November 2022

Heidegger and the Origin of Authenticity

John J. Preston
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd

Part of the Philosophy Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/9808

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the USF Graduate Theses and Dissertations at Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in USF Tampa Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@usf.edu.
Heidegger and the Origin of Authenticity

by

John J. Preston

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Lee Braver, Ph.D.
Iain Thomson, Ph.D.
Mor Segev, Ph.D.
Alex Levine, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
October 28, 2022

Keywords: Martin Heidegger, Phenomenology, Method, Aristotle, Endoxa, Ethics

Copyright © 2022, John J. Preston
DEDICATION

To my grandma, Barbara, for always making me find the mistake in morning paper and for never passing up an opportunity to improve my grammar.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ............................................................................................................................................v

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1
  0.1 Why Authenticity? .........................................................................................................................4
  0.2 What even is Authenticity? ..........................................................................................................5
    0.2.1: Authenticity as Self-ownership .........................................................................................7
    0.2.2: Authenticity as Self-loss .................................................................................................10
  0.3 The Tradition: Three Definitions of Heideggerian Authenticity .............................................14
    0.3.1: Schalow and Denker ....................................................................................................15
    0.3.2: Dahlstrom ......................................................................................................................18
    0.3.3: Käufer ............................................................................................................................21
    0.3.4: Gathering the Insights of the Tradition ........................................................................24
  0.4 The Path to Authenticity ..........................................................................................................24

Chapter 1: Gathering the Phenomena of Authenticity ......................................................................28
  1.1: A Brief Overview of *Being and Time* ...............................................................................29
    1.1.1: Entities and their Worlds ...............................................................................................34
    1.1.2: Authentic Encounters with Tools ..................................................................................36
    1.1.3: Authentic Encounters with Others ...............................................................................38
    1.1.4: Authentic Self-Encounters .............................................................................................44
    1.1.5: Unified Care Structure ...................................................................................................46
    1.1.6: Ontic Breakdown .............................................................................................................47
    1.1.7: Ontological Breakdown ..................................................................................................49
    1.1.8: Heroes, Destiny, and the *Volk* ....................................................................................56
1.2: The Phenomena of Authenticity (So Far) ................................................................. 59

Chapter 2: On the Several Senses of Eigentlich in Heidegger ........................................ 61

2.0.1: Making Distinctions .......................................................................................... 62

2.1: Identifying Technical uses of Eigentlich ............................................................. 66

2.1.1: Unstressed Adverbial Eigentlich ....................................................................... 67

2.1.2: Stressed Adverbial Eigentlich ......................................................................... 69

2.1.3: Adjectival Eigentlich ....................................................................................... 71

2.1.4: Guidelines for Identifying Technical Uses of Eigentlich ................................. 75

2.2: Eigentlich in Macquarrie and Robinson’s Being and Time ................................... 75

2.2.1: Eigentlich in Existentialist Sections ................................................................... 78

2.2.2: Hidden Eigentlich in Sections on Descartes .................................................... 79

2.2.3: Inconsistent translation of Eigentlich in sections on Anxiety ............................ 84

2.2.4: A Confusing Precedent .................................................................................... 86

2.3: Finding Technical Uses ....................................................................................... 89

2.3.1: Technical Eigentlich in Being and Time ......................................................... 89

2.3.2: The First Technical Uses of Eigentlich in the Lectures ................................... 94

2.4: Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 101

Chapter 3: Heidegger’s Endoxic Method ...................................................................... 102

3.1: Aristotle’s Method ............................................................................................... 104

3.1.1: Empirical Phenomena .................................................................................... 106

3.1.2: Endoxa as Phenomena ................................................................................... 108

3.2: Heidegger’s Early Lectures .................................................................................. 114

3.2.1: Formal Indication ......................................................................................... 117

3.2.2: Phenomenological Destruction ....................................................................... 118

3.2.3: Aristotle, Authenticity, and Method in GA 61 ............................................... 120

3.2.4: Authenticity, Doxa, and Endoxic Method in GA 18 ....................................... 126

3.3: Endoxic Method in Being and Time ..................................................................... 133

3.4: Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 141
Chapter 6: A Proper Conclusion .......................................................... 250

6.1: Authentic Appropriations ......................................................... 250
6.2: Authenticity and Humanitas ..................................................... 252
6.3: Eigentlich Translation ............................................................. 260
   6.3.1: Old Translation ............................................................. 262
   6.3.2: New Translation ............................................................ 263
6.4: Conclusion .............................................................................. 272

References ..................................................................................... 273

Heidegger’s Collected Works ....................................................... 273

Other References .......................................................................... 275

Appendix 1: Publication Permission Disclosure ............................. 282
ABSTRACT

Since the publication of Sein und Zeit in 1927, scholars have coupled Martin Heidegger’s reflections on authenticity with a rich tradition of thought which reminds us that philosophy can, from time to time, function as a catalyst for self-discovery. While this function is an undeniable feature of Heideggerian authenticity, I would like to suggest that it is secondary to the role that authenticity plays in Heidegger’s philosophical investigations. By analyzing the full phenomena of authenticity and tracing its first technical uses back to Heidegger’s early lectures on Aristotle, I show that Heidegger’s methodological breakthrough in the early 1920s, the development of hermeneutic phenomenology, and the very structure of Being and Time are the result of Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s philosophical method. By analyzing these lectures and traditionally ignored uses of authenticity in Being and Time, I develop an account of the methodological sense of authenticity which looks to the tradition to uncover phenomena which have been obscured and covered over. In comparing this methodological reading to some standard readings, what I call the existential, intentional, and practical readings of authenticity, I show that the problems which arise in these accounts can be addressed by considering the full phenomena of authenticity and its methodological role in Heidegger’s thinking. Ultimately, I show that the term “authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]” is not only an ineliminable part of the structure of Heidegger’s Being and Time but that it is also at the heart of his phenomenological method.
INTRODUCTION

Since the publication of *Sein und Zeit* in 1927, scholars have coupled Martin Heidegger’s reflections on authenticity with a rich tradition of thought which reminds us that philosophy can, from time to time, function as a catalyst for self-discovery. While this function is an undeniable feature of Heideggerian authenticity, I would like to suggest that it is secondary to the role that authenticity plays in Heidegger’s philosophical investigations. In this dissertation, I show that the term “authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]” is not only an ineliminable part of the structure of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* but that it is also at the heart of his method of phenomenological ontology as he develops it in the 1920s. Thus, the question at the heart of this dissertation is “What does Heidegger mean by authenticity in *Being and Time*?” As straightforward as that question may be, the answer I found, and the path I had to take to get to it were far from simple.

When it comes to identifying what Heidegger means by authenticity in *Being and Time*, we face a complex challenge. Although Heidegger talks about authenticity often and in relation to numerous concepts, he never defines the term outright. He may mention that he intends it to have a technical status or that it is not to be confused with some sort of moral or religious concept, but these negative qualifiers only stand to ward off misinterpretations.¹ This is

¹See SZ: 43/68: “These expressions [authenticity and inauthenticity] have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense...” Also see “Letter on Humanism” where he reiterates their technical and non-moral status (GA 9: 332-3/253.) For a list of abbreviations used in this dissertation, see the section entitled “Abbreviations” in the bibliography.
complicated by the fact that authenticity appears frequently throughout the text in sections which
seem unrelated to one another. To borrow a phrase: *authenticity* is said in many ways.

Here, Heidegger’s own advice may be helpful. In his early lectures, Heidegger spends a
great deal of time translating and interpreting terms from Aristotle’s philosophy. When it comes
to understanding any concept in particular, Heidegger looks to three important aspects: (1) What
has been said about that concept by the tradition, (2) the phenomena that the concept is
attempting to capture, and (3) the context for the discussion of the phenomena that the concept
refers to.\(^2\) This dissertation follows this guidance generally, grouping these three aspects around
the available sources of information: (1) the secondary literature on Heideggerian authenticity,
(2) *Being and Time* itself, and (3) the now-published lectures which Heidegger gave prior to 1927.

In the secondary literature, there is disagreement on almost every aspect of authenticity:
what authenticity means,\(^3\) if it is morally charged,\(^4\) if it is too subjectivistic,\(^5\) if it is even
attainable,\(^6\) when Heidegger first uses it,\(^7\) and even which pivotal philosophical figure inspired
Heidegger to use it in the first place.\(^8\) Each interpretation attempts to address these issues by

---

\(^2\) This is a paraphrase of Heidegger’s discussion in GA 18. For a thorough outline of this method of philosophical
investigation, see Chapter 3.

\(^3\) This can be seen in the way that translators cannot seem to agree on the right word to capture the spirit of this
technical term, see 2.2 for my critique of Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of this family of terms. See 6.3 for
my suggestion on how to translate the term to adequately address the phenomena in question.

\(^4\) Although Heidegger is explicit that this is not a moral concept, it does at least seem normative in the prima facie
sense that it seems better to be authentic than inauthentic.

\(^5\) Zimmerman considers the authenticity of early Heidegger to be a form of volunteerism which amounts to a kind of
subjectivism that Heidegger is forced to eventually abandon (Michael E. Zimmerman, *Eclipse Of Self: The

\(^6\) Rebecca Kukla argues that Heideggerian authenticity requires living in a constant state of anxiety and that if such a
state of being were maintained, the result would be a “crippling form of psychosis” (Rebecca Kukla, “The Ontology

\(^7\) This can be seen by the way that scholars ignore uses of this term in his early work. See 2.3.2 for my analysis of
when this term is first used in a technical sense.

\(^8\) See chapter 5 for my analysis of who inspired Heidegger’s use of authenticity.
providing an account which can make sense of the many ways that authenticity appears in these texts. To their credit, these interpretations often draw our attention to some important aspect of authenticity. As we will see, however, these interpretations have a tendency to leave us with more questions than answers and fall short of explaining the full phenomena of authenticity.

Given the central question of this dissertation, it should be obvious that Being and Time is the primary source for this investigation. The first step of this investigation required the collection and categorization of the various ways that authenticity can be found throughout this book. What was surprising, however, is how many of these uses of authenticity were not accounted for or discussed at all in the standard interpretations of authenticity. Additionally, I discovered that there were uses of authenticity which were missing from the English text. The problem was partially a matter of linguistics, since the German word for authentic, eigentlich, has a colloquial sense which can muddy the waters for translation. But I also discovered that the problem was partially a matter of philosophical interpretation, as the translators opted to translate eigentlich differently in contexts which they deemed non-technical. Although this discovery, and the resulting detour into linguistics and the praxis of translation was unexpected, the results proved overwhelmingly useful and ultimately provided guidelines for identifying the earliest uses of authenticity in Heidegger’s thinking. In uncovering these uses of authenticity from Heidegger’s early writings, I was able to make a crucial step toward understanding the role of authenticity in Heidegger’s phenomenological method.

The lecture courses, many of which were only recently published, offer a wealth of new information and provide the context for many of Heidegger’s more opaque discussions in Being and Time. Although the presence of this additional information has made the task of defining authenticity more cumbersome, the insights gleaned from these lectures have been crucial for the
interpretation of authenticity developed in this dissertation. From the outset, what we find in these early lectures is that Heidegger uses authenticity in even more ways than previously seen in *Being and Time*. These additional uses will become clues for developing a new theory of authenticity, one that not only addresses the issues present in the debate on authenticity but also clarifies Heidegger’s method of phenomenological ontology and the very structure of *Being and Time*.

In preparation for the investigation ahead, the goal of this introduction is threefold; I aim to explain (1) why I was motivated to research authenticity, (2) the historical significance of this concept, and (3) the discordant state of Heidegger scholarship surrounding this term. I will conclude the introduction by providing an outline for the entire dissertation with a brief summary of the goals of each chapter.

**0.1: WHY AUTHENTICITY?**

My interest in authenticity began when I was a sophomore philosophy major reading French Existentialism. Like many who read these influential texts at a young age, I quickly became aware of how much of my life I had been living on autopilot and began wondering what it would be like if I started making choices for myself. Of course, other philosophical questions interested me at this time: “How do we know there are other minds?” or “How do we know life itself is not a dream?” Yet, none felt as serious and pressing as “How do I become more authentic?” While the existence or non-existence of the external world felt like a problem for all of philosophy, answering the question of authenticity felt personal and urgent, as though every moment it went unanswered was another moment wasted. Not understanding authenticity began to feel like not understanding myself, and not understanding myself began to feel like not being a full person. In pursuit of this question, however, I quickly discovered that I needed a clearer understanding of
what authenticity is, and thus, I directed my focus towards a new question: “What even is authenticity?”

0.2: WHAT EVEN IS AUTHENTICITY?

This question led me to the work of Charles Guignon, who, in his wonderfully concise book, *On Being Authentic*, describes authenticity as one of the central ideals of the modern age. In this text, Guignon assures us that authenticity, which can be found in various permutations through various new-age movements and self-help books, is something that all human beings desire. Although Guignon characterizes these contemporary views of authenticity as a recent development, various formulations of it can be found in the thinking of Plato. According to Guignon, as an ideal, authenticity has two distinct stages: First, authenticity calls us to become more reflective of our lives and choices. Second, this reflection prompts one of two responses: either self-ownership, or self-loss.

The first part – the act of reflection – echoes one of the Delphic maxims: “know thyself” (γνῶθι σεαυτόν), and Socrates’ view that “the unexamined life is not worth living.” These battle cries of western philosophy emphasize the importance of reflecting on the human condition and our greater place within the world. Such reflection can lead to a kind of self-

---


11 Plato, *Apology*, 38a: “On the other hand, if I say that it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day and those other things about which you hear me conversing and testing myself and other, for the unexamined life is not worth living for men, you will believe me even less.” Translation from Plato, *Plato: Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo*, ed. John M. Cooper, trans. G. M. A. Grube, Second Edition, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2002).
knowing that proves beneficial to living a fulfilling life, but it can also come at a cost. In Socrates’ case, his own introspection leads him toward a conflict with the status quo, a disruption of the social order and reveals to him that most people have no idea what they are talking about. Ultimately, this reflection and investigation reveals to Socrates that what we believe we know is mostly a jumbled and confused mess of opinions passed down to us unquestioningly. But in telling everyone what he has learned about himself and the limits of human understanding, Socrates is vilified and put to death. It is understandable then, why, in the Crito, Socrates suggests that we reject what has been understood by most people and instead shift our focus to the opinions of only those who can claim to be experts on the matter at hand. Indeed, central to the concept of authenticity, throughout its various historical permutations, is the idea that we ought to maintain a healthy skepticism of what is said or understood by the public since what is understood by all is often a step or two removed from the truth. The upshot of this reflection is not entirely negative, as this reflection can do more than just dismiss the views of the hoi polloi. Instead, reflection can give rise to a “moment of vision” which Guignon describes as follows:

In the moment of vision, what is disclosed is not something outside yourself; rather it is you yourself. Yet this you that is discovered is a you that is for the most part concealed, hidden, lost, displaced, almost totally forgotten. What is needed, then, is a project of self-transformation aimed at recovering this lost you and reinstating it to its proper place at the center of your life.

To borrow from Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: In the moment of vision, we come to see the shackles on our hands, recognize the shadows on the walls for what they are, and begin looking

12 Plato, Apology, 21c-22e.
13 Socrates claims that it is his tendency to point out the deficiency in his interlocutor’s position that has earned him such disdain. Plato, Apology, 23d: “… they would not want to tell the truth, I’m sure, that they have been proved to lay claim to knowledge when they know nothing.”
14 Plato, Crito, 47a.
15 Guignon, On Being Authentic, 2-3.
for an exit. Here Plato’s story holds up, since by most accounts of authenticity, our initial response is to feel compelled to turn back towards the shadows. But if we find the courage to leave the cave, what do we find at the exit? Historically, what one finds when they give up the shadows on the wall varies depending on your view of what it means to be a self. In other words, while many philosophical perspectives favor the initial step of reflecting on your situation, what to do with that information is going to depend on what you think you have found. For the French existentialists, the act of reflection may reveal to you your role in choosing a path for yourself through *self-ownership*. For the religiously inclined, it may reveal to you your role in accepting your fate, surrendering to a higher power through an act of *self-loss*.

**0.2.1: Authenticity as Self-Ownership**

As a call to self-ownership, authenticity echoes Pindar’s maxim: “become who you are” (*γένοι' ὅιος ἐσσὶ μαθών*). That is, authenticity is not just about knowing who we are and examining ourselves but putting that knowledge to work: changing who we are or becoming who we are supposed to be. In English, the word “authenticity” meaning self-doing (*auto-heutes*), captures this aspect well since this version of becoming authentic requires an act of the will; a *doing* (*heutes*) which originates from the self (*auto*). To will oneself authentically on this account requires one to understand oneself authentically.

---

16 Plato, *Republic*, 515d-e: “And if someone compelled him to look at the light itself, wouldn’t his eye hurt, and wouldn’t he turn around and flee towards the things he’s able to see, believing that they’re really clearer than the ones he’s being shown?” Translation from Plato, *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997).

17 A fuller translation of this phrase is even more compelling for my argument since Pindar’s quote is really “become who you are, knowing who that is.” Within the original Greek is the sense that becoming who you are depends on a revelatory experience of understanding.
For the French philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, the act of reflection reveals that what it means to be a self is to be a pure consciousness, what he calls a for-itself (être-pour-soi). This act of reflection reveals to us that, as conscious beings, we are solely responsible for all that is good and bad in our experience of the world.\(^{18}\) This has the potential to make us relatively uncomfortable, generating a great deal of anxiety, since we come to understand that we must make choices to become what we want to be. Sartre thinks that for the most part, we try to avoid this responsibility and cover up our understanding of this fact. The numerous ways of being that we take up to avoid this responsibility are what Sartre calls “bad faith” or inauthenticity. One of the main ways that we behave in bad faith is to adopt a role which is given to us in society.\(^{19}\) Sartre gives an account of the waiter who inauthentically performs the role of waiter to the highest degree.\(^{20}\) Everything the waiter does is completely planned out and manufactured: “he is playing at being a waiter in a cafe.”\(^{21}\) Sartre thinks that this form of inauthenticity is just a way for the waiter to hide from the anxious call of his conscious being. Adopting a social role then becomes a way in which we pretend we are not free. Often, accounts of authenticity view falling into some socially assigned role as a failure to adequately respond to the anxiety that accompanies the freedom to choose your own fate.

Another prime example of this kind of self-ownership can be found in Nietzsche’s later philosophy. In the *Gay Science*, Nietzsche tells us that humans have a drive to exalt their own ideals to the level of deities. In cultures where polytheism is practiced, humans are able to find fulfillment in following gods or spirits who embody the values that they find within themselves.

\(^{19}\) Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 82.
\(^{21}\) Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 102.
With the dominance of monotheism, Nietzsche believes that western culture has adopted a stance counter to their own will, which limits the pursuit of ideals intrinsic to the individual. For Nietzsche, this step has come at the cost of undermining the individuality of each person and can only be overcome with a radical transformation of our relation to the world and to ourselves. This radically transformed individual, which Nietzsche calls the Übermensch, is self-owning above all else, a creator who sculpts himself out of marble. As Nietzsche describes it, the Übermensch breaks free from the views of the masses, with mankind as it has previously been understood, and becomes something completely new. The Übermensch is not ignorant, but rather, enlightened, and it is from the state of heightened understanding that he comes to be. Although Nietzsche does not use the language of authenticity, the idea of radical self-transformation is central to his later philosophy. For Nietzsche, however, this transformation precedes a radical transformation of society in general. This is not always the case with accounts of self-ownership, since society is often construed as the source of inauthentic social conformism.

Authentication as self-ownership is often criticized for its tendency to interpret the world in egoistic or subjectivistic terms. These criticisms are not unfounded, since authenticity as self-ownership is usually accompanied by social criticism and frequently regards the people we encounter in our everyday lives as mere sheep, or pawns, under the control of their overlords

23 Friedrich Nietzsche, Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ed. Alan D. Schrift and Duncan Large, trans. Paul S. Loeb and David F. Tinsley, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2019), 332: “superhumans completely beyond all previous virtue, hard-hearted due to their compassion, -- those who create, who unsparingly hammer their marble. For Zarathustra’s last speech.” My thanks to Will Parkhurst for finding this quote.
who they obey without question. From the perspective of everyday folks, these self-owned individuals may appear as delusional tyrants bent on controlling themselves and the world around them. This situates the self-owned as masters of their own destiny, godlets, or supermen who strike out to create the world anew in their own image. Those who are critical of self-ownership often propose that a radical self-transformation is impossible, or even a mere delusion. For those who propose that self-ownership is unattainable, authenticity as self-loss may present a humbler alternative.

0.2.2: Authenticity as Self-Loss

Authenticity can also be thought of as a form of self-loss. Rather than inspiring us to choose our own path, authenticity reveals to us our place within the cosmos, our obligation to others, or our subservience to God. Authenticity on these accounts is best realized through a process of letting go of the desires of the ego, and letting oneself be what we already are. As self-loss, authenticity can be an acceptance of the world as it is and one’s place within it.

Socrates can be seen in this paradigm in the Apology where he describes himself as a being on a mission from God, inspired by an encounter between Chaerephon and the Oracle at Delphi who claimed that no one is wiser than Socrates.²⁴ It is an open question as to whether we should take Socrates at his word when he discusses his divine mission to a room of people looking to condemn him to death. But if we take him seriously, his description of this divine revelation, which inspires his entire life pursuit, embodies this spirit of authenticity as letting-go or acceptance of one’s fate in the name of something larger. Such self-resignation for something bigger than one’s own aspirations is central to the ideal of authenticity as self-loss. This reading

²⁴ Plato, Apology. 21a: “[Chaerephon] asked if any man was wiser than [Socrates], and the [oracle] replied that no one was wiser.”
is supported by the *Crito* where, when asked to flee to save his life, Socrates rejects the arguments of his interlocutor; not because he does not think it would work, but because it would fly in the face of who he is, or at least, who he has surrendered himself to be. To flee would be to reject the divine fate which has been offered to him. To flee would be inauthentic; and so, to be authentic, Socrates accepts his unjust punishment and drinks the hemlock.

In authenticity as self-loss, death is not always required. The loss of the self need not be a literal destruction of the authentic person. Instead, authenticity as self-loss tends to focus on surrender or resignation to forces beyond our control, and consequently, features prominently in the tenets of stoic philosophy. Marcus Aurelius says that philosophy “consists in keeping the divine spirit within each of us free from disrespect and harm… accepting all that may happen and is allotted to us as coming from that source, whatever it is, from which we ourselves came.” In proper stoic fashion, Marcus Aurelius tells us to accept that there are things out of our control, as we can only affect small things like our judgments of the events, or actions we are responsible for. As Guignon describes it: “… having a place in the shared world and fulfilling one’s responsibilities is sufficient to provide a secure sense that one is faring well and achieving one’s proper purpose in the scheme of things.” This is not to say that stoic philosophy requires inaction, or some form of defeatism, but it usually involves accepting one’s place within a larger system, resigning the possibility that one is solely in charge of their own fate. On some accounts,

---

25 Plato, *Crito*, 54e: “Let it be then, Crito, and let us act in this way, since this is the way the god is leading us.”
26 Even Socrates’ final words, where he asks Crito to sacrifice a cock to Aselepius indicate that nothing was more important to him than doing right by the Gods. Having been unable to pour out some of the hemlock on the floor just moments ago, Socrates found himself in breach of the religious custom of pouring out some libation for the divine before enjoying his drink. The sacrifice of the cock is meant to remedy this misstep. (Plato, *Phaedo*, 118a)
this self-resignation still involves a conscious choice, but it is a choice to come to terms with our limitations rather than attempt to overcome them.

We can also find such views in Augustine, who, in his *Confessions*, begins the long reflective process of understanding himself and who he is. The result of this act of reflection is the revelation that he is a servant of God. Consequently, he spends the rest of his life attempting to accept this fact while ignoring his sinful call to be anything else. As Guignon puts it: “What Augustine finds through his self-inspection is that the self is like a free radical, incomplete and hopelessly unstable unless it is bound in the right way to God.”\(^\text{29}\) The only way to become bound to God is resign one’s willful existence and give it up to God in an act of self-loss.

Critics of authenticity as self-loss often note the possibility that whatever the individual is surrendering themselves to may, in fact, not be real. For instance, a man who surrenders himself to the will of God in an act of self-loss may think he is fulfilling his true potential as a servant of God. If that god does not, in fact, exist, then what this individual is surrendering themselves to is likely a set of culturally contingent practices. Rather than becoming one’s true self, this person may in fact become the exact opposite; a person living a prescribed life based on a lie. Even worse: if the cultural practices are not contingent or random but are in fact the result of a concerted effort to manipulate people, then not only could you be giving up your only chance at being yourself but you might also be the victim of overt manipulation. A prime example may be the number of individuals who, out of their surrender to the will of God, set off for battle during the crusades. These soldiers caused great suffering and suffered greatly themselves, all in the

\(^{29}\) Guignon, *On Being Authentic*, 16.
name of something which may not even exist. Thus, authenticity as self-loss can lead to
dangerous ideological territory as well.

The debate over self-ownership and self-loss within the broader notion of authenticity
conveys why Guignon is correct in establishing authenticity as a central modern ideal. In
essence, these debates are just a different way of asking “what does it mean to be a true human
being and how do I achieve it?” Even though these two paths of authenticity radically diverge
when it comes to the means of achieving authenticity, they both agree that what is desirable is an
authentic, and thus true relation to our own self. On the account of self-ownership, this self is
something we are responsible for creating. On the account of authenticity as self-loss, our
responsibility is to let go, and open up ourselves to a self which is given to us by others, our
society, or God. Nevertheless, both accounts view authenticity as an ideal of the self and begin
with a moment of reflection or insight which prompts a radical self-transformation to achieve
some harmonious state of being.

The influence of this tradition of authenticity is visible in the way that scholars debate the
nature of Heideggerian authenticity in *Being and Time*.³⁰ While scholars disagree on whether
Heidegger sides with self-ownership or self-loss, they seem to agree that Heidegger’s reflections
on authenticity are best understood as an ideal self-relation, where the goals of authenticity are
seen entirely in terms of some accomplishment of the self. While it is understandable to attempt
to situate Heidegger’s views on authenticity within this larger tradition, what results is a
narrower interpretation of authenticity than Heidegger intended. This narrower interpretation is

---

³⁰ It was not an accident that Guignon wrote an entire book on authenticity which happened to include a section on
Heidegger. As Guignon conveyed to me over lunch one day, the inexplicit goal of *On Being Authentic* was to
provide the historical context for his own research into Heideggerian authenticity.
what I call the “traditional interpretation” of Heideggerian authenticity and refers to any account which argues that authenticity is a self-focused ideal which is achieved through self-ownership or self-loss.

0.3: THE TRADITION: THREE DEFINITIONS OF HEIDEGGERIAN AUTHENTICITY

Although some parts of Being and Time seem to corroborate the traditional interpretation of authenticity and cast Heidegger as just another voice in a long history of debates over this ideal self-relations, when juxtaposed against the stated goals of the text, this traditional interpretation casts Heidegger’s project in a strange light. Since the goal at the outset of Being and Time is to investigate what we mean by “being” and how that relates to time, it is not entirely clear why Heidegger would bother to spend so much time talking about authenticity and becoming a self. It is as though Heidegger merely got sidetracked into composing an ethical treatise in the middle of writing his magnum opus. Of course, scholars can just appeal to the fact that Heidegger wrote this text quickly, relying mostly on lecture notes, in hopes of securing a job. Thus, any strangeness in the organization of the text, its topics, and its apparent detours, can all be explained as an unintended consequence of its hasty construction.31 Instead of asking if this is really what Heidegger had in mind, the traditional interpretation of authenticity devolves into a debate as to whether Heidegger successfully carried out this task of mapping out the guidelines for this self-focused ideal.

31 For an illuminating text concerning the state of Heidegger’s project in Being and Time see Lee Braver, ed., Division III of Heidegger’s Being and Time: The Unanswered Question of Being, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2015). While the title of this anthology perhaps suggests that each article is offering a plausible reconstruction of the third division to complete the first part of Being and Time most of the articles shy away from that idea and instead propose theories as to why division three was never published. See Braver’s introduction to that text for a helpful orientation.
The view proposed in this dissertation conflicts with this traditional interpretation of authenticity and argues that while Heidegger’s use of authenticity has some affinity with these traditional considerations, its role is much more significant. Let us consider three excellent attempts within the traditional view to make sense of the complex phenomena of authenticity. These attempts are found in dictionaries and lexicons dedicated to decoding the complexities of Heidegger’s robust family of terms. These definitions are particularly useful because, while they attempt to remain neutral concerning the various ways that authenticity can be interpreted, they demonstrate the clear influence of the tradition in how they focus on certain aspects of authenticity while ignoring others.

In what follows, we will see in the work of Schalow and Denker, Dahlstrom, and Käufer, definitions of authenticity which attempt to provide a full understanding of the phenomena present in Being and Time. In these definitions we will uncover some crucial insights as to what authenticity means for Heidegger, in addition to discovering some of the puzzles which have stumped scholars for generations. At the end of this section, I will synthesize these accounts into what I call the traditional definition of Heideggerian authenticity.

0.3.1: Schalow and Denker

In their Heidegger dictionary, Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy, Frank Schalow and Alfred Denker provide a dense and limited interpretation of the phenomena of authenticity which aligns with the traditional interpretation. This definition provides us with two insights concerning authenticity: the importance of translation, and the role of anxiety in self-reflection. But this definition also presents us with a puzzle concerning how authenticity is achieved for Dasein in terms of practical action.
When it comes to interpreting and translating Heidegger’s works, etymology is always an essential first step. Heidegger painstakingly picks his words, often changing his terminology when it fails to meet his expectations or creating new words when he finds it necessary. The German word for authenticity, *Eigentlichkeit*, is no exception. The root, *eigen*, which means “own” is central to what Heidegger means by this term.\(^{32}\) In acknowledging the etymological root, Schalow and Denker opt to translate *Eigentlichkeit* and *Uneigentlichkeit* as “ownedness” and “unownedness” respectively, which they define as “two modes of human existing that are grounded in the mineness of being-there.”\(^{33}\) Already we can see that this definition coincides nicely with the traditional conception of authenticity discussed above by thinking of authenticity as a self-focused ideal. For Schalow and Denker, Heideggerian authenticity is best understood as a mode of human existence that requires taking ownership of one’s own self, echoing the notion of authenticity as self-ownership discussed above.

Their definition also captures the fact that for Heidegger, Dasein is always in a state of tension between ownedness and unownedness. To take ownership of our self, we must overcome the unownedness of our being. Taking ownership is made possible by anxiety which brings “[Dasein] face-to-face with its ownmost, individualized self and for the possibility of coming into its own, which it already is.”\(^{34}\) Here again we see the traditional view of authenticity in plain sight: there is a reflective moment which reveals to us our ownmost being, and makes self-

\(^{32}\) Dahlstrom puts it succinctly in his definition discussed below: “to be authentic is precisely to own up to oneself…” (Daniel O. Dahlstrom, *The Heidegger Dictionary* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 28.)

\(^{33}\) Frank Schalow and Alfred Denker, *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy*, 2nd edition (Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 213. I share the concern of scholars like Walter Brogan, who argue that the language of “ownedness” runs the risk of characterizing Dasein as the kind of being that owns beings it encounters throughout the world in a sort of subjective mastery or domination. See Walter Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being*, SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy (State University of New York Press, 2005),154-5. For my own suggestion for how to translate *Eigentlichkeit*, see 6.3.

\(^{34}\) Schalow and Denker, *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy*, 213.
ownership possible. We can see that the moment of reflection, what precipitates authentic self-choosing, is brought about through an encounter with anxiety and self-ownership is described as a mode of human existence that we can take up in response.

The problem which arises in this definition concerns the logistics of achieving authenticity. According to Schalow and Denker, Dasein becomes authentic insofar as it comes “face-to-face with its ownmost, individualized self,” but they describe this self as something “which it already is.” In describing the authentic encounter as “coming face-to-face” it is not entirely clear what that requires. Perhaps coming face-to-face would merely require recognizing who we are. But if authenticity is merely discovering who we are, then what does this have to do with resolutely choosing? Is choosing yourself merely acknowledging who you are and accepting it? From this definition alone, it is altogether unclear if Dasein even needs to do anything except reflect on its anxiety in order to achieve authenticity.

Given the limited space that Schalow and Denker dedicate to this definition, we should not expect an exhaustive definition, or a full account of how Dasein achieves authenticity. Nevertheless, this definition shows why the traditional interpretation of authenticity is so often applied to discussions of Heideggerian authenticity. From this definition alone, it seems like Heideggerian authenticity is fairly straight-forward: To become authentic is to own yourself, which can only happen after a moment of reflection inspired by anxiety. This puts Heidegger in line with a rich tradition of thinkers who argued along the lines of self-ownership outlined above. The only puzzle left is to figure out the requisite criteria for self-ownership. Unfortunately, things are not so simple. As we will see in these additional definitions, there is much more to the phenomena of authenticity and the puzzles will only continue to pile up.
0.3.2: Dahlstrom

In his work, *The Heidegger Dictionary*, Daniel Dahlstrom dedicates three pages to his definition of authenticity, which allows him to identify some of the complexities of this term. Dahlstrom’s definition is helpful because it addresses the negative and positive significance of social assimilation, the call of conscience and the importance of the resolute choice. This definition, gives rise to an additional puzzle, since (on Dahlstrom’s reading) Heidegger’s account struggles to provide adequate motivation for the resolute choice which is requisite for authenticity.

Dahlstrom’s definition follows the traditional interpretation of authenticity as self-ownership and identifies the importance of overcoming social influence for becoming a self: “Before we have even come of age, we have fallen prey to forces of assimilation. We seemingly make choices all the time, but it is not clear that we are doing any more than going through the motions since the choices are made under the sway of some group (the They).” Here, Dahlstrom indicates the centrality of overcoming the sway of “the They,” a social influence that assimilates us into fallenness. On this account, authenticity is only achieved by going against the grain of social conventions and practices by way of a Kierkegaardian or Sartrean rejection of social conformism. This is common to the traditional interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity that casts the social in opposition to the will of the individual: To be authentic is to break free of the herd.

Although Dahlstrom does focus on this anti-social element, his definition also draws our attention to the possibility of authentically being-with others whereby we avoid “foisting our possibilities upon [others.]” Already, we can see glints of conflict between Heideggerian

authenticity and the traditional model of authenticity as self-ownership, which tends to view society as a source of inauthenticity, rather than a possible avenue for authentic self-realization. Dahlstrom’s brief but notable discussion on authentic being-with suggests a level of community and shared concern that usually goes unexamined. Thus, our first crucial insight concerns the possibility that Heideggerian authenticity is in part a rejection of the social, while simultaneously being amenable to being-with our fellow Dasein.

For Dahlstrom, it is the call of our conscience that calls Dasein to “take accountability of itself,” and to help release it from the demands of the herd. According to Dahlstrom, for Heidegger it is the conscience that “attests to [our] authentic capability.” In other words, while authentic self-reflection is preempted by anxiety, the resolute self-choice is inspired by the call of conscience, which is ultimately just Dasein listening to itself for the first time. Thus, from Dahlstrom’s definition, our second crucial insight is that an adequate interpretation of authenticity must account for the role of conscience in our resolute choosing.

So far, despite his brief departure to address a more positive aspect of the social, Dahlstrom’s definition is fairly close to the traditional interpretation of authenticity, which characterizes authenticity as a self-focused ideal. Nevertheless, Dahlstrom is aware that there are some serious limitations to this view, which he attributes to Heidegger’s views on the nature of authentic choosing. Here he demonstrates that the traditional interpretation struggles to find an intelligible middle path between unbounded radical freedom and rigid social conformism:

If that basis [for the choice], e.g., some reason or belief, is drawn from the averageness of everyday Dasein, then the authenticity of the choice seems questionable. Some interpreters countenance this enabling role of average

everydayness in Dasein’s capacity to be authentic, while others contend that the authentic choice to choose prescinds from any such norm, thereby inviting the charge of decisionism. Both approaches are problematic. The former seems to violate the indexicality of Dasein’s authentic choice, i.e., the fact that its choice to choose is made in view of its projection of its death, not shared with any other Dasein. The latter approach renders authenticity an unmotivated spontaneity, a kind of moral luck.\textsuperscript{39}

This portion of Dahlstrom’s definition of authenticity brings out the long held interpretive problems that have surrounded the traditional reading of authenticity. To be authentic, we must transcend the influence of the social. The problem with this conception of authenticity is that in order for something to be ownmost, it must come completely from within.\textsuperscript{40} In order to break free of the herd, we would have to choose to be something that has not been passed down to us through society. But what roles or ways of being exist that have not already been influenced by society? All choices, all ways of being, are historically and socially contingent. Dahlstrom notes that the two viable options are unsatisfying. For scholars who tend to see Heideggerian authenticity as part of this traditional debate, this dilemma between the social and the self is a point of extreme contention.\textsuperscript{41}

Dahlstrom’s definition shows authenticity to be a terminologically rich phenomenon. It emphasizes a significant relation between authenticity and the social, the call of conscience, and questions the possibility of making a truly resolute choice. What we can glean from this

\textsuperscript{39} Dahlstrom, \textit{The Heidegger Dictionary}, 29-30.

\textsuperscript{40} We find a similar view in Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of authenticity in \textit{Being and Nothingness}. Sartre sees the world in terms of a dichotomy between an in-itself (entities which are defined entirely by their facticity) and a for-itself (humans who are defined by their consciousness which can transcend facticity). A for-itself is a conscious being and is defined entirely in terms of their ability to negate the positive aspects of their being. According to Sartre, the definitive trait of consciousness is its negative relationship to being: consciousness defines itself by rejecting various aspects of the world. Freedom and consequently, the ability to negate all being, becomes the existential ideal for Sartre.

definition is that if we are going to make sense of authenticity, we will have to be able to address
the role of the social, the conscience, and resolve the puzzle concerning the conditions for
authentic choosing.

0.3.3: Käufer

Our third and final definition comes from Käufer’s entry on “Authenticity” in The Heidegger
Lexicon. Käufer’s definition is much more detailed, spanning seven pages, and containing much
of the content of the above definitions with some important additions. The crucial insights
gleaned from this definition are as follows: the emphasis on authenticity as self-expression that
has historically gone astray and the recognition that inauthentic self-interpretations have plagued
the history of philosophy. The puzzle of this definition is derived from the fact that while Käufer
attributes a methodological role to authenticity, he does not adequately explain what that role is.

In line with the traditional interpretation of authenticity, Käufer considers authenticity
entirely in terms of an ideal self-relation when he defines authenticity generally: “As a general
definition one can say that Dasein exists authentically if it exists in such a way as to express its
own ontological make-up, including the vulnerability of its basic commitments.”42 Authenticity
here is understood as a way of existing, one that is preferable to its inauthentic counter-point.
According to Käufer, the counter-concept, inauthenticity, can be understood as “exist[ing] in
such a way as to cover up its own ontological make-up…”43 Thus authenticity and inauthenticity
are characterized by the way that they uncover or cover up Dasein’s ontology respectively. For
Käufer, authentic self-relating is a mode of disclosure which uncovers the ontology of Dasein,

whereas inauthentic self-relating result in the covering up or obfuscation of Dasein’s ontology. Thus, the first insight from this definition is the link between authenticity and unconcealment.

Käufer’s general definition of authenticity also leads us to the next crucial insight: Historically we have been conceptualizing the self in a way that covers up its ontology. Käufer describes the historical self-conceptions from Kant and Descartes, which see human beings as a “persistent, world-independent self-identifying entity.”

Käufer sees Heidegger’s account of authenticity as a corrective to these Kantian and Cartesian inauthentic depictions of the self. To overcome the mistaken (and inauthentic) self-interpretations passed down to us through our history, we have to gain an authentic self-understanding. Thus, our second insight is that authenticity is part of Heidegger’s attempt to overcome the traditional misinterpretation of the self.

Taken together, these two insights lead us to our puzzle: Käufer believes that authenticity as the self-relation which un conceals Dasein’s ontological structure is important for Heidegger’s method in Being and Time, but his description of how that takes place is incredibly vague. According to Käufer, while the first division of Being and Time introduces the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity, they do “little conceptual work until division two.”

He notes that since the goal of Being and Time is to uncover the full ontology of Dasein, and because it is only in division two that Heidegger adds his analysis of authentic Dasein to the account of Dasein’s ontological structure, it is only with the second division where we find the account of Dasein in its authentic mode of being, and consequently, see the full picture of Dasein’s

---

44 Käufer, “Authenticity,” 73.
ontology. Here the “full picture” refers to both the authentic self-interpretation found in the latter half of *Being and Time*, and the various inauthentic self-interpretations which have been passed down through the tradition which can be found in the first half of *Being and Time*. The problem is that Käufer gives no justification for why Heidegger would need to bother with these inauthentic conceptions of the self in his demonstration of the ontology of Dasein. If the goal of *Being and Time* really is to uncover the full ontology of Dasein, why would Heidegger even want to focus on accounts which distort that ontology in the first place? Thus, the puzzle of this definition which must be resolved pertains to the role of authenticity and inauthenticity for Heidegger’s method. If we are to better understand Heideggerian authenticity, we will need to explain why Heidegger would dedicate so much time to talking about inauthentic modes of being.

This puzzle notwithstanding, Käufer’s definition should be praised for defending the multifaceted nature of authenticity. As we will see in chapters three and four, the link between authenticity and unconcealment will prove crucial for understanding Heidegger’s views on authenticity. Furthermore, the problem of inauthentic self-interpretations passed down through the tradition of philosophy will also be vital for understanding the importance of history in Heidegger’s phenomenological method which informs the very structure *Being and Time*. Lastly, Käufer’s suggestion that authenticity is methodological is insightful, even if his description of that method is underdeveloped.

---

46 Käufer, “Authenticity,” 72. As we will see in Chapter 3, authenticity is indeed a central part of Heidegger’s method, and the work in division two is requisite for the overall goal of *Being and Time*. What Käufer’s account fails to recognize is that the goal of the *Being and Time* is not just the ontology of Dasein, but fundamental ontology. Heidegger tells us in the introduction, that we are only investigating Dasein to get to this further question.
0.3.4: Gathering the Insights of the Tradition

We now have a provisional understanding of Heideggerian authenticity. Even if, for the most part, these definitions remain framed by the traditional interpretation of authenticity. From Schalow and Denker we learned that, for Heidegger, anxiety prompts the moment of self-reflection which makes authenticity possible. However, it was unclear what, other than self-reflection or awareness, is required to achieve authenticity for Dasein. From Dahlstrom we learned that authenticity involves a complex relation to the social. However, the depiction of authenticity as a rejection of the social put the possibility for a resolute choice in question. From Käufer we saw that authenticity is a condition for the possibility of uncovering the ontology of Dasein and thus is rooted in the method of Being and Time itself. But the way that authenticity and method were related remained underdeveloped. Taken together, these definitions demonstrate the tension found in the secondary scholarship concerning authenticity.

Synthesizing these views into a singular definition, what I call the “traditional interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity” could be defined as follows: “A self-focused and ideal mode of being for Dasein that is brought about through an anxious moment of insight, which prompts Dasein to overcome the social roles that it has heretofore unthinkingly adopted in its inauthentic everydayness.”

0.4: THE PATH TO AUTHENTICITY

In the above definitions we have uncovered some crucial insights and highlighted some interpretive puzzles. While these definitions do not exhibit the full range of interpretations within the scholarship, they go far enough to demonstrate the influence of the traditional interpretation of authenticity and the problems which arise from it. If anything, we can at least glean that Heideggerian authenticity is an unsettled issue within the scholarship. In order to settle it, this
dissertation aims at carefully working through all of the phenomena of authenticity, to provide a full answer to the question: “What does Heidegger mean by authenticity in *Being and Time*.” The dissertation is structured as follows:

In chapter one, “Gathering the Phenomena of Authenticity,” I summarize key portions of *Being and Time* to provide the context and framing for situating Heidegger’s various uses of authenticity. This chapter is not merely a rehash of previously tread ground, but an essential assembly of the phenomena of authenticity which must be addressed in full. What we will find is that while discussions of authenticity in the scholarship tend to relegate themselves entirely to Dasein’s self-disclosure (a legacy of the traditional interpretation of authenticity), the account of authenticity in *Being and Time* is much more multifaceted.

In chapter two, “On the Several Senses of *Eigentlich* in Heidegger,” I demonstrate that one of the reasons there is so much confusion surrounding Heideggerian authenticity is that scholars are not entirely sure when Heidegger is using the term technically and when he is using it colloquially. This explains why some scholars disregard the numerous uses of authenticity that appear in non-traditional contexts. Without a clear linguistic analysis of this term, we cannot even begin to gather up all of the phenomena of authenticity, and the project is compromised from the start. Consequently, this chapter plays a crucial role in our investigation by utilizing linguistics to establish guidelines for identifying when Heidegger is using authenticity in a technical way. With these guidelines in hand, we are able to see this term in its broader meaning and trace its use all the way back to Heidegger’s early lectures on phenomenological method.

In chapter three, “Heidegger’s *Endoxic* Method,” I show that not only does authenticity show up in these early lectures but that authenticity is at the heart of how Heidegger defines his phenomenological method. I start by roughly outlining Aristotle’s approach to philosophical
problems to demonstrate the method which inspired Heidegger. I then show that authenticity appears in three interrelated and crucial breakthroughs in Heidegger’s thought: (1) his early descriptions of formal indication and phenomenological destruction, (2) his descriptions of Aristotelian *endoxic* method, and (3) his own description of method in *Being and Time*. By tracing these early uses of authenticity, the account developed in this chapter provides a map of Heidegger’s methodological development from 1921 to 1927 and ultimately shows that the structure of *Being and Time* is the result of his appropriation of Aristotle’s method.

In chapter four, “Reinterpreting Authenticity,” I bring the insights of chapter three to bear on the discussion of authenticity by splitting the term into its two senses: methodological authenticity and applied authenticity. With this new interpretation, we will see that many of the unexplained uses of authenticity can now be properly understood. We will also see why authentic being-oneself is a particularly complex form of applied authenticity, and why Heidegger dedicates so many pages to it in *Being and Time*. Ultimately, we will see how the methodological interpretation of authenticity accounts for all of the phenomena in question, while also squaring nicely with Heidegger’s reflections on *Being and Time* in the years following its publication.

In chapter five, “Destructing of the Tradition,” I analyze and critique four significant interpretations of authenticity found within the Heideggerian secondary literature. I group these interpretations into camps which are based loosely around who these scholars tend to associate most closely with Heidegger’s interpretation of authenticity. Much like the definitions of authenticity discussed in this introduction, I show that while each camp gets some portion of the story correct, on their own they each fail to account for some of the phenomena of authenticity. By the end of this chapter, I show that my reading of authenticity is better, not only because it
can explain the phenomena in question but also because it can explain why previous interpretations were misled or confused.

Lastly, in the sixth and final chapter, “A Proper Conclusion,” I reiterate the value of my reading for interpreting the structure of proposed goals of *Being and Time* while also indicating how this methodological reading could prove useful for understanding Heidegger’s thought in his middle and later period, in the years after *Being and Time*. We will look briefly at Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” to see how his interpretation of *Being and Time*, twenty years after its publication, squares with the interpretation developed in this dissertation. At the end of this chapter, I address the question of whether authenticity is the best translation for this term, now that we understand both its methodological and applied meanings.
CHAPTER 1: GATHERING THE PHENOMENA OF AUTHENTICITY

In the introduction, we defined the traditional interpretation of authenticity generally as: “A self-focused and ideal mode of being for Dasein that is brought about through an anxious moment of insight, which prompts Dasein to overcome the social roles that it has heretofore unthinkingly adopted in its inauthentic everydayness.” While this definition is useful for addressing one particular mode of authenticity, it should become quickly apparent that this definition fails to account for the many ways that authenticity is used in Heidegger’s philosophy. To demonstrate the broader use of authenticity, the first step in our investigation requires us to gather up the various ways that the term “authenticity” is used and provide a provisional account of its meaning.¹ As seen above, without the context, no matter how thorough the definition, it is difficult to fully understand the term. Consequently, the goal of this chapter is to provide a general outline of Being and Time to contextualize the various ways that authenticity appears throughout the text. Throughout this chapter, we will see four different ways that authenticity is used: in relation to tools, in relation to other Dasein, in relation to ourselves, and in relation to

¹ In Being and Time “authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]” and “inauthenticity [Uneigentlichkeit]” are modes of being for Dasein, whereas the terms “authentic [eigentlich]” and “inauthentic [uneigentlich]” are used to describe encounters with all types of entities. On my reading, Dasein achieves authenticity when it encounters its own self authentically. Thus, the direct relation between authentically encountering entities and the mode of being of authenticity is crucial for my interpretation. In chapter 4, I outline how my broader interpretation of the Heideggerian notion of “the authentic,” derived from his earlier lectures, is what informs his notion of Dasein’s authenticity in Being and Time. My thanks to Iain Thomson for helping me clarify this issue.
communities as a whole. Taken together, these phenomena of authenticity will demonstrate the inadequacies of the traditional interpretation of authenticity.

1.1: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF BEING AND TIME

Heidegger describes *Being and Time* as a work in the field of ontology (the study of beings.) As a work of ontology, Heidegger sets out to discuss the many ways that things exist in the world of our everyday experience. But, as Heidegger notes:

… there are many things which we designate as ‘being.’ Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way, is being; what we are is being and so is how we are.\(^2\)

Thus, the guiding question for Heidegger’s project in *Being and Time* is: “What is the meaning of Being?” The problem, however, is that since the works of Aristotle and Plato this question has been forgotten. When it comes to being, the problem is the immediacy of it. As Aristotle tells us: “For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all.”\(^3\) When things are always evident, they fade into the background, become taken for granted and eventually forgotten. Like the glasses on our face, or gravity which holds us to the surface of this planet, before long we forget they are even there, regardless of how important they are. The glasses which occupy many of our faces, and the gravity which holds us all down are not nothing, even if we lack awareness of them; rather they play a crucial role in the navigation of our life-worlds. The same goes for being, although in perhaps a much broader way.


“Being” or its third person present form, “is”, can be found constantly throughout our language: In literature, philosophy, politics, this word quite literally is everywhere. Like the glasses which bring our world into focus, the proximity of “is” is – philosophically speaking – a bit of a curse. As has already been apparent in these last few sentences, we use this word predicatively to describe things, which means that speaking of “is” often requires use of the word “is.” What results is the philosophical equivalent of trying to make the bed while you are lying in it, where the closeness of the task only increases the difficulty. Heidegger, aware of the peculiar difficulty of this investigation, is hesitant to move too fast too quickly, but instead carefully plods along, subjecting his own approach to scrutiny along the way. 4

Thus, in some ways Being and Time is an attempt to get some perspective, or at least, to demonstrate the tools which prove useful for doing so. It is for this reason that Heidegger opens his magnum opus with a quote from Plato’s Sophist: “‘For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression ‘being’. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.’”5 To which Heidegger responds: “Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all.”6 Such is the sad state of the question of the meaning of being: We have become so far removed from it that we have forgotten how to even ask it.7 Unlike losing our keys, where the impediment is obvious and the solution just as simple, in the case of the question of the meaning of being, it

4 This qualification speaks to the fact that Heidegger always describes his path as a provisional or preliminary approach to the question of the meaning of being. Throughout Being and Time, he seems divided as to the effectiveness of his method. On the one hand, he often pauses to remind the reader that this is only one approach to the question. On the other hand, he confidently asserts that the analytic of Dasein is a requisite step for his own investigation. See SZ: 333/382 where Heidegger considers the limitations of his method. Also see SZ: 437/488 where at the end of division two he considers the plausibility of his investigation concerning the nature of time.
5 SZ: 1/19. Citing: Plato, Sophist, 244a.
6 SZ: 1/19.
7 SZ: 1: “But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression ‘Being’? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question.”
is not even clear to us that we have lost something. Once we are aware that something is missing, where do we even begin to look? Is there a historical and philosophical equivalent to a catchall bowl in the kitchen or couch cushions which harbor metaphysical concepts? Not quite.

In his attempt to ask and provide an answer to the question of what we mean when we say the word “being”, Heidegger suggests that what is needed is an approach which carefully investigates the various ways that being can become manifest. The good news is that in asking the question “What do we mean by Being?”, we already are in a particular way; that is, we are existing in a form of being as a questioning thing. To question, is to exist, to be in the way of questioning, or to put it in a catchy phrase: “I think, therefore I am.” For Heidegger, the reversal is just as true: I am, therefore I think. Thus, to exist is to understand being, even if that understanding is vague or implicit. So Heidegger’s point of entry into the realm of ontology is to provide a provisional analysis of the kind of being that can even ask this question in the first place: namely, us, what Heidegger calls Dasein. This provisional analysis of Dasein, also

---

8 Citing Descartes' “cogito ergo sum” in a summary of Heideggerian ontology might be considered a sin in some circles, but I maintain that Heidegger has no real problem with the phrase. In fact, Heidegger discusses this phrase explicitly and points out that the real issue is that we do not give enough attention to the sum: “If the ‘cogito sum’ is to serve as the point of departure for the existential analytic of Dasein, then it needs to be turned around, and furthermore its content needs new ontologico-phenomenal confirmation. The ‘sum’ is then asserted first, and indeed in the sense that ‘I am in a world.’” (SZ: 211/254). For Heidegger, the sum means not only I am but rather, I am thrown into a world of meaningful possibilities. See also SZ: 46/71: “[Descartes] leaves the ‘sum’ completely undiscussed, even though it is regarded as no less primordial than the cogito.”

9 SZ: 5/25.

10 Guignon questions the legitimacy of this approach whereby Heidegger seeks an answer to the question of Being by analyzing the being Dasein. He notes that the appeal to everyday interpretations of Dasein seems to run the risk that any results will themselves be historically contingent: “If all interpretations are rooted in finite and historical Dasein, then it seems natural to assume that the ‘interpreting of interpreting’ which makes up the existential analytic will be in the same boat as any other interpretation: it will be a cultural and historical product, not the discovery of timely, immutable structures.” (Charles B. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, (Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1983), 63). As a result, Guignon worries that this method will be unable to secure an interpretation of Dasein which is transhistorical and transcultural. As I show in chapter three, Heidegger is aware of this concern, and seeks the help of Aristotle to avoid falling into this trap.
known as the Analytic of Dasein (Daseinsanalytik) takes up the entire first division of Being and Time.

