
Going Global: The International Dimensions of U.S. Homeland Security Policy

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Going Global: The International Dimensions of U.S. Homeland Security Policy

Abstract

Scholarship examining U.S. homeland security policy proceeds from the assumption that homeland security policy-making is a largely domestic—that is, United States-centric—endeavor. This article challenges that assumption. The mission of the Homeland Security Enterprise is domestic security but achieving a satisfactory state of preparation, prevention, response, recovery and resilience requires efforts that extend beyond our boundaries. We argue that advances in technology and globalization have accelerated the degree to which global events directly and indirectly influence U.S. homeland security. Contemporary threats do not recognize national boundaries; efforts to counter them, accordingly, must transcend border lines as well. In this article, we present evidence from the homeland security sub-fields of border security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, public health, and disaster management to show that U.S. homeland security policy is now inherently transnational in nature and therefore best analyzed and understood by taking a broader, global perspective.

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INTRODUCTION

On Wednesday, October 27, 2010, a young woman dropped off two packages in San'a, Yemen—one at a UPS store, the other at a FedEx location.¹ Inside each of the two packages was a Hewlett-Packard desktop laser printer.² Yet these were no ordinary shipments of office supplies. Within the toner cartridge of each printer was a small amount of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), a powerful explosive material used in construction and industrial work.³ The PETN had been inserted into the cartridges so that the printers, if X-rayed, would have appeared to contain ordinary laser printer ink powder.⁴ The cartridges were wired to small detonators powered by cell phone batteries.⁵ Both packages were addressed to synagogues in Chicago.⁶ UPS and FedEx employees in Yemen screened the packages manually, saw nothing obviously amiss within them, and cleared the packages to be shipped to the United States.⁷

The next day, intelligence officials in Saudi Arabia contacted their counterparts in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to advise them that they had received a tip about two package bombs constructed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that were en route to the United States—the same two package bombs that had been shipped from San'a.⁸ Saudi officials were able to share with their American counterparts the precise tracking numbers for the packages.⁹ A furious hunt for the packages began. Intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic agencies in the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and Germany, together with officials from UPS and FedEx, exchanged information and coordinated their responses to the Saudi intelligence tip, ultimately leading to the discovery of the package bombs. Local authorities disarmed the explosives at airports in East Midlands, England, and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.¹⁰ Investigators later determined that the bombs likely would have detonated in mid-flight, causing the airplanes carrying them to crash into the Atlantic Ocean.¹¹

The 2010 AQAP printer cartridge bomb plot was by any measure a serious threat to the global supply chain, particularly the U.S. air cargo system. The plot also illustrates a remarkable shift in our understanding of U.S. homeland security policy. Virtually every element in the plot, from the moment the package bombs were dropped off in Sana'a until the explosives within them were disarmed in England and the United Arab Emirates, took place outside the United States. The cooperation and coordination of multiple governments' security services and at least two air express carriers in the private sector led to the package bombs being located and disabled before the package bombs arrived in the United States.

Most academic research on U.S. homeland security proceeds from the assumption that contemporary U.S. homeland security policy-making is largely a domestic endeavor. This article challenges that assumption. We argue that advances in technology and globalization have accelerated the degree to which transnational events directly and indirectly influence U.S. homeland security.¹² In this article, “transnational” refers to the coalitions, contacts, and interactions that take place across state borders that are not controlled exclusively by the central foreign policy organs of governments.¹³

Hardly any homeland threat today does not generate a cause or effect abroad. Our homeland security begins and ends not at the borders of the United States, but internationally, where people commence their travel and cargo goods are loaded for transport. It may sound paradoxical, but the fact remains that for the United States to have satisfactory homeland security, we need to direct our attention toward what is happening abroad. It is through collaboration with our foreign allies, in border security, law enforcement, and counterterrorism, that the United States will more effectively be protected. Many readers may be surprised to learn, for example, that the Department of Homeland Security now has the third largest civilian footprint outside of the United States of all federal agencies.¹⁴ Yet the scholarly literature on homeland security has not yet caught up with this evolution.

The article proceeds in four steps. First, we introduce and describe the Westphalian nation-state system, which at first glance may appear to conflict with countering the global, dynamic, and persistent threats confronting the United States. We then show that scholarship on U.S. homeland security policy largely overlooks transnational security considerations. Next, we present evidence from the homeland security sub-fields of border security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, disaster management, and public health to demonstrate that transnational security concerns are integral to U.S. homeland security. The article concludes with a discussion of the policy and research implications of our findings.

NATION-STATES, TRANSNATIONAL FLOWS, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

International relations scholars usually point to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 as the start of the modern nation-state system.¹⁵ The treaty ended the Thirty Years War in Europe and set in motion a system whereby sovereign European states began to co-exist.¹⁶ This system involved

principles such as mutual respect for the territorial integrity of states, agreements not to interfere in other nations' internal affairs, and the legal equality of nation-states within the broader international system. As European influence spread globally, these pronounced concepts of sovereignty and nationality, and the prerogatives and implications which attached to them, were disseminated, as well.

Today, sovereignty asserts itself at national borders by determining who and what may enter, exit, or cross the space.¹⁷ This exercise of sovereignty along nation-states' borders has long been a means for governments to assert and maintain internal political control.¹⁸ At the same time, nations levy customs and travel fees on the cross-border movement of people and goods to generate revenue. Borders today can therefore be thought of as both lines of sovereignty and points of flow. This new understanding of borders as lines and flows challenges the Westphalian conception of borders solely as "hard" boundaries around sovereign nation-states.

To be clear, we are not suggesting that sovereign borders have become irrelevant or unimportant. However, because of accelerating technological innovation, time and space have been dramatically compressed such that global flows today are non-stop, and in many cases, instantaneous. Globalization is the cumulative effect of these trends: a 24/7/365 movement continuously around the world of capital, labor, cargo, people, goods, services, ideas, images, data, and electrons. These flows today often operate independent of nation-states. They are the decisions of actors such as multinational corporations, terrorist movements, transnational criminal organizations, and other non-state actors. For this reason, they are sometimes referred to as "borderless" or "stateless" phenomena. Nevertheless, they continue to flow toward and over Westphalian borders, have their principal effects within nation-states, and the governments operating there regulate the actors. This presents us with an apparent contradiction: The sovereign power to regulate cross-border flows remains exclusively national, while the flows themselves—lawful and illicit—essentially are transnational.

