
Comparing Civilian Support for Terrorism

Srobana Bhattacharya

Georgia Southern University, sbhattacharya@georgiasouthern.edu

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Comparing Civilian Support for Terrorism

Abstract

Terrorism is an extreme form of political violence, that is inherently abhorrent in nature. Yet, it continues to attain enough support to continue and survive. The recent proliferation of Islamic State and its ever increasing domestic and international civilian support base urges immediate attention to this question. While most research holds that provision of public goods by terrorist groups is the primary cause for high levels of civilian support, I argue that, terrorist groups are more interested in resource extraction rather than resource provision. Additionally, these studies pay scant attention to existing resource structure, especially territorial and political control to explain terrorist-civilian interaction. This paper emphasizes the bi-directional nature of this interaction - a. perception of civilians by the terrorist group and b. terrorist group's perception of the civilians. To analyze levels of civilian support for terrorism, I compare fifteen terrorist groups using qualitative comparative analysis and show how territory, political competition, ethnicity, target selection and organizational structure combine to explain conditions that lead terrorist groups to include or exclude civilian population for support. Based on the variance in support networks of terrorist groups, counter-terrorism policies should also differ. High civilian support indicates the need to use non-military methods to decrease the appeal of terrorist groups. However, terrorist groups with more diffused and multiple support structures need more collaborative and coercive measures to intercept all the possible links to the main group.

Introduction

When and how do terrorist groups attract high levels of civilian support? When discussing support for terrorism, scholars have usually identified and analyzed active support in the form of material and financial aid in the form of the following sources—communities (population), states, diaspora, charities and aid from non-governmental organizations; organized criminal groups, and other insurgent and terrorist groups. Yet others have explored behavioral and attitudinal support, which can be both active and passive, to assess rebel group's military success.¹ Literature that specifically focus on understanding certain aspects of civilian support for terrorism discuss levels of violence used against civilian and availability of resources.² Some others analyze the relevance of religion and support for terrorism³. Yet others have studied whether anti-Americanism is the major cause of popular support for terrorism.⁴ Another set of scholarship analyzing the relationship between

¹ Levitt, Matthew, "Hezbollah: Financing Terror through Criminal Enterprise," *Testimony given to Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs*, Washington, D.C. 25 (2005); Brynjar, Lia, and Katja Skjølberg, "Why terrorism occurs: a survey of theories and hypotheses on the causes of terrorism," *Oslo, FFI/RAPPORT-2000/02769* (2000): 17; Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan. *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001); Mascini, Peter, "Can the Violent Jihad Do Without Sympathizers?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29:4 (2006): 343-357; Smith, Paul J. "Climate change, weak states and the War on Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 29:2 (2007): 264-285; Millen, Raymond A., and Steven Metz, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response*, (Diane Publishing, 2004); Lilja, Jannie, "Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds? Rebel Strategies to Attain Constituent Support in Sri Lanka," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21:2 (2009): 306-326.

² Rebels might include a host of actors including terrorists, guerilla fighters, insurgents, secessionists etc. Since their behavior towards generating fear using violence is common and overlapping, I include an analysis of rebel-civilian interaction in general, to understand terrorist behavior. Weinstein, Jeremy, *Inside Rebellion* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2007). This study focuses on understanding rebel behavior. Though his analysis does not particularly mention terrorists, the behavior as emulated by the rebels in his study is applicable to various terrorist groups' behavior, especially left wing extremists. For this reason, I include his analysis on rebel behavior and resource endowment in my discussion of terrorist-civilian interactions.

³ Fair, C. Christine, and Bryan Shepherd. "Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries," *Coastal Management* 29:1 (2006): 51-74; De Mesquita, Ethan Bueno, *Correlates of Public Support for Terrorism in the Muslim World*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007).

⁴ Tessler, Mark, and Michael DH Robbins, "What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51:2 (2007): 305-328. These authors investigate the anti-American sentiment in the Arab world, particularly Algeria and Jordan to understand whether religion and culture, or political and economic considerations are the determinants of support for terrorism following this anti-Americanism.

terrorist groups and civilian support have considered inter-group competition, economic resource maximization, active and passive coercion, and resource provision by the terrorist group.⁵ Bloom investigates why Palestinian public opinion increasingly supported radical Islamist organizations and their method of suicide bombings. One of the causes as identified by Bloom is inter-group competition.⁶ Her argument closely follows that of Kydd and Walter, who state that groups engaged in outbidding use violence to convince the public that terrorists have greater resolve than the other rivals do.⁷ The competition between Hamas and Fatah is a classic example of this behavior.

Other studies investigating the link between civilian support and terrorism point out that terrorist groups' ability to provide public goods increase public support for these groups.⁸ However, not all civilians receive equal incentives. As Weinstein points out, some civilians get favorable treatment, but others do not, mainly because of the existing resources.⁹ While these authors emphasize the role of competition and resources to discuss rebel-civilian and terrorist-civilian interactions, others show the importance of ideology and organizational structure. These variables are no doubt important. However, a crucial element that is missing is the discussion about support for terrorism the relevance of territory. Territorial access by terrorist groups, in addition to organizational strength, ideology, financial support, competition, or partnership with other groups, is an important element in determining how frequently terrorists interact with civilians. My key theoretical interest is in the combined effect of terrorist group's territorial control, ideology, ethnicity, political competitiveness, and target selection on civilian support. While previous studies have considered some of these categories, none has

⁵ Bloom, Mia, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," *Political Science Quarterly* 119:1 (2004): 61-88; Byman, Daniel, "Understanding Proto-Insurgencies," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 31:2 (2008): 165-200; Berman, Eli, and David D. Laitin, "Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model," *Journal of Public Economics* 92:10 (2008): 1942-1967; Lilja, Jannie, "Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds? Rebel Strategies to Attain Constituent Support in Sri Lanka," 306-326.

⁶ Bloom, Mia, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," 61-88.

⁷ Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," *International Organization* 56:2 (2002): 263-296.

⁸ Berman, Eli, and David D. Laitin. "Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model," 1942-1956; Berman, Eli, *Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical Religious Militias*. No. w10004. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003; Simon, Steven, and Jeff Martini. "Terrorism: Denying al Qaeda its Popular Support," *Washington Quarterly* 28:1 (2004): 129-145.

⁹ Weinstein, J. M., *Inside Rebellion* (Boston, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

emphasized the role of territory in determining levels of civilian support. This article addresses this gap and builds on the existing scholarship of civilian-terrorist interaction.

Territory can feature in two ways in terrorism—as a goal, and/or actual control of territory. Kydd and Walter identify territorial change as one of the important goals of terrorism.¹⁰ Territorial change means taking territory away from the state with the purpose of establishing a new state. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers fought mainly for separate Tamil territory. Another purpose of taking territory away from the state can include joining another state. Lashkar-e-Taiba is fighting for Kashmir region in India, to become a part of Pakistan.¹¹ Territorial control is not a straightforward concept, because sometimes terrorist groups deliberately do not seize territory to maintain their clandestine nature.¹² These terrorist organizations with no territorial control are classified as underground organizations.¹³ The Red Army Faction in Germany was fully clandestine and operated in cities only. Merrari uses the criterion of territorial control to distinguish between terrorism and guerilla warfare.¹⁴ However, many groups use terrorism and guerilla warfare interchangeably. These hybrid groups can and often does have access to territory, and it is worth exploring how access to territory can determine the levels of civilian support received by the terrorist group.¹⁵

Assessing levels of civilian support for terrorism is a timely and relevant topic. This is a challenging but relevant topic because as conflict progresses over time, people increasingly become dependent on rebels for their livelihoods, physical security, and this leads to their further cooperation with the rebels.¹⁶ For example, territorial control gave LTTE new opportunities to extract

¹⁰ Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” *International Security* 31:1 (2006): 49-80.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² De la Calle, Luis, and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “Rebels without a Territory An Analysis of Non-territorial Conflicts in the World, 1970–1997,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56:4 (2012): 580-603.