Dasein does not have the kind of being which we might call a “subject” in the traditional sense of a mind or thinking thing which stands independently from objects. Rather, for Heidegger, Dasein is a being which is always already in a world and engaged with it. A Dasein without a world, is no Dasein. This is why Heidegger defines Dasein’s being as being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein). Contrary to the tradition, rather than thinking of ourselves as subjects surrounded by objects, Heidegger uses the term “disclosure” (Erschlossenheit) to talk about the way in which we encounter the world meaningfully. To “dis-close” something is to actively take something which is hidden (or rather, “closed off”) and open it up. This speaks to our everyday experience, where, rather than seeing the world as a set of objects (Gegenstände) we encounter a horizon of meaningful possibilities found in the way that entities (Seienden) show themselves in their being.

This self-showing is what Heidegger calls “phenomena” from the Greek φαινόμενον. But more than just “seeing” them, to encounter phenomena, or entities, is to move about them, interact with them, and use them to carry out our tasks and goals. In other words, to encounter something in its self-showing is to encounter it meaningfully. All encountering must take place within a world, and all worlds must be already disclosed in some way or other. When we disclose an entity, we disclose it as something. This “as structure” speaks to the way in which all

---

11 SZ: 52/77.
12 SZ: 53/79.
13 GA 17: 6-7/4. “Phenomenology is put together from λόγος and φαινόμενον. Φαινόμενον means: something that shows itself. Φαίνομαι is the same as “to show itself,” φαίνω the same as “to bring something to the light of day.”
things show up “as” something or other. Typically, things show up “as” something for use or something we are concerned about. This meaningful totality which makes up the “as structure” is not some explicit activity that Dasein knowingly engages in, but rather is happening in the background of Dasein’s encounter with the world as a whole. Heidegger believes that it is at the heart of all existence (for Dasein) to have disclosed the world and to be constantly disclosing it anew. That is, Dasein is constantly opening-up and thus encountering entities in their being.

John Haugeland famously said that what defines human beings, and what sets them apart from say computers or artificial intelligence, is that they “give a damn.” Or to put it in Heideggerian terms: Dasein cares. This care is not an activity that we explicitly engage in, though it can become explicit in the right circumstances; rather it is our unconscious drive towards our projects and aspirations. In the analytic of Dasein, Heidegger identifies several unique ways that we can disclose things in their being: as objects of use, as mere things, as fellow human beings, and lastly, as ourselves. With each of these encounters, Heidegger describes a unique horizon or world within which such entities are encountered. Each horizon is described in terms of a unique way of care about the entities in question. Within each kind of care, we find discussion of authentic encounters with the entities in question. These authentic encounters are often overlooked by scholars who have been influenced by the traditional

---

14 SZ: 33/56.
16 See SZ: 131/169: “But what more is there to point out in Being-in-the-world, beyond the essential relations of Being alongside the world (concern), Being-with (solicitude), and Being-one’s-self (‘who’)?” Although it should stand out to any reader of this text that Heidegger divides up being-in-the-world into these various constitutive horizons, I must give credit to Ed Boedeker for teaching this to me in my first Heidegger class. This entire dissertation is indebted to his interpretation which brought this text to life for me so many years ago.
interpretation of authenticity. These encounters will stand as crucial indications for the phenomena of authenticity.\textsuperscript{17} A brief description of each should serve as a helpful introduction.

1.1.1: Entities and their Worlds

Heidegger describes human existence as being highly determined by the meaningful way our immediate world calls to us. Early on in \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger goes to lengths to distance his view from the modern approach to ontology which views all beings in terms of their temporal and spatial orientation and the various properties which can be assigned to these objects. For Heidegger, reality does not show up for us in that way; at least, it does not show up for us that way originally, even if it can be made to show up for us in that way through an act of abstraction. According to Heidegger the world always already (\textit{immer schon}) shows up as meaningful (or significant). This “always already” speaks to the way that most of our encounters in the world are accompanied by a general understanding which has been functioning in the background since we first gained consciousness. Dasein feels at home in the world which shows up as significant and intelligible.

For the most part, this significance is derived from the way that various tasks are interrelated and dependent on one another. Taken as a whole, these myriad tasks, chores, and goals determine how things show up to us in our environment (\textit{Umwelt}).\textsuperscript{18} Heidegger notes that each of these tasks has an associated “in-order-to” (\textit{um-zu}) and some sort of equipment (\textit{Zeug})

\textsuperscript{17} These discussions of applied uses of authenticity will be returned to in chapter 4, after the methodological meaning of authenticity has been clarified.

\textsuperscript{18} The German “\textit{Umwelt}” speaks to the way that Heidegger provisionally defines Dasein as “that being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being [\textit{Das Sein, darum es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein geht}]” (SZ: 42/67.) Translated literally: “That being whose being goes around [\textit{geht darum}] itself in its being.” The “\textit{um}” of the \textit{umwelt} and the “\textit{um}” of \textit{darum}, speak to the way in which Dasein, proximately and for the most part, finds itself caught up in the world of its concern: what surrounds (\textit{um}) it.
which goes along with those tasks. For example, I need my toothbrush in order to maintain proper dental hygiene.

Our environment is not just a simple one-to-one relation of tools to various tasks. Instead, in-order-to’s string together to form webs of related tasks, procedures, plans and schedules. I pack my lunch in order to have calories later in the day in order to do better work in the afternoon in order to keep my job. Ideally, all of these in-order-to’s are unified in relation to some ultimate goal which organizes them, what Heidegger calls our “for-the-sake-of-which” (Worumwillen). This for-the-sake-of-which can be some version of our self that we aim to become, such that we organize our activities around carrying out tasks which will help us become that person. For example, we may start drinking protein shakes and jogging every day in hopes of becoming a fitter and healthier version of our selves. Sometimes we choose to take on these new routines, but often these for-the-sake-of-which’s are chosen for us by other people. For example, when we are young, our parents may direct us towards activities which will lead us to becoming a doctor or a lawyer. Consequently, the for-the-sake-of-which plays a crucial role in Heidegger’s account of authenticity, since becoming an authentic person ultimately entails choosing or perhaps accepting a for-the-sake-of-which to orient our lives around. Although we might be able to center our lives around a few for-the-sake-of-which’s, we cannot choose all of them, meaning that we will have to choose some over others. Making this choice authentically requires that we understand the stakes of the choice, which requires that we come to terms with

19 Notice the connection between: Umwelt, Um-zu, and Worumwillen. Heidegger intentionally links these “um” words together to stress their interrelation. See Section 15 of Being and Time for a detailed account of these related terms.

20 SZ: 327/375: “Self-projection upon the ‘for-the-sake-of-oneself’ is grounded in the future and is an essential characteristic of existentiality.”
our finitude.\textsuperscript{21} This finitude speaks to two distinct limitations: that I cannot pursue every project at once, and that eventually my time as an existing Dasein will be up.\textsuperscript{22}

To summarize this section by way of example: We make breakfast to have energy, we need energy to carry out our jobs, we work jobs to further a career, and we pursue a career to establish ourselves as a certain type of person. That Dasein directs itself towards activities which relate to some for-the-sake-of-which is not accidental. Heidegger thinks that this way of living is rooted in the kind of being we are: “… Dasein, when understood \textit{ontologically}, is care.”\textsuperscript{23} If Dasein did not care about its projects, its friends, or itself, it would not be motivated to pursue some future.\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{1.1.2: Authentic Encounters with Tools}

As noted above, there are different types of care tied to the kind of entity with which Dasein is engaged. Heidegger calls the kind of objects that we encounter every day, and consequently disclose as useful beings: ready-to-hand (\textit{Zuhanden}) entities.\textsuperscript{25} Although this way of disclosing entities is not limited to household tools like you might own if you perform regular home maintenance, such tools are regularly used as examples for this kind of being. Strictly speaking,

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{21} SZ: 384/435: “Only being-free for death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one’s existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly—and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate.”


\textsuperscript{23} SZ: 57/84.

\textsuperscript{24} SZ: 193/238: “Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies 'before' every factual 'attitude' and 'situation' of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies in them. So this phenomenon by no means expresses a priority of the 'practical' attitude over the theoretical. When we ascertain something present-at-hand by merely beholding it, this activity has the character of care just as much as does a 'political action' or taking a rest and enjoying oneself. 'Theory' and 'practice' are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must be defined as "care".

\textsuperscript{25} Notice the connection between the ‘zu’ of \textit{Zuhanden} and the ‘zu’ of \textit{um-zu}. \textit{Zuhanden} entities are what we use in order to (\textit{um-zu}) carry out our tasks within the \textit{Umwelt}. 
\end{flushleft}
any entities which we use in our everyday lives – cars, phones, shoes, hats, keys, etc. – are encountered primarily in terms of their readiness-to-hand. Heidegger’s paradigmatic example is the hammer.\textsuperscript{26} As noted before, for Heidegger, in order to encounter a hammer, we must have already disclosed the environment of significance to which that entity belongs. There is no such thing as a tool in isolation from its meaningful context: a hammer in a world with no hammering is merely a stick with a dense object attached to one end.\textsuperscript{27}

The environment (\textit{Umwelt}) which provides this particular meaningful context is structured by a form of care which is translated as “concern.” Although care and concern are related terms in English, this translation slightly obscures the fact that Heidegger intended these words to share an etymological root: care is \textit{Sorge}, while concern is \textit{Besorge}.\textsuperscript{28} As we will see, Heidegger uses these roots as a way to signify the interrelatedness of care and map out his architectonic. For each kind of encounter, there is a corresponding mode of care, and (as I plan to show by the end of this dissertation) a corresponding way of authentically caring for the entity in question. We get hints of this when Heidegger defines a tool using the terminology of authenticity: “The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically.”\textsuperscript{29} In other words, readiness-to-hand is peculiar in that our encounter with the hammer is more authentic the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{26} SZ: 69/98.
\item \textsuperscript{27} SZ: 68/97: “Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is.”
\item \textsuperscript{28} The link between these terms can be found at SZ: 57: “... the being of Dasein itself is to be made visible as care. This expression too is to be taken as an ontological structural concept. (See Chapter 6 of this Division.) It has nothing to do with ‘tribulation’, ‘melancholy’, or the ‘cares of life’, though ontically one can come across these in every Dasein. These – like their opposites, ‘gaiey’ and ‘freedom from care’ – are ontically possible only because Dasein, when understood \textit{ontologically}, is care [\textit{Sorge}]. Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world is essentiality concern [\textit{Besorge}].”
\item \textsuperscript{29} SZ: 69/99.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
less we think about it. The hammer is most hammer-like (or embodies its hammerseness) in moments where it is at work: when we let it fade into the background.

That Heidegger flags this encounter as peculiar (eigentumlich) should indicate to us that this conclusion is the opposite of what we might have expected. As discussed above, authenticity is often accompanied by a moment of reflection, where we come to understand what we are, prior to the moment where we act upon that information. But here, authenticity regarding encounters with tools follows the opposite path. Rather than authentically encountering the hammer when we stop to look at it and reflect on its features, Heidegger suggests that the real authentic encounter comes in our unthinking engagement with it. Already in this section, we can see that for Heidegger, authenticity pertains to more than just discussions of self-ownership or self-loss. Rather, authenticity is crucial to understanding how we uncover various types of entities in ways which disclose their being in its being.

1.1.3: Authentic Encounters with Others

For Heidegger, tools of use cannot be understood entirely on their own, without the rich social background which gives them meaning. The hammer has no place in a society which has no history of hammering, or tasks which require its use. This is because Dasein’s daily hierarchy of tasks to be completed is deeply rooted in our social practices. Many of the tasks we take on are for the sake of the household, our friends, or our community as a whole. As Dasein, we find ourselves thrown into a world full of obligations, rituals, and traditions. Heidegger notes that even a Dasein who attempts to live a life of solitude, does so in a way which recognizes this inherently social aspect of our being, even if it represents a privative version of our traditional
Likewise, being amongst a crowd need not fulfill Dasein’s social needs. When one finds oneself surrounded by strangers on a bus, or at a movie theater, it is possible to feel lonely. Whether we are social in our solitude, or lonely in a crowd, Heidegger argues that Dasein is inherently a being-with-others. The horizon of social intelligibility which serves as the source for these various obligations and rituals is what Heidegger calls *das Man*.

*Das Man* is a technical term for Heidegger that he uses to capture the way in which we speak generally about things which apply to all of us, but no person in particular. Although *das Man* gets portrayed in negative terms by the secondary literature, and even by Heidegger himself on occasion, it plays a crucial and ineliminable role in our lives. This term can be translated as “the they,” or “the one,” or “the everyone.” It speaks to the way that we often appeal to a general social intelligibility when we say things like “they say it’s good to have a glass of wine every once in a while”, or “one must tell the truth”, or “everyone knows that an apple a day keeps the doctor away.” Of course, this appeal to a general social fact is likely rooted in some assertion made by a particular individual at one time or another, but who that individual is, and whether they are right, has long been lost to history. Once enough people repeat the phrase, it fades into

---

30 SZ: 120/157: “The Other can be missing only in and for a being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; its very possibility is the proof of this.” A fitting example of this can be found in the movie Cast Away, where the protagonist befriends a volleyball, which he names “Wilson,” in order to maintain some semblance of social normalcy.

31 SZ: 123/160: “According to the analysis which we have now completed, Being with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein, which is an issue for Dasein in its very Being. Thus as Being-with, Dasein ‘is’ essentially for the sake of Others. This must be understood as an existential statement as to its essence. Even if the particular factical Dasein does not turn to Others, and supposes that it has no need of them or manages to get along without them, it is in the way of Being-with.”

32 SZ: 129/167: “The ‘they’ is an existentiale; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein’s positive constitution.”

33 For example, Theodor Adorno believes that *das Man* is “subsumed under inauthenticity” and that Heidegger calls for the neutrality of this source of intelligibility are insincere (Theodor W. Adorno, *Jargon of Authenticity*, (London: Taylor & Francis Books Ltd, 1973), 95.)

34 SZ: 130/168: “From the kind of Being which belongs to the ‘they’ – the kind which is closest – everyday Dasein draws its pre-ontological way of interpreting its Being.”
the background of conventional wisdom, even if someone comes along to reject the thesis.\textsuperscript{35} In the circumstance that enough people question the social wisdom, and given enough time, the view may change. But it is entirely possible that conflicting wisdoms carry in the views of the public despite their apparent contradiction. For example, the phrases “opposites attract” and “birds of a feather flock together” demonstrate conflicting viewpoints while being maintained as conventional wisdom to be evoked whenever the moment calls for one or the other saying. Without the common wisdom of the general interpretation of the world, we would only be able to rely on what we ourselves had uncovered through our individual experience. Through \textit{das Man} however, significance is derived from our interaction with other people. By communicating with others, we take part in a greater social understanding of what is meaningful. Heidegger calls this public shared world a “we-world (\textit{Wir-welt})” or “with-world (\textit{Mitwelt}).”\textsuperscript{36}

As mentioned before, to encounter another human being (fellow Dasein) is to have an already disclosed social world (\textit{Mitwelt}) that makes it possible. The way of being, what Heidegger calls being-with (\textit{Mitsein}), which characterizes our encounter with other people, is not as simple as merely existing in proximity of other living beings.\textsuperscript{37} Instead, being-with involves all of the complex social interactions that accompany our everyday lives. Becoming a teacher, a nurse or a doctor, may be the goal of an individual Dasein, but it depends on the existence of a complex network of interdependent people who specialize and offer each other goods and services. Just as there is no such thing as a hammer in a world without things to hammer, there is no such thing as a teacher in a world without students. For Heidegger, all goals are characterized

\textsuperscript{35} SZ: 168/212: “We do not so much understand the entities which are talked about; we already are listening only to what is said-in-the-talk as such. What is said-in-the talk gets understood; but what the talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially.”

\textsuperscript{36} See SZ: 64-65/93 for the many meanings of “world.”

\textsuperscript{37} Note again how Heidegger clues us in to the relationship between these terms by utilizing the prefix “\textit{mit}.”
by their dependence on these social structures. Moments where these structures are in a state of upheaval, such as a war or a pandemic, can have vast ramifications on how we carry out our projects and consequently, understand ourselves.\textsuperscript{38} Encountering others is not like encountering tools or present-at-hand objects because other people are defined, like us, in terms of existence. That is, to be a human being, for Heidegger, is to be concerned about our own existence. Other people have jobs, and goals, and plans, and they have entities which are ready-to-hand to take on those tasks.

For the most part we encounter people in a form of indifference: When we walk past strangers on the street, or order our coffee at the café, we do so in a way which hardly engages the other person directly. But this does not mean that we treat these fellow Dasein as objects to manipulate, and even less do we think of them as moving obstacles that exist in three-dimensional space, like sentient traffic cones.\textsuperscript{39} Instead, when we pass someone in the hall, we nod to acknowledge them. When we let someone into our lane in traffic, we wave to them to let them know we see them.\textsuperscript{40} When someone gets on the elevator, if we are standing near the buttons, we ask what floor they are looking for. These simple and mostly habitual interactions indicate that we recognize the kind of being that our fellow Dasein’s possess. We know they have seen us, or have somewhere to be, or likely have a reason to be stepping on the elevator.

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{38} For evidence of this, see Covid-19 pandemic.
\textsuperscript{39} SZ: 121/157: “Yet Being-alone ‘among’ many does not mean that with regard to their Being they are merely present-at-hand there alongside us. Even in our Being ‘among them’ they are \textit{there with} us; their Dasein-with is encountered in a mode in which they are indifferent and alien.”
\textsuperscript{40} These rules may not apply in Florida.
This kind of care that we demonstrate only towards human beings (or things which we elevate to this status), is what Heidegger calls “caring-for” or “solicitude” from the German: “Fürsorge.”  

Although Heidegger is famously skimpy on the details of this social interaction in his discussion of being-with (Mitsein) in Being and Time, he does give us some additional details for how caring-for may manifest in what he calls “extreme” cases. Heidegger calls these two extreme modes of caring-for “leaping ahead” and “leaping in.” Leaping ahead is shorthand for “leaping ahead and giving being” while “leaping in” is shorthand for “leaping in and taking over one’s being.” The idea is that leaping ahead is a way of caring-for which allows for a fellow Dasein to authentically pursue their possibility, whereas leaping-in takes that possibility away from them. Heidegger is vague about what this might look like, but the language lends itself to some potentially straightforward interpretations. If we think of a child who, when working on a science project, asks for help from their parents, we can imagine two distinct ways of helping. The parent who leaps in and does the entire project themselves may end up earning their child high marks, but at the cost of the child’s education. On the other hand, the parent who leaps ahead, figuring out what needs to be done, and guides their child to reach that conclusion, may end up with a slightly lower grade, but the child will have learned something. Richard Polt notes

______________________________

41 Although I attempt to maintain continuity with the Macquarrie and Robinson translation in most cases in this dissertation, the translation of Fürsorge to solicitude is an exception. Admittedly, the hyphenated “caring-for” is a bit messy, but it makes up in clarity what it lacks in elegance.
43 SZ: 122/158-99.
that for Heidegger, the spirit of this interaction is captured in the Chinese parable that suggests that teaching a man to fish is a greater act of kindness than merely catching the fish for him.\textsuperscript{44}

These reflections speak to Heidegger’s general philosophy on the nature of teaching and education, where he calls on his students not to repeat his words, but to come to recognize the world in different ways.\textsuperscript{45} Heidegger refers to leaping-ahead as an authentic encounter with other Dasein, while speaking of leaping in as the inauthentic way of encountering fellow Dasein:

[Inauthentic] caring-for, which leaps in and takes away ‘care’, is to a large extent determinative for Being with one another, and pertains for the most part to our concern with the ready-to-hand.

In contrast to this, there is also the possibility of a kind of caring-for which does not so much leap in for Others as leap ahead of him in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of caring-for pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a “what” with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.\textsuperscript{46}

Here we see that the conditions for achieving an authentic encounter vary greatly from the authenticity found in our discussion of the ready-to-hand. The authenticity of an encounter with the ready-to-hand, which simply uses the object for its purpose, would ultimately be very inappropriate if applied to our social encounters. In fact, using people like they are mere tools to serve my own ends sounds much closer to Heidegger’s description of inauthentic leaping-in, whereby Dasein takes over another person’s project entirely, to just get something done. Here we another indication that the conditions for authenticity are contingent on the encountered entity.

\textsuperscript{45} GA 18: 66/47: “We must now hold fast to this basic structure. You must familiarize yourselves with it, not by learning it by heart but so that these things show up in your concrete being-there, so that they make themselves clear therein.”
\textsuperscript{46} SZ: 159/122 tm. When possible, I prefer to translate \textit{Fürsorge} as “caring-for” rather than “solicitude.”
What makes for an authentic encounter is not some single way of being for Dasein, but an attunement to the type of entity it encounters.

1.1.4: Authentic Self-Encounters

According to Heidegger, we can also encounter ourselves, which is admittedly a strange way of talking about the experience. As we are always encountering ourselves in some way or another, it seems strange to think of it in terms of an encounter, like turning a corner and being frightened by seeing our own reflection in a mirror. But the logic of encountering one’s own self applies in much the same way that Heidegger thinks of our social (Mitwelt) and environmental (Umwelt) encounters. Just as we are always already encountering the world socially and environmentally at any given point, regardless of our explicit awareness of it, we are also always already encountering ourselves. Heidegger says that were we to speak of this self-encounter in terms which parallel the above discussion of Umwelt and Mitwelt, self-encountering would be deemed the self-world (Selbstwelt), and the kind of being associated with it: Being-oneself (Selbstsein).47

Encountering one’s own self is a peculiar encounter to describe because our being is not fixed. What we encounter when we encounter ourselves is always up for grabs, on the move, and ready to change. Particular to each Dasein is the fact that we all have mineness (Jeminigkeit) as an essential characteristic of our being. To be Dasein is to belong to one’s own self. The being I encounter in the Selbstwelt is myself, it is mine. Dasein is not a “what” but a “who,” understood in terms of the things they do, rather than some concrete unchanging essence. Heidegger defines

47 It should be noted that Heidegger’s use of the term “Selbstwelt” (and Selbstsorge) falls off significantly by Being and Time, but when he does use it, it fulfills the same meaning as it does in earlier lectures. See GA 61: 94/71: “That toward which a factical life is directed in caring, the world in which it lives, is, however, always one that stands out from the basic worlds, which we designate as the surrounding world [umwelt], the shared world [Mitwelt], and one’s own world [Selbstwelt].”
Dasein as the kind of being which determines its own being by choosing to become what it is. Since Dasein belongs to itself, it can lose itself, and it can win itself. Roughly speaking, losing oneself is what Heidegger calls inauthentically being-one-self, whereas winning oneself is what Heidegger calls authentic being-one-self. Here authenticity pertains to winning oneself back from a fallenness into the world of our projects and the influence of *Das Man*.

Following the parallel structure laid out in the previous discussions of kinds of entities which Dasein can encounter, Heidegger describes encountering oneself as a way of caring about oneself or self-care, *Selbstsorge*. Even when we encounter ourselves inauthentically, the encounter is not absent of care. Instead, we encounter ourselves with a kind of care which takes its cues from other people or the world and do so unquestioningly. Thus, inauthentically encountering one’s self, for Heidegger, does not result in some lack of care, in the form of neglect, but rather an unquestioning form of existence, where one may be taking care of themselves fully.

Heidegger argues that for the most part, we find ourselves busy with the world we care about. We are caught up in the everyday task of taking care of ourselves, others, and the projects that we have taken up in our work and homelife. This tendency to get caught up in our lives and forget who and what we are is what Heidegger calls Dasein’s tendency towards “fallenness [Verfallen]”. It is important to draw a contrast between “being fallen” as a state of being, and fallenness, as something which is part of Dasein’s existential constitution. In short, Dasein falls because it has a tendency towards fallenness. Heidegger also emphasizes that being fallen and

---

48 SZ: 42-43/68.
49 SZ: 43/68: “Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity – when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment.”
50 SZ: 179/224.
fallenness itself have nothing to do with sin or some relation to the divine. To be Dasein is to exist in a way which has a tendency towards falling into the world of one’s activities. When we fall into the world, we tend to get mired in the average everyday interpretations of things which simplify and dismiss anything which challenges us. Part of authenticity, then, is freeing oneself from these entanglements and resisting the temptation and tranquility of going with the flow of the public opinion.

1.1.5: Unified Care Structure

It is important that we recognize the unity of care (Sorge) in Heidegger’s analytic: as concern (Besorge), caring-for (Fürsorge), and self-care (Selbstsorge). Each mode corresponds to a different kind of entity which can be encountered in meaningful ways. Heidegger is often explicit about the unity of these various horizons of disclosure. There is no Umwelt without a Mitwelt, no Selbstwelt without an Umwelt, and so on. Consequently, there is no Being-in-the-world, the existential which houses these various horizons, without the horizons themselves. Within each of these horizons of disclosure we find authentic and inauthentic ways of encountering entities. Authentic encounters with tools, within the horizon of the umwelt required that we put the tool to use for our concerns and projects in a way which allowed the tool to carry out its function. Whereas inauthentic tool use involved any encounter with a tool that made the tool unready-to-hand or inoperable. Authentic encounters with fellow Dasein required that we care-for our fellow Dasein in a way which opens the possibility for them to achieve authenticity.

---

51 SZ: 176/220. As Lee Braver puts it: “Once we understand that what it means to be Dasein is to care what happens to ourselves, we can understand why it takes the form of pursuing projects in a world we’ve been thrown into” (Lee Braver, Heidegger: Thinking of Being, (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2014), 76.)

52 Heidegger defines each mode of care in terms of a horizon of intelligibility where we meaningfully encounter various entities. See SZ: 193/237: “Because being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-alongside the ready-to-hand could be taken in our previous analysis as concern, and being with the Dasein-with of others as we encounter it within-the-world could be taken as solicitude.”
in their own being. Inauthentic encounters with fellow Dasein described any encounter where we step in and take away their being, in a dominating fashion. Lastly, authentically encountering ourselves meant a form of self-care whereby we acknowledge the kind of being we are, a being which can make choices for itself, and own up to that ability by resisting our tendency to fall into the trappings of social conformism. Since the purpose of this chapter is to continue to collect these phenomena of authenticity, we should now look to Heidegger’s discussions of breakdown in *Being and Time* for more clarity on these terms. This will provide us with additional phenomena for consideration.

1.1.6: Ontic Breakdown

Roughly speaking, Heidegger’s preliminary goal in *Being and Time* is to analyze the various structures which make experience possible. To see these structures, they must become explicit to us. Like the glasses on our face which only become apparent when they fog up, sometimes we need to have moments where things fall apart in order to know they are there. These moments are often called “breakdown.” In breakdown, the structures which normally operate in the background grind to a halt, bringing our awareness to their existence for the first time.

Heidegger speaks about breakdown on two distinct levels. The first level of breakdown is common in our everyday experience. As outlined above, Heidegger argues that contrary to the modern and Cartesian accounts of human experience, we mostly do not see the world as extended substance, but instead see the world as a set of meaningful possibilities which call out to us. I do not see the door handle as a 3-inch metallic object suspended in the body of a door, but rather, the door handle beckons me to open it. The door handle says to me “you should really wash your hand after touching this, you have no idea who used this.” It says, “if you are gentle, you won’t wake the sleeping baby on the other side.” It says many things, all of which speak to
possibilities and meaningful encounters that structure our everyday lives. For Heidegger, it is only when the handle breaks that I begin to reflect on its purpose. Now that it is an obstacle, it makes my goal of getting into the room that much more apparent to me. As a broken and inoperable thing, the physicality of the handle becomes more apparent to me. The handle’s materiality and form emerge from the background of my everyday use into the foreground of my reflective engagement.

Heidegger describes this move from encountering an object in terms of the meaningful possibilities for use to encountering an object as a mere thing as a transition from encountering something in its readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) to encountering it in its presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). These concepts are important for Heidegger since they demonstrate how the resistance of the world provides a disclosive catalyst whereby Dasein gains awareness of the very structures which enable its everyday interactions. Since this part of the text is of such import to Heidegger, the relationship between these two modes of being is the source of a great deal of debate, much of which we cannot entertain here. Roughly speaking, the difference between these two ways of encountering entities is found in a distinction between using something unthinkingly and examining something in a moment of reflection. The reality is that Heidegger believes there are many intermediate stages between these two ways of encountering objects which speak to the complexity of human interactions.53 The door handle can stick, or creak, or be locked and require a key. These events would constitute a minor form of breakdown, drawing my attention to the handle and away from the task of moving through the door, but not in a way that completely shuts down my activity. I need not stop what I am doing to investigate

53 See Section 16 of Being and Time, where Heidegger lays out the various ways that entities can become un-ready-to-hand, while not being entirely present-at-hand.
the properties of the handle at this moment if, after a brief pause, I could instead unstick the handle, turn it slower to avoid waking the child, or find the key necessary to open the door.

In these moments of breakdown, I may become more aware of the door itself and its role in my meaningful world. When it becomes locked, I may for the first time ask the question whether this door needs to have a lock on it at all. When the handle sticks, I may consider for the first time whether it needs to be replaced or updated or fixed. All these thoughts arise as a response to the breakdown and likely would have remained in the background of my mind had the handle simply worked as it was supposed to.

1.1.7: Ontological Breakdown

If the breakdown is significant enough, it can completely shut us down. In cases where our entire world falls apart, we can experience a form of existential breakdown. In these cases, the breakdown of some entity we are relying on draws our attention outward to the bigger picture of our projects as a person. If I mistakenly park my car in the wrong spot and it is towed, I might be late to my job and, consequently, fired. This might spawn a string of events which result in being evicted from my apartment, being dumped by my girlfriend, and looking for a new place to live. One day I am happy, employed, and self-sufficient, and the next day I am unemployed living with my parents asking for a loan to get my car out of the impound. This one mistake may ultimately force me to rethink my entire identity.

This existential level of breakdown is much more intense and results in moments of extreme anxiety (angst), or what amounts to a full-blown panic attack. Here we experience breakdown of the entire structure of significance that scaffolds our everyday activities. Heidegger describes anxiety in terms of a suspension of all of the meaningful interactions in our lives.
Anxiety discloses an insignificance of the world; and this insignificance reveals the nullity of that with which one can concern oneself – or, in other words, the impossibility of projecting oneself upon a potentiality-for-Being which belongs to existence and which is founded primarily upon one’s objects of concern.\textsuperscript{54}

Here Heidegger speaks of the impossibility of making choices when the world shows up as meaningless. But, like the door handle which breaks, anxiety provides an illuminatory effect, a making explicit of the very structures that we have tacitly presupposed all along and perhaps a chance to examine those structures anew. “The revealing of this impossibility, however, signifies that one is letting the possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-Being be lit up.”\textsuperscript{55} Like ontic breakdown, which drew our attention to the inadequacies of the ready-to-hand entities we were meaningfully engaged with, ontological breakdown brings about a shift in our perspective concerning our own being. Rather than seeing the significance of a particular object which fails to be useful, however, anxiety makes manifest the totality of meaning which undergirds the being of the entities we encounter in our everyday meaningful lives. This draws our awareness, not to any particular thing, but to the whole of our experience which is only made possible by the ontological structures which make up our being as Dasein. Among others, the structures which are disclosed by anxiety are the inherent sociality of our existence, the reliance on others to understand ourselves, and the fact that we are beings defined by the projects we actively pursue. Most importantly, however, anxiety reveals to us that all of this has a degree of finality, in that the entire project of our life is framed by our unavoidable and inevitable death. For Heidegger, death is not just the biological conclusion of a living being, nor is it the personal death of a friend, but rather is an existential phenomenon that gives rise to an awareness that all our

\textsuperscript{54} SZ: 343/393.
\textsuperscript{55} SZ: 343/393.
possibilities could come to an abrupt end. Heidegger describes the authentic response to this finitude “anticipating (Vorlaufen) death.”

That Heidegger chooses death as the frame through which we interpret ourselves as existing beings is not arbitrary. The topic of death has a rich tradition in the history of western philosophy. In Plato’s *Phaedo*, Socrates tells his friends that “To Philosophize is to train for death,” to which his followers jokingly replied that it is indeed the case that “[most people] agree that philosophers are nearly dead and that the majority of men is well aware that they deserve to be.” Socrates offers a rejoinder; “And they would be telling the truth, Simmias, except for their being aware.” Of course, Plato’s reason for exalting death is not Heidegger’s. Plato values death because it offers liberation from the bodily; the contingent and shadowy realm which blocks our soul’s access to the forms as they are in themselves. For Plato, the soul is immortal, and death –which releases us from our mortal cage– a blessing. Heidegger, on the other hand, values death because it implies a finitude to our existence. As finite beings, we have a limited number of years to get things right, to live the lives that we want to live, and to be the person we want to be. As Guignon puts it: “… ‘death’ refers to not some future event but to the essential finitude of our Being. As contingent entities, we constantly stand before the possibility of having

56 SZ: 263/307. Macquarrie and Robinson translate Vorlaufen as anticipation, but the German can also mean “running ahead” in the sense of “charging towards.” Iain Thomson notes that Heidegger was inspired to use this language by Ernst Jünger’s autobiographical accounts of charging (Vorlaufen) into battle during the first world war. Thus, Thomson frames Heideggerian authenticity in terms of a heroic encounter with death. (Iain Thomson, *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 175.)

57 Plato, *Phaedo*, 64b.

58 Plato, *Phaedo*, 64b.

59 Plato, *Phaedo*, 118a. The rest of this dialogue is spent entertaining various arguments which claim the soul is immortal in order to prove the initial thesis that death is not a curse but a blessing. One reading would suggest that Socrates’ final wish, a sacrifice to Asclepius, the god of good health and medicine, indicates that he really does see death as a medicine for the soul.
no more possibilities.” As Dasein exists as a being which has the capacity to choose for itself its own path forward, death provides the impetus to actually carry this out.

Heidegger notes that in moments of extreme anxiety, we are called back to ourselves and see ourselves as stripped of our meaningful connection to the world. That is, the environmental and social worlds which normally provide a meaningful context of significance for our lives are cut off from us. In anxiety, we are called back to ourselves, and individuated. In this moment, we recognize that for the most part, the choices we make in our everyday lives are not our own, but rather the product of social and environmental pressures. These pressures do not necessarily tell us to do things we do not want to do or coerce us into a life of destitution. On the contrary, going with the flow of our social and environmental horizons can be quite pleasant and can be accompanied by success as much as failure. Nevertheless, inauthenticity is described as an unreflective approach to existence that constitutes a way of being where we are not explicitly choosing who we are for ourselves. That is, we are encountering our own self in a way which gives that self over to someone (or rather everyone) else. Heidegger calls this inauthentic way of encountering oneself the “they-self” (Manselbst). Here we can see the root of both das Man, the horizon of social intelligibility which accompanies the Mitwelt, and Selbst, the kind of being that we are. This way of being is what Heidegger thinks we live in for the most part in our everyday lives and refers to it as inauthentically being-oneself. It takes an experience like ontological

60 Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, 134.
63 SZ: 181/225: “The Self, however, is proximally and for the most part inauthentic, the they-self [Manselbst].” The Manselbst, which is Heidegger’s way of talking about inauthentic Dasein, is often confused with das Man, which plays both a positive and negative role pertaining to our self-interpretation and our understanding of the world as a whole. For an account which illuminates the distinction between das Man and Manselbst see Boedeker, “Individual and Community in Early Heidegger.” For an account of the positive and negative role of das Man with regard to Heidegger’s method, see my discussion in 3.4.
breakdown for us to recognize for the first time that we can choose what we want to become, and for the most part, we have not been making that choice ourselves. This calling back to oneself is what Heidegger calls the call of conscience. As a call, it summons us back towards ourselves to see Dasein as it is in itself without its connection to the world: a nothing. This encounter with nothing (das Nichts), or nullity (Nichtigkeit) of our own existence, stripped of our meaningful connection to the world is a revelatory experience.

Thus, the breakdown in anxiety, whereby our conscience calls us to ourselves as our ownmost nullity, untethering us from our meaningful world also reveals to us the solution to this unpleasant experience of being untethered. This experience results in a self-transparency that reveals to Dasein its being. As Guignon puts it: “As transparent, then, authentic Dasein understands its own structure, including its finitude and thrownness into [das Man], and it is in a position to project itself onto its ownmost possibility with a sense of the uniqueness and wholeness of its life.”64 As Guignon suggests, this transparency is requisite for the authentic self-projection back into the world of our everyday lives. Thus, the solution is not to shut out the world around us when we become detached from it in anxiety, but rather to resolutely retether ourselves to those projects explicitly, making them our own. Heidegger calls this resolute choosing of one’s own self projects authentic being-oneself. Such resolute choosing means picking one’s fate for oneself and doing so with the understanding that we get no second chances, no do-overs, and that this life will eventually come to an end.

This illuminatory effect of ontological breakdown through existential angst and the call of conscience squares nicely with Guignon’s description of the moment of reflection discussed

64 Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, 136.
Heidegger calls this moment “der Augenblick”, which literally means “the blink of an eye” but is often translated as “the moment of vision.” In anxiety, we gain a reflective distance which allows for us to understand ourselves more clearly, and consequently, set out to become authentic. In other words, this moment of vision is what makes authentic being-onself possible.

This emphasis on the value of anxiety with regard to the moment of insight which provides the reflective distance requisite for authentic self-choosing was seen in the above definitions of authenticity discussed in the introduction above. It is understandable, then, why so many scholars have linked Heidegger’s discussion here to the broader traditional interpretation of authenticity. The affinity, with regard to this aspect of Heidegger’s thoughts on authenticity is undeniable. Nevertheless, this section is also the source of the debate concerning Heidegger’s thoughts on the nature of authenticity for Dasein. The question here is whether authenticity, for Heidegger, is an act of self-ownership, or self-loss. As of now, we have only seen that Heidegger’s account of authenticity contains an account of self-reflection made possible by the call of conscience in existential breakdown. But what of the response to this moment of reflective insight?

Ownership both implies the unique characteristic of Dasein as something which is always my own (Jemineigkeit) and the fact that I am owning up to, or taking responsibility for who I am and what I wish to become. That Heidegger links all of this with the call of conscience, which is

65 This is not coincidental, since Guignon had Heidegger in mind when he outlined the structure of authenticity in On Being Authentic. When I pitched my dissertation to Guignon, he told me that deep down the whole book was just his attempt to understand Heidegger’s view more clearly: a provisional interpretation. I am grateful for said provisional interpretations, as they have paved the way for my own research.
66 For a detailed account of the Augenblick, see William McNeill, The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999). McNeill notes the use of this concept, and other themes related to authenticity, go back to Heidegger’s lectures on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. My reading, which I develop in chapter four and five is heavily indebted to his thorough analysis of this concept.
characterized by Schuld, what is sometimes translated as guilt, but can also be translated as “responsibility,” speaks to the fact that becoming authentic means accepting a sense of responsibility for one’s actions.\textsuperscript{67} Thus, the resolute choice is described as choosing one’s fate, and is consequently tied to a notion of self-ownership. But, as Heidegger learned from Dilthey, to be is to be historical. In other words, historicality (Geschichtlichkeit) is part of Dasein’s existential constitution. This means that the choice we make, even if it is resolute, relies on the world for its meaning. As mentioned earlier, a world full of students is required for the possibility of being a teacher to be real. Even authentic choices are grounded in a world which we are always already a part of. As Guignon notes: “In taking a stand on my life as a whole, I understand myself as a teacher, spouse, father, cook, or whatever, and these are all possible roles I take over more or less as anyone would.”\textsuperscript{68} Thus, even if we are able to resolve to be one thing or another, our fate is determined by our historical situation, and therefore involves accepting our place in the world, and is consequently similar to our account of authenticity as self-loss.

As we have mentioned, this discussion of ontological breakdown and the path to authenticity through the call of conscience and the resolute choice is often what scholars focus on when debating the meaning of authenticity in Heidegger’s Being and Time. So far, however, we have seen that Heideggerian authenticity extends beyond this discussion of the self to discussions of tools and encounters with our fellow Dasein. The traditional response is to merely ignore these uses of authenticity by writing them off as non-technical, or to allow for them as a simple subset of authentic encounters which are insignificant when compared to Dasein’s

\textsuperscript{67} Frederick Olafson describes Schuld as follows: “By virtue of being the kind of entity we are, we do constitutionally owe something – something is due from each of us – and what is due from each of us is a choice” (Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics, 47.)
\textsuperscript{68} Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, 134.
authentic self-encounter. This becomes harder to do, however, when we look at authenticity which takes place at the level of communities of people.

1.1.8: Heroes, Destiny, and the Volk

Heidegger’s discussion of fate and destiny in his analysis of history in the second division of Being and Time is admittedly, an immensely difficult part of an already dense text. As we will see in chapter three, part of the reason of this is that Heidegger is synthesizing years of lecture notes into a few hastily written sections.69 Broadly speaking, these sections contain discussions of the philosophical and intellectual developments of entire groups of people in order to show that self-understanding is always a product of our culture and environment. To borrow a phrase from Richard Polt, this part of Being and Time acknowledges the fact that the question “Who am I?” is tied to the broader social question of “Who are we?” and any relevant answer to the first question will always require an answer to the second.70 Of course, philosophizing on the level of the larger community invites comparisons to Hegel as well as questions concerning the relationship between these ideas and Heidegger’s eventual plunge into politics. But we need not assume that this discussion of destiny is inherently a work of proto-Nazism, or that these

69 Kisiel reports that the entire project was hastened by the department pushing Heidegger to publish something in order to secure a promotion, with the final draft of the manuscript of Being and Time composed “in a single month, in March 1926…” (Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (University of California Press, 1993), 489.)

70 Polt, Time and Trauma, 44.
discussions naturally lead to Nazi values. Instead, we should look at these discussions since they hold one of the many lesser discussed uses of authenticity from *Being and Time*.

In this discussion, Heidegger suggests that the *fate* of individual Dasein is determined by the collective *destiny* of a community. Since Heidegger has already established that being-with other Dasein is a part of our existential constitution, it should not surprise us that our engagement with others is of utmost importance for Heidegger. In his most idealistic moments, Heidegger describes a community of Daseins authentically engaging with one another to bring about a better future:

> But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as *destiny*. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several subjects. Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein.72

This discussion is important since it demonstrates that authenticity can entail an overtly social and communal engagement. In this discussion Heidegger echoes the rather skimpy discussion of

71 That Heidegger’s account of a destiny of a people has been interpreted as proto-Nazi rhetoric should not surprise anyone. But the influence is not a direct and causal link. Hitler did not read *Being and Time*, and it is unlikely that any of his associates did either. Scholars have noted that it seems that the Nazi party wanted very little to do with Heidegger’s actual philosophy. When Heidegger was offered the rectorship at Freiburg, they did not want his philosophy to set the party on a new path, but instead wanted to use his name to prop up the legitimacy of the party. That said, the nationalistic values which inspired Heidegger’s views on the superiority of German philosophy and culture were likely part of the same cultural movement which inspired the Nazi worldview. In other words, while Heidegger’s reflections on destiny were not inspired by the Nazis, nor did they likely inspire the Nazis, they may have been cut from the same cloth. For example, the *volkish* movement was highly influential in the wake of World War 1. That a view is potentially shared with the worldview of the Nazis, however, does not inherently disqualify it intellectually. The Nazi party also propagated information that smoking is bad for us. Even totalitarian regimes can be right about something. A rejection of the regime should not be taken as a rejection of every value held by that regime or every person who was persuaded by it.

authentic *Mitsein* and expands this notion beyond interactions with another individual to interactions at the level of entire communities.

For Heidegger, communities share a history and take up projects from their shared past to make them new, appropriating (*aneignen*) them. One can imagine that Heidegger has in mind a radically different conception of education and community, one where the members of the community work together to disclose the world in its authenticity.\(^{73}\) This discussion also incorporates the idea of a hero, who leads the community by homing in on the shared vision of their people:

The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been – the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero – is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated.\(^{74}\)

The hero offers an exemplar from the past which Dasein can take as a source of inspiration. Repetition, here is not just a blind repeating, but an appropriation in the sense of taking up something and making it your own. As Iain Thomson puts it:

… Heidegger believed it possible, in a ‘moment of vision,’ to step back from the heroes we have ‘always already’ chosen, adopt a second-order perspective on those choices, and choose again, in full awareness that we are choosing a hero, and that doing so lucidly can help us own our own lives in a way that will restore our sense of the meaning, weight, and integrity of our actions.\(^{75}\)

---


\(^{74}\) SZ: 385/437.

Here Thomson demonstrates the complexity of Heidegger’s account of authenticity, which extends past the level of the individual to the level of the community and then back to the individual. This reciprocal rejoinder of Dasein with its community locates the possibility for Dasein’s ownmost authentic self-understanding within the moment of a people. This rather sparse discussion of authentic communities is admittedly underdeveloped in *Being and Time*, but nevertheless stands in direct opposition to the traditional notion of authenticity which casts authentic Dasein in opposition to the goals of society.

1.2: THE PHENOMENA OF AUTHENTICITY (SO FAR)

So far, we have seen that Heidegger speaks of authenticity in his analysis of many kinds of entities we encounter within the world: tools, Dasein, ourselves, and communities as a whole. Since authentically encountering a hammer and authentically encountering ourselves require different modes of being, one insight we have gleaned is that the conditions for what make an authentic encounter possible are partially determined by the entity in question. To authentically encounter a hammer, I cannot treat it like a fellow Dasein, and *vice versa*. We also saw that authenticity is disclosed in moments of breakdown and self-discovery, where we are pulled out of our everyday ways of being and forced to reflect on the complexities of our human situations. Lastly, we saw that Heidegger applies authenticity to the broader notion of the entire movement of a people.

Taken together, we can already see how these broader uses of authenticity clash with the traditional interpretation of authenticity. So far, however, these additional uses do not seem significant enough to warrant a full investigation into authenticity. A scholar might respond: “So what if Heidegger talks about authentic hammers? The real important part is his discussion about authentic Dasein!” And they would not be entirely wrong for thinking this. The problem,
however, is that in dismissing these other uses of authenticity, they end up misunderstanding
what Heidegger is doing when he is talking about authentic Dasein. These broader and non-
traditional uses point us towards a methodological meaning of authenticity, one which has been
missed for myriad reasons both philosophical and linguistic. In order to uncover these lost
phenomena of authenticity, and to provide a proper definition of authenticity which can account
for all of the phenomena, we will need to analyze the very language of *Being and Time* itself and
discover the several senses of *Eigentlich* which have been covered up for one reason or another.
CHAPTER 2: ON THE SEVERAL SENSES OF EIGENTLICH IN HEIDEGGER

In line with chapter 1, the goal of this chapter is to continue to gather the phenomena of authenticity. At the heart of this problem is the fact that the German word for “authentic,” “eigentlich,” can be used in three conflicting ways. Eigentlich can be used colloquially, where it takes the form of a “discourse particle.” As a discourse particle, its function is to merely change the tone of the sentence. Eigentlich can be used formally, but non-technically to simply modify a noun or verb by adding emphasis. These uses are common to the German language and can be found all throughout German philosophy. Lastly, eigentlich can be used technically in a way which is philosophically significant. When used technically, eigentlich is the adjectival or adverbial way of talking about authenticity (Eigentlichkeit). Thus, the problem addressed in this chapter is part linguistic and part philosophical. Since authenticity is an essential philosophical concept for Heidegger’s thinking, and the focus of this investigation, it is crucial that we are able to identify which use of eigentlich Heidegger has in mind when we uncover them in his lecture courses and other published works. However, adjudicating between these three uses requires an understanding of German linguistics and the practice of utilizing philosophical terms. In part one of this chapter, I will provide guidelines for adjudicating between these uses of eigentlich, which will give us a foundation to stand upon when criticizing translations and tracking the development of authenticity in Heidegger’s thinking. In part two, I will apply these guidelines for identifying technical uses of eigentlich to the dominant English translation of Being and Time to demonstrate a hidden bias in how this family of terms has been translated. Here we will see
that the influence of the traditional interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity was already present in the translation choices made by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, setting the stage for traditionalist interpretations for years to come. In part three, I will apply these guidelines for identifying technical uses of *eigentlich* to Heidegger’s early lectures in order to identify the origin of authenticity in his early thinking.

2.0.1: Making Distinctions

The problem of identifying technical uses of *eigentlich* is twofold. First, we have to identify if *eigentlich* is being used colloquially or formally. If *eigentlich* is being used colloquially, we can simply ignore it. If it is being used formally, then there is a chance Heidegger is using it in a technical sense. Thus, the second problem is figuring out if that formal use is actually a technical use as well. Consequently, the first part of this chapter is focused around these two major distinctions: colloquial versus formal, and technical versus non-technical. It is helpful to think of colloquial and formal as *linguistic* terms that correspond to the function of a word in a sentence. A colloquial use means that *eigentlich* is being used to convey tone, while a formal use means that *eigentlich* is being used to modify the meaning of another word in the sentence. The distinction between technical and non-technical is more philosophical. If *eigentlich* is being used in a way which has a specific meaning within Heidegger’s thinking, then we call it technical. If *eigentlich* is being used in a way which utilizes a common meaning of the term, then it is non-technical. All technical uses must be formal, but not all formal uses are technical.

Let us start by looking at some examples of colloquial and formal uses of words in our own language. These three examples all utilize the word “well” but only two of them do so in the formal sense:

1. John fell down a well.
2. John is not well, today.

3. Well, John has had a tough week.

In the first example, “well” is used formally as a noun meaning “a hole in the ground which provides water.” In the second example, “well” is used formally again (with a different meaning) as an adjective meaning “healthy.” In the third example, however, “well” serves as an interjection, where the various meanings of the word “well” are not significant to the sentence. In this third sentence, there is no discussion of health or holes in the ground; rather, “well” is evoked to denote tone, express surprise, or indicate the resumption of discourse. The use of “well” here, could indicate a break in a conversation where our speaker wants to suggest that our listener needs to consider the broader context of what has happened this week. This colloquial use of “well” is common to our everyday spoken language. When used in this way, “well” functions as a discourse particle, and although it may not modify the syntax of a sentence, it does help to denote an important shift in tone. When discourse particles appear in texts which require translation, however, they present a challenge.

Take these two sentences which portray similar ideas, but to different effect:

4. It’s your decision.

5. Well, it’s your decision.

In sentence 5 (and 3 above), the word “well” tells a story, but not one which can be picked up from the direct meaning of the word itself. The use of this word is not superfluous, since removing “well” from the sentence would change the meaning of what was said. But it is clear no particular meaning of the word “well” is being evoked. If a translator were forced to try and capture the tone of this sentence, it would not be as simple as looking up the German word for “well.” Instead, the translator would have to look up common discourse particles that are used in German and find one that provides a similar tone.
Noticing the difference between the formal and colloquial use of words can be difficult outside of spoken contexts. If these sentences were spoken out loud, the listener would likely have a better chance of identifying that “well” is being used as a linguistic crutch or filler word which denotes the feeling of the speaker. Identifying these words in text requires experience with the language and when translators fail to adjudicate between colloquial and formal uses, the translation can suffer. This is sometimes apparent in online translators, which often aim for a translation with one for one word parity. For example, if a reader misunderstood the difference between formal and colloquial uses of “well” in sentence 3, they might think the sentence is about a speaker addressing a hole in the ground (a well) about John’s tough week. Of course, the absurdity of this example would likely give the reader pause, but it is not an impossible meaning of this sentence. Consequently, understanding the difference between formal and colloquial uses is essential for comprehension, and more so for effective translation. In cases where a word is used formally, the translator can turn to standard translation resources to find the appropriate word. In cases where the word is used colloquially, however, the rules are less clear, and the translator must look to equivalent colloquial phrases to achieve the same expression of tone.

While distinguishing between formal and colloquial uses of words is important for all translation, there is another category of words that stands out as particularly important for translating philosophy: technical terms. For a word to be used technically, it must first be formal, since the word must denote some particular meaning rather than the tone of the speaker, and it must serve a stable use within a system. Stability of meaning is what makes technical terms

---

1 If this sentence occurred in the context of a story about people seeking out “wishing wells” and speaking to them, then perhaps sentence 3 could represent a formal use.
2 All languages have these informal words which are often used to fill a pause between sentences or denote a specific tone. In English, words such as “like” and “I mean” and the nondescript “um” are used regularly in this way.
useful. While the meaning of the word can be context-dependent, if its meaning changes drastically within a single context, then it becomes almost impossible to know what the speaker is talking about. For example, when Kant speaks about the use of reason, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, the German word is “Vernunft.” A simple glance at a dictionary tells us that Vernunft can also be translated as “sanity,” or “prudence,” in some contexts. But if translators of Kant’s works use these translations interchangeably throughout the text, it would be (even more) difficult for readers of the English editions to track what Kant is talking about. So, on the one hand, it is clear that maintaining terminological consistency is essential. On the other hand, however, we need to recognize that not every word in a philosophical text is a technical term, and treating each word as such would result in some very unreadable texts. Consequently, figuring out which words are being used technically (and which are not) is a significant and demanding task for translators. As we will see in this chapter, when it comes to translating Heidegger’s work, this task is immensely challenging.

Most technical terms have everyday uses; for instance, the word “benign” means “gentle” or “kind” in certain non-technical contexts. But a reference to a patient’s “kind tumor” in a doctor’s office would lead to confusion. On the other hand, if someone said your dog is “benign,” you would not take them to mean that your dog appears to be free of malignant tumors. To avoid confusion in conversation, the technical meaning of terms must be considered in certain contexts but ignored when outside of those contexts. Sometimes different contexts share words with vastly different meanings; when the word “virus” is used in a medical context, it means something completely different than in the context of computer science. ‘You have a virus’ is still a sentence containing a technical use of the word “virus” but could mean vastly different things depending on the context. Using terms consistently in their proper context is
essential for clear communication and the same applies for philosophical texts. To aid in this, in many sciences, researchers develop texts that catalog technical terms to codify their meaning and establish a universal vocabulary.\(^3\) In philosophy, however, there is rarely a lexicon available for reference which is considered completely authoritative. As we saw in the introduction to this dissertation, attempting to define a term without spending a great deal of time on the context is extremely difficult.\(^4\) Often technical terms are multifaceted and subject to change over time. That such lexicons are attempted indicates the importance we place on identifying these technical terms, despite these immense difficulties.