The homeland security mission is to protect domestic security. However, achieving a satisfactory state of preparation, prevention, recovery, and resilience in the domestic context requires efforts that extend beyond our borders. Contemporary threats do not recognize national boundaries. Responses to these challenges, accordingly, must also transcend the borders that separate one country from another. Terrorism, cyberattacks, narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, pandemic diseases, money laundering, and natural disasters are transnational security challenges

with clear implications for U.S. homeland security policy. Understanding these threats, and developing innovative solutions to them, requires that security practitioners in the United States and abroad share information, collaborate, and adjust how they execute policies over time. For those working in the homeland security profession today, it comes as no surprise that the U.S. government must work regularly with allied nations and multilateral organizations to achieve its own homeland security objectives.¹⁹ The global homeland security enterprise—consisting of strong international engagement, cooperative partnerships among governments, and between the private and public sectors—is necessary for the security of all.

HOMELAND SECURITY SCHOLARSHIP: A NEXT GENERATION PERSPECTIVE

Existing scholarly conceptions of homeland security are almost entirely domestic in orientation and have been this way for well over a decade. It is important to emphasize that this literature is generally solid, focusing on significant domestic coordination and security challenges. However, it is incomplete, overlooking an important and expanding dimension of homeland security.

The years pre-dating the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 saw tremendous shifts in foreign policy emphases as well as the growth of terrorist attacks on U.S. targets from domestic and international actors. The Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union, which took place from approximately 1947 until the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, provides important historical context for understanding the growth in counterterrorism activities after 9/11. Some of the most prominent pre-9/11 scholarship from the Cold War focused on the potential defenses against a Soviet nuclear attack on U.S. soil, for example, foreshadowing the rise of emergency management activities in the years after 9/11.²⁰

Terrorist attacks against U.S. government facilities in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, and Tanzania between 1983 and 1998 underlined the rising threat posed by international terrorist groups.²¹ The bombings of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, as well as the World Trade Center in 1993, demonstrated that terrorists were capable of carrying out dramatic attacks inside the United States.²² Writing in *Foreign Policy* in 1997, John Deutch, a former director of the CIA during the Clinton administration, noted that "...if we are going to mount an effective campaign to combat [terrorism], we must clarify the roles and missions

of various government agencies. As it stands now, the responsibility for counterterrorist initiatives is divided.”²³ Others scholars took up this theme of how to organize government agencies more effectively to combat terrorism in subsequent years.

Later research explored the ways in which misaligned U.S. agency and departmental missions left open significant gaps in the United States’ ability to deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks.²⁴ These analyses focused on domestic policy affairs. Writing in spring 2001, Richard Falkenrath described a White House in the late 1990s which sought to coordinate a sprawling range of counterterrorism programs across the executive branch—a situation similar to conditions in the executive branch today.²⁵ Falkenrath included a small reference to U.S. international counterterrorism assistance programs, but he placed this reference in a domestic policy context: “U.S. officials argue that [providing international counterterrorism assistance] has had considerable success in promoting greater counterterrorism efforts and discreet cooperation among other states, especially in curtailing state sponsorship of international terrorism. Critics argue that the U.S. response is excessive.”²⁶

Widely cited work published in the decade following the 9/11 terrorist attacks similarly focused on domestic policy-making and politics. For example, research by Charles R. Wise and Rania Nader on the challenge of organizing the federal government to address homeland security threats does not mention other national governments or international organizations at all, though it does acknowledge the threat posed by international terrorism.²⁷

Still other scholars have addressed transnational threats and their impact on domestic security policy-making in a general sense. These treatments of transnational threats are usually tangential and not U.S.-centric. For example, one 2009 study on the growing linkages among internal and external security problems used a primarily European perspective for its analyses.²⁸ This research pointed out that most security studies scholarship “very rarely” ties together international and domestic security problems, underlining the need for the present study, which focuses on the transnational dimensions of U.S. homeland security.²⁹ Other research has examined related issues, such as the connections among cross-border migration and globalization-related phenomena like trade, or the collective action problems that can arise when multiple nations attempt to coordinate their respective counterterrorism policies.³⁰

Later post-9/11 research continued to emphasize domestic policy concerns by examining, for instance, domestic inter-organizational

coordination in response to disasters and prevention of global pandemics that may make their way to U.S. shores.³¹ A 2011 study that appeared in *Policy Studies Journal* sought to understand the cross-cutting policy forces that brought about the homeland security enterprise during the 2001-2004 time period.³² However, this work, too, overlooks the interactions between U.S.-based homeland security officials and overseas partners in its analyses.

Only recently have scholars begun to grapple with how traditional notions of U.S. homeland security interact with transnational security considerations. One example appeared in October 2017, when Philip Osborn challenged the idea that cyberspace is borderless.³³ Cyberspace includes physical infrastructure, which crosses sovereign borders, such as Internet cables. Therefore, Osborn argued, traditional customs authorities could be invoked to examine these cables and their digital contents for homeland security purposes.³⁴

To be sure, federal agencies that later were folded into the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had, to varying degrees, established international ties with foreign counterpart agencies prior to 9/11.³⁵ Other non-DHS agencies that today form part of the homeland security enterprise, such as the CIA, also worked with international partners before the 9/11 attacks.³⁶ Moreover, international groups, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have acted for years as hubs for the exchange of important information among their members. Nevertheless, we maintain that there at least two key differences between these pre-9/11 international activities and the types of transnational homeland security initiatives that are apparent today. First, international cooperation pre-dating the 9/11 attacks was largely ad-hoc, in the sense that it was not geared toward achieving a cohesive group of policy goals that transcended multiple government agencies. Second, pre-9/11 global collaboration along these lines was not born out of the recognition that tackling U.S. homeland security threats abroad—in a systematic fashion—can yield domestic security dividends. Rather, this pre-9/11 collaboration was oriented toward solving discrete sets of policy problems that were bounded by the specific missions of the government agencies participating in these partnerships.³⁷ In both form and substance, then, transnational homeland security activities today represent a fundamental break from past practice.