¹³ Della Porta, Donatella, “Recruitment processes in clandestine political organizations: Italian left-wing terrorism,” *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988): 155-69.

¹⁴ Merari, Ariel, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5:4 (1993): 213-251.

¹⁵ Since terrorists and insurgents share some common elements like method of violence used, motivation for using violence, this overlap is difficult to ignore. Most of the terrorist groups borrow heavily from insurgent tactics and vice-versa. In this paper, this point is taken into consideration to understand the terrorist group behavior.

¹⁶ Lilja, Jannie, “Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds?” 306-326.

constituent support.¹⁷ The comparison of civilian support for terrorist groups shows ‘how’ differently terrorist groups behave with the constituent population that they seek to represent. For instance, the degree of public support seems to have a strong influence on the strategic use of violence by groups.¹⁸ A full understanding of terrorism needs to look beyond counting incidents and consider its severity, differences in strategies, constraints, range of actions, organizational dynamics, and relevance of host populace and competition from other groups.¹⁹ Faria and Arce point out that strategic analyses of terrorism are broadly divided into two types—one studies the consequences of counter-terrorism policies, the other set of scholarship looks at rationality of decisions made by individual terrorists. Faria and Arce introduce the relevance of a third line of enquiry—recruitment of human resources for terrorist activity.²⁰ Comparing levels of civilian support can show how people are directly and indirectly associated with terrorist groups.

Analysis of civilian support is also pertinent for counter-terrorism. Various terrorist groups manipulate public opinion in many ways.²¹ Often the terrorists use violence in such a way as to provoke counter-terrorism responses that result in backlash against the government by constituent population.²² Public support thus becomes an important element for competing against the government. In Nepal, state responses to Maoist conflict were so repressive that national and international audiences criticized it. The Nepalese state violated human rights. This worked in favor of the Maoist group who gained considerable popular support following this. It is important for governments to assess the levels of support to plan specific responses, often combining military and non-military methods.

¹⁷ Ibid. The author mentions about territorial entrapment to explain how rebels treat civilian population over time. She explains that with acquisition of territory, LTTE territorially entrapped people by restricting movement of people to leave these areas. The LTTE did this to prevent information leaks and increase recruitment (p. 315)

¹⁸ Clauset, A., L. Heger, M. Young, and K. S. Gleditsch, “The Strategic Calculus of Terrorism: Substitution and Competition in the Israel-Palestine Conflict,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 45:1 (2010): 6-33.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Faria, J. R. and D. G. Arce, “Terror Support and Recruitment,” *Defence and Peace Economics* 16:4 (2005): 263-273; Pape, Robert A, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *American Political Science Review* 97:3 (2003): 343-361.

²¹ Bueno de Mesquita, E., “Correlates of Public Support for Terrorism in the Muslim World,” United States Institute of Peace, Working Paper, No.1. (2007).

²² Bueno de Mesquita, E. and E. S. Dickson, “The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization,” *American Journal of Political Science* 51:2 (2007): 364-381, and De Figueiredo, R. and B. R. Weingast, “Vicious Cycles; Endogenous Political Extremism and Political Violence,” *Institute of Governmental Studies Working Paper* 2001-9 (2001), University of California, Berkeley.

This article is organized as follows. In the first section, I discuss why terrorist group's access to territory along with other variables like terrorist group's political involvement, organizational strength, ties to other groups, target selection, and ethnic composition of the area they operate from are important for assessing levels of civilian support for terrorism. The second section discusses the concepts, data, and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as a method and how this study used QCA. The third section analyzes the empirical evidence and the concluding section mentions the key findings, the relevance of the combined effects of territory, ideology, and organization in determining the levels of civilian support and avenues for future research.

Terrorist-civilian Interaction: Determining levels of support for terrorism

This article proceeds from the premise that both terrorists and civilians are rational actors. However, rational behavior is usually influenced by socio-political and economic institutional arrangements underlying the societies where violence is taking place.²³ Therefore, it is important to analyze the socio-political resource environment in which the terrorist groups operate to learn how this environment can explain terrorist-civilian interaction and varying levels of civilian support for terrorist groups.

In terrorist-civilian interaction there are two sets of rational action—one from the point of view of the terrorist group and other from the point of view of civilian population. From the terrorist group's standpoint, the rational decision to include or exclude civilian support is dependent on a set pre-existing, dynamic and acquired conditions. Together, these conditions help build a resource environment for the terrorist groups. These conditions indirectly affect the civilian's decision making as well. Based on their perception of these conditions the civilians decide whether to support terrorist groups. These conditions are therefore bi-directionally perceived by a) directly by the terrorists and b) indirectly by the civilians. Since the terrorist group is the main actor, the above-mentioned conditions are directly relevant for their decision-making, and the civilians are secondary actors.²⁴ In this article, the focus is solely on terrorist-civilian interaction and deliberately exclude the discussion on state actors in assessing civilian support, because


²³ Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, Mogens K. Justesen, and Robert Klemmensen, "The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism," *Public Choice* 128:1-2 (2006): 289-315.

²⁴ Terrorists are the main actors because they are initiators of violence and threats. In many instances, if not all, terrorists act first, thereby beginning a chain of events.

type of state and actions of the state (repressive, negligent, tolerant) constitutes a different topic of discussion in relation to support for terrorism. What is important is how civilians perceive terrorist group irrespective of the role of the state, nature, and type of the state (democratic or authoritarian). In addition, in some cases, states are involved in providing some support for violence. By analyzing causal conditions like terrorist's ideological motivation, target selection, and political involvement, there is some indirect reference to state function.

While it is not possible to include all the aspects of the pre-existing, dynamic and acquired conditions that determine terrorist-civilian interaction, the following are relevant - terrorist group's ideological motivation; territorial access; target selection; political involvement; sub-group affiliation and the levels of ethnic fractionalization in the area of terrorist control. Scholars have studied one or more of these to learn about how terrorist groups survive, how lethal they are and their organizational strength. However, they are treated as individual categories and few studies have analyzed the combined effects of two or more of these conditions to analyze levels of civilian support. This article highlights how these categories create the pre-existing, dynamic, and acquired conditions that. Figure 1 explains the relevance of these conditions.

Figure 1. Resource environment of terrorist group - pre-existing, dynamic and acquired conditions



Source: Based on the theoretical discussion above, the author created this table.

Pre-existing conditions are those that are already present when the terrorist group begins to function, for instance ethnic composition of the area ideological motivation (this can be religious or nationalist ideology) and targets (national or international government/civilians). Dynamic conditions are those that change over time. These conditions can include terrorist group's political participation over the course of time; various terrorist groups began to operate as political parties and vice versa. Motivation and target selection can fall under this category if they change. Acquired conditions are those that the terrorist group gradually comes into possession, as is the number of affiliations the group has. While there can be overlap between the dynamic and acquired conditions, one distinction is that acquired conditions might not change over time. These three types of conditions build the resource environment for the terrorist group.

