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## PEACE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES: SADC AND MOZAMBIQUE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

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**PEACE AND SECURITY  
CHALLENGES: SADC AND  
MOZAMBIQUE CONFLICT  
MANAGEMENT IN CABO  
DELGADO**

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**INTRODUCTION AND  
CONTEXT**

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After 16 years of war (1977-1992), and the loss of more than 1 million lives, local and international interventions succeeded with ending the protracted conflict in Mozambique.<sup>1</sup> On the 4th of October 1992, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed in Rome between the Government of Mozambique (Frelimo) and the insurgent group (Renamo). Mozambique was one of the world's poorest countries, without most of the pre-conditions believed to be favourable to support peace and democracy. Surprisingly, a decade after signing the GPA, Mozambique stood out as one of the most peaceful countries in the region and was considered as a UN post-conflict success story.<sup>2</sup> Initially, the GPA guided the end of the war, but how Mozambique subsequently transformed the conflict constructively remains unanswered by most scholars.<sup>3</sup>

In "*Transition from civil war to peace: The role of the United Nations and international community in Mozambique*", Ayokunu Adedokun studies the factors behind the successful transition from war to peace in Mozambique. Adedokun outlines five principal factors that have been put forward as the reasons for Mozambique's transition from war to peace, namely: (1) The lengthy

military stalemate made Renamo and Frelimo realize that neither could win a military victory. (2) The significantly reduced external aid to both parties, especially with the end of the Cold War. (3) The devastating drought threatened both sides with mass starvation. (4) Mozambique was simply a unique and lucky case. (5) The substantial external intervention. Adedokun argues that the previous research has overlooked the factors which sustained the peace and offers three factors that supported the peace after the war ended: (1) The international community's facilitation of the peace building process.<sup>4</sup> Numerous have credited UN's support to the peace negotiations, the demobilization of the former soldiers, the creation of a united national army, and the building of a legitimate, political opposition, for the success.<sup>5</sup> (2) The local ownership of the peace process and the local participation in the peace process. A key actor was the Christian Council of Mozambique, together with the Italian lay organization Sant'Egidio, which could have a dialogue with both parties. (3) The persistent elite bargain.

Conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation present three approaches to conflict intervention. The aim in conflict management is to reach political settlements, including compromises reached by different kinds of pressure. The article therefore seeks to make an analysis on the effectiveness of SADC conflict intervention strategies in volatile political environments, taking a closer look at the country of Mozambique

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<sup>1</sup> Bartoli, A et al. 2010. Peace is in Movement: A Dynamic Systems Perspective on the Emergence of Peace in Mozambique. Peace and Conflict

<sup>2</sup> Manning, C. 2002. The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-conflict Democratization, 1992-2000

<sup>3</sup> Adedokun, A. 201. Transition from Civil War to Peace: The Role of the United Nations and International Community Mozambique.

<sup>4</sup> Adedokun, A. 201. Transition from Civil War to Peace: The Role of the United Nations and International Community Mozambique

<sup>5</sup> Weinstein, M. 2002, Mozambique: A fading UN success story

**SITUATION  
ANALYSIS**

Population 29.5M	GDP per Capita \$1.136
Life Expectancy at Birth 58.9	Human Development Index (HDI) Index:0.437 Rank: 180/189
Neighbours Eswatini, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe	RECs SADC

**Source: Africa Development Bank Group (2019)**

The Republic of Mozambique lies in the Southern African region along the Indian Ocean coast and shares borders with Eswatini, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Mozambique’s coastal location gives it geographic and strategic importance not only regionally as it provides a corridor for trade to other markets, but also on the continent linking Africa to the east. After it gained independence from Portugal in 1975, a brutal civil war (1977-1992) followed between the governments led Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) that resulted in the death of nearly one million people and the displacement of five million. The war ended with the signing by both warring parties of the 1992 General Peace Accords in Rome which led to the transition into a new democratic era.

In the wake of arising out of the common conflict, Mozambique was viewed as a

post-struggle example of overcoming adversity with near 20 years of harmony and soundness. Somewhere in the range of 2004 and 2015, the nation encountered a stable financial development of about 8% per annum getting one of the ten quickest developing economies on the planet and was estimated to proceed at this promising development trajectory.<sup>1</sup> This hopefulness was combined with the revelation of gas fields off the nation's coast in 2017 which had the assumption for drawing in venture and changing the economy. While huge changes have occurred in the previous many years, the nation has now started confronting numerous difficulties one of which is that it has one of the world's least Human Development Indexes (0.437). The greater part of its 29.5 million populace lives in destitution. Additionally, it is described by disgraceful financial circumstance and high paces of lack of education and youth joblessness, particularly in provincial regions.

