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## The Vested Interest Theory: Novel Methodology Examining US- Foreign Electoral Intervention

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## **Abstract**

News of Russia potentially influencing the 2016 US Presidential election shines a light on the United States' own history of foreign electoral intervention. The United States has a tumultuous history of foreign electoral intervention starting in 1947 with the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency. Since then, the US has intervened in as many as eighty-one elections around the world. This article provides a novel theory, called the vested interest theory, that is used to identify the vested interest of the United States, or any global power, in a foreign electoral intervention. It identifies vested interest by utilizing a threefold methodology of analysis: the methods and tactics of a predator-country, the stated justification, and the magnitude of the election in relation to the global power. This article applies the vested interest theory to four landmark elections in the history of the United States: the 1948 Italian election, the 1964 Chilean election, the 1970 Chilean election, and the 2002 Bolivian election. With the application of the vested interest theory, this article develops a unique perspective of how and why the United States intervenes in foreign elections.

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# The Vested Interest Theory: Novel Methodology Examining US-Foreign Electoral Intervention

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### ABSTRACT

News of Russia potentially influencing the 2016 US Presidential election shines a light on the United States' own history of foreign electoral intervention. The United States has a tumultuous history of foreign electoral intervention starting in 1947 with the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency. Since then, the US has intervened in as many as eighty-one elections around the world. This article provides a novel theory, called the vested interest theory, that is used to identify the vested interest of the United States, or any global power, in a foreign electoral intervention. It identifies vested interest by utilizing a threefold methodology of analysis: the methods and tactics of a predator-country, the stated justification, and the magnitude of the election in relation to the global power. This article applies the vested interest theory to four landmark elections in the history of the United States: the 1948 Italian election, the 1964 Chilean election, the 1970 Chilean election, and the 2002 Bolivian election. With the application of the vested interest theory, this article develops a unique perspective of how and why the United States intervenes in foreign elections.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Why do global powers, like the United States, get involved in each other's elections? Accusations arose during the 2016 US presidential election that Russia had interfered with the US election after an investigation from the Intelligence Community. President Obama expelled 35 Russian diplomats and suspected these intelligence operations in retaliation.<sup>1</sup> This incident has been in the national spotlight giving fuel to both conservative and liberal rhetoric alike, but the United States is quite familiar with the act of foreign electoral intervention and political espionage. This article intends to survey the broad history of the foreign interventions by the United States and propose a threefold methodology that is used to examine the how and why global powers, like the United States, seek to influence other countries' elections.

The United States has practiced political espionage since before the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776 but electoral intervention is a more recent phenomenon starting in the mid-20th century, near the end of World War II. Since the creation of the Office of Strategic Services in 1942 and the subsequent creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, the United States has intervened in as many as 81 elections around the world.<sup>2</sup>

Research has shown that about two-thirds of these electoral interventions were covert, meaning the voters did not know about the intervention during the election period. About one third of the 81 elections were overt in nature, meaning the United States publicly supported a candidate in a foreign election by means of campaign strategy or finance. More recently, the United States has not been as involved in overt interventions, ending a streak of elections during the Cold War where the United States strategically and covertly suppressed the spread of the Communist Party.<sup>3</sup> There is surprisingly little research in foreign electoral intervention thus this work will greatly utilize the new and landmark research of Dov H. Levin, Daniel Corstange, Nikolay Marinov, and James Miller.

## **OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY**


The methodology will be qualitative and threefold in nature arguing that the vested interest of the United States within a past foreign election is determined by analyzing three key variables: the tactics used by the United States in the intervention, the motivations of the United States to intervene in a foreign election, and the magnitude of the intervention.

These variables will be analyzed in the context of three landmark electoral

interventions by the United States at three different periods of history: First will be the 1948 Italian election, second will be the 1964 and 1970 Chilean elections, and the third will be the 2002 Bolivian election. These specific elections were picked are because of their historical significance and the range of reasons that the United States used to justify becoming involved in the elections provides insight into how the United States conducts covert or overt political espionage, helping us arrive to conclusions on their multivariable incentive. The range of the dates of occurrence of these elections also provides insight into how the United States' decision-making process evolves from the inception of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 to current.

Tactics and methodologies (variable 1; displayed as  $V_1$ ) will answer the question of how the United States intervened in these elections. They are outlined as whether they intervened covertly or overtly in the election in question. The motivations (variable 2; displayed as  $V_2$ ) will answer *why* the United States intervened in these elections and their justification. This variable will utilize Corstange and Marinov's theory of two types of foreign intervention: Partisan intervention and process intervention, which is defined later.<sup>4</sup> The application of these categories will set the foundation of which we will build our new theory. The last component (variable 3; displayed as  $V_3$ ) will answer the *significance* of the why and how by analyzing the magnitude of the intervention. The analysis of magnitude will consist of two categories: How much of a global impact it would have or had, or if the intervention was solely to further the interests of

Figure 1. The Three-Variable ( $V_n$ ) Vested Interest Theory.



Notes:  $V_1$  will identify the tactics and methodologies of intervention,  $V_2$  will identify the stated motivation of intervention, and  $V_3$  will identify magnitude of intervention then classify it as globally-motivated or self-motivated.

the United States. This article proposes to label them: Globally-motivated intervention and self-motivated intervention respectfully.

These three variables are applied to the four pre-selected elections and given a value-based metric of *high vested interest* or *low vested interest*.

### ***Delimitations***

This article seeks to apply the threefold methodology to the four previously stated elections that the United States interfered. These electoral interventions do not include any coup d'états or forced regime changes that have happened in the past. It only seeks to analyze strategic intervention where the United States utilizes covert or overt methods to influence rather than to coerce.

### ***Definition of Terms***

- Espionage is known colloquially as spying but in this context, espionage is defined as the art or practice of spy-craft, or using spy tactics to collect, analyze, or influence intelligence.
- Covert Action in the context of this article will retain its original definition from the Central Intelligence Agency as a foreign policy tool to further US interests in another country without the US Government being fully aware of it.
- Overt Action is a type of action used by the United States government that is public in nature, “operations... without concealment.”
- Partisan Intervention as proposed by Corstange and Marinov is “where the foreign power takes a public stance on its support for one side [of an election].”<sup>5</sup>
- Process Intervention as proposed by Corstange and Marinov, is “to support the rules of democratic contestation, irrespective of who wins.” Essentially intervening in the election to maintain the democratic process.<sup>6</sup>
- Foreign Electoral Intervention is the action of one country, covertly or overtly, intervening in another country’s election or its subsequent results.
- Globally-motivated intervention is a country intervenes in the election of another country for the interests, betterment, or well-being of the international audience.
- Self-motivated intervention is a country intervenes in the election of another country to further the interests, betterment, or well-being of themselves.