Territorial control, for instance, provides the terrorist groups with safe-haven or sanctuary where they can hide their weapons, train without being caught and maintain communications with local civilians to gain relevant information. Furthermore, this territorial control provides the terrorist group with power to exercise coercion with local population.²⁵ This location can be strategically used to maintain ties with other affiliate organizations. Sanctuaries are spaces safe from harassment and surveillance and it fosters oppositional culture and group solidarity.²⁶ It can work as spatial ‘preserves’ not necessarily in the geographical sense but as ‘free’ social spaces, where members of subordinate groups discover their common problems and discuss ways to overcome these. These spaces can be located within clubs, associations, even within families of nationalist militants.²⁷ To create these social spaces, the terrorist groups have access to certain locations, which later constitute part of the territorial control. These can be created nationally and internationally. My focus is on national or domestic territorial control and once territory is acquired formally or informally, it affects the functioning of the group and it will always vie for territorial control, thereby making it more of an acquired condition than dynamic.

Holding territory implies some measure of power and control over local residents.²⁸ To maintain this territory, the groups need social, political, and economic resources. Therefore, terrorist group’s domestic territorial control (national sanctuary) is a key determinant of the levels of civilian support that the group receives. ‘Where’ and ‘how’ terrorist groups operate has direct implication on how these groups are perceived by civilians. Territorial control gains further relevance when certain conditions are present or absent. It is important to discuss how it is associated with other preexisting, dynamic, and acquired conditions like ideological motivation, target selection, political

²⁵ Coercion is often a preferred tactic used by terrorists to gain information and some level of support. While it is an important element, it is not the only method used. In this paper, the theoretical focus is why we see civilian support for terrorist groups, and not how they are forced to support terrorism. It is one way of understanding support. By expanding the analysis of civilian support, this paper shows when there is support even in the absence of coercion.

²⁶ Fantasia, Rick, and Eric L. Hirsch, “Culture in rebellion: The appropriation and transformation of the veil in the Algerian revolution,” in eds. H. Johnston and B. Klandermans, *Social Movements and Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1995): 144-59; Haussler, Nicholas., I., J. Russel, and A. M. Baylouny, *Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraq Insurgency* (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, Thesis 2005).

²⁷ Johnston, Hank, *Tales of Nationalism: Catalonia, 1939-1979* (NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1991).

²⁸ De la Calle, Luis, and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “Rebels Without a Territory: An Analysis of Non-territorial Conflicts in the World, 1970–1997,” 580-603.

involvement, sub-group affiliation, and levels of ethnic fractionalization in the area of control, in determining levels of civilian support for terrorism.

Concepts, Data and Method

In this article, a terrorist group is defined as:

A group of non-state actors (sub-national/ clandestine) having national and/or transnational territorial base, but is not formally recognized as a legitimate wielder of the means of violence or threat of violence that they use strategically with a political purpose, directed against representatives of a formally recognized state actor in the international system (domestic or transnational) and/or civilians with the aim of influencing several audiences.²⁹

This definition of a terrorist group, offers both general and contextual understanding of the term. To do this, Gerring's method is used. The method has three components—the term, the phenomena to be defined and the properties or attributes that define it.³⁰ To define the term contextually, the attributes of terrorist group (following its definition) are included and the function of these attributes is further elaborated to determine how some of

²⁹ Definition of terrorism is drawn from existing scholarship, particularly, “Politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role,” in Weinberg, L., A. Pedahzur, and S. Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16:4 (2004): 777-794.

“Modern terrorism refers to a type of violent interaction initiated by a non-state actor which is not formally recognized as a legitimate wielder of the means of violence or a valid initiation of violent interactions directed against representatives (human, material or symbolic) of a formally recognized state actor in the international system which does not follow the institutionalized rules and convention of military engagement,” see Lizardo, O, “Defining and Theorizing Terrorism: A Global Actor-Centered Approach,” *Journal of World-Systems Research* 14 (2008): 91-118.

Another much used definition of terrorism put forth by American Law (Title 22 of the US Code, Section 265 f(d)) defines it as: “Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience...” And Goodwin (2006) defines it as “The strategic use of violence and threats of violence usually intended to influence several audiences by oppositional political groups against civilians or non-combatants who belong to specific ethnicity, religion or national group, social class or some other collectivity without regard to their individual identities or role.” See Goodwin, J., “A Theory of Categorical Terrorism,” *Social Forces* 84:4 (2006): 2027-2046.

³⁰ Gerring, John, *Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 39.

these are linked with civilian support³¹. Table 1 presents the general and specific attributes and the functions of these attributes. In particular, focus on the techniques, targets, actors, and goals to conceptualize the terrorist group.

Table 1. Attributes of a Terrorist Group and Functions of these Attributes

Concept	Attributes	Functions of the attributes	How functions are related
	Collective of people using violence (non-state actors)	Interaction between groups of people defined by violence and fear	The functions define how the terrorist group interacts with their audiences, especially civilians
Terrorist Group	Territorial or transnational base	Control over territory and sections of population	This interaction is governed by fear, punishment, common grievances, control and coercion
	Targets civilians and governments	Motives, goals and action	
	Not formally recognized as a legitimate wielder of the means of violence or threat of violence	Justification for the use of violence is absent	

Source: Table created by author.

This study analyzes fifteen terrorist groups in this study. The selected cases illustrate the outcome of interest positively, meaning that for these positive cases the outcome of interest (high civilian support) is occurring. For example, some of the cases (terrorist groups) show high levels of civilian support (outcome of interest), while other cases do not necessarily show the

³¹ Gerring, John, *Social Science Methodology*, 70. At the general level, as suggested by Gerring a definition is not concerned with empirical matters but rather looks at ‘formal’ criteria of the term. To determine the ‘formal’ criteria, I use three steps—sampling usages (existing definitions), typologizing attributes and construction of minimal and ideal typical definition. For details about definitions please see Weinberg et al (2004); Lizardo (2008); American Law (Title 22 of the US Code, Section 265 f(d)); Goodwin (2006).

occurrence of the outcome (i.e. they do not have high levels of civilian support and in this sense, they are negative cases). Together the set of positive and negative cases constitute the relevant set of cases for the analysis.

Furthermore, the fifteen groups included here are some of the most important terrorist groups because of their prolonged survival. In existing terrorism literature, there is an over emphasis on studying Islamic fundamentalist organizations. Therefore, in addition to Islamic fundamentalist organizations, I include left extremist groups, with a focus on Maoist groups, active in South Asia. Highlighting both right and left extremist groups provides detailed insights about how differences in ideological motivation affect civilian support for terrorist groups. Cases are selected from both developing and developed regions and different political regimes to include regional diversity.

The outcome variable is civilian support. This constitutes an important aspect of strategic communication and can function at two levels—ideological or attitudinal (passive) and/or behavioral (direct or active). The focus here is on ideological support. Behavioral and attitudinal support is difficult to demarcate. Lilja points out that both attitudinal and behavioral support are necessary for the rebel groups to succeed militarily.³² Lilja uses the term behavioral support as an ‘act’ of providing support.³³ This can range from passive to neutral co-operation or silence, offering food, shelter, finances, and information to active provision of armed and non-armed services. In existing terrorism literature, there is no concrete definition of civilian support. Khalil, Paul, and Lilja distinguish between attitudinal and behavioral support to identify the function of support.³⁴ Table 2 elaborates this distinction.