In 2013, a low-power struggle reappeared between the public authority and RENAMO when the last assaulted Muxungué Police Station in reprisal of a police attack on its neighbourhood central command in April of that year. A progression of conflicts followed, until the marking of a truce that went before the October 2014 general races in which President Filipe Nyusi was chosen and FRELIMO held greater part status in the National Assembly. After the overall races, the re-established struggle proceeded for RENAMO questioned the political decision results referring to anomalies on the public authority's part and pressures expanded fundamentally until an unforeseen one-sided détente was pronounced by RENAMO in December 2016.

Mozambique's shakiness is not, at this point restricted to the since quite a while ago settled clash between the public authority, generally comprised of FRELIMO, and RENAMO as the nation faces other diverse difficulties. The security circumstance from

that point forward has been disturbed by an Islamist local army bunch that surfaced in October 2017 and has since acquired footing in northern Mozambique.

Moreover, in March and April 2019, Mozambique was hit by successive typhoons, Idai and Kenneth, which moved through focal and northern areas of the nation causing tremendous flooding that brought about annihilation of towns, towns and fundamental foundation. The extreme typhoons, as indicated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), prompted very nearly 648 passing's and 163,927 individuals allegedly uprooted while more than 2.2 million needed compassionate help. This philanthropic debacle raises significant worries for Mozambique's financial and social strength.

In August 2019, a significant advance was taken by the public authority and RENAMO to sign another authoritative harmony bargain preparing for the impending general decisions. After perhaps the most vicious political mission periods in the nation's set of experiences, Mozambicans went to surveys on 15 October 2019. In the races the decision FRELIMO party got an avalanche triumph (73%) with occupant President Filipe Nyusi reappointed briefly term and larger part control of parliamentary and common get together seats. Following the political race results, RENAMO required the revocation of the races asserting presence of brutality and appointive extortion and blaming the decision party for disregarding the harmony bargain. The political race presented significant vulnerability in the country's delicate harmony, portrayed by the contention among FRELIMO and RENAMO, and diminished the harmony arrangement's feasibility which is denied acknowledgment by the 'Military Junta' - a group of RENAMO.

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***VIOLENCE IN  
MOZAMBIQUE'S  
CABO DELGADO-  
2020***

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IS says its new “Central Africa Province” branch – it claims this affiliate also includes rebels from eastern Democratic Republic of Congo – is behind some of the attacks, which have left hundreds of people dead. But a home-grown extremist sect – known locally as al-Shabab, or Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah (ASWJ) is also involved in the violence, according to researchers, as are extremists from nearby Kenya and Tanzania. The connection between IS and ASWJ remains unclear, beyond occasionally attributed attacks, and the killers have not produced a manifesto or put forward a leader with a clear religious message, leaving many to doubt their jihadist leanings all-together. Interviews with local researchers and residents, as well as UN officials and aid workers in Cabo Delgado, suggest extremism is most likely only one part of the jigsaw, and that multiple groups and cells are now operating in the region with different objectives.

### **Mozambiquan Government Losing Control**

Despite vast natural resources and one of the world's biggest untapped offshore gas fields, worth an estimated \$50 billion, the majority-Muslim province is one of Mozambique's poorest, with high rates of unemployment and illiteracy. Organised crime syndicates some are believed to be involved in the violence and political elites hoover up much of the wealth.

With no public face, the killers have confounded residents, birthed a string of conspiracy theories, and added a crippling layer of fear of the unknown and the

uncertain on top of the very real danger civilians are facing.

The militancy has also created a difficult operating environment for international aid groups they lack clear information on which to base security decisions and that might allow them to communicate with the armed groups responsible, as they commonly do in other contexts.

Residents say the government has offered them little help, while journalists and researchers have been arrested for working in the region, creating an information vacuum that has allowed conspiracies theories to fester. Though poorly understood, the militants are getting stronger launching more sophisticated attacks with better weapons against soldiers and civilians, and driving up humanitarian needs.

### **Islamic State Take Note**

IS claimed its first attack in Cabo Delgado June 2019 – the group seeking fresh pastures as it lost ground in its Middle Eastern strongholds. Jasmine Opperman, a security and terrorism analyst has since counted more than two dozen attacks attributed by the group.

The attributions – as well as video and photo reports – indicate a certain level of contact, said Opperman, adding that the increasing sophistication and brazenness of attacks demonstrates outside support. But there is little evidence that Islamic State is directly supplying or training the militants, and some question whether the attribution of attacks is a PR exercise by a group determined to prove its continued relevance after the collapse of its self-proclaimed “caliphate”.

Other researchers have documented connections pointing in different directions: to radical clerics and their followers in Kenya and Tanzania – and to Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Algeria, where some

hard-line Cabo Delgado residents completed religious scholarships.

Rather than foreign connections, some analysts say the emphasis should instead be on the home-grown nature of the insurgents, who began launching attacks in Cabo Delgado in October 2017, more than a year and a half before IS took note. The attackers were thought to be members of al-Shabab, a local religious sect – with no clear links to the Somali extremists of the same name – that had emerged in Cabo Delgado a few years earlier.