- Predator-country is a colloquial term this article proposes to define the aggressor country that intervenes into the other country's election.
- Prey-country is a colloquial term this article proposes to define the receiving country that is having their election intervened.

## LITERATURE REVIEW AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

### *ITALY, 1948 GENERAL ELECTION*

#### ***Background***

The 1948 Italian general election was held on April 18, 1948 to elect the First Republican Parliament of the country. Earlier that year in February, there was a communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia where the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), backed by the Soviet Union, forced the resignation of non-Communist cabinet and parliament ministers and appointed a new government that was friendly to the KSČ. The coup brought Czechoslovakia into the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. This worried the United States and brought speculation that it could influence the Italian election and bring Italy into the Soviet sphere of influence. There was such strong speculation that Italy would be drawn into the Soviet sphere of influence that Time Magazine released a statement saying that a probable left-wing victory in the Italian election will be "the brink of catastrophe."<sup>7</sup>

The campaign was a three-way race between Alcide De Gasperi of the Christian Democracy party (DC), Palmiro Togliatti of the Popular Democratic Front (FDP), and Ivan Matteo of the Socialist Unity party (SU). The Popular Democratic Front was a leftist coalition of parties that consisted of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). Italian historians quote the campaign as being, "the most passionate, the most important, the longest, the dirtiest, and the most uncertain electoral campaign in Italian history."<sup>8</sup>

Near the end of the campaign period, only two parties were left: The DC and the FDP. Both the DC and FDP were competing for their own vision of the future of Italy. The Christian Democracy was the right-wing and conservative party that fought for a capitalist Italy, citing that within communist countries, "children send parents to jail...children are owned by the state...[and] people eat their own children."<sup>9</sup> The DC also utilized religious propaganda slogans to influence voters.<sup>10</sup>

The FDP led the de facto Italian Communist Party that had trouble controlling militant arms of the party that terrorized parts of Italy within an area deemed the Red Triangle.<sup>11</sup> The PCI pushed the Italian Socialist Party out of prominence and effectively sat on the sidelines with the Socialist Unity party. The Cold War effectively started the year before the election in 1947. This geopolitical tension prompted President Harry Truman to sign the National Security Act of 1947 that legalized foreign covert operations. The National Security Act was a major restructuring of military and intelligence agencies of the United States. The Act created the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Air Force, protected the United States Marine Corps as their own branch, and abolished the Department of War. It also set the framework for the United States' involvement in future foreign elections.<sup>12</sup>

### ***Methodology of Intervention by the United States***

The 1948 election was first influenced by the tension ramping up between the Soviet Union and the United States. The political climate between the two Superpowers was spreading throughout the world and an election victory could mean the difference of one side of the War or another. The tactics of intervention used by the United States were covert and classified in nature. The budget of the project has maintained classified status, but the details have since been released to the public.

First, the United States used financial means to help the DC. F. Mark Wyatt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Officer stated, "We had bags of money that we delivered to selected politicians, to defray their political expenses, their campaign expenses, for posters, [and] for pamphlets." This covert financial backing of the DC set the foundation of a much larger operation. Second, the United States created an influence campaign reminiscent of the recent Russian influence campaign.<sup>13</sup> Multiple US agencies coordinated in writing millions of letters that were distributed to voters, making anti-communist short-wave radio broadcasts, and publishing hundreds of books and articles all of which were used to convince the Italian voter population to believe that consequences were imminent in a Communist-run Italy. Third, the US media backed the operation and made a public endorsement of the leader of the Christian Democracy, Alcide De Gasperi. Time Magazine featured Gasperi on the cover of the April 1948 edition and covered him in their leading story.<sup>14</sup>

The Soviet Union was running a similar operation backing the PCI without evidence to prove an influence campaign of similar caliber.<sup>15</sup> Wyatt estimates that as the campaign neared the election, the amounts of Soviet money grew to "\$8-\$10 million a month...directly out of the Soviet compound in Rome"<sup>16</sup> The Kremlin has actually released a statement



disputing the amount of money going into PCI, instead stating that the amount of money was “occasional and modest.”<sup>17</sup>

The US intervention methodologies prevailed, and the Christian Democracy won a decisive victory over PCI by winning 48.11 percent of the vote, which amounted to 305 seats in the Italian Chamber of Deputies and 131 seats in the Italian Senate.<sup>18</sup> The CIA continued this practice for 24 years after the initial election in 1948, and according to Wyatt, a left-wing group would not win an election until 1996- 48 years later.<sup>19</sup>

## **CHILE, 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION**

### ***Background***

The United States has a long history of meddling in the country of Chile starting as early as 1809 when President James Madison sent an inspector to investigate revolutionaries within the Spanish colonies in South America.<sup>20</sup> United States interests in Chile slowly ramped up throughout the first half of the twentieth century as two major US companies, Kennecott and Anaconda, grabbed hold of most of Chilean resources. For the majority of the twentieth century Kennecott and Anaconda “controlled between 7 percent to 20 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).”<sup>21</sup>

The 1964 Chilean election maintains a similar theme as the 1948 Italian election in that US interests were fueled by fears that the country would succumb to a political party that we surrender them to the Soviet Union. The Chilean election was a three-way race between Eduardo Frei Montalva who was representing the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Salvador Allende of the Socialist party (PS), and Julio Duran of the Radical party (PR).