³² Lilja, Jannie. “Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds?” 306-328.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Khalil, James. “Insurgent–Populace Relations in Nepal: An Analysis of Attitudinal and Behavioural Support,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23:2 (2012): 221-244; Paul, Christopher, “How Do Terrorists Generate and Maintain Support?” *Social Science for Counterterrorism* 74:6-C (2009): 113; see also: Lilja, Jannie, “Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds?” 306-328.

Table 2. Common Elements in Conceptualizing Support for Terrorism

Paul 2009, Lilja 2009 and Khalil (2012)- conceptualizing support for terrorism and armed groups	Related actions
1. Finances	↘ 'act' of supporting
2. Shelter, information/ safe house, armed forces	↗
3. Passive consent, not reporting events, passive neutral co-operation, non-armed services	Expressed support, sympathizing for the cause, not protesting or preventing it.

Source: Paul (2009), Lilja (2009), and Khalil (2012).

Passive consent is often a precursor to active support later. Active support for terrorism is often difficult to measure accurately. Although passive consent is also a challenging concept, public opinion surveys have tried to capture the attitudinal support for terrorism making it possible to measure, in some way, the levels, and causes of this type of support. Following the discussion on attitudinal and behavioral support, this article identifies common elements of conceptualizing civilian support as:

Attitudinal and co-operative support by a section of the constituent population that is represented by the terrorist group, located in the terrorist group's home country, where the terrorist group has some territorial control or base.

Collating civilian support data for terrorism is challenging because few surveys are done to measure attitudinal support and it is difficult to conduct these surveys because of accessibility of data due to sensitivity of the topic. For this article, macro-level data, collected from existing public opinion surveys is combined with micro-level data collected through field research and archival document analysis.³⁵ Appendix i.

³⁵ The author used the following public opinion surveys—World Public Opinion Poll (2006), Times of India Poll (2010), Himal Media Public Opinion Poll (2003), Euskobarometer—Universidad del Pais Vaseo (2009), Gallup Poll (1998-2001), Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research—Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No.

lists the data sources and levels of civilian support for the fifteen terrorist groups under study here.

The data indicates that civilian support for the fifteen groups ranges from 2 percent to 60 percent. What is challenging about measuring ideological support for terrorist groups is determining the correct quantitative value to estimate high or low levels. Even if a group has 5 percent, popular support it is substantial for terrorist groups. What might represent a lower value, for instance 15 percent can actually be a high level of support for terrorist groups. For estimating low levels of civilian support, a low percentage level—2 percent to 15 percent is assigned to determine groups having low levels of civilian support. Groups that have 60 percent to 15 percent civilian support are considered as having high levels of civilian support.

There are six causal conditions under study.³⁶ The focus is to understand combination of conditions, thereby highlighting causal complexity. Territorial control depicts the regional area controlled by terrorist groups in their home country where they have active base (country of origin and where they conduct operation).³⁷ The second causal condition is target selection, which is classified into four categories— a) purely national, b) mostly national with limited international targets, c) mostly international with limited national target and d) purely international. The third causal condition is ideological motivation. Based on data from Global Terrorism Database (GTD), groups are classified based on a) having purely religious motivation, b) predominantly religious in conjunction with nationalist separatist motivation, c) predominantly nationalist/separatist with low religious motivation and d) purely nationalist/separatist motivation or purely non-religious motivation. The fourth causal condition is ethnic fractionalization. To analyze this condition, Fearon's data is used to measure the level of ethnic composition in

46 (2012), Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2009-2010, 2012, SETA and Pollmark (2009), Public Opinion Poll, Lima 1991, and Harmon 1992. From each of the public opinion surveys, the author identified key questions that directly focus on measuring support for the respective terrorist group. Since the research relied on multiple data sources, the author identified common key questions in these surveys (mentioned in Appendix ii.). These questions contain direct and indirect inquiries about the particular group and/or its main leader, and the methods used by these groups. Several of these questions look at measuring public attitudes about the violence used by particular organizations.

³⁶ In qualitative comparative analysis, the independent variable is known as a causal condition. The dependent variable is known as an outcome variable.

³⁷ Territorial control does not always mean creating autonomous zones. It can be areas regularly frequented by terrorist groups, where they have informal bases with training camps. Within a particular region, there can be multiple locations of this sort.

the terrorist home country from where they gain civilian support.³⁸ The number of sub-groups related to the terrorist groups measures the fifth causal condition, sub-group affiliation. To determine the number of allies, the GTD database is used. The sixth and final causal condition is political involvement. By this, I mean levels of active engagement by terrorist groups in electoral politics and/or levels of affiliation with political parties that contest for elections. To measure this, I rely on existing empirical studies on terrorist group profiles by Weinberg et al.³⁹ Following this data, groups are classified as a) actively participates in electoral politics, b) not active in electoral politics but has support from other political party c) not active in electoral politics but has marginal support from other political party, and d) not active in electoral politics and no support from political parties. Appendices ii and iii, present the causal conditions is details.

Fuzzy set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) is suitable for this analysis because it is relevant to assess the complex and conjunctural (conditions are sufficient in combination) nature of the study. Furthermore, due to this connection between causality and complexity, QCA is naturally suited for cross-case diversity meaning that cases with similar levels of civilian support might not have the same causal mechanisms that generate it. Each causal path, no matter how many cases this path represents is relevant and potentially meaningful.⁴⁰ What is most interesting about QCA is that it allows the researcher to have high level of familiarity with the data. QCA is an interactive and creative process.⁴¹ It allows for combining qualitative and quantitative data. The method of fs/QCA has several stages and is indeed labor intensive. However, it describes and analyzes data in a systematic format. At the same time, it does allow the researcher intuitive freedom to construct knowledge about each case. Additionally, it offers the researcher an ability to work with relatively smaller number of cases in comparison to purely large-N studies where number of cases must meet a minimum

³⁸ Fearon, James D. "Ethnic and cultural diversity by country," *Journal of Economic Growth* 8:2 (2003): 195-222.

³⁹ Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur, and Arie Perliger, *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups*, Vol. 10. (New York, Routledge, 2008).

⁴⁰ Rihoux, Benoît, and Bojana Lobe, "The case for qualitative comparative analysis (QCA): Adding leverage for thick cross-case comparison," *The Sage handbook of case-based methods* (2009): 222-242.

⁴¹ Rihoux, Benoît, "Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related systematic comparative methods recent advances and remaining challenges for social science research," *International Sociology* 21:5 (2006): 679-706.

threshold. QCA can be applied to research designs involving small and intermediate size Ns (5-50).⁴²

Measuring Causal conditions: Fuzzy Membership Values

To analyze the data using fs/QCA the next step is to calibrate the fuzzy membership scores of the six causal conditions. Based on the data as presented in the appendices, both direct and indirect method of calibration is used to assign fuzzy membership scores of these causal conditions for each case. A range of data (both qualitative and quantitative measures) is included. The calibration of the data was done using the fs/QCA software, using the command ‘compute’, followed by the function calibrate and identifying the variable and the three anchor points for each variable (outcome variable and causal conditions). Table 3 and 4 shows the process by which the initial values are determined.