**2.1: IDENTIFYING TECHNICAL USES OF EIGENTLICH**

In the case of identifying when *eigentlich* is a technical term, the matter is complicated. As stated above, we first have to establish that the word is not being used colloquially, as a discourse particle, and then afterwards establish that it is being used consistently within a context. Regine Eckardt, a linguist who studies the semantic and syntactic use of *eigentlich* in German speech and writing, notes that *eigentlich* is not only difficult to translate but also difficult to define. In her paper “The Real, The Apparent and What is *eigentlich*,” Eckardt demonstrates multiple ways in which *eigentlich* can function in German sentences.\(^5\) I have split these uses into four constructions which can be found in Heidegger’s writing: (1) unstressed adverbial *eigentlich*, (2) stressed adverbial *eigentlich*, (3) adjectival *eigentlich*. By analyzing these three uses we will be able to establish guidelines for identifying technical uses of *eigentlich*.

---

\(^3\) For example, in Medicine, doctors may turn to something like *Stedman’s Medical Dictionary*, Twenty-Eighth edition (Philadelphia: Stedman’s, 2005).

\(^4\) See section 0.3 of this dissertation.

2.1.1: Unstressed Adverbial *Eigentlich*

For the purposes of translation, (1) unstressed adverbial *eigentlich* is the most problematic.⁶ “Unstressed” simply means that the word is not emphasized in the sentence when the word is spoken out loud. When *eigentlich* is used as an adverb and is not stressed, it functions like the discourse particle we discussed above. Since what we are dealing with is a body of text, and not an audio recording, there are only a few clues which can help us identify if a word is stressed or unstressed, such as the presence of quotations, italics, or other flags. An example from Eckardt’s paper shows us why translating unstressed adverbial *eigentlich* is so tricky:

German: “Was willst Du eigentlich hier?”

English: “What do you want here after all?”⁷

In this sentence, *eigentlich* is unstressed. Thus, the meaning of *eigentlich* cannot be fully encapsulated in a word like “truly” or “genuinely.” This is due to the fact that *eigentlich* is not being used formally, but instead being used to convey tone as a discourse particle. Like the use of “well” in the above examples, sometimes *eigentlich* exists in a sentence to flag a change in tone or emphasis. In English, the word “actually” or “really” is a decent substitute because English also utilizes “actually” or “really” as a discourse particle in a similar way. In English, asking “Actually, what do you want?” without putting stress on “actually” conveys that this question needs to be taken seriously and reflected upon carefully. In both languages, the way the sentence is spoken helps identify the way that this word functions. According to Eckardt, in most cases (1) unstressed adverbial *eigentlich* functions less as a word with a specific meaning, and more as a flag to note that this sentence is being asked in the sense of “now that you have

---

⁶ Eckardt, “The Real,” 78.
⁷ Eckardt, 77.
thought about it.” Consequently, with (1) unstressed adverbial *eigentlich*, translators are usually free to translate the word loosely, or if they think the tone is already adequately conveyed: ignore it all together.

This unstressed type of *eigentlich* seems to be what John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson have in mind when they discuss the complexities of translating this family of words found in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*:

The adverb ‘eigentlich’ occurs very often in [*Being and Time*]. It may be used informally where one might write ‘really’ or ‘on its part’, or in a much stronger sense, where something like ‘genuinely’ or ‘authentically’ would be more appropriate. It is not always possible to tell which meaning Heidegger has in mind. In the contexts which seem relatively informal we shall write ‘really’; in the more technical passages we shall write ‘authentically’, reserving ‘genuinely’ for ‘genuin’ or ‘echt’. The reader must not confuse this kind of ‘authenticity’ with the kind, which belongs to an ‘authentic text’ or an ‘authentic account.’

As they mention, adverbial forms of *eigentlich* show up often, and it is hard to identify if Heidegger is stressing the word or not, since we cannot hear the sentence spoken out loud. If the word is stressed, then a technical translation would be appropriate, but if it is unstressed then the word can be replaced for any English word which adequately captures the tone Heidegger seems to be portraying. We can find Heidegger using (1) unstressed adverbial *eigentlich* all throughout his writing. Take the following example from an early course lecture:

German: “Es ist die Frage: Was wollen wir denn eigentlich historischindividualisierend verstehen und kennenlernen?”

8 Eckardt, 84.
9 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, footnote on page 24. Their use of the term “informal” here would be better understood as “non-technical” in our sense of the word, since they still believe it warrants a direct translation. Note that they do not address the problem of translating *eigentlich* as a discourse particle in this footnote. It is important to note that here Macquarrie and Robinson are only discussing the translation of adverbial *eigentlich*. Although there is no footnote about adjectival *eigentlich*, it appears that Macquarrie and Robinson also struggled with translating it in this form since they opted to modify the translation based on context. For more on this, see the section 2.2 below.
10 GA 56-57: 173.
English: “It is the question: What do we actually \([\text{eigentlich}]\) want to understand and know in this historical individualizing way?’”\(^{11}\)

Here \textit{eigentlich} denotes a sense of asking a thoughtful question considering all the new information that has come to light. \textit{Eigentlich} thus serves the function of a discourse particle, signifying \textit{how} the question is being asked. Since this question appears at the start of a section in one of Heidegger’s lectures, we can imagine that the question is being asked rhetorically to initiate a further line of questioning and clarification.\(^{12}\)

\textbf{2.1.2: Stressed Adverbial \textit{Eigentlich}}

The problem is that it can been difficult to track in written language when adverbial \textit{eigentlich} is stressed or unstressed. Again, since the stress is only noticed when the language is spoken, or in rare cases where italics or other markers are utilized, it is up to the reader to decide what the author originally intended. Eckardt demonstrates how two syntactically identical sentences change meaning when stress is shifted between \textit{eigentlich} and the verb:

\begin{quote}
\begin{align*}
\text{German:} & \quad \text{Wie heißen Sie \textit{eigentlich}?} \\
\text{English:} & \quad \text{What’s your name, by the way?} \\
\text{German:} & \quad \text{Wie heißen Sie \textit{eigentlich}?”} \\
\text{English:} & \quad \text{What is your \textit{real} name?}\(^{13}\)
\end{align*}
\end{quote}

In this example, we see that if the emphasis is placed on \textit{eigentlich}, then the question seems focused on getting the \textit{true} answer. When phrased in this way, the question implies that we were previously given a false name, and now demand the truth. However, if the emphasis is placed on the verb, then \textit{eigentlich} only functions as a discourse particle that portrays a “certain speaker

---


\(^{12}\) Heidegger, \textit{Towards the Definition of Philosophy}, translated by Ted Sadler: 130. Sadler’s translation depicts Heidegger’s pensive attitude and rightfully underplays the use of \textit{eigentlich} by translating it as “actually,” since it is a commonly used discourse particle in English.

\(^{13}\) Eckardt, 80.
attitude” of pausing reflectively.\textsuperscript{14} In spoken language, this is captured through tone, but in written language we rely on italics, bold words, and quotes to portray the right tone. In moments where such clues are unavailable, the meaning remains ambiguous. Here, we can see an example of Heidegger using inward facing guillemets to make it clear that he is using \textit{eigentlich} in its (2) stressed adverbial form:

Wenn man, wie es heute durchgängig üblich geworden ist, Wahrheit als das bestimmt, was »eigentlich« dem Urteil zukommt, und sich mit dieser These überdies auf Aristoteles beruft, dann ist sowohl diese Berufung ohne Recht, als vor allem der griechische Wahrheitsbegriff mißverstanden.\textsuperscript{15}

If, as has today become customary, truth is determined as what is »authentically [eigentlich]« to be judged, and if one also refers to Aristotle with this thesis, then not only is this citation without justification, but most of all, the Greek conception of truth is misunderstood.\textsuperscript{16}

Rather than functioning simply as a discourse particle, this use of \textit{eigentlich} is clearly stressed, and therefore warrants a direct translation. Were someone to attempt to translate the above quote as though \textit{eigentlich} were a discourse particle the result would be a readable but inaccurate translation: “If, as has today become customary, »by the way«, truth is determined as what is to be judged…” Here “by the way” is the English discourse particle that we have inserted in an attempt to convey the same tone that we would get from the use of \textit{eigentlich} as a discourse particle in the German. When we compare these two sentences, we can see that this translation covers up the emphasis on “what is to be judged” and undermines the focus in the sentence. Fortunately, we were able to avoid this mistake since it is obvious that \textit{eigentlich} in the above

\textsuperscript{14} Eckardt, 80.
\textsuperscript{15} SZ: 33.
\textsuperscript{16} SZ: 33. My translation.
quote is stressed. In many other instances of Heidegger’s writing, we are often not lucky enough
to have such direct markers.

But how do we know if *eigentlich* is being used in a *technical* sense? As noted at the
beginning of this chapter, this question is inherently philosophical. For a word to qualify as a
technical term, it would need to maintain a consistent meaning throughout a system. Since (1)
unstressed adverbial *eigentlich* is just a discourse particle which is used to convey tone, then it
cannot be a technical term. This establishes our first helpful guideline for identifying technical
uses of *eigentlich*:

A use of *eigentlich* may be technical if:

1. Adverbial *eigentlich* is not being used colloquially as a discourse particle.

**2.1.3: Adjectival *Eigentlich***

Of the four uses of *eigentlich* that we are looking at, (3) adjectival *eigentlich* is the easiest to
define. When used as an adjective, *eigentlich* traditionally means something like “true”, “real”,
or “proper.” Furthermore, because German adjectives are declined, they are also the easiest to
identify. In other words, it is very easy to notice when *eigentlich* is being used adjectivally
because only uses of this type have additional letters added to the end of the word. Take the
following example:

German: Der eigentliche Philosoph ist Aristoteles.

English: The true philosopher is Aristotle.

In this simple example, we see that the root word had an “e” added to its ending, which helps us
know that *eigentlich* is modifying the noun.
When it comes to discussing what the word means in German, Eckardt tells us that *eigentlich*, when used adjectivally, has the formula of “*eigentliche(r/s)* N” where “N” is any noun which is being held out as a paradigmatic exemplar.\(^\text{17}\) This definition squares nicely with how Heidegger seems to utilize the term in his own work. For example, when he discussed authentic encounters with tools or fellow Dasein, Heidegger seemed to have in mind an exemplary encounter. We can find examples of this usage all over Heidegger’s writing:

Die letztgenannte Möglichkeit besagt: das Dasein erschließt sich ihm selbst im eigensten und als eigenstes Seinkönnen. Diese *eigentliche* Erschlossenheit zeigt das Phänomen der ursprünglichsten Wahrheit im Modus der Eigentlichkeit.\(^\text{18}\)

This recently mentioned possibility means: Dasein discloses itself to itself in its ownmost [eigensten] and as its ownmost [eigenstes] potential for being. This authentic [eigentliche] disclosedness shows the phenomena of the most original truth in the mode of authenticity [Eigentlichkeit].\(^\text{19}\)

Here “[t]his eigentliche disclosedness” refers to “Dasein [disclosing] itself to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality-for being” which stands out as the paradigmatic or exemplary kind of disclosure for Heidegger. In this example it is obvious that Heidegger is using *eigentlich* technically since, although there are other kinds of disclosure, this kind of disclosure holds a special value and therefore stands out as significant. In this instance, we can see why there are multiple plausible translations for adjectival *eigentlich* since inserting the words “true”, “actual”, or “real” would probably add all the emphasis we need for distinguishing this kind of disclosure from other non-exemplary kinds. In this quote, we also see that Heidegger wants to stress the etymological link between *eigentliche* and *Eigentlichkeit* further on in the same sentence. By translating *eigentlich* as “authentic”, Macquarrie and Robinson are able to rely on the readily

\(^{17}\) Eckardt, 79.  
\(^{18}\) SZ: 221. Original emphasis.  
\(^{19}\) SZ: 221. My translation.
available term “authenticity” for the nominalized form of *eigentlich: Eigentlichkeit*. Because this relationship is crucial, translating (3) adjectival *eigentlich* and *Eigentlichkeit* consistently is important for maintaining their connection. But there is also a link drawn between *eigensten*, translated here as ownmost, and *eigentlich* that has been covered up. As Macquarrie and Robinson mention in the above footnote, translating *eigentlich* as “authentic” obscures the link between these two words. Consequently, English readers of Heidegger may not notice the deep connection between “ownmost” (*eigensten*), “authentic” (*eigentlich*) and “authenticity” (*Eigentlichkeit*).

Although the link between *eigensten* and *eigentlich* is obscured, the link to *Eigentlichkeit* does help us establish our second guideline for identifying technical uses of *eigentlich*. *Eigentlichkeit* is not a normal German construction. In fact, it is considered an erroneous construction in some online dictionaries. Occurrences of *Eigentlichkeit*, therefore, serve as flags that Heidegger is using the root word *eigentlich* and its related terms, in a way which is technical. In texts where we find a discussion of *Eigentlichkeit*, it is much more likely that Heidegger’s use of adjectival and stressed adverbial *eigentlich* are being used as technical terms.

As noted above, one plausible translation of (3) adjectival *eigentlich* is the word “true.” In English, we can use “true” in a couple of ways that are sometimes contradictory. Likewise, in German, *eigentlich* can be used to represent two entirely different kinds of truth. Eckardt gives us a helpful example which demonstrates two kinds of truth in action:

20 See Schweizerisches Idiotikon entry on *Eigentlichkeit* where it is called an “irrtümlichen Rekonstruktion.” (https://digital.idiotikon.ch/idtkn/id1.htm?page/10147/mode/1up)
21 Eckardt, 86-87.
German: “Frau Meier leitet die Geschäfte von Tag zu Tag. Die eigentliche Chefin ist Frau Schmitz.“

English: “Mrs. Meier leads the business from day to day. The *eigentliche* boss is Mrs. Schmitz.”

German: “Frau Schmitz steht der Firma offiziell vor. Die eigentliche Chefin ist aber unsere Sekretärin, Frau Meier.“

English: “Mrs. Schmitz is the official leader of the company. The *eigentliche* boss, however, is our secretary Mrs. Meier.”

As noted, this semantic versatility is not unique to the German language. In English, translating *eigentliche* as the word “true” in the above examples will yield a similar result where the multiple meanings of “true” would be on display. We can talk about the “true” boss in a pragmatic way, referring to who really holds the power, or we can talk about a “true” boss in the nominal way, referring to who holds the title. This ambiguity prompts further questions when considering “Who is the *eigentlich* boss?” We might ask if the questioner means: “*eigentlich* in title or *eigentlich* in practice?” Eckardt notes that this capacity to represent either the nominal truth or the pragmatic (what she calls phenomenological) truth, makes *eigentlich* difficult to define.

Eckardt cites this ambiguity as one reason why, at least in normal German language use, the word *uneigentlich* is nonsensical. If *eigentlich* can mean both nominal truth (what seems to be the case) and pragmatic truth (what actually is the case), then *eigentlich* already functions as its own negative counterpart, undermining the need for the negative construction: *uneigentlich*. Eckardt’s suggestion that “*uneigentlich*” has no role outside of specialized contexts provides us with another helpful clue for sorting through the various uses of *eigentlich*. In the special cases where *uneigentlich* shows up in German, the word likely functions in contrast to a use of

\[\text{__________________________}\]

\[\text{22 Eckardt, 90.}\]
eigentlich which also falls outside of the normal scope of German semantics. Thus, we have our third guidelines for identifying terminological use: In cases where eigentlich and uneigentlich can be found in the same text, it is likely that eigentlich is being used in a formal and technical sense in opposition to the atypical and technical uneigentlich.

2.1.4: Guidelines for Identifying Technical Uses of Eigentlich

Our guidelines are now as follows:

A use of eigentlich may be technical if:

I. Adverbial eigentlich is not being used colloquially as a discourse particle.
II. Adjectival or stressed adverbial eigentlich occurs alongside Eigentlichkeit.
III. Adjectival eigentlich occurs alongside uneigentlich.

Taken together we have a reliable list of guidelines for identifying when eigentlich may be technical. By applying these rules to Heidegger’s texts, we should be able to detect moments when eigentlich is being used in a way that warrants consistent translation. As a text, Being and Time very clearly has uses which meet these guidelines since it contains (I) uses stressed adverbial eigentlich, (II) uses of the neologism Eigentlichkeit, and (III) uses of uneigentlich. Taken together we can see that any use of eigentlich that we find in Being and Time, outside of unstressed adverbial use, in the form of colloquial discourse particles, is likely being used in a technical sense.

2.2: EIGENTLICH IN MACQUARRIE AND ROBINSON’S BEING AND TIME

Now that we have a grasp of the language, we can begin to sympathize with the complexity of Macquarrie and Robinson’s task. Adjudicating between (1) unstressed and (2) stressed adverbial eigentlich can be difficult since in many cases it is ambiguous if the word would be stressed
when spoken out loud. But we have also seen that in cases where the word falls outside of its
adverbial form, it should be easy to identify it as formal.

When we look to *Being and Time*, given the prevalence of *eigentlich* alongside
*uneigentlich* and *Eigentlichkeit*, it is fairly obvious that these terms are being used technically.
Thus, we should expect to see *eigentlich* translated as the same word in *all cases* except those
adverbial constructions where the stress is ambiguous. Since Macquarrie and Robinson have
chosen authentic for their translation of *eigentlich*, though they provide no explanation for their
translation choice, we should expect to find this term in all instances where *eigentlich* appears
where it clearly is not being used colloquially as a discourse particle. Following this line of
reasoning, when we look to *Being and Time* we should expect Macquarrie and Robinson to adopt
the following translation scheme:

1. Unstressed adverbial *eigentlich* would be treated colloquially as a
discourse particle, and thus translated as whatever word or phrase
captures the spirit of the sentence.

2. Stressed adverbial *eigentlich* would be translated as the English adverb
“authentically.”

3. Adjectival *eigentlich* would be translated as the English adjective
“authentic.”

Any use of *Eigentlichkeit* would be translated as a technical term as
authenticity.

The problem is that this is not what we find. Instead, we find our translators picking and
choosing when they think *eigentlich* is a technical term and when it is not. But how do they
decide when it is being used technically and when it is not? As we will see, it mostly comes
down to context. Recall that in the above footnote they give their criteria for identifying

23 As seen above, translating “*eigentlich*” as “authentic” has certain advantages, but also runs the risk of misleading
readers in certain contexts.
adverbial *eigentlich* as “really” as any place where *eigentlich* appears in non-technical contexts. What they do not say is that they apply this to adjectival *eigentlich* as well. Thus, we will see that when Macquarrie and Robinson think that the discussion seems unrelated their interpretation of authenticity, they translate *eigentlich*, in both its adverbial and adjectival constructions as “really” or in some cases completely cover it up by ignoring the word altogether. So the new question becomes: “Which contexts are considered formal for Macquarrie and Robinson?”

Here the influence of the tradition of authenticity can be seen most clearly. In the introduction to this dissertation, when we briefly traced the history of authenticity with the help of Guignon, we saw that traditionally authenticity as self-ownership is accompanied by a number of existentialist themes such as a rejection of the social and the creative power of one’s own will. We then skipped over Heidegger’s *Being and Time* and went straight to the definitions of Heideggerian authenticity found within the secondary literature. But now we are returning to that middle step, between the tradition of authenticity and what I have defined as the traditional interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity, to show that it is Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation choices which bridge this gap. In other words, I argue that Macquarrie and Robinson’s interpretation of *eigentlich* is derived from the traditional interpretation of authenticity since they choose to translate *eigentlich* technically only in those contexts which align with this traditional interpretation. The result is a self-fulfilling prophecy, insofar as these translation choices perpetuate a narrow interpretation of *eigentlich* by ignoring evidence to the contrary. The result is that readers of the English text are missing aspects of authenticity which have been obscured by the translation. Now that we have some guidelines for identifying technical uses, and we have seen that *Being and Time* clearly meets these criteria, we are ready to go back into Heidegger’s text and find these phenomena which have been covered over.
2.2.1: *Eigentlich* in Existentialist Sections

Let us start, however, with a baseline of translations which demonstrate that Macquarrie and Robinson really do see *eigentlich* as a technical term in the contexts which align with themes present in the traditional interpretation of authenticity. What we will see is that in these contexts, Macquarrie and Robinson translate both adjectival and adverbial *eigentlich* technically in almost every instance.

Consider the following example:

German: Die Entschlossenheit löst als eigentliches Selbstsein das Dasein nicht von seiner Welt ab, isoliert es nicht auf ein freischwebendes Ich. Wie sollte sie das auch – wo sie doch als eigentliche Erschlossenheit nichts anderes als das In-der-Welt-sein eigentlich ist.\(^{24}\)

M&R: Resoluteness, as authentic [*eigentliches*] Being-one’s-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating ‘I’. And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic [*eigentliche*] disclosedness, is authentically [*eigentlich*] nothing else than Being-in-the-world?\(^{25}\)

In this quote we can see that Macquarrie and Robinson opt to translate adverbial and adjectival *eigentlich* as authentically and authentic respectively, demonstrating that they do see this use of the term as technical. The context for this quote is clearly concerned with traditional themes of authenticity since it concerns authentically encountering one’s own self in the resolute choice.

Let us consider an example which contains a more direct connection between adverbial and adjectival *eigentlich*:

German: Das Dasein »ist« ständig schuldig, kann nur heißen, es hält sich in diesem Sein je als eigentliches oder uneigentliches Existieren. Das Schuldigsein ist keine nur bleibende Eigenschaft eines ständig Vorhandenen,

\(^{24}\) SZ: 298  
\(^{25}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 344.
sondern die existenzielle Möglichkeit, eigentlich oder uneigentlich schuldig zu sein.\textsuperscript{26}

English: To say that Dasein ‘is’ constantly guilty can only mean that in every case Dasein maintains itself in this Being and does so as either authentic \textit{[eigentliches]} or inauthentic \textit{[uneigentliches]} existing. Being-guilty is not just an abiding property of something constantly present-at-hand, but the existentiell possibility of being authentically \textit{[eigentlich]} or inauthentically \textit{[uneigentlich]} guilty.\textsuperscript{27}

Here we see that Macquarrie and Robinson have no problem translating adverbial \textit{eigentlich} as authentic. As identified above, the association with its counter-concept \textit{uneigentlich} establishes that this is clearly a case where \textit{eigentlich} (adverbial or otherwise) should be considered to be a technical term. To their credit, it appears that Macquarrie and Robinson always consider \textit{uneigentlich} to be a technical term insofar as they always translate it as inauthentic. The same goes for \textit{Eigentlichkeit} which always gets translated as authenticity, regardless of the context. Taken together, it is fairly clear that Macquarrie and Robinson hold \textit{uneigentlich} and \textit{Eigentlichkeit} to be technical, warranting consistent translation. This coincides nicely with the guidelines laid out above, since we acknowledged both these forms of \textit{eigentlich} to be odd constructions in standard German language use. As we will see, the problem is that their treatment of adverbial and adjectival \textit{eigentlich} does not follow this pattern.

\textbf{2.2.2: Hidden Eigentlich in Sections on Descartes}

Let us start by looking at something we have already discussed. When we compare these quotes, we should now see a glaring inconsistency:

\begin{quote}
German: „Eigentlich ist das immerwährend Bleibende.“\textsuperscript{28}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{26} SZ: 305-6.
\textsuperscript{27} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 353.
\textsuperscript{28} SZ: 96.
M&R: That which enduringly remains, really [eigentlich] is.29

German: Das Dasein ist eigentlich es selbst nur, sofern es sich als besorgendes Sein bei … und fürsorgendes Sein mit … primär auf sein eigenstes Seinkönnen, nicht aber auf die Möglichkeit des Man-selbst entwirft.30

M&R: Dasein is authentically [eigentlich] itself only to the extent that, as concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being rather than upon the possibility of the they-self.31

In the first quote, eigentlich is treated as a non-technical word and is consequently translated as “really.” Whereas in the second quote, eigentlich is treated as a technical term and thus translated as “authentically.” Both are adverbial constructions, but one is deemed technical while the other is not. Why translate one use of adverbial eigentlich as “really” and the other as “authentically?”

The answer comes down to philosophical interpretation: Macquarrie and Robinson translate eigentlich as “really” or “for its part” in instances which they deem to be non-technical. We know full well that eigentlich can be used colloquially as a discourse particle, but that is not what is happening in these sentences. Their decision to render these uses of eigentlich in these sections as non-technical goes entirely unjustified. Instead of translating this word consistently and letting the reader decide its meaning, Macquarrie and Robinson intervene and translate the word differently depending on context. But why?

It all becomes clear when we notice that this curious quotation comes from a section where Heidegger is discussing Descartes. The topic of the sentence (“that which enduringly remains” or as I put it “the everlasting constant”) is a reference to Descartes’ ideal being. For Descartes, “the everlasting constant” stands apart (as an exemplar) from beings that fail to live

\[\text{References:}\]
29 Heidegger, Being and Time, 128.
30 SZ: 263.
31 Heidegger, Being and Time, 308.
up to this standard. For Descartes, the everlasting being is the authentic being and vice versa. But if this emphatic and formal use of *eigentlich* is there in the German, why would our translators ignore it? It has to do with the philosophical view in question.

As is quickly apparent while reading *Being and Time*, Descartes’ ideal or paradigmatic way of being is antithetical to the view espoused by Heidegger. By translating this emphatic and formal use of *eigentlich* as something less technical, it could be that Macquarrie and Robinson are attempting to avoid confusion in the reader by distancing Heidegger’s thought from Descartes’ philosophical perspective. After all, what could be more confusing than Heidegger referring to Descartes’ ontology as having access to authentic [*eigentlich*] being? If anything can be gleaned from *Being and Time*, it is that Descartes’ interpretation of being is confined entirely to “being-present-at-hand” (*Vorhandensein*), a mode of being which fails to disclose the authentic (*eigentlich*) being of so many things, most importantly: Dasein. For Heidegger, the ontological foundation of Descartes' philosophy is inherently problematic and is in need of a complete destruction. 32 Thus, from Macquarrie and Robinson’s perspective, authenticity in the traditional sense of choosing to become oneself, has nothing to do with Descartes! But nevertheless, these uses of *eigentlich* show up in the discussion of Descartes’ philosophy. What is the relation between authenticity and Descartes? Why would Heidegger use this term in this section? These are questions which are denied to us, since Macquarrie and Robinson have stepped in to smooth over these wrinkles. Consequently, while we may empathize with their motivations for this translation choice, the result is problematic: in covering up this use of *eigentlich* they obscure uses of *eigentlich* that fall outside of the traditional interpretation of

32 For more on the role of historical destruction in Heidegger’s method see 3.2.2.
authenticity. This translation choice sets a precedent for narrow interpretations of authenticity in Heidegger’s work for years to come.

One might think that my critique is ignoring the possibility that Macquarrie and Robinson simply mistook an instance of stressed adverbial *eigentlich* as unstressed. But this objection are not borne out in the text. In this section of *Being and Time* alone, we find our translators making a concerted effort to distance these uses of *eigentlich* from others found in the text by translating (2) stressed adverbial *eigentlich* as “really” and translating (3) adjectival *eigentlich* as “real.” Since (3) adjectival *eigentlich* is the easiest construction to identify (due to its easily identifiable conjugated endings) these translation choices stand out as particularly strange:

M&R: Instead [Descartes] prescribes for the world its ‘real [*eigentlichen*]’ being.  33

M&R: Under the unbroken ascendance of the traditional ontology, the way to get a genuine [*echt*] grasp of what really is [*des eigentlichen Seienden*] has been decided in advance… 34

M&R: Descartes knows very well that entities do not proximally show themselves in their real [*eigentlichen*] being. 35

Outside of the fact that Heidegger is discussing Cartesian ontology, there is no linguistic or philosophical precedent for Macquarrie and Robinson translating *eigentlich* as “really” rather than “authentic.” This is not to say that “really” is a poor translation of *eigentlich*, or that authentic is the best translation; but that maintaining consistency in the translation of technical

---

33 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 129.
34 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 129.
terms is essential.\textsuperscript{36} In the original footnote, their claim was that adverbial \textit{eigentlich} is sometimes difficult to track, and we acknowledged the linguistic basis for this in the ambiguity of stressed terms as they appear in writing. But when it comes to adjectival constructions, there is no ambiguity about their function in the sentence. By translating (3) adjectival \textit{eigentlich} as “really,” Macquarrie and Robinson have demonstrated that their translation choice of this term is interpretive and philosophical in nature. In the broader context of translation mistakes, this might seem insignificant, but for those Anglo-American interpreters of Heidegger who want an answer to the question “What does Heidegger mean by authenticity?” it is crucial that we recognize that the Macquarrie and Robinson translation does not give us the full picture of this phenomenon.

To make matters worse, Macquarrie and Robinson are not even consistent in their treatment of \textit{eigentlich} in these sections. Consider a paragraph in section 19, where, in Heidegger’s discussion of the world as \textit{res extensa} Macquarrie and Robinson utilize both “authentic” and “real” for translations of adjectival \textit{eigentlich}: “What makes up the authentic \textit[eigentliche] Being-in-itself of the \textit{res corporea}?\textsuperscript{37} He responds a few lines down: “Extension – namely, in length, breadth, and thickness – makes up the real \textit[eigentliche] Being of that corporeal substance which we call the ‘world.’”\textsuperscript{38} Admittedly, since through our guidelines we have identified adjectival \textit{eigentlich} as a technical use, we should be happy to see it translated

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item Peter Kemp shares my concern that Macquarrie and Robinson run the risk of confusing the reader by using these inconsistent translations. Kemp notes that, at least in section 31, Macquarrie and Robinson “blur the difference between Eigentlichkeit and Echtheit by rendering \textit{eigentlich} [as] ‘really’” (Peter Kemp, “Ricoeur between Heidegger and Lévinas: Original Affirmation between Ontological Attestation and Ethical Injunction,” \textit{Philosophy & Social Criticism} 21, no. 5–6 (September 1, 1995), 52.)
\item SZ: 123/90.
\item SZ: 123/90.
\end{itemize}

\normalsize
consistently as “authentic” here. Nevertheless, the disconnect between these uses is immensely frustrating. New readers might ask: Are we using authentic in a technical sense or are we not?

2.2.3: Inconsistent translation of Eigentlich in sections on Anxiety

It may be important to note that Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation choices do not appear to be intentional in the sense of overtly covering up the meaning of the word eigentlich. Translating a work of philosophy like Heidegger’s Being and Time is an immensely difficult task, and sometimes translators take liberties to deliver a more readable version of the text. Additionally, when Macquarrie and Robinson translated this text in the 1960s, they lacked many of the resources we have today, and consequently, had little access to Heidegger’s more detailed discussions of terms which are only addressed briefly in Being and Time. While we should assume they were doing the best they could with the information they had, we should acknowledge that the difficulties of the text, and this lack of the full contexts would give rise to a translation with some (potentially serious) mistakes. Evidence for this can be found in the fact that, our translators occasionally failed to identify technical uses of terms even in the very contexts that they seemed to prefer them to arrive; namely, in those sections pertaining to themes which coincide with the traditional interpretation of authenticity.

Consider the following examples:

M&R: After all, the mood of uncanniness remains, factically, something for which we mostly have no existentiell understanding. Moreover, under the ascendancy of falling and publicness, ‘real’ [»Eigentliche«] anxiety is rare.\(^39\)

M&R: Even rarer than the existentiell Fact of “real” [eigentlichen] anxiety are attempts to interpret this phenomenon according to the principles of its existential-ontological Constitution and function.\(^40\)

\(^39\) SZ 190/234.
\(^40\) SZ 190/234-5.
M&R: On the contrary, the rarity of the phenomenon is an index that Dasein, which for the most part remains concealed from itself in its authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] because of the way in which things have been publicly interpreted by the “they”, becomes disclosable in a primordial sense in this basic state-of-mind.\textsuperscript{41}

These quotes all follow one another in the same section and discuss a series of interrelated concepts and ideas. In the first quote, we see that Macquarrie and Robinson decide to translate \textit{eigentlich} (which appears here in guillemets) as “real” in single quotes, to denote that this use of \textit{eigentlich} is not related to authenticity as a technical term. Given the use of guillemets, which Macquarrie and Robinson often take to indicate an alternative (rather than emphasized) meaning, we can see why they chose this translation. In the second quote, however, they chose the word “real” once again, this time opting for double quotes, despite there being no indication of additional punctuation in the German. These double quotes are added by the translators in order to signal a relation to the mention of “real” above, but they do not note this at all in their footnotes. Instead, they insert a double quoted “real” into the text when it should be obvious that the adjectival construction warrants translation as a technical term. Lastly, in the third quote, when Heidegger gathers all of these ideas together, drawing a relation between \textit{eigentlich} anxiety and the \textit{Eigentlichkeit} of a particular Dasein, Macquarrie and Robinson opt to translate \textit{eigentlich} technically, as authenticity. The result in the English text is two uses of the term “real,” one with improvised punctuation, and a use of authenticity which is now appears disconnected from the above discussion, despite all of them being explicitly linked in the German text. Thus, we can see that, even in a discussion of anxiety, a mainstay of the traditional interpretation of

\textsuperscript{41} SZ 190/235.
authenticity, Macquarrie and Robinson fail to connect all of these technical terms in a consistent way.

### 2.2.4: A Confusing Precedent

We have now seen that in Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of *Being and Time*, in cases where the themes do not coincide with the traditional interpretation of authenticity, and even in cases where they do, *eigentlich* in both the adverbial and adjectival construction get covered up regularly. While the adverbial construction is admittedly a bit harder to parse, the adjectival construction should be plain as day. Throughout the Heidegger’s Introduction to *Being and Time*, much like the section on Descartes, these confusing translation choices happen again and again, even in sections where Heidegger is using *eigentlich* in its easily identified (3) adjectival construction:

> … [Its] real [*eigentlicher*] progress comes not so much from collecting results and storing them away in ‘manuals’ as from inquiring into the ways in which each particular area is basically constituted…

> The real [*eigentliche*] movement of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself.

Given the context of these quotes we can deduce why Macquarrie and Robinson opted to translate *eigentlich* as “real” rather than “authentic.” As stated above, since their interpretation of *eigentlich* is derived entirely in terms of the traditional interpretation of authenticity which aligns more consistently with the themes prominent in the second half of *Being and Time*, they associate *eigentlich* with other significant terms such as resoluteness and death. Naturally, it is a bit of a stretch to pair these themes with some of the topics of the first division and even more

---

difficult to see how this relates to something like “science,” as found in the above quote. These discussions of science and progress appear completely disconnected from other discussions of authenticity found later in Being and Time, and Macquarrie and Robinson promote this disconnect by translating these words in a different way. The problem is that if translators follow Macquarrie and Robinson’s strategy for translating eigentlich, they will also participate in covering up uses of eigentlich which fall outside of certain approved contexts. Consequently, further translations of Heidegger’s work which adopt this approach will only serve to reinforce this narrow interpretive scheme.

When it comes to translating Heidegger’s philosophical works, there are two significant difficulties which must be overcome: internal consistency, and consistency across texts. Internal consistency speaks to the consistency of translation within the text. For example, whatever word is chosen in English to represent a German technical term should be translated in the same way in all contexts. As we have seen, regarding the translation of eigentlich, it would appear that Macquarrie and Robinson have failed to achieve consistency for the numerous reasons outlined above. Their inability to accurately track technical uses of eigentlich outside of their occurrence in the chapters pertaining to traditional concepts of authenticity, and even inside of those very chapters, has set a precedent that can be seen throughout the secondary literature and in the most recent translations of Heidegger’s work into English. This has had an effect on the way translators work with Heidegger’s publications and lectures which predate Being and Time. When faced with a seemingly technical use of eigentlich in a work which predates Heidegger’s interest in the general themes of the traditional interpretation of authenticity (death, resoluteness, etc.), translators often trade terminological consistency for ease of reading by opting for whatever synonym of eigentlich best flows in the sentence. In other words, the traditional
interpretation of authenticity continually reinforces itself insofar as scholars continue to treat these uses of *eigentlich* as non-technical.

This inconsistency is more often the rule, and not the exception. In many of Heidegger’s early works, *eigentlich* shows up in Heidegger’s writing in one form or another. In fact, in many ways, it often seems like scholars do not consider *eigentlich* to be a technical term until the publication of *Being and Time*. Take, for instance, a translation of *The Concept of Time*44, subtitled aptly the “First Draft of *Being and Time*” as it was written in 1924, and contains rough approximations of many of its themes.45 In this text, as you might expect of a literal “Draft” of *Being and Time*, *eigentlich* appears frequently throughout. But if you only read the English, you might not notice, since depending on the context, *eigentlich* might translated as: true, genuine, authentic, proper, actual, or real.46 In other words, the translator seems to dismiss the possibility that authenticity is meant in a technical sense in this work. If we cannot even take *eigentlich* seriously in cases where the writing in question is supposed to be a draft of what is considered to be the sole authoritative text on authenticity, then it is apparent that something is wrong with our narrow interpretation of *eigentlich*. We might wonder what *Being and Time*, and the other texts which precede it chronologically look like when we apply the guidelines we have established for identifying technical uses.

---

44 GA 64. Not to be confused with *History of the Concept of Time* (GA 20.)
45 For more on the history of this draft see Kisiel, *Genesis*, 323.
2.3: FINDING TECHNICAL USES

Given that we now have the tools to identify technical terms, it is important for us to look at Being and Time with fresh eyes and look for places where eigentlich may be functioning in ways missed by the dominant Anglo-American perspective. In this section we will start by looking to the very first pages of Being and Time, where Heidegger sets out to describe the goal of his entire project. Here we will find uses of eigentlich which have gone undiscussed in the secondary literature. As we will see in chapter three, these uses of eigentlich will match up nicely with discussions found in Heidegger’s early lectures on method. This will present us with a problem, however, since (as we saw above) much of the scholarship is hesitant to utilize discussions of eigentlich which predate Being and Time. Following Macquarrie and Robinson, many translators of Heidegger refuse to translate eigentlich technically unless it concerns themes traditionally associated with authenticity. Thus, in the second part of this section we will attempt to broaden our interpretation of authenticity by showing that Heidegger’s first technical use of eigentlich can be found as far back as 1921. This will open up the possibility of a new interpretation that can account for the full phenomena of authenticity.

2.3.1: Technical Eigentlich in Being and Time

Many English readers might be surprised to know that Heidegger’s first use of eigentlich occurs before the preface, in the very first line of the book in his translation of the quote from Plato’s Sophist:

German: Denn offenbar seid ihr doch schon lange mit dem vertraut, was ihr eigentlich meint, wenn ihr den Ausdruck »seiend« gebraucht, wir jedoch glaubten es einst zwar zu verstehen, jetzt aber sind wir in Verlegenheit gekommen.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{47} SZ: 1.
M&R: For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression “being”. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.\textsuperscript{48}

In this famous quote, which initiates Heidegger’s \textit{magnum opus}, we see that Macquarrie and Robinson translate \textit{eigentlich} as though it were a discourse particle; which means they exclude the word entirely from their translation. This is reasonable way of translating the sentence since it is ambiguous as to whether \textit{eigentlich} is stressed or not. Admittedly, Heidegger’s use of the word “\textit{eigentlich}” appears to be his translation of the Greek “τί ποτε” which is not explicitly a technical term in Aristotle’s thinking, and in fact functions similarly to a discourse particle in the original Greek. Consequently, Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation is the better translation of the original Greek text.\textsuperscript{49} Nevertheless, Heidegger’s use of \textit{eigentlich} in this translation is mirrored by his use of it in the following sentences. This suggests to me that Heidegger is reading this crucial technical term into the above quote. Let me explain why.

As discussed earlier, without hearing the sentence, it would be difficult to know either way. But what happens if we instead read \textit{eigentlich} as stressed? Consider this alternative translation:

\begin{quote}
JJP: Clearly, for a long time, you have been aware of what you \textit{authentically} mean when you use the expression “being”, but we who once used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.
\end{quote}

By my estimation, the sentence feels more impactful. Admittedly, the emphasis on “\textit{authentically}” is a bit clunky and runs the risk of being redundant. We might ask if there is any meaningful distinction between “[what we] mean by the expression ‘being’” and “[what we]

\textsuperscript{48} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 19.

\textsuperscript{49} My thanks to Mor Segev for pointing out this relation between the original Greek and German and English translations.
authentically mean by the expression ‘being’?” Given this ambiguity and taken in isolation, Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of this sentence as an instance of (1) unstressed adverbial eigentlich not only makes sense, but pairs better with the original Greek.

When we read on, however, we see that this first use of eigentlich is paralleled by a second use of eigentlich in Heidegger’s follow-up question to the quote:

G: Haben wir heute eine Antwort auf die Frage nach dem, was wir mit dem Wort »seiend« eigentlich meinen? Keineswegs. 50
M&R: Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really [eigentlich] mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all. 51
JJP: Do we have in our time an answer to the question of what we authentically mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all.”

Once again, Heidegger is utilizing eigentlich adverbially to modify the verb meinen (“to mean”). In this sentence, Macquarrie and Robinson have opted to treat eigentlich as a (2) stressed adverbial construction, rather than as a discourse particle; translating eigentlich as “really,” which signifies that they see this use of eigentlich as non-technical. But these two uses of eigentlich are nearly identical: Both modify the same verb and do so in a way that emphasizes a paradigmatic sense of meaning that has been lost.

Of course, it is possible that what Heidegger has in mind here is a formal, but non-technical use of this word. But we have already seen that, as a whole, it is highly likely that most uses of eigentlich within Being and Time are technical, aside from their occasional use as a discourse particle, given that the text is full of uses of uneigentlich, Eigentlichkeit, and adjectival uses of eigentlich. Reading these uses as technical actually provides a great deal of clarity when

50 SZ: 1.
51 Heidegger, Being and Time, 19.
it comes to addressing other uses of *eigentlich* as they appear on the first few pages. In fact, Heidegger utilizes this same construction again a few pages later when discussing the importance of ontological genealogy for getting at authentic Being:

German: Und gerade die ontologische Aufgabe einer nicht deduktiv konstruierenden Genealogie der verschiedenen möglichen Weisen von Sein bedarf einer Vorverständigung über das, »was wir denn eigentlich mit diesem Ausdruck ›Sein‹ meinen«.\(^{52}\)

M&R: And the ontological task of a genealogy of the different possible ways of Being (which is not to be constructed deductively) is precisely such a sort as to require that we first come to an understanding of ‘what we really \(\text{[eigentlich]}\) mean by this expression ‘Being’’.\(^{53}\)

JJP: And it is precisely the ontological task of a non-deductively constructed genealogy of the various possible ways of being that requires a prior understanding of “what we authentically mean with this expression ‘being.’”

In Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of the quote, *eigentlich* goes relatively unnoticed and its relation to the other uses of *eigentlich* is completely obscured. In my translation of this quote, we see that Heidegger is emphatic about our ability to access some *authentic* meaning of being which will prove vital for fundamental ontology. This relationship between phenomenological ontology and authenticity is crucial for understanding the methodological sense of authenticity that we will uncover in full in the next chapter. Already in the first line of the first page of Heidegger’s text we find our first clue to what he really means by authenticity, a clue which has been missed for generations of Heidegger scholarship for both linguistic and philosophical reasons.

In addition to squaring nicely with the rest of the introduction which follows the *Sophist* quote, this reading also makes sense of why Heidegger, in his lectures which predate *Being and

\(^{52}\) SZ: 11.
Time, would also use the language of *eigentlich* to describe Plato’s investigation. In his 1924-5 lecture entitled *Plato’s Sophist*, Heidegger utilizes this exact same language when referencing this quote from the *Sophist*. Here we see Richard Rocjewicz and André Schuwer’s translation of the text: “For the proper [*eigentlich*] theme of this investigation is made abundantly clear at [Plato’s *Sophist*] 244a.”\(^{54}\) This quote emphasizes how intentional Heidegger was with his word choice. Here we see Heidegger is essentially pointing at the Plato’s *Sophist* and saying, “this is where we find the *authentic* theme of our investigation.” The authentic theme, of course, is the question of what we *authentically* mean by this expression “Being,” i.e., the central question of fundamental ontology.

Again and again, in this lecture course, in the same way he does in *Being and Time*, Heidegger demonstrates that his use of *eigentlich* is intentional. In the sentences which immediately follow this quote from the lecture, we see him use *eigentlich* twice more. Unfortunately, the translators obscure this by translating *eigentlich* differently in each sentence.

In the following quote we can see *eigentlich* used once in the paraphrastic translation of Plato’s words, and again in his interpretation of the dialogue as a whole:

> R&S: ‘…you yourself must clarify for us what you properly [*eigentlich*] mean when you utter this word ὀv.’ That is the genuinely [*eigentlich*] central concern of this passage and of the whole dialogue.\(^{55}\)

From this quote we can glean two insights. First, we see that Heidegger’s use of *eigentlich* to describe the quote from Plato’s *Sophist*, as well as the goals of fundamental ontology, is not accidental. This tells us that we need to consider the possibility that authenticity is related to the

\(^{54}\) GA 19: 446/309. Here we see the translators opt to translate *eigentlich* as “proper” rather than authentic. As we will see in the conclusion to this dissertation, there are some serious advantages to this translation choice.

\(^{55}\) GA 19: 446-7/309. “R&S” is meant to denote the last names of the translators of this English edition: Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer.
method of phenomenological ontology and the goals of *Being and Time*. Second, we see that the paradigm set by Macquarrie and Robinson, where *eigentlich* is treated as a technical term only in contexts which square with the traditional interpretation of authenticity, is still being utilized by scholars who are now translating Heidegger’s early lectures. As can be seen from this quote, even if “proper” is an adequate translation of *eigentlich*, the fact that the translators translate *eigentlich* as “genuine” in the following sentence indicates that they do not see *eigentlich* as a technical term. As we mentioned from the outset, one reason for this hesitance to maintain terminological consistency with regard to *eigentlich* is that the translators may not consider this word to be technical yet. As we saw in the above example of the “First Draft of *Being and Time*” (GA 64), scholars have often struggled to determine when this word gains its technical status and in which contexts. To justify looking back to these lectures as a source for additional uses of technical *eigentlich*, we will now have to provide some account of when Heidegger first adopts *eigentlich* as a technical term.

### 2.3.2: The First Technical Uses of *Eigentlich* in the Lectures

It should be noted that whether *eigentlich* qualifies as a technical term at any given point in Heidegger’s philosophical development is a live matter of debate. As far as I am aware, there is no moment in Heidegger’s published works, journals, or letters to friends where he simply states: “Today I coined the term *Eigentlichkeit*, and this is what it means to me now and forever.” With regard to his early works, we should recognize that the texts as we have them are not perfectly preserved transcripts of what was said in those lectures. These texts are often reconstructed from lecture notes and Heidegger’s person manuscripts. Consequently, there is always the possibility

---

56 For my thoughts on the proper translation of *eigentlich* see 6.3.
that the influences of scholars, editors, or Heidegger himself have worked terminology back into
the manuscripts to alter them in anachronous ways. Furthermore, we should note that the
meaning of terms is always relative to the context within which they are used, and that even
within a set context their meaning can change as the thinkers that use them change. All of that
said, the application of the above guidelines can still provide us with a positive result, even if it is
impossible achieve absolute certainty.

Admittedly, the application of these guidelines to the first half of Heidegger’s
Gesamtausgabe was a massive endeavor, requiring many days of manually scanning texts and
searching through thousands of scanned pages for the various formulations of eigentlich
discussed above. The results were mixed but indicated a clear trend: In works prior to 1921, there
were texts which met some of the guidelines established above, but all three criteria are not met
until 1921. This means that while Heidegger may have thought of eigentlich as a technical term
as early as 1919, by my estimation there is not sufficient evidence to suggest consistent technical
use until around 1921, as it is only in texts from that period onward that Heidegger’s writing
fulfills all three of the above guidelines. To put it more directly: In Heidegger’s 1921 lecture,
Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle (GA 61), eigentlich appears in stressed adverbial
and adjectival constructions (I), alongside the terms Eigentlichkeit (II) and uneigentlich (III). In
nearly all of the texts which chronologically follow after that lecture, we can find all three
criteria, and an increase in their frequency leading up to Being and Time’s publication in 1927.\(^\text{57}\)

\(^{57}\) That eigentlich becomes a technical term around this period of time is (by my estimation) not accidental, as it is
around this time that Heidegger is developing his phenomenological method. The link between authenticity and
Heidegger’s phenomenological method, is consequently, the topic of chapter 3 of this dissertation.
In this 1921 winter semester course, two moments stand out as significant for identifying the use of *eigentlich* as a technical term. In the first moment, Heidegger establishes a link between *eigentlich* and *uneigentlich* in his definition of formal indication. The second moment is found in loose pages which accompany this text in the form of an appendix. It is in these notes that Heidegger uses and defines *Eigentlichkeit* for the first time. By addressing both moments and additional uses of *eigentlich* throughout this text, we will clearly see that this course fulfills all of the guidelines for identifying technical use of *eigentlich*. To reiterate, the guidelines established were as follows:

A use of *eigentlich* may be technical if:

I. Adverbial *eigentlich* is not being used colloquially as a discourse particle.

II. Adjectival or stressed adverbial *eigentlich* occurs alongside *Eigentlichkeit*.

III. Adjectival *eigentlich* occurs alongside *uneigentlich*

To set up this first moment, it is important to note that the content of Heidegger’s lecture at this point has been about providing a firm foundation for philosophy through an appropriate phenomenological method. Although we will detail this method in chapter 4, for now, it is important to note that what we find in this moment is a series of significant technical distinctions and definitions. Amidst this discussion of phenomenological method, we find a description of *eigentlich* and how it relates to *uneigentlich*.

German: … sondern angezeigt so, dass das, was gesagt ist, vom Charakter des »Formalen« ist, uneigentlich, aber gerade in diesem »un« zugleich positiv die Anweisung.²⁸

---

²⁸ GA 61: 33.
English: [Indicated] here means that which is said of the character of the “formal,” and so is admittedly improper [uneigentlich]. Yet precisely in this “im-” [»un«] there resides at the same time a positive reference.\textsuperscript{59}

Although we currently lack the methodological context to fully unpack this quote, we can still rely on the linguistic criteria established above to focus on the language to see if eigentlich qualifies as a technical use. When we look at how Heidegger unpacks uneigentlich by explaining the importance of the “im- - [»un«]” the relationship between eigentlich and uneigentlich could not be any more explicit.

Although we have not discussed exactly what “formal indication” means, it is clear that eigentlich and uneigentlich play an essential and technical role in its definition. When paired with the first sentence of the following paragraph this becomes even more apparent:

German: Es liegt in der formalen Anzeige eine ganz bestimmte Bindung; es wird in ihr gesagt, dass ich an der und einer ganz bestimmten Ansatzrichtung stehe, dass es, soll es zum Eigentlichen kommen, nur den Weg gibt, das uneigentlich Angezeigte auszukosten und zu erfüllen, der Anzeige zu folgen.\textsuperscript{60}

English: There resides in the formal indication a very definite bond; this bond says that I stand in a quite definite direction of approach, and it points out the only way of arriving at what is proper [Eigentlichen], namely, by exhausting and fulfilling what is improperly [uneigentlich] indicated, by following the indication.\textsuperscript{61}

Here, Heidegger relates eigentlich and uneigentlich once again to the process of formal indication. These terms are not merely descriptive or informal, but rather seem bound to the starting point and goal of phenomenology. There appears to be some sort of process that results in “exhausting” the uneigentlich to arrive at the eigentlich which he reiterates on the following page:

\textsuperscript{60} GA 61: 33.
German: Der Gegenstand selbst, im Wie des Prinzipseins bestimmt, ist uneigentlich da, »formal angezeigt«; man lebt im uneigentlich Haben, das seine spezifische Vollzugsrichtung auf die Zeitigung des eigentlichen Habens nimmt, ein Haben, das durch diese Richtungnahme gerade als eigentlich bestimmt ist. Das eigentliche Haben ist bei manchen Gegenständen in einem radikalen Sinn ein Sein, d.h. das spezifische Sein des je Vollzugshaften, der Zeitigung für die Existenz.\(^62\)

English: The object itself, determined in the “how” of its being a principle, is inauthentically \([\textit{uneigentlich}]\) there, “formally indicated.” We live in an inauthentic \([\textit{uneigentlich}]\) mode of possession, which takes a specific direction of actualization towards the maturation of the authentic \([\textit{eigentlichen}]\) mode of possession, and the latter is determined as authentic \([\textit{eigentliches}]\) precisely through this taking of direction. The authentic \([\textit{eigentliche}]\) mode of possession is, with respect to many objects, in a radical sense a Being, i.e., the specific Being of the respective actualization, of the maturation of existence.\(^63\)

Although the prose is dense and difficult to parse, there is a clear link between numerous types of \textit{eigentlich} here, and, as in the previous quote, explicit links to \textit{uneigentlich}. Even if it remains unclear how all these terms relate, the use of these specialized terms in conjunction with one another consistently over this entire section seems intentional by Heidegger and warrants careful philosophical investigation.

Already in these few quotes we see two of our guidelines have been met: Stressed adverbial usage (I), explicit relationship between \textit{uneigentlich} and \textit{eigentlich} (III). In order to fulfill the final guideline, we will need to find uses of \textit{eigentlich} linked with the nominalized adjective \textit{Eigentlichkeit}.

\textit{Eigentlichkeit} occurs in two places in this text. The first is found in a discussion of definitions which has ties to the above cited discussion on formal indication:

German: Und das im Sinne der Idee der Definition, des eigentlichen Definitionverstehens, situations- und vorgriffsgebührend; diese Bestimmtheiten der Definition sind nicht erledigt mit dem ersten Ansatz und

\[^{62}\text{GA 61: 34.}\]
\[^{63}\text{Heidegger, \textit{Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle}, 27.}\]
English: …. Specifically in the sense of the idea of definition, according to the genuine \[eigentlichen\] understanding of definition, and as appropriate to the situation and to the preconception. These strictures of definition cannot be met or even sufficiently clarified upon a first approach. Yet they become more pressing as we progress toward authenticity \[Eigentlichkeit\] in the understanding of the definition. They become ever more insistent, and, in their unity and increasing urgency, they bring to maturity precisely the appropriation \[Aneignung\] of the concrete.65

Although it is obscured by the English translation, we can see here that Heidegger has drawn a connection between \textit{eigentlich} and \textit{Eigentlichkeit}. From this quote we can glean that Heidegger’s goal seems to be a method which progresses towards an authentic understanding. This squares nicely with this use of authentic above, which he described as a move through the inauthentic towards something more authentic.