This was Allende’s second time running for president after losing by about 33,000 votes to President Jorge Alessandri in the 1958 election. President Alessandri was an ally to the United States during his presidency, even introducing tariffs that flooded the Chilean markets with American products.<sup>22</sup> Salvador Allende made a comeback in the 1964 election and was a top contender for the presidency until the United States found his policies not in line with US interests. Allende’s stated intent was “to bring about an “irreversible” Marxist revolution in Chile.” Allende was not only supported by the PS, but by a group of leftist parties that came together to support him who went by the name of the Popular Action Front (FRAP).<sup>23</sup>

### ***Methodology of Intervention by the United States***

The thematic fear of Cold War sympathy, as seen in the 1948 Italian

election, remains constant throughout this election as well. The United States authorized money to support the PDC in 1962 and after the intervention strategy was finalized, the CIA approved \$3 million for execution of their plans.<sup>24</sup> The funds for the election were not only delivered to candidates covertly but were also funneled to the country using President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress partnership to create better diplomatic relations with Latin America. Using the \$20 million in the Alliance for Progress partnership, the United States sent about 100 staff members to support the intervention program.<sup>25</sup> The intervention tactics were covert in nature and mostly utilized a large-scale propaganda campaign to skew public opinion of the leftist candidate, Allende.

Tactics like covert radio and print advertising were primary methods of influence and intervention. Later in the campaign, they also utilized conventional campaigning techniques like polling voters to supporters and non-supporters, GOTV (get out the vote) drives that are aimed to mobilize a targeted voter base to support a candidate, and voter registration drives used to register non-voters and irregular voters to get out and vote. Frei Montalva had an impressive victory, winning 56.61 percent of the vote. Allende's campaign was able to conjure 38.9 percent of the vote and Julio Duran earned 5 percent. The program was not only managed the Central Intelligence Agency but also was a joint effort with the US Department of State.<sup>26</sup>

## **CHILE, 1970 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION**

### ***Background***

The United States' plan for intervention in the 1970 Chilean election built on the large-scale program established in 1964. The election was a three-way race between Salvador Allende of the Socialist party, Jorge Alessandri who was independent, and Radomiro Tomic of the Christian Democratic Party. The committee overseeing covert operations decided that the United States will not be supporting either candidate against Salvador Allende, the leftist candidate, but instead focused its efforts against the Popular Unity (UP) coalition that supported Allende. The UP was a group of leftist parties comprised of Socialist, Communist, and other leftist ideologies that came together in a united front. The UP was directly funded by the KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti; Soviet intelligence agency) from a personal request from Allende to the Soviet Union to provide funding at the amount of "\$400,000...and an additional personal subsidy of \$50,000 directly to Allende."<sup>27</sup> He requested this from his own personal contact, KGB officer Svyatoslav Kuznetsov and this

assistance was a known turning point in the outcome of the election.<sup>28</sup>

The campaign period was marked with violent acts caused by the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a guerilla movement that was founded in student organizations across the universities in Chile. The leaders of the MIR were active in the youth branch of the Socialist Party where they developed endorsements and alliances with trade unions and local electorates throughout the country. One of the notable early leaders was Andrés Pascal Allende who was a nephew of Salvador Allende.<sup>29</sup>

### ***Methodology of Intervention by the United States***

The United States' methodology was notably different compared to the 1964 election. They focused primarily on a covert "anti-Allende propaganda" versus supporting any one candidate in the three-way race. The United States spent \$425,000 to produce this propaganda, labeling it a "scare campaign," of which included pamphlets, posters, and other campaign literature that linked a government or regime led by Allende to be connected to the oppression and failures of the Soviet Union.<sup>30</sup> The United States also connected with local media and groomed journalists to produce anti-Allende articles, particularly through El Mercurio, a prominent Chilean newspaper.<sup>31</sup>

The main goal behind the campaign was to target the distressed economy of Chile and add financial and social panic that the country was on the brink of a financial disaster. While the economy was stressed, they released the anti-Allende propaganda that the United States hoped would connect Allende and his leftist ideology with the failing economy. They also aimed to break apart the UP by splitting the Radical Party off from the coalition.<sup>32</sup>

As mentioned in the background, the KGB was funding Allende's campaign and the UP coalition directly. These directed funds were utilized more efficiently than the US campaign, which contributed to Allende winning much of the vote. The then-CIA Director Richard Helms stated that the White House wanted him to "beat something with nothing," blaming them for the inefficient funds to run a complete intervention campaign.<sup>33</sup>

Allende won the election with many of the votes at 36.61 percent, Alessandri received 35.27 percent of the votes, and Tomic received 28.11 percent. No candidate won an absolute majority of the votes (greater than 50 percent of the popular vote) so the decision went to the Chilean National Congress to decide between the top two candidates, Allende and Alessandri, to decide the next President of Chile.<sup>34</sup> During the time

between the election and the Presidential Inauguration, the National Congress seemed to favor Alessandri as a candidate over Allende. The United States exploited this by intensifying their propaganda operations and having actions approved by the US Ambassador to Chile. The political climate of Chile intensified enough to result in a military coup d'état supported by the United States in 1973.<sup>35</sup>

## **BOLIVIA, 2002 GENERAL ELECTION**

### ***Background***

Like Chile and other South American countries, Bolivia has a long history of political instability since The Bolivian War of Independence in 1809. The 2002 Bolivian election marked the fifth consecutive democratic election after the country developed a multi-party democracy after multiple coups d'état in the early 1980s.<sup>36</sup> As the Bolivians developed a consistent political party system, three major parties emerged. The Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) and the Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN) emerged from the center right. The Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) represented the center left. Various parties were founded to compete with the three major parties and were successful enough to capture a small amount of the votes.

Two years before the election in 2000, the country was in turmoil over privatization of water infrastructure in Cochabamba, the third-largest city of Bolivia, by the company Semapa. This turmoil resulted in a full year of protests where thousands of people marched against national police resulting in hundreds of injuries. This protest was known as the Cochabamba Water War. During the time that the Cochabamba Water War was ramping up, the Bolivian government was trying to eradicate coca farms as part of a program to enforce the United States' War on Drugs. The coca farmers, known as coccaleros, were forced to mobilize, create unions, and create a political party known as the Movement for Socialism- Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-IPSP, or MAS).<sup>37</sup>

The election was a six-way race with the three major parties and smaller populist parties. The top three contenders were Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada who was the candidate with the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement and the Free Bolivia Movement (MNR-MBL), Evo Morales who was the candidate with the Movement for Socialism (MAS, AKA MAS-IPSP), and Manfred Reyes Villa who was the candidate for the New Republic Force (NFR). Sanchez de Lozada won the election with 22.5 percent of the vote and Evo Morales won with 20.9 percent of the vote.