Table 3. Assigning Fuzzy Membership Scores to the Outcome Variable: Civilian Support

Outcome variable	Percentage	Membership	Anchor points
Civilian support	0%	Fully out	0
	15%	Threshold of inclusion/exclusion	0.5
	60%	Fully in	1

Table 4. Causal Conditions and Fuzzy Membership Scores

Causal Conditions (VARIABLE NAME)	Indicators	membership
Target selection (NATIONALTAR)	90 percent events in home country	Fully in
	45 percent events in home country	Threshold of exclusion
	20 percent events in home country	Fully out
Ethnic fractionalization (ETHFRAC)	Ethnic fractionalization score 0.811	Fully in
	Ethnic fractionalization score 0.300	Threshold of exclusion
	Ethnic fractionalization score 0.161	Fully out

⁴² Recent research shows that QCA is increasingly being used to study 100-1000 cases. The method can be applied to a vast range of cases. Fiss, Peer C., “Case studies and the configurational analysis of organizational phenomena,” *Handbook of case study methods* (2009): 424-440.

Causal Conditions (VARIABLE NAME)	Indicators	membership	
Organizational Affiliates (AFFILIATES)	Link with 36 groups Link with 5 groups Link with 0 groups	Fully in Threshold of exclusion Fully out	
Ideology (RELIDEOLOGY)	Purely religious Mostly religious with nationalist/separatist Less religious and mostly nationalist/separatist Purely non-religious	4 3 2 1	4=fully in 2.5= threshold 1=fully out
Territorial control (TERCONTROL)	Based only in home country Mostly based in home country, limited presence outside Loosely based in home country, considerable presence abroad No presence in home country, only located abroad	4 3 2 1	4=fully in 2.5= threshold 1=fully out
Political involvement (POLINVOLVE)	Actively participates in electoral politics Not active in electoral politics but has support from other political party Not active in electoral but has marginal support from other political party Not active in electoral politics and no support from party	4 3 2 1	4=fully in 2.5= threshold 1=fully out

Source: Created by author

It further mentions the variable names for the six causal conditions. The values for these corresponding anchor points are mentioned in Table 5. The numerical values linked to three qualitative anchor points represent the criteria for inclusion or exclusion in a set (fully in, threshold of exclusion/inclusion, fully out). Following this, it generates a membership value based on a continuous scale ranging from 0.95 to 0.05.

Table 5. Fuzzy Membership Scores for the Outcome Variable and Causal Conditions

GROU PNAM E	CIV_ SUPP	AFFI LIAT ES	ETH FRAC	NAT_ TA R GET	REL_ IDE OLOGY	TER_ CO N TROL	POL INVOLV E
ABUSAYAAF	0.12	0.50	0.05	0.95	0.27	0.95	0.05
ALQAEDA	0.14	0.95	0.93	0.19	0.95	0.27	0.05
CPIMAO	0.95	0.62	0.95	0.95	0.05	0.95	0.27
CPNMAO	0.60	0.52	0.90	0.95	0.05	0.95	0.95
ETA	0.40	0.35	0.77	0.94	0.05	0.73	0.73
FARC	0.07	0.52	0.89	0.95	0.05	0.95	0.73
GIA	0.12	0.50	0.53	0.94	0.95	0.73	0.05
HAMAS	0.95	0.62	0.79	0.55	0.27	0.95	0.95
HEZBOL	0.92	0.57	0.94	0.81	0.73	0.73	0.95
IRA	0.83	0.52	0.06	0.90	0.05	0.73	0.73
LTTE	0.68	0.23	0.68	0.95	0.05	0.95	0.27
LASHKART	0.61	0.60	0.80	0.05	0.73	0.73	0.05
PKK	0.55	0.66	0.49	0.89	0.05	0.73	0.27
SHNPATH	0.31	0.14	0.88	0.95	0.05	0.95	0.05
TALIBAN	0.20	0.35	0.93	0.84	0.95	0.73	0.73

Source: Created by author

Empirical Results: Analysis of the Sufficient Conditions

To determine the sufficient conditions for high civilian support for terrorist groups, truth-table algorithm is used. This truth table lists all possible combinations and each configuration's empirical outcome.⁴³ The algorithm reveals combinations of causal conditions that are sufficient to explain the outcome. The meaningful patterns of necessity and sufficiency as generated by fs/QCA are based on the idea of subset relations between the combination of causal conditions and the outcome.⁴⁴ The assessment of sufficient conditions involves examining the membership of all the terrorist groups in the set of those who have high levels of civilian support, with their membership in the sets of causal conditions, and this membership in the condition is greater than or equal to membership in the set of high civilian support. The proportion of cases for which this relationship holds true is known as 'consistency' and the 'coverage' score shows how many instances show this relationship.

This analysis uses the complex solution to locate these combinations. In set-theoretical logic, logical AND (*) refers to the intersection of sets and logical

⁴³ Ragin, Charles C. *Redesigning social inquiry: Fuzzy sets and beyond*, Vol. 240. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

⁴⁴ Schneider, Carsten Q., and Claudius Wagemann, "Standards of good practice in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets," *Comparative Sociology* 9:3 (2010): 397-418.

OR (+) to the union of sets. In addition, the symbol ~, indicates the absence of a condition or NOT. The strongest membership of each case in any combination with a value of 1.00 is considered an ‘ideal’ case followed by consistency of 0.9 and 0.8. For my analysis, I look at cases that are marked by a consistency score of .85 and higher. Table 5 shows the consistency and coverage scores of the configurations.

The first set of conditions in Table 6 shows that when a group has high number of affiliates or connections with other similar organizations in conjunction with territorial control and high levels of ethnic fragmentation, but not active political participation and international target (not national target), then it is sufficient for high levels of civilian support. The consistency for this combination is 0.92 but the coverage is low 0.20. The group that represents this combination is Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). However, what is important here is the fact that the number of affiliates in addition to ethnic fragmentation and territorial control matters when the group’s ideology is more religious and partially leans towards nationalist/separatist. In addition, it matters when the group is not actively involved in local politics, and when the target is international. The predominant motive for LeT is securing Kashmir (now Indian Territory) to make it be part of Pakistan. The underlying motive is religious but their demand is territorial. Predominantly, the group wants to liberate the Islamic population residing in the Indian territory of Kashmir.

Table 6. Sufficient Conditions for High Civilian Support for Terrorist Groups

Analysis of sufficient conditions for high civilian support for terrorist groups			
	High civilian support for terrorist groups		Example groups
	Consistency	Coverage	
Affiliates AND Ethnic fragmentation AND ~National target AND ~Political involvement AND Religious ideology AND Territorial control	0.92 _x	0.20	Lashkar –e -Toiba (LeT)
Affiliates AND Ethnic fragmentation AND National target AND Territorial control AND	0.84 _y	0.44	CPN(M), Hezbollah, Hamas

Political involvement			
Affiliates AND National Target AND ~ Religious ideology AND Territorial control AND Political involvement	0.88 _x	0.44	CPI(Maoist), IRA and Hamas
Ethnic fragmentation AND National target AND ~ Religious ideology AND Territorial control AND Affiliates	0.88 _x	0.47	CPI(M), Hamas and CPN(M)
Total solution	0.87	0.68	

Notes:

~ indicates the inverse of a condition (1 -membership score).