### **Multi-layered insurgency**

No attacks have been claimed under the name al-Shabab and few residents interviewed by The New Humanitarian could square how a relatively small band of young men had turned into such ruthless killers. A religious message has also been hard to discern amid seemingly indiscriminate village burnings, while the small number attacks on Christian missionaries, international aid groups, foreign oil and gas workers in the region has puzzled residents.

“All of this religious discourse disappeared entirely,” said Marcos Lazaro, a member of a local farmer’s union. Many analysts and UN officials have concluded that alongside extremists there are most likely multiple groups and cells that are active, and that local issues rather than extremist ideologies motivate many of the combatants.

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**KEY CONCEPTUAL  
ISSUES: THE  
MOZAMBQUE  
CONFLICT: ITS  
CAUSES**

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### **Centralisation of Power and Weak Governance**

The FRELIMO-led government has held power nationally since independence in 1975 and its continued strong grip of power has permitted it to gain significant control over state institutions. The complex combination of factors that guides FRELIMO's relationship with the state, added to the political struggle between FRELIMO and RENAMO, has contributed to weak central governance which led to instability of the country. The result of the centralised power is demonstrated through a winner takes- all system that allowed FRELIMO to have a significant advantage politically and financially over the opposition. Furthermore, power centralisation enabled FRELIMO to ensure its political base and overcome its unpopularity in areas of RENAMO strongholds.

The value placed on central governance calls for greater decentralisation giving the main opposition party, RENAMO, an opportunity to redistribute power through direct election by the local population of provincial governors in the country's 10 provinces rather through appointment by the ruling party, FRELIMO. This change in the electoral process is hoped to bring about potential stability. In addition, decentralisation is fundamental to levelling the playing field in the competition and properly managing and distributing natural resources between the government and RENAMO as it would fairly consider the ownership and control of such resources, which thus far has only benefited the government.<sup>6</sup> Since the current government's incumbency has remained unbroken, power has primarily been revolving within the party and was not in a neutral state that it could be taken over by another political party. Besides this, the Mozambican Government's inability to exert jurisdiction over the entire country, as FRELIMO and RENAMO have distinct

strongholds throughout the country, has contributed to the weak central governance.

### **Regional Disparities**

The divisions that exist between the centre and peripheries of the country can be traced back to the colonial period and the subsequent decentralisation of power. Incongruities in Mozambique spin around provincial disparities between the middle/north and south, instead of around nationality and religion. Notwithstanding, these factors can't be limited as they could be covered by local aberrations. The area of Maputo in the south, with nearness to South Africa and centralisation of force, has brought about the grouping of assets and present-day financial areas in the capital city. The FRELIMO-drove government's consistent principle has empowered the provincial strength of the south as reflected in political portrayal and support. In any case, the focal and northern locales keep on being underestimated as they don't get equivalent profit with financial development and are denied even admittance to monetary freedoms. They experience high destitution and joblessness rates, and need essential conveniences and administrations. Indeed, notwithstanding the country's financial development in the course of the most recent twenty years, destitution decrease has not been equivalent in the country with proceeded with high neediness rates in the territories of the northern area like Zambezi (62%), Nampula (65%) and Niassa (67%), which are over the public normal pace of 48.4%. It is against this scenery that an insight flourished that the populace in the north doesn't profit with the forthcoming normal asset revelations and consequently arose the

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<sup>6</sup> Regalia (2017). *The Resurgence of Conflict in Mozambique: Ghosts from the past and Brakes to Peaceful*,



Islamist state army bunch in asset rich Cabo Delgado area.

### **Natural Disaster Mismanagement**

In the past three decades, Mozambique has been struck by cyclones and has suffered flooding several times. Before cyclones Idai and Kenneth struck, it had been widely reported that the country was battling with high levels of food insecurity.<sup>7</sup> The government's lack of adequate preparedness for a country prone to natural disasters and its failure to warn citizens in areas mostly affected could be attributed to lack of planning and resources for unexpected hazards. This is with the exception of the case of Cyclone Idai in which the government issued a red alert a few days before it struck.<sup>8</sup> After destructions by the cyclone, the areas affected happened to be the same provinces facing food insecurity which, in fact, are situated in the regions marginalised by the government. Food insecurity has been exacerbated by the natural catastrophes deepening citizen's mistrust and frustration with the state and consequently leading to instability.

### **Inadequate Implementation of the DDR Process**

One of the stipulations of the 1992 GPA was to implement Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process which was to be overseen by the UN Peacekeeping Mission Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Failure by the ONUMOZ to follow up the initiated DDR activities contributed to a break in the continuity of the process and it took almost a decade before the government, which

lacked the capacity, was able to reactivate the DDR programme. In fact, the DDR process was left incomplete without any clear next steps beyond the collection of arms. What is more, there was significant concern that RENAMO had several hidden stockpiles. Even then, disarmament was not prioritised mainly due to mistrust between the government and RENAMO and there was a fear that insistence by RENAMO not to submit to a rigorous disarmament process would undermine the peace process.