The Bolivian government has an absolute majority political system where if no candidate wins an absolute majority (greater than 50 percent of the vote) then the Legislature will pick between the top two candidates.<sup>38</sup>

What helped Sanchez de Lozada the most was his enlistment of American political strategist James Carville and the firm Greenberg Carville Shrum. Carville was Chief Strategist on Bill Clinton's presidential campaign that led him to the White House. Sanchez de Lozada was not liked in Bolivia because of his United States ties and American accent. He grew up, attended schools in the United States, and was viewed as a foreigner. James Carville was able to turn notoriously low chances into a winning campaign.<sup>39</sup>

### ***Methodology of Intervention by the United States***

The tactics used by the United States to interfere in the Bolivian election was overt in nature, a change compared to the Chilean and Italian elections that utilized covert espionage tactics. The Bolivian populace was revolting against globalist policies enacted by Sanchez de Lozada in his previous term as president that were sympathetic to US interests in Bolivia. As mentioned in the background, the United States wanted to eradicate cocoa farms to enforce the War on Drugs in South America. Evo Morales, the MAS candidate and president of the cocalero union, fought to maintain these farms. For the United States to maintain their interests in the country, the then-US Ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, made a statement saying that the United States will cut off aid to Bolivia because of its support of cocoa farms.<sup>40</sup> This resulted in a huge surge of support for Evo Morales effectively leading him to finish close second at the election.<sup>41</sup>

## **RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

The research design of this theory is primarily qualitative in nature with supplementary quantitative datasets of espionage expenditure. The information used to conduct this research is a range of academic documents published by a few key researchers in foreign electoral intervention. As foreign electoral intervention is a small, yet budding, field in political science, the following scholars dominate the research: Dov H. Levin, Daniel Corstange, Nikolay Marinov, and James Miller. These researchers have created original theories and electoral datasets that this thesis will build off, laying the foundation for future researchers in this field.

Besides academic publications, this thesis has utilized news media from the period of time that the elections occurred. As evident in a few of the elections, the United States conducted influence and information campaigns where US media, and foreign media alike, endorse and inform

voters to vote for a certain candidate. These articles provide insight into the methodology used by the United States. Congressionally chartered investigative reports are used to analyze unclassified insights into the rationale behind some of the interventions. The Central Intelligence Agency meticulously documented their involvement in some of the elections so when an investigative inquiry was launched they could share their own research and methodologies, though partially redacted, with Congress and the public.

The methodology of the vested interest theory as applied to the elections is as follows:

### **1948 Italian Election**

*V<sub>1</sub>: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when they intervene in a foreign election?*

When analyzing the tactics and methodologies used by the United States it will first be determined if the intervention utilized covert or overt action. The information that we will use to determine this comes primarily from first-hand accounts of CIA Intelligence Officer F. Mark Wyatt who reported the extent of the United States involvement in Italy to Cable News Network (CNN). Secondly, what needs to be determined is if the United States is expending resources to combat an opposition force, for example an opposing political candidate or an opposition campaign. Another component to this second variable is if they are opposing overtly or covertly against their adversaries. Third, what needs to be analyzed is the United States' financial expenditure on the intervention tactics. This information is less readily available depending on the election since mission budgets tend to stay classified, though we can maintain rough estimates based on how extensive the intervention is. For the Italian election specifically, F. Mark Wyatt has mentioned many financial figures in terms of United States intervention in his extensive interviews with CNN.<sup>42</sup>

*V<sub>2</sub>: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a foreign election?*

The United States will generally form a justification for why they are to get involved in an election. For the 1948 Italian election specifically, the stated motivation will be derived from F. Mark Wyatt's statements on why the intervention happened. James Miller's research on Cold War elections will also be used to supplement the analysis of Wyatt's statements. The second variable of this question will answer if the intervention is a process intervention or partisan intervention. Determining whether the intervention is for process or partisan is important because it sheds light into whether the United States intervened to support a specific political

party or solely to support the democratic and political process. F. Mark Wyatt's statements on the election will again be used to identify political or partisan intervention.

*V<sub>3</sub>: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?*

Analyzing the magnitude of the intervention consists of two variables: First is analyzing if the purpose of the intervention was for global betterment and betterment for the prey-country and the surrounding region or if the intervention was solely to further the interests of the United States. These two variables will be labeled globally motivated intervention and self-motivated respectively. After determining whether the intervention was globally or self-motivated, we can then analyze how much of a qualitative impact the intervention had on both the predator and prey-country.

#### **1964 Chilean Election & 1970 Chilean Election<sup>43</sup>**

*V<sub>1</sub>: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when they intervene in a foreign election?*

To identify the tactics and methodologies of United States intervention in Chile, the Congressionally-chartered Church Committee report will be used to determine the three variables of the first sub-question: Covert or overt action, whether they are combating an opposition, and the financial expenditure of the United States. Various academic articles will add accessory information to supplement the Church report.

*V<sub>2</sub>: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a foreign election?*

Since there was a Congressional inquiry into these elections specifically, the stated justification was published in the Church report. The accuracy or sincerity of the justification is something that can be explored later. Whether the election was process or partisan motivated will again be determined by the Church report and supplemented by various academic articles.

*V<sub>3</sub>: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?*

The Church report and a few academic sources will again be used to determine if the intervention was globally or self-motivated. Andrew and Mitrokhin's text on the KGB involvement in third-world countries will be used to determine the global or domestic impact of the intervention.

#### **2002 Bolivian Election**

*V<sub>1</sub>: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when they intervene in a foreign election?*

The Bolivian election is different from the other elections in that covert action was not taken in the country to influence this specific country, so all political espionage happens with overt action and public policy. The primary sources that will be used to examine this election are academic articles that examine US foreign policy in South America, some that detail terrorist or guerrilla tactics, and others that discuss the general political instability of the country that led to the United States trying to intervene in the election. Because the intervention tactics in this election are overt in nature, the financial expenditure and the opposition campaign will be easier to assess.

*V<sub>2</sub>: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a foreign election?*

The stated motivation of this intervention was based on US foreign policy at the time, so the research that will be used includes academic examinations of early-2002 US foreign policy. The second component of this question, partisan or process intervention, applies to this election in a different sense compared to the other elections. Because of the overt nature of the intervention, the partisan motivation of the United States is well documented, so the same sources will be used to examine this.

*V<sub>3</sub>: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?*

Identifying whether this intervention was globally or self-motivated will be derived from the same major academic sources as before and from those sources, we can determine the domestic or global impact that the intervention had.