Finally, the last piece of evidence (and the second use of \textit{Eigentlichkeit} in this lecture) comes from Appendix II, which contains “loose pages” that Heidegger wanted associated with these lectures.66 It is in this part of the text where Heidegger uses the term \textit{Eigentlichkeit} multiple times and sketches its relation to \textit{eigentlich}:

German: Zeitigung des konkreten Zugangs zum Gegenstand, d.h. das ist schon eigentlicher Umgang, ein Wie des fragenden Besorgens. Eigentlicher Umgang!
«Eigentlichkeit» -- entnommen aus dem Seienden. Entscheid über Eigentlichkeit der Seinscharakter des Zugangs, Kategorien. Anzeige des

64 GA 61: 62
66 When it comes to dating when Heidegger composed something, loose pages are even more suspect than the edited lectures themselves. It is entirely possible that these pages were added years after Heidegger wrote these lectures. Still, I maintain that the content of these pages combined with the rest of the evidence from this lecture course justifies their inclusion as evidence for technical uses of \textit{eigentlich} in 1921.

English: Maturation of the concrete access to the object: that is already a genuine \textit{eigentlicher} way of dealing with the object, a mode of apprehensiveness that questions. Genuine \textit{Eigentlicher} dealing with the object! “Genuineness \textit{Eigentlichkeit}” – drawn from the being. Decision over the genuineness \textit{Eigentlichkeit} of the ontological character of the access, categories. Indication of the being in the proximity of the dealings. The proximal: life. Indication of an ontological character: life as Being. Genuineness \textit{Eigentlichkeit} of the dealings: Being! Mode of Being!\textsuperscript{68}

Admittedly, this text is not easy to parse as it reads more like Heidegger’s marginalia than the polished work of a scholar. The translator does maintain consistency between \textit{eigentlich} and \textit{Eigentlichkeit} by translating them as “genuine” and “genuineness.” Unfortunately, this has the side effect of obscuring the relation between this discussion and the discussion found in the previous quote where \textit{Eigentlichkeit} was translated as authenticity. Nevertheless, this paragraph offers a key insight into Heidegger’s views on \textit{Eigentlichkeit} in 1921: Even though we do not fully understand its role at this time, it is clearly technical and has some relation to the concepts of life, being, and formal indication.

We can now see that this lecture meets all of the guidelines for identifying technical use of \textit{eigentlich}: \textit{Eigentlich} was used in stressed adverbial and adjectival constructions (I), alongside the use of \textit{Eigentlichkeit} (II) and \textit{uneigentlich} (III). As we will see in chapter three, these uses anticipate a major philosophical breakthrough in Heidegger’s thinking where \textit{Eigentlichkeit} plays a central and pivotal role as a technical term worthy of consistent translation.

\textsuperscript{67} GA 61: 189.
\textsuperscript{68} Heidegger, \textit{Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle}, 142.
2.4: CONCLUSION

In this chapter we saw that some of the confusion surrounding Heideggerian authenticity stems from the word *eigentlich* itself. By unpacking the various ways that *eigentlich* is used in German, we were able to establish guidelines for identifying when it is being used technically. When we looked to *Being and Time*, we saw that the translators of the English edition, Macquarrie and Robinson, translated the term with great inconsistency in sections which lacked themes traditionally associated with authenticity. We then saw that this inconsistency has become the norm in the scholarship, since scholars are unsure as to when *eigentlich* gains its technical status, and in which contexts. Here our guidelines proved useful, since it allowed for us to notice new phenomena of authenticity in *Being and Time* and the first uses of authenticity in Heidegger’s early lectures. These new phenomena of authenticity suggest that a methodological use of authenticity has gone underdeveloped in the secondary literature. In the next chapter we will unpack Heidegger’s method, as he has appropriated it from Aristotle, to see that authenticity plays a central and ineliminable role in his understanding of phenomenology.
CHAPTER 3: HEIDEGGER’S ENDOXIC METHOD

Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, which debuted in Being and Time, has often been interpreted as a synthesis of two dominant influences on his early thinking. Following Husserl, Heidegger is adamant that phenomenology is the only proper way to do philosophy; following Dilthey, Heidegger claims that philosophy is not possible without a radical reinterpretation of the tradition. As the story goes, with only months to produce a publication to get a job, Heidegger writes Being and Time, creates hermeneutic phenomenology, and resolves the problems presented by both sides, ushering in a new age of philosophy. Now that we have access to Heidegger’s early lectures, however, we can see that the story is much more complex. Rather than overcoming these two contradictory views in a single moment of vision, we now see that Heidegger went to lengths to defend phenomenology from criticisms (Dilthey and Natorp) while simultaneously pushing it beyond the confines of descriptive accounts of objects (Husserl). These years leading up to the publication of his magnum opus involved serious investigations into the history of philosophy carried out in the classroom, meticulously developing his method.

2 Of course, an argument can be made for the influence of existentialism and transcendental philosophy, and many other traditions of thought.
to the delight and exasperation of his students. These gradual advances come to a head in 1921 in his interpretive readings of Aristotle, where he finds a philosopher who both roots his investigations in the phenomena of everyday experience and looks to history for philosophical insights. These exciting lectures, which Gadamer once described as seeing Aristotle come back from the dead, are the primary source of Heidegger’s early thinking up to and including *Being and Time*.

In this chapter, I aim to draw a direct line from these early lectures to the very structure of *Being and Time* itself. In part one, I demonstrate how Aristotle grappled with similar problems concerning the proper way of doing philosophy. His solution is found in the development of *endoxic* method. In part two, we will see that Heidegger also looks to *endoxic* method to provide the foundation for his phenomenological method. Consequently, I show that although Husserl, Natorp, and Dilthey generate the puzzles occupying early Heidegger’s investigations, it is

---

3 In a letter to Karl Löwith in September of 1920, Heidegger expresses his desire to use his courses to grow as a philosopher: “I myself want to learn something in my seminars…” (Kisiel, Theodore. *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*. (University of California Press, 1993), 150). This echoes Heidegger’s more famous mantra: “In all teaching, the teacher learns the most” (Martin Heidegger, *What Is a Thing?* Translated by W. B. Barton and Vera Deutsch. (Gateway Editions, Ltd., 1970.), 73). Gadamer and other members of the “Aristotle breakfast club,” the nickname for the students who attended Heidegger’s courses on Aristotle which took place early in the morning, remarked that the early Marburg lectures were completely life changing (Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Heidegger’s Ways*.Translated by John W. Stanley. (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1994), 115). This approach was not enjoyed by all of Heidegger’s students, however. In the semester on *Phenomenology of Religious Experience*, Heidegger faced backlash from his students for spending weeks discussing phenomenological method, rather than talking about religion. For Heidegger’s frustrated response to mutinous students, see GA 60: 65/45.

4 For another champion of the view developed in this chapter, see Walter Brogan’s *Heidegger and Aristotle*, where he notes that, like Heidegger, “Aristotle beings by situating his own philosophical questions in relationship to his predecessors. For Aristotle [and Heidegger both], this task is not merely a preliminary investigation, but a philosophical way of recovering and discovering the question that motivate his own philosophy project” (Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 6.)


6 “*Endoxic* method” refers generally to any investigation which relies on *endoxa* (usually translated as reputable opinions) for evidence of its conclusion. Aristotle often relies on *endoxa* in dialectic, and which he splits it into inductive and deductive versions. Inductive dialectic relies on *endoxa* to generate first principles. Deductive dialectic draws on *endoxa* as support, sometimes alongside empirical phenomena to make conclusions about the natural world.
Aristotle who provides the resolution. Here we will see that authenticity was central to how Heidegger defines his method from the very start. In part three, I spell out, not only how Heidegger’s method solves the problems his mentors could not but how endoxic method, and authenticity, can be found in the very structure of Being and Time.

3.1: ARISTOTLE’S METHOD

Given the breadth and complexity of Aristotle’s corpus, it should not be surprising that the status of his method (or methods) is a topic of intense debate. Even though he often explains his method at the outset of his writing, it is an open question as to whether Aristotle truly follows the project that he sets out for himself. For the purposes of this chapter, we are only interested in a broad overview of Aristotle’s method which will prove illuminating for our understanding of Heidegger. Consequently, I will present a general account of Aristotle’s method, leaving some notable objections in the footnotes for further investigation. In my presentation, I will follow Christopher Shields’s view that phainomena and endoxa are central to Aristotle’s method.

For Aristotle, philosophy begins in wonder, that is, in response to something which we find puzzling in our everyday experience. The existence of these puzzles (aporia) in our experience are an indication of our human failure to grasp the complexity of the world. However, our ability to notice these puzzles presents us with the possibility of finding a resolution so long as we employ the right method of investigation. It is in the Nicomachean Ethics that, in

---------------------------

8 Christopher Shields, Aristotle, 2nd edition (Routledge, 2014), 28: “…Aristotle thinks that we begin in philosophy precisely where we are: we begin with how things appear to us – we begin, that is, by stating the appearances, the phainomena, of which the endoxa sometimes form a subclass.”
discussing the concept of “lack of self-control” (*akrasia*), Aristotle provides a general formula for all of his investigations:9

We must, as in all other cases, set the phenomena before us and, after first discussing the difficulties [*aporiai*], go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the reputable opinions [*endoxa*] about these affections or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative; for if we both resolve the difficulties [*aporia*] and leave the reputable opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently.10

Aristotle begins each investigation by surveying what appears to be the case, or what we call the phenomena. He describes this process in the *Physics* as advancing “from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature.”11

Because we always start with what seems to be the case, there is always the possibility that we are being deceived. In other words, all investigations start with what is familiar or self-evident but possibly false and proceed towards what really is the case, which may be more difficult for us to comprehend. Consequently, a satisfactory or “sufficient” resolution to the puzzle must preserve the phenomena. I take this simple formula – gather the phenomena, lay out the puzzles, and seek a resolution that preserves the most phenomena – to be the general methodological approach in all of Aristotle’s works.12 This approach applies generally to all of Aristotle’s investigations, but varies with regard to the types of phenomena in question.13 In some cases, the

---

9 Aristotle also outlines the role of *endoxa* in the *Topics*, which we will discuss below.


11 Aristotle, *Physics*, 184a20. See also *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1095b1: “Presumably then, we must begin with things familiar to us.”


13 In the published version of this chapter, *Heidegger’s Endoxic Method: Finding Authenticity in Aristotle*, I made a distinction between “scientific” and “philosophical” investigations. It has been made clear to me that this dichotomy does not make sense within Aristotle’s thought.
phenomena are the empirical observations which lead us to conclude causal relations between objects of the natural world. When dealing with empirical observations, the goal is scientific knowledge, and it is achieved through demonstration. In other cases, the phenomena are the *endoxa*, what the wise have said about the topic at hand. In cases where *endoxa* are the phenomena in question, the method by which Aristotle resolves the puzzles which arise between the various views of the wise is called dialectic. Dialectic is what gives rise to an understanding of first principles.

3.1.1: Empirical Phenomena

In Book One of *Meteorology* Aristotle presents the following observation: It seems to be the case (the empirical phenomena show) that a group of rivers and lakes continue to dry up more and more every year. The puzzle arises from the fact that the phenomenon of disappearing water seems to contradict a core philosophical presupposition that forms part of our understanding of reality: that nothing in the universe can be destroyed. When Aristotle gathers more empirical data, he concludes that this puzzle is a result of confining one’s phenomena too narrowly. For the person who lives near the lake, it may appear as though the world’s water was slowly disappearing. However, if we expand our view more broadly, we will notice that there are places

---

14 Although Aristotle makes these distinctions in the *Topics*, it is debated whether he sticks to them. For instance, Andrea Falcon and Mariska Leunissen note that Aristotle appeals to *eulogos* (reasonable) argumentation in *de Caelo*. (Falcon and Leunissen, “The scientific role of *eulogos* in Aristotle’s *Cael II 12*” in David Ebrey, ed., *Theory and Practice in Aristotle’s Natural Science* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2015). In *de Caelo*, Aristotle seems to be engaging in dialectic since it appears he “has reached the limits of what can be established scientifically,” but Falcon and Leunissen suggest this is not the case (Falcon and Leunissen, “The scientific role,” 232.) Instead, they suggest that Aristotle occupies a middle ground, utilizing both scientific and dialectical solutions in a way which is “accountable to empirical evidence” (Falcon and Leunissen, 240.)

15 Aristotle, *Topics*, 101a26-b4. In particular, induction, which is a form of dialectic, is what is responsible for generating first principles.


17 Aristotle, *Meteorology*, 352b18: “Since there is necessarily some change in the whole world, but not in the way of coming into existence or perishing (for the universe is permanent), it must be, as we say, that the same places are not for every moist through the presence of sea and rivers nor for ever dry.”
in the world where the water level is rising. Thus, the solution to the puzzle of the missing water: it is not being destroyed, but just going somewhere else. But Aristotle does not simply stop after giving his alternative explanation; as Shields puts it, “[for Aristotle] a scientific explanation does not only put facts on display, but gives an account of why the fact should be so.”\(^{18}\) Aristotle draws on the evidence of silt deposits and historical accounts of rivers which no longer exist to show that, “the same parts of the whole earth are not always either sea or land, [rather] all this changes in the course of time.”\(^{19}\) Aristotle concludes that rivers and lakes grow and change naturally moving from one location to another, advancing in one place and receding in another on a massive timescale.

In this example, Aristotle explains a puzzle which arises from our everyday experience (missing water), presents the relevant phenomena (empirical observations about more general water levels), and seeks a resolution which preserves the phenomena (things seem to disappear) while maintaining our philosophical principles (nothing can be destroyed). He achieves all of this by explaining the phenomena in a broader context (the developmental cycle of rivers and lakes). This example from elementary science demonstrates how Aristotle uses empirical evidence in scientific investigations to ground his arguments and support his philosophical principles.

However, the missing water is only a puzzle in conjunction with the principle that nothing can be destroyed. Where does this principle come from and how can Aristotle assert it so authoritatively? Aristotle wrestles with the origin of principles at length in the *Posterior Analytics*, where he considers how science depends on a foundation which has not been

---


\(^{19}\) Aristotle, *Meteorology*, 353a24.
adequately explained. He notes that for scientific investigations to produce understanding, they must depend on things which are “true and primitive and immediate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the conclusion.” These principles which ground our understanding could not themselves be the product of scientific demonstration as this would result in circular reasoning and consequently undermine the veracity of the knowledge. Aristotle ultimately concludes that the proper way to establish principles is through dialectic.

3.1.2: *Endoxa* as Phenomena

For Aristotle, dialectic follows the same general approach outlined above: first we gather up the phenomena, then we address the puzzles, and ultimately, we seek a resolution that preserves the most phenomena. The phenomena of dialectic are the *endoxa*. In the *Topics*, Aristotle defines *endoxa* as the opinions which are reputable to “everyone” or “most people” or just “the wise.” This appeal to “what has been said” (*legomena*) by reputable opinions (*endoxa*) is different from its demonstrative counterpart because it investigates the views of wise and common people who have come to understand the world through their everyday experience. In *endoxic* method, we

---

20 Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 74b5: “Now if demonstrative understanding depends on necessary principles (for what one understands could not be otherwise), and what belongs to the objects in themselves is necessary…, it is evident that demonstrative deduction will depend on things of this sort…”


22 Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 72b35 “There results for those who say that demonstration is circular not only what has just been described, but also that they say nothing other than that this is the case if this is the case – and it is easy to prove everything in this way.” He continues at 73a1: “Hence it results that those who assert that demonstration is circular say nothing but that if *A* is the case *A* is the case. And it is easy to prove everything this way.”

23 The resolution is found in Aristotle, *Topics*, 101a34-b4: “For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are primitive in relation to everything else: it is through reputable opinions [*endoxa*] about them that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic; for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.” See also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139b25-31: “And all teaching starts from what is already known, as we maintain in the [Posterior] *Analytics* also; for it proceeds sometimes through induction and sometimes by deduction. Now induction is of first principles and of the universal and deduction proceeds *from* universals. There are therefore principles from which deduction proceeds, which are not reached by deduction; it is therefore by induction that they are acquired.”

seek an account which preserves as much as possible of what has been said by “the many” or “the wise” while resolving the puzzle at hand. The process of weighing these various options is called dialectic, and Aristotle argues it is the sole “path to the principles of all inquiries.” For example, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle utilizes *endoxic* method to investigate the ultimate good for human beings. Although there is general agreement that it is happiness (*eudaimonia*), the details surrounding what constitutes happiness are jumbled and confused. To provide an answer that is adequate, Aristotle must explain these various dominant perspectives and show how they each relate to the truth of the matter.

In some cases, it is difficult or outright impossible for Aristotle to preserve all the phenomena since the ambiguous nature of this definition allows many things to qualify as *endoxa*, including views which directly contradict one another. In this way, *endoxa* can be both problem and solution for Aristotle. They are a problem because many of the views found in our everyday thinking are passed down generationally with little thought. Such dogmatic accounts acquire a great deal of authority even though they may not have arisen through a proper investigation of the matters. Shields argues that, when using *endoxic* method, Aristotle holds no view to be certain and is always willing to disregard those which are patently false.

---

25 It should be noted that Aristotle often has in mind “the wise” when speaking of *endoxa*. That this term also includes “the many” indicates a complex relationship between things which are so self-evident that everyone knows it, and things which the wise have discovered that have consequently become adopted by the many.

26 Aristotle, *Topics*, 101b1. It should be noted that Aristotle speaks of dialectic in terms of deduction and induction, where the former moves from universals to particulars and the latter moves from particulars to universals. As I understand it, first principles are universals derived from a dialectical analysis of particular *endoxa*.

27 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1095a16-21: “Verbally there is a very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and faring well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise.”

On the other hand, their very popularity indicates that they likely have some relation to
the truth. Although Aristotle admits that we are unable to examine “all the opinions,” he is
willing to entertain any view which is “prevalent” or seems “to have some reason in their
favour.”29 Shields concludes that, for Aristotle, *endoxa* are important because they “often track
the truth – if not the surface truth presented by the appearance, then a discoverable truth whose
relation to our initial appearance becomes clear upon investigation and analysis.”30 On this
reading, Aristotle works through *endoxa* because, despite their potential to mislead, they bear
some relation to the truth or to what really is. For Aristotle, the fact that something is widely
believed is not definitive proof that it is true, far from it, but it does indicate some shared relation
to the truth which must be considered and comprehended, a view that clashes with Plato’s notion
that only the views of the wise are worth considering.31 Thus, the goal of *endoxic* method is to
carefully sort through what has been said and uncover what truth it contains.

A representative example of *endoxic* method can be found in the *Physics* Book one.
Although we might be inclined to think of “physics” as a scientific enterprise, Aristotle is very
clear from the outset of the text that his main goal is to become acquainted with the “principles”
of nature. In the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle argues that this process of establishing principles
is not the task of demonstration but of dialectic.32 In book one of the *Physics*, Aristotle is

31 Plato, *Crito*, 48a: “Socrates: We should not then think so much of what the majority will say about us, but what he
will say who understands justice and injustice, the one, that is, and the truth itself. So that, in the first place, you
were wrong to believe that we should care for the opinion of the many about what is just, beautiful, good, and their
opposites.”
32 One of the first scholars to explain *endoxic* method, G.E.L. Owen, relies heavily on these two texts in his famous
essay “*Tithenai ta phainomena*”, where he argues that Aristotle’s *Physics* should be read as both a philosophical and
scientific work. Owen suggests that in the first half of the *Physics*, we find Aristotle generating the principles
through *endoxic* method, whereas, in the latter half, we see Aristotle apply those principles to phenomena of sense
experience. Our example, which Owen references, comes from this first half.
investigating the philosophical puzzle of how things can be said to “become something else” or “change.”33 The puzzle arises, as in the case of the missing water, because something in our everyday experience clashes with a philosophical principle. We see many things change (seasons, people, weather, etc.) but numerous ancient philosophers, most notably Parmenides, have stated that all things being one, change is impossible.34 Aristotle seeks to resolve the tension between our lived experience and the *endoxa* of earlier thinkers by investigating the first principles of nature and what is said about change.

Following the process outlined above, Aristotle starts by presenting the various *endoxa* relevant to this discussion, surveying views from such wise men as Parmenides, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Melissus, Heraclitus, and Empedocles.35 A cynical reading might view these “reputable opinions” merely as strawmen that Aristotle has assembled so he can take them to task. Although he is critical of these thinkers, he rarely dismisses them outright and often points to moments of clarity and ingenuity in their thought. In this way, Aristotle’s critique remains positive, always looking to what we can learn from our predecessors: how they set up the problems, their attempted solutions, and the mistakes that they made in their reasoning.36 *Endoxa* are not merely outdated viewpoints to be discarded like alchemy once chemistry is discovered, to use an anachronistic analogy of anachronism, but genuine glimpses of the truth, and any glimpses are to be appreciated, no matter how dim or fleeting. As we noted above, what is truest in nature is attained by advancing through what is self-evident to us. In this case, what is self-

---

evident or commonly accepted about the first principles of nature is a confused jumble of contradictory views, so these constitute our starting point.\textsuperscript{37}

To resolve the puzzle, Aristotle compares these \textit{endoxa} with each other in order to uncover their similarities and differences. This allows him to show that most of these ancient accounts actually agree with one another about one important aspect of the nature of reality:

\begin{quote}
Hence their principles are in one sense the same, in another different; different certainly as indeed most people think, but the same inasmuch as they are analogous; for all are taken from the same table of columns, some of the pairs being wider, others narrower in extent.\textsuperscript{38}
\end{quote}

The various \textit{endoxa} agree that the universe should be understood in terms of “contraries.” Even though it is a matter of debate as to just what those things standing in contradistinction from one another are, the fact that the \textit{endoxa} share a common reliance on contraries is indicative of some deeper truth about reality. Aristotle summarizes this insight by stating, “It is clear then that our principles must be contraries” because such a consensus was not arbitrarily established but “constrained… by the truth itself.”\textsuperscript{39} Rather than dismiss these previous accounts for his own, entirely different view, Aristotle looks to what is true in them and builds his own account from there. Since there is a shared notion among the \textit{endoxa} that the world should be understood in terms of contraries, Aristotle thinks we should follow suit.

But Aristotle cannot just create any theory which utilizes contraries. Instead, he has to provide an account which can make sense of the truths of his predecessor’s accounts. Like we saw in the example of the \textit{Meteorology}, Aristotle wants to show how his view supersedes theirs

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
by accounting for wider phenomena and making greater sense of the world of our experience.

Finally, another criterion for success is to provide an account which can explain how these earlier thinkers could have been led astray by resolving the puzzles (aporiai) which plagued their accounts.\(^{40}\) In this way, Aristotle decisively surpasses his predecessors in providing an account which grapples with the history of the puzzle and explains how it came to be.

To resolve the *Physics*’ puzzle of mutability, Aristotle looks to a problem inherent in the language used by the earlier thinkers, asking what we mean when we use the word “becoming”: Do we take this to mean the generation of something entirely new? Or is there some other way to view change? Aristotle’s answer is that earlier thinkers were misled because they conflated different senses of “becoming,” specifically, the sense of generation *ex nihilo* with the sense of changing in any way. As a result, these earlier thinkers struggled to reconcile their commitment to the principle that “nothing can come from nothing” with the phenomena of constant change and motion present in everyday life. By explaining *why* these thinkers were misled, he has met his own methodological criterion, concluding: “Such then was their opinion, and such the reason for its adoption.”\(^{41}\) In contrast, Aristotle’s own account argues that while qualities of something can always change, there must be an underlying substance which remains constant. This distinction can account for changes in the qualities of something, explain what the earlier thinkers got right and what they got wrong, and still maintain the philosophical principle that nothing can come from nothing.\(^{42}\) The *endoxic* method salvages what is true and accounts for the false along the way to clearing up the puzzle.

\(^{40}\) Aristotle, *Physics*, 191a23. “We will now proceed to show that the difficulty [aporia] of the early thinkers, as well as our own, is solved in this way alone.”


To summarize: in both demonstration and dialectic, Aristotle begins with the phenomena, although in the former these are empirical experience while in the latter, endoxa. He then shows how these phenomena generate various puzzles (aporiai). He resolves the puzzle(s) by giving an account which untangles the initial puzzle, preserves as much as possible of the relevant set of phenomena, and explains the failures and successes of earlier thinkers. From a Heideggerian perspective, this method phenomenological, insofar as it addresses what shows itself, and historical, in that it requires attending to what has been said (legomena) and passed down through tradition in the voice of the wise (endoxa). We will now see why this method proved so vital to early Heidegger.

3.2: HEIDEGGER’S EARLY LECTURES

In his autobiographical descriptions of his development, Heidegger is explicit about the importance of Aristotle in both his pre-philosophical development, via Brentano’s dissertation, and his early philosophical development at Freiburg and Marburg, circa 1919-1927. When applying for his first position, at the University of Marburg, Heidegger was prompted to provide a writing sample. What he produced was an introduction to a book on Aristotle. As the story goes, Heidegger never finished the text, and when pushed to publish once more, decided to write Being and Time instead. By the end of this chapter, we may ask ourselves if Heidegger really did give up on the Aristotle book, or whether he merely gave it a new name and broadened its scope.

Scholars frequently point out the shared content of Heidegger and Aristotle’s thinking, such as the emphasis on practical wisdom (phronesis), or the ineliminable role of affectedness in

---

43 See the letter between Heidegger and Richardson (c. 1962) in the preface of Richardson, William J. Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. 4th ed. edition. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993.) Also see Heidegger’s essay “My Way to Phenomenology” (GA 14: 91/OTB 74).
understanding (pathe for Aristotle, Befindlichkeit for Heidegger). These concepts, and many others, are in fact central to Heidegger’s analysis of Aristotle’s philosophy and factor into much of his early thought. But Heidegger often cites Aristotle not just as a source of rich content, but as an inspiration for his own phenomenological method. In “My Way to Phenomenology,” Heidegger notes that “self-manifestation of phenomena is thought more originally by Aristotle.” This insight, that Aristotle could be interpreted as a phenomenologist, was a crucial breakthrough for Heidegger’s method at the time. To see how this resolution came to be, we must look to the puzzles which troubled Heidegger in these early lectures.

Heidegger’s early lectures portray a young and serious thinker who is frustrated with the current state of philosophy. In his lectures and correspondence, we see that Heidegger wishes to reestablish philosophy as the heart of the university. As a student of Husserl, Heidegger adopts and advocates for phenomenology as the only method which grasps things as they show themselves. At this time, however, Husserlian phenomenology was under a great deal of scrutiny. Most notably, Paul Natorp, a founding member of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantians whom Heidegger referred to as “the one who was best prepared to discuss Husserl,” objected that Husserlian phenomenology was overly theoretical and detached from the world of lived

44 Although my thinking here arose from my own research, I must note that Charles Guignon gave this link a brief but excellent discussion in “Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Question of Phenomenology” which appears in David Egan, Stephen Reynolds, and Aaron Wendland, eds. Wittgenstein and Heidegger. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 82-98. For Guignon’s account of endoxa, which he attributes to Nussbaum’s reading of Aristotle, see page 91. Special thanks to Megan Altman for bringing this paper to my attention.
45 GA 14: 99/OTB 79.
46 During this period, Heidegger writes Karl Jaspers frequently to discuss how they might team up to radically change the university and “revitalize philosophy” (Walter Biemel et al., Briefwechsel 1920-1963, (Frankfurt am Main: München: Klostermann, Vittorio, 1990), 15.)
47 Heidegger often references Husserl’s Logical Investigations as a major source of inspiration. Kisiel notes that Heidegger is often vague in these lectures concerning how much of Husserl’s view he adopts (Kisiel, Genesis, 18.) In his 1923 lecture, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, Heidegger gives a more detailed account of how Husserl’s philosophy relates to his own thinking (GA 17: 49/37.)
48 GA 19: 3/2.
experience. Additionally, Heidegger’s Diltheyan intuition that philosophy is an inherently historical enterprise led him to question the ahistorical nature of Husserl’s rigorous and scientific account of phenomenology. This insistence on history created an insurmountable gap between Heidegger and Husserl’s approach to phenomenology from the outset of their relationship. Consequently, while Heidegger begins his early years defending Husserl’s approach from Natorp, describing his own historical work as merely an extension of Husserl’s project, by 1923 he concedes that Husserl’s unwillingness to consider history bars the way for a genuine phenomenological method. These courses find Heidegger struggling to develop a method, an inquiry that itself follows Aristotle’s method rather strikingly. He wants to maintain the insights of these thinkers—Heidegger’s method must be phenomenological (Husserl), rooted in non-theoretical lived experience (Natorp), and historical (Dilthey)—while addressing these

---

49 While he is generally critical of Natorp’s philosophical views, Heidegger does take Natorp’s philosophy seriously. Consequently, Heidegger explains and critiques Natorp’s philosophical position (known as “reconstruction [Rekonstruktion]”) in every course from 1919 to 1921 (GA 56/57: 99/77, GA 58: 7/6, GA 59: 92/77, GA 60: 11/8.)

50 See Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy page 122 for his critique of Dilthey and historicism.


52 Heidegger’s description of Husserl’s critique of Dilthey and historicism is almost pathological (GA 17: 90-107/66-77.) He speaks as though Husserl were afraid to adopt a position which could not establish objectively valid truth and calls Husserl anxious: “With a squinting glance at existence, one is made anxious.” Heidegger describes Husserl’s quest for validity as a fallen investigation into a public form of truth inspired by Plato. In this text, Heidegger is referencing Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, where Husserl argues that philosophical considerations of history result in “worldview [Weltanschauung]” philosophy and dangerous skepticism (See Husserl, Edmund. Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy. Translated by Quentin Lauer. 1st Harper Torchbook Ed, 1965 edition. (HarperCollins, 1965,) 124.) In 1920, private correspondence between Heidegger and his students (most notably Karl Löwith) indicate that Heidegger is frustrated with Husserl who he refers to unkindly as “the old man [der Alte].” (See Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan, eds. Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927. (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 104; and Kisiel, Genesis, 150.)
criticisms. The solution to the puzzle of the method is found in Heidegger’s two-part method of formal indication and phenomenological destruction.\textsuperscript{53}

3.2.1: Formal Indication

Gadamer once claimed that formal indication was not just significant for studies of \textit{Being and Time} or the lectures which preceded it, but rather was something which “holds for the whole of [Heidegger’s] thought.”\textsuperscript{54} Once we have established the link between authenticity and formal indication, we can begin to understand what Gadamer may have meant by this sentence. Unfortunately, although the term formal indication is used frequently in Heidegger’s early writings, it is not easy to define.\textsuperscript{55}

As we saw in chapter two, formal indication is linked to the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity and described as a movement through (by exhausting \textit{[auszukosten]}\textsuperscript{56}) what is inauthentic to uncover what is authentically there. According to Heidegger, this addresses Natorp’s criticisms by enabling him to investigate the phenomena which give rise to our theoretical concepts. Through formal indication, we can avoid the charge of being too theoretically abstracted by working through those abstractions to uncover what makes the theoretical possible, the phenomena found in the flow of lived experience. As Kisiel puts it,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{53} Although Kisiel also acknowledges the link between formal indication and phenomenological destruction in \textit{Genesis}, Jonathan O’Rourke offers a more thorough explanation in “Heidegger on Expression: Formal Indication and Destruction in the Early Freiburg Lectures” \textit{Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology}, 49:2 (2018), 109-125. My argument in this paper attempts to take this view a step farther by linking these methods with Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle.


\textsuperscript{55} The term “formal indication” first appears in the tail end of his 1919-20 winter semester course but remains relatively undefined until a year later. It can be found in the second appendix of \textit{Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, in the transcript of the course provided by Oskar Becker (GA 58: 248/187.) Heidegger’s course manuscript containing the term is missing.

\textsuperscript{56} GA 61: 33/26.
\end{flushright}
formal indication relies on the fact that every theoretical understanding contains some reference to something “pre-theoretical,” what Heidegger called the “pre-worldly something [Das vorweltliche Etwas]” or “primal something [Ur-etwas].” By analyzing our theoretical understandings, as codified in definitions or senses of our everyday words, we can uncover the primal something to which they refer, thus exposing the pre-theoretical aspects of our lived experience to philosophical investigation.

The method consists in laying out the various ways that a concept has come to be understood and then looking for how these various senses could have arisen, what connects and gives rise to them all. In his 1920 lecture course *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*, for example, Heidegger looks at the various ways that we have come to understand the term “history.” He presents multiple definitions or senses of the term before showing that only one sense of the term refers to the original pre-worldly experience that makes all of the other senses possible. These senses themselves might be misleading, incorrect, or only partial. In this way, they represent the inauthentic meanings of history which derive from the authentic meaning. Heidegger concludes that the derivative senses of history, such as the university study and the body of scholarship, arise from and are only made possible by a primordial experience situated in “concrete individual historical Dasein,” making that the authentic meaning.

### 3.2.2: Phenomenological Destruction

The other element of his early method, phenomenological destruction, addresses Dilthey’s concern to take history seriously. It refers to the process of showing what the calcified definitions

---

57 Kisiel, *Genesis*, 23. For Heidegger’s “pre-worldly something,” see (GA 56/57: 115/88.)
58 GA 59: 86/66.
59 For a thorough account of the various meanings of history that Heidegger formally indicates see Kisiel, *Genesis*, 127-130.
got wrong and why they were led astray. Already in 1920, Heidegger argued that the hardened definitions of concepts found within the philosophical cannon are the product of an intellectual history which cannot be ignored, and that any attempt to start philosophy “from scratch” would result in a naïve internalization of the historically determined values we already hold (the reproving allusion to Husserl, the perpetual beginner, is hard to miss). While phenomenological destruction is critical of the tradition, its goal is not negative in the sense of rejecting these old views for being simple or ignorant; instead, it seeks the positive in each account. As Walter Brogan describes it: “The destruction of the tradition has the positive aim of destructuring the sedimented deposit of knowledge in order to set free the creative roots and vital sources that are preserved in this history.” In our example, the formal indication’s result of the sense of Dasein’s own historicity as the primal something towards which all definitions of history relate was merely the first step. The subsequent destructive task is to explain how derivative senses like the academic study of history could have come to be understood as the dominant meanings by addressing the various presuppositions which lead to this erroneous view. In this way, the authentic meaning of history can help us understand why the inauthentic meanings arose in the first place. This is precisely what we find when Heidegger performs a destruction of Natorp and Dilthey in the lectures which immediately follow this formal indication of history.

---

60 GA 59: 29/21.
61 GA 59: 37/26. Also, see the introduction to his unwritten Aristotle Book from around that time: “… this destructive confrontation with its own history is not merely a supplement for illustrating how things stood in earlier times, an occasional overview of what others before us ‘came up with,’ or an opportunity for depicting entertaining perspectives in world-history. Rather, destruction is the authentic path upon which the present needs to encounter itself in its own basic movement, doing this in such a way that what springs forth for it from its history is the permanent question of the extent to which it itself is worried about appropriating radical possibilities of founding experiences and of their interpretations.” (GA 62: 368/S 124)
62 Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle, 7.
63 He outlines an investigation into “[Paul] Natorp, [William] James, [Hugo] Münsterberg and [Wilhelm] Dilthey” and describes this sequence as “intentional” but does not hold himself to this order and only destructs Natorp and Dilthey before the course ends (GA 59: 96/76).
indication uncovers the pre-theoretical basis, while phenomenological destruction traces its fall into theorizing, the covering up that necessitates the former’s uncovering.

3.2.3: Aristotle, Authenticity, and Method in GA 61

As we have seen, in his 1921 course, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, Heidegger explicitly defines formal indication and establishes its link to phenomenological destruction for the first time. As noted in chapter two, this lecture is also the first time that Heidegger begins using *eigentlich* fully as a technical term, and it is in these very definitions of formal indication and phenomenological destruction that authenticity arises. Here I will provide a quick summary of this lecture to provide the context, before linking this thinking to Aristotle’s *endoxic* method.

Despite the title of the course, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* appears to be shockingly bare of Aristotelian interpretations. Like many courses during this period, Heidegger forgoes much of the promised content and instead investigates the problem of method and the foundation of philosophy, which leads him to formally indicate and phenomenologically destruct philosophy itself. In formally indicating philosophy, Heidegger splits interpretations of philosophy into various camps, roughly grouped by whether their definitions “overestimate” or “underestimate” the goals of philosophy. In underestimations, philosophy loosely means some way of living one’s life. In overestimations, philosophy is seen as a strict discipline on par with the sciences or even superseding them in significance. We see Heidegger asking whether we can truly grasp concepts without removing them from lived experience, and whether we can really do philosophy without addressing history.

---

64 GA 61: 15/13.
This formal indication of philosophy occupies most of the semester, apparently squeezing out the titular subject matter, until, in a dramatic flourish, Heidegger reveals that Aristotle has actually been the subject the entire time:

The sphere of tasks with regard to the interpretation of Aristotle is not different from that dealt with in the introduction, and the mode of explication of the latter is not more systematic than the one to be pursued in the former sphere; on the contrary, it is less genuine [uneigentlicher]. In terms of the content, the same three groups of problems we have discussed, more or less determinately, up to now in the introduction will also occupy us in our interpretation of Aristotle: the knowledge of principles which, in its actualization, concerns its own facticity.65

While the major topics of the lecture have appeared to be meditations on methodology with no direct links to Aristotle’s philosophy, in fact they have been Aristotelian all along. Heidegger grapples with the question of first principles and their foundation, and like Aristotle, the solution is not to turn to experience alone. Instead, first principles must be grounded in an appeal to the meanings found in our historical and social understanding of the world—what has been said by previous thinkers, and what is now taken for granted. Just as Aristotle relies on endoxa to generate first principles, we find Heidegger settling on formal indication and phenomenological destruction as his solution. But, as we will see, these methods are nearly identical.

When Heidegger describes his method in detail, we find that, as with Aristotle, reputable opinion (endoxa) is both problem and solution. It is part of the problem insofar as reputable views become stagnant or calcified to the point of becoming self-evident. This process of becoming stagnant is called “ruinance,” an early conception for what becomes “fallenness” in

65 GA 61: 112/83. The three discussions Heidegger is referencing are: the problem of principle (arche), the problem of grasp (logos), and the problem of beings in the sense of being (on – ousia – kinesis – phusis). The idea is that Heidegger’s lecture implicitly addresses each of these problems which are central to Aristotle’s thinking in formal indication of philosophy.
Heidegger argues that there are many ways that something can become ruinant, but all of them are naturally occurring processes that can be traced back to how we use language, just as Aristotle located the error of his predecessors in their confusion over the word “becoming” in the endoxic survey that began his philosophical investigation. Here ruinant average interpretation is both problem and solution:

Insofar as everything is clarified in factical life, stands in some implicit discourse [Rede] or other, and ‘is’ in an undelineated and factically ruinant interpretation, there then resides in this life the possibility and factical necessity of formal indication as the method of approach of the existentiell-categorial interpretation. In other words, Heidegger sees in the calcified rhetoric of everyday language references to some hidden truth which can be uncovered. He calls formal indication and phenomenological destruction a counter-movement to the fallenness of our everyday interpretation which can move through the ruinant (or fallen) interpretations in our everyday intelligibility to uncover the truth. Recall however, that Heidegger described formal indication as a movement from what is inauthentic towards what is authentic. We can see now that the ruinant (or fallen) interpretations of concepts are the inauthentic starting point of any investigation. And we can now see how Aristotelian it is:

The term, “formally indicated,” does not mean merely represented, meant, or intimated in some way or other, such that it would remain completely open how and where we are to gain possession of the object itself. “Indicated” here means that that which is is said of the character of the “formal,” and so is

---

66 For a helpful summary of ruinance, see Sean D. Kirkland’s “Heidegger and Greek Philosophy” in Raffoul, Francois, and Eric S. Nelson, eds. The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger. Expanded edition. (Bloomsbury Academic, 2016.) Kirkland lays out early Heidegger’s conception of fallenness. There he presents two ways: falling into the world of activity or falling into the general interpretation of the tradition (Kirkland, 79).
67 See 3.1.2 for my description of Aristotle’s use of endoxic method to resolve the issue of “becoming.”
68 GA 61: 134/100.
69 GA 61: 153/113.
admittedly inauthentic [uneigentlich]. Yet precisely in this “in” [un] there resides at the same time a positive reference.⁷⁰

Already we can see that the formal and inauthentic meanings of the indicated phenomena which we have gathered are not taken to be absolute truth. Instead, they are taken to be a positive reference to the truth, which must be wrestled free.

He continues in the next paragraph:

There resides in the formal indication a very definite bond; this bond says that I stand in a quite definite direction of approach, and it points out the only way of arriving at what is authentic [eigentlich], namely, by making the most of [auszukosten] and fulfilling what is inauthentically [uneigentlich] indicated, by following the indication. A making the most [Auskosten], a drawing out: precisely not such a one that the more it grasps, the less it leaves behind (by way of removal) to be acquired, but the reverse: the more radical and formal is the understanding of what is empty, the richer it becomes, because it leads to the concrete.⁷¹

Here Heidegger splits formal indication into its two constitutive words in this passage. First, by indicating (gathering the relevant phenomena), Heidegger is mirroring the first step of Aristotle’s approach.⁷² “Indication” means a way of maintaining an “arm's length” precautionary distance from them, so that we can remain open to the various ways that meanings show themselves. As

⁷¹ GA 61: 33/27, tm, em. The use of auszukosten and Auskosten here makes this sentence particularly challenging to translate. The word appears in these two sentences and nowhere else in this text. Richard Rojcewicz translates it as “exhausting” which captures the negative side of trying to get everything you can out of something. I opt for “making the most” because it suggests that whatever remains is utilized rather than discarded. The more common translation is “to savor” which also works but implies a mental state of satisfaction rather than a result of a philosophical investigation. Gadamer discusses his struggles with translating this term in “Martin Heidegger’s One Path,” in Reading Heidegger from the Start, pg. 33.
⁷² As Shields notes, this language of “it seems to be the case that” and “it is said that” is the source of constant confusion and frustration for novice readers of Aristotle who have trouble sorting between what Aristotle is investigating and what Aristotle believes to be the case. Given the similarity of their methods, it should be unsurprising that we find similar problems in interpretations of Heidegger’s work. For example, in a section on Descartes in Being and Time, Heidegger mentions the most authentic being is what “remains constant and endures.” Later, Heidegger will show that such a description fails to capture what is authentic in Dasein and many other things. This phenomenon where Heidegger argues for views that he ultimately disagrees happens regularly enough that Lee Braver has named it “tricky Martin” (for a discussion, see Braver, Lee. Heidegger’s Later Writings: A Reader’s Guide. (London; New York: Continuum, 2009), 41.)
noted above, Aristotle approaches philosophical puzzles in a similar way: by remaining open to the *endoxa* and letting them all speak for themselves until some shared aspect of their thinking comes into view. Second, “formal” describes the contents of the investigation which are moved through. It is not an accident that he calls this starting point *inauthentic*, nor is it an accident that it is only through “making the most of” these formal indications that we get at “what is proper [*eigentlich*].” As we will see when we return to an analysis of the method of *Being and Time*, the process of working through or “making the most of” the inauthentic phenomena is arduous. Nevertheless, it is the only way to get to the things themselves.

Now we can begin to see why understanding Heidegger’s method is crucial to understanding authenticity. Inauthenticity here is not some moral failing of a particular Dasein, but the speaks to the everyday interpretations which have been passed down to us through tradition and history. To get to the things themselves, we must be able to work through these inauthentic interpretations, making the most of them; only then can we arrive at the authentic.

In this way, Heidegger and Aristotle rely on investigating what has been said by the wise; by looking to *endoxa*, but not in the sense of putting them before us as bare facts. Heidegger states that we cannot just look back at opinions in the history of philosophy since the task is to interpret them. Only insofar as we address what was “left behind” can we explain our new interpretation, namely, by destructing the past in order to uncover their source. Once again, the affinity between Heidegger and Aristotle could not be clearer. Aristotle is adamant that only by showing how his solution solves the previous misinterpretations will he be satisfied with the

73 The talk of “making the most of” and “fulfilling” what has been indicated should remind us of Aristotle’s dialectic method of moving through what has been said insofar as the account is able to provide a rich understanding of the concrete, which is why this “destruction” is “at the same time a positive reference.”
74 GA 61: 112/84.
results. Heidegger echoes this when he declares that formal indication is “fundamentally” clarified only once the phenomenological destruction has taken place. Formal indication is not complete without a subsequent phenomenological destruction.

We can now see that Heidegger’s 1921 lecture course, where he joins his twofold method of formal indication and phenomenological destruction, shows great affinity to Aristotle’s method. First, in his formal indication of philosophy, Heidegger presents the relevant endoxa to see what puzzles arise. These various inauthentic indications ultimately stem from some authentic encounter with the phenomena at hand. Then Heidegger shows us, not just how they come up short, but what they happen to get right, how they point us towards the authentic understanding. Lastly, he resolves the tension between these views by providing an account of how they were led astray and how his method avoids the same pitfall by means of a phenomenological destruction. Heidegger’s formal indication matches Aristotle in its approach (addressing a puzzle by laying out the endoxa), contents (the various meanings of what is being investigated), and criteria for success (establishing an account which preserves what was right in the phenomena and explains his predecessors’ errors.) The method also neatly satisfies the two objections to phenomenology that initially troubled him: it focuses on the phenomena of our lived experience as they show themselves and it is deeply historical because the endoxa in question are the product of our intellectual and cultural traditions.

---

75 In 1922, Heidegger describes Aristotle’s investigation into motion in terms of endoxa (opinions): “Proceeding from this first stage of research, our interpretation shows how he interrogates the opinions and explications found in the ‘ancient natural philosophers’ with respect to how far they got in allowing the phenomenon of motion to speak for itself, and how they were always in principle impeded in their explication of this phenomenon because of their preconceived theories about the sense of being” (GA 62: 394/S 142.)

76 GA 61: 141/105.
3.2.4: Authenticity, Doxa, and Endoxic Method in GA 18

By 1924, only two years before he begins writing Being and Time, Heidegger has spent almost three years lecturing on Aristotle and thinking about his relevance for phenomenology. In the lectures of this year, Heidegger clarifies his views on the role of *endoxa* by explaining their relation to *doxa*. A doxa is simply a view or an understanding of something. We have a doxa about everything that we encounter in our everyday lives. Whether this doxa adequately captures the phenomena in question is ambiguous. At some points it can become clear that some doxa we held was in fact false. When it comes to phenomena that we regularly encounter, certain doxa become stable. Which means that, for the most part, our understanding of the world (and the things we encounter in it) is something we accrue over years of experience and education.

When those views come to be respected, or held by many, they become *endoxa*. What happens in the move from *doxa* to *endoxa*, according to Heidegger, is that some particular understanding become self-evident. Thus, Heidegger emphasizes that *endoxa* is related to the truth as well.

---

77 Each of the course from 1921 to 1924 speak about Aristotle at some length. See GA 61, GA 62, GA 63, GA 17, GA 18 (listed chronologically) and the “Natorp Report” which secured Heidegger a job at Marburg. The “report” was an introduction to a book on Aristotle which he never wrote. In a letter to Arendt, Heidegger describes GA 18 as a much-discussed lecture of great importance to Heidegger’s thinking. (Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, *Letters: 1925-1975*, ed. Ursula Ludz, trans. Andrew Shields, (Orlando: Harcourt, 2003), #145). She joined his class the following semester in the lecture that is now known as *Plato’s Sophist* (GA 19.) In their correspondence, Arendt describes these lectures as having been deeply influential on her thinking, and Heidegger responds to her stating: “More than anyone, you have touched the inner movement of my thought and of my work as a teacher, which has remained the same since the *Sophist* lectures.” (Arendt and Heidegger, *Letters 1925-1975*, #118) Thanks to Mahon O’Brien for drawing my attention to this letter (Mahon O’Brien, *Heidegger and Authenticity: From Resoluteness to Releasement* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 127.)

78 GA 18: 149/101.

79 GA 18: 149/101: “Doxa reaches out to the entire world; for the *praktôn* with which I deal is not a determinate realm of beings, but is that with which I have to do as beings, that which is itself in the world, in the being of nature.”

80 GA 18: 139/95: “At the same time, this familiarity is the mode in which views and orientations are cultivated. Views [doxa] are cultivated, renewed, established, hardened in speaking.” He continues further down the page: “Regarding these beings, it is valid to state definite views, to cultivate others, to bring being-there into doxa, to carry an *endoxon* about the world forward.”

81 GA 18: 44/32: “In [Aristotle’s] explication, that which was already vital in the history of the Greek interpretation of being-there explicitly comes to fulfillment. Aristotle’s tendency is only to say what is *endoxon*, what lies in the natural being-there itself, what is self-evident. But that is, precisely, what is often the most difficult to say.”
and can also mean “the common view” or what is “taken for granted.” So while *endoxa* is understood as what has been said in the tradition (what has been said by philosophers or the wise), it can also be understood as what has been said by the many (the average view found in Dasein’s everyday being-in-the-world). This second use of *endoxa* indicates an appeal to a social intelligibility, anticipating what Heidegger will eventually say about *das Man* in *Being and Time*. As discussed in chapter one, the intelligibility offered from *das Man* is always present, frequently misguided, but necessarily bears some relation to the truth. Here Heidegger describes this approach:

> Even beings with which I negotiate, not in the sense of concern but in the sense of setting forth facts in the way that they are, initially are there in a *doxa*. From there, Aristotle consciously refers back to the history of philosophy. He initially reviews every fundamental problem with regard to the way one thought about it, on the basis of the positive understanding of the fact that the matter must have somehow come into view in such a *doxa*. Indeed, *doxa* is the characteristic trust in that which shows itself initially. And that which shows itself initially is the basis of the investigation of the matter itself [*Sache selbst*].

In this quote we can see Heidegger attributing a historical sensitivity to Aristotle’s method, as well as the importance of finding the positive aspects of any traditional theory. In a lecture that Heidegger gives the following year, he describes book one of Aristotle’s *Physics* in nearly

---

82 GA 18: 368/248: “Everydayness, tradition, *endoxa.*” In this note, which is part of the handwritten manuscript, Heidegger cryptically equates these terms.

83 As he describes it in 1922: “The question we ask is: how is that which Aristotle defines as research there for him in its point of departure? Where is it found and as what? How does Aristotle approach it and deal with it?” (GA 62: 387/S 138). He answers this later: “The initial approach of this research is critique and more precisely fundamental critique concerned with principles. Aristotle’s interpretation makes clear why such research into the question of access must necessarily take a critical approach: namely, because all research moves within a particular level of some pregiven interpretation of life and within certain pregiven ways of discussing the world. What is still there and at work in the facticity of Aristotle’s own research is the how in which the “ancient physicists” had already seen, addressed, and discussed ‘nature’” (GA 62: 392/S 140.)

84 GA 18: 152/103.
identical terms. In the above quote, we also find Heidegger exploring the role of \textit{das Man} in prototypical fashion, which will prove essential to understanding method and the role of authenticity in \textit{Being and Time}, and doing so under the influence of Aristotle’s \textit{endoxic} method.

Recall that Aristotle suggests in the \textit{Physics} that we must move from “what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature,” pointing out that what is “clear to us” is actually quite “confused.” We can now see that Heidegger has internalized this approach when he paraphrases this Aristotelian insight in this course lecture:

It is so self-evidently there, that I see beyond it; I do not notice it… But I must proceed precisely from what is inauthentically [\textit{uneigentlich}] there to what is authentically [\textit{eigentlich}] passed over in acquaintance. These principles are the programmatically authentic [\textit{eigentlich}] counter-thrust to Platonic Philosophy. Aristotle says: I must have ground under my feet, a ground that is there in an immediate self-evidence, if I am to get at being.

Relying on the self-evident implicitly, while lacking an explicit understanding of it, is a central theme for both thinkers. In the \textit{Metaphysics} Aristotle says we must start by why is available to us, even if it is only roughly related to the truth. In 1922, Heidegger describes the self-evident as the inauthentic interpretation passed down to us by the tradition. This self-evident (or

---

85 GA 19: 89/61: “… Aristotle grasps at the same time the meaning of the movement of history and the question of the Being of \textit{phusis}, i.e., the history which preceded his own research and which he set forth in the first book of the \textit{Physics}.”

86 Although there is a great deal of debate on this issue, in general I interpret \textit{das Man} as the social horizon of intelligibility which dictates and determines us proximally and for the most part.


88 GA 18: 37/27, tm.

89 Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, 1029b10: “But yet one must start from that which is barely intelligible but intelligible to oneself, and try to understand what is intelligible in itself, passing, as had been said, by way of those very things which one understands.”

90 GA 62: 367/S 123: “According to what was said above about the tendence toward falling effecting all interpretation, it is precisely “\textit{what is self-evident}” in this pregiven interpretation, i.e., what is not discussed in it, what is thought ot require no further explanation, which will turn out to be what inauthentically, i.e., without being explicitly appropriated from out of its origins, sustains the reigning effective force of pregiven problems and the directions of questioning.”
everyday) way of understanding things is the phenomenological starting point for investigations for both thinkers. It may be a jumbled and confused mess to start, but it is the only place to properly begin. Notice again the overwhelming use of the language of authenticity in a way which bears no relation to existentialist themes. Instead, we see that inauthenticity is what we must start with in order to proceed towards authenticity. Heidegger describes the doxa as “directed at ‘what we do not yet genuinely [eigentlich] know,’” which suggests that we have access to some particular entity, though perhaps in an inauthentic way. We can see parallels to discussions in Being and Time where Heidegger describes our everyday experience as ontically close but ontologically farthest away.91

For Heidegger, what significantly determines our everyday ontic understanding is the social horizon of intelligibility known as das Man. For Heidegger, das Man is a manifestation of “the many” and “the wise,” since both traditional and colloquial wisdom are passed down through generations. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is always aware of the significance of the social interpretedness of human experience and speaks of it regularly when discussing various conceptions of the good life.92 For example, when discussing eudaimonia, in Book 1, Aristotle considers the fact that while many people agree on the end goal, there is general disagreement as to how to get there.93 These social interpretations passed down by our culture are the endoxa which Aristotle sees as the initial phenomena investigated in matters of philosophical inquiry. We can see now that Heidegger’s investigation into the average

91 SZ: 16/37.
92 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1095a21.
93 He notes that for the sick person, happiness might be considered healthiness. For the poor person, happiness might be attained through wealth. He also entertains the possibility that pleasure and honor, common views held by Greek citizens, might offer a path to eudaimonia. Before proposing his own theory, he acknowledges the truth of these accounts (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1095a20-25.)
everydayness of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is, if Aristotle is right, a methodological necessity. After all, as Heidegger tells us, paraphrasing Aristotle: “We must have ground under our feet!” After all, as Heidegger tells us, paraphrasing Aristotle: “We must have ground under our feet!” That ground is offered by the social intelligibility of das Man (through the Mitwelt) and the world of our immediate concern (through the Umwelt). Heidegger then notes that he sees endoxa and the average intelligibility which determines our everyday understanding, or das Man, as one in the same: “the intelligibility in which Dasein moves, the one [das Man], is grounded ultimately in doxa, in the average meanings of things and of oneself.”