The completion of the process was further impeded by, firstly, the decision to allow RENAMO to uphold its bases and the failure to collect its small weapons and, secondly, the tolerance towards RENAMO combatants' handing over old weapons and withholding new ones as an 'insurance policy'.<sup>9</sup> The worry that RENAMO had covered up stores was validated during the resurgence of contention in 2013 when it handily figured out how to get re-furnished. Comparable to coordination of the two powers, RENAMO warriors were disappointed with their prohibition from the full reintegration benefits given by the public authority, especially from annuities. They were left out in light of the fact that FRELIMO troops had added to their annuities from their pay rates while RENAMO warriors didn't on the grounds that they had no administration pay rates during the common conflict. Notwithstanding that, RENAMO made a suggestion that annuity benefits be reached out to its fighters yet the public authority dismissed the thought utilizing the benefits banter as a chance to show its political muscle.<sup>10</sup> As a result, inequality in the benefits received by the troops was created.

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<sup>7</sup> Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (2019) Mozambique Situation Report

<sup>8</sup> The Guardian (2019)

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/28/>

*Mozambique-mayor-cyclone-deaths-negligence-idai-rural*

<sup>9</sup> Littlejohn, G. (2015) Secret Stockpiles: Arms Caches and Disarmament Efforts in Mozambique

<sup>10</sup> A.Vines (2019) Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique: Third Time Lucky? Chatham House

The issue was raised twice after the election but had only minimal impact on government policy. This became one of the causes of the renewed conflict.

### **Economic Mismanagement**

With Mozambique's post-conflict success story, donors invested substantially to support the economic and political performance of the country. This led to donor dependency with 40% of contributions made to the budget support.<sup>11</sup> However, despite the economic growth and discovery of natural resources, corruption remained a pervasive issue as indicated by the Corruption Perception Index which ranked Mozambique at 158 out of 180 countries.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, failure to transform weak state institutions into independent ones that are capable of assuming the role of oversight bodies has deterred inclusive economic growth. This led to a growing discontentment on the part of the citizens towards the government. In 2016, the discovery of secret loans guaranteed by the government amounting to \$2 billion compromised the country's economic growth, leading to the withdrawal of budget support by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other foreign donors, reduction in foreign investments, elevated inflation rates and currency depreciation.<sup>13</sup> The loans were intended for the assistance of economic sectors but were instead diverted to military and security purposes and also benefitted senior FRELIMO officials under former President Guebuza's government who have since been charged for their alleged involvement. There was also a growing threat of illicit trade of narcotics, ivory and timber in the north region. These goods were said to be transited through the region from West Asia to Asian markets. The activity has had serious consequences on Mozambique's fragile economy

resulting in easy recruitment of gangs from among the marginalised groups and strengthening of illicit trade networks.

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### **WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONFLICT IN MOZAMBIQUE?**

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### **The Government**

The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) is the ruling party and as previously mentioned has been in power since independence in 1975. It remained the dominant party through the one-party system that ended in 1994 and thereafter came the first multi-party system which has been practiced in all subsequent elections. FRELIMO was formed in 1962 as a unification of separate nationalist movements into a front, with the purpose to liberate the country.<sup>14</sup> The public authority's point is to proceed to hold and solidify it's anything but a unified framework which has been instrumental for its leftover in power for over forty years. FRELIMO's monetary help originates from its admittance to state assets, just as organizations of financial impact and force which have established its situation at the focal point of the Mozambican culture. Through unavoidably conceded powers, the Mozambique Armed Defence Forces (FADM) and police are under the immediate control of the president, which has permitted FRELIMO to remain in power. Remotely, FRELIMO has developed territorial connections of fortitude with some previous freedom developments in the locale like The

<sup>11</sup> B. Machave (2018) Mozambique's tense elections. How we got here? African Arguments, 7 October

<sup>12</sup> Transparency International (2019) Mozambique Corruption Perceptions Index

<sup>13</sup> Geopolitical Intelligence Services (2019) Mozambique: The biggest corruption case in Africa

<sup>14</sup> C. Darch (2016) Separatist tensions and violence in the 'model post conflict state.' Mozambique since the 1990s



People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola and The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe, which is showed in the proceeded with help for FRELIMO and non-intercession in the contention with RENAMO.

After a long peace negotiation process, the government signed a definitive peace deal with the opposition RENAMO in August 2019 to end armed hostilities in advance of the upcoming elections. During the pre-election period, FRELIMO partly ensured its victory using state resources by incumbent candidates and conducted the registration of ghost voters onto the voters' roll. Additionally, there were reports of serious violent incidents perpetrated by FRELIMO supporters: intimidation, arson and restriction of opposition members' movement.<sup>15</sup> In the October 2019 general elections, FRELIMO's candidate, incumbent President Filipe Nyusi was re-elected with an overwhelming victory of 73%. This is considerably more than when he was initially elected in 2014 with 57.3%. The party also increased its representation in parliament to 184 out of 250 seats and won seats in all the country's ten provincial assemblies. On the election day FRELIMO was accused by the opposition of ballot box stuffing and large-scale electoral fraud through non-transparent tabulation at polling stations. Despite this, FRELIMO hailed the elections as free and fair.