Meets 0.70 consistency benchmark for usually sufficient combination. Meets .85 consistency benchmark for almost always sufficient condition.

Source: Created by author.

The second set of conditions show that when the number of affiliates, ethnic fragmentation, territorial control, and national target selection along with active political participation combine then it is sufficient for high levels of civilian support. The consistency for this set is 0.84 and the coverage is 0.44. A consistency score of more than .70 is usually sufficient. This combination also reveals that ideology is not important when these conditions are present. The group's ideology can be purely religious, purely nationalist, or purely political. What matters instead is the group's active participation in local politics or active support from political groups. This element combines with the other factors to determine high levels of civilian support.

The third set indicates a combination of the following causal conditions-- number of affiliates, national target, territorial control and political competition and not purely religious ideology. However, this set is like the previous set of conditions there are some important differences. Here, ideology matters when it is predominantly nationalist/separatist rather than only religious. In addition, ethnic fragmentation is absent from this set. This shift is due mainly to the fact that the group's ideology is more nationalist or political. This is important in assessing group relation to ethnic composition of the region that they are representing. The consistency for this set is 0.88 and the coverage is 0.44. The cases that fall under this set are CPN(M), IRA, and Hamas. Political participation and territorial control in addition to group affiliations remains a strong indicator in this set.

The fourth set of conditions show that ethnic fragmentation and national target selection, in addition to territorial control, political competition, and nationalist/separatist ideology can lead to higher levels of civilian support for terrorist groups. It is important to note that nationalistic goals are more relevant along with the other factors to determine whether a group will have high levels of civilian support. In this set, the number of affiliates does not matter. The consistency score for this set is 0.88 and the coverage is .47. The groups that fall under this set are CPI(M), Hamas, and CPN(M).

The four sets of combination of causal conditions consistently show that territorial control and number of affiliates is usually sufficient conditions that may lead to high civilian support. What stands out, however, is the fact the certain conditions matter only in the presence or absence of other condition/s. Political involvement matters only when ideological motivation is nationalist and or political. ETA in the Basque region can fall under this category. Furthermore, this finding can be applied to analyze left extremist terrorist organizations, some of which later transforms into legitimate political parties; CPN(M) in Nepal is an example. Religious ideology matters most in determining higher levels of civilian support when ethnic polarization is high. This can be applied to analyze the Islamic State (IS) since they operate in areas where the polarization between Shia and Sunni is high. Nationalist ideology matters more when the group is vying for political involvement. Additionally, political competition and national target selection in combination with other factors plays an important role in determining the levels of civilian support for particular terrorist groups.

The role of territorial control is significant. It indicates that terrorist groups are keen to control significant geographical areas to construct a secure base. Once they do have a base, they begin to interact with civilian population frequently. To maintain the base, the groups also need civilian support. This becomes further relevant when the groups are active in local or national politics, or have active support from political groups. The case of the Maoist group in Nepal is an appropriate example. The Communist Party of Nepal, CPN(M) actively participated in the electoral politics. Immediately after the abolishment of monarchy and the ceasefire in 2006, the CPN(M) won the elections. This shows that they had active attitudinal support from the population. Moreover, this group had and still has significant territorial control and a clear aim of targeting the domestic government. The assessment of necessary conditions further emphasizes which conditions explain the occurrence of high civilian support.

Empirical Results: Analysis of the Necessary Conditions

Table 7 presents the analysis of the necessary conditions for high levels of civilian support for terrorist groups. This analysis reveals four usually necessary conditions that can lead to high levels of civilian support for particular terrorist groups. Three of these conditions—high ethnic fragmentation, nationalist/separatist ideology and national target selection are a priori conditions. The causal condition, territorial control is an acquired condition. These conditions exceed the .85 benchmark for usually necessary condition. The analysis of necessary conditions reveals that the following conditions—territorial control, national target, not (~) religious ideology and ethnic fragmentation are both necessary and sufficient conditions for determining high levels of civilian support.

Table 7. Necessary Conditions for Civilian Support for Terrorist Groups

Analysis of necessary conditions for high civilian support for terrorist groups				
	High civilian support		~ High civilian support	
	Consistency	Coverage	Consistency	Coverage
Territorial control	0.96 _x	0.59	0.89 _x	0.56
~Territorial control	0.28	0.72	0.35	0.90
Political involvement	0.66	0.72	0.47	0.52
~Political involvement	0.56	0.51	0.74 _y	0.69
Affiliates	0.72 _y	0.70	0.66	0.65
~Affiliates	0.64	0.65	0.69	0.71
Ethnic fragmentation	0.85 _x	0.60	0.82 _y	0.58
~Ethnic fragmentation	0.35	0.69	0.44	0.75
Religious ideology	0.34	0.49	0.49	0.71
~Religious ideology	0.79 _y	0.60	0.64	0.50
National target	0.85 _x	0.54	0.86 _x	0.55
~National target	0.29	0.68	0.28	0.66

Notes:

~ indicates the inverse of a condition (1-membership score)

_x Meets 0.70 consistency benchmark for usually necessary condition

_y Meets .85 consistency benchmark for almost always necessary condition

Source: Created by author.

However, as presented in the right-hand column, two of these conditions—territorial control and national target—are also related to the absence of civilian support. Although this is paradoxical, this is largely due to the coding technique used here. These causal conditions do not have a value of zero and it is difficult to mark the presence or absence of these conditions by the score of zero. All the cases have some levels of territorial control and the number of events that occur nationally. Alternatively, the particularly interesting evidence that is emphasized here is that these conditions by themselves or singularly cannot explain the presence of high levels of civilian support. The conditions must combine in order to create the recipe for high levels of civilian support for particular terrorist organizations. As shown in the analysis of sufficient conditions, the most outstanding feature of the combinations is the presence of high territorial control in home country along with other conditions, particularly important being political competition and nationalist/separatist ideology.

The two other causal conditions that are related to low civilian support are no political competition and when the groups have less number of affiliates or none at all. When terrorist groups are not active in electoral politics and are not part of any political organization, the likelihood of receiving popular support decreases. Part of this explanation is related to the fact that without political support, terrorist groups lose much of their constructed legitimacy. This directly influences people's perception of these groups. Again, these groups for propagation as well as communication with civilians often use a political platform. The second factor is absence of affiliates. The conclusion that follows automatically from this is that the more affiliates that a terrorist group has, the more likely it is that these groups are communicating with more people. The possibility of reaching out to more people increases. All these findings are relevant for counterterrorism.

The finding about political competition is highly relevant in analyzing the present transformation of FARC in Colombia. This left extremist group is undergoing a major shift in organizational structure, at present. FARC has a long history with phases where they operated as purely terrorist organization, narco-terrorist organization, and now, vying for legitimate political actor. This changing nature of operation influenced the levels of civilian support, which was high initially, but was low when narco-terrorism was their preferred mode of operation. In 2016, civilian support has changed yet again. In a recent referendum regarding the Colombian Peace deal between the government and the FARC, Colombians did reject the peace deal. However, the margin was narrow. Forty-nine point eight percent of the voters were in

favor of the peace deal, indirectly implying that they support FARC in their quest for legitimate political power. This is a significant change in levels of civilian support considering that it was low during ARC's narco-terrorism phase. Political involvement, in this case, matters in determining levels of civilian support for organizations like FARC.