Charles Guignon, in his discussion of these lectures, notes that for Heidegger, the “given” of phenomenology is the idle chatter (Gerade) of our shared understanding of the world. Recall that our formal indications of history resulted in working through the various meanings of and ungrounded talk of “history” that we find in our everyday lives (what is self-evident to us). Guignon describes the investigations in Heidegger’s early work as a shift from Gerade to Rede, from average intelligibility to genuine understanding. This description is rather helpful, since Heidegger claims that Gerade represents the inauthentic mode of Rede. On my reading, however, Gerade and Rede are just two instances of the bigger methodological move from what is self-evident and inauthentic towards what is hidden and authentic. Thus, we can see now why Heidegger would claim that calling our everyday inauthentic discourse “Gerade,” should not be understood as a disparaging.

As the source of our investigation, regardless of how far removed it is from the phenomena in question, it should not be dismissed as “mere gossip.”

94 GA 18: 37/27.
95 GA 18: 73/52. See also GA 18: 117/80: “… for the Greeks, this basic determination of being-there is an endoxon.”
97 SZ: 168/211. Adorno mocked this quote from Heidegger saying, “The quotation marks around ‘disparaging’ are the kid gloves of prudish metaphysics” (Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, 95.)
Heidegger describes *doxa* as “the authentic discoveredness of being-with-one-another-in-the-world”\(^{98}\) and portrays *das Man* in a positive sense, as the ample source for philosophical investigations.\(^{99}\) Heidegger is explicit and consistent in *Being and Time* that he does not see *das Man* or the “they-self” (*Manselbst*) as some sort of moral failing for human beings. As noted in chapter one, scholars often disregard these comments from Heidegger, which is understandable given that his characterization of *das Man* and *Manselbst* are overwhelmingly negative. However, we can now understand both Heidegger’s insistence on its positive role and the strong negative sense: Although *das Man* as the social horizon of intelligibility tends to cover up and distort the truth, it is also our only source of philosophical analysis, and leads to truth when developed. This positive and negative aspect is inherent to the problem of phenomena itself that Aristotle presented, i.e., that phenomena can lead to the truth, but they can also deceive. This also explains why Heidegger spends so much of *Being and Time* investigating the average everyday interpretation of concepts central to philosophy (death, self, time, etc.). Here, Heidegger notes an inherent tendency to simply appeal to what ancient thinkers said (often handed down unwittingly) without investigating the matters for themselves. When it comes to *das Man*, “one does not have to investigate everything with regards to its concrete content; what others say about it is what one thinks about it.”\(^{100}\) In other words, *das Man*, like *doxa*, is both the

---

\(^{98}\) GA 18: 149/101, tm.  
\(^{99}\) Scott Campbell also notes the positive account of *das Man* in Scott M. Campbell, *The Early Heidegger’s Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language*, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012.), 211. Campbell cites Heidegger’s 1923 course: “The ‘every-one’ has to do with something definite and positive – it is not only a phenomenon of fallenness, but as such also a how of factical Dasein” (GA 63: 17/14.)  
\(^{100}\) GA 18: 152/102.
necessary resource for opening philosophical investigation and an unfortunate source of close-mindedness.\(^{101}\)

With this reinterpretation of Aristotle’s method, Heidegger has finally overcome the objections that he has been struggling with for years. By orienting his method towards the average interpretedness of everyday life—what the many say—Heidegger’s analysis remains rooted in factual lived experience (meeting Natorp’s challenge). By utilizing Aristotle’s method of investigating philosophical questions, Heidegger’s philosophy grapples with the tradition in a way which remains deeply historical (meeting Dilthey’s challenge). By focusing on *endoxa*, Heidegger appropriates an Aristotelian method which can address philosophical puzzles while remaining phenomenological (meeting Husserl’s challenge). Heidegger reconciles Natorp and Dilthey with Husserl by means of Aristotle: an extraordinary fulfilling of his own *endoxa*.

Furthermore, we have seen that the guidelines for identifying technical uses of authenticity have proved fruitful, since they drew our attention to Heidegger’s definition of formal indication in the 1921 lectures. We have now seen that these uses of authenticity and inauthenticity were intentional since they arise again and again in discussions of method, as was seen in the 1924 lectures. Taken together we can see that authenticity provides us with a clear link between formal indication and phenomenological destruction and Aristotelian *endoxic* method. This link between Aristotle’s method and Heideggerian authenticity is further strengthened when we recall that it was through the work of Brentano that Heidegger began to appreciate the power of Aristotle’s thinking. When we look back to the work that played such a

\(^{101}\) GA 20: 120/87: “Every phenomenological proposition, though drawn from original sources, is subject to the possibility of concealment when it is communicated as an assertion.”
major influence on Heidegger’s thinking, Brentano’s Being is said in many ways, there is one quote which really stands out to encapsulate both Heidegger and Aristotle’s approach:

For there will always be one thing which in a primary and more authentic [eigentlicher] sense carries the name and upon which all others are dependent, and in this case it is substance, as Aristotle himself points out in the fourth book. All the others are thus determined by this one and differ in their relation to it, but it is not necessary that they should also stand in relation of dependency with respect to each other, for they are not distinguished by virtue of direct relations to each other, but by virtue of their relation to this one.  

Here we see Brentano credit Aristotle with the notion that the authentic meaning of a concept makes possible and determines the other meanings which depend on it. In this quote, Brentano is talking about Aristotle’s notion of substance, or ousia, which Brentano regularly calls the authentic sense of Being for Aristotle. Heidegger borrows this language as well, when describing Aristotle’s philosophical perspective, and is usually careful to distinguish this perspective from his own. This idea of the underlying authentic meaning is a necessary presupposition for Aristotle and Heidegger both, and a condition for the possibility of phenomenology itself. Now we are ready to look back to Being and Time where we will see authenticity fulfilling this very same role, as the primary meaning which makes all derivative ones possible.

3.3: ENDOXIC METHOD IN BEING AND TIME

It should be apparent now that much of the discussion of Being and Time focuses on the everyday way that things show up for us, or, in other words, the inauthentic interpretations that

103 Brentano, On the Several Senses of being in Aristotle, 97/66: “Among the categories it is substance [ousia] which is being in the first and proper sense.” German: “Von den Kategorien ist das erste und eigentliche Seiende die Substanz (ousia).”
104 GA 18: 344/232: “Ousia was translated: ‘beings in the how of their authentic being.’” Translation modified.
we have of the various things around us. We have seen why this is the necessary starting point for phenomenological investigations. We have also seen that we cannot merely bracket away our prejudices or history and look at the objects of our investigation. Instead, we have to approach each issue carefully, and work through the various everyday meanings which we find. When we turn to the introduction of *Being and Time*, we will see a lot of language which parallels this approach to phenomenology.

As mentioned in chapter one, the central question taken up in *Being and Time* is what we mean by the word “being.” Knowing what we now know about Aristotle’s *endoxic* method, we can now see that in proper Aristotelian fashion Heidegger begins with what “has been said” about “being” by the tradition, setting out the various *endoxa* for our examination at the very start of the inquiry.\(^\text{105}\)

Heidegger notes that Being is said to be: “the most universal,” something “indefinable,” and “self-evident.”\(^\text{106}\) In each of these definitions, we find a traditional view which has calcified into self-evidence. He notes that these accounts are not the product of fantasy but instead stem from Dasein’s “average understanding of Being in which we always operate and which in the end belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself.”\(^\text{107}\) We noted before that such average understanding is a product of what gets said by the many, or *das Man*. Heidegger rightly concludes then, that any investigation into the meaning of being will be determined by our

\(^{105}\) Kisiel notes that when Heidegger was working on *Being and Time*, his colleagues described it as a “synthesis of the phenomenological way of research – here for the first time free from all subjectivism – with an assessment of the great wealth of the tradition of ancient, medieval, and modern metaphysics.” (Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, 480.)

\(^{106}\) SZ 3-4/22-3. Heidegger often cites Brentano’s influential dissertation for the insight that, for Aristotle, “being is said in many ways.” We can see now that these many ways of being are the *endoxa* that Aristotle investigated in order to uncover the meaning of being for himself. Heidegger’s *Being and Time* can thus be seen as another investigation into the same puzzle, picking up where Aristotle left off.

\(^{107}\) SZ: 8/28.
average historical and traditional everyday ways of self-interpretation. However, this investigation must not only provide us with an account which is satisfactory but, in addition, it will explain how each of the *endoxa* relates in some (albeit likely erroneous) way to what is really the case. Thus, *Being and Time* itself, as an investigation into the question of being which looks to what has been said and what is understood through the everyday historical understandings passed down to us, embodies the Aristotelian approach to its fundamental question.

In the introduction to *Being and Time*, we can see this approach in the outline of Heidegger’s plan for the two parts of the text. Starting with a formal indication of being in the first part and concluding with a phenomenological destruction of the entire historical tradition in the (unwritten) second part. Ideally, this formal indication and phenomenological destruction would have explained what previous thinkers got right, while providing a new account of Being to explain and solve all the problems which arose from these conflicting accounts.¹⁰⁸

Recall that Aristotle’s critique of the “earlier thinkers” was that they lacked an understanding of nature that could account for change and his proposed solution was a differentiation of subjects from predicates. Heidegger’s solution to the problem of being in *Being and Time* follows a similar trajectory by looking to an unclarified aspect of traditional ontology. Heidegger suggests that our inadequate understanding of time is what limits our understanding of being, leading to these puzzles. Much of his critique in the introduction centers around a view of time which overemphasizes the present at the cost of covering up a fuller, more human sense of temporality. Heidegger suggests that once he has fully explained his conception of time, we can

¹⁰⁸ The first part of *Being and Time* offers an interpretation of Dasein with a new account of temporality. The second part was supposed to entail a “phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology” (SZ: 39/63.)
reinterpret the various puzzles and resolve them, concluding that his account will not be successful “until it brings us the insight that the specific kind of Being of ontology hitherto, and the vicissitudes of its inquiries, its findings, and its failures, have been necessitated in the very character of Dasein.”

Like Aristotle, his investigation only succeeds once even the failures have been explained. He clarifies what he means in Section 6, “The task of destroying the history of ontology.” Here Heidegger stresses the problematic influence of the tradition which can block “our access to those primordial ‘sources,’” but also stresses that we have a chance to overcome this influence as well. As with Aristotle before him, and as we saw in the lecture courses, Heidegger is emphatic that the purpose of destruction is not to render history into “nullity” but rather “the aim is positive.” He is looking to find what primordial sources inspired the thinkers who came before him, and where these thinkers went wrong. Consequently, Heidegger describes the entire investigation into Dasein at the outset of Being and Time as provisional:

Our analysis of Dasein, however, is not only incomplete; it is also at the first instance, provisional. It merely brings out the Being of this entity, without interpreting its meaning. It is rather a preparatory procedure by which the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting Being may be laid bare. Once we have arrived at that horizon, this preparatory analytic of Dasein will have to be repeated on a higher and authentically ontological basis.

We can now see why this investigation is provisional, since requisite for any phenomenological destruction is an assembly of the various inauthentic meanings which have been passed down to us through the tradition. To get to the question of the meaning of being, Heidegger must first

109 SZ: 19/40.
110 SZ: 21/43.
111 SZ: 23/44.
112 SZ: 17/38.
disclose the full ontological constitution of Dasein, which requires working through the inauthentic meanings to find their positive reference.

If we recall the first time *eigentlich* is used in *Being and Time*, and utilize the translation I suggested in chapter 2, we will see that the puzzle which motivates the entire project is laid out clearly in his response to the quote in Plato’s *Sophist*: “Do we have in our time an answer to the question of what we *authentically* mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all.” The problem is not that we have no understanding of Being. Heidegger is emphatic throughout *Being and Time* that an understanding of Being is always present, regardless of how inexplicit or inauthentic it is. The problem at the outset of *Being and Time* is that we lack an authentic understanding of it.  

We can now trace the connection between authenticity and method as it evolves from 1921 to the publication of *Being and Time*. In the lecture courses from 1921, Heidegger described formal indication as the move from what is inauthentically known to what is authentically known, the “removal” of the “in” (*un*) of “inauthentic” (*uneigentlich*). In 1924, Heidegger describes Aristotle’s movement from self-evidence towards truth as the move from what is inauthentically there towards what is authentically there. Lastly, in 1927, in the introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that we lack an authentic understanding of Being and have become “perplexed.” The resolution to the puzzle of being can only be accomplished by investigating the being which asks the question of the meaning of being,

113 For a thorough discussion on authenticity and inauthenticity as it relates to everydayness, see Abergel, David C. “The Confluence of Authenticity and Inauthenticity in Heidegger’s *Being and Time.*” Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 10 (2020): 74-110. Abergel concludes in his paper that “For everyday human life – from its most mundane tasks and leveled-town trivialities to its most complex constructions and sophisticated theoretical abstractions – is always already not only in untruth, but truth, not only in deception but open to revelation, not only inauthentic, but authentic” (Abergel, 103). I believe my paper shows how this confluence of authenticity and inauthenticity is an insight which Heidegger gleaned from Aristotle.

114 See 2.3.1 of this dissertation.
establishing the authentic meaning of Dasein, and then utilizing these insights while repeating
the interpretation into the meaning of being on an authentically (eigentlichen) ontological basis.

In the introduction he argues:

The way in which Being and its structures are encountered in the mode of
phenomenon is one which must first of all be wrested from the objects of
phenomenology. Thus, the very point of departure from our analysis requires
that it be secured by the proper [eigene] method, just as much as does our
access to the phenomenon, or our passage through whatever is prevalently
covering it up.115

Here we find Heidegger looking to the average everyday interpretation of things which is,
proximally and for the most part, inauthentic. Only by carefully utilizing his method does he
uncover what is authentic. For Heidegger, as for Aristotle, this inauthentic starting point is
necessary and has both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, there is a tendency in
inauthentic understandings to mislead or deceive, but on the other hand these understandings are
the result of some original experience which can be uncovered: “… inauthenticity is based on the
possibility of authenticity.”116

Understanding the inauthentic starting point of all investigations on these terms, we can
see why Heidegger goes to such lengths to dismiss any notion that inauthentic means “immoral”
or “lesser.”117 Being unaware of the full ontological structure of our being that makes our
existence possible does not render us incapable of living a full life and being a good person.
Likewise, being aware of these structures does not inherently make us a better person.118 We can
see now why the methodological interpretation is at odds with the traditional interpretation of

115 SZ: 36-37/61.
116 SZ: 259/303.
117 SZ: 43/68.
118 See Heidegger’s personal life for numerous examples.
Heideggerian authenticity which we laid out in the introduction to this dissertation. Within the traditional interpretation of authenticity, inauthenticity is a failure to achieve an ideal mode of being. But in methodological (Aristotelian) terms, the inauthentic is merely the self-evident confused jumble which serves as the unavoidable point of departure for philosophical inquiries.\textsuperscript{119} Formally indicating the meanings found therein, and destructing the tradition, are the only way back to the primordial position which made such inauthentic understandings possible.\textsuperscript{120} Authenticity is not a rejection of the tradition, but an appropriation and transformation of it. For Heidegger, destruction is simultaneously a deconstruction, a breaking down which uncovers the foundation which the tradition was built upon. This is why Heidegger explicitly describes his own method from 1921 to 1927 in terms of a move from what is self-evident but inauthentic towards what is authentic but initially hidden.

In this way, Heidegger is also directly critiquing Husserl, who he sees as too preoccupied with taking things in a “straightforward manner” which results in seeing things in a covered up or misleading way:

Their showing-themselves can be an aspect which has become so restricted and fixed through tradition that this inauthenticity [Uneigentlichkeit] is no longer able to be recognized, but rather is taken to be what is authentic [Eigentliche], the actual things in question.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{119} In his 1925 lecture, \textit{History of the Concept of Time}, he describes this in terms of semblance: “… the possibility of appearance as reference is founded in the authentic phenomenon, self-showing. The structure of appearance as reference already intrinsically presupposes the more original structure of self-showing, the authentic sense of phenomenon” (GA 20: 113/82-3.)

\textsuperscript{120} GA 63: 75/59: “What is needed is to get beyond the position started from and arrive at a grasp of the subject matter which is free from covering up. For this it is necessary to disclose the history of the covering up of the subject matter. The tradition of philosophical questioning must be pursued all the way back to the original sources of its subject matter. The tradition must be dismantled. Only in this way is a primordial position on the subject matter possible.”

\textsuperscript{121} GA 63: 75/59.
The problem is that this attempt to see the world with no prejudices has resulted in the obfuscation of the beings in their true being. In this lecture Heidegger concludes that what’s needed is this return to Aristotle.\textsuperscript{122} It is Aristotle who shows us the way to authentically encounter entities.

Heidegger not only uses this endoxic method to frame the inquiry of the book as a whole; he employs it multiple times within the work, usually when he opens the discussion of a new topic. I will briefly show two examples of this.\textsuperscript{123} First, his discussion of the various ways we talk about ourselves, as “I”, “ego”, “subject,” etc. in I.3 contains one of the few direct references to formal indication found in \textit{Being and Time}: “The word ‘I’ is to be understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator, indicating something which may perhaps reveal itself as its ‘opposite’ in some particular phenomenal context of Being.”\textsuperscript{124} Heidegger takes up and works through the various self-evident and given interpretations before concluding that his account of Dasein alone can both account for all of these misunderstandings while getting the rest of the phenomena right. In his critical yet positive style, he explains that such interpretations of the self accurately grasp one aspect of Dasein’s being—the mode of existence of theoretical contemplation—but miss the broader phenomenon in question. The second example, is found in the second division where Heidegger analyzes the concept of death.\textsuperscript{125} Heidegger lays out the

\textsuperscript{122} GA 63: 76/59.
\textsuperscript{123} For a third, see Heidegger’s discussion of aletheia where he notes that his interpretation, which appropriates the definition from its historical origin will be seen as more convincing “if we succeed in demonstrating that the idea of agreement is one to which theory had to come on basis of the primordial phenomenon of truth, and if we can show how this came about” (SZ: 220/262.) In other words, Heidegger thinks his account of aletheia as unconcealment can demonstrate the derivative and privative accounts of truth as correspondence that we find in the tradition.
\textsuperscript{124} SZ: 116/152. The “opposite” he has in mind here is the notion that for the most part Dasein is not its authentic self, but (having lost itself) some version of the Manselbst.
various ways that death is understood: as demise, perishing, as the end, as something ownmost, as something non-relational, etc. Here Heidegger formally indicates what has been said about death by all, the doxa, or the wise, the endoxa. He then looks through them to find the one understanding of death that can account for all of the others. Heidegger concludes that one sense of death can capture the primordial phenomenon and performs a destruction, demonstrating how these other conceptions are derivative of the originary meaning.

3.4: CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we followed the thread that we picked up in chapter two, where we identified the first uses of authenticity in Heidegger’s early lectures. We saw that, like Aristotle, Heidegger was setting out to develop a method which could address the complexities of being part of a historical tradition. In part one, we examined how Aristotle solved this problem. Through the use of endoxic method, Aristotle showed us the value of turning to the tradition in a way that maintains the phenomena. In part two, we saw how Heidegger emulated and appropriated Aristotle’s method in order to overcome the deficiencies of phenomenology in his own time. In both the development of his early method, and his description of Aristotle’s method which he was clearly appropriating, we saw technical and explicit use of the concepts of authenticity. By comparing Aristotle’s endoxic method with Heidegger’s two-step method of formal indication and phenomenological destruction, we were able to establish a clear link between these two thinkers, finally answering the question of how Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle effected his views on phenomenology. In part three we saw that Heidegger’s method and his use of authenticity in these early lectures mirrors the method and use of authenticity found in Being and Time. Thus, we can now see that the very structure of Being and Time is built around this
discussion of authenticity. We are now ready to answer the question of what Heidegger really means by authenticity.

Before providing a new definition of authenticity, it is important to note that this dissertation itself has been following the methodological outline demonstrated by Heidegger and Aristotle. The question at the heart of this dissertation is “What does Heidegger mean by authenticity?” In the introduction we identified what has been said about authenticity by analyzing three definitions. We saw that when the traditional view of authenticity –that sees authenticity as a self-focused ideal– is applied to Heidegger’s thought, there are some puzzles which naturally arise. In chapter one, we looked to the various ways that authenticity appears in *Being and Time* and noted that many of the phenomena of authenticity discussed in that text were missing from the traditional interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity. In chapter two we discovered that additional puzzles arise as a result of the linguistic and philosophical complexities of translating Heideggerian authenticity. With the help of German linguistics, we were able to establish guidelines for identifying the technical uses of authenticity in earlier texts, expanding the available phenomena of authenticity greatly. In this chapter, we investigated these phenomena closely and linked authenticity to Heidegger’s phenomenological method, demonstrating the prevalence of this term throughout Heidegger’s development from 1921 until the publication of *Being and Time*. There are now two outstanding steps in our process which will be addressed in the final two chapters. First, in chapter four, we will propose a new theory of authenticity which can hold true for all of the phenomena of authenticity we have considered so far and attempt to resolve the puzzles proposed by the traditional interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity discussed the introduction. Then, in Chapter 5, we must compare this new theory of authenticity to some of the dominant views of authenticity within the scholarship, to demonstrate
how our interpretation can account for the phenomena in question, resolve the puzzles generated by these other accounts, and explain why these theories were possibly led astray.
CHAPTER 4: REINTERPRETING AUTHENTICITY

In this chapter we will see that authenticity can best be understood as having two interrelated senses: a methodological sense and an applied sense. The methodological sense of authenticity was outlined briefly in chapter three but is now ready for a much more thorough definition. By the applied sense of authenticity, I mean the particular application of authenticity to entities encountered within our various worlds. What I am proposing is that while both the methodological and applied sense of authenticity are highly technical, the methodological sense is the primary sense of authenticity since it makes the applied sense possible.\(^1\)

Consequently, in part one of this chapter, I will clarify the methodological role that authenticity plays in *Being and Time* and explain its relation to phenomenology and the concept of truth as *aletheia*. In part two, we will return to a discussion of the various applied forms of authenticity as they relate to tool use, other Dasein and communities. We will see how the methodological sense of authenticity helps us better understand these applied uses of authenticity.

4.1: METHODOLOGICAL AUTHENTICITY

In chapter three we explained Heidegger’s method and demonstrated how authenticity can be found at the heart of his method at each stage of his philosophical development. Roughly

\(^1\) See Brentano quote above for clarification.
speaking, the methodological use of authenticity describes the movement from what is self-evident towards what is passed over in our everyday experience. We saw that Heidegger uses the same language in the introduction to *Being and Time*, where he reminds us that the problem is that (for the most part) we have an inauthentic understanding of the world around us. But, as we learned from Aristotle, the upshot is that this inauthentic understanding always relates back to something authentic. The authentic is thus the presupposed primal something of our experience which makes all inauthentic interpretations of that phenomena possible. In contrast, if the authentic meaning is the goal of phenomenological inquiries, then the inauthentic meanings are what is investigated, worked through, or exhausted, to arrive at that authentic meaning.

4.1.1: Returning to Authenticity and Method

There were many steps linking authenticity to method in the previous chapter. In this section I would like to quickly link them all together to set the stage for a discussion of phenomenology and truth as *aletheia*. This will provide us with the methodological foundation which can give rise to an applied sense of authenticity which will feature in the second section of this chapter.

In chapter three, we saw that Heidegger describes Aristotle’s method as a movement from what is inauthentically there to that which is authentically underneath. The idea of a hidden but authentic meaning is at the core of my methodological interpretation of authenticity. Recall again that at the outset of *Being and Time*, Heidegger, paraphrasing the *Sophist*, tells us that we are not ready to answer the question of the authentic meaning of being. We can see now that the authentic meaning of being (the goal of fundamental ontology) has been covered up by the tradition and forgotten. Heidegger does not tell us that we are unable to answer these questions because such questions are impossible, or because nobody has figured out a way to abstract away from all those things which cloud our understanding. Instead, the problem is that we have not yet
worked through the various inauthentic meanings that we find in our everyday life, or in the
tradition as it has been passed down. This language can be found in both the body of Being and
Time and various lectures from around the same time. See this quote from History of the Concept
of Time, a lecture from 1925: “We live always already in an understanding of ‘is-ness’, without
being able to say what it authentically means.”

This understanding which we always already have, constitutes the phenomenological
starting point for the investigation. Much like how Aristotle, in his investigations into the various
sciences, starts with what “has been said” by others, Heidegger begins his project with an
overview of the various but inauthentic ways that Being has been understood. The goal is not to
disparage the tradition, but rather to find the truth that is contained therein:

Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical
inquiry of the sciences. But it remains itself naïve and opaque if in its
researches into the Being of entities it fails to discuss the meaning of Being in
general. And the ontological task of genealogy of the different possible ways
of Being (which is not to be constructed deductively) is precisely of such a sort
as to require that we first come to an understand of ‘what we really
[eigentlichen] mean by this expression “Being”’.

Here Heidegger links together the notion that ontology must be done by working through various
historical ways of understanding Being, where the result is the authentic meaning of being. He
cites the tradition as being the source of our understanding of Being but also a source for its
apparent self-evidence. What we see in this first glance is historically, culturally, and socially,

---

2 GA 20: 194. My translation. Original German: „Wir leben immer schon in einem Verständnis des »ist«, ohne daß
wir genauer sagen könnten, was das eigentlich bedeutet.“
3 SZ: 11/31.
4 SZ: 21/43: “Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence…”
determined. Nevertheless, he does not belittle the first glance. Instead he cites it as the only way to get at the truth in the first place—it’s the *first* glance, to be followed up by more glancing.

### 4.1.2: Authenticity and Truth as *Aletheia*

Recall that in the introduction, Heidegger describes *Being and Time* as an investigation into the meaning of being. Heidegger notes that what is required is an analysis of the entity which can ask the question of the meaning of being, Dasein. He notes that an analysis of Dasein must take place on two levels: a provisional one, and an authentic one. The provisional and preparatory analysis, what we start with, is best understood as the analysis the everyday inauthentic self-evidence that is available to us.

Since Heidegger is speaking about analyzing Dasein in particular, the natural starting point would be to investigate the various inauthentic meanings we have for human existence. That is exactly what Heidegger does when he paraphrases Scheler stating that “[t]he person is not a Thing, not a substance, not an object.” He continues, looking back to the tradition to Aristotle, Christian theology, anthropology, biology, and even psychology. Each of these traditions suffers from the problem of self-evidence, insofar as they have come to adopt a view on what human beings are without questioning it. Thus, we can see that the analytic of Dasein itself follows *endoxic* method, provisionally sifting through the inauthentic meanings in order to get to the authentic truth of Dasein’s existence. The link here between truth and authenticity is crucial for unpacking the methodological sense of authenticity.

---

5 In *Being and Time*, Heidegger regularly stresses that *Uneigentlichkeit* is separate from moral, religious, or negative connotations such as “lesser” or “inferior” (SZ: 43/68.)
6 SZ: 12/32.
7 SZ: 17/38.
8 SZ: 47/73.
9 SZ: 50/75.
Among the many things that Heidegger concludes concerning Dasein’s ontological constitution is the fact that Dasein is unique in its ability to disclose entities. Previously we noted that Heidegger wanted to analyze the being of Dasein because Dasein can ask the question of the meaning of Being, but we did not explicitly address why this is the case. Early on in *Being and Time*, Heidegger notes that any investigation must begin with some sense of what we are after. The idea is that by asking the question of being, we already must have some notion of what it is, regardless of how explicit or implicit that meaning is. But having an understanding of something requires that we have already disclosed it as something. This capacity to disclose the world around us, the entities we find, and the concepts that we analyze is unique to Dasein’s ontological constitution. This disclosure is what Heidegger thinks of as truth in the original sense.

Heidegger’s radical reinterpretation of truth as disclosure is undoubtedly one of the most important and complex insights that he brings to the table in *Being and Time*. In very simple terms, Heidegger’s new notion of truth is meant to critique an older model of truth as correspondence. Truth as correspondence is the notion that a thought or utterance can be called true if it matches or corresponds to some outside phenomena. If I point at a rock and call it a cat, that statement can be evaluated as false because what was said does not correspond to the phenomena.

Heidegger does not ignore that truth as correspondence is helpful for everyday language or useful in its proper context. Instead, he suggests that it relies on and is made possible by a more original truth: truth as disclosure. In order to make the judgement that one’s thoughts or words do or do not correspond to some phenomena in the world, one has to have already disclosed the phenomena in question. Heidegger’s point is that this act of disclosure, whereby we
come to meaningfully understand the phenomena as it shows itself in itself within the world, is
the original and primordial form of truth. Dasein, as a being which discloses meaningful entities
in this way, is “in the truth.”

Disclosure is Heidegger’s appropriation of the Greek notion of truth as aletheia. Heidegger
describes aletheia as an activity of wresting meaning from the world, of literally
uncovering something which has become hidden. Dasein, as a being which does this naturally, is
in the truth insofar as it is a being which is constantly uncovering what is the case. He calls
Dasein “Being-uncovering” whereas the phenomena which we encounter meaningfully are
“being-uncovered.”

But not all disclosure is the same. What is meaningfully disclosed is sometimes what
only appears to be the case. He calls this deceptive disclosure semblance. In History of the
Concept of Time, Heidegger details his account of the difference between semblance and
phenomena, in a way which sheds light on this very issue. Semblance is Heidegger’s word for
something which shows itself but not as it is, it tricks us. Nevertheless, semblance has a positive
feature: it “always goes back to something manifest and includes the idea of the manifest.” In
other words, semblance, things appearing to be the case, is only possible because there is some
authentic self-showing which has been concealed:

… the Possibility of appearance as reference is founded in the authentic
phenomenon, self-showing. The structure of appearance as reference already

---

10 SZ: 221/263.
11 GA 62: 377-8/S 131: “The meaning of alethes, namely being-there as unconcealed, i.e., being meaning in itself, is
in now way drawn from and explicated on the basis of judgment and thus does not originally resist in it or refer to it.
Aletheuein [being-true] does not mean “possessing the truth” but rather taking the beings meant in each case and as
such into true safekeeping as unveiled.”
12 SZ: 220/263.
13 GA 20: 113/82.
intrinsically presupposes the more original structure of self-showing, the authentic sense of phenomenon.\(^\text{14}\)

Dasein can work through this semblance to uncover the phenomena which gives rise to it. Here we can hear echoes of Aristotle’s *endoxic* method once again, insofar as the mistaken phenomena are taken to be indications of the truth, even if they must be worked through carefully.

Things get even more complicated when we recognize that Dasein, as being in the truth as disclosing and uncovering the meaningful phenomena encountered within the world, can even uncover itself. Not only are we the kind of being which can ask the question of the meaning of being, we are also the kind of being which can ask what it means to ask that question in the first place. Heidegger thinks that uncovering our own being, as existence, is requisite for fully answering that latter question. He describes the process of uncovering the truth of our being:

This authentic disclosedness shows the phenomena of the most primordial truth in the mode of authenticity. The most primordial, and indeed the most authentic, disclosedness in which Dasein, as a potentiality-for-being, can be, is the truth of existence. This becomes existentially and ontologically definite only in connection with the analysis of Dasein’s authenticity.\(^\text{15}\)

What we see here is that Heidegger’s new definition of truth as disclosure links up nicely with his discussion of authenticity. To disclose something as it shows itself in itself is to authentically disclose it. With regard to Dasein’s being, what that entails is much more complex than say, encounters with rocks or tools, but nevertheless, we can come to authentically encounter and thus disclose ourselves to ourselves, if we can work through the semblance and uncover what underlies it.

\(^\text{14}\) GA 20: 113-4/82-3.
\(^\text{15}\) SZ: 221/264.
Thus, this methodological use of authenticity, which speaks to the phenomenological disclosure of meaningful entities as they show themselves in themselves speaks to Heidegger’s broader philosophical goals. Authenticity is about getting to the truth of the being. Thus, the answer to the question “What does Heidegger mean by authenticity in *Being and Time*?” is answered as follows: In its methodological sense, authenticity refers to the goal of phenomenology which is wrested from the inauthentic everyday meanings of concepts which have been passed down to us through the tradition. It is the disclosure or uncovering of the phenomena in a way that it shows itself in itself from itself. It is the presupposed primal something of our experience which makes all inauthentic interpretations of that phenomena possible. In contrast, if the authentic meaning is the goal of phenomenological inquiries, then the inauthentic meanings are what is investigated, worked through, or exhausted, to arrive at that authentic meaning.

With this methodological use of authenticity, we can actually look back to those quotes discussed in chapter two, where Heidegger speaks about Descartes and progress in the sciences. If we adopt the view that *eigentlich* is Heidegger’s way of referring to what lies underneath and what makes possible the various inauthentic understandings that we always already have, then we can see these passages in an entirely new light:

>[Its] authentic [*eigentlicher*] progress comes not so much from collecting results and storing them away in ‘manuals’ as from inquiring into the ways in which each particular area is basically constituted…

The authentic [*eigentliche*] movement of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself.

---

16 SZ: 9/29, tm.  
17 SZ: 9/29, tm.
Authentic progress in the sciences can be understood as the movement towards an understanding of the world that discloses it as it is. Authentic movement is found when there is an adoption of a new ontological foundation that supports the evidence. Consequently, translating these instances of *eigentlich* as “really” underplays the way in which Heidegger is drawing on Aristotle to make substantial ontological points. Heidegger is talking about a progress, or movement, which uncovers things in their truth, rather than distorting them and covering them up.

We are now ready to look at applied authenticity, the application of this notion of authenticity, the true disclosure of phenomena, to particular encounters which Heidegger divides up according to their modes of being: tools within the *Umwelt*, other people and communities within the *Mitwelt*, and ourselves within the *Selbstwelt*.

4.2: APPLIED AUTHENTICITY

Applied authenticity refers to the state of an encounter with some particular phenomena which discloses the entity in its ownmost being. Thus, an *authentic* encounter is one which discloses the being of an entity in its truth and an *inauthentic* encounter is one that covers up or distorts the being of that entity. With this definition, we can see why this term, and its various formulations, is so important to Heidegger in every aspect of his philosophical investigation. With this definition in hand, we are finally able to address the many ways that authenticity shows up in Heidegger’s writings. From this broader methodological use which can explain the authentic movement of the sciences, we can begin to reinterpret Heidegger’s applied authenticity with regard to encounters with tools, fellow Dasein, community, and itself.

---

18 This mirrors Heidegger’s description of phenomena in *The History of the Concept of Time*, where he notes that “Being-covered-up is the counter concept to phenomenon, and such concealments are really the immediate theme of phenomenological reflection” (GA 20: 119/86.)
4.2.1: Authentic Zuhandensein

In chapter one, we mentioned that Heidegger describes authentic encounters with tools, or ready-to-hand (Zuhanden) entities. This discussion raised a number of issues for the standard interpretation, since, if we had merely applied the rules of authenticity as described by the traditional interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity, we may have been forced to puzzle about how a hammer can resolutely seize its ownmost possibility in light of the anticipation of its death. Now we can see that authenticity applies to encounters in a broader fashion, which can resolve these puzzles. If authenticity describes an encounter which uncovers something in its ownmost being, then an authentic encounter is merely one which discloses the being of that entity rather than distorting it. To return to the hammer, an authentic encounter would be one which uncovers the being of the hammer in its hammersness. But it is important to note, that recognizing a hammer as a tool, as in uttering the phrase “that thing is useful for hammering” is not the same thing as encountering it in its authentic being.

What does it mean to disclose the being of a hammer authentically, for Heidegger? The answer, as you might have guessed, once again goes back to Aristotle. Heidegger gets his idea of authentic tool use from Aristotle’s discussion of the telos:

In having on the clothing that is put on, it is genuinely [eigentlich] there as put on. An article of clothing is not there when it is hanging in the closet, but when it is put on; it is in its telos. In being put on, the clothes are what constitutes the genuine [eigentlich] there of the clothes, both put on and worn: the hexis. Here, Heidegger describes a “hexis” as a “having” or way of being which relates Dasein to entities within its world. When we wear clothes in a way where they are most useful, they fade

19 GA 18: 175/118.
from our awareness.\footnote{To quote Lee Braver: “It is clothing when it is cloth-ing.”} Comfortable clothes which move easily with us are most authentically in use when our attention is not drawn to them. This mirrors Heidegger’s discussion of tools in \textit{Being and Time} where he describes the hammer as being most authentic when it is at work and not drawing our attention away from the task at hand.\footnote{SZ: 69/99.} Of course, the hammer, as a physical object is constituted by its weight and mass and various physical properties. But that is not what we mean when we speak of hammers. Nor is an authentic encounter achieved by seeing a hammer as a useful thing. Hammers get their meaning through the act of hammering. That is, hammers fully become what they are when they are put to use by some particular Dasein for some particular goal.\footnote{GA 62: 382/S 133: “…just as it is the case that a tool used in some work first comes to its authentic being, namely, \textit{doing work}, when it is taken in hand…”}

Heidegger notes that this authentic encounter is peculiar: “The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically.”\footnote{SZ: 69/99.} In other words, the most authentic encounter with a tool is one where the tool functions purposefully in the background, helping to bring about some task. The reason Heidegger refers to this as “peculiar” is that, in contrast to the authentic encounter with oneself where the possibility of authenticity is the result of a resolute choice, the authentic encounter with a tool requires that it remain unthematic and inexplicit. Thus, Heidegger’s discussion here suggests that because there are different kinds of entities with their own kind of being, there are different conditions for encountering those entities authentically. But this should not surprise us at all: If authenticity is about encountering an entity in its
ownmost way of being, in a way which truly uncovers the being of that entity, then the kind of entity we encounter will determine the way in which we can best encounter it authentically.

In his early lectures, Heidegger maintains the significance of this relationship between understanding something as a tool and reducing that tool to an object of theoretical contemplation. Taking some tool and encountering it as a mere object “[forfeits] the authentic character of [the tool’s] there and now holds itself in and lingers in the indifference of something we are merely able to ascertain.”²⁴ The authenticity of the encounter is lost as the entity in question is reduced to something which covers up its ownmost being.

This connects nicely with Aristotle’s notion that the essence of a particular entity is determined by its function, or ergon.²⁵ Admittedly, many things share functions. Both animals and humans require sleep and nutrients to flourish. Thus, to determine our essence, Aristotle notes that we have to find the function is special or unique to our being, what he calls the idion.²⁶ The idion is the definitive aspect of the particular being. If any being lost its idion, it would cease to be what it was.²⁷

But what does the idion of some entity have to do with authenticity? Heidegger defines Aristotle’s idion as the function (ergon) which is ownmost (“zu eigen”) to the particular thing.²⁸

²⁴ GA 63: 95/73.
²⁵ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b23-29: “Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function.” See also Nicomachean Ethics, 1139a17: “The excellence of a thing is relative to its proper function.”
²⁶ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b33: “For living is evidently shared with plants as well, but we are looking for what is special [idion].”
²⁷ Shields, Aristotle, 122: “… to specify the being of human being, or in our terminology, to specify the human being’s essence, we will do well to appeal to rationality rather than the cluster of necessary features it explains. Aristotle has a technical term for such non-essential but necessary features. They are [idia].”
²⁸ GA 18: 98/68.
Elsewhere, however, Heidegger defines authenticity, *Eigentlichkeit*, as that which is ownmost, *zu eigen* to that entity.\(^{29}\) In other words, Heidegger accepts Aristotle’s notion that the *idion*, the special function of the entity in question, is what determines its essence. Thus, this *idion*, this special function, also determines the authentic being of the entity in question.\(^{30}\) As mentioned previously, this link between owning (*eigen*) and authenticity (*eigentlich*) has been obscured by the Macquarrie and Robinson translation, but we can now see how they tie together.\(^{31}\) In the “rough draft” of *Being and Time*, Heidegger describes inauthentic Dasein as someone who “does not own themselves” (*sich nicht zu eigen*).\(^{32}\) In the early Freiburg lectures, Heidegger describes authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) as dependent on the possibility that Dasein can be its own: that it has ownness (*Eigenheit*).\(^{33}\) In *Being and Time* he maintains this link in his definition of authenticity:

> But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic [*eigentlich*] -- that is, something of its own [*zueigen*] -- can it has lost itself and

\(^{29}\) Heidegger reflects on this question of Dasein’s essence again in 1946 in his “Letter on Humanism.” See GA 9: 329-30/233: “The substance of man is existence – but substance thought in terms of the history of being, is already a blanket translation of *ousia*, a word that designates the presence of what is present and at the same time, with puzzling ambiguity usually means what is present itself. If we think the metaphysical term ‘substance’ in the sense already suggested in accordance with the ‘phenomenological destructing’ carried out in *Being and Time*, then the statement ‘the substance of man is ek-sistence’ says nothing else but that the way that man in his proper [*eigenen*] essence becomes present to Being is ecstatic inherence in the truth of Being.” For my interpretation of the relation between early and later Heidegger on the question of essence and authenticity, see 6.2 of this dissertation.

\(^{30}\) Scholars like Walter Brogan are suspect of this use of the *ergon* argument in Heidegger’s work. Brogan claims that adopting a view of the world that determines beings by their function is dangerous: “Not only would this mean that Heidegger’s view of beings other than ourselves is seriously limited, but it would also imply a less than successful outcome for his analysis of Dasein’s being since, as he shows, our very being becomes entangled and caught up in these equipmental structures in a way that is, in Heidegger’s terms, fallen and inauthentic.” (Brogan, 140.) Admittedly there is a way in which one could use the works of later Heidegger to condemn the functional definition of entities as being a form of technological enframing. Whether *Being and Time* is guilty of this kind of thinking is an open question. However, when it comes to *Being and Time*, Heidegger’s descriptions of entities in terms of their function (*ergon*) are not at odds with authenticity. In this quote, Brogan makes a mistake common to traditional interpretations of Heideggerian authenticity by equating a life engaged with equipment with inauthenticity. Of course, inauthentic everydayness is caught up with tools and indeed lost into a world of concern, but authentic Dasein is also engaged with tools and sees them in terms of their function. As we will see in this chapter, engagement with tools in terms of their authentic function is not the cause of our inauthenticity, nor is our social engagement with others.

\(^{31}\) See GA 62: 366/S 122: “…(‘authentic’ [*eigentliche*] is being understood literally here as ‘one’s own’ [*die eigene*])…”

\(^{32}\) GA 64: 26/20.

\(^{33}\) GA 63: 85/65.
not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity \([\text{Eigentlichkeit}]\) and inauthenticity \([\text{Uneigentlichkeit}]\) (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness.\(^3\) Here we see that Heidegger links the authenticity of Dasein to the particular character which makes it special: the \textit{idion} of Dasein as mineness. Mineness is what makes authentic choosing possible. I can only choose myself (or fail) because I am mine. Likewise, Heidegger also describes authentic encounters with tools in terms of their use, which is what makes them special. Thus, we see that an authentic encounter with a hammer is one where Dasein engages with the entity in a way that brings out its unique \((\text{idion})\) function \((\text{ergon})\): hammering.

But what does this applied use of authenticity to tools have to do with methodological authenticity? In these sections on tools, Heidegger is trying to identify that one of the main ways that we encounter things in the world is through the use of things as tools to carry out projects. We learn that a significant aspect of Dasein’s existential constitution is determined by its ready engagement with the world of its environment. For the most part, this pragmatic engagement has been covered up by the tradition which views all objects of use in terms of the presence-at-hand. By seeing entities in terms of presence-at-hand, we obscure their more meaningful and originary purpose in our everyday lives.

For the most part, this meaningful encounter with entities goes unnoticed, but in moments of breakdown, this structure can become explicit. Thus Heidegger, by appealing to the everyday phenomena of hammers and the various tasks which we take up without thinking about them, shows us that inauthentic understandings of objects, which view them as mere presence-at-hand

\(^3\) SZ: 42-3/68.
are only possible because of an authentic encounter with those objects which goes unnoticed yet presupposed.

Thus, this analysis of tools, whereby Heidegger demonstrates the authentic and inauthentic ways of encountering them, is simply a way for him to demonstrate how the tradition of philosophy can obscure our relation to the phenomena. It shows us that the tradition, which tends to view entities as objects which stand against a subject, has led us astray for so many years. But he also demonstrates in these sections that the authentic can be arrived at through an analysis of the inauthentic. By looking at how we have come to define entities in terms of their presence-at-hand, Heidegger thinks we can learn something about the way that we obscure and cover up the world around us. The only person who appeared to have a sense of the real being of tools was Aristotle, who recognized that things were best understood in terms of their function.\(^{35}\) With this teleological understanding of the being of entities, we can now turn to fellow Dasein to see how Heidegger’s discussion of authentic \textit{Mitsein} can now be made more sensible.

\textbf{4.2.2: Authentic Mitsein}

When we first looked at \textit{Mitsein}, Dasein’s social encounter with its fellow Dasein, we noted that Heidegger speaks about this encounter on two levels. Heidegger describes the first level as personal interactions with fellow Dasein on the scale of individuals encountering one another in their everyday lives. Here we noted that there were two extreme forms of encounter, one described as authentic and the other as inauthentic. The second level of sociality discussed by Heidegger regarded communities as a whole, where he described the authentic gathering of

entire peoples. In this section we will see how the methodological sense of authenticity can explain these two levels of social encounter with much more clarity.

While we encounter fellow Dasein as we concernfully carry out tasks within the environment, we do not necessarily see other people as tools. Nor do we encounter fellow Dasein in the negative sense of being “non-tool objects out in the world.” Instead, we see other people as their own kind of being, as existing beings, or in other words, as fellow Dasein. Heidegger tells us that even if we see a person standing around doing nothing, they are encountered as an existing being which is merely standing about, unconcerned about any particular task at hand.\(^{36}\) Just as tools are defined by their function regarding our daily tasks and within the mode of care (\textit{Sorge}) known as concern (\textit{Besorge}), fellow Dasein are also defined by a mode of care: caring-for (\textit{Fürsorge}).\(^{37}\) As mentioned previously, this form of care is present even in the most formal and distant relationships. Even if you do not know who is sitting in the park, you still encounter them as a human, you care-for them, even if you do not like them. Caring-for just means that we see them as fellow existing beings and not as a park bench to sit on, or a rock to kick.

Heidegger distinguishes caring-for fellow Dasein from concernful engagement with worldly entities by giving the example of teaching a class:

We have analyzed the network of comportments that (to put it extrinsically) stretches from involvement with the chalk all the way up to the goal of communicating and understanding. And we analyzed a lecture as a communication and as a comportment of my own \([\textit{eigenen}]\) existence [as the teacher.] In all that, we showed (granted, in a somewhat one-sided fashion) that existence’s being is at stake in this comportment. But in our analysis we omitted an essential connection: that at the very same time, although in a different way, the current existence of those who are listening and understanding is likewise at stake. One might think that the care [\textit{Sorge}] of the

---

\(^{36}\) SZ: 120/156.

\(^{37}\) Translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as “solicitude.” See SZ: 121/157.
existence who is communicating is “concerned for” [be-sorgten] and “deals with” those who are listening, and that they are always there in the lived world [Umwelt] and hence fall within the circle of its being concerned-about [be-sorgten]. But this wrongly interprets the phenomenal state of affairs.\(^38\)

The network of comportments discussed here is a reference to the series of in-order-to’s which populate our environmental work of concern. In this example, Heidegger cannot write on the board without engaging with the chalk as a tool. Furthermore, he mentions that, as an existing being, he is carrying out the activity of teaching, something which is only possible for a being which can choose to be what it is. But the students also play a crucial role, and not merely an instrumental one. The students are not merely tools for the teacher’s activity of lecturing. They are instead entities which are encountered with regards to their own being. He reiterates: “You the listeners are not objects of a concern-about [Be-sorgtes].”\(^39\) Because concern, here translated as “concern-about” is a mode of care particular to environmental entities like tools, it is not the proper way to talk about our engagement with other people. He concludes that teaching, as a mode of communication, engages in a form of mutual-care: a caring-for [Fürsorge].\(^40\)

Just because Heidegger is encountering his students in terms of their being-with and caring for them as a teacher, does not mean that we can conclude that he is doing so authentically. Being-with as caring-for can take many forms, and not all teaching engages students authentically. Here we can see a tension in Heidegger’s thinking regarding authentically encountering other beings. If we think of authenticity as an encounter whereby Dasein identifies the other entity correctly, then authentically encountering other human beings would merely require that I notice that they are also Dasein. Heidegger goes a step beyond this, however, and

\(^{38}\) GA 21: 222/186-7.
\(^{39}\) GA 21: 222/187.
\(^{40}\) In GA 21, Thomas Sheehan translates Fürsorge as “concern-for” and Besorge as “concern-about” while keeping Sorge as “care.”
authentically encountering others begins to take on an ethical tone. Just as authentically encountering a hammer requires that I put the hammer to use, rather than just acknowledging its potential use, authentically encountering other Dasein requires that we take action.\footnote{Heidegger’s thoughts on teaching and paideia are relevant to this discussion. Heidegger speaks of authentic teaching explicitly at GA 8:18. However, the relationship between teaching, education, and Heidegger’s plunge into Nazism is too complex to detail here. For more on this issue, see Iain Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology, 162: “Heidegger seeks to educate his students against their preexisting ontotheological education.” In short, Heidegger’s reflections on teaching echo much of what is discussed in his lectures concerning authentic mitsein.}

What is interesting about authentically encountering other people is that it involves helping that person come into their own authenticity. When we authentically encounter others, we help them authentically encounter themselves. Thus, we can see that Heidegger’s description of leaping-ahead was an attempt to talk about ways in which we can help other Dasein authentically encounter themselves:

“In contrast to [leaping in], there is also the possibility of a kind of solicitude [Fürsorge] which does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead of him in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a “what” with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.”\footnote{SZ: 122/159.}

This quote brings together a number of important elements, in that it speaks to the fact that encountering a fellow human authentically is not a matter of our own authenticity, but of the authenticity of our fellow Dasein. We can see why Heidegger chose the above example of the teacher when talking about caring-for. A good teacher is one who engages the students authentically, and as a result guides the students to their own authenticity.\footnote{There is also the Socratic point of drawing wisdom out of your students. My thanks to Dr. Braver for drawing this insight out of me.}

To encounter others
authentically, we have to disclose their being in its ownmost being as a potentiality-for-being which can become transparent to itself and free to choose.

Just as with the hammer, where we saw that identifying the entity as a hammer, as a tool, was not enough to satisfy the requirements of an authentic encounter, we see that when it comes to encountering fellow Dasein, we must do more than just notice they are a human being. Instead, an authentic encounter involves encountering the entity in its truth. Since Dasein, whose being is defined by its existence, is ownmost when it has authentically seized itself as a possibility, then authentically encountering others requires that we aid them in coming to that self-encounter. For the most part, we fail to do this, and encounter others inauthentically, not necessarily in an uncaring way, but in a way which does not free them for their own authenticity.

In his early lectures, we find Heidegger expressing this much more explicitly, and in direct reference to the thinking of Aristotle:

So you see that in this determination (logon echon), a fundamental character of the being-there of human beings becomes visible: being-with-one-another. This is not being-with-one-another in the sense of being-situated-alongside-one-another, but rather in the sense of being-as-speaking-with-one-another through communicating, refuting, confronting.  

In this early lecture, Heidegger goes to lengths to demonstrate how Aristotle’s ethics, politics and even metaphysics are inherently social or communal. To be human, in the Aristotelian sense, is to live in the polis. In the same fashion, when Heidegger describes Dasein as Being-in-the-world, he frequently reminds us that the Mitwelt is an ineliminable aspect of that world. In these

44 GA 18: 47/33.
45 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a24-9: “It is clear, then, that the city both exists by nature and is prior in nature to the individual. For if an individual is not self-sufficient when separated, he will be in a similar state to that of the other parts in relation to the whole. And anyone who cannot live in a community with others, or who does not need to because of his self-sufficiency, is no part of a city, so that he is either a wild beast or a god.”
early lectures Heidegger links our ability to become resolute in the first place, to our capacity for deliberation, something that is honed as a result of our socially determined ontology. In other words: there is no authentic Dasein without a community.

We can now see that Heidegger accepts Aristotle’s thesis concerning the ineliminable role of community on two levels. As demonstrated in chapter three, we saw that without a community and without a tradition, philosophy is forced to flail wildly in the dark. Dasein is inherently historical, social and communal. There is always already a tradition which has constructed itself long before we arrived on the scene. It is only through philosophical appropriation of the past and a destruction of the tradition that we come to fully understand ourselves and the world around us. There is no philosophy without the community of philosophers and the traditions from which they come. But just as significant is the narrower sense of community which makes possible our individual pursuits and self-understandings. Just as virtuous habits are instilled in us by others, there is no authenticity without fellow-Dasein.

This Aristotelian insight should also help reframe Heidegger’s discussion of the role of community in his discussion of the destiny of a people. We can now hear the voice of Aristotle when Heidegger emphasizes the significance of the community, where the destiny of an entire people can be determined by the thinking of its leaders. He describes authenticity as a shared endeavor:

Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggle does the power of destiny become free. Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein.46

46 SZ 384-5/436.
Although he does not go to lengths here to outline the ways in which our community shape our possibility for authenticity, by linking authenticity to historizing and describing it as a shared project of communication, we can see how they are bound together. He attributes this very same approach to Aristotle:

[Aristotle] wants to show that the polis, a characteristic way of being-together, is not brought to humans by chance, but rather that polis, is the being-possibility, phusei, that itself lies enclosed and traced out in advance in the human being’s authentic [eigenen] being.47

This speaks to Aristotle’s discussion of virtue in the *Nicomachean Ethics* which depends heavily on the habituation of children by the citizens of the polis. It also echoes our discussion of Aristotle’s endoxic method, since the community is both indebted to the past which provides the rich tapestry of possibility, while being forced to struggle against the tradition which narrows the scope of those possibilities.

But what does this all have to do with the methodological reading of authenticity? Sure, to authentically encounter others, we must ourselves be authentic, but how does authentic being-one’s self relate to the tradition? Heidegger describes the ineliminable role of the social when he speaks more directly in terms of heritage in the same lecture:

[Dasein] has the possibility of tearing heritage away from the everyday, and bringing it to an original interpretedness, that is, out of everydayness, and in opposition to it in the hexis to appropriate [anzueignen] the conceptual in the genuine [eigentlichen] sense.48

Here Heidegger demonstrates that authentic understanding is a process of appropriating what is found in everydayness. Heritage, tradition, community, are all the wellspring of authentic understanding, for ourselves, for others, and for the entities found in our everyday lives. The

---

47 GA 18: 49/25, tm.
48 GA 18:277/188.
community is the condition for the possibility of authentic philosophy, and authentic philosophy is the condition for the possibility of making the past our own.