## **RENAMO**

After a long harmony arrangement measure, the public authority marked a conclusive harmony manage the resistance RENAMO in August 2019 to end furnished threats ahead of the impending decisions. During the pre-political race time frame, FRELIMO incompletely guaranteed its triumph utilizing state assets by officeholder up-and-comers and led the

enrolment of phantom electors onto the citizens' roll. Furthermore, there were reports of genuine fierce episodes executed by FRELIMO allies: terrorizing, pyromania and limitation of resistance individuals' movement.<sup>16</sup> In the October 2019 general decisions, FRELIMO's competitor, officeholder President Filipe Nyusi was reappointed with a staggering triumph of 73%. This is extensively more than when he was at first chosen in 2014 with 57.3%. The gathering likewise expanded its portrayal in parliament to 184 out of 250 seats and won seats in every one of the country's ten commonplace congregations. On the final voting day, FRELIMO was blamed by the resistance for voting booth stuffing and huge scope **electing** misrepresentation through non-straightforward classification at surveying stations. In spite of this, FRELIMO hailed the decisions as free and reasonable.

The demise of previous RENAMO pioneer Afonso Dhlakama, who drove the gathering since 1979, brought about the arrangement of Ossufo Momade as another gathering chief. Momade drove the marking of the August 2019 harmony manage the public authority with an end goal to decentralize power, build up a cycle through which RENAMO warriors can incapacitate and reintegrate into the security powers, and officially end threats between the fighting gatherings. Dhlakama's demise and the new authority raised interior divisions inside the gathering prompting a force battle that brought about the rise of a splinter bunch alluded to as the 'Military Junta'. The gathering is driven by General Mariano Nhongo, head of the furnished wing of RENAMO, who professes to have 500 equipped individuals. However, analysts refute this suggesting he may have about 80 armed members instead.<sup>16</sup> General Nhongo demands the resignation of Momade and the nullification of the peace deal as he

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<sup>15</sup> Africa Confidential (2019) Frelimo Takes No Chances

<sup>16</sup> A. Vines (2019) Hope, peace and Reconciliation: Pope Francis in Mozambique

believes Momade has no legitimacy to negotiate a peace deal and decide on the fate of RENAMO combatants to be incorporated into society.

The October 2019 elections marked the first time for RENAMO to contest a presidential election with a new candidate, Ossufo Momade, who secured 21.8% of the votes which was a decline from 36.6% won in the last elections (2014). Contrary to expectations, for the provincial elections, RENAMO did not win a single vote under the new electoral laws which would have allowed the party to appoint its governors. RENAMO rejected the results appealing to the Constitutional court to annul the election citing immense electoral fraud and violation by the government of the August 2019 peace deal.

### **Islamist Militant Group**

Ahlu Sunna Wal Jammaa (ASWJ) which means "individuals of the Sunnah people group" likewise alluded to as Ansar al-Sunna or Al-Shababa locally, is an Islamist civilian army bunch in northern Mozambique. The gathering's presence can be followed back to October 2017 when it assaulted three police headquarters in Mocímboa da Praia, Cabo Delgado region. From that point forward, it has purportedly done more than 200 assaults on Mozambican security forces and civilians<sup>17</sup> and the group's membership is estimated to be between 350 and 1500.<sup>18</sup> ASWJ has been forged against the backdrop of economic marginalisation of Cabo Delgado, the country's most underdeveloped province.<sup>19</sup> While the discovery of large gas and oil reserves in the province generated

expectations for local development, communities have seen only few benefits and this has bred resentment giving rise to militant group traction in the area.<sup>20</sup> Additionally, the group is allegedly financially supported by trafficking illicit products through Cabo Delgado.<sup>21</sup> Before the October 2019 decisions, as assailant assaults proceeded in spite of weighty military presence, the Mozambican government purportedly went to a private Russian security firm for help despite the fact that Russia denied any inclusion. Nonetheless, progressing savagery in the space restricted residents' interest in the political race.

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### ***IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICT IN MOZAMBIQUE***

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The insurgent group has engaged in several raids on homes, villages and communities in Cabo Delgado Province, resulting in communities abandoning their homes for security reasons. The majority of people have sought refuge in some parts of Mocímboa da Praia town, other safer parts of the province and in the neighbouring provinces of Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia. As of 8 December 2020, there were 711 violent attacks by the insurgency, according to estimates from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project<sup>22</sup>. Given the nature of terrorism and insurgency, it is highly probable that numerous attacks in Cabo Delgado go

<sup>17</sup> Z. Machado (2019) Insecurity In Mozambique Leaves Thousands Unable to Vote: Authorities Fail to Ensure All Voters Can Cast Ballots Human Rights Watch

<sup>18</sup> E. Morier-Genoud (2018) Mozambique's own version of Boko Haram is tightening its deadly grip, Quartz Africa, 16 June

<sup>19</sup> The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (2018) Clear Threat Murky Objectives: Ahlu Suma Wa; Jammaa and Instability in Cabo Delgado

<sup>20</sup> E. Morier-Genoud (2019), Tracing the history of Mozambique's mysterious and deadly insurgency. The Conversation, 18 February

<sup>21</sup> Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (2018) Where Crime Compounds Conflict: Understanding Northern Mozambique's Vulnerabilities

<sup>22</sup> *Human Rights Watch (2017) World Report 2017: Events of 2016*

unreported; hence, the ACLED estimates may be an underestimation.