It is now essential to advance understandings of the transnational dimensions of U.S. homeland security to increase knowledge of policy options and limitations in the homeland security sphere. By framing

homeland security in a transnational security context, policy-makers stand to make better-informed decisions about how to formulate strategies and allocate scarce time and resources to achieve their homeland security objectives. At the same time, understanding the transnational dimensions of homeland security fosters awareness of the limitations of internal security policies limited to the domestic context.³⁸

It is also imperative to bring current homeland security scholarship into line with contemporary practices in homeland security. Squaring homeland security as it is conducted with the broader literature on homeland security policy can benefit scholars by offering a more accurate assessment of policy conditions, which in turn can lead to analyses that are more precise. We next turn to the first of five homeland security sub-fields that this article examines: border security.

BORDER SECURITY

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) secures and expedites the movement of people and goods across U.S. borders.³⁹ In a globalized world, where technology has accelerated both transport and communication, the ports of entry at air, sea, and land borders have become the last line of defense, rather than the first, as they traditionally have been viewed. For example, the so-called Underwear Bomber, Nigerian citizen Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, boarded a plane in the Netherlands intending to ignite PETN explosive material and blow up a Northwest Airlines flight over Detroit in 2009. CBP identified Abdulmutallab as a person of interest after the flight departed from Amsterdam bound for Detroit. CBP officers planned to refer him for secondary inspection upon his arrival in the United States. However, this obviously would have been too late to prevent Abdulmutallab from blowing up the plane. Therefore, in retrospect, the “border” we needed to focus on was located not in Detroit, but at Schipol Airport in the Netherlands.⁴⁰ The goal of border security, too, needed to change in this instance. Rather than intercepting Abdulmutallab upon his arrival in Detroit, U.S. homeland security interests would have been best served by preventing Abdulmutallab from boarding the Northwest Airlines flight in the first place.

Today CBP and other U.S. agencies with a stake in border security have pushed their operations “out”; that is, away from U.S. borders and toward the last point of departure abroad for people and goods bound for the United States.⁴¹ The U.S. government’s new global approach to border security is evident in operations conducted by CBP, Immigrations and

Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Coast Guard, and Transportation Security Administration (TSA), in conjunction with partner agencies abroad.

The Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), including Passenger Name Records (PNR), are collected by airlines regarding each air traveler boarding a plane for travel in and toward the United States. CBP screens this data against information about known or suspected terrorists and other high-risk individuals. The Underwear Bomber plot highlighted the need to conduct the APIS and PNR security checks before planes departed for the United States rather than shortly before they arrived in the United States.⁴² Terrorists must be kept from boarding planes bound for the United States and not just prevented from being admitted into the country. This necessarily requires DHS component agencies to operate abroad by collaborating with foreign partners.⁴³

CBP has made strides in developing a permanent overseas presence to stop or intercept dangerous people and things from making their way to the United States. For example, CBP officers based in Canada, the Caribbean, and the United Arab Emirates are an integral part of CBP's preclearance program.⁴⁴ This program deploys uniformed CBP officers abroad to screen people and goods bound for the United States at their original point of departure, rather than upon arrival in the United States.⁴⁵ In addition, CBP sends plainclothes officers to work in foreign airports through its Joint Security Program and Immigration Advisory Program.⁴⁶ These initiatives require close collaboration among CBP, airlines, and host country border and law enforcement agencies, with a view to stopping potentially dangerous individuals from flying to the United States.⁴⁷

The preclearance program has produced encouraging results. A 2017 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a federal watchdog, found that preclearance programs prevented over 10,000 potentially dangerous passengers from boarding aircraft bound for the United States in fiscal year 2015 alone.⁴⁸ This suggests that the program is achieving the desired effect of preventing potentially hostile actors from boarding U.S.-bound flights.

CBP's Container Security Initiative (CSI) complements the preclearance program, in that it focuses on intercepting potentially hazardous cargo destined for the United States at departure points abroad. The CSI now has a presence at over 50 maritime ports around the world.⁴⁹ Dating from the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the CSI uses intelligence and automated tools to identify potentially high-risk containers that may contain weapons or weapons precursors that could

be used by terrorists.⁵⁰ Containers that are deemed high-risk are then screened using other technologies, such as X-ray machines or radiation detection devices.⁵¹ Some eighty percent of containers bound for the United States are now screened overseas through the CSI.⁵²

There is limited publicly available data on the effectiveness of the CSI. One 2015 GAO report indicated that CBP was not able to provide complete data on the disposition of certain containers that it had determined were high-risk.⁵³ This suggests that it is at least possible that certain high-risk containers were released from CBP custody without being properly screened or accounted for. Still, the CSI clearly represents an advance in cargo screening techniques for the United States, because it uses a systematic, intelligence-driven approach to target and screen higher risk cargo containers. In addition, it does so by enlisting time and space as early as possible and as far away geographically as possible before the goods arrive at U.S. ports of entry.⁵⁴

CBP also manages the Air Cargo Advance Screening Program (ACAS), which began in June 2018.⁵⁵ The program requires foreign entities to submit, in advance, information about the goods they are shipping to CBP. Moreover, it is worth underscoring that this information sharing with CBP takes place prior to the point at which cargo is actually loaded on U.S.-bound aircraft. In this way, CBP is able to gain a better understanding of the goods that are being transported to the United States. In cases where there may be doubt or suspicion about certain cargo, CBP can work with shippers to prevent the cargo from being placed on aircraft. This sequence of steps can reduce the risks posed to aircraft, airline passengers, and the transportation sector as a whole by hazardous cargo. Moreover, it pushes the point of air cargo screening as far from physical U.S. borders as possible. ICE uses similar tactics abroad with respect to potential high-risk travelers to the United States.