## **RESULTS OF THE STUDY**

The research and data that will be used to determine the vested interest of the United States has been gathered in this section. In the following section, the research and data will be examined in the context of the vested interest theory and a conclusion will be derived to find the vested interest of the United States in the four elections that have been selected.

### **1948 Italian Election**

*V<sub>1</sub>: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when they intervene in a foreign election?*

The sources used to determine the methodologies of the United States in the 1948 Italian election were statements made by F. Mark Wyatt. Wyatt was a former CIA Intelligence Officer who joined the CIA Clandestine Service in 1948. When commenting on tactics used in the Italian election he stated:



“The communist party of Italy was funded, in the first place, by black bags of money directly out of the Soviet compound in Rome; and the Italian services were aware of this. As the elections approached, the amounts grew, and the estimates [are] that \$8 million to \$10 million a month actually went into the coffers of communism...we had bags of money that we delivered to select politicians, to defray their political expenses, their campaign expenses, for posters, for pamphlets.”<sup>44</sup>

Wyatt’s comments could be used to answer all three clarifying questions under the first major sub-question.

*V<sub>2</sub>: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a foreign election?*

The stated motivation of the intervention in the 1948 Italian election can be traced back to F. Mark Wyatt’s statements in an interview with CNN. He said,

“I was deeply concerned, and I was glad to see things like [George] Kennan...saying that, ‘This election is coming up, and should the communists be able to form a government, should they win, our whole position in the Mediterranean and probably in Europe will be undermined.’ And I was delighted to see that attention was paid on it.”<sup>45</sup>

Later, he addressed the spread of the Soviet Union in Italy, he said, “what the CIA needed was authority to develop a program of covert action which could confront and meet the everlasting and indefinite expansionism of the Soviet Union.”<sup>46</sup>

*V<sub>3</sub>: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?*

When identifying the magnitude of an electoral intervention, based on the theory, it must be determined if the intervention was globally or self-motivated in nature. In F. Mark Wyatt’s previous statement, that determines the stated motivation:

“I was deeply concerned, and I was glad to see things like [George] Kennan...saying that, ‘This election is coming up, and should the communists be able to form a government, should they win, our whole position in the Mediterranean and probably in Europe will be undermined.’ And I was delighted to see that attention was paid on it.”<sup>47</sup>

He states that a “coming up” of the communists will lead to the United States losing their position in the Mediterranean. Using this statement, we will explore whether this means that the US intervention was globally or self-motivated.

**1964 Chilean Election & 1970 Chilean Election**

*V<sub>r</sub>: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when they intervene in a foreign election?*

The main source used for the 1964 and 1970 Chilean elections is the Church Committee report on covert action in Chile from 1963 to 1973. Here is an excerpt from the Church Committee report with respect to propaganda operations:

“The most extensive covert action activity in Chile was propaganda. It was relatively cheap. In Chile, it continued at a low level during “normal” times, then was cranked up to meet particular threats or to counter particular dangers... The most common form of a propaganda project is simply the development of “assets” in media organizations who can place articles or be asked to write them... the covert propaganda efforts in Chile also included “black” propaganda-material falsely purporting to be the product of a particular individual or group. In the 1970 election, for instance, the CIA used “black” propaganda to sow discord between the Communists and the Socialists and between the national labor confederation and the Chilean Communist Party.”<sup>48</sup>

*Figure 2. Tactics and methodology expenses expanded on 1964 Chilean election.*<sup>49</sup>

<b>TECHNIQUE</b>	<b>AMOUNT</b>
Propaganda for elections and other support for political parties	\$8,000,000
Producing and disseminating propaganda and supporting mass media	\$4,300,000
Influencing Chilean institutions (labor, students, peasants, women)	\$900,000
Promoting military coup d'état	<\$200,000

*Notes: Figures rounded to the nearest 100,000.*

Besides discussing propaganda, the Church Committee report also discusses other techniques of intervention such as supporting local media; gaining influence in Chilean institutions; supporting political parties; and direct efforts to promote a military coup. The report also provides a breakdown of expenditure of propaganda operations:

*V2: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a foreign election?*

The United States' stated motivation for intervention is detailed in the Church Committee report as follows:

“The goal, broadly, was to prevent or minimize the influence of Chilean Communists or Marxists in the government that would emerge from the 1964 election. Consequently, the U.S. sought the most effective way of opposing FRAP (Popular Action Front), an alliance -of Chilean Socialists, Communists, and several miniscule non-Marxist parties of the left which backed the candidacy of Salvador Allende. Specifically, the policy called for support of the Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Front (a coalition of rightist parties), and a variety of anti-communist propaganda and organizing activities.”<sup>50</sup>

The United States also played a role in the 1970 Chilean election but at a much smaller scale compared to the 1964 election. The Church Committee states, “that effort, however, was smaller and did not include support for any specific candidate. It was directed more at preventing Allende’s election than at insuring another candidate’s victory.”

*V<sub>3</sub>: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?*

The Church Committee report will be used to determine the magnitude of the 1964 and 1970 Chilean election. In the stated justification, we found that the report stated the following on the 1964 Chilean election:

“The goal, broadly, was to prevent or minimize the influence of Chilean Communists or Marxists in the government that would emerge from the 1964 election. Consequently, the U.S. sought the most effective way of opposing FRAP (Popular Action Front), an alliance -of Chilean Socialists, Communists, and several miniscule non-Marxist parties of the left which backed the candidacy of Salvador Allende. Specifically, the policy called for support of the Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Front (a coalition of rightist parties), and a variety of anti-communist propaganda and organizing activities.”<sup>51</sup>

From this excerpt, we can also determine the magnitude of the intervention and if it was globally or self-motivated. Further, in the report it states:

“The U.S. reaction to Fidel Castro’s rise to power suggested that while the Monroe Doctrine had been abandoned, the principles which prompted it were still alive. Castro’s presence spurred a new

United States hemispheric policy with special significance for Chile—the Alliance for Progress. There was little disagreement among policy-makers either at the end of the Eisenhower Administration or at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration that something had to be done about the alarming threat that Castro was seen to represent to the stability of the hemisphere.”<sup>52</sup>

In this excerpt, the Committee took note of Fidel Castro’s rise to power and subsequent threat to the stability of the region as a motivation for electoral intervention and political espionage over the course of two elections.