Like the case with most mental oppressor social events, Ansar al-Sunna has used a couple of unusual battling procedures and techniques. The revolutionaries have attacked normal individuals and used repulsive executing procedures, for instance, decapitating and burning-through losses. They have moreover devoured houses, plundered the properties of getting away from families, annihilated public establishment workplaces, coordinated vehicles and taken firearms and ammunition from public security powers. Considering various reports from the media, police and government, there are incalculable impacted towns and organizations in Cabo Delgado, with ordinary people (checking women and children) having been seized, executed, harmed or dislodged, and properties either plundered or consumed.<sup>23</sup>

Attacks and assaults by the mental oppressor state armed force have in like manner connected with public establishment and business exercises. On 21 February 2019, for example, suspected revolutionaries attacked Anadarko Petroleum Corporation on two occasions in the town of Palma in Cabo Delgado, executing one worker and hurting a couple of others, (Relief web, 2020). Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, a United States oil and hydrocarbon examination association, driven the LNG project on the Indian Ocean coast before it was replaced by Total close to the completion of 2019. There were moreover reports that an association vehicle for Fenix Construction Services, an advancement firm subcontracted by Total South Africa on the Mozambique LNG

project, was caught by fanatics' right outside Mocímboa da Praia town on 27 June 2020, and eight laborers were murdered.<sup>24</sup> The public force service organization, Electrocadate de Mozambique, had a maintenance truck trapped in Muidumbe District by radicals on 28 September 2020, as its labourers endeavoured to fix electrical cables that had been cut by the agitators. The specialists were caught and harmed prior to being delivered.<sup>25</sup> Another EdM specialist was slaughtered by presumed guerrillas in Awasse in September 2020, while a grade school was vandalized and a clinic consumed in September 2019.<sup>26</sup> The agitators caught the area capital of Quissanga and the town of Mocímboa da Praia – including the associating streets to the towns – in March 2020, and the essential port of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020. Consequently, the insurrection in Mozambique keeps on influencing public harmony, security, wellbeing, vocations of individuals, monetary exercises, and public improvement activities and projects.<sup>27</sup>

Because of the raising savagery and removal of regular people brought about by the fear based oppressor local armies, the Government of Mozambique dispatched its public protection and security powers to battle the insurrection. These incorporate the FADM, the Mozambique Republic Police (PRM), the Rapid Intervention Unit and the National Criminal Investigative Service (particularly the Counter-Terrorism Unit). The public guard and security powers have recorded the two triumphs and losses in the lopsided fighting and counterinsurgency against the fear-based oppressors. For instance, on 29 October

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<sup>23</sup> UNOCHA (2019) Southern and Eastern Africa: Cyclones Idai and Kenneth

<sup>24</sup> G. Faleg (2019) *Conflict prevention in Mozambique: Can there be peace after the storm?* European Union Institute for Security Studies

<sup>25</sup> Crisis Group (2018) *Mozambique Tracking Conflict*

<sup>26</sup> M. Webb (2019) *Cyclone recovery key issue in Mozambique election*, Aljazeera, 13 October

<sup>27</sup> B. Mavhinga (2019) *Broad Amnesty in Mozambique Likely to Fuel Future Abuses*, Human Rights Watch

2020, the PRM Commander-General announced that they had sought after and killed 108 fear-based oppressors in Cabo Delgado, and had held onto enormous amounts of war materials from the psychological militants in the "previous 72 hours".<sup>28</sup>

The revolt has had expansive ramifications inside the social, monetary, compassionate and political circles. What is irrefutable is the way that Mozambique has not yet had the option to contain and stifle the radicals, as they need greater limit as far as preparing, military knowledge, observation and gear. It is against this foundation that the part of SADC isn't just unavoidable yet additionally required, predictable with the SADC Treaty and other applicable SADC and African Union (AU) instruments. Other compelling security and political factors also warrant SADC intervention in Mozambique.<sup>29</sup>

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***SADC's  
INVOLVEMENT IN  
MOZAMBIQUE***

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### **SADC's Sluggish Development**