Officials from ICE work with U.S. and foreign government agencies to stop potentially threatening individuals from making their way to the United States. For instance, DHS routinely places ICE officers in U.S. embassies as part of the Visa Security Program, where they collaborate with State Department (DOS) officials to screen U.S. visa applicants.⁵⁶ These visa screenings target would-be terrorists and international criminals who, using fraudulently obtained visas, would otherwise seek to enter the United States and harm others.⁵⁷ ICE officials also liaise with counterpart agencies in Mexico and Central America to obtain biometric data, such as fingerprints and photos, of Central American migrants and national “special interest aliens” from third countries who may pass through

Mexico en route to the United States.⁵⁸ Moreover, ICE works with the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, among other nations, to arrest members of violent transnational gangs and human trafficking organizations.⁵⁹ Of course, the illegal movement of people and goods is not limited to land. Water-based trafficking of migrants and drugs presents challenges for homeland security, too.

Coast Guard personnel, like their ICE counterparts, work to reduce the risk of potentially threatening individuals and cargo entering the United States. One of the most visible examples of this work is the interdiction of illegal narcotics in the Caribbean. CBP operates several P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft and uses these planes to collect intelligence on suspicious vessels, which it then relays to Coast Guard ships.⁶⁰ The Coast Guard ships, in turn, can set a course to intercept the suspicious vessels and determine whether they merit further investigation. Coast Guard personnel may also identify and stop potential drug trafficking on their own. For example, in 2013, a Coast Guard helicopter was used to shoot out the engine of a go-fast boat in the Caribbean, bound for the United States, carrying some \$35 million dollars' worth of cocaine.⁶¹

The Coast Guard also plays a part in stopping irregular migrants who attempt to make their way to the United States. In 2015, for instance, the Coast Guard began to see a sharp increase in the number of Cuban migrants intercepted in the Caribbean who were bound for the United States.⁶² When the Coast Guard detains migrants at sea, the agency will usually transfer those detained migrants to ICE, which then arranges for the migrants to be returned to their countries of origin.⁶³

Interdictions of drugs and people like these are routine for the Coast Guard. In addition, they form part of a broader-based homeland security strategy. By conducting these operations in the Caribbean, the Coast Guard can stop the movement of potentially dangerous people and things toward the United States far from actual U.S. borders. The TSA carries out complementary operations in foreign airports with the aid of counterpart agencies.

The TSA must rely on foreign air transportation authorities to implement its security directives.⁶⁴ For example, in 2017 U.S. intelligence agencies learned of a plot by ISIS to embed explosives in electronic devices, such as laptops and tablets.⁶⁵ In response to this intelligence, the TSA issued new guidelines for U.S.-bound airline passengers that imposed restrictions on carrying certain devices in aircraft cabins. In the United Kingdom,

for example, these guidelines effectively banned any device larger than a smartphone from being placed in carry-on luggage.⁶⁶ This example underscores the importance of close working relationships between the TSA and its counterparts abroad. Without these relationships, the TSA would have a much more difficult time ensuring the safety of U.S.-bound airline passengers. It is also worth noting that the TSA operates several programs related to the screening of cargo on passenger flights.⁶⁷ These programs outline the specific technologies that transportation firms can use to screen air cargo. The programs also provide a means for firms to become certified cargo carriers.⁶⁸

The operations discussed above by CBP, ICE, the Coast Guard, and TSA offer compelling evidence that the United States today takes an international approach to securing U.S. borders. These measures seek to push the point of security screening far from U.S. borders, thus reducing exclusive reliance on more rigorous screening at U.S. borders themselves. Border security is closely linked to U.S. counterterrorism policy, which we address in the next section.

COUNTERTERRORISM

The United States' efforts to prevent terrorist attacks have led to a wide array of transnational counterterrorism initiatives undertaken on a "whole of government" basis. We explore here the military operations, economic sanctions, and intelligence cooperation that the United States leverages to reduce the possibility of terrorist attacks occurring inside the United States.

The U.S. military campaign to stop terrorists overseas before they directly threaten the United States has taken numerous forms. The most prominent recent example of this activity is the U.S. Department of Defense's Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, which was established in 2014 to combat the rising threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).⁶⁹ Together with the United States, 79 partner nations have contributed military assets and resources to erode ISIS's ability to carry out terrorist attacks outside the Middle East. Contributors to this task force include nations with large, professional militaries, such as France, the United Kingdom, and Australia, as well as nations with less robust military forces, such as Bulgaria and Fiji.⁷⁰ At the time of the writing, the coalition's efforts have been largely successful. ISIS's geographical footprint in the Middle East has collapsed.⁷¹ The group's ability to carry out attacks on U.S. interests in the Middle East has declined.⁷² Despite ISIS having weakened, the group still poses a threat to

the United States, in that it has proven adept at inspiring so-called “lone wolf” terrorists to strike targets inside the United States.⁷³

International economic sanctions are tools designed to cut off terrorist financing sources. These sanctions usually prohibit the transfer of money or goods between sanctioned persons or entities, businesses, and financial institutions. The United States must rely on foreign financial institutions and governments to execute these sanctions. Since the U.S. dollar is universally respected as a kind of “global currency,” and given that U.S. financial institutions act as a hub for an enormous number of international financial transactions each day, the U.S. government can compel foreign financial institutions and governments to implement these sanctions. In addition, foreign financial institutions can incur penalties for violating these sanctions. That can shut them out from the global financial system. These institutions, therefore, have powerful incentives to comply with the U.S. government’s demands.