### **2002 Bolivian Election**

*V<sub>1</sub>: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when they intervene in a foreign election?*

Due to the public nature of the 2002 Bolivian electoral intervention, we will be using media coverage and academic writings from the time. A New York Times article from 2002 details:

“Mr. Morales’s showing is a blow to the United States, which has financed a largely successful effort to eradicate most of Bolivia’s coca, which is used to produce cocaine... Mr. Morales, a harsh critic of the United States, has charged that the American ambassador in La Paz, Manuel Rocha, has been pressuring leading lawmakers on behalf of Mr. Sanchez de Lozada.”<sup>53</sup>

More recently, Jorge Dominguez wrote an editorial piece in the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) detailing the United States’ tumultuous history of electoral intervention in South American countries. Here is what he says about the 2002 Bolivian electoral intervention:

“More recently, the intervention of U.S. Ambassador Manuel Rocha, under instructions from Washington, against Evo Morales in the 2002 Bolivian presidential election exemplifies the same dramatic failure. In response to the Ambassador’s warning that Bolivians should vote against Morales because of his leadership of the coca growers’ movement, Morales’ support soared, and he came in a close second on election day.”<sup>54</sup>

Since this action was overt in nature and the intervention itself was so miniscule, there is no need to examine the expenses.

*V<sub>2</sub>: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a foreign election?*

The stated motivation of the United States’ intervention in the 2002 Bolivian election was the eradication of cocoa farms as part of the War on Drugs

under the Bush Administration. Like earlier stated, the US Ambassador, under orders from the White House, made a statement saying, "voting for Mr. Morales could jeopardize American assistance and investment."<sup>55</sup>

Something of note in the Bolivian election is that the United States had unconscious influence on the election by use of private political consultants. James Carville, Stan Greenberg, and Robert Shrum were leading political consultants who were tasked to breathe life into the dying campaign of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada.<sup>56</sup>

*V<sub>3</sub>: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?*

Again, using the stated motivation from the second sub-question we will derive the magnitude of the 2002 Bolivian election and determine whether it is globally or self-motivated. The determination whether the intervention was globally or self-motivated. The stated justification comes from an article in the Argentinian newspaper Clarín, "I want to remind the Bolivian electorate that if you choose those who want Bolivia to become a cocaine exporter, it will endanger US aid."<sup>57</sup>

During the time of the 2002 Bolivian election, the US President George W. Bush and his administration were proactively implementing the War on Drugs he inherited from his father, President George H. W. Bush, and President Ronald Reagan. This led to orders from the White House to tell US Ambassador Manuel Rocha to address the Bolivian electorate.<sup>58</sup>

## SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

### **Summary of Results**

The results from the study will be summarized here following the previous formats of Election→V<sub>n</sub>. The previous background research from Literature Review will be used to answer these questions and determine the vested interest. These answers will be derived in the discussion below.

#### 1948 Italian Election

*V<sub>1</sub>: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when they intervene in a foreign election?*

The research into the 1948 Italian election was able to identify statements from F. Mark Wyatt, a CIA Intelligence Officer from the era that served as the Rome Station Chief in Italy. Wyatt identified clandestine tactics: Political posters, brochures, and propaganda, expenses, and a large-scale influence campaign all used by the United States to combat Soviet influence of the same kind. Wyatt stated that money was coming directly

out of the Russian Embassy in Italy to fund the leftist coalition in the election.<sup>59</sup>

*V<sub>z</sub>: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a foreign election?*

The stated motivation of the United States in the 1948 Italian election was stated directly from F. Mark Wyatt. Wyatt stated that the United States needed to develop covert action programs to address the expansion of the Soviet Union. Cold War fears are thematic in every election that this thesis examines, motivations stem from fear of leftist candidates winning.

*V<sub>3</sub>: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?*

Determining the magnitude of the 1948 Italian election first started with identifying whether the election was self-motivated or globally motivated. This identification will be saved for the discussion, but the research used was able to identify a statement from F. Mark Wyatt that stated that the Mediterranean would be undermined if the Soviet Union were to expand through Italy and potentially through Europe.<sup>60</sup>

### **1964 & 1970 Chilean Election**

*V<sub>r</sub>: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when they intervene in a foreign election?*

Tactics used in the 1964 and the 1970 elections were similar and were discussed jointly in the Church Committee report but for this portion of the summary of results the elections will be separated. The Central Intelligence Agency initially approved \$3 million for executing covert action, but \$20 million was also funneled to the country through John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress program that was used to develop better diplomatic relations with Latin American countries. Besides covert radio and print advertising, conventional political techniques were used to influence the election: Using pollsters and polling data, GOTV operations, and voter drives were all used by the United States to influence the 1964 election.<sup>61</sup>

The tactics used in the 1970 Chilean election were substantially different compared to the 1964 election. The United States tried to develop an "anti-Allende" campaign rather than supporting any one candidate like in the 1964 election. The tactics used were primarily pamphlets, posters, and other propaganda that tried to connect the failing Chilean economy with the failures of the Soviet Union in the minds of the Chileans. The United States also tried to connect with local media, producing articles that were anti-Allende. The United States spent \$425,000 for this intervention (compared to \$3 million in the previous intervention) and development of the propaganda.<sup>62</sup>

*V<sub>z</sub>: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a foreign election?*

The stated motivation in both the 1964 and 1970 elections were also identified in the Church Committee report. The report states that the goal of electoral intervention is to “prevent or minimize” influence coming from the Chilean Communists and Marxists. The Communists and Marxists were partnered under a leftist coalition that shared an anti-capitalist US ideology.<sup>63</sup>

*V<sub>3</sub>: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?*

Identifying whether the 1964 and 1970 Chilean elections are self or globally motivated will come from analyzing the statements of justification said in the Church Committee report that the reason that the United States intervened in Chilean affairs was to “minimize the influence of Chilean Communists” in 1964. In the 1970 election, the United States did not create an effective plan of attack against the leftist coalition nor did they fully support or fund their own candidate; instead, the United States ran an “anti-Allende” campaign that was doomed to fail.<sup>64</sup>

### **2002 Bolivian Election**

*V<sub>r</sub>: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when they intervene in a foreign election?*

The United States used more indirect and overt tactics to intervene in the 2002 Bolivian election compared to the other elections. The US Ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, made a strong statement to the Bolivian electorate that voting for Evo Morales, the Socialist candidate and cocalero union leader would destroy relations with the United States and that Bolivia will lose aid because of their support of cocoa farms. This statement did influence the election but a different effect than anticipated.