Notwithstanding the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (the Organ) that was incorporated into its system in 1996, SADC has made a bunch of foundations that – along with constructions of the African Union (AU) and other local financial networks – structure part of the APSA. The advancement of SADC's tranquillity and security establishments is faltering, nonetheless, and the constructions that have been made so far need political help, authoritative limit and assets. Since the time its arrangement in 1992, SADC that got involved in the Congo War has reacted to a progression of intrastate

emergencies. In the previous decade the results of its emergency intercessions and its history in advancing harmony and the majority rule rules that are cherished in its initial guidelines have been blended

The institutional traditions of SADC's archetype associations have prompted a bifurcated design, vesting both the SADC Summit and Organ with power to oversee harmony and security concerns. SADC's little Secretariat and the Organ Directorate remain inadequately resourced. Organizations cherished in the SADC Treaty that could ensure residents' privileges contrary to discretionary standard have not been engaged inferable from part states' reluctance to surrender position to these supranational constructions. The Parliamentary Forum has no administrative force and the SADC Tribunal was destroyed by the predominantly incredible culmination subsequent to arriving at a badly arranged decision.

The life expectancy of SADC's most significant strategy archive on harmony and security, the updated Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (Sipo II), has been stretched out to 2020, despite the fact that pieces of it are obsolete and it neglects to set out concrete, nitty-gritty designs to accomplish the record's goals. As indicated by Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, some advancement has been made on political decision the executives, the foundation of an intercession infrastructure, SADC's tranquillity keeping and early-cautioning limits, and the territorial coordination of policing and battling wrongdoing. Nonetheless, Sipo II's execution and working of the framework have been impeded by absence of coordination between SADC organizations and, in particular, by part states' reluctance to loan sufficient material and political help to the

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<sup>28</sup> *Crisis Group (2019) Mozambique October 2019*

<sup>29</sup> *Burke, J. (2019) Mozambique election is 'test for democracy' in the wake of peace*

*deal. The Guardian, 15 October*

supranational constructions. Having been made on the drive of the Secretariat and benefactors, these constructions need proprietorship on piece of the part states. In this manner, while SADC has all the sub-provincial components of the continental APSA in place (including a standby force, whose deployment readiness has been demonstrated in the DRC and Lesotho), most of the institutions – and especially those in the critical domain of mediation and preventive diplomacy – function poorly and are short-staffed.

SADC's policies on regional peace and security reflect a normative tension between the principle of national sovereignty and the mandate to promote peace, human rights and democracy in member states. In practice, the principles that guide SADC's crisis responses are constantly renegotiated by the members of the Summit, whose composition is very heterogeneous the dominance of liberation-party governments, the lack of democratic commitment from some members, and SADC's limited capacity to enforce its principles in non-compliant regimes mean that stability and sovereignty tend to take precedence over democracy. According to Laurie Nathan, the region's anti-imperialist defence reaction, which has been exploited by Zimbabwe and other regimes, has prevented the organisation from offering effective protection for human security.

### **A chequered conflict management record**

SADC responded conclusively to military interfering in regular citizen legislative issues and government precariousness in the small province of Lesotho, by authorizing the sending of troops. What's more, a few SADC states contributed troop contingents to the UN-ordered Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC (where they endured human misfortunes). In any case, SADC couldn't react viably either to the political emergency made by DRC President Kabila's inability to hold races

before his protected term of office terminated or to the intrastate emergencies in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe referenced previously. Given that RENAMO used to be supported by politically-sanctioned racial segregation South Africa and inspires little compassion from Southern Africa's freedom party governments, SADC was naturally in no position to go about as a tenable and unbiased middle person in the Mozambican clash. Nonetheless, SADC additionally neglected to unequivocally react to the insubordination in Cabinda and state-supported brutality against strict and youth bunches in Angola.

SADC pursued for a very long time to contain the Zimbabwean emergency through different discretionary drives and stabilised the nation by facilitating a solidarity government. However, after the seriously imperfect, yet trustworthy enough, 2013 decisions permitted the Summit to drop the enduring Zimbabwean issue of its plan, SADC looked as Zimbabwe again spiralled into financial and political emergency. In spite of the fact that the SADC Chair focused on that neither the AU nor SADC would endure an illegal difference in government, the flimsy facade of constitutionality that hidden Zimbabwe's rebellion was sufficient to guarantee that SADC and the global local area acquiesced to the tactical upset that constrained President Mugabe to leave and that united the hang on force of those ZANU-PF military hardliners answerable for the vast majority of the denials of basic freedoms of the post-colonial time. By tolerating the true overthrow, SADC not just showed its weakness opposite the Zimbabwean 'securocrats' and its reluctance to pay the significant expense of implementing majority rule standards, yet in addition set a perilous trend, flagging that the Community would endure unlawful changes of government and military intruding, just inasmuch as they were meagrely spruced up in sacred dress.