The methodological sense of authenticity, which described the method of working through what is passed down to us through the tradition, demonstrates the value of authentically encountering other people and our community as a whole. Having built up the Umwelt and the Mitwelt and the authentic encounters found therein, we are now ready to return to the Selbstwelt to see what Heidegger means by authentically encountering ourselves.

4.2.3: Authentic Selbstsein

Since authentic encounters with entities require that we encounter the being in its ownmost being, then the question of how to authentically encounter our own self depends on the broader question: “What am I?” As with tools, and fellow Dasein, the encounter with our own self requires that we attend to the kind of being in question. We can now see why describing this encounter is such a difficult task: we are much more complex than hammers.

In Being and Time, we find different answers to the question of Dasein’s existential constitution. Each answer represents a more nuanced interpretation than the last. Heidegger begins by telling us that we are “whos” and not “whats.” He suggests that our being is being-in-the-world and that this includes various relations to entities which are requisite for our existence. He then describes our being as care, subdivided up into three unique ways of meaningfully

---

49 In its most idyllic form, this is the goal of publication and academic debate. Teachers and students engaging in scholarship by appropriating the thinking which has been passed down through the tradition to uncover the kernel of truth and open up new ways of disclosing the meaning of texts. See Lee Braver, “Preston’s Endoxic Reading of Heidegger’s Endoxic Method: Finding Aristotle in Heidegger,” Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 11 (July 27, 2021), 148: “This is how the hermeneutic circle continues to turn, spun by time through generations of readers and thinkers taking their turns to return to the same works that are never the same, continually turning them over, ever making them over anew.”

50 SZ: 45/71.
engaging with entities: concern (Besorgen), caring-for (Fursorgen), and self-care (Selbstsorgen). Lastly, he describes human beings as time itself, insofar as existence is defined by our indebtedness to the past, our engagement with the present, and our necessary projection into the future. Each of these answers discloses the Being of Dasein at a deeper level. Thus, the question of what it means to authentically be oneself is a question of coming to terms with the complexity of human existence as it unfolds on these various levels. In this section, we will tackle authentic being-oneself at each of these levels before bringing them all together in a comprehensive account of Dasein’s authentic encounter with itself.

4.2.3.1: Whos and Whats

The major wrinkle when it comes to authentic being-one’s self comes from the fact that we are the kind of being which can determine our own being. A hammer gets its being from use, but this use is not something it controls. In contrast, a human being exists in the sense of ex-sistere, standing out into the world. This standing out involves taking a stand and making a choice as to what we want to become. Even not choosing is itself a choice, and one which we make for the most part in our everyday lives. By stating that we are “whos” and not “whats” Heidegger is telling us that our essence is partially constituted by our bodies, our world, our history, and other external factors, but it is also something which we can determine for ourselves. When we decide to pursue a particular degree, or job, or relationship, we do so by choosing one path out of many. The path chosen determines who we are and how we see ourselves. A hammer is what it is. A Dasein decides who they are or fails to do so.

51 SZ: 206/249.
52 SZ: 436/486.
As in the cases of tools and fellow Dasein, recognizing that we are a Dasein is necessary for authenticity, but it is not sufficient. It is not enough that we notice we are an existing being, instead we must further choose what we want to be by freeing ourselves for our own authenticity. Thus, in coming to encounter ourselves in our ownmost being, part of the task is recognizing what we are (an existing being) but more importantly than that, we must also decide who we are to become and carry out that transformation through action: “As resolute, Dasein is already taking action.”

Once again, Aristotle proves helpful for unpacking what Heidegger has in mind. As we discussed in the discussion of authentic encounters with tools, Heidegger seems to adopt Aristotle’s notion that the telos of the entity determines the way we should authentically encounter it. What is unique about human beings is not that they have some innate telos, but rather that they live their telos as a way of being, what he calls teleion. Thus Heidegger claims that for Aristotle:

Telos thus means, originarily: being-towards the end in such a way that this end constitutes the genuine [eigentlich] there, determining, in a genuine [eigentlich] way, a being in its presence.

In this discussion, Heidegger brings up the notion of death a particular kind of telos, a kind of end, but admits that without an understanding of authentic Dasein, we would lack the ability to explain it fully. Already we can see that Heidegger’s discussion here anticipates being-towards-death from Being and Time. For now, we are left to discuss notions of teleion, a way of being

---

S-Z: 300/347. William McNeill notes that Heidegger is hesitant to use the word “action” because of the danger of interpreting action “one-sidedly within the theory/praxis distinction…” He notes that for Heidegger, “[t]he action in question is originary action…” (McNeill, The Glance of the Eye, 111.)

GA 18: 88/61.

GA 18: 90/62.

GA 18: 90/62: “Here there is a fundamental context, namely that not being or not-being-there [Nicht-Dasein] can be interpreted only when one has positively explicated being-there [Dasein] itself in a genuine [eigentlich] way.”
towards the limit of our own being, which Heidegger attributes to Aristotle’s notion of the good life for human beings. Heidegger notes that for Aristotle, the good (agonth) means the most complete (or consummate) way that something can exist. Heidegger references Aristotle’s example of the excellent musician and draws a connection between the idea of a limit as an end, and someone who exists most fully in their own way of being by being consummate: “A consummate violinist is, by being consummate, in his genuine [eigentlichen] being.” The consummate violinist lives fully within their authentic being. This is because the violinist chooses their path and makes it their own.

But human life can be fulfilled in ways beyond the expert use of a violin. Heidegger draws on the etymological link between telos and intelligence in Aristotle’s notion of the human soul as entelecheia. That human beings are determined by entelechiae means that we are “the type of being that maintains itself in its genuine [eigentlichen] being-possibility so that the possibility is consummated.” Because we can come to understand our own telos, we can make that telos explicit for ourselves, and consequently, choose it for ourselves. When we choose and carry out our being-possibility, we become authentic individuals:

If the being is such that it can possess its telos, then the telos stands in view so that it can be spoken about. In this concept of entelecheia, the most fundamental character of the there comes into expression. This determination

57 GA 18: 90/62.
58 GA 18: 90/62. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a7-17: “If, then, the function of a human being is activity of the soul in accord with reason or not without reason, and the function of a sort of thing, we say, is the same in kind as the function of an excellent thing of that sort (as in the case of a lyre player and an excellent lyre player), and this is unconditionally so in all cases when we add to the function the superiority that is in accord with the virtue (for it is characteristic of a lyre player to play the lyre and of an excellent one to do it well)—if all this is so, and a human being’s function is supposed to be a sort of living, and this living is supposed to be activity of the soul and actions that involve reason, and it is characteristic of an excellent man to do these well and nobly, and each is completed well when it is in accord with the virtue that properly belongs to it—if all this is so, the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue and, if there are more virtues than one, then in accord with the best and most complete.”
59 GA 18: 90/62.
of the telos can now become of fundamental significance insofar as the being of beings can become explicitly for this being itself, and this possibility of being explicitly in the genuine [eigentlichen] being for a being remains for a being that we character as living, being-in-a-world.60

In other words, authentically being a human being means taking up our own telos. But this process is not as easy as it might seem. Here it is important to draw a distinction between two orders of telos. For Aristotle, there is a particular telos, the end or purpose we take up as individuals, and a broader telos, an end or purpose which fulfills the essence of the being in question.61 In his discussion of Aristotle, Heidegger recalls Aristotle’s example of a thief who is very good at stealing.62 On the one hand, the thief is taking up their telos, in deciding to be a thief, and fulfilling that telos, by being the best thief they can be. But on the other hand, the thief is failing to be a good human being since thievery is not a viable way to be a consummate human being. They are good qua thief, and bad qua human being. This is because for Aristotle, there are only a few ways of living which would qualify as being a good human being, and thief is not one of them. Here is a possible point of division for Heidegger and Aristotle, since Aristotle characterizes the good life as the life of contemplation, whereas Heidegger’s views on the matter are more opaque.

In contrast to hammers and other entities, one peculiarity of Dasein is that we live most of our lives encountering ourselves inauthentically. Heidegger describes this tendency to fall in

60 GA 18: 90/62.
61 For particular use of telos see Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1021b17: “And thus we transfer the word to bad things, and speak of a complete scandal-monger and a complete thief; indeed we even call them good, i.e. a good thief and a good scandal-monger.” For general telos of human beings see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a12-17: “If happiness is activity in accordance with excellence, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest excellence; and this will be that of the best thing in us. Whether it be intellect or something else that is this element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its proper excellence will be complete happiness. That this activity is contemplative we have already said.”
62 GA 18: 83/58.
the world of our affairs and to be swayed by the mass opinion of the public. We let ourselves be defined and determined by others without harnessing our unique ability to choose for ourselves who we want to be. We let others decide our telos for us. To break free of this tendency, however, we need a moment of clarity which breaks through the everyday. Authentically encountering one’s own self requires a recognition about the kind of being we are, and as a consequence, requires a moment which demonstrates the various crucial structures which manifest our meaningful lives, including a realization that we determine our own telos. 63

According to Heidegger, such moments occur in extreme anxiety, or as mentioned in later lecture courses in moments of extreme boredom. 64 Regardless of the ontological mood which brings about this realization, Heidegger insists that the next step, whereby we recognize our responsibility to choose our telos for ourselves is requisite for achieving authenticity.

### 4.3.4.2: Authentic Being-in-the-World

As we move into a discussion of authenticity, anxiety and the resolute choice, we can begin to see familiar themes to those discussed in what I have called the traditional interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity. Although we have now seen that authenticity is a much broader

---

63 In this way, the ergon of human Dasein is, for Heidegger, to disclose entities in their ownmost being. As Lee Braver puts it, “Heidegger does not exactly call [Dasein’s existence] an essence, but says that it takes the place of essence in the traditional sense. For one thing, [existence] is far more dynamic: disclosing beings is closer to something that we do than a quality we have or a state we are in. It is closer to the sense of Aristotle’s ergon, or a being’s distinctive activity.” (Braver, *Heidegger’s Later Writings*, 67.)

64 See GA 29/30 for Heidegger’s reflections on boredom. William McNeill summarizes Heidegger’s reflections on boredom nicely: “In boredom, we are indeed held, yet in a strangely indeterminate manner, in a way that leaves us empty in our very being. Things themselves no long fill us, no longer absorb us; we feel empty, unfulfilled, indifferent. Indeed, as Heidegger describes it, the experience of profound boredom, of being ore with beings as a whole, is a telling refusal on the part of beings themselves that calls us back to our proper vocation of “being there,” toward the Augenblick in which we may experience the world as world—experience the fact that things call for us in their very being, that they need us to let them be” (McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 121.) Heidegger returns to this discussion of moods or attunements which disclose aspects of Dasein’s being in a 1941 lecture course where he says: “But it is no less certain that the title of §40, which deals with anxiety is worded as follows: ‘The Basic Disposition of Anxiety as an Exemplary Disclosedness of Dasein.’ We do not read that anxiety is ‘the’ exemplary disclosedness of Dasein; nor is it being claimed that it is the only one” (GA 49: 33/26.)
concept for Heidegger’s philosophy, what we will see in these sections is that the traditional interpretation is not a fabrication; it comes from an analysis of these sections on authentically encountering one’s own self. The problem with the traditional interpretation of authenticity was never that it was wholly false, but that it emphasized one aspect of authenticity at the cost of missing the broader and more philosophically helpful sense of authenticity.

Heidegger does use some of the language which can be found within the tradition of authenticity, echoing the language of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, for example in his discussion of the dangers of *das Man* and the power of angst to break us free from our everyday meaningful lives. Because the language surrounding anxiety and death is loaded with references to individuation and isolation, people are led to believe that Heideggerian authenticity follows a similar path. The problem is that readers conflate Heidegger’s discussion of angst, which removes Dasein from the totality of meaningful significance, with the moment of resolute choosing whereby Dasein rejoins the meaningful world and determines its own for-the-sake-of-which or *telos*. The first step may be individuating, isolating, and miserable, but it is also informative. Only by being cut off from the totality of significance which structures our meaningful lives does Dasein come to understand the importance of that totality and its role in maintaining it in some sense.

Dasein always returns to the world which is comprised of its various horizons. Thus, all resolute choosing takes place within those horizons of intelligibility discussed earlier: the *Umwelt, Mitwelt* and *Selbstwelt*.

---

65 SZ: 188/232: “... anxiety discloses Dasein as *Being-possible*, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualized in individuation.”
Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as ‘solus ipse’. But this existential ‘solipsism’ is so far from the displacement of putting an isolated subject-Thing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an extreme sense what it does is precisely bring Dasein face to face with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world.66

Here Heidegger describes anxiety as bringing us face to face with the fact that we exist as being-in-the-world. Since Heidegger describes being-in-the-world as comprised of the *Umwelt*, the *Mitwelt* and the *Selbstwelt*, we can assume that each of these is present at the moment of resolute choosing. In other words, this indicates to us that being an authentic individual means coming to terms with every aspect of our being-in-the-world. In fact, Heidegger became so frustrated by the common misconception that authentic being-oneself is individualistic that he explicitly addresses it in lectures after the publication of *Being and Time*.

Many times, even ad nauseam, we pointed out that this being qua Dasein is always already with others and always already with beings not of Dasein’s nature. In transcending, Dasein transcends every being, itself as well as every being of its own sort (Dasein-with) and every being not of Dasein’s sort. In choosing itself Dasein really [*eigentlich*] chooses precisely its being-with other and precisely its being among beings of a different character.67

To put it simply, authentic being-oneself is not cut off from the world of entities, nor is it isolated from other Dasein. Authentic being-oneself recognizes that we are social and practical beings as beings-in-the-world. The individuating effect of anxiety merely takes a reflective distance on these everyday relationships and provides us with the insight that these relationships, including our relationship to our own self, are what define us. As McNeill puts it, the individuating effect of anxiety is an “*individuation* that each Dasein can authentically be, as the unfolding of originary *praxis* in which freedom occurs as finite disclosure.”68

---

66 SZ: 188/233.
67 GA 26: 245/190.
When we choose some *telos*, some for-the-sake-of-which to orient our lives, we do so socially and practically. We can see now why Heidegger would bother to provide authentic and inauthentic accounts of encounters with other entities. If authentically encountering one’s own self requires that we authentically encounter the entities around us, then it is methodologically necessary to have spelled out these kinds of authentic encounters beforehand.

The importance of the *Mitwelt* and the *Umwelt* for Dasein’s authenticity are often overlooked in the traditional interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity, but now we can see that they play an ineliminable role in Heidegger’s thoughts on authentic being-oneself. Take the following quote on the matter in *Being and Time*:

> Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one’s-Self, does not detach Dasein form its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating “I”. And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful [*besorgende*] being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous [*fürsorgende*] Being with others.\(^{69}\)

The moment of *angst* may be illuminating, but it is not the entire story. Dasein encounters itself and becomes its ownmost self by engaging with practical and social matters. As a Being-in-the-world, Dasein can only authentically become itself by taking up projects within this world, and caringly encountering tools and other Dasein.

This addresses a puzzle established earlier in our traditional interpretation of authenticity which questioned the role of the social and the world in our resolute choosing. It is not a radical and ungrounded choice, since it comes from the meaningful world around us, nor is it some sort of moral luck, since we are actively in control of it. We can now see, like with philosophical

\(^{69}\) SZ: 298/344.
investigations, Heidegger finds the authentic through an appropriation, a making one’s own, of the inauthentic. When we merely saw authenticity as a self-focused ideal, the social was seen entirely in negative terms, as something to overcome or transcend. Instead, we see now that the social, the *Mitwelt*, as an ineliminable part of Dasein’s ontological constitution, cannot be overcome, but must be appropriated authentically.

But does Dasein need to authentically encounter these entities in order to achieve an authentic relation towards itself? In other words, can one resolutely choose to be a person who manipulates people or treats his friends as tools? Here Heidegger is less clear. It is hard to imagine that Dasein can authentically be itself while engaging with other beings in a way which covers up their being and disguises them. But Heidegger only really speaks to the inverse of this relationship in *Being and Time* where he demonstrates that authentic being-with requires authentic being-one’s own self:

In the light of the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ of one’s self-chosen potentiality for being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. Dasein’s resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality-for-being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of others. Only by authentically being-their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another – not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the ‘they’ and in what ‘they’ want to undertake.  

Here Heidegger demonstrates that authentic being-with is not something we arrive at accidentally. Without authentic being-oneself, there is no possibility of authentic caring-for in the sense of leaping forth and liberating fellow Dasein for their own authenticity. When we are transparent to ourselves, we can help others achieve that same transparency. But what about the

---

70 SZ: 298/344.
reverse? Can we authentically be ourselves and treat others inauthentically? Recall the example of the excellent thief discussed earlier. For Aristotle, a thief can be excellent, insofar as they are good at stealing, but a bad human being insofar as they are failing to carry out a life which fulfills the essence of human beings. The question which we put to Heidegger is “Can Dasein be an authentic thief?”

Heidegger rarely speaks to this, but does hint that the answer is likely no. While caring-for our fellow Dasein can take on many forms, some of which would be considered negative or harmful, authentically caring-for others is limited. Authentic caring-for requires that we can engage with others and leap ahead of them in order to aid them in their coming to be themselves. Since nobody wants to be stolen from, stealing would be inauthentic because it would require treating other people inauthentically regularly. Thus the thief, in stealing, would be taking away the way of being from those that they steal from.

The link between authentic being-oneself and authentic being-with is intertwined for Heidegger. He tells us that Dasein’s resoluteness is communal and defined in terms of a “silent exemplary activity together with and for others.” If we think of authentic caring as a precursor to authentic encounters with other people, then authentically being-one’s own self (which makes authentic being-with possible) would be requisite for something like friendship. In fact, in one of the few moments that Heidegger does speak of friendship, he uses it to describe the way that our own call of conscience speaks to us like the voice of a friend:

---

71 For Aristotle, the complete life can be found in the life of contemplation. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, X.7 for a full discussion.
72 GA 64: 82/70.
Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-being – as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it.\textsuperscript{73}

Here we can see the reciprocal nature of authentically being one’s self as it relates to being-with. When we set out to become authentic, we appropriate ways of being from our culture and we do so as though we were being summoned by the call of a friend. When we engage with others authentically, we can become that call for them.

Unsurprisingly, this is yet another thing that Heidegger claims to have found in Aristotle:

The human being is not only a speaker and a hearer, but is for itself such a being that hears itself. Speaking, as self-expression-about-something, is at the same time a speaking-to-oneself. Therefore, the definition of logon echon further contains in itself that the human being also has logos in the mode of hearing this, its own speaking.\textsuperscript{74}

Being-with and hearing others is the condition for the possibility of hearing our own self, which is of providing a self-interpretation, the requisite first step in authentically becoming oneself. But authentic being-oneself is more than just personal and social, it is practical as well. It involves taking up our concerns in the world, engaging with the appropriate tools appropriately. That is, it requires that we authentically engage with tools as well to carry out our tasks.

This is what I call the trifecta of authenticity, insofar as becoming an authentic Dasein requires that we encounter ourselves, our fellow Dasein, and the entities within the world in a fully authentic way. References to the horizons of intelligibility and their particular ways of authentic engagement are plentiful in Heidegger’s writing and their connection together is demonstrated time and time again.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{73} SZ: 163/206.
\textsuperscript{74} GA 18: 104/72.
\textsuperscript{75} GA 63: 103/79.
Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being rather than upon the possibility of the they-self. Here we see Heidegger demonstrate the significance of these horizons of intelligibility when it comes to becoming an authentic person. Just because he rejects the notion that the possibility comes from the they-self, the inauthentic way encountering one’s own self, does not mean that the possibility is not social: far from it. Because Dasein as Being-in-the-world is determined by its Mitwelt, Umwelt, and Selbstwelt, its ownmost potentiality-for-being is determined by all of those things.

The kind of projection necessary for authenticity comes from understanding oneself as a finite being-in-the-world. As mentioned earlier, the inevitability of our own death is what provides the frame or backdrop from which Dasein comes to understand itself. For the most part, our understanding of death is an inauthentic one, which has come to us through the calm and dismissive voice of the public opinion found in Das Man. This is why Heidegger suggests that authentic being-oneself requires a projection which rejects the inauthentic interpretation of death (via the they-self) and replaces it with one which is authentic.

Authentically being one’s own self, on this level, would require that Dasein choose who they are to become, while also authentically engaging with fellow Daseins who make that choice possible, and authentically utilizing tools to carry out the tasks necessary to seek the chosen for-the-sake-of-which. Thus, we can see now that while the thief may choose to steal in light of their finitude, and choose how to be a thief by appropriating the profession in their own way, the fact

---

76 SZ: 263/308.
that they must also treat other Dasein without respect to the kind of being they possess makes this way of life untenable if authenticity is the goal.  

We can see now why Heidegger gives the example of the teacher above. The teacher can become authentic insofar as they resolutely choose to become a teacher, accepting the finite nature of the decision. But teaching requires that we put the texts and chalk and other course materials to work so that in their authentic use they become unthematic and inexplicit, allowing the class to focus on the matter at hand: the students. Encountering the students authentically, leaping ahead and guiding them towards their own authentic being, would thus be the ultimate goal, and one which is requisite for becoming an authentic teacher.

We have seen now how Heidegger’s reflections in the analytic of Dasein concerning our existential constitution provide us with a layered interpretation of human existence. On the most basic level, in distinguishing humans as “whos” rather than “whats” we see that authentic being-onethelf requires acknowledging our role as beings who can make a choice in determining our own being. At the next level, whereby Heidegger splits Dasein’s being-in-the-world into its relevant sub-horizons, we can see that authenticity requires tending to the various beings within the world that make our existence possible. There is no authentic Dasein without people to care for and things to concern ourselves with. This discussion of our own mortal finitude, a requisite self-realization for authenticity, brings us to the deepest level of self-understanding that we find in Being and Time: Dasein as a temporally unfolding being. It is important to emphasize that

77 Admittedly, this account of how the thief factors into Heidegger’s views on authenticity deserves a more thorough discussion than can be entertained here.

78 While there are many roles which could achieve this authentic caring relationship, Heidegger tends to return to this example of the teacher throughout his career.
Heidegger sees the discussion of Being-in-the-world as a necessary step for disclosing Dasein’s being as temporality.  

4.2.3.3: Temporality and Authenticity

In the introduction of *Being and Time*, Heidegger is explicit that our understanding of time is inadequate and grounded in phenomena which have long been misunderstood. In similar fashion to his discussion of being, Heidegger describes his investigation in terms of a need to find the more original, and thus more authentic sense of time. With this more original and more authentic notion of time, we will be able to look back at our mistaken notions of time and explain how we went awry. Once again, we can see the *endoxic* method at work, as it is Aristotle who provides the jumping off point for the investigation. Heidegger claims, unsurprisingly, that Aristotle was the last person to have really contributed to the discussion. Everyone since Aristotle has been playing variations on a theme.

Because the focus of this dissertation is on authenticity, and not temporality, our discussion of temporality needs to be as brief as possible. To put it simply, Heidegger’s point is that time, or better, temporality, is more than something we live in as one might live in a house. Instead, temporality defines our being entirely. Heidegger draws on the notion that as existing

---

79 SZ: 317/365: “Thus the care-structure does not speak against the possibility of Being-a-whole but is the condition for the possibility of such an existentiell potentiality-for-being.”
80 SZ: 25/47. Heidegger states that our views on temporality have confined our ontology to think of beings in their most real sense as those which are present: “Entities are grasped in their Being as ‘presence’; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time – the ‘Present.’”
81 Heidegger notably mentions Kant’s discussion in the Schematism as having come closest to a new discussion of time, a theme which he returns to in his 1929 book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. In *Being and Time*, however, Heidegger claims that when Kant gets close to investigating the meaning of time itself, he “shrinks back” and changes course (SZ: 23/45.)
82 Throughout this dissertation, I have often noted that Heidegger relies on Aristotle’s proto-phenomenological descriptions of the world and the things within it for his own interpretation. These reflections on time are one of the few places where Heidegger finds himself at odds with Aristotle’s proposed doctrines.
beings we literally stand out: ex-sistere. From here he draws a link between this standing out, and the various ecstases, or modes of time, that we find ourselves in. There is no Being-in-the-world without temporality. Heidegger subdivides temporality into three ecstases that roughly correspond to our everyday notions of time as future, past, and present.

Each temporal ecstasis has its own authentic and inauthentic mode of encounter. Furthermore, Dasein must authentically encounter all three of these ecstases in order to achieve a completely authentic encounter with one’s own self. In an authentic encounter with these ecstases, Dasein comes to understand how they are intimately linked, and how their unity makes possible Dasein’s authentic being-in-the-world in its fullest sense.

It should be noted that in these sections where Heidegger discusses time and temporality, he speaks in terms of authenticity and inauthenticity regarding our understanding of these concepts. Our relation to time plays a role in our ability to encounter ourselves authentically. In the same way that we tend to get caught up in the hustle and bustle of everyday life whereby we forget ourselves and begin to understand ourselves in terms of how others see us, we can also come to think of ourselves within an inauthentic temporal understanding. The inauthentic self sees itself as infinite, as always having another day to do something, as being able to put something off indefinitely because there is “always more time.” Thus, part of becoming an authentic Dasein requires recognizing this inauthentic relation towards our future.

Understanding our finitude, the inevitability of our death, and the possibility that at any point all of our choices could become completely closed off, is what enables Dasein to encounter
its future authentically for the first time.\textsuperscript{83} This constitutes a form of authentic temporality for Heidegger, whereby Dasein understands itself as a being which has a future but one which does not stretch on indefinitely. Heidegger calls this way of being, whereby we authentically encounter our future, anticipation:

To designate the authentic future terminologically we have reserved the expression ‘anticipation.’ This indicates that Dasein, existing authentically, lets itself come towards itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—that the future itself must first win itself, not from a Present, but from the inauthentic future.\textsuperscript{84}

We can see here why the future is such an important ecstatic for Heidegger’s account of authentically being one’s own self. Resolutely choosing requires determining one’s own future, or of deciding our own \textit{telos} in terms of some ultimate-for-the-sake-of-which. Dasein cannot achieve authenticity without this authentic understanding of the future.

Dasein does not merely exist in the present, where the past is dead and the future unreal. Instead Dasein only exists insofar is it projects itself meaningfully into its future having understood itself as determined and defined by its past at every present moment. The past is crucial for authentically encountering one’s own self, because the past determines so much of who we are and what we do. In contrast to the inauthentic sense of past which views it as a series of present moments which happened previously, Heidegger argues that our authentic past is found in the existential concept of our thrown facticity.

As human beings we are thrown into the world and constantly find ourselves thrown into possibility, most of which we ourselves did not choose. That these projects define our being in

\textsuperscript{83} See Thomson, “Death and Demise in \textit{Being and Time},” 261: “… the experience of the phenomena Heidegger calls ‘death’ discloses ‘futurity,’ which is itself the first horizon we encounter of originary temporality, that fundamental structure of intelligibility that makes possible any understanding of being at all.”

\textsuperscript{84} SZ: 336/386.
some way demonstrates that Dasein is determined by the facts of its existence, in other words, its facticity. Of course, as a being who can choose its own future, Dasein is not determined in the strict sense of being unable to escape its fate. Dasein can resolutely choose how it responds to the situation it finds itself in, or it can fail to do so and merely follow what others have prescribed. Regardless, there is no world where authentic choosing or inauthentic letting-others-choose-for-me results in a complete divorce from the past. On the stage of life, we can improvise or follow a script, but the other characters and the backdrop were here before we arrived and will be here long after we leave.

In authentically encountering one’s own past, Heidegger suggests not a complete rejection of who we are, but rather a resolute appropriation. Authentically encountering one’s self requires a recognition of what we are, and when we authentically project ourselves towards a future that we wish to find, we do so by appropriating our past, what he calls our “having-been,” in such a way that we come to make it our own. He calls this appropriation a retaking or repetition (Wiederholung) of our being, where we take up our thrownness and make it our own.85 This speaks to why Heidegger emphasized the social element of authenticity when discussing the “destiny of a people,” and the activity of “choosing a hero.” If authenticity is precipitated by the appropriation of the past, then becoming oneself naturally means choosing to be something which has come before, even if this is done in a new and novel way. Dasein can only repeat the past because it has historicity as part of its being.86

According to Heidegger, within the history of philosophy, the tradition has mostly focused on the present as a means to define time and temporality. Thus, the past is seen as a

---

85 SZ: 385/437.
86 SZ: 385/436.
present which is no longer, and the future is seen as a present which has yet to come. The present itself is seen as a “now”: a moment of time sequentially strung together with other “nows.” According to Heidegger, it is this focus on the present that causes us to interpret all beings in terms of their ability to endure in the present. Because the past is gone, and the future is always out of reach, the tradition of philosophy tends to assert that beings are most real insofar as they are available to us at the present moment. Thus, Heidegger links up this idea of beings as found in the present to his notion of being as presence-at-hand (*Vorhandensein*).

Heidegger thinks that this interpretation of time has led us astray for two thousand years, and as drastically in need of an update. Heidegger proposes an update by drawing our attention back to the discussion of authentic and resolute choosing. Here, Heidegger notes that authentically encountering one’s own self requires an authentic relation to the present. The authentic present, however, is merely the moment of vision, the *Augenblick*, where Dasein comes to see itself in its ownmost being. In other words, Dasein is its ownmost authentic self when it understands itself, not as a being who is present in a series of “nows,” but as a being who, in a moment of vision, finds itself forced to make a resolute choice as to who they want to be. As McNeill puts it:

… Dasein in the *Augenblick* stands explicitly before its own finitude as the finitude of the factual situation into which it has been thrown. It anticipates this finitude in its authentic being-to-wards-death that casts it back upon its thrownness in disclosing the situation as a finite situation of action that Dasein can take upon itself in resolute openness.  

Put simply, the *Augenblick* reveals to Dasein its authentic being as a temporally unfolding entity which is always already disclosing the world, and can choose to disclose itself to itself as something new.

It is in the unity of these three ecstases that we find Heidegger’s full definition of authentic being-one’s-self. Here Heidegger says we resolve upon the situation which lies before us. We can see this unfold when he combines all three temporal ecstases to define authentic being-one’s-self:

Resolution gains its authenticity as anticipatory resoluteness. In this, Dasein understands itself with regard to its potentiality-for-being, and it does so in such a manner that it will go right under the eyes of Death in order thus to take over in its thrownness that entity which it is itself, and take it over wholly. The resolute taking over of one’s factual ‘there’, signifies, at the same time, that the Situation is one which has been resolved upon.88

Because Dasein authentically encounters itself in its ownmost being when it resolutely chooses its own future, the authenticity of the resolution is a very important existential moment. From this quote we can see that Heidegger links all three ecstases together emphasizing their authentic modes respectively. Authenticity, in this full temporal sense demands a resolute choice in the moment of vision (present) which appropriates thrownness as one’s having been (past) and anticipates its own death (future.)

It should be apparent why Heidegger’s book is called *Being and Time*, and not simply *Being*. For this full account of Dasein’s being, we had to continually dive deeper into the existential structures that make our existence possible until we arrived at temporality. We saw that at each interpretive level, there was a more nuanced account of what it meant to be an

88 SZ: 382/434.
authentic Dasein. These accounts are not in conflict, but rather build upon one another to provide us with an answer to the question of the being of Dasein. As a “who,” we are a being that can authentically determine our own being. As a being-in-the-world, we can authentically care for the world, fellow Dasein, and ourselves. As a temporally unfolding existence, we can authentically encounter our being as thrown repetition (past), and anticipation (future) of the moment of vision (present).^89

As we stated at the outset of this chapter, authenticity, in the broader methodological sense, speaks to the truth which underlies and makes possible our inauthentic everyday interpretations. Because an answer to the question of the meaning of being requires a complete understanding of the kind of being who can ask that very question, the goal of the first two parts of *Being and Time* is to provide a complete and authentic account of Dasein. With the methodological insights adopted from Aristotle, Heidegger showed that we can only start this investigation by looking to what has been said by the tradition and what is available to us in our everyday self-evident interpretations. Only by working through, and making the most of these phenomena, were we able to uncover an interpretation of Dasein’s being which can account for all of what has been said.^90

---

^89 McNeill summarizes this temporal unfolding nicely: “in resolute openness of its anticipation, as the unfolding of the *Augenblick*, Dasein understands its potentiality for being in such a way that “it passes under the eyes of death, so as to entirely take on, in its thrownness, the ‘being that it is’ (SZ, 382). The passage under the eyes of death (from where do they look?) bestows upon Dasein the look of mortality; it delivers Dasein over to the facticity of being in its particular, finite situation that offers finite possibilities for being-in-the-world, and in which it finds itself in its destiny with others. Such is Dasein’s being for “its time” – a time shared as finitude, as the finitude in which Dasein existence with other beings (SZ, 385).” (McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 123.)

^90 It should be noted that after Heidegger defines Dasein’s authentic encounter with itself in this fullest sense, he dedicates some time to explaining why the previous notions proposed by the tradition fell short. This demonstrates his need to fulfill the last requirement of *endoxic* method: destroying the tradition. See discussion around SZ: 322/368.
At each stage of this investigation, Heidegger has continually peeled back more and more of Dasein’s being to reveal the existentials which make its being possible. Many of these existentials are rooted in Aristotelian insights about human existence as practical, social, and centered around some ultimate for-the-sake-of-which which situations our self-understanding. At the simplest level, Dasein is merely the kind of being who can determine its own goals or purposes in the Aristotelian sense of having possession of its own telos. Moving deeper into Dasein’s being, we saw that this required a recognition of the various kinds of beings that make our existence meaningful in the first place, the entities we engage with in our everyday concern and the fellow Dasein who structure our meaningful social horizon. The last layer of this investigation revealed that Dasein’s being is determined by the three ecstases which frame our temporal existence.

At each point we saw that authenticity required tending to the being of the phenomena as it showed itself in itself. Because Dasein’s being is so multifaceted, an authentic encounter with our selves is inherently much more complex than an authentic encounter with a tool. From our methodological interpretation of authenticity, we learned that for Heidegger, authenticity speaks to the truth which underlies untruth, the phenomena which is hidden by semblance. Now we can see why Heidegger defines resoluteness in terms of truth and untruth as well:

Disclosed in its ‘there’, [Dasein] maintains itself both in truth and untruth with equal primordiality. This ‘really [eigentlich]’ holds in particular for resoluteness as authentic [eigentlichen] truth. Resoluteness appropriates [zu eignet] untruth authentically [eigentlich].

---

Resoluteness, an activity of Dasein, is requisite for its own authentic self-encounter and makes possible the appropriation of its untruth to disclose the truth of its own being. In summary then, we can see that authentically encountering oneself, can be defined as follows:

Dasein is authentic (is in a state of authentically encountering itself) if it recognizes its thrown being-in-the-world, appropriates the facticity of its being, and resolutely chooses to anticipatorily project itself towards its ownmost future. This is done by retaking possibilities from its culture and putting itself to work with tools of its concerns alongside its fellow Dasein in a way which acknowledges their being as existence.

This highly technical definition is admittedly a bit dense, but there is no real way to avoid it. Dasein’s being is complex. Encountering that being in a way which truthfully discloses its being as it is requires tending to this complexity. Now that we have exhausted the definition of authenticity in both the methodological and applied senses of the term, we are ready to look at how this term may be more properly translated to provide a better sense of its meaning.

We have now resolved the last of the problems of the traditional interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity. Schalow and Denker’s definition was unclear about the way authenticity was achieved. We can now see that authenticity is achieved through the activity of resolutely choosing one’s ownmost being. Dahlstrom’s definition questioned the possibility of a resolute choice. We see now, how it is a complex matter of appropriating choices which have been passed down to us, which we must make our own. Käufer suggested that authenticity was methodologically significant for Heidegger, but could not explain why it was the case. We now see that in order for Heidegger to begin his investigation into the meaning of being, he had to have an authentic interpretation of Dasein. Because Dasein is a being which can disclose beings in their truth, it can also disclose itself in its truth through resolutely choosing itself.
4.3: CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have finally defined authenticity in both its methodological and applied sense and established the link between them. We saw that because the applied use of authenticity is determined by the entities in question, there are as many ways to authentically encounter entities as there are types of entities to encounter. The most complex of these encounters is Dasein’s encounter with its own self, since Dasein’s being is itself immensely complex. By analyzing Dasein’s authentic self-encounter at various stages of existential interpretation, we were able to show how authenticity functions at each level. At the most basic level, authenticity required a recognition that Dasein was in control of its own telos, and consequently, could choose who they were. At the next level, authenticity was shown to require a caring relation to the world and its various horizons of intelligibility. Authenticity is not something that Dasein takes on in isolation or by sitting idly, but instead requires action within a community. At the deepest level, authenticity required an authentic relation to all three temporal ecstases, meaning that Dasein had to appropriate (aneignen) its past and anticipate its most proper (eigenste) future while resolutely choosing to be itself in the moment of vision (Augenblick).

What we have now provided is an interpretation of authenticity which can account for the phenomena of authenticity that we collected through our analysis of Being and Time and the early lectures. We have seen that this definition resolves the puzzles which appeared in our analysis of the traditional interpretation of authenticity. But as we learned from Aristotle and Heidegger, the best interpretations are ones which can account for why previous interpreters were led astray. To adequately address these misinterpretations, what is required is a destruction of the tradition. Again, this destruction is positive, in the sense that we move through what has been said to uncover the truth of the matter. In the next chapter, my aim is to present some of the most
compelling interpretations of Eigentlichkeit, in an aim to show what they got right, and where they went wrong. If my account of the primacy of methodological authenticity is adequate, then we should be able to resolve the various puzzles that these accounts present to us.
CHAPTER 5: DESTRUCTING OF THE TRADITION

When we first described Aristotle’s method, we outlined it as having a few significant steps. First, he starts with the phenomena in question, which includes evidence of whatever he is investigating, as well as what has been said by the wise about the subject matter. Next, he demonstrates how these phenomena have resulted in various interpretive puzzles. Lastly, he tries to provide a theory that can make sense of the phenomena and resolve the puzzles which have arisen. This process is only successful insofar as it solves these puzzles and explains why previous thinkers were led astray.

This is the general outline for this dissertation as well. In chapters one and two, we collected the phenomena of authenticity. Among these phenomena we found authenticity used in myriad ways in relation to several concepts, discussions of method, and descriptions of encounters with entities. We noted a tendency in the scholarship to emphasize the use of authenticity in sections which relate to themes discussed within the tradition of authenticity, while ignoring occurrences elsewhere. We further noted the linguistic problems inherent to translating eigentlich and its family of terms. By providing guidelines for identifying technical uses of this term, we were able to trace authenticity back to its roots, where it arises in relation to Heidegger’s breakthrough method of formal indication and phenomenological destruction which we showed to be an appropriation of Aristotle’s endoxic method. Once we collected these additional uses of authenticity, we were able to create a new theory, which emphasized this methodological sense of authenticity as the primary meaning of the term. In chapter four we
were able to reinterpret the phenomena that previously puzzled us to see how this new theory is able to make sense of some of the more befuddling aspects of authenticity. Now, we are ready to entertain some of the dominant theories of authenticity as they have been passed down through the tradition, in order to demonstrate how our methodological interpretation of authenticity can resolve tensions present in these views.

Within the tradition, however, there are many different interpretations of authenticity, so the question becomes: “Which ones do we investigate?” In the secondary literature, scholars often suggest that Heidegger got the idea for authenticity from one philosopher or another, arguing that by understanding the thinking of that previous philosopher, we can better understand Heidegger’s thoughts on authenticity. These scholars essentially argue that one philosopher functions as Heidegger’s muse for authenticity, and that by understanding the muse, we can understand Heideggerian authenticity. Consequently, I have opted to sort the tradition into camps centered around a particular muse. In this chapter we will look at three camps centered around three significant muses: the existentialist camp which features Kierkegaard, the intentionalist camp which features Husserl, and the practical camp which features Aristotle.

The first, and dominant camp, is that of the existentialist reading of authenticity. This camp features Kierkegaard as its muse and focuses on authenticity and its relation to overcoming social and traditional values. Here we will look at two ways of parsing Kierkegaard’s influence on Heidegger. In the work of Hubert Dreyfus and Jane Rubin, we will see what I call the “hard reading,” which suggests that Heidegger is directly borrowing (if not stealing) ideas from Kierkegaard.¹ Secondly, we will look at the work of Claire Carlisle who argues for the

Kierkegaardian influence is a more subdued sense. The second camp is the intentionalist camp, which places Husserl as Heidegger’s main source of inspiration for authenticity. This camp plays up the role of authenticity in Husserl’s phenomenological method in the *Logical Investigations*. Here we will look to the work of Leslie MacAvoy. The third camp is what I call the practical camp since it grounds its understanding of authenticity in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and the discussion of *praxis* found therein. The practical camp focuses mostly on the affinities between the *phronimos*, or person of practical wisdom, and Heidegger’s authentic Dasein. Here we will look to the work of Lawrence Hatab. Once each of these camps have been brought to bear on the phenomena of authenticity outlined above, we will be able to see that while each camp offers clarity with regard to some aspect of authenticity, each camp creates problems which can only be resolved with our methodological reading of authenticity. I will end by returning to the work of Charlie Guignon, who proposed a version of the methodological interpretation of authenticity in his later writings.

**5.1: KIERKEGAARD (EXISTENTIALIST)**

When writing on Kierkegaard, one must first answer the question: “Which Kierkegaard?” Kierkegaard’s style of operating under multiple pseudonyms – some of which directly and intentionally contradict each other (Climacus and Anti-Climacus being the most overt examples) – makes it difficult to know what he truly believes. Scholars have cited numerous texts of Kierkegaard’s as a potential source for inspiring Heidegger’s views of authenticity.

---


Consequently, there are many ways that Kierkegaard has been said to have influenced Heidegger, and we cannot entertain all of them.

In what follows, I will present two plausible accounts, which I call the “hard” and “soft” readings of the Kierkegaardian influence on Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. In the hard reading, we find Hubert Dreyfus and Jane Rubin’s view that authenticity in *Being and Time* is just “secularized Kierkegaard.” In the soft reading, we find Clare Carlisle’s argument that Heidegger is deeply influenced by some key themes, but by virtue of his unique ontology diverges with Kierkegaard greatly when it comes to the particulars. In keeping with proper *endoxic* method, we will seek to find the positives in these interpretations, the kernels of truth found within these approaches to the problem of authenticity, before ultimately showing how they were led astray by mistaken assumptions.

5.1.1: Dreyfus and Rubin (Hard Reading)

In the appendix to Dreyfus’ influential text, *Being-in-the-World*, Dreyfus and Rubin develop one of those most Kierkegaardian readings of Heideggerian authenticity to be found within the secondary literature. This text goes to lengths to explain the affinity between Heidegger and Kierkegaard. On their account, Heidegger’s discussion of average everydayness and leveling-down are unabashed derivatives of Kierkegaard’s thinking that maintain a similar meaning. According to Dreyfus and Rubin, Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity mirrors Kierkegaard’s account of the self who transcends the life of the ethical to the life of religion; the self who relates to something else in an act of faith. That Heidegger does not speak of God or faith at all in his account of authenticity does not undermine the affinity between Heidegger and

---

Kierkegaard. This is because Dreyfus and Rubin argue that Kierkegaard is aware of the historically contingent and ungrounded nature of his views of the self: “In calling his claim Christian-Dogmatic, Kierkegaard is emphasizing (1) that this is a cultural claim and (2) that it cannot be justified or grounded in any way…” Thus, for Dreyfus and Rubin, the religious and Christian aspects of Kierkegaard are contingent and can be exchanged with non-Christian and non-religious counterparts without undermining the philosophical view in question. This is what they believe takes place in the discussion of authenticity found in Being and Time, what they refer to as “Heidegger’s secularization of Kierkegaard.”

Dreyfus and Rubin draw on more than just Sickness Unto Death, including Either/Or, The Present Age, and The Concept of Anxiety to the list of influential texts for this discussion. Drawing parallels between these different accounts of the self is already a problematic enterprise since each text offers slightly different perspectives on what it means to achieve the highest form of selfhood. Nevertheless, Dreyfus and Rubin conclude that in all of these texts the message is relatively uniform: achieving the highest level of self for Kierkegaard requires giving up one’s relation to the self in order to relate to something else: an act of self-loss or surrender.

For Kierkegaard, this act of self-loss which requires a leap of faith towards God is what Kierkegaard calls “Religiousness B.” But there is another form of religiousness that Dreyfus and

---

7 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 299.
8 Dreyfus, Being-In-the-World, 299.
Rubin find inspirational. Instead of making this leap towards God, one can instead leap faithfully into one’s own life. Kierkegaard calls this “Religiousness A”. Dreyfus and Rubin interpret this as any activity, practical or professional which one uses to define one’s life. It is in this intermediate step to Religiousness A, that Dreyfus and Rubin think Heidegger finds his account of Dasein’s authenticity. Rather than continue onwards to the leap into Religiousness B in the moment of faith, they note that Heidegger and Kierkegaard diverge concerning what they think determines the authenticity of the life lived: “[For Heidegger] what makes one way of life better than another is… whether a way of life does or does not own up to and manifest in actions and implications of being a self-defining set of factors.” On this account, Heidegger follows Kierkegaard, but only so far, abandoning the final step into faith in God. Kierkegaard’s end game is self-loss, whereas Heidegger refuses to give up on the self.

Nevertheless, Dreyfus and Rubin think that this move is significant enough to cement Heidegger’s indebtedness to Kierkegaard. On this view, they argue that Heidegger and Kierkegaard stand as allies against the entire philosophical tradition:

“Heidegger shares with Kierkegaard the rejection of the Aristotelian and medieval views of the self as aiming at self-realization. There is no human potential. But Heidegger does not accept Kierkegaard’s substitution of the goal of creating one’s identity ex nihilo through unconditional commitment. Heidegger holds that (1) all for-the-sakes-of-which’s are provided by the culture and are for anyone and (2) Dasein can never take over these impersonal public possibilities in a way that would make them its own and so give it an identity.”

Thus, Dreyfus and Rubin draw our attention to the affinity between their projects, but simultaneously introduces a rift between their views. Kierkegaard’s solution to the problem of

---

despair is unconditional commitment to God. But God is the condition for the possibility of despair for Kierkegaard. Without God, not only is there no solution to despair but there is also no cause of it either. Without Kierkegaard’s account of the divine, there is no creation ex nihilo: Without the deus of the deus ex machina, we remain confined to the world, the finite, and the mortal. Thus, even one of the champions of the thesis that “Heidegger is merely a secularized version of Kierkegaard,” acknowledges that that he is not really Kierkegaard. There is no leap of faith for Heidegger; at least, not one grounded in the divine as it is construed in western monotheism. Consequently, their reading of the Kierkegaardian influence on Heidegger is that authenticity bottoms out in social norms, which are provided by the culture and never fully Dasein’s own.

This departure, however, does not sit easy with Dreyfus and Rubin, who are concerned about the lack of easy solution to the proposed problem of anxiety and despair. In a move typical to Heideggerian scholarship of this variety, they associate the lack of similarity between Heidegger and Kierkegaard’s account, not as an indication that they have conflicting views, but rather as an indication that Heidegger failed to adequately appropriate Kierkegaard’s work. They note that the mistake in Heidegger’s philosophy is the “incomplete secularization of Kierkegaard’s anxiety” which contains both the concept of sympathy and antipathy.

For Kierkegaard, sympathy is the attractive element of wanting to define-oneself. The counter-concept to sympathy, antipathy, speaks to the repulsion of not wanting to pursue a

13 In Heidegger’s later work, however, it is true that Heidegger returns to a foundational notion of the holy (Heilige) to motivate his thinking. A full discussion of Heidegger’s complex relationship with the divine is outside of the scope of this dissertation.
14 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 287. The terms are actually “sympathetic antipathy” and “antipathic sympathy.” They are citing Kierkegaard, Concept of Anxiety, 42.
possibility which is unknown. In the *Concept of Anxiety*, Kierkegaard argues that it is antipathy that brings about the encounter with anxiety.\(^\text{15}\) This account of sympathy, of wanting to define oneself, and of finding that definition in an absolute commitment, is (according to Dreyfus and Rubin) missing from Heidegger’s text. Without sympathy, however, there is nothing to balance out against this anxiety. Consequently, all that remains is the antipathy, the repellent force of anxiety which suggests that any possibility we choose is just as pointless as the next.

For Dreyfus and Rubin, Heidegger’s account is unsatisfying, as the difference between inauthenticity and authenticity is a matter of form, rather than content. But since the form lacks justification, and because any answer is as good as the next, they ask: “Why should we even want to be authentic in the first place?” The only answer, according to their interpretation, is that while inauthenticity merely “represses” anxiety (pretending it away), authenticity “addresses” anxiety by acknowledging the truth that all tasks are just as meaningless as the next (leaning in to the absurdity). As a result, Dreyfus and Rubin are concerned that Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity amounts to a form of nihilism since there is no meaningful distinction between one choice and another as “… all differentiations are revealed by anxiety to be totally indifferent, and so equally meaningless.”\(^\text{16}\)

It is this relentless reminder from anxiety, that ultimately all choices are equally meaningless, that Dreyfus and Rubin find most damning in Heidegger’s account. What results is a sort of authenticity which approaches the world in complete indifference, willing to abandon

---

15 Dreyfus and Rubin cite Kierkegaard, *Concept of Anxiety*, 41.
any project at a moment’s notice since we recognize that deep down any project is just as meaningless as the next:

Authentic Dasein, since it does not expect whatever project it is engaged in to give it an identity and a meaningful world, can follow a project tenaciously, yet let the project go without grief when the project becomes unrealistic, i.e., when it ceases to show up as being what needs to be done. Since the project never defines the self and its world there will always be something else in the world which becomes most important as soon as any particular project ceases to fill that role.\footnote{Dreyfus, \textit{Being-in-the-World}, 326.}

For Dreyfus and Rubin, this form of authenticity is best characterized as “open resoluteness” which maintains itself in a constant state of responsiveness to the situation. It speaks to the way in which Heidegger’s resolute Dasein is always ready for the moment (\textit{Augenblick}) and responsive to the situation. They draw on the example of the authentic athlete, who, in responding to the situation adjusts their strategy, never willing to be confined to one particular approach.\footnote{Dreyfus, \textit{Being-in-the-World}, 323.} When it comes to acting in the moment, following the rules of a sport, such a description casts authenticity in a positive light. Afterall, the athlete who remains open to new ways of playing the game may be able to overcome the greatest odds by thinking outside of conventional strategies. However, when this form of authenticity is applied to the wider lives of individuals, it becomes quickly apparent that this form of being is not inspiring at all. The husband who remains open to finding a new wife at any moment is worthy of our scorn, and not heralded as a hero. Consequently, authenticity, as the openness to letting any “project” go when it becomes “unrealistic” cannot be what Heidegger means.

This conclusion speaks to a broader problem inherent to discussions of Heideggerian authenticity: What choices can be authentic, and what makes them authentic? In other words,
when I make the resolute choice, on what do I resolve? Dreyfus and Rubin are not the first to notice this problem in Heidegger’s thinking. In fact, it seems that the students of Heidegger’s 1920s lectures were as inspired by his discussion of resoluteness, as they were confused by it, leaving them to comment: “I am resolved, only towards what I don’t know.” Dreyfus and Rubin note that Heidegger’s response to this is merely formal, and consequently, “does not enable Heidegger to distinguish between those public possibilities that promote an authentic life form and those that promote an inauthentic one.” Since, “Any possibility that makes sense given the culture can be taken up in a style in which anxiety is repressed.” And likewise, any possibility can be taken up in a way which addresses anxiety, and accepts the inherent meaninglessness of any particular task. All that matters, for their reading of Heidegger is that “Authentic Dasein in forerunning, repeating, resoluteness, lives out the temporality of Dasein in such a way as to give a constant form to its activity, no matter how its specific projects come and go.” For Dreyfus and Rubin, authentic Dasein becomes a form of openness towards anything and everything, with the expectation that any part of it could fall through at any moment, with

the confidence that none of it matters in the end.\textsuperscript{24} When cast in this light, authenticity comes across as solipsistic and borderline sociopathic.\textsuperscript{25}

Dreyfus and Rubin are not blind to this problem, but instead blame Heidegger’s views on anxiety for its inevitable conclusion. They ask: “How can anything matter to Dasein once it lives in anxiety, since… …anxiety makes all meaning and mattering slip away? Heidegger’s answer is indirect and not totally convincing.”\textsuperscript{26} Thus they conclude that Heidegger’s conception of authenticity, as a secularization of Kierkegaard comes up short.\textsuperscript{27} Rather than attempt to salvage Heidegger’s account from \textit{Being and Time}, Dreyfus and Rubin appeal to Heidegger’s later works where he apparently recognized the error of his ways, suggesting that authenticity from this early work is unsalvageable.\textsuperscript{28}

When looking to Kierkegaard’s influence in the account of Heidegger as “secularized Kierkegaard,” we might notice that it is perhaps the \textit{secularization} that is the important part of that equation. Kierkegaard’s ontology depends heavily on God as the source of despair, the self,

\textsuperscript{24} A parallel to this interpretation of authenticity can be found in Ricky Gervais’ show \textit{After Life} where he plays a middle-aged man named Tony who recently lost his wife to cancer. After a close encounter with suicide that is interrupted by a hungry dog asking for dinner, Tony decides to live his life however he pleases with the idea that he can always fall back on suicide if it doesn’t work out. The ability to openly pursue any possibility (with the realization that none of it matters in the end) becomes his “superpower.” Ultimately, however, this approach backfires on him, as he comes to realize that there is more to life than just doing what you want.

\textsuperscript{25} Walter Brogan criticizes Dreyfus for this position as well, stating that “[Dreyfus] reads \textit{Being and Time} as primarily a treatise on factual life, and he subsumes Heidegger’s treatment of authentic existence to the world o everyday concern by positing the thesis that authenticity for Heidegger amounts to the realization that our existence in itself is a nullity; our being is nothing other than what we do.” (Brogan, \textit{Heidegger and Aristotle}, 150.)

\textsuperscript{26} Dreyfus, \textit{Being-in-the-World}, 332.

\textsuperscript{27} Dreyfus, \textit{Being-in-the-World}, 335. Dreyfus and Rubin also claim that fallenness is just “secularized sin.”