Sanctions have been a preferred tool of both Republican and Democratic administrations. Before the United States fired a single missile into Afghanistan in 2001, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13224, which barred financial transactions with a list of 29 known terrorist organizations and suspected individual terrorists.⁷⁴ The Obama administration used sanctions to pressure the government of Iran, a designated state-sponsor of terrorism, to stop developing its suspected clandestine nuclear weapons program.⁷⁵ In addition, the Obama White House helped to spearhead the adoption of United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 2178, which explicitly called upon U.N. member states to disrupt financial transactions that may benefit terrorist organizations.⁷⁶ President Donald Trump has signaled that he may impose financial sanctions on government officials in Pakistan if they do not stop promoting militant groups.⁷⁷ At the same time, it is important to note that financial sanctions are blunt tools that can trigger unforeseen consequences, such as discouraging banks from setting up operations in contested areas. Still, given that each U.S. presidential administration since the 9/11 attacks has used sanctions to target terrorist financing, it stands to reason that these sanctions—while limited in their effectiveness—will continue to be used for the foreseeable future. In a similar vein, foreign governments have also played important parts in sharing intelligence that benefits U.S. homeland security interests.

There have been dramatic increases in international intelligence cooperation for counterterrorism since the 9/11 attacks. This cooperation appears to have had a direct, positive impact upon U.S. homeland

security. We acknowledge that intelligence is, by nature, secret. Success stories in the intelligence business are rarely made public. We must therefore rely on publicly available accounts of international intelligence sharing to assess its effects, both perceived and real.

Perhaps most notable among the United States' intelligence-sharing agreements is the so-called "Five Eyes" group, consisting of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.⁷⁸ The origins of the Five Eyes group can be traced to accords between the United States and United Kingdom in the period during and immediately following World War II.⁷⁹ Terrorism-related intelligence is today especially prized among Five Eyes members. U.S. government officials have publicly acknowledged the benefits of intelligence sharing for counterterrorism with Five Eyes members, too. For example, in 2004 U.S. Senate testimony, the U.S. State Department's Coordinator for Counterterrorism cited cooperation with the United Kingdom, along with France and Mexico, as being helpful for the United States in its response to specific aviation threats around Christmas 2003.⁸⁰ More recently, in 2015 an Obama administration-backed U.N. Security Council resolution called for greater information sharing on the movement of so-called "foreign fighters" seeking to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria.⁸¹ In addition, in 2017, a meeting of security and justice officials from the Five Eyes group generated a joint communiqué noting the group's mutual commitment to share timely, detailed information on terrorist and foreign fighter activity.⁸² Each of these examples underscores the strong link between international intelligence sharing practices and U.S. homeland security.

There are practical reasons that the United States shares intelligence with its allies. The United States is widely believed to be the most advanced of the Five Eyes members in terms of its ability to capture signals intelligence (SIGINT), such as emails, phone calls, and text messages.⁸³ The U.S. government shares SIGINT with other Five Eyes members.⁸⁴ At the same time, the United States has comparatively weak abilities to collect intelligence from human sources, or HUMINT.⁸⁵ Therefore, the United States must sometimes rely on the stronger HUMINT capabilities of its allies to collect HUMINT.⁸⁶ The differing comparative advantages of the United States and allied intelligence services can lead to exchanges. The United States may agree to send SIGINT collected from a target to another Five Eyes member. In return, the United States may receive HUMINT that the other Five Eyes member collected. This hypothetical HUMINT-for-SIGINT exchange points toward the importance of transnational intelligence cooperation for homeland security. Without this cooperation, U.S. policymakers can suffer from a less complete picture of

the threats that they face, potentially leading to less-informed decisions and less desirable outcomes. The need for intelligence on cyber threats has also grown in recent years. The next section explores the transnational dimensions of cybersecurity.

CYBERSECURITY

Cybersecurity concerns have risen in prominence within homeland security circles during the past ten years. Given that cyberspace is essentially borderless, the United States government's efforts to address these concerns have led to new levels of international cooperation to combat cyber threats. In May 2011 the United States issued a new *International Strategy for Cyberspace* to provide a blueprint for building an international framework to make cyberspace secure and reliable. This requires a full range of partners—including other U.S. government agencies, the private sector, individual users of the internet, and international partners across the world. This strategy is not just a U.S. initiative, either. It is an invitation to other countries, organizations, and people to build innovative global networks. Especially notable in this regard are U.S. collaboration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). At the same time, the DOS and DHS prioritize the use of bilateral partnerships in carrying out their respective cybersecurity missions: DOS to pursue cyber cooperation through diplomacy and DHS to promote private sector civilian cybersecurity and protect the federal .gov domain.

NATO is a valuable forum for the United States to advance its cybersecurity objectives. When the United States participates in cybersecurity initiatives through NATO, this serves at least two purposes: strengthening the cybersecurity posture of fellow NATO members and advancing U.S. homeland security interests. The United States government contributes significantly to the rising importance of NATO in cybersecurity. For example, a former DOD official was recently named head of NATO's Communications and Information Agency—the specific unit responsible for the alliance's cybersecurity initiatives.⁸⁷ The Tallinn Manual, an academic publication whose production NATO facilitated, represents the most comprehensive attempt yet to reconcile existing provisions of international law and the unique legal complexities surrounding conflict in cyberspace.⁸⁸ U.S. scholars contributed significantly to the Tallinn Manual's development, including James Bret Michael of the Naval Postgraduate School, Eric Talbott Jensen of Brigham Young University, and Chris Jenks of Southern Methodist University, all of whom are listed as contributors in the Manual itself. Beyond important

law and policy-related considerations, the United States has also applied its technical prowess to NATO's cybersecurity initiatives. For instance, in April 2017, the United States participated in a NATO-sponsored cyber defense exercise that included participants from 25 nations.⁸⁹

The United States' cooperation with the EU on cybersecurity issues dates to at least 2010. In that year, Obama administration officials and EU representatives launched the Working Group on Cybercrime and Cybersecurity to advance transatlantic cooperation for cybersecurity.⁹⁰ The Working Group collaborates on areas of mutual concern, such as cyber incident management and critical infrastructure protection.⁹¹ The EU-US cooperation on cybersecurity issues will likely continue due in part to shared democratic values.⁹² A 2014 EU-sponsored study published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies supports this idea, noting that there is great potential for transatlantic collaboration in constructing cyber "norms" for states.⁹³

Both the DOS and DHS make international coordination for cybersecurity an integral part of their respective operations. For example, in March 2016, the State Department released its international cyberspace policy strategy.⁹⁴ This strategy document lists numerous achievements that the State Department cites as examples of its diplomats promoting global norms in cyberspace to address international security concerns. These achievements include securing commitments from G20 leaders in 2015 to refrain from stealing intellectual property online, as well the United Nations' adoption of a U.S.-led framework for stability in cyberspace.⁹⁵ These examples demonstrate that the DOS, working through international institutions, has taken steps that in its view advance U.S. security interests.

