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The *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies* is a most welcome addition to the body of literature on the topic that takes its rightful place *front and center*. A collection of essays, each one a pearl, written by acknowledged experts in the various themes covered, this paragon belongs on the shelf of *every Intelligence professional*, as well as anyone who is a serious student of the subject. Whether as an introduction to the neophyte or a refresher for the seasoned veteran, the tome has depth and breadth on myriad topics within the Intelligence field of study.

Part I of the book examines the evolution of Intelligence Studies and how Intelligence developed as an independent discipline in the post-Watergate/Vietnam era. It pays homage to past and present groundbreakers such as Sherman Kent, Richard K. Betts, Robert Jervis, Michael I. Handel, Christopher Andrew, Walter Laqueur, Jeffrey T. Richelson, Gregory F. Trevorton, and Mark M. Lowenthal to set the stage for a comprehensive discussion of the current state of play regarding the many facets of modern Intelligence. It contrasts the study of Intelligence in the U.S. (through a prism of political science, history, sociology, multi-disciplinary) vis-à-vis the United Kingdom (academic, history). In the last few years, Intelligence has even come into its own as a field of study; students can obtain degrees in Intelligence from various civilian and military universities and colleges. Fields of study include Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). The topic of Intelligence has commercial viability as fiction and non-fiction books and movies have now become “mainstream” in the cultural zeitgeist. The book undertakes a number of case studies encompassing a wide range of topics (case studies, counterintelligence, analysis, dissemination, and politicized intelligence). After each failure (CIA domestic activities in the 1970s, the 911 attacks, the Iraq WMD assessment), fact finding commissions have called for better Intelligence integration.

Part II of the book discusses abstract approaches to Intelligence. The end of the Cold War brought a seemingly endless parade of declassified files and post-facto second guessing of why Intelligence failed to see certain events coming. The authors confront this type of armchair analysis by addressing what Intelligence can and cannot do, as well as what it is and is not. One expert offered the following definition: “Intelligence is any process producing knowledge that might be used in making a decision OR influencing the process, knowledge, or decisions of competitors AND in the face of competitors’ efforts – real or imagined – to affect one’s own processes, knowledge, or decisions in matters of national policy” (27).

The authors then outline the uses of Intelligence: as a tool of state power (the leader must understand the environment to gain decision advantage); as a risk mitigation tool (to narrow uncertainty for the leader or decision maker); and as a set of comparative systems and services (how to test hypotheses and theories of intelligence). Intelligence analysis pioneer Sherman Kent advocated objectivity (we all have biases) and relevance. Yet intelligence professionals must also understand the other side’s capabilities as well as their own in order to avoid inflating a threat or underestimating their own ability to thwart it. The perennial tension between policy and Intelligence (the politicization of the Iraq WMD assessment crops up now and again) continues to the present. In order to serve the decision maker effectively, policy and Intelligence *must* work together for the good of the nation, not their own agendas.

There are four measures of success for Intelligence: Collection (the ability to gather competitively relevant information); transmission (the ability to freely pass information between Intelligence and policy); anticipation (the capacity to warn); and denial and deception (selective secrecy). There is a brief study of history's most famous strategists (Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini) and their views of Intelligence in war. Various iterations of the Intelligence Cycle (planning and direction, collection and processing, analysis, assessment and production, dissemination, and interaction with the policy maker) are examined as well. As an evolving craft, Intelligence is vital to decision support as defined by outputs (vice inputs). Its components in this sense are secret war, strategic analytics, and collective Intelligence – all undergirded by integrity and accountability.

Part III undertakes an examination of the historical approaches to Intelligence. These disciplines include Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), HUMINT, Economic Intelligence, Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), and OSINT. Each topic is given sufficient depth to demonstrate its intrinsic value without getting so far into the weeds the reader wanders off.

Part IV studies international intelligence systems from various countries. Essays include treatments of the intelligence services of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, France, India, China, Japan, Israel, Germany, Russia, and Spain. Each country's holistic intelligence capability is studied through the lens of its traditional competencies and in light of the extant challenges it faces in the present.

Part V concludes the book with observations of contemporary challenges that have no easy answers. Grappling with counterterrorism and Intelligence, Director General of the British Security Service Jonathan Evans states:

“In recent years, we appear increasingly to have imported from the American media the assumption that terrorism is 100% preventable and any incident that is not prevented is seen as a culpable government failure. This is a nonsensical way to consider risk and only plays into the hands of the terrorists themselves. Risk can be managed and reduced but it cannot realistically be abolished, and if we delude ourselves that it can, we are setting ourselves up for a nasty disappointment.” (245)

In this sense, counterterrorism is an Intelligence war without wartime objectives. The Intelligence Community (IC) role in counterterrorism is to understand the threat, warn of adversary intent and capability, find and disrupt the adversary, and measure the effectiveness of counterterror policy/strategy/operations. Viewed through another prism, Intelligence is about managing and reducing risk. In order for counterterrorist operations to disrupt terrorist networks, they must encompass strategic, operational, and tactical analyses, with offensive and defensive actions factored into the decision making matrix.

Crossing the deep chasm from a Cold War posture to a counterterrorism mindset has been challenging. The cognitive dissonance between ordered forces in a linear hierarchy to non-linear networks globally dispersed is a paradigm shift whose requirements include keeping pace with rapidly evolving technology and ever changing cyber threats.

“Terrorists innovate more conceptually than technologically, driven by opportunity and strategic imperatives, with ‘high-concept/low-tech’ advances such as the 9/11 attacks and simultaneous truck bombs. Terrorists seek

spectacular attack, not easily yielded by cyberattack, which carries great risk of failure than a truck bomb. Furthermore, most terrorist groups are operationally conservative, will not innovate for the sake of innovation, and tend to keep with weapons that are proven.”

“That said, terrorist groups are constantly evolving and exploring ways to increase their effectiveness, and any trend or technology that increases the effectiveness of the current terrorist threat is a danger” (251).

Should terrorists acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the situation, in the words of the late Herman Kahn, one of the first nuclear strategists, would be “thinking the unthinkable.”

Globalization now means that Intelligence know no boundaries. Wrapped in secrecy, Intelligence can find new targets, make new partners, engage in covert action, and walk the fine line between more transparency and less state secrecy. Such are the challenges of a borderless world. This book is an outstanding contribution to the field and a **must have** for anyone seeking to understand how Intelligence plays a vital role in modern society.

Mark J. Roberts, Intelligence Officer