trial. Carney served less than twelve years at Leavenworth.

Finally, Kostka covers the role of the Allied Military Liaison Missions in East Germany, showcasing the dangers faced by those engaged in above-board, sanctioned intelligence gathering operations. Several documented incidents of auto accidents and shootings, with one killing an American officer, are discussed in this interesting chapter.

Kellerhoff begins coverage of the German intelligence services with an overview of how early post-war collaboration between German communists and Soviet intelligence representatives led to the creation of a police apparatus that would eventually fall under Soviet dominance and give rise in 1950 to the Ministry for State Security (Stasi). Kellerhoff’s treatment is less anecdotal but more detailed and analytical in tracing the events that led to Erich Mielke’s 1957 takeover of the Stasi as de-Stalinization cleared the way for a new breed. Stasi methodology, including the common use of prostitutes as a means to obtain information from Western visitors or to compromise politicians, is also discussed.

Opposition to the East German regime includes discussions of the role of The Combat Group Against Inhumanity operating internally in the East, as well as agencies such as the West German Federal Intelligence Service (BND). The final section of the book concludes with coverage of numerous espionage operations throughout the 1950s and 1960s, as well as later East German support for terrorist groups like the Red Army Faction. One of the most brazen espionage efforts, however, was the Stasi-financed Luftbrücke Hotel near Templehof Airport. From the mid-1970s until its closure in 1981, the hotel played host to the coordinator of a Stasi spy network as well as to thousands of unwitting American military personnel who registered their details at the facility.
Any work that deals with intelligence, espionage, and classified operations is naturally hindered by the availability of source material, and thus while this work makes good use of the available sources, only time will disclose the full story. Meanwhile, *Capital of Spies* fills the gap admirably and the work should be of interest to students and practitioners alike.