DHS has also leveraged its relationships with foreign governments and international organizations to advance U.S. cybersecurity interests. For example, since 2006 DHS has organized a biennial exercise called "Cyber Storm" to evaluate the abilities of U.S. government entities and U.S. allies to manage significant cyber events.⁹⁶ The most recent of these exercises, Cyber Storm V, took place in 2016, and incorporated teams from most U.S. federal agencies, many U.S. state governments, over two dozen businesses, and 12 partner nations, including Australia, Hungary, New Zealand, and Switzerland.⁹⁷ It is telling that DHS involved so many partner nations in Cyber Storm V. This broad involvement illustrates the extent to which DHS views international cooperation as essential to achieve its cybersecurity objectives. DHS has also emphasized internally the importance of expanding global cooperation for cybersecurity. The U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) and its counterparts

abroad meet routinely, further demonstrating the importance DHS attaches to its international partners.⁹⁸

The need to strengthen international collaboration for cybersecurity has led the United States to ink several bilateral agreements with other nations, as well. For example, in 2015, President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed in principle to refrain from engaging in government-sponsored online theft of intellectual property.⁹⁹ In April 2017, representatives from the DOS and the government of Argentina signed an agreement intended to develop policy communication channels for cybersecurity topics like critical infrastructure protection.¹⁰⁰ In May 2017, DHS finalized an agreement that would fund joint research among scientists in the United States and the Netherlands on the defense of industrial control systems (ICSs).¹⁰¹ Two months later, a DHS delegation flew to Tel Aviv, Israel to sign an accord that would develop joint working groups addressing topics such as international cyber policy, research and development, and the future cybersecurity workforce.¹⁰² These examples of cybersecurity-oriented international agreements highlight the degree to which DHS and other federal agencies now approach cybersecurity as an international matter of concern.

The steps taken above to bolster the United States' cybersecurity capabilities take place amidst a rising tide of cyber threats. The Russian government, in particular, has ratcheted up efforts to delegitimize and destabilize the U.S. government using online tactics.¹⁰³ For example, DHS concluded that the Russian government scanned electronic voting systems for potential vulnerabilities to exploit in over a dozen states during the 2016 Presidential Election.¹⁰⁴ In addition, the U.S. Intelligence Community found that the Russian government executed a "multifaceted" influence campaign during the 2016 election, seeking to sway the views of American voters using social media platforms.¹⁰⁵ After leaving government, James Clapper, a former U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI), flatly concluded that Russian cyber intrusions and manipulation of information "swung" the election in favor of Donald Trump.¹⁰⁶ At the time of the writing, U.S. government investigations into the 2016 Russian influence campaign continue under Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller. Their outcomes are not certain. Nonetheless, the existence of this Russia influence campaign reinforces the urgency of the U.S. government's efforts to strengthen U.S. computer networks against malicious attacks. In addition, the prospect of future online influence campaigns will no doubt figure prominently in discussions about the security of future U.S. elections.

PUBLIC HEALTH

The U.S. government recognizes that the spread of global pandemics can pose serious risks to U.S. homeland security. Diseases can travel rapidly from one nation to another. Deadly strains of bacteria and viruses pose immediate and potentially widespread threats to persons inside the United States. Three ways the U.S. government advances public health initiatives are via global disease surveillance networks, international pandemic prevention campaigns, and deliveries of emergency assistance to nations suffering pandemics.

Within the federal government, numerous agencies share responsibilities for coordinating surveillance of international pandemics. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), located within the DOS, operates the Emerging Pandemic Threats program.¹⁰⁷ This program focuses on building the capacity of local, regional, and national governments to prevent, diagnose, and treat potential pandemics.¹⁰⁸ This capacity building comes about by focusing on so-called “hot spot” areas, such as Central Africa, to amplify the potential impacts of USAID’s efforts.¹⁰⁹ However, USAID is not the only federal agency to monitor pandemics globally. The Department of Defense’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program conducts bio surveillance activities overseas and develops new detection and diagnosis technologies.¹¹⁰ In addition, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), a component agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), carries out sophisticated research on some of the deadliest known pathogens, such as the Ebola virus.¹¹¹

The United States has also embraced a transnational approach to prevent pandemics by promoting specific disease-prevention initiatives. For example, the George W. Bush administration launched the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, to reduce deaths from HIV/AIDS in Africa.¹¹² PEPFAR relies on networks of on-the-ground partners in Africa to implement the program and stay focused on results.¹¹³ Public health officials credit the program with saving the lives of millions in Africa.¹¹⁴ There is a powerful moral case to be made for saving persons infected with HIV/AIDS in Africa. However, PEPFAR also advances U.S. homeland security, in that it helps prevent the spread of an illness, which, even with effective preventions and treatments, continues to kill thousands of Americans each year.¹¹⁵

When pandemics occur abroad, the U.S. government can be swift to intervene with emergency assistance. This aid bolsters U.S. homeland

security, because it works to reduce the probability of deadly pandemics affecting large segments of the U.S. population. For example, during the 2009 outbreak of the H1N1 influenza virus, the U.S. government spent some \$16 million in international assistance funds via USAID, the CDC, and the Department of Defense to aid nations in Latin America struggling to contain the spread of the disease.¹¹⁶ A 2014 West African outbreak of the Ebola virus, which causes fatal hemorrhaging, led to a significantly larger, multi-pronged U.S. government response. The Department of Defense sent a U.S. Army general to Liberia to help coordinate DOD's response to the outbreak. Some 3,000 U.S. Army also soldiers participated.¹¹⁷ USAID distributed "protection kits" to vulnerable households in Liberia.¹¹⁸ The National Institutes of Health (NIH), a component of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), accelerated testing of an experimental Ebola virus vaccine.¹¹⁹ The CDC deployed over 100 personnel to West Africa to provide on-the-ground expertise and logistical assistance to communities suffering from the Ebola pandemic.¹²⁰ DHS began screening airline passengers arriving in the United States from the affected West African nations more closely upon their arrival in the United States.¹²¹

Disasters can exacerbate the spread of diseases worldwide. Earthquakes, for example, can damage water purification and health care facilities. Communities may rapidly find themselves suffering from outbreaks of certain illnesses without access to these facilities. Effective disaster management, which we address in the next section, can prove essential in protecting communities from post-disaster pandemics.

DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Natural and man-made disasters routinely pose threats to the United States. The ways in which those disasters are addressed influence U.S. international approaches to disaster management worldwide. These include processes of response, recovery, and resilience carried on domestically and internationally. The U.S. response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the federal government's development of a strategy to absorb international assistance during U.S. disasters, as well as global accords to address climate change, exemplify this transnational orientation in disaster management.

The U.S. government's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake illustrates several of the ways in which U.S. approaches to disaster management have become transnational. The earthquake devastated Haiti, killing over 300,000 people and rendering more than one million Haitians homeless.¹²² The earthquake knocked out electricity to the entire capital city of

Port-au-Prince. The temblor destroyed 14 of 16 government ministry buildings, the presidential palace, and the parliament building, effectively decapitating the government.¹²³

The U.S. response to the earthquake began in dramatic fashion. Within hours after the earthquake, a Haitian government representative drove a motorbike to the residence of U.S. Ambassador Kenneth H. Merten and verbally delivered an official request for U.S. government assistance.¹²⁴ Within less than 24 hours, the first U.S. government team arrived in Haiti to begin assisting in the disaster recovery process.¹²⁵ President Obama designated USAID as the lead U.S. government agency for assisting in the recovery following the earthquake, though he also ordered the executive branch to employ a “whole of government” approach.¹²⁶

DHS contributed significantly to these “whole of government” efforts. The U.S. Coast Guard ship *Forward* arrived in Port-au-Prince on January 13, 2010. The *Forward's* crew began immediately to aid earthquake victims. Coast Guard personnel later helped to re-open the country's maritime ports.¹²⁷ The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) established an incident support base in Florida. It later deployed an incident response team and 10 search and rescue groups to Haiti.¹²⁸ CBP re-allocated personnel to Miami to help screen and process individuals entering the United States from Haiti. Following the collapse of a jail in Haiti, ICE agents helped their Haitian counterparts to identify prisoners who had escaped.¹²⁹ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) cleared over 1,000 Haitian children to come to the United States.¹³⁰ These examples of DHS assistance to Haiti provide clear evidence of the new transnational approach to disaster management. At significant expense, the U.S. government re-allocated DHS personnel and equipment to aid its Caribbean neighbor.

Besides serving humanitarian needs, this re-allocation of people and gear also served U.S. homeland security interests. For example, by investing early in Haiti's recovery, the U.S. government likely increased the chances of Haitian earthquake survivors remaining in Haiti, rather than fleeing to the United States. The United States has seen Haitian immigration crises in the past. Beginning in the early 1970s, waves of so-called Haitian “boat people” made their way to the United States.¹³¹ The timing of these waves has often coincided with periods of political and economic turbulence in Haiti. In 1992, for example, a government coup in Port-au-Prince led thousands of Haitians to escape by sea to the United States. U.S. Coast Guard ships intercepted many of these Haitians.¹³² In 2004, during a period of both political unrest and grinding poverty, a second wave of Haitians

made their way to the United States.¹³³ Detaining, interviewing, and processing these Haitians' immigration applications comes at significant cost to the U.S. government. By providing direct aid to Haiti following the 2010 earthquake, the U.S. government was essentially calculating that the cost of providing direct aid would prove less than the potential unknown future cost of managing a post-quake immigration wave from Haiti. In this way, providing direct disaster relief aid to Haiti served U.S. homeland security interests.

The U.S. transnational approach to disaster management has also worked in the other direction—that is, when U.S. allies assist the United States following disasters that take place inside the United States. Although little reported on at the time, large numbers of U.S. allies offered the United States government assistance following Hurricane Katrina in 2005.¹³⁴ The governments of Bangladesh, Thailand, Germany, and Kuwait sent money, equipment, and personnel to perform tasks like pump out flooded areas, feed disaster survivors, and rebuild damaged levees.¹³⁵ The U.S. government recognized the need to develop an integrated strategy to absorb and manage these sorts of donations in the future. As a result, in 2010 DHS published its International Assistance Strategy (IAS), which sought to develop an organized system for managing aid offers. The DOS was designated as the lead agency for coordinating foreign offers of assistance.¹³⁶ FEMA retains the sole authority under federal law to accept or reject offers of assistance.¹³⁷ Moreover, FEMA can make decisions regarding the disposition of potentially unused donations.¹³⁸ It is important to underscore that the IAS is not activated following every federal disaster declaration. The FEMA Administrator makes that decision depending upon the conditions he or she faces during the disaster in question.¹³⁹ Nevertheless, the existence of the IAS demonstrates that DHS recognizes the importance of a transnational approach to disaster management and has taken steps to integrate this transnational approach formally into its daily operations.