Conclusion

The analysis in this article reveals key necessary and sufficient conditions that combine to explain why and how some terrorist groups have high civilian support while others do not. A variety of socio-political and geographical conditions combines to explain the context in which terrorist groups gain popular support. That some terrorist groups can gain high levels civilian support certain conditions combine is important for several reasons. First, it shows how terrorist groups despite their frequent use of violence, continue to proliferate and survive. Second, it shows key patterns of terrorist-civilian interactions. If terrorist organizations with a strong commitment to nationalist or political agenda hold territory and are well networked, the groups are more probable to attract civilian support. Civilians regularly assess the terrorist group's commitment to the cause. Whether they ideologically support the group or not depends on this perception. Third, the findings indicate that contrary to popular belief that most people despise terrorism, there is considerable civilian support for it. This article looks at passive ideological support, which is often a precursor to active support. Fourth, it emphasizes the complexity of terrorism. Most studies analyze specific terrorist groups, types, and organizational mechanism or include event analysis. This study analyzes a different layer of indirect engagement, thereby urging counter-terrorism to look beyond military response. Fifth, it opens avenues for future research on the topic of support for terrorism.

Possible areas of study include—analysis of levels of support for left extremist groups versus right extremist groups; distinction between rural and urban support base for terrorism and detailed analysis of types of violence used by terrorist organization and how it affects the levels of popular support. This study highlights six causal conditions. However, this list is not exclusive. Other possible conditions that can be relevant are state repression and types of violence used by terrorist groups. Furthermore, this analysis does not address the question of temporal variation in determining civilian support. For many terrorist groups, civilian support changes over time. While at the inception, a terrorist group can begin with high or low civilian support; this

can gradually change due to various factors. This might be another avenue of future research.

The combination of conditions further reveal that those terrorist groups having active links with local/national politics with substantial control over territory will have different interactions with civilians than those that have territorial control but no active role in local politics. Along with this condition the demography of terrorist home country, particularly ethnic composition combine to explain that ethnic homogeneity does not always lead to higher levels of civilian support. The other key conditions are choice of target and events. If the enemy is usually, the national government with substantial events happening in home country then the other conditions like political competition, territory, and mainly nationalist/separatist ideology becomes highly relevant to explain the levels of civilian support. Another significant factor that is further revealed by the analysis is that nationalist/separatist ideology and not purely religious ideology is tied to higher civilian support. These findings have direct consequences for counter-terrorism.

The existing public opinion surveys imply that only some of the major terrorist groups and their home countries have been included in these surveys. However, what is needed is a more comprehensive approach to locate and measure popular support for terrorist groups. This in itself should be part of the counter terrorism process. As the passive support from civilians in the terrorist home country is directly linked to the group's survival and regular resource extraction, it is important to analyze how and in what capacity the civilians can be deterred from supporting these groups. If the terrorist groups relate the support to systematic punishment or provision of incentives then information should be culled from the people with specific details about the methods used by the terrorist groups. Often there is high public grievance against the state and existing government policies. In these cases, the national government must understand which areas of socio-economic and political development needs attention. These governments should also work extensively to decrease the lure of terrorist groups. The process of gauging civilian's perception of terrorist group is the necessary first step in assessing the popularity of the group. This can be followed by elaborate programs to intercept the groups or their affiliates. Present counter terrorism policies include extensive military methods to repress terrorist groups. However, in areas where terrorists are in regular contact with the civilians, non-military methods should be introduced to make the appeal for terrorism less attractive. The first step of this non-military method should include an assessment of public attitudes towards the terrorist group.

Counter-terrorism policies are often designed based on the assumption that all terrorist groups operate using the same strategies. Comparing civilian support for terrorist groups reveals that terrorist-civilian interactions vary. This finding is especially relevant for counter-terrorism. Anti-terrorist policies are usually equated with deterrence. Governments all over the world have used strict anti-terrorism laws, repressive military measures, curtailing political, and human rights. These sorts of responses have largely ignored other possibilities, especially non-military methods to curb terrorism. For terrorist groups with high civilian support, non-military methods are essential. Using non-military methods will have a two-fold benefit. First, civilians will refrain from immediately criticizing government response. It might strategically help the government to reach out to the population. Second, it will end the cycle of violence by introducing peaceful ways of resolving conflict.

High civilian support means that terrorist groups are deeply entrenched in the society. Additionally, my findings show that these groups have territorial control in the home country, are often active in electoral politics, are motivated by nationalist/separatist ideology, and usually have several affiliates. Since these groups are intrinsically linked with the socio-political scene, some non-military methods are possible options. These methods can be applied at two levels—one designed for civilians and the other for the terrorist groups. High civilian support for particular terrorist groups challenges the conventional military response to terrorism. The complex interactions between terrorist and civilians require programs that undermine the effectiveness or attractiveness of the terrorist groups. For example, to undermine the Red Brigades, a vigorous public education program in concert with an effective amnesty program (the pentiti program) was crucial in reducing public support for the Red Brigades.⁴⁵ Atran suggests another line of defense that suggests appealing to Muslim communities to stop supporting religious schools and charities that fund terrorist networks.⁴⁶ Frey and Luechinger suggest that positive incentives to abstain from violence are constructive and a way that introduces non-violent alternative to address terrorist's political agendas. These authors further suggest increasing incomes

⁴⁵ Post, J. M., "When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism," *Political Psychology* 26:4 (2005): 615-636.

⁴⁶ Atran, S., "Mishandling Suicide Terrorism," *Washington Quarterly* 27:3 (2004): 65-90. The education program framed the terrorists as murderers rather than cultural heroes. The terrorists were also seen as damaging the economy and hurting the entire society.

in peaceful occupations.⁴⁷ Furthermore, since terrorist groups with territorial control have considerable access to constituent population, programs should be implemented to deprive terrorist outfits of territory that they use as safe havens.

Methodologically, this analysis emphasizes the significance of the interactions between pre-existing/a priori conditions and acquired conditions, which constitutes the environment where the terrorist groups originate and continue their activities. Subsequently these interactions are responsible for high civilian support for these groups. In contrast to existing studies on terrorism and popular support that mentions the importance of resource provision, this study indicates another component, that is, resource extraction in the form of ideological support from the constituency. This reiterates the fact that terrorist groups are not altruistic but predatory in nature. In fact, resource provision can be a necessary precondition for future resource extraction. The pre-existing and acquired conditions of the terrorist groups create a resource environment. The groups carefully assess this environment to include or exclude civilian support. When terrorist groups have clear aim of controlling territory it automatically leads them to interact with civilians. As this study shows, territorial control by terrorist groups in addition to their motives, targets, political aims, and networks with other organizations affects the levels of civilian support received by them. Therefore, it is important to delve deeper into the territorial bases of terrorism to see how ordinary civilians are impacted. My findings ultimately address the complicated issues present when intervening in communities where active terrorist groups are interacting regularly with civilian population.

⁴⁷ Frey, B. S., and S. Luechinger, "Three Strategies to Deal with Terrorism," *Economic Papers: A Journal of Applied Economics and Policy* 27:2 (2008): 107-114.