*V<sub>z</sub>: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a foreign election?*

The stated motivation of the United States in the 2002 Bolivian election was a public stance against the Bolivian’s support for cocoa farms and the union farmers who worked on them. The Bush Administration inherited the War on Drugs from his father, President George H. W. Bush, and President Ronald Reagan.

*V<sub>3</sub>: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?*

Identifying the magnitude of the 2002 Bolivian election comes from the statement made by US Ambassador to Bolivia Manuel Rocha. According to the Argentine newspaper Clarin he said, “I want to remind the Bolivian

electorate that if you choose those who want Bolivia to become a cocaine exporter, it will endanger US aid.”<sup>65</sup> This statement came from direct orders from the White House, who wanted to maintain the War on Drugs and keep Bolivian cocaine out of the United States.<sup>66</sup>

## **DISCUSSION OF RESULTS**

This section will take the vested interest theory and apply it to the research conducted in previous section. The previous section research and the Summary of Results section will serve as the academic backing that this article will draw from to form any conclusions. The vested interest theory methodology will be summarized per each election and conclusions will be drawn from there.<sup>67</sup>

### ***1948 Italian Election***

The 1948 Italian election was held to elect the first republican parliament of the country. A coup d'état in Czechoslovakia was held earlier in the year backed by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. This worried the United States as this coup d'état and propping of a Soviet-backed government would bring Italy into the Soviet sphere of influence. The United States saw that the Soviet Union was conducting covert political operations in Italy as the election ramped up. The United States made an endorsement of De Gasperi, the Christian Democracy candidate, and US intervention methodologies led to a victory over the Soviet-backed faction.<sup>68</sup>

Following the vested interest theory, the tactics and methodologies will be organized by whether they were covert or overt, did they combat foreign tactics, and the financial expenditure of the operation. The tactics were covert in nature as multiple US agencies were coordinating an influence campaign consisting of millions of letters writing to voters, short-wave radio broadcasts, and book and article publishing. All to influence the Italian electorate and convince them that the shortfalls of the Communist Party were directly connected to what will happen to Italy if the leftist candidate were to win.<sup>69</sup>

These covert tactics outlined above were used in opposition to direct adversarial covert tactics. The Soviet Union was running a direct opposition funding the Popular Democratic Front (FDP), the leftist coalition of parties supporting candidate Palmiro Togliatti. The extent of the Soviet campaign to support the FDP is not well known nor documented. What is known is the statement provided by F. Mark Wyatt who stated there were bags of money coming straight out of the Soviet compound in Rome going to politicians and parties they supported. There is speculation that the amount of money coming out of the Soviet compound equated to \$8-\$10 million a month. The US campaign outspent



and outran the Soviet campaign leading to a victory of De Gasperi and the Christian Democracy; with this information this analysis will speculate that the campaign of the United States was surpassing \$8-\$10 million in direct campaign funds- and that is not including the large-scale influence campaign ran in coordination by multiple US agencies.<sup>70</sup>

The stated justification that the United States used in intervening in the 1948 Italian election was identified with F. Mark Wyatt's statements about fear of Soviet influence in Italy and the undermining of the United States' position in Europe and the Mediterranean.<sup>71</sup> The intervention itself was partisan motivated, meaning it was motivated by the support of a candidate, political party, or faction. The intervention was globally-motivated based on statements made that the justification for intervention was that our position could be lost or undermined in the region if the opposing party would win and bring Italy into the Soviet sphere of influence.

After analyzing the methodology of the theory and applying it to the research that has been previously conducted, it can be determined that the United States had a high vested interest in the 1948 Italian election. This is based on the use of expensive and incredibly in-depth covert tactics that combatted foreign espionage tactics, the stated justification of keeping Italy out of the Soviet sphere of influence. The nature of the intervention was globally-motivated, affecting not only the United States but also the stability of the Mediterranean and possibly all of Europe.

### ***1964 Chilean Election***

The 1964 Chilean electoral intervention maintains some of the same fears of Soviet influence as did the Italian election. History of US influence started as early as 1890 when President Madison investigated revolutionary groups in South America. The United States found the views of the front-running candidate of the election, Salvador Allende, against US interests. Allende stated he wanted to "bring about an irreversible Marxist revolution in Chile." This led to the United States to plan and conduct their intervention.<sup>72</sup>

The tactics and methodologies used by the United States started with an initial \$3 million for plan execution. An initial \$20 million was also funneled to Chile through President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress partnership that was used to create better diplomatic relations with Latin American countries, though some of this money was used in the electoral intervention.<sup>73</sup> The tactics were primarily covert in nature as the CIA used large-scale propaganda campaigns to skew public opinion on the leftist candidate. The CIA did use overt tactics that were reminiscent of conventional political operations: Get-out-the-vote operations, voter registration drives, canvassing, etc.

The primary source of influence, black propaganda, was used to create divides between the Communist party and the local union and community leaders. Propaganda falsified to look like another party distributed it rather than the true manufacturer is black propaganda. These tactics were used against the Chilean Communist Party and that will be considered combatant operations even though funds from Russia are only speculated.

The Church Committee report touches on the stated justification stating that the broad goal of the intervention was to minimize, or ideally prevent, any influence from Chilean Communists or Marxists in the elected government emerging out of the 1964 election. The intervention was partisan motivated since the United States was specifically seeking to oppress a combatant or opposing political party from emerging in Chilean politics.<sup>74</sup> The intervention was globally-motivated because of the stated justification that no intervention from the United States will result in influence of Chilean Communists and Marxists in the newly-elected government; thus, leading to destabilization in the region and Communist influence that could spread to other South American countries.

After the application of the vested interest theory, it shows that the United States had a *high vested interest* in the Chilean election, like in the Italian election. We have identified that the United States used both covert and overt tactics to influence the electorate; the stated justification of keeping Chilean Communist and Marxist influence out of the newly-elected government; the nature of the justification being a partisan intervention; and the nature of the intervention itself was globally-motivated because of the United States' desire to prevent and minimize Communist influence in Chile.<sup>75</sup> The United States believed that Communist influence would become Soviet-backed instability in the region.