Domestic and international initiatives to address the effects of climate change further illustrate the degree to which disaster management has become transnational in scope. During the Obama administration, federal agencies were charged with developing plans, procedures, and strategies that would take account of the effects of climate change in preparation for the future.¹⁴⁰ To fulfill this charge, in 2013 DHS published a Climate Action Plan that linked the effects of climate change to DHS's five mission areas.¹⁴¹ DHS maintains that the effects of climate change may exacerbate social tensions and political unrest in areas abroad where state capacity to address terrorism is limited.¹⁴² As a result, climate change, at some

level, may be one factor that can “enable” terrorist activity.¹⁴³ At least two studies support this finding, which suggests that natural disasters can lead to a rise in domestic and transnational terrorist activity.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, DHS states that climate change can lead to powerful storms that may knock out vital telecommunications infrastructure. This, in turn, can pose risks to human lives, especially when persons are unable to contact relevant authorities during a life-threatening emergency.¹⁴⁵

U.S. approaches to disaster management at home and abroad have become markedly transnational in recent years. In the U.S. government response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the development of an International Assistance Strategy, and efforts to address climate change, it is apparent that global events and considerations influence U.S. government decision-making in the homeland security arena.

The five homeland security sub-fields that we have assessed thus far in this article each illustrate the growing transnational orientation of U.S. homeland security policy. In the next section, we begin to outline some of the most significant implications of this transnational understanding of homeland security. We also offer suggestions for homeland security policymakers to integrate this new transnational approach to homeland security more effectively.

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This article has shown that far from being a purely domestic matter, homeland security policy today has become transnational in nature, in that forces and events outside the United States affect U.S. homeland security policy, both directly and indirectly. There are at least three major implications arising from this shift in our understanding of U.S. homeland security policy: first, this evolution has implications for institutions that formulate homeland security policies and suggests a functional realignment among the organizations charged to implement those policies. Second, this shift in perspective and paradigm helps illuminate a potential evolution in the federal approach to homeland security established in the wake of 9/11—an evolution that represents a more global understanding of the homeland security field. Third, the traditional frameworks scholars and policy analysts use to examine and assess homeland security may no longer provide useful research lenses or produce entirely accurate results. We examine each of these implications below.

Implications for Homeland Security Institutions

As we have shown, the federal government places homeland security officials abroad to protect the American homeland from external threats.¹⁴⁶ This change breaks down old dichotomies and definitions by which policymakers and analysts in the past drew distinctions with a difference. The activities of DHS agents and officers overseas blur the traditional boundaries between national security and law enforcement, on one hand, and law enforcement and border security, on the other. The subject matter of their missions more and more frequently coincides. For this reason, border security and law enforcement capabilities in the future may come to be viewed as another form of national power, alongside intelligence, military action, diplomatic activity, depth of financial capacity, and energy independence. We admittedly are at the threshold of exploring these shifts, but the requirement to examine them rigorously and systematically seems clear.¹⁴⁷

The federal government institutions dedicated to addressing homeland security issues also may no longer mesh well with the increasingly transnational nature of homeland security threats. Historically speaking, the National Security Council at the White House is the mechanism through which inter-agency disputes are resolved and “whole of government” responses engineered. However, homeland security challenges have spawned new executive-level positions and offices. For example, President George W. Bush created the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism position in 2001.¹⁴⁸ That position continues to exist. Bush also established via executive order the White House Homeland Security Council in 2003.¹⁴⁹ Bush’s successor, President Barack Obama, saw homeland security and national security issues as natural complements. He merged the staffs of the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council.¹⁵⁰ At the same time, President Obama preserved the independent structures and membership of the councils themselves.¹⁵¹ At the time of this writing in 2018, President Trump retains the independent structures of the councils.

Given the evolution of homeland security threats, the NSC’s role in homeland security has expanded in recent years. Thus, it is not difficult to envision a future in which the Homeland Security Council and National Security Council merge entirely. The 2001 creation of the Homeland Security Council, like DHS itself, reflected the broader public mandate for the federal government to react quickly in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.¹⁵² The Homeland Security Council’s structure was based upon the structure of the National Security Council. Similar to the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council initially complemented a White

House Office of Homeland Security and a homeland security advisor.¹⁵³ There was, and remains, significant overlap among the HSC and NSC's memberships.¹⁵⁴ In light of these factors, merging the HSC and NSC into a single organization may align them better with the transnational nature of contemporary homeland security threats.¹⁵⁵

Implications for Homeland Security Functions

DHS component personnel stationed abroad promote the “soft” homeland security power of border security and law enforcement with their foreign counterparts. The Department's Office of Policy and International Affairs leads efforts to forge agreements with DHS' overseas partners and works with the international affairs offices in the DHS component offices to do so.¹⁵⁶ The bulk of these agreements pertain to law enforcement cooperation and training, capacity building programs, and information sharing.

As DHS's international role expanded and its fragmented deployment was coordinated through regional strategies generated internally at DHS, significant tension resulted with the DOS. The DOS views itself, consistent with its role in the past, as the U.S. Government's exclusive voice in conducting U.S. foreign policy. It has been allocated exclusive legal authority, for example, to dispense foreign aid and assistance funds. Yet considering the changed circumstances attendant to homeland security in a globalized context, it may be helpful for DHS to receive direct authority and appropriations from Congress to design, fund, and conduct law enforcement programs abroad. There may also be opportunities for funding comparable programs in border, aviation, and maritime security with other host governments. This could potentially facilitate greater return on DHS's relationships with foreign partners.

Implications for Homeland Security Scholarship

The analytical tools scholars use to assess U.S. homeland security policy may also need to adjust to the new transnational homeland security paradigm. Public policy research has a reputation for being “theory poor.”¹⁵⁷ Public policy scholars frequently borrow or adapt theories and tools from other disciplines for policy studies of homeland security. Yet these theories and tools may no longer be adequate. Policy scholars may look to new sources for theoretical and analytical models. In particular, international relations and economics offer an array of robust theories with good explanatory power. These disciplines take account of governmental, organizational, and individual behavior in their theories. Tools and theories from these disciplines may help scholars better understand the transnational forces that influence homeland security policy today.

CONCLUSION

The acceleration of globalization and technological innovation since 9/11 has had significant impacts on our understanding of homeland security. Our international responsibilities have become critical to not only our physical security, but our economic security, as well. This means that U.S. homeland security is a shared responsibility—among governments, the private sector, individuals, and communities. As these trends continue, it is nearly certain that the interconnections among U.S. homeland security policy and global security challenges will grow. Transnational homeland security is here to stay.

ENDNOTES

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