Appendix i. Public Opinion Surveys for Terrorist Groups: Recording Popular Support for Terrorist Groups

Groups	Source	Question	Support for the Group
Al Qa'eda	World Public Opinion Poll 2006 (Sample:2,089 Afghan Adults)	View of Al'Qaeda's influence in the world	Positive 6% Negative 81%
		View of Osama Bin Laden	Positive 5% Negative 90%
Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG)	Lexis Nexis	Not Applicable	Less than 5%
CPI(M)	Times of India Poll 2010 (521 Adults in central India)	Whether the Maoists were good or bad for the region?	60% - good
CPN(M)	Himal Media Public Opinion Poll 2003 (1,667 respondents)	If the Maoists laid down their arms and took part in elections today who would you vote for?	21% (for Maoists)
ETA	Euskobarometer – Universidad del PaisVaseo 2009 (1200 respondents)	Question related to ETA- exact words of the question no known	13% identified as former ETA sympathizers 10% agreed with ETAs end 3% justified support for ETA with criticism (Total support: 13%)
FARC	Gallup Poll – Fuerzas Militares de cara al Siglo XXI (1998-2001)	Exact question not known	2% viewed the ELN and FARC favorably
GIA	Information on Armed Islamic Group – www.aph.gov.au	Report – The GIA lost significant portion of its membership following defections to the GPSC and has only 30-100 active members	Less than 5%

 Hamas	Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research- Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (46) 2012 (Sample: 1270 Adults)	Given the outcome of the war between Hamas/other resistance groups and Israel, in your view whose way is the best to end the Israel's occupation and build a Palestinian state: Hamas' way or Abbas's?	Certainly Hamas – 33% Hamas – 26% (Total: 59%)
 Hezbollah	Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2009-10 (Sample: 1000 Muslim Adults)	Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Hezbollah?	31 % favorable 10% somewhat favorable 52%

Appendix 1. continued.

Groups	Source	Question	Support for the Group
IRA	Hewitt (1990) and Water and Fish 1981	Percentage holding positive image of IRA in Northern Ireland (exact question not known)	39%
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)	Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2012 (1,206 Adults)	Please tell me if you have very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Lashkar-e-Toiba	Very favorable + favorable = 22%
LTTE	Mia Bloom (2004) Interview conducted in 2002	Has the LTTE gained more now by using negotiations versus violence?	No: 26%
PKK	SETA and Pollmark (2009) (10,577 respondents in 601 urban and rural areas)	In your opinion, which of the below will be the most effective in the process of settlement of the Kurdish question?	Both Turks and Kurds PKK 7.4% Among Kurds PKK 18.8%

		do you think, PKK's giving up of arms and participation of its members in civil life would settle the Kurdish question?	Both Turks and Kurds 51.1% NO Among Kurds No 50%
		Do you think the neutralization of the PKK by the Turkish Military Forces would resolve the Kurdish question?	Both Turks and Kurds 55.6% NO Among Kurds No 75.3 %
Shining Path	Public Opinion Poll, Lima 1991 in Harmon 1992	People were asked about their reaction to a terrorist attack in connection to Shining Path? Support for Abimael Guzman?	11% said they would understand it. 17% within lower economic group
Taliban	World Public Opinion Poll 2006, Afghanistan (Sample: 2089 Adults)	If your opinion of Taliban is very favorable, favorable, unfavorable or very unfavorable?	8%

Table created by author based on the information provided in the table.

Appendix ii. Location of Events, Target Selection and Ideology of the Terrorist Groups

Group	Years	No. of incidents	National: in home country	Outside home country	Target	Ideology
Abu Sayyaf	1994-2011	209	Philippines (100%)	--	National	Nationalist/Separatist +religious
Al Q'aeda	1991-2011	79	Afghanistan (38%)	Multiple locations (62%)	International	Religious
CPI(M)	2005-2011	1418	India (100%)	--	National	Communist/Socialist
CPN(M)	1996-2008	23	Nepal (100%)	--	National	Communist/Socialist

ETA	1970-2011	2027	Spain (97%)	Multiple locations (3%)	Mostly national	Communist Socialist/Nationalist separatist
FARC	1975-2011	2060	Colombia (99%)	Other 1%	National	Communist Socialist
GIA	1994-2006	239	Algeria (96%)	Multiple locations (4%)	Mostly national	Religious
Hamas	1988-2009	297	West Bank and Gaza strip (58%)	Israel (41%)	International	Nationalist Separatist/religious
Hezbollah	1982-2009	368	Lebanon (77%)	Multiple locations (33%)	Mostly national	Nationalist Separatist/religious
IRA	1970-2011	2673	Northern Ireland (88%)	Great Britain and others (22%)	international + national	Nationalist Separatist
LTTE	1979-2010	1607	Sri Lanka (99%)		national	Nationalist Separatist
LeT	1999-2011	118	India	India and others (1%)	International	Nationalist Separatist +religious
PKK	1984-2011	1226	Turkey (86%)	Multiple (14%)	Mostly national	Communist Socialist/ Nationalist separatist
Shining Path	1979-2009	4519	Peru (99%)	Other (1%)	National	Communist Socialist
Taliban	1995-2011	2045	Afghanistan (80%)	Pakistan (20%)	Mostly national	Religious

Source: Global Terrorism Database, GTD, Terrorist Organization Profiles and TOPs and National Counterterrorism Center, Fearon (2003) database on ethnic fractionalization, Weinberg and Pedahzur (2004)

Appendix iii.

	Territory in home country	Political competition	Ethnic fractionalization in home country	No. of Affiliates
Abu Sayyaf	Active in Mindanao, Sulu Island and Basilan – major presence	Not active in electoral politics	.161	5
Al Q'aeda	Limited presence is Afghanistan-	Not active in electoral politics	.751	36

	spread across North Africa, Pakistan, Middle East, Southeast Asia			
CPI(M)	Major presence in India	Not active in electoral politics but some support from certain political parties	.811	10
CPN(M)	Major presence in Nepal	Very active in electoral politics	.677	6
ETA	Primarily in Basque autonomous regions in Northern Spain and southwestern France	Active link with political party Herri Batasuna	.502	4
FARC	Major presence in Colombia	Not active in electoral politics but links with Colombian Communist Party	.656	6
GIA	Mostly based in Algeria with limited presence outside	Not active in electoral politics	.32	5
Hamas	Major presence in West Bank and Gaza Strip	Very active in electoral politics	.526	10

Hezbollah	Major presence in Lebanon, southern part of Beirut, Bekka valley, some presence in Europe, Africa and South America	Very active in electoral politics	.78	8
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**Appendix
iii.
continued.**

Group	Territory in home country	Political competition	Ethnic fractionalization in home country	No. of Affiliates
IRA	Major presence in Northern Ireland with limited presence in Great Britain and Europe	Linked with Sinn Fein	.171	6
LTTE	Major presence in Sri Lanka	Not active in electoral politics, some support from political parties	.428	3
PKK	Present in Turkey but has base in Europe, Middle East and Asia	Not active in electoral politics, some support from political parties	.299	12
Shining Path	Major presence in rural Peru	Not active in electoral politics	.638	2
Taliban	Major presence in Afghanistan and limited presence in Pakistan	Mostly active in politics	.751	4

Source: Global Terrorism Database, GTD, Terrorist Organization Profiles and TOPs and National Counterterrorism Center, Fearon (2003) database on ethnic fractionalization, Weinberg and Pedahzur (2004)