### **1970 Chilean Election**

The analysis of the 1970 will encompass much of the same research and analysis completed in the 1964 election but will maintain a separate analysis. The tactics used in the 1970 election were negligible compared to the previous year's election. The United States utilized unspecific ad-campaigns that were not targeting a particular demographic but instead were directed at preventing Salvador Allende's victory.<sup>76</sup>

The stated motivation was the same as the previous election and maintained partisan and globally motivated intervention. The difference is that there was great disdain shown with upper-level and executive management in the Central Intelligence Agency because of the lack of direction the program maintained. Statements made by the Station Chief of Chile openly criticized the management and blamed them for the failures of the program.<sup>77</sup>

From the lack of direction and focus in the program, the United States can be seen as having a low vested interest in the election. Better direction may have resulted in better outcomes in the program, but the results were simply not there. The intervention led to Salvador Allende winning the election and the installment of the military coup d'état in 1973.<sup>78</sup>

### **2002 Bolivian Election**

Bolivia had a long history of instability before the 2002 election, like other South American countries, they relied on US aid for many government programs. The Bolivian government was trying to eradicate coca farms as part of a program to enforce the United States' War on Drugs ran by the Bush Administration. The coca farmers, known as coccaleros, were forced to mobilize and create unions, of which became a political movement in Bolivia. The leader of the movement, Evo Morales, was seen as a substantial threat to US interests in Bolivia.<sup>79</sup>

The tactics used to intervene in the 2002 Bolivian election were solely overt in nature, did not fight against an opposing campaign, nor did they have any substantial financial expenditure. The main tactic of intervention was a statement made by US Ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, warning the Bolivian electorate to not vote for Evo Morales, the Socialist candidate.<sup>80</sup>

The stated justification was that Bolivia would lose aid if Evo Morales were to be elected and is partisan motivated intervention because of the lack of support for a certain political faction. This intervention would be considered self-motivated intervention since the reason Ambassador Rocha made a statement to not support Morales was directly because of the War on Drugs and the problems with Bolivian cocaine interdiction in the United States.

After this more unconventional analysis of this intervention compared to the more conventional electoral interventions previously examined, differences can be seen in practically all aspects of execution and these differences can shed some light on the effectiveness of different intervention tactics. The United States had a low vested interest in this election given by the lackluster tactics used that backfired in Evo Morales' favor. If the United States wanted to implement a better strategy to influence Bolivian policy, they would have had a more comprehensive plan of attack with covert operations and allocated funds.<sup>81</sup>

Figure 3. Visual summary of the results.



Notes: The variables are displayed with the summary of the results per each election.

## CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This article began with the articulation of a novel theory that would be used to identify the vested interest of the United States in foreign electoral interventions. It identified this vested interest by identifying three main questions:

- What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when they intervene in a foreign election?
- What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a foreign election?
- What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?

To prove the academic viability of this new expanded theory, it was applied to four elections that the United States intervened in, analyzed them by the defined factors, and then rated the intervention on the metric of high vested interest or low vested interest.

The article first examined the 1948 Italian election, analyzing all the potential Soviet Union influences that could have destabilized the Mediterranean and Europe as a whole. It then examined the 1964 and 1970 Chilean elections where Communist and Marxists parties were trying to influence the newly-elected government. Lastly, it examined the statements made by Ambassador Rocha in the 2002 Bolivian election, its effect on the Bolivian electorate, and how the decision of the White House to pressure the Bolivian electorate to vote a certain way with a threat effectively backfired and led to overwhelming support for the Socialist candidate.

## PROFESSIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

Being able to identify the vested interest of a predator-country within a prey-country has wide-reaching benefits, specifically with the United States and other global powers.<sup>82</sup> Though this article methodology is purely qualitative in nature, its conversion to a quantitative “vested-interest test” could produce datasets that demonstrate our historical regional interests. Using this data and combining it with a regression-model analysis that predicts future conflict for example DARPA’s Integrated Crisis Early Warning System, can help form a historical analysis of the governmental priorities of the United States, contributing one variable to the larger equation used to determine if we should be involved in a prey-country’s election henceforth.

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## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Jonathan was previously a political and legislative staff member working in California state politics. He started his political career doing legislative research for the California State Assembly specializing in military and veteran’s issues. He staffed political campaigns for the California State Assembly, Senate, and U.S. House of Representatives within the San Francisco Bay Area. He accepted a mayoral appointment as a City Commissioner serving on the Community Services Commission of his hometown of Vacaville, California where he worked on parks, recreation, public safety, and open space issues. After his time as a City Commissioner, he served in the United States Air Force stationed at Beale, Air Force Base with the 940th Air Refueling Wing. Jonathan attained a Bachelor of Arts degree from Thomas Edison State University in Trenton, New Jersey and is a Master of Business Administration candidate at Western Governors University in Salt Lake City, Utah. His academic interests include political psychology, military policy, and foreign electoral espionage.

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## Godinez: The Vested Interest Theory

### The Vested Interest Theory

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- 62 Ibid, 57-61.
- 63 Ibid, 14.
- 64 Ibid, 18.
- 65 Perkins, *The Secret History of the American Empire*, 126-127.
- 66 Forero, "The (American) Selling of the (Bolivian) President."
- 67 These conclusions, or the answers to the questions in the vested interest theory, serve as the answer to theory - identifying the vested interest of the United States in these elections.
- 68 *Time Magazine*, "How to Hang On."
- 69 Weiner, "F. Mark Wyatt, 86, C.I.A. Officer, Is Dead."
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 Ibid.
- 72 Andrew, *The World Was Going Our Way*.
- 73 Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*.
- 74 United States Senate, *Church Committee*, 14.
- 75 Ibid.
- 76 Ibid, 13.
- 77 Nohlen, *Elections in Americas*.



- 78 Ibid.
- 79 Schiffler, "Bolivia: The Cochabamba Water War and Its Aftermath."
- 80 Nohlen, *Elections in Americas*.
- 81 Though this election has a far more disappointing analysis, and a less than exciting background compared to the others, it felt pertinent to include an election that the US influenced that did not utilize conventional in other words covert means to provide well-rounded diversity to the application of the vested interest theory.
- 82 This is also important because of the scant research performed on foreign electoral intervention and that it is a burgeoning subfield of international relations and political science. Foreign electoral intervention will find its place in the study of espionage, political behavior, motivation, and political psychology.