## Response in Mozambique

Prior to the October 2019 general elections, the AU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) failed to respond directly to the continued tensions between the Mozambican government and RENAMO, as well as the Islamist militant insurgency in the north. While the AU's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) sought to help identify governance-related issues<sup>30</sup> and South Africa raised concern over the possibility of extremist activity in the north<sup>31</sup>, these efforts fell short of regional level action. As per the standards of subsidiarity, it was SADC's duty to intercede in clashes inside their area. Notwithstanding, its situation on Mozambique has generally been taken through quiet discretion. This reaction might be established in the insight that the contention between the public authority and RENAMO is of a home-grown sort and warrants no thought from SADC, because of its impediments for mediating in home-grown issues. SADC's inability to on the whole react to the circumstance in Mozambique might be credited to the common impression of the country's effective post-struggle status. Further, FRELIMO's fortitude with SADC part states governed by freedom developments may see intercession as a treachery of that fortitude

The South African National Defence Force led the first regional response followed by SADC launching a regional appeal for humanitarian assistance for the victims of cyclone Idai.<sup>32</sup> Generally, SADC under its Regional Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction should have taken more responsibility of relief operations. However, coordination between member

states was weak and highly unresponsive. Nevertheless, SADC's diplomacy contributed to a continental response from the AU which established an emergency fund for disaster mitigation and provided a large sum of the fund to Mozambique as it was mostly affected.

During the August 2019 peace deal signing, the African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, SADC Heads of State and Government and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda supported the landmark deal by witnessing the event taking place between the government and RENAMO leader, Ossufo Momade. Afterwards, the AUC Chairperson<sup>33</sup> and President of Namibia and SADC Chairperson, Dr. Hage Geingob, released diplomatic statements welcoming the peace deal

As per their individual commands, SADC and the AU sent perception missions to Mozambique for the October 2019 races. The SADC Mission pronounced that the political and security circumstance was by and large serene during their perception however noticed the viciousness and assaults revealed in certain regions and the activities by the Islamist aggressor bunch in the northern piece of the country. It inferred that the pre-political race and the democratic were by and large serene and led in an efficient way. Nonetheless, the AU brought genuine worries up according to the setting of the races especially, the pre-political race viciousness and detailed killing of the top of a neighbourhood spectator bunch in Gaza area. It likewise underlined the difficult political and security climate with the Islamist assailant bunch in the north, progressing harmony measure between the public authority and

<sup>30</sup> *Institute for Security Studies (2019) The AU urges Mozambique to get its act together, March 20*

<sup>31</sup> *P. Fabricus (2018) Mozambique's apparent Islamist insurgency poses multiple threats. Institute for Security Studies, 20 November 2018*

<sup>32</sup> *SADC (2019) SADC to Launch a Regional Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance for Millions Affected*

*by the Devastating Impacts of Tropical Cyclone IDAI*

<sup>33</sup> *AU (2019) AUC Chairperson welcomes the signing of peace deal in Mozambique; SADC (2019) Statement By H.E. Dr. Hage G. Geingob, President of the Republic of Namibia*



RENAMO, and the outbreak of cyclones.<sup>34</sup> Despite the notable challenges, the Mission stated that the elections were conducted on time and in a generally peaceful environment. Both SADC and the AU election observation missions also commended Mozambique for the implementation of diaspora voting to ensure inclusivity and expansion of citizen participation in the electoral process.

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### ***STRATEGIC OPTIONS***

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#### **To the Government**

The government, along with the resistance ideological groups and residents, ought to name a politically impartial board to work with exchange and counsels among ideological groups, non-government associations, the National Electoral Commission and residents to handle the different issues influencing the country and claims raised around the contestation of political decision results. As a recently chosen individual from the AU Peace and Security Council, Mozambique ought to focus on the nation's tranquillity and security circumstance dependent on the mainland body's plan. Hence, it should resolve issues identifying with the revolt bunch in the north and execute a compelling inclusivity strategy that will manage issues of underestimation through better administration of regular assets that advances comprehensive development and equivalent admittance to financial freedoms. The public authority ought to foster a possible model for calamity reaction techniques, with local area wellbeing limit as a foundation, preparing of local area wellbeing labourers to oversee illnesses in post-fiasco settings, weakness mappings and reinforcing of framework. For future decisions, as per the African

Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance<sup>52</sup>, the public authority ought to draw in an autonomous expert constituent administration body to direct its races. It ought to likewise stick to the equivalent appropriation of force and upgrade of political incorporation to make a space for various political perspectives.

#### **To SADC**

The AU, SADC and different partners should help the public authority to foster an early admonition framework that reacts proactively to all potential political, security and ecological dangers. This can be accomplished by carrying out Article 16(2) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU which calls for interviews with RECS to advance drives that forestall clashes. SADC should move past its quiet strategy position with Mozambique and effectively guarantee that the nation maintains Article 5 of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections to execute mediations that advance popularity-based standards and practices. The AU ought to expect a functioning part on the side of the DDR interaction and as per Article 14 of the Peace and Security Commission Protocol, give help to Mozambique to execute DDR totally. The AU can use its mainland status to cooperate with the UN which recently figured out how to carry out a thorough cycle.

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<sup>34</sup> AU (2019) AUEOM to General Election in Mozambique: Preliminary Statement

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