\textsuperscript{28} Dreyfus, \textit{Being-in-the-World}, 338. They are referencing this quote from \textit{End of Philosophy} “Here neither Kierkegaard’s concept nor that of existential philosophy is at stake. Rather, existence is thought by returning to the ecstatic character of human being with the intention of interpreting being-open in its eminent relation to the truth of Being. The occasional use of the concept of existence is determined solely by this question. The question serves only to prepare for an overcoming of metaphysics. All this is outside of existential philosophy and existentialism. Thus it is profoundly different from Kierkegaard’s passion which is at bottom theological. But it does remain in the essential critical dialogue with metaphysics” (GA 6.2 477/\textit{End of Philosophy} 71.)
and as the resolution of that despair in the leap of faith. But if Heidegger is secularized
Kierkegaard, then really what is left? What is the source of the despair? If the self is a relation to
itself as split between the mortal and the divine, what does it mean to say that there is no divine?
Without God, there is no relation between finite and infinite, mortal and divine. Consequently,
the self, which is a relation to said relation, is merely a relation to a non-relation. If Heidegger is
adopting Kierkegaard’s account and jettisoning the divine, then what results is ontological
nonsense. Which means that authenticity is an ungrounded appeal to social norms, prompted by a
disruptive emotion which has no origin but itself, that pulls Dasein out of a different, but also
ungrounded, appeal to social norms.\footnote{29} This appears to be the logical conclusion of the hard
reading of Kierkegaard.\footnote{30} If Heideggerian authenticity is merely secularized Kierkegaard, then
what results is a view which is, to borrow Dreyfus and Rubin’s words: unconvincing.

When we look at this hard Kierkegaardian reading of Heidegger, as it has been passed
down through the existentialist interpretation of authenticity, we might ask what positives there
are to be found in an account which seems rife with problems. Once we drill down past the
surface-level details, is there anything to this account which helps us in our understanding of
authenticity? Yes. There are two significant contributions that we can take from this account.
First of all, this account does draw our attention to the fact that anxiety, while disclosive and
significant, cannot be the singular driving force behind authenticity. Dreyfus and Rubin’s

\footnote{29} Brogan cites Dreyfus’ tendency to emphasize the “primacy of division I” over division II as the source for this

\footnote{30} Dreyfus takes up this problem again in his book with Sean Kelly, \textit{All Things Shining} where they argue that our
age is lacking positive prescriptive accounts of how to be. They use the example of athletes once again to describe
virtuous actors who respond to the environment. “It is a fair bet that nobody in the stadium that day felt even a tinge
of T. S. Eliot's indecision, or Samuel Beckett's sense of interminable wait, or David Foster Wallace's anger and
frustration at his inability to find meaningful differences in life” (Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly, \textit{All Things
Shining: Reading the Western Classics to Find Meaning in a Secular Age}, (New York, NY: Free Press, 2011), 192.)
mistake was not in their condemnation of a life of pure antipathy, but in their attribution of that view to Heidegger. As we clearly demonstrated in chapter four, for Heidegger all living, authentic or otherwise, is determined by our care for the world. Authenticity is not a life of anxiously accepting the inherent meaninglessness of the world, but a life spent caring for other people and taking care of projects and goals which Dasein has decided to take on for its own purposes. Anxiety may pull us from the world, but the world always pulls us back. When it does pull us back, we retether to those things which we found meaningful before and appropriate them anew. Secondly, we can see that this account focuses on the centrality of authentic being-one’s-self in Heidegger’s philosophy. As was shown in chapter four, the centrality of this applied form of authenticity is important to Heidegger because his goal in *Being and Time*, to understand what we authentically mean by being, is predicated on first authentically understanding who and what Dasein is. But that is just an intermediate step. Although the rest of *Being and Time* went unwritten, the outline for the text, which can be seen in the introduction, points towards an analysis of fundamental ontology which is predicated on our ability to authentically disclose the truth of beings. By appealing to Kierkegaard, Dreyfus and Rubin cannot make sense of these other uses of authenticity, nor of the broader role of authenticity in the method of *Being and Time*. Of course, they are not completely wrong to play up the importance of this applied form of authenticity, but by focusing too narrowly on this singular applied use of authenticity, they have missed the forest for the trees.

31 Brogan notes that Dreyfus completely ignores the possibility of an authentic community: “On such a reading, Dasein’s mineness and radical individuation is interpreted as a fundamental solipsism, a return to the notion of Dasein as an isolated subject devoid of any substantive connection to an objective world. On [Dreyfus’] reading, the nonrelational character of Dasein’s existential being makes any notion of community implausible, especially a notion of community and being-with that is intrinsic to the very being of Dasein” (Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 153.)
Although the hard account is untenable, the affinities between Heidegger and Kierkegaard’s discussions of the self should not be dismissed. In what follows, I present a softer reading of Kierkegaard, one that emphasizes how particular concepts could be argued to have influenced Heidegger’s views on authenticity. These concepts are often taken as clues which help us understand the nuance of authenticity in *Being and Time*.

**5.1.2: Carlisle (Soft Reading)**

Clare Carlisle argues in “A Tale of Two Footnotes” that *Being and Time* is haunted by the spirit of Kierkegaard.\(^{32}\) The title of Carlisle’s paper is a reference to the fact that although Heidegger’s *Being and Time* seems indebted terminologically to, and covers similar topics as, Kierkegaard, his name rarely appears, and when it does, only in footnotes.\(^{33}\) These footnotes, she argues, demonstrate Heidegger’s complex relationship to Kierkegaard insofar as they “acknowledge a debt” but also tend to speak disparagingly or dismissively about Kierkegaard’s work in general. As an acknowledgement of a debt, Heidegger is haunted in the sense that his work is inspired (has the spirit of) Kierkegaard. But the animosity towards Kierkegaard which is also apparent in these footnotes and elsewhere speaks to a different kind of haunting: It would seem that Heidegger is attempting to flee the ghost of Kierkegaard. According to Carlisle, this animosity is taken to be a sign that Heidegger is attempting to distance himself in order to play down the parallels between them. She goes as far as to say that Heidegger’s sentiment in a letter to Carl

\(^{32}\) Claire Carlisle, “A Tale of Two Footnotes,” 38.

\(^{33}\) She claims he is only in two footnotes. Kierkegaard is actually mentioned in three (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 190n. iv, 235n. vi, and 338 n. iii.) In the Macquarrie and Robinson translation, all of Heidegger’s footnotes are turned into endnotes to make room for translator and editor comments. Sometimes I wonder if the Anglo-American assessment of Heidegger’s treatment of Kierkegaard would be different if the most popular English edition had not buried the few citations of Kierkegaard in the very back of the book.
Löwith, where he admits that he is frustrated by people associating his views with Kierkegaard’s, is just further evidence that Heidegger is deeply Kierkegaardian.\footnote{Carlisle, “A Tale of Two Footnotes,” 44. Of course, one worries about this style of argumentation whereby one is taken to provide proof that they are something by virtue of rejecting the very claim. We laugh when someone suggests that the phrase “I am not a cop” is exactly what a cop would say. But for some reason, when Heidegger claims he is not a Kierkegaardian, the scholarship seems content to reply: “That’s exactly what a Kierkegaardian would say.” Insofar as Kierkegaard’s writing represents myriad conflicting and complex views, however, perhaps a Kierkegaardian truly would reject the notion that they are a Kierkegaardian, though likely because such a unified identity is not a possible reality.}

Carlisle is not the first to utilize this argument to motivate a Kierkegaardian reading of Heidegger. Often the idea is that the figure that a particular philosopher spends their time arguing with is a great source of inspiration, but the figure that goes relatively undiscussed is their secret muse. Along this line of thinking, were Heidegger to spend more time talking about Kierkegaard, the affinity between their views would be too close, and consequently, it would become apparent that Heidegger is actually adding very little. Carlisle’s argument walks a fine line between this harder interpretation and the softer one which she concludes with by the end of her paper. The strength of her argument comes from her focus on the way that Heidegger’s thinking is haunted in the first sense: as having the spirit of Kierkegaard. Along these lines, Carlisle draws our attention to three significant concepts which play a major role in discussions of authenticity: repetition, anticipation and the moment (of vision).

For Heidegger, repetition (\textit{Wiederholung}) is the way that Dasein makes a resolute choice in the moment of vision. As a repetition, the choice is seen not as a possibility which was removed from our meaningful world or created \textit{ex nihilo}, but as an act of appropriation of some possibility that is already in the world. In resolute choosing, as repetition, Dasein takes something which comes from the past, and resides in the present and projects it towards a future:
making it its own. Drawing on *Either/Or, The Concept of Dread*, and a text literally called *Repetition*, Carlisle demonstrates that this term is unquestionably Kierkegaardian in its origin.\(^{35}\) Repetition, for Kierkegaard, is a modification of a Hegelian notion of spirit as a process of ongoing appropriation towards absolute spirit. Kierkegaard, in rejecting this Hegelian metaphysics, suggests that the repetition occurs at the level of the individual.\(^{36}\) This repetition is the result of our human freedom and our ability to choose one possibility or another. Consequently, Carlisle defines Kierkegaardian repetition as follows: “Repetition signifies a relationship to the past which brings that past into existence – which, in other words, appropriates the past as a possibility to be engaged with and decided upon anew.”\(^{37}\) Here the affinity between Heidegger and Kierkegaard is unmistakable.

But repetition takes on a religious function for Kierkegaard as well, as the condition for the possibility of questioning the doctrines of the church, and potentially as a condition for the possibility of salvation itself. If one is born a sinner, and can only overcome that sin through a form of appropriating that past, then salvation is available only to those who are “capable of [repetition].”\(^{38}\) Now we can see why Heidegger may have wanted to put some interpretive distance between himself and Kierkegaard. By the time Heidegger is writing on repetition in

\[\text{References}\]


\(^{37}\) Carlisle, “A Tale of Two Footnotes,” 43-44.

\(^{38}\) Carlisle, “A Tale of Two Footnotes,” 45.
Being and Time, he has long since concluded that philosophy itself must be atheistic.\(^{39}\) Even if Heidegger and Kierkegaard both recognize the ineliminable importance of history and the unavoidable nature of appropriation through repetition, their goals as well as the conditions for the possibility of their success rely on completely different frameworks.\(^{40}\) Consequently, for Heidegger, repetition may be inspired by Kierkegaard, but what it means to appropriate our past, and why we must do it, cannot be answered in the same way.

Carlisle’s second major term for discussion is “anticipation.” For Heidegger, anticipation signifies the way that Dasein authentically understands its own death as that which is always a possibility (or rather impossibility) which frames our lives at every moment.\(^{41}\) Without anticipation, Dasein cannot fully understand itself as a being-towards-death, and consequently, encounter itself authentically in making the resolute choice. If repetition speaks to the way that Dasein encounters its own past authentically, through an act of appropriation, then anticipation plays a similar role in relation to Dasein’s future.\(^{42}\) For this reason, Carlisle draws our attention

---

\(^{39}\) GA 21: 232-3/194: “In fact, any philosophy – which, as philosophy, must stand outside of faith – not only may not, but absolutely cannot be a Christian interpretation.” See also GA 62: 363/S 121: “… if philosophy is in principle atheistic and understand such about itself – then it has resolute chosen factual life with a view to its facticity and, in acquiring it as an object for itself, it has preserved it in its facticity.” See Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle, 153-4, for a discussion of the importance of atheism for Heidegger’s approach. Heidegger himself seems to reject this view later in his career, most notably in the “Letter on Humanism” when he attempts to distance himself from Sartre’s atheist existentialism: “Thus it is not only rash but also an error in procedure to maintain that the interpretation of the essence of man from the relation of his essence to the truth of Being is atheism.” (GA 9: 351/253.)

\(^{40}\) Additionally, one wonders if there are not more compelling frameworks that posit similar things with less metaphysical baggage. Hegel’s views of the development of history in the Phenomenology of Spirit, as well as the development of individual consciousness do not seem to conflict with this account of repetition. Dilthey seems to make the same point, and Heidegger often credits him with having done so. Even Jaspers, who is admittedly channeling Kierkegaard, though in a way which remains agnostic on matters of religion, can be seen as making this same point in Psychologie der Weltanschauung. Why do we not accuse Heidegger of being a Jaspersian?

\(^{41}\) SZ: 305/353: “As Being-towards-the-end which understands – that is to say, as anticipation of death – resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be. Resoluteness does not just ‘have’ a connection with anticipation, as with something other than itself. It harbors in itself authentic Being-towards-death, as the possible existentiell modality of its own authenticity.

\(^{42}\) SZ: 325/373: “Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural, and in such a way that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, as being, is always coming towards itself – that is to say in so far as it is futural in its being in general.”
to *Fear and Trembling* which illustrates that, for Kierkegaard, we “relate to death as a possibility at ‘every moment.’”43 Carlisle argues that Heidegger’s discussion of anticipation is more narrow in its scope than Kierkegaardian anticipation which can involve anticipating the death of others, or our own culture in addition to our own death.

Kierkegaard’s account also includes with it a “new beginning,” in the form of the eternal happiness of life after death. This new beginning is missing from Heidegger’s account, insofar as Dasein’s finitude is just that: finite. While it is possible to read Heidegger’s reticence on the topic of an afterlife as a general agnosticism towards what comes next, it seems more likely that he would have rejected such a thing on grounds that, whatever form it may take, it would be quite miserable.44 For Heidegger, life is meaningful because it can end. Consequently, it seems unlikely that Kierkegaard’s anxiety about the destruction of the “Christian way of life,” which is finite insofar as it is always at risk of being overcome by modernization, is the same sort of finitude found in Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s existence towards death. The Christian, after all, finds solace in the infinitude of their eternal existence after death. Wouldn’t such solace undercut the force of any call to accept one’s own finitude?45 Here we see that while both philosophers regard anticipation as an essential component for coming to terms with one’s death, they diverge considerably when it comes to how and why this takes place. As with any attempt to reconcile the thinking of two individuals, the devil is in the details.

43 Carlisle, “A Tale of Two Footnotes,” 47.
45 George Pattison’s makes this point as well: “… [Kierkegaard’s Christian reworkings of the question of death] fundamentally ground our obligation to live lives of charity in our relation to God as creator and not in our own mortality” (Pattinson, “Death, Guilt, and Nothingness” in *Heidegger, Authenticity and The Self*, 69.)
Lastly, Carlisle speaks to what constitutes the “most direct link” between Heidegger and Kierkegaard: the use of the Augenblick, sometimes translated as the “moment” or “the moment of vision.” As discussed above, the moment of vision for Heidegger is the reflective experience which provides Dasein with the self-transparency needed to make the resolute choice. In the moment of vision, Dasein sees itself and its relation to the world, and comes to understand itself in new ways. By the end of Being and Time, Heidegger argues that this self-transparency, can also disclose to Dasein its temporal being as such, allowing it to see itself as a Being-in-the-world in the full sense of its temporality:

The present is not only brought back from the distraction with the objects of one’s closest concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been. That Present which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is authentic itself, we call the ‘moment of vision.’

Thus, the moment of vision features prominently as part of Dasein’s authentic encounter with itself. In a similar fashion, Carlisle draws on The Concept of Anxiety, to define the moment of vision as Kierkegaard’s “ethical concept” which “renders the individual’s temporal existence ecstatic.” In other words, for Kierkegaard and Heidegger, the moment vision shows us the “fullness of time.” That both thinkers link the moment of vision to a full understanding of temporality, is, as Carlisle notes, arguably the “most direct link” between these thinkers that one can draw. Consequently, we can thank this softer reading of Kierkegaard for drawing our attention to one significant aspect of authenticity: that it requires an appropriation of the three horizons of temporality as well. We developed this idea in chapter four, but now we can see that

---

46 Carlisle, “A Tale of Two Footnotes,” 49.
47 SZ: 338/387.
48 Carlisle, “A Tale of Two Footnotes,” 50. Carlisle’s work on this is very helpful since, as she notes in this paper, explaining Kierkegaard’s use of this term requires a careful analysis of a text which resists careful analysis.
Heidegger may have first got it from Kierkegaard. Thus, Carlisle reminds us that to be authentic, we must temporalize authentically.

Compared to the other two concepts, the similarities between Heidegger and Kierkegaard concerning the moment of vision are much more compelling. First, both Heidegger and Kierkegaard champion the notion that the moment is a disclosive event that reveals to us something about our temporal existence. Second, this is one example of a term that Heidegger, in a rare moment of generosity during his lectures, credits to Kierkegaard directly.\footnote{Carlisle, “A Tale of Two Footnotes,” 51. That Heidegger speaks highly of Kierkegaard in his lectures, but leaves him undercited in \textit{Being and Time} is taken by Carlisle as further evidence that Heidegger’s was haunted in the secondary sense outlined above. This seems to contradict Heidegger’s more ample reflections on Kierkegaard found in GA 49, where he goes to lengths to explain the differences in their views.} He writes: “What we here designate as moment of vision’ is what was really comprehended for the first time in philosophy by Kierkegaard…”\footnote{GA 29/30: 224/150.} Thus, we cannot help but recognize that Kierkegaard is clearly a source of inspiration. Carlisle argues that the moment of vision:

\begin{quote}
…illustartes the close connection between the ethical and the ontological concerns at work in Heidegger’s 1927 text. The question of who Dasein is – the question of the meaning of its being, which is itself inseparable form the question of the meaning of being as such – leads directly to the question of how to live authentically, and vice versa. Again, this echoes the distinctive blend of ethical and ontological issues in Kierkegaard’s works.\footnote{Carlisle, “A Tale of Two Footnotes,” 52.}
\end{quote}

The unique mix of ontology and ethics is significant for both thinkers. Although he is fairly reticent on the details, Heidegger himself seems to view ethics as derivative of, and secondary to, ontology.\footnote{He spells out the relationship most clearly in his later work: “If the name ‘ethics,’ in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ethics, should now say that ‘ethics’ ponders the abode of man, then that thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of man, as one who ek-sists, is in itself the original ethics. However, this thinking is not ethics in the first instance, because it is ontology” (GA 9: 356-7/258.)} One reason for the reticence might be the primacy of ontology itself: Without working out the question to the meaning of being, we cannot begin to philosophically analyze
how we ought to be in relation to the beings encountered in the world. Consequently, any venture into the realm of ethics would be suspended until the ontology was settled, and with the task started at the beginning of Being and Time unfinished, the corresponding ethics remains unactualized. Thus, we can once again thank Carlisle’s account of Kierkegaard for drawing our attention to the quasi-ethical nature of authenticity in Heidegger’s thinking.

Before moving forward, though, we should look back to Heidegger’s footnotes on Kierkegaard to see if we now find them to be disingenuous or dismissive:

S. Kierkegaard is probably the one who has seen the existentiell phenomenon of the moment of vision with the most penetration; but this does not signify that he has been correspondingly successful in Interpreting it existentially. He clings to the ordinary conception of time, and defines the ”moment of vision” with the help of “now” and “eternity.” When Kierkegaard speaks of ‘temporality’, what he has in mind is man’s ‘Being-in-time’ [”In-der-Zeit-sein”]. Time as within-time-ness knows only the "now"; it never knows a moment of vision. If, however, such a moment gets experienced in an existentiell manner, then a more primordial temporality has been presupposed, although existentially it has not been made explicit. On the ‘moment of vision’, cf. K. Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, third unaltered edition, 1925, pp. 108 ff., and further his 'review of Kierkegaard' (ibid., pp. 419-432).

We see that Heidegger credits Kierkegaard for his insightful interpretation, but only on an existentiell level. Remember that for Heidegger the existential is the level of the ontological, while the existentiell is the level of the ontic. This existentiell understanding is not nothing, since it is the everyday understandings and interpretations which serve as an essential first step in uncovering the existential. It is the way that Kierkegaard goes about investigating these phenomena that Heidegger finds so problematic. According to Heidegger, Kierkegaard is mired in the dogma of Christianity and Hegelianism which starts with a presupposition which frames his investigation in ways which distort and cover up the phenomena in question. In other words,

53 SZ: 338/497.
Kierkegaard may have been investigating the right phenomena, but his method was unable to adequately move past the inauthentic and to the authentic. Thus, for Heidegger, Kierkegaard has an inauthentic interpretation of the moment of vision, which remains confined to an inauthentic account of temporality.

Following Aristotle’s *endoxic* method, however, we should note that Heidegger does not reject Kierkegaard’s insights out of hand. Instead, he notices that despite the deficient views of ontology, Kierkegaard has drawn our attention to the correct phenomena. Thus, we should not take Heidegger’s critique of Kierkegaard’s inadequate views on temporality as an outright condemnation, since on Heidegger’s reading, nobody has had an authentic view of temporality for at least two millennia, and perhaps longer. However, it does cast doubt on the idea that Heidegger is taking Kierkegaard’s discussion of the moment of vision wholesale.

When we turn to the other footnotes, we do not see a crisis of influence, but an acknowledgement of inspiration, tempered by a qualification that Kierkegaard’s thinking was highly influenced by prejudices which cannot go ignored:

The man who has gone farthest in analyzing the phenomenon of anxiety—and again in the theological context of a ‘psychological’ exposition of the problem of original sin—is Soren Kierkegaard. Cf. Der Begriff der Angst [The Concept of Dread], 1844, Gesammelte Werke (Diederichs), vol. 5.54

First, Heidegger lauds Kierkegaard’s contribution on the topic of anxiety. But then he qualifies the statement to point out that Kierkegaard’s reflections were related to the topics which occupied him within theology. Consequently, while Kierkegaard’s views are helpful, they remain

---

54 SZ: 190/492.
inadequately grounded in the ontology. In this final footnote on Kierkegaard from *Being and Time* Heidegger writes:

In the nineteenth century, Soren Kierkegaard explicitly seized upon the problem of existence as an existentiell problem, and thought it through in a penetrating fashion. But the existential problematic was so alien to him that, as regards his ontology, he remained completely dominated by Hegel and by ancient philosophy as Hegel saw it. Thus, there is more to be learned philosophically from his 'edifying' writings than from his theoretical ones—with the exception of his treatise on the concept of anxiety. [Here Heidegger is referring to the work generally known in English as The Concept of Dread.—Tr.] 55

Once again, Heidegger maintains that Kierkegaard is engaging with the phenomena which are crucial for understanding the existential analytic, but lacks the phenomenological method requisite for understanding the ontology. This, by the way, is the exact same criticism that Heidegger uses against Jaspers, a good friend of his who is also entertaining the phenomena addressed by Kierkegaard, sometimes directly analyzing Kierkegaard’s thoughts on the matter. 56

Taken together, we can see that Heidegger’s footnotes do not demonstrate a fear of the ghost of Kierkegaard, but rather a measured acknowledgement that in the tradition of philosophy we can find indications of the truth even in accounts which obscure the phenomena and get the ontology wrong.

These footnotes echo a similar sentiment that Heidegger has throughout his early courses: Kierkegaard was investigating the right phenomena, but with inadequate methods. The concepts of repetition, anticipation, and the moment of vision may be found in Kierkegaard’s thinking and may function for both thinkers to help uncover and appropriate the past in order to pursue an

55 SZ: 235/494.
authentic future, but the way that they do so is very different. The kind of methodological rigor required to approach these phenomena in a way that escapes the dominant ontology of presence-at-hand is completely missing from Kierkegaard. As radical as Kierkegaard is, he remains in the ontological framework of Hegel. Consequently, Heidegger often accuses Kierkegaard of making things too easy for himself or of being confined to an ontology which fails to adequately address the phenomena in question.

As we saw in chapter three, in the years leading up to *Being and Time*, Heidegger was deeply concerned about approaching philosophy and the existential analytic properly. That Heidegger condemns Kierkegaard’s thinking here merely means that he puts Kierkegaard in the same pile as basically everyone else. Needless to say, it seems like a stretch to play up the

57 One might consider that the phenomena, and not the ontology, are enough to establish a firm affinity between these two thinkers, but if the dominant source of influence is the phenomena in discussion, then we have a further problem since much of Kierkegaard’s work is a reflection on the thinking of Hegel. Hegel also speaks about the problems of self-consciousness, and its various evolving forms. Would it be appropriate to say that the second division of *Being and Time* should be marked “imported from Jena”? But we need not stop with Hegel, since he did not invent these problems. Hegel was responding to the German idealists who were in turn responding to Kant. As Heidegger demonstrates in his 1929 text, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (GA 3), Kant also struggled with these problems and demonstrated the need to unpack the particularities of human cognition in an attempt to provide some resolution. In other words, for Heidegger, all of these thinkers are concerned with the conditions for the possibility of human experience, the role of self-consciousness, and how all of it relates to time. But these themes expand far beyond the German idealists and their commentators. For Heidegger, these problems have been at the center of philosophy since its inception. In the quote from Plato’s *Sophist*, which Heidegger intentionally sticks at the opening of his *magnum opus*, we find Socrates questioning about the phenomena of being, which we have long since forgotten. In other words, Kierkegaard may have written about some of the issues central to authenticity, but so has just about everyone else; investigations into the phenomena relevant to the discussions of *Being and Time* are a dime a dozen.

58 GA 63: 30/25: “[Kierkegaard’s] presuppositions, approach, manner of execution, and goal were fundamentally different, insofar as he made these too easy for himself. What was basically in question for him was nothing but the kind of personal reflection he pursued. He was a theologian and stood within the realm of faith, in principle outside of philosophy. The situation today is a different one.” Heidegger regularly calls something “too easy,” a callback to Aristotle’s discussion of the *mesotes*, the difficult middle path of virtue which falls between two easy vices. Heidegger attributes this “making easy” to a fallen state of being, which fails to appropriate the past originally. See GA 61: 108/81 for more on this concept. GA 63: 42/33: “In the authentically philosophical aspects of [Kierkegaard’s] thought, he did not break free from Hegel. His later turn to Trendelenburg is only added documentation for how little radical he was in philosophy. He did not realize that Trendelenburg saw Aristotle through the lens of Hegel. His reading the Paradox into the New Testament and things Christian was simply negative Hegelianism.”
“dismissal” of Kierkegaard as some sort of crisis of influence, whereby Heidegger is unnecessarily cruel in an attempt to distance himself. Instead, it seems more plausible to assume that Heidegger is adopting the approach of *endoxic* method and recognize that Kierkegaard represents one of the many views which have been passed down by the tradition which must be investigated in order to arrive at the truth of our inquiry.

What Carlisle brings with her Kierkegaardian interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity is a softer and more reasonable interpretation. We see here good evidence for the relationship between these thinkers, though there is plenty of discontinuity as well. The positive of this account can be found in the emphasis on the importance of both the moment of vision, and the role of repetition. The former is probably the most compelling tie between these two thinkers, despite their disagreement on what follows this moment and why. As we saw in chapter three, Heidegger views phenomenology itself as a historical process, and this can also be captured by the notion of repetition. We arrive at authenticity by working through, and appropriating what came before us, by repeating it in our own way. This is true for both the method of phenomenological ontology, whereby we work through the inauthentic meanings of the tradition to uncover their authentic core, and in the applied sense of becoming an authentic Dasein by taking up what has come before us and making it our own. But this sense is missing entirely from the Kierkegaardian reading, as well as discussion of authenticity which relate to the authentic disclosure of entities that are not Dasein. Kierkegaard’s thinking, even on this softer reading, does not open a space for authentic encounters with entities or fellow Dasein, and how should it, since for Kierkegaard authenticity is inherently a relation to God?
5.1.3: Evaluation

The existentialist camp which promotes a Kierkegaardian interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity has been a dominant view for almost a century, and now we can see why. The focus on anxiety, our relationship towards our own self, and the importance of repetition, anticipation, and the moment of vision, make it clear why so many people have attempted to derive Heidegger’s views from the thinking of Kierkegaard. When it comes to the discussed phenomena, there certainly is a great deal of overlap. But when we look to the ontology which attempts to make sense of it all, we see a major interpretive chasm has formed. Dreyfus and Rubin showed us that Heidegger’s account, when read in a “harder” Kierkegaardian sense, seems underdeveloped and in need of some serious modifications. Carlisle showed us that while a couple of the themes central to authenticity were taken up by Kierkegaard in a very similar way, there was also cause for hesitation when affiancing these two views, since the method and the ontological presuppositions significantly change how these themes are interpreted. Both accounts, however, fail to account for any of the phenomena of authenticity outside of the self-encounter.

If we look back now to the indications of authenticity discussed in chapter one, we can see that most of the phenomena of authenticity are missing from the Kierkegaardian interpretation. Nowhere in Kierkegaard do we find anything like a discussion of authentic tool use, authentic being-with others, or the authenticity of a community rallied around a hero. In fact, social authenticity would be antithetical to Kierkegaard’s approach. If the Kierkegaardian interpretation can only make sense of authenticity pertaining to being-one-self, are we to ignore any use of authenticity which falls outside of these discussions? For scholars of this interpretation, it seems like the answer is a resounding yes. What results, however, is a narrow
interpretation of authenticity and a hermeneutic feedback loop, where scholars assume authenticity is a Kierkegaardian concept, ignoring evidence to the contrary, and consequently reinforce that interpretation by only ever focusing on uses within that narrow range and interpreting and translating other uses as non-technical.

Of all the applied uses of authenticity discussed above, we can see that the authenticity of the individual (authentic being-oneself) is the most likely to have been inspired by Kierkegaard. There are admittedly, many parallels between Kierkegaard’s account of leveled down experience in unknowing despair and Heidegger’s account of lived everydayness. Both accounts capture that Dasein exists in an ontologically inadequate relation towards itself and does so while busy and occupied with the world. Additionally, Kierkegaard’s account of the moment of vision and its importance for overcoming the negatively charged attitude of despair seems to have inspired Heidegger’s views on the significance of anxiety in making authenticity possible.

However, when it comes to spelling out the details of authenticity, and in particular our relation to the social, Kierkegaard and Heidegger seem to diverge significantly. For Kierkegaard, our culture, social norms, and historical traditions are products of a mass culture and offer a leveled down or diminished view of reality. Kierkegaard claims we need to transcend these views and reject the status quo. For Heidegger, however, this leveled-down truth, which is a

59 Since despair arises out of an awareness of oneself as a self-relation where one's self has been created by God, then those who do not know of Christianity or God's role in this constitution will just go about their life in a state of despair that they are unaware of. He points out this description fits many people, including pagans and children. It is an innocent despair because these people mostly lack self-awareness and therefore lack the tools to become faithful (Kierkegaard, *Sickness Unto Death*, 45.) This innocent despair is characterized also by the way in which individuals get caught up with the masses. Everyone copies one-another, and becomes one of the many: “a mass man” (Kierkegaard, *Sickness Unto Death*, 34.) He notes that this kind of despair usually goes on “unnoticed” and that it can be very conducive to living a productive life and achieving one's ends: “[These people] use their capacities, amass money, carry on secular enterprises, calculate shrewdly, etc., perhaps make a name in history, but themselves they are not; spiritually speaking, they have no self, no self for whose sake they could venture everything, no self before God – however self-seeking they are otherwise” (Kierkegaard, *Sickness Unto Death*, 35.)
product of *Das Man*, is not a failure of society, but its naturally occurring biproduct; it is as much a source of inspiration as it is obfuscation. Authenticity can be found only in a modification of this product, and never rejection of it.

The divide only gets worse when we compare their views on authentically becoming a self. For Kierkegaard the authentic choice is a leap of faith, where authenticity is achieved in the self-surrender to the ungrounded faith in God. For Heidegger, on this existentialist reading, it is a leap into the world composed the socially constructed possibilities which exist before us. On Dreyfus and Rubin’s reading, this leap remains ungrounded, and therefore open to constant change. On Carlisle’s reading, however, we see that authenticity requires appropriating one’s past, present, and future, at any given moment. In appropriating, a form of *Wiederholung* (translated as repetition), Dasein takes up projects which are passed down to it. Although Carlisle makes a compelling case for the influence of Kierkegaardian terminology on Heidegger’s thinking, when it comes to authentically becoming oneself it is clear the parallels between Heidegger and Kierkegaard can only be made at a surface level. When it comes to making a resolute choice, what is chosen, how it relates to our ontology, and why it is chosen, differ for both thinkers. Kierkegaard calls for a rejection of the social and an appeal to the divine. Heidegger calls for an appropriation of the past in taking up our heritage and making it our own, and calls for a recognition that our lives are finite. For Heidegger, Kierkegaard’s unwillingness to part with the religious dogma and its ontological presuppositions renders him incapable of fully understanding authenticity.

In conclusion, the existentialist camp, motivated by interpreting Kierkegaard as Heidegger’s muse for authenticity, offers us a helpful introduction to the applied sense of authenticity with regard to being one-self. We can see how this view has come to play a major
role in shaping the traditional interpretation of authenticity. The definitions provided in the introduction to this dissertation speak of authenticity along similar lines and contain many of the same puzzles we saw in this existentialist reading. In particular, the problem of the role of the social seems to stand out in both the traditional and existentialist interpretations of authenticity. This is likely due to the influence of the existentialist interpretation on Macquarrie and Robinson which factored into the way they translated *Being and Time* into English in a way which obscured uses which did not square with the traditional themes of authenticity as a self-focused ideal. While the Kierkegaardian reading of authenticity is helpful for addressing some of the terminological inspiration, when adopting this view wholesale, more problems arise than are solved. For Kierkegaard authenticity is nonsensical without the divine, whereas with Heidegger there is no such presupposition. Furthermore, the role of society in Kierkegaard is antithetical to the role as it is discussed in *Being and Time*. In order to play up their affinity, scholars have to look past and dismiss the ineliminable role of history and community when it comes to authentically becoming-oneself. We can see that the methodological reading proposed in chapter four is better able to address the full phenomena of authenticity without bringing along a host of new problems.

**5.2: HUSSERL (INTENTIONALIST CAMP)**

The second camp argues that it is Husserl who inspires Heideggerian authenticity. The idea is that Husserl’s account of intentionality, the heart of his method of phenomenology, is what inspires Heidegger’s account of our authentic encounters with entities. Consequently, this interpretation, which I call the intentionalist camp, does share a number of parallels to the methodological view outlined in chapter four, but with some major divergences. For one exemplar of this view, we will look to the work of Leslie MacAvoy.
5.2.1: MacAvoy

In her paper, “Dasein’s Fulfillment: The intentionality of Authenticity,” Leslie MacAvoy provides a compelling argument for why we ought to take a serious look into the possibility that Heidegger inherits authenticity from his Doktorvater: Husserl. She describes Husserl’s project as an attempt “to uncover the a priori logical principles that guide thought, which turn out to be the principles for the constitution of objects” in order to establish “an a priori logical grammar.” 60 She sees Heidegger as taking up this project in Being and Time, but with some important modifications.

Heidegger rejects how Husserlian phenomenology tends to interpret entities as theoretical abstractions, decontextualized and deprived of their meaning. Heidegger finds Husserl’s investigations into intentionality lacking, and as a consequence sets to remedy this by providing a robust account of intentionality in the form of an analytic of Dasein. She notes that the relationship between this project overall and Heidegger’s use of authenticity has been obscured by the incomplete nature of the text. MacAvoy argues that, since the version of Being and Time which we have today is only a small portion of the planned text, which focuses primarily on the analytic of Dasein, readers tend to overplay the significance of the existentialist themes at the cost of missing the bigger picture: the question of the meaning of being (Seinsfrage). 61 Consequently, she anticipates the concern expressed in this dissertation that the traditional interpretation leads to a misunderstanding of authenticity and inauthenticity. Unlike the existentialist account, this intentionalist reading of authenticity takes into consideration the

broader phenomenological project of *Being and Time*, and suggests that authenticity is first and foremost an issue of phenomenological method.⁶²

MacAvoy claims that it is in Heidegger’s appropriation and radicalization of the categorial intuition, pulled from those sections of the *Logical Investigations* where Husserl questions the origin of meaning, that we find the Husserlian influence on authenticity. For Husserl, meaning lies in the unity of intuitive and expressive acts. MacAvoy summarizes this as follows:

Expressive acts refer to some meaning; they are referential or signifying, a projection from the subject toward the object. Intuitive acts are acts of apprehension in which the object gives some sort of meaning to the subject. The directionality of the intuitive act is opposite to that of the expressive act. Both types of acts however, bear a relationship to meaning; both give meaning *[sinngebend]*.⁶³

Intention, here in the form of an expressive act, determines our directedness towards some entity. But our intention is not a blind projection which produces any meaning we choose. Instead, in the intuition of the object as it is in itself, we come to see that the object resists or accepts our expressive act. If I call my pencil a pen, my intuition of the pencil itself will resist my own expressive act. Since meaning only arises when these two acts coincide, my expression about my pen is an empty or unfulfilled intuition. Additionally, when there is only one act, say in the event that the apprehended object has not been expressed, the intention remains empty. For Husserl, meaning only arises when both sides of the equation are present.

---

⁶³ MacAvoy, “Dasein’s Fulfillment,” 43.
An empty intention is not a dead-end, however, since it can become fulfilled at any time so long as it is “confirmed through an intuitive act.” If I make a claim about the properties of my apartment, for example, the claim remains unfulfilled unless I provide evidence, either through direct experience or through some form of argument of the claim in question. Thus, meaningful claims about my apartment require a correspondence between the expressive acts I make and the intuitive acts of apprehending the apartment. This speaks to the notion of truth as correspondence which we discussed earlier. For Husserl, truth is merely a correspondence between expressive acts and intuitive acts. Likewise, inauthenticity is, in these Husserlian terms, understood as any instance where these acts do not correspond. Thus, inauthenticity and authenticity, in this Husserlian interpretation, are another way to talk about unfulfilled and fulfilled intentions.

This association between truth and authenticity is a step in the right direction. As we saw in chapter four, Heidegger’s notion of truth as unconcealment (aletheia), a more primordial form of truth which makes truth as correspondence possible, was understood in terms of authentically disclosing a being in its ownmost being. Unfortunately, the intentionalist camp, following Husserl, lacks this more originary sense of truth. Nevertheless, we should see what this reading of authenticity, as the fulfillment of a correspondence of expressive and intuitive acts can show us.

One strength of MacAvoy’s account is that the problem of unfulfilled intentions also seems to feature in the central question of Being and Time. When we talk about the question of the meaning of Being, the intention is empty insofar as we fail to apprehend the entity in

64 MacAvoy, “Dasein’s Fulfillment,” 44.
question. We express Being without apprehending being, without understanding its meaning fully. Thus, she argues:

Dasein understands Being much in the same way that empty intentions refer to the meanings which they express: it understands Being without grasping Being. And since intentionality is the structure of lived experience, this proto-understanding of Being is operative in Dasein’s existence; indeed it is an integral part of it.⁶⁵

Here MacAvoy reinterprets the opening of the analytic of Dasein as a question of an unfulfilled intention of being which, if fulfilled, would provide its meaning. Fulfilling this intention would mean providing an expressive act which adequately corresponds to our intuitive apprehension of Being. MacAvoy argues that while this state of existence is what Heidegger is after, he cannot help but start with the unfulfilled intentions which we find in our everyday being-in-the-world; when Dasein is in the mode of the inauthentic they-self (Manselbst):

[Heidegger] must show how Dasein understands its own Being, not only in everydayness – where Dasein only emptily intends its Being – but also in authenticity where what is only indeterminately understood in everydayness is more fully grasped.⁶⁶

Thus, for MacAvoy, Dasein needs to fulfill the empty intentions which have dominated our discussions of human existence, or at least, to fulfill whichever one actually corresponds to the authentic apprehension of Dasein’s being. The difference between authenticity and inauthenticity then becomes a distinction between a fulfilled and unfulfilled intention respectively.

Although I think there are significant problems with this interpretation, I want to first note that MacAvoy’s suggestion to associate authenticity and fulfilled intentions is quite ingenious. It challenges the traditional interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity and promotes

---

⁶⁵ MacAvoy, “Dasein’s Fulfillment,” 49.
⁶⁶ MacAvoy, “Dasein’s Fulfillment,” 49.
the idea that authenticity is not just some existentialist ideal, but rather an integral part of Heidegger’s phenomenological method. It opens up a paradigm shift for how scholars ought to interpret authenticity as a whole and suggests the possibility of a radical reinterpretation of *Being and Time*. As we saw in chapter four, the move to associate authenticity with Heidegger’s phenomenological method and truth is the first step for fully understanding the phenomena of authenticity.

Although the Husserlian jargon is absent (for the most part), from the body of *Being and Time*, we can see it alive and well in the lectures which predate its publication; in particular, in the *History of the Concept of Time*. In these lectures, Heidegger does use the language of authenticity when discussing fulfillment of intentions. At one point, Heidegger links this discussion of intuitive apprehension to authenticity when he refers to encountering an object directly in a sensory apprehension as a more authentic apprehension of the entity.\(^{67}\)

On the surface there is a great deal of affinity between our methodological interpretation and this intentionalist interpretation, since both of them turn to Heidegger’s use of formal indication in the 1921 lecture course *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*. MacAvoy, however, argues that formal indication “echoes Husserl’s use of this terminology to characterize thought that truly grasps its object in intuition and thought that merely signifies it.”\(^{68}\) MacAvoy’s view is that formal indications are just another term for empty intentions and thus serve as the methodological and provisionary starting point for Heidegger’s phenomenological method.

\(^{67}\) GA 20: 66/49: “I can in an empty way now think of my desk at home simply in order to talk about it. I can fulfill this empty intention in a way by envisaging it to myself, and finally by going home and seeing it itself in an authentic [*eigentlicher*] and final experience.”

\(^{68}\) Leslie MacAvoy, “Formal Indication and the Hermeneutics of Facticity,” *Philosophy Today* 54, Supplement (October 1, 2010), 85.
Understood this way, authenticity amounts to encounters where our expressive act corresponds to the intuitive act of apprehension, resulting in a fulfilled intention. Thus, she argues that the structure of *Being and Time* needs to be reinterpreted along the lines of intentional fulfillment:

The first division maps out the formal indications with respect to Dasein which must be confirmed in the second division, where Heidegger must show how Dasein’s empty intentions of its own Being can be fulfilled. He must demonstrate how Dasein’s Being can be disclosed to it in a way that gives evidence for what it emptily intends in everydayness.  

On this reading, division one, which focuses on the inauthentic everydayness is just a provisionary assembly of the various empty intentions which we find in our cultural and philosophical traditions. The goal of *Being and Time*, then is to fulfill those intentions.

It should be obvious now, why I have called this the intentionalist camp. By reinterpreting authenticity and inauthenticity as fulfilled and unfulfilled intentions respectively, MacAvoy distances Dasein’s resolute being-itself from the traditional interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity and demonstrates why authenticity is critical to Heidegger’s overall project. In order to get to authentic Dasein, a prerequisite for the *Seinsfrage*, MacAvoy argues that we must fulfill the empty intention of Dasein’s being. The advantage of this perspective of authenticity is that it puts the condition for the possibility of authenticity, not just in the act of some subject willing to be one way or another, but in the correspondence of some expression with the way things really are. Thus, MacAvoy argues that Heidegger’s discussion our everyday interpretation of the self is just a discussion of the various empty intentions that we find in our expressive acts about Dasein. For MacAvoy, providing a robust account of Dasein’s temporality,

69 MacAvoy, “Dasein’s Fulfillment,” 55.
and existential structure is requisite for fulfilling the intentions and providing the meaning of Dasein as existence.

For MacAvoy, Heidegger’s phenomenological reduction of Dasein, in the experience of anxiety in the face of death is what brings about the possibility of fulfilling the intentions which started entire investigation:

This disclosure must occur through a type of phenomenological reduction in which Dasein’s Being is uncovered and becomes more explicitly an issue for it. It occurs when the meaning of Dasein’s own Being is thrown into question against the horizon of its own death. Being-towards-death is what phenomenological reveals Dasein’s Being to it as such. The meaning of Dasein’s Being is mortality, which derives its sense from a more general understanding of Being in terms of temporality. 70

Here MacAvoy cites Being-towards-death as the source of a direct intuitive apprehension of Dasein’s being. This generates the possibility of an expressive act which corresponds to this intuitive apprehension, resulting in a fulfilled intention: a meaningful expression about the Being of Dasein. With anxiety we get the disclosive moment which provides us with the ability to truly and meaningfully understand ourselves in an authentic way.

In addition to providing a solid link between Heidegger’s phenomenological method, the overall project of Being and Time, and the phenomena of authenticity, this interpretation is also helpful in explaining the full phenomena of authenticity discussed above. As we have seen, intentional fulfillment is not limited to encounters with Dasein’s own being, but rather describes all encounters with phenomena. Consequently, on this interpretation, any encounter with an entity counts as authentic so long as it results in a fulfilled intention. Thus, authentic encounters with tools can be explained on this intentionalist reading as an encounter where my expressive

70 MacAvoy, “Dasein’s Fulfillment,” 55.
act “that is a hammer” corresponds to my intuitive apprehension of the tool in question: the hammer itself. Rather than see the world as a matter of Dasein’s subjective projections, MacAvoy argues that intentional fulfillment (and consequently, authenticity) is entity-sided, or at least that authenticity is found in the unity of the expressive act with the apprehension of the entity in question.

This works well for things encountered in our everyday lives, like bridges and hammers, because their being is determined by what they are. But for Dasein, whose being is determined by who they are, the formula is much trickier. With hammers, what it means to fulfill the intention is determined by the being of the hammer itself. If I call the hammer a knife, I am expressing something which I fail to apprehend in my intuition, resulting in an empty intention. With regular entities, their being is entirely a consequence of what they are, but with Dasein things are different: because Dasein’s being is existence, what (or better, who) it is, can change. In other words, the expressive side is the entity side, at least partially. As MacAvoy puts it: “In authenticity, Dasein is it intentionality in the mode of Being it, in the way of a fulfilled intention.”

MacAvoy is aware that this invites a certain problematic aspect to Dasein’s Being: When I resolutely choose to become a teacher, since my being is what I choose, my choice changes my existence. Consequently, my expressive act coincides with the apprehension of myself as an existing being as being a teacher. But if my choosing is what determines what I am in the fullest sense, then how could I ever be inauthentic? If Dasein’s being were entirely determined by self-projection, as may be suggested in certain existentialist readings of Being and Time, then

71 MacAvoy, “Dasein’s Fulfillment,” 52.
fulfilling the intention would merely be recognizing that the expressive act itself determines the intuitive act of apprehension. At any moment I could reinterpret myself and become something else and remain authentic. Authentically being-oneself on that account, would merely amount to being the person who makes the choice for who we want to be, regardless of any other aspects of my facticity. The only criteria for authenticity would be making sure that I make that choice, rather than letting something else make that choice for me. All other aspects of my being would be ignored entirely. MacAvoy rejects this notion, however, and suggests, that even for Dasein, the entity-sided focus of intentionality is at play.

Just because Dasein can choose to become itself in a resolute act, does not mean that that choice is an act of subjective projection which fully constitutes the being of that Dasein. Instead, MacAvoy recognizes that Dasein’s own ontological constitution plays a determining role in the ways that it can fulfill its own intention. We may be the author of our own story, but the other characters, and the world around us are not up to us. Thus, authenticity requires an expressive act which adequately corresponds to the intuitive apprehension of our being. I cannot merely choose to be a God or a dragon, or anything else outside of the realm of my own possibilities. Instead, in resolutely choosing, I can only pick options which are possible for me, as a finite temporal being who cares. This speaks to the two notions of telos discussed above. While there are many ways people can live their lives, only some of them are authentic because only some of them are responsive to the truth of Dasein’s being, the being of other Dasein, and the being of entities found within the world of our concern.

5.2.2: Evaluation

The main limitation of MacAvoy’s argument is not in her view that authenticity plays a role central to the method present in Being and Time. And for the most part, I agree with MacAvoy’s
entity-sided account of authenticity, which argues that authenticity in the applied sense must be sensitive to the way that the entity shows itself. Instead, the limitation of MacAvoy’s interpretation is that she attributes too much of it to Husserl, and in so doing she runs the risk of characterizing authenticity as a correct beholding of an entity in the sense of something present-at-hand (Vorhandensein). When we stop to consider what it is that Heidegger is getting from Husserl on this account, it becomes apparent that Heidegger’s modifications to the field of phenomenology render his approach far too many steps removed from Husserl to have him qualify as Heidegger’s muse for authenticity.

In contrast to Kierkegaard, who died long before he could have weighed in on the affinities between Heidegger’s philosophy and his own, Husserl lived for quite some time after Heidegger published Being and Time and had a great deal to say about it. This is not to say that Husserl’s reflections on the matter of whether or not he inspired Heidegger’s views on authenticity should be taken to be completely authoritative. It is likely that Husserl and Heidegger have a distorted view of the events that transpired and the development of their own philosophy. That said, it would also be a mistake to simply omit their words on this issue, since they may help us adjudicate between competing accounts. Consequently, it is important to note that Husserl himself seems to openly reject Heidegger’s account of authenticity, and the analytic of Dasein on which it depends.
In “Phenomenology and Anthropology,” Husserl refers to the quest for “authentic philosophy” as a “complete reversal of phenomenology’s fundamental standpoint.” In letters to his colleagues later in life, Husserl admits to rereading *Being and Time* a second time in order to carefully understand what Heidegger has to say. In one particular letter Husserl confides that, after reading *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (which was published two years later), he could no longer see any real relation between his and Heidegger’s work:

I arrived at the distressing conclusion that philosophically I have nothing to do with this Heideggerian profundity, with this brilliant unscientific genius; that Heidegger’s criticism, both open and veiled, is based upon a gross misunderstanding; that he may be involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which I have always considered it my life’s work to make forever impossible.

Rather than seeing Heidegger’s account of authenticity as an extension of his own work on intentionality, Husserl seems to reject Heidegger’s project wholesale. Husserl thus concludes: “…I cannot admit [Heidegger’s] work within the framework of my phenomenology…”

According to Husserl, Heidegger’s thinking in *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* is so distinct that it does not even qualify as phenomenology. This leads Husserl to

---


73 From Husserl’s marginalia notes, which are confirmed by his correspondence, we can see that carefully read all of *Being and Time*, tracking the various uses of authenticity as they occur, underlining them and defining them in the margins. For more on Husserl’s thorough read of *Sein und Zeit* see Sheehan’s introduction to Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology*, 29. Sheehan notes that these marginalia were originally published in "Randbemerkungen Husserls zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit und Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik," ed. Roland Breeur, *Husserl Studies 11*, 1 (1994), 3-36. Husserl's copy of *Sein und Zeit* is catalogued as BP 78 at the Husserl-Archives, Leuven.

74 Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology*, 482.
dismiss Heidegger’s project outright: “…I also must reject its entirety as regards its method, and in the essentials as regards its content.”

Husserl’s suggestion that Heidegger, who he had originally imagined as his philosophical successor, is now the apple which has fallen far away from the tree, is confirmed by Heidegger’s own assessment of the situation. Even in the lectures cited above by MacAvoy, we find Heidegger dismissing Husserl’s account after spending so much time emphasizing its value. In these lectures, and elsewhere, Heidegger concludes that although Husserl’s insights have proved useful, they also remain bound to an ontology which sees all entities in terms of their presence-at-hand:

The critical reflection shows that even phenomenological research stands under the constraints of an old tradition, especially when it comes to the most primordial determination of the theme most proper [eigensten] to it, intentionality. Contrast to its most proper [eigensten] principle, therefore, phenomenology defines its most proper [eigensten] thematic matter not out of the matters themselves but instead out of a traditional prejudgment of it, albeit one which has become quite self-evident. The very sense of this prejudgment serves to deny the original leap to the entity which is thematically intended. In the basic task of determining its ownmost field, therefore, phenomenology is unphenomenological! – that is to say, purportedly phenomenological.

Here, Heidegger argues that the core concept of intentionality is inherently compromised for Husserl by the dominance of present-at-hand ontologies. We can see now why Heidegger abandons the language of intentionality in *Being and Time*. It is another attempt to avoid the baggage of traditional ontology. Husserl himself observes Heidegger avoiding the use of this term and comments on it in his marginalia, remarking: “What complicated formalities and unclarities, simply so as not to make use of intentionality.”

---

76 GA 20: 178/128. It seems like the old version of phenomenology fails to escape the tradition.
77 Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology*, 382.
word because it was a loaded term, and Husserl was cognizant of what Heidegger was doing. Heidegger was trying to avoid an ontology where entities as they are apprehended in the intuition are seen merely as objects with properties: as mere things.

In contrast, Heidegger’s ontology, is grounded in the way that things meaningfully show up for us when we are engaged with them. We first see things in terms of their possibilities: We authentically encounter the hammer when we build something, not when we see it as some object suspended in three-dimensional space. This speaks to something we addressed in chapter four, which is that authentically encountering an entity is not just a process of identifying the type of being that shows itself. If that were the case, authentic encounters with hammers would be ones where we correctly identify that what is in front of us is a hammer. Heidegger argues that authenticity is more than that when he situates authenticity in the activity of utilizing the hammer. Likewise, authentically encountering other Dasein is not as simple as noticing that the person walking down the street is a person, but rather requires a much more demanding form of interaction whereby we leap ahead of our fellow Dasein and help them authentically become themselves. Furthermore, authentic being-oneself is not just recognizing that we are human beings who can choose who we become, but rather it is the act of choosing itself.

Thus, Heidegger tells us that what is missing from Husserl’s phenomenology is an account of “being in its sense.”

For Heidegger, being is a how, an activity, and not a what. Our modes of encountering other beings are modes of being (Seinsmodi), ways that we act, which are determined partially by our own constitution and partially by the being that we encounter.

Because a discussion of being in its sense is the requisite first step for phenomenology, Husserl’s

---

78 GA 20: 178/129.
phenomenology represents a “fundamental neglect” of this question, and a continuation of the philosophy of presence-at-hand which plagues the tradition.\textsuperscript{79}

This is not to say that Heidegger rejects intentionality outright. Instead, he credits this concept, and Husserl who developed it most fully, for bringing philosophy back to the question of the “being of the intentional.”\textsuperscript{80} Intentionality demonstrates that we need to acknowledge that the perceiver plays a role in what is perceived. But Heidegger does not need Husserl for this insight since it echoes something which goes back to the thinking of Plato and Aristotle. It is in the philosophy of the latter that we find a much more compelling argument for authenticity, one which acknowledges that authenticity is an activity and not just a correspondence between what is intuited and what is expressed. Heidegger tells us that it is in Aristotle that we find an investigation into the phenomena as they meaningfully appear to us in our lived everyday experience.

In conclusion, we should acknowledge that there are significant advantages to the intentionalist interpretation, especially when compared to the narrow existentialist interpretation. The intentionalist camp demonstrates the relationship between authenticity and truth and does so in relation to encounters with all types of entities. The problem is that Husserl’s notion of the truth is confined to correspondence, whereas the truth Heidegger seeks regarding authenticity is at the level of disclosure. The result is that while the intentionalist account points us in the correct direction, is also obscures the meaning of authentically encountering entities to be one of merely identifying them through expressive acts. Additionally, the intentionalist camp draws our attention to the role of authenticity in phenomenological method. As we saw in chapter three,

\textsuperscript{79} GA 20: 179/129.
\textsuperscript{80} GA 20: 184/136.
MacAvoy is right to associate authenticity to phenomenological method, and even to formal indication. Unfortunately, she is wrong to attribute that insight to Husserl, whose phenomenology bottoms the ontology of presence-at-hand. What is authentically disclosed in *Being and Time* is not an object with properties, but a being whose being is existence. Lastly, contrary to the intentionalist account, we can see that both Heidegger and Husserl seem to agree that their approaches to phenomenology, and the content derived from these approaches are not only different but potentially in opposition to one another. Taken together, we can see that while the intentionalist account points us in the right direction, relating authenticity to truth and method, it fails to account for the interpretive gulf between Husserl and Heidegger’s conceptions of truth and being.

5.3: ARISTOTLE (PRACTICAL CAMP)

From the outset of this dissertation, I have credited Aristotle with inspiring Heidegger’s thoughts on authenticity in numerous ways. The most obvious influence was discussed in chapter three where we saw that Aristotle’s *endoxic* method was the inspiration for Heidegger’s approach to formal indication and phenomenological destruction. But additionally, Aristotle has appeared from time to time to help us better understand Heidegger’s characterization of applications of authenticity to particular encounters. In particular, we looked at the way that Aristotle’s reflections on the *telos*, were fruitful for unpacking the distinction between an entity which has a purpose, and an entity which determines its own purpose, albeit in a way which is constrained by its facticity. To that end, the methodological interpretation of authenticity, which was fully outlined in chapter four, does consider Aristotle to be Heidegger’s muse of choice. That said, there is another camp of interpretation which focuses on Aristotle’s reflections on *praxis* (human activity) and *phronesis* (human wisdom) to make sense of the applied uses of authenticity. What
we will see is that while this camp is able to make sense of many of the phenomena of authenticity, without an account of the methodological, this camp remains underdeveloped.

5.3.1: Hatab

For the most part, the practical camp tends to follow Heidegger’s focus on the first 9 books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.\(^{81}\) Scholars who follow in this tradition usually attempt to establish a link between the *phronimos* (the person of practical wisdom) in Aristotle and Heidegger’s authentic Dasein.\(^{82}\) Comparisons between Aristotle and Heidegger work out nicely insofar as the *phronimos* and authentic Dasein both struggle with tense moments of decision and seek resolution through a difficult choice. These interpretations tend to draw on two of Heidegger’s lectures from 1924: *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* (GA 18), and *Plato’s Sophist* (GA 19), where Heidegger dedicates a significant number of lectures to unpacking the concepts and ideas present in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

One such interpretation can be found in the work of Lawrence Hatab who, in his book *Ethics of Finitude*, argues that Heidegger’s account of phronesis results in a retrieval of the

---

\(^{81}\) Walter Brogan notes that the genesis the *Daseinsanalytik* of *Being and Time* can be traced back to Heidegger’s earlier attempts to interpret Aristotle’s ontology of human beings: “One of the clearest indications of the legitimacy of efforts that have been undertaken to show the link between the genesis of *Being and Time* and Heidegger’s work on Aristotle is found in [the essay “Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle”] where Heidegger announces that the question he is asking as he approaches Aristotle’s texts is the question of the being of human being. He makes clear that his projected reading of Aristotle is to be a *Daseinsanalytik*, a questioning about the being who experiences and interprets being.” (Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 13.) The essay discussed in this quote has been cited previously as GA 62 since it can be found in the appendix of that lecture. For Brogan’s analysis of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as an ontological interpretation of Dasein see Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 138-148.

\(^{82}\) It should be noted that *phronesis* appears to play many interrelated roles in Heidegger’s thinking. At times he seems to equate it with circumspection (*Umsicht*), a kind of sight which takes up concerns relative to the environment (*Umwelt*) (GA 31.) At other times he equates it with the call of conscience (*Gewissen*) which prompts resolute and authentic choosing (GA 19.) Walter Brogan attempts to bridge these two readings by noting that *phronesis* is a form of self-reflection (*Selbstbesinnung*) whereby Dasein deliberates about its being in its “human way of being authentically in a situation” (Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 147.) See also Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 175.
Greek word *ethos* which simply means dwelling or abode. According to Hatab, this retrieval opens the possibility for building an original ethics out of the ontological concept of Being-in-the-world. Although Hatab’s project is broader in its scope, his discussion of Heidegger and Aristotle is illuminating for discussions of authenticity. In the process of bringing Heideggerian insights to bear on ethics, providing a corrective to the modernistic and analytic interpretations of ethics which have come to dominate contemporary moral philosophy, Hatab uncovers a link between Heidegger’s *Being and Time* and Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and develops a view of authenticity where Dasein can be resolute while maintaining social and communal obligations.

To draw out the similarities between these views, Hatab demonstrates affinity among several crucial Aristotelian concepts and Heidegger’s interpretation of them as they appear in *Being and Time*. Hatab links Heidegger’s discussion of the call of conscience, the call which brings Dasein back to its ownmost self as the guiding element found in Aristotelian *phronesis* which can be defined as “a capacity for practical discernment, or an ethical finesse, a cultivated aptitude to uncover the appropriate balancing and ordering of practical possibilities.” For both Aristotelian *phronesis* and Heideggerian conscience, this balancing and ordering speaks to the way that the virtuous actor and authentic Dasein maintain the mean or *mesotes* by considering

---

83 Hatab, *Ethics and Finitude*, 90-91. See also Braver, *Heidegger’s Later Writings*, 67: “[Ethos] means the place where we dwell, which makes us what we are, thus pointing to the clearing. This line of thought adapts a very old form of ethics, sometimes called perfectionism, which receives it canonical formulation in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. The idea is that once we find our essence or what makes us distinctive (our *ergon*), the best way of living consists in performing that activity with excellence (*arete*).” See also Iain Thomson, “Heidegger Perfectionist Philosophy of Education in *Being and Time*,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 37, no. 4 (2004): 439–67.

84 Hatab, *Ethics and Finitude*, 90.

85 Hatab, *Ethics and Finitude*, 106. For Heidegger on *phronesis*, see GA 62: 383/S 134: “What *phronesis* brings into true safekeeping is the toward-which of going about those dealings that human life has with itself and the how of these dealings in the own being. These dealings are *praxis*: i.e., how one handles oneself in dealings that are not productive but rather in each case simply perform action in the precise sense of this term. Phronesis is the illumination of dealings that co-temporalizes and unfolds life in its *being*.”
the complexities of the particular situation. Hatab also establishes the link between Heidegger’s Augenblick and Aristotle’s discussion of the kairos, the crucial moment of choice. Lastly, Hatab draws our attention to the link between deliberation in Aristotle and the resolute choice in Heidegger. In Aristotle’s discussion of the moment of deliberation where the phronimos finds itself in a state of choosing (hexis proaresis) we can see a prototype for Heidegger’s authentic Dasein. Hatab concludes that, taken together, these examples establish a direct relation between resoluteness and virtue.

In contrast to the view espoused in the existentialist tradition, which depicts Dasein as groundless and making it up as they go along, the practical interpretation roots Dasein in its culture and its social and practical commitments. While the anxiety which precedes the moment of vision cuts us off from the world, in the end it always brings us back. This is useful because it demonstrates that the moment of vision (Augenblick), as expressed in Being and Time has resonances which predate the discussion of Christian salvation in Kierkegaard. According to Hatab, “Authentic ethical action charged by finitude is far from a loss of direction: it is a deliverance from facile abstractions and convictions toward the complexities of practical situations.” We are not cut off from the world, but come to recognize its importance. As

86 Hatab, Ethics and Finitude, 120: “Phronesis can be understood as the balancing of this tension at moments of decision, as the capacity for responsiveness and appropriate action.” See GA 19: 56/39: “Phronesis is nothing other than conscience set into motion, making an action transparent.” See also GA 62: 383/S 134: “Phronesis makes the circumstances of the actor accessible by keeping a firm hold on the on eneka (“for the sake of which”) of an action, by making available its more precisely defined “what-for;” by grasping the “now” it is to be performed at, and by mapping out its how.”

87 Hatab, Ethics and Finitude 175, citing GA 24: 409/288: “Already Aristotle saw the phenomenon of the [augenblick], the kairos, and he defined it in the sixth book of his Nicomachean Ethics…”

88 Hatab, Ethics and Finitude, 74.

89 McNeill’s commentary on this is helpful: “Heidegger goes on to distance his understanding of the Augenblick from that of Kierkegaard although he readily acknowledges the importance of Kierkegaard’s genuine insight), and to indicate that Aristotle had already seen the phenomenon of the Augenblick or kairos in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, but had not explicated its specific temporality” (McNeill, The Glance of the Eye, 136.)

90 Hatab, Ethics and Finitude, 175.
Heidegger tells us “From out of the moment [Augenblick] itself it brings into view for circumspension the how of the fitting way to set to work and authentically achieve the end in question.” Consequently, one significant advantage of this account comes from how it manages the issues of individuation and sociality in authenticity. While Heidegger does cast the influence of das Man in a negative light, he also frequently stresses its importance for Dasein’s self-understanding. As we saw in the existentialist reading of authenticity, to maintain continuity with other existentialist thinkers like Sartre and Kierkegaard, scholars are often dismissive of this positive aspect of das Man. As we saw previously, this is done because they believe that any outside influence compromises Dasein’s claim to authenticity which, on their reading, must originate purely from the self. But on this ethical reading, we can see how Dasein depends upon its community to become authentic. Just as Aristotle sees phronesis and virtue as deeply indebted to systems of habituation and education and aided by friendship, Heidegger sees authenticity has having a distinctively social register. Authenticity is, after all, only a modification of our inauthentic everydayness. Hatab summarizes it nicely: “[I]n choosing itself authentically, Dasein chooses its being with other Dasein and other beings in the world.”

Hatab’s view of authenticity coincides nicely with our discussion of applied authenticity as determined by various modes of care. As discussed earlier in chapter four, Heidegger divides Dasein, which he defines as Being-in-the-world into a set of horizons, each with their own

---

91 GA 62: 384/S 135. McNeill notes that circumspersion (Umsicht), as it is used in this 1922 essay (GA 62), has a broader use than its application in Being and Time where it is mostly applied to concerns within the horizon of our productive work world (McNeill, The Glance of the Eye, 126.)

92 Walter Brogan advocates for a similar view and takes it a step further suggesting that authenticity opens up a more authentic relation to non-human entities which resists the enframing nature of modern technological thinking: “This apparent retreat from everyday practical involvements back into a concern for one’s own being is neither for Aristotle nor Heidegger a form of solipsism but the only genuine bases for human community, and for a kind of relating to nonhuman being that cannot be reduced to the kind of relating derived from the structures of techne or those operative in modern technology” (Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle, 139.)

93 Hatab, Ethics and Finitude, 175.
entities and modes of care which speak to the way that Dasein encounters those entities meaningfully. Within the horizon of Dasein’s concern (Besorgen), the environment (Umwelt), we find tools (Zuhanden) and natural objects (Vorhanden). Within the social horizon of the with-world (Mitwelt) we find fellow Daseins and engage with them in a multiplicity of relationships known as “caring-for” (Fürsorge). Lastly, within the horizon of our own self-world (Selbstwelt), we encounter ourselves in a form of caring for ourselves (Selbst-sorge). Each of these horizons contains particular entities, each with their own modes of authentic encounter.

One such encounter was already outlined in chapter four in Aristotelian terms. There we mentioned that Heidegger gets his notion of tool use from Aristotle’s suggestion that the purpose of something is what determines its being. Consequently, Heidegger’s suggestion that the hammer is most a hammer when it is being used for hammering fits nicely with Aristotle’s notion that the being of the entity is determined by its telos or purpose. A hammer is a hammer when it fulfills its function.

Another example can be found in the discussion of authentic caring-for within the horizon of the with-world (Mitwelt). Here Heidegger describes two radically distinct ways in which Dasein can authentically and inauthentically encounter its fellow Dasein. This coincides nicely with Aristotle’s views on true friendship. True friendship is a relationship whereby two people help bring out virtuous action in each other. Likewise, Heidegger’s description of authentic being-with (Mitsein) is one where we help our fellow Dasein pursue their own authentic Being. Both of these accounts talk about how encountering another human being in the

---

94 Walter Brogan also develops this view in Chapter Five of Heidegger and Aristotle. He states: “Ironically, the misunderstanding of the framework Heidegger gives for rethinking the self-other relationship replicates the misunderstanding of Aristotle’s famous claim that friendship is rooted in self-love, a claim that, as he makes clear, is neither selfish nor nonpolitical” (Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle, 149.)
fullest and most virtuous sense involves caring for them in a way which helps them to become who they are. Furthermore, both accounts stress that these kinds of relationships are rare, or represent extreme modes of encounter, which we do not always find in our everyday engagements. By seeing Heidegger’s account of authentic caring-for (Fürsorgen) as an Aristotelian true friendship, we can see now why Heidegger was so adamant in *Being and Time* and elsewhere to point out that authenticity is not an egoistic enterprise. Although the language of authentic being-one’s-self seems solipsistic, it is important to remember that being-with others, and caring-about (Besorgen) things we encounter in the world, are both crucial parts of what it means to be a Dasein. In other words, being-oneself for Heidegger is inherently social and practical. There is no self without the horizons which constitute that self. Heidegger seems to have inherited this idea from Aristotle as well, who sees all human existence has defined by a life in the *polis*.

Lastly, we can even see a similarity between these accounts grounded in the fact that they are susceptible to the very same criticisms: namely, that both Aristotle’s account of *phronesis*, and Heidegger’s account of authentic being-oneself, are inherently formal, and thus lack any definitive discussion of content. We know that courage is essential to being a virtuous person, but we do not know the specifics on exactly when and how that courage should take place. To know why we should act a certain way requires a long life of habituation, study, and deliberation. Since that sort of life is not available or feasible to most people, we often learn to become virtuous by imitating those who are already virtuous: the *phronimos* of our community. Likewise, Heidegger suggests that authentic Dasein make a resolute choice in response to the moment of vision, tending to the complexities of the particular situation, but gives us little guidance as to which choices are preferable. In similar fashion, at least pertaining to his
discussion of becoming an authentic community, there is the possibility of following the actions of a hero or leader, who takes up the destiny of a people. This hero is presumably an authentic Dasein who seeks to help others achieve authenticity in their own being.

One point of contention within this Aristotelian interpretation of authenticity regards the status of Aristotle’s reflections on the life of contemplation as they are expressed in Book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.\(^95\) The problem is that elsewhere in Aristotle’s thought, he seems to advocate for a social and practical foundation for virtuous activity, whereas in book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he seems to ground virtue in the detached and isolated activity of pondering the truths of the universe.\(^96\) Scholars have attempted to remedy this problem by insisting more continuity between these two accounts. One such method can be found in the work of Richard Kraut who argues that the life of contemplation is a profession that still requires a need to develop and exercise practical wisdom and ethical virtues.

The best way to understand him is to take him to be assuming that one will need the ethical virtues in order to live the life of a philosopher, even though exercising those virtues is not the philosopher's ultimate end. To be adequately equipped to live a life of thought and discussion, one will need practical wisdom, temperance, justice, and the other ethical virtues. To say that there is something better even than ethical activity, and that ethical activity promotes this higher goal, is entirely compatible with everything else that we find in the *Ethics*.\(^97\)

\(^95\) Here we find Aristotle describing a life which seems detached and removed from the life of activity discussed elsewhere in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*. In this book, Aristotle debates the different kinds of lives which people find fulfilling and contrasts the life of contemplation with a life spent enjoying lower bodily pleasures and pleasant amusements. For Aristotle, what matters is what the virtuous person finds enjoyable. (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1176b24) This means that a life spent in contemplation is superior to any other life because it engages the divine aspect of our soul which understands the world and is something we can do at any time for great lengths of time (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a21).

\(^96\) Aristotle himself seems to contradict this reading, however, in his suggestion that philosophy is best done with friends: “But the theoretically-wise person, even when by himself, is able to contemplate, and the more wise he is, the more he is able to do so. He will do it better, presumably, if he has co-workers, but all the same he is most self-sufficient” (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by C.D.C. Reeve, 1177a31-34.).

Here Kraut attempts to bridge these two readings, by insisting that a life of contemplation does not conflict with a life of practical virtue, but rather that they are bound together. Christopher Shields also advocates for this reading, as it provides us with an account whereby Aristotle does not directly contradict himself.\textsuperscript{98} Heidegger, however, expresses his doubts that these views are so amenable. He argues that for Aristotle, authenticity is found in a life of pure contemplation.\textsuperscript{99} Heidegger spells this out clearly:

\begin{quote}
[For Aristotle,] \textit{theorein} is being-there’s \textit{[Dasein]} ownmost \textit{[eigenste]} possibility since in it being-there reaches its end in such a way that it is transposed into its most genuine \textit{[eigentlichste]} possibility, into its ownmost \textit{[eigenste]} there, as \textit{theorein} constitutes the most genuine \textit{[eigentlichste]} \textit{entelecheia} of the being of human beings. What was concrete in Greek existence as an existence-tendency is here brought to its most genuine \textit{[eigentlichen]} expression, and in such a form that Aristotle makes this existence intelligible on the basis of its genuine \textit{[eigentlichen]} sense of being and being-there, and grounds it therein.\textsuperscript{100}
\end{quote}

Here Heidegger emphatically demonstrates what we might call the authentic way of being for Aristotle in the life of contemplation, the \textit{bios theoretikos}. This is where Heidegger and Aristotle appear to diverge, however, since Heidegger finds this way of life to be too far removed and focused entirely on beholding beings in the pure presence-at-hand.\textsuperscript{101} Heidegger refers to this as an “extreme position” which Aristotle arrives at by way of his approach to ontology.\textsuperscript{102} Thus, within the practical reading of Heideggerian authenticity, we must note that Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle is limited in a sense. While the life of authenticity, the way of being

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{98} Shields, \textit{Aristotle}, 402-9.
\textsuperscript{99} GA 18: 44/32.
\textsuperscript{100} GA 18: 92/64.
\textsuperscript{101} GA 19: 177-8/121-2.
\textsuperscript{102} GA 19: 178/122.
\end{flushright}

241
which fulfills being of human for Aristotle is found in the life of contemplation, the life of authenticity for Heidegger remains tied to the virtuous practical activity.

5.3.2: Evaluation

In conclusion, we have seen that Heidegger openly equates his concepts with Aristotle’s, borrowing heavily from the *Nicomachean Ethics* in his descriptions of human flourishing. For Heidegger, being an authentic Dasein requires responding to the situation in the moment of vision and making the resolute choice. For Aristotle, the *phronimos* makes a deliberative choice in the moment to act in a way which balances two vices. Of course, for Heidegger authenticity is always a modification of inauthenticity, and so we can see that the *phronimos* and the authentic Dasein seem bound to respond to a situation and make a difficult choice, resisting the urge to take the easy route towards vice and inauthenticity. We do not have to make this difficult choice alone, however, as both Aristotle and Heidegger emphasize the importance of other people in our lives to keep us authentic and virtuous. For Heidegger being-with is part of the constitution of our being, and for Aristotle friendship is a necessary component of human flourishing. Lastly, both thinkers emphasize that all of this must take place in a political sphere, at the level of the community. For Aristotle, the *polis* is necessary for the flourishing of its citizens, a natural organization of its people. For Heidegger, the community is the source of inspiration which gives us exemplars and heroes to emulate in our quest for authentically becoming ourselves. Thus, we have seen that Aristotle’s view can account for the applied uses of authenticity regarding tools, oneself, other Daseins, and the community as a whole.

These reflections alone demonstrate why Aristotle is a top contender for Heidegger’s muse. When it comes to the applied sense of authenticity, the practical camp is capable of explaining many of the phenomena of authenticity in their fullest sense. One limitation of this
interpretation is found in the way that Heidegger and Aristotle diverge concerning their views on the life of contemplation. Nevertheless, even though Aristotle and Heidegger may disagree on which live results in the fulfilment of Dasein’s being, it is in Aristotle’s account of the
phronimos that we found Heidegger’s authentic Dasein. The problem with this account is not that it inadequately characterizes these applied uses of authenticity. Instead, the problem is that the practical interpretation of authenticity cannot explain how authenticity factors into the goals of Being and Time. With this practical reading, it is as if Heidegger set out to write a book on ontology, and ended up writing a book on ethics. Without a clear understanding of the methodological role of authenticity, we cannot explain the use of authenticity in their non-applied contexts, or the structure of Being and Time as a whole. In other words, from the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics alone, we cannot fully understand what Heidegger means by authenticity in Being and Time.

This is admittedly a rather weak objection, and for good reason. There is a great deal of evidence that suggests Heidegger relies on Aristotle when interpreting the worldly phenomena that are discussed in our applied uses of authenticity. In fact, prior to the discovery of the role of authenticity in Heidegger’s method, this entire dissertation was structured around demonstrating the potency of the practical reading of authenticity in contrast to the existentialist and intentionalist readings. Nevertheless, this practical camp fell short when it was unable to explain these methodological uses, and I was forced to look elsewhere for a camp which could account for the full phenomena of authenticity.

103 Brogan suggests that these two philosophical schools are inseparable (Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle, 148-157.)
5.4: ARISTOTLE AGAIN (METHODOLOGICAL CAMP)

This final camp is, in essence, the view that I have advocated for throughout this dissertation. In this way, what I am speaking about here should be relatively familiar. But because I did not invent this interpretation wholesale, it is important to address the interpretation and influence of the scholars who championed a version of this view before me. As we saw in the introduction, and again in the thinking of Leslie MacAvoy, there are a number of influential scholars who believe that authenticity plays a methodological role in *Being and Time*. Since Heidegger suggests as much in his discussions about authenticity, the difficulty has always been in discerning how it relates to method. In chapters three and four we were able to answer that question definitively, and saw that it was Aristotle’s *endoxic* method which inspired Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. In this chapter, I’d like to focus on the work of Charles Guignon who should be credited with pointing me towards Aristotle for all things authenticity. In this section, I will develop Guignon’s methodological account to demonstrate how my own methodological interpretation is merely an extension of the thinking that he started.

5.4.1: Guignon

In Guignon’s “Authenticity and the Question of Being,” we find a compelling argument which situates Heidegger’s notion of authenticity within the context of his phenomenological method. The work in this paper represents a departure from the perspective Guignon championed in his work, *On Being Authentic*, since Guignon came to realize that there was much more going on with this term than he had originally anticipated. In this paper Guignon asserts the much bolder thesis that “[t]he goal of understanding the meaning of Being – that is, the job of ‘fundamental ontology’ – is something that can only be achieved by a person who is, or at least fully
understands what it is to be authentic.”

Guignon identifies that these discussions on selfhood in the more existentialist-sounding moments of *Being and Time*, are actually subservient to the overall goal of *Being and Time*. In other words, authenticity is methodologically requisite for his task of fundamental ontology to provide an analysis of the being of Dasein. Without authenticity, Heidegger cannot discover the meaning of the question of being. As Guignon puts it: “By giving a full account of Dasein – one that embraces its possibility of authenticity – we will disclose the ‘horizon’ in which any understanding of being whatsoever becomes possible.”

Thus, more than some ethical or existential ideal, authenticity becomes the prerequisite for doing fundamental ontology in the first place. In other words, before Dasein can even ask the question which guides the project of *Being and Time* from its outset, the question of the meaning of being (*Seinsfrage*), it must achieve authenticity, in the sense of a full self-transparency. Only authentic Dasein is capable of engaging in fundamental ontology. Of course, as we have seen, our authentic self-encounter is a complex issue, which can be unpacked at varying stages of existential depth. To be authentic means to uncover the totality of Dasein’s existential constitution and to put that constitution to action by choosing oneself. This means understanding Dasein’s being as temporality, its historicity, and its being as care and acting in response to that information.

Guignon’s emphasis on the importance of authenticity in Heidegger’s method squares nicely with the discoveries made in the second chapter of this dissertation which place the first

terminological uses of authenticity somewhere around the 1921 course lectures. As mentioned previously, it is not an accident that authenticity arrives on the scene at the same time that Heidegger is both reading Aristotle and developing his own phenomenological method. As we discussed in chapter four, there is an affinity here between Heidegger’s approach to disclosing the whole authentic being of Dasein and Aristotle’s view that all things are determined by the fulfillment of their proper function. Guignon recognizes this affinity when he summarizes the goals of the analytic of Dasein: “Discovering what constitutes an authentic existence provides us with a way of understanding what it is to be a Self in the technical sense Heidegger gives this word.”

Guignon’s argument is rather straightforward: To answer the question of the meaning of being, we must understand the contexts and conditions for the possibility of that question. The conditions for the question are made possible by the existence of Dasein, a temporally unfolding being which can choose to be itself. Thus, to understand the question-asker in full detail, we must authentically disclose that being in its most authentic being. But we cannot start with the full disclosure of Dasein, but must instead start with those formal indications about the being of Dasein. Here Guignon credits Aristotle with the formal indication of Dasein’s being, since Heidegger sees Dasein as a kind of motion (kinein) defined by an activity (praxis) which is determined by some function (ergon). Thus, Guignon concludes:

Heidegger’s Aristotelian view holds that, although their various vocations and particular norms governing action are drawn from the historical culture in which one lives, there is an overarching goal or purpose present in all praxis: the goal of becoming a person of a particular sort.

Guignon’s argument walks the line of the practical and methodological reading, in a way which anticipates the view proposed in this dissertation. The role of the social is seen as both positive and negative: as the source of inspiration and concealment. Working past the concealment of *das Man* and the tradition is what makes possible an investigation in the authentic Being of Dasein. Guignon concludes that *Being and Time* reveals the authentic Being of Dasein to be its temporality. Thus, the question of the conditions for the possibility of fundamental ontology has been answered insofar as we recognize that what is required to ask the question of the meaning of being is time itself. Unfortunately, Guignon does not see the way that formal indication and phenomenological destruction relate to this method, and ultimately concludes, alongside other scholars that the unwritten third division would have likely been dissatisfying since the notion that we are “temporal beings” is ultimately not that impressive of a discovery.\(^{111}\)

Guignon’s work in this paper is admittedly fairly formal, insofar as he lays out his thesis that authenticity is methodologically requisite for Heidegger’s project and generally lays out the project of *Being and Time*. Guignon’s work expresses how Heidegger plans to get to fundamental ontology, but lacks an explanation of why Heidegger proceeds in the way that he does. With the account of methodological authenticity established in this dissertation, we can now explain to Guignon why Heidegger thought this path was necessary. Consequently, while Guignon lacked the complete picture of methodological authenticity, we can see there are insights in his account.

What we find in Guignon’s methodological interpretation was another way of utilizing the thinking of Aristotle to inform our understanding of authenticity in Heidegger. Rather than focus on the applied sense of authenticity which is found in the practical interpretation which relates authentic-being-oneself to the activity of the *phronimos*, this methodological reading emphasizes the role that authenticity plays in opening up the possibility of answering the question of the meaning of being. In broad strokes, Guignon notes the affinity between formal indication and discussions of authenticity in these early lectures in a way which anticipates much of what we discussed in chapter three. Guignon’s account falls short only insofar as his thesis remains underdeveloped. He draws our attention to the importance of understanding method and formal indication as they relate to authenticity, but is unable to fully explain the relationship over the course of a single paper. In this way, I hope that the work achieved by this dissertation follows through on Guignon’s thesis that authenticity plays a methodological role first and foremost.

5.4.2: Evaluation

The methodological camp has proven to be the most capable interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity insofar as it has addressed the phenomena in their fullest sense while also explaining the mistakes of the traditional views which populate the secondary literature. The version of it initiated by Guignon is admittedly provisional and underdeveloped in the sense that it cannot explain why Heidegger thought authenticity was requisite for fundamental ontology. Consequently, the work done in chapters three and four of this dissertation can be seen as an extension of Guignon’s project.
5.5: CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we looked to the tradition to see what has been said by the wise concerning authenticity. In the process we were able to identify how each of these interpretive camps, by drawing on a particular muse, were able to make some sense of Heideggerian authenticity. We saw, however, that once we got past the surface-level similarities, many of these camps of interpretation lead to problematic assumptions and views which were unable to account for the full sense of the phenomena of authenticity. With the existentialist interpretation we saw that Kierkegaard is helpful for understanding the temporal nature of our authentic resolute choice, but was unable to address Heidegger’s views of the community, tool use, and the relationship of authenticity to method. With the intentionalist perspective, we were able to see how authenticity relates to phenomenology and intentionality in terms of method, but were unable to reconcile the ontological differences between Husserl and Heidegger. Furthermore, we discovered that Heidegger’s notion of authenticity as the truth as disclosure was more originary than the applied sense of authenticity for Husserl which ultimately bottomed out in a view of being as presence-at-hand. With the practical interpretation we were able to make sense of Heidegger’s views of authenticity and community by appealing to their origin in Aristotle’s writings on *phronesis* and *praxis*. But by limiting authenticity to a discussion of human activity and wisdom, we saw that the practical camp was unable to address the broader methodological use of authenticity which we uncovered in chapters three and four. Consequently, it was only when we brought in the insights from the methodological camp that we were able to fully understand what Heidegger means by authenticity.
CHAPTER 6: A PROPER CONCLUSION

We have now carried out Heidegger’s endoxic method in full. We have looked to the tradition to see what has been said (introduction), we have gathered the phenomena of authenticity (chapters 1 and 2). We have attempted to provide an account of authenticity which can account for these phenomena (chapters 3 and 4) and we have worked through the inauthentic meanings of authenticity to disclose the meaningful phenomena which gave rise to them (chapter 5). As a result, we have seen how our new interpretation can account for all of the phenomena and resolve the puzzles generated by the traditional interpretations. In other words, we have disclosed the authentic truth of authenticity. In this conclusion I would like to reflect on three points: First, I would like to suggest what this interpretation means for the future of Heidegger scholarship in general. Second, I would like to look to Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” to briefly show how this methodological reading can make sense of aspects of later Heidegger’s thoughts. Lastly, I would like to propose a new way of translating this word which reflects the full sense of the phenomena.

6.1: AUTHENTIC APPROPRIATIONS

The goal of this dissertation was to figure out what authenticity means to Heidegger in Being and Time. As stated from the outset, the path I took to get to that answer was much more complicated that I had initially anticipated. But the journey has opened up new horizons of investigation into the connection between Heidegger’s early thought and the thinking which follows. In addition to the discoveries pertaining to the full meaning of authenticity, by clarifying the method of Being
and Time, we now have a solid foundation for comparison against the work of the later Heidegger.

Here are four general insights gleaned from this investigation:

(1) We discovered a new way of understanding the method and structure of Being and Time itself. Within that method we situated a use of authenticity and a positive and ineliminable role for inauthenticity as the everyday meanings and interpretations which point towards the truth, even if they conceal that truth outwardly. Thus, we have addressed why Heidegger involves the everyday meanings of things in a way which does not characterize him as a general social critic. An open question concerns whether Heidegger maintains this approach in his later works or whether he modifies or abandons it entirely. Either option is philosophically significant since if he continues this approach, we could argue that, despite changing his terms, Heidegger’s early and later thinking operate on similar principles. Alternatively, in the case that Heidegger abandons this strategy, we might have a clue for why Heidegger gave up on finishing Being and Time.

(2) In his autobiographical writings, Heidegger often claims that Aristotle inspired his method of phenomenology. This dissertation has shown exactly how he was inspired, not just in terms of content, but in terms of his approach to the problem of philosophical method and hermeneutic phenomenology. We now see why Heidegger spends so much time working through what has been said in our everyday speech since it is in those everyday uses of words that we find a positive reference back to the phenomena.

(3) This interpretation of authenticity can help us better understand the goals of the unwritten parts of Being and Time. Given these Aristotelian insights, in connection with the
importance of phenomenological destruction, we can see why Heidegger would dedicate the second half of his book to a historical analysis of being in the thinking of Descartes, Kant and Aristotle. We now know that, following Aristotle, Heidegger did not see his investigation as complete until the theory provided could prove itself by demonstrating why and how other major philosophers were led astray. This allows for us to estimate more closely what Heidegger would have said in these unwritten chapters of Being and Time’s second part.

(4) By having a broader understanding of authenticity in the applied sense, as any encounter which discloses the truth of the being in question, we can open up Heideggerian authenticity for a wider set of applications. We can see why Heidegger talks about authentic encounters with art in “The Origin of the Work of Art.” We can also speculate as to why Heidegger maintained the importance of the root eigen when his language transitioned to talk about ereignis in the thirties and forties. This raises the question: does authenticity ever fade from Heidegger’s thought, or does it just take on a new name?

Taken together, these reflections on authenticity are not just important for understanding some small portion of Being and Time, but rather speak to Heidegger broader philosophical method and the goals of his philosophy before and after Being and Time. Like Being, authenticity is said in many ways, and by working through the various ways that authenticity has been said, we have uncovered its originary meaning. Next, we will look at Heidegger’s thinking in the 1940s to show how his reflections on authenticity almost two decades later appear to coincide with the account developed in this dissertation.

6.2: AUTHENTICITY AND HUMANITAS

In addressing the central question of this dissertation, we have arrived at a definition of authenticity that can account for the phenomena present in Heidegger’s early period up to and
including the publication of *Being and Time*. Throughout this dissertation I have confined my statements concerning Heideggerian authenticity to this ‘early’ period, only rarely citing later Heidegger when appropriate. This was done to limit the scope of criticisms to this project and to make sure that the project could reach a definitive conclusion. The qualification ‘early’ arises in response to a vast secondary literature that sees in the ‘later’ work of Heidegger a departure from the themes and goals expressed in *Being and Time*.\(^1\) Although Heidegger’s later works do contain uses of ‘*eigentlich*’ and its family of terms, demonstrating that these uses parallel the uses found in *Being and Time* would take a significant amount of argumentation, assuming it is true in the first place.\(^2\) Consequently, while a theory of authenticity which can account for its uses in the five decades which follow *Being and Time* may be possible, and may in fact benefit from the work accomplished in this dissertation, it remains outside of the scope of the current

\(^1\) Scholars occasionally refer to this distinction as Heidegger I and II, signifying that they see a meaningful break between the two periods. (For Heidegger’s reflection on this distinction, see Richardson, *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*, xxii). In the secondary literature, the move from Heidegger I to II is referred to as Heidegger’s *Kehre* or “turn,” and is taken to signify Heidegger’s departure from the themes and goals of *Being and Time*. This interpretation clashes with Heidegger’s own reflections on the matter, but, as Lee Braver notes: “Regardless of how [Heidegger] uses the word, however, it has come to have this meaning in the secondary literature…” (Lee Braver, “Turn (Kehre)” in Mark A. Wrathall, ed., *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 783.) In other words, regardless of if Heidegger changed his philosophical views, scholars tend to use the less interpretively loaded “early” and “late” designations. The cut off between these time periods is itself a matter of debate, with some scholars suggesting we should adopt the idea of a *middle* Heidegger. (Thomson refers to writings from the 1930s as this ‘middle period’ in *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, 58fn.) In this dissertation, I have assumed that the early period is everything Heidegger wrote up to and including *Being and Time* occasionally stepping a bit beyond that to include lectures and writings from 1929 (most notably, GA 3). By my estimation, this period could genuinely be extended into the early 1930s. If there is a middle period, it would occupy the 1930s, which puts everything from 1940 on into Heidegger’s later period.\(^2\) For instance, in defining works of Art in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger uses the language of authenticity repeatedly.
project. And yet… there is at least one significant text that can establish a helpful bridge between early and later Heidegger, where Heidegger turns back to the question of Dasein (or mankind) to ask the question: What is the *humanitas* of the *homo humanis*?

In his famous “Letter on Humanism” from 1946, Heidegger revisits the question of the essence of human beings, returning to his work in *Being and Time* to supplement his account. In this essay, which first materialized as a letter to Jean Beaufret, Heidegger refutes the Sartrean (existentialist) reading of *Being and Time*, clarifying aspects of his thought that had gone misunderstood for two decades. In addition to these clarificatory remarks, this essay is important to this dissertation in three ways: First, it includes a return to a discussion of the essence of human beings – a return to the analytic of Dasein, where Heidegger clarifies what he was attempting to say in *Being and Time*. Second, in this essay, he addresses the question of the relationship between ethics and ontology. Third, this essay contains a clarification on the matter of his terminological use of *Eigentlichkeit* and *Uneigentlichkeit*. Taken together, this essay provides evidence for the interpretation of authenticity disclosed in this dissertation, while also suggesting the possibility of continuity between Heidegger’s early and later work.

This entire dissertation is a discussion of human essence. Already in the introduction to this dissertation, we recognized that “What it means to be true to yourself depends on what you

---

3 Mahon O’Brien’s incredibly insightful work in *Heidegger and Authenticity* can be seen as taking up this task. As I see it, his main objective is to establish the affinity between the later Heidegger’s *Gelassenheit* and the early Heidegger’s *Entschlossenheit*. He argues, in line with other thinkers like Thomas Sheehan, that there is significant continuity between early and late Heidegger which has been covered up by the secondary literature which overemphasizes Heidegger’s turn. By my estimation, the interpretation of authenticity developed by O’Brien is similar to the view developed in this dissertation, but with some significant departures. For one, O’Brien starts with *Being and Time* and attempts to derive his definition from that text alone, which means that he misses some of the crucial insights concerning authenticity to be found in these early lectures. In particular, O’Brien is silent on way that authenticity functions with regard to method, and does not attend to discussions of authentic encounters with non-Dasein entities. Nevertheless, O’Brien’s account of authenticity is one of the best I’ve encountered, and his argument for continuity between early and later Heidegger is persuasive.
are.” By carefully working through the analytic of Dasein, we saw that Heidegger’s account of this human essence is robust and can be interpreted on many levels. As a who, and not a what, Dasein is determined by its activity, rather than some properties or possibilities. As a Being-in-the-world, Dasein is determined by the horizons of intelligibility that it finds itself in. As a temporally unfolding entity, Dasein is its past, lives its present and projects itself meaningfully towards its future. For Heidegger, being true to your ownmost self, means understanding these aspects of your being and acting. This topic is taken up again in this later essay “Letter on Humanism.”

At the heart of this essay, we find Heidegger’s conflict with Sartre’s interpretation of Being and Time. Sartre equates humanism with existentialism, by taking “existence precedes essence” to mean that our being is entirely up for grabs. Sartre believes that Heidegger also follows this interpretation – as they are both atheist existentialists. For Sartre, the fact that Dasein’s essence lies in its existence means that human beings generate the meaning that we find in the world. As Braver puts it, “Sartre reads Being and Time as claiming that subjects supply all organization and value to an inert, absurd world…” While this is one possible way that Being and Time can be read, perhaps due to some unfortunate word choice on Heidegger’s part, it is a misreading of the central views of the text. Instead, Heidegger suggests that man’s essence, as existence, means that we are thrown into a world which resists our interpretations and pushes back. Although we can, and should attempt to project ourselves towards our future meaningfully, what that involves is determined by a series of things which are not up to us.

---

4 Braver, Heidegger’s Later Writings, 57-8.
5 Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, 20.
6 Braver, Heidegger’s Later Writings, 62.
7 Braver, Heidegger’s Later Writings, 58.
As demonstrated in chapter 4 this dissertation, for Heidegger, authentically encountering entities means letting entities show themselves in themselves as themselves, it means encountering them in their truth. This does not mean merely observing entities, but recognizing the kind of being they possess and engaging with them appropriately. Here Heidegger’s reflections in “Letter on Humanism” echo the view we cultivated in this dissertation insofar as what constitutes the appropriate way to encounter beings is determined by the truth of being itself, and not up to us:

Man is thrown from being itself into the truth of Being, so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of being, in order that beings might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are. Man does not decide whether and how beings appear, whether and how God and the gods or history and nature come forward into the clearing of Being, come to presence and depart. The advent of being lies in the destiny of Being.8

Here Heidegger connects some of the themes of his later thought with discussions found in Being and Time. Admittedly, when Heidegger engages in this kind of reflection on his past work, there is always a danger that Heidegger is misleading his audience by insisting there is more continuity between his early and later thought than there actually is. Nevertheless, with the view of authenticity developed in this dissertation, we can see that Heidegger’s 1940s reflections on the text are not at odds with our interpretation. As we can see, encountering other entities authentically requires that we let them be what they are. Contra Sartre, we cannot decide how they appear to us. He reiterates that this was his view all along in Being and Time, and now we have reason to take this seriously:

But for man it is ever a question of finding what is fitting in his essence that corresponds to such destiny; for in accord with this destiny man as ek-sisting has to guard the truth of Being. Man is the shepherd of Being. It is in this

8 GA 9: 330/BW 234.
direction alone that *Being and Time* is thinking when ecstatic existence is experienced as “care.”

Here Heidegger demonstrates that a key feature of the analytic of Dasein is found in our responsiveness to the truth of Being as we find it. Of course, human beings play some role in this encounter. As Braver puts it: “…we cannot properly think of ourselves or Being apart form the other: being is essentially appearing which needs someone to appear to.”

Dasein unconceals beings in their being. Here Heidegger connects his later concept of releasement (*Gelassenheit*) with his earlier notion of resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*). On the methodological reading developed in this dissertation we can see how this view was already presupposed in *Being and Time*. If authentically encountering entities means unconcealing them in the truth of their being, which means letting them show themselves in themselves, then Dasein’s resoluteness naturally entails this process of “releasing” or “letting entities” be seen in themselves. Of course, my account remains agnostic concerning the relationship between Heidegger’s early and later thought on authenticity. Nevertheless, it does bode well for my interpretation that later Heidegger seems to agree with the interpretation which I have already shown makes the most sense of the phenomena of authenticity as they appear in his early lectures up to *Being and Time*.

Admittedly, I am not the first to note this relationship. Mahon O’Brien’s work connecting early Heideggerian authenticity to later Heidegger’s thought is probably the most comprehensive and compelling account on this issue.

---

9 GA 9: 331/BW 234.
10 Braver, 66.
11 As Iain Thomson puts it: “Like the neo-Aristotelian view of ‘open resoluteness’ (Ent-Schlossenheit) that Heidegger developed in *Being and Time*, his later view of the active receptivity of ‘releasement’ (*Gelassenheit*) suggests a phenomenological development of ethical and aesthetic phronesis or practical wisdom.” (Thomson, “Heideggerian Perfectionism and the Phenomenology of the Pedagogical Truth Event” in *Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics*, 188.)
12 See O’Brien, *Heidegger and Authenticity*. 

257
In addition to providing a bridge between resoluteness and releasement, this essay also explains Heidegger’s thoughts on the relationship between ethics and ontology. In the practical interpretation of authenticity, Hatab demonstrated this affinity already by drawing on this essay. We can now look a bit deeper to see what Heidegger has to say about these two fields of study. In essence he equates the ontology and ethics, noting that ethics is a study into the ways of being of Dasein, but as ways of being they are part of the broader purview of ontology.\(^\text{13}\) Heidegger goes a step further, however, saying that basically both ontology and ethics are derivative of what he’s talking about now.

Lastly, this essay is particularly relevant because in it we find later Heidegger speaking directly about *Eigentlichkeit* and *Uneigentlichkeit*. Here he reiterates that these terms are not anthropological, moral, or existentialist concepts. Rather, they are provisional technical terms which serve to point us towards the “truth of Being”:

Accordingly, the terms ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’, which are used in a provisional fashion, do not imply a moral-existentiell or an ‘anthropological’ distinction by rather a relation which, because it has been hitherto concealed from philosophy, has yet to be thought for the first time, an ‘ecstatic’ relation of the essence of man to the truth of Being. But this relation is as it is not by reason of ek-sistence; on the contrary, the essence of ek-sistence derives existentially-ecstatically form the essence of the truth of Being.\(^\text{14}\)

This connection between authenticity and truth was developed most clearly in chapter 4 of this dissertation. We can now see that it squares nicely with later Heidegger’s reflections on the

\(^{13}\) GA 9: 353/BW 255: “Where the essence of man is thought so essentially, i.e., solely form the question concerning the truth of Being, but still without elevating man to the center of beings, a longing necessary awakens for a peremptory directive and for rules that say how man, experienced from ek-sistence toward Being, ought to live in a fitting manner.”

\(^{14}\) GA 9: 332-3/BW 236.
matter. Later Heidegger continues to develop this view of encountering the truth of being through our authentic encounters with entities:

Man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of Being. Man loses nothing in this ‘less’; rather, he gains in that he attains the truth of Being. He gains the essential poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the preservation of Being’s truth.\(^{15}\)

It does not seem like much a stretch now to move from letting entities show themselves in their truth, to the notion of authentic disclosure as guarding and preserving the truth. As Mahon O’Brien so elegantly puts it:

What Heidegger is continually exhorting [in these later lectures] is the necessity of authenticity… In other words, how do we authentically relate to ourselves, each other and the world around us? In his early thinking, resoluteness, that is, the resolve to will is pivotal nevertheless, to will in *Being and Time* involves a ‘letting’. The phenomenology of *Being and Time* was appropriate as a way of letting beings be: as opposed to imposing a framework, it allows beings to emerge. To be resolute then can be seen as willing to let beings/things be.\(^{16}\)

It should be noted that the goal of this section is not to suggest that later Heidegger and early Heidegger are perfectly contiguous, but rather to suggest that Heidegger’s early thoughts on authenticity, particularly the view developed in this dissertation, seem to coincide with later Heidegger’s reflections on the matter. Heidegger’s discussion of *Entschlossenheit* and *Gelassenheit*, his account of the relationship between ethics and ontology, and his account of the purpose of authenticity and inauthenticity in *Being and Time*, all coincide nicely with the views developed in this dissertation. In this way, the methodological interpretation of authenticity not only accounts for early Heidegger’s thoughts on the matter but also squares nicely with his retrospective interpretation. While it is not necessary that our account agree with later

\(^{15}\) GA 9: 342/BW 245.

Heidegger’s self-assessment, it does not hurt that it does. Now we can turn to one final task of this investigation, which opens up the possibility of reinterpreting *Being and Time* and Heidegger’s other works, by focusing on a translation which can make sense of full phenomena in question.

**6.3: *EIGENTLICH* TRANSLATION**

We have seen now why the question of the meaning of authenticity has been so difficult to answer: Heidegger uses authenticity in many ways, producing numerous indications as to what this term means to him philosophically. It has a methodological use which applies to the process of working through what has been said and what appears to us in our everyday interpretations, and an applied sense which speaks to particular encounters with entities. Even among the various encounters that Heidegger entertains in *Being and time*, we saw that the authenticity of that encounter is determined by the type of entity in question. Consequently, authentic being-oneself is vastly different from authentic encounters with tools or other people. In this section, we will consider a new translation that can address the multifaceted nature of this technical term.

As seen above, when *Eigentlichkeit* is translated as authenticity, a tendency which both derives from and reinforces the traditional interpretation of *Being and Time*, many aspects of this term can become obscured. Because authenticity often feels like an inappropriate term in sections which do not contain the traditional themes of authenticity, Macquarrie and Robison were often forced to forsake continuity in the name of readability. This has resulted in inconsistency within the English translation of *Being and Time*, where *Eigentlichkeit* in its fuller methodological sense remained opaque.

Alongside the difficulty of inconsistency within texts, we are also presented with the problem of inconsistency across Heidegger’s rather large collection of works. Due to the
linguistic difficulties expressed in chapter two, differences in translation styles among scholars, and disagreements concerning its technical definition and use, what we find in the English editions of Heidegger’s work is that *eigentlich* (and its various formulations) is translated in many ways. Sometimes this inconsistency across texts is merely the result of a genuine philosophical disagreement about how this family of terms should be rendered. Within texts which identify *eigentlich* as a technical term, it is still possible that a translator might translate it as genuine, proper, or real. As a result, the connection between these uses of *eigentlich* and the discussions of authenticity in *Being and Time* are obscured. But so long as the translator remains internally consistent, a single footnote pointing out this connection is enough to bridge the gap. Often translators opt to provide a short list of terms and their chosen translation in the form of a glossary in the back. This is a nice compromise for scholars who wish to emphasize a different way of interpreting a term without cutting it off entirely from other works which share the same term.

As Heideggerian scholarship develops, partially as a result of the novel work of scholars, and partially as a product of the release of additional scholarly resources from Heidegger’s body of works, we should also expect that technical terms take on different meanings as their context becomes clarified. The evolution of terminology is an important part of philosophy and translators are often responsible for bringing about paradigm shifts by virtue of how they render words. We know that terminology grows and changes over time. New translations are required to breathe new life into stale texts with outdated terms. We should expect that *eigentlich* would follow a similar path.
6.3.1: Old Translation

By choosing the word “authentic” I believe that Macquarrie and Robinson set themselves up for failure, as this term clearly feels out of place in contexts lacking existentialist themes.

Authenticity means authority or authorship. Etymologically it means a form of “self-doing” where the being in question asserts itself, like an author writing their own story. This speaks directly to the way that Heideggerian authenticity is interpreted in narrativist terms. But it also fails to account for discussions of a proper (eigene) philosophical method. Consequently, when forced to translate a sentence on eigentlich science, or eigentlich progress, Macquarie and Robinson opted for clarity over consistency. Because authentic being-oneself, a major theme of this text, was tied to themes like resoluteness and death, our translators were hesitant to draw a connection between these themes. After all, what would it mean for a science to resolutely project itself in light of the inevitability of its own death?

Peter Kemp argues along this line regarding the French reception of Heidegger, noting that French translator’s choice to render eigentlich as “authenticité” rather than “propriété” may have misled French interpreters of Heidegger for years, specifically Sartre and Ricoeur.\footnote{Kemp, “Ricoeur between Heidegger and Lévinas,” 50.}

Since the French interpretation of Heidegger, and especially the work of Sartre, played such an influential role in setting the stage for Heidegger’s Anglo-American reception, it is possible that translation choices made in these early French editions had an unrecognized influence on the English translation. Although Heidegger spent many years and pages trying to distance himself from the French existentialist interpretation of his work, Macquarrie was not shy about comparing him to Sartre:
Heidegger’s views were very different [than Sartre’s], though sometimes he does seem to speak with a voice very much like Sartre’s. So if he was misunderstood, it was largely his own fault.\textsuperscript{18}

Here, Macquarrie claims that an affinity between Sartre’s work and Heidegger’s is the result of Heidegger’s failure to differentiate himself clearly enough. That Macquarrie sees an affinity between their work at all, suggests that perhaps he saw a similarity between the French *authenticité* in Sartre, and the German *Eigentlichkeit* in Heidegger, establishing one justification for translating the term as authenticity. Of course, this is all speculation, since Macquarrie and Robinson never provided any justification for their use of the term.

But this leads us to another significant question: If the translation of philosophical terms is open to change in light of new information and clarified contexts, then what is the best translation of *eigentlich*, today? We are now ready to answer this question.

\textbf{6.3.2: New Translation}

Above we clarified that *Eigentlichkeit* should be considered as it refers to the method of phenomenological ontology, and to its application to particular phenomenological encounters. Thus, we need a word which captures the broader use of the term which speaks to method and a word that speaks to the way that any particular entity shows itself from itself. Furthermore, any translation would need to be able to be modifiable in a way which allows for its various formulations to be translated in similar fashion. As Kemp suggests above, the French translation of *Eigentlichkeit* to *authenticité* rather than *propriété* was a mistake. I think this applies to the English translation as well. As mentioned in chapter two, the connection between *eigentlich* (translated as “authentic”) and *eigen* (translated as “own” or “proper”) is obscured by using

authenticity. We are not just looking for a term, but a family of terms which all share a common root. Lastly, because this word is so frequently utilized, it will need to flow conveniently in a number of sentences in varying contexts. In this section, I aim to show that the root word which fits all of these criteria best is “proper.”

As a technical term, “properness” is not without its faults. The word itself suggests appropriate behavior in the sense of acting courteously or performing all the correct social graces and avoiding faux pas. Thus, when we speak about the properness of Dasein’s being, we will need to specify that we do not mean in the sense of tending to social mores.

That said, speaking about “the proper encounter with a hammer as one which tends to the being of that hammer” does make a great deal more sense than Macquarrie and Robinson’s discussion of an “authentic encounter with a hammer.” Additionally, we can recognize that a proper encounter with a hammer is one that tends to its proper use which is itself a property, something belonging to the hammer itself, in the broadest sense of the term. Heidegger himself seems to link the term eigentlich with the Latin “proprie” in his translation of Augustine’s “Ad oculos enim videre proprie pertinet” as “Seeing belongs properly [eigentlich] to the eyes.”

By using the term proper, we can also make use of the readily available English term “appropriation” in translating “aneignen” which involves taking something which already exists and making it our own (eigen). As we saw above, proper Dasein is forced to appropriate (an-eig[e]n-en) possibilities from the past to become who it is. And we should recall that Heidegger

19 It also speaks to later Heidegger’s thoughts on the term. See GA 9: 332-3/253.
20 I fully acknowledge that Heidegger is emphatic that the being of a hammer is not a property of the hammer in the sense of some predicate which is contained within a present-at-hand entity.
21 SZ: 171.
often reminds us that what he means by *eigentlich* is that something is “zu eigen”: proper to itself. I should further note that there is already a trend in the scholarship to translate *eigentlich* and its various formulations as proper. This may have been apparent in some of the block quotes above. This tendency speaks to the broader context for *eigentlich* which has come to light since the publication of *Being and Time*.

My suggestion is that we recognize that these uses in the secondary literature and various new translations are not disconnected from the discussions of “authenticity” found in *Being and Time*. Although these discussions fall outside of the existentialist interpretation, they remain well within the bounds of the methodological use of authenticity outlined in this dissertation.

Translating *eigentlich* as proper also has the further advantage of potentially establishing a link between early Heidegger’s thoughts on resolute Dasein, and the later Heidegger’s reflections on the “event of appropriation” known as *Ereignis* (*er-eig[e]n-is*) which shares this common root. Although a link between the early and later Heidegger on this issue is itself a matter of complex debate, I hope that I have provided the possibility of seeing *Eigentlichkeit* in a broader and more methodological sense which may be helpful for linking up Heidegger’s early phenomenological thought to these later ideas. In other words, while *Ereignis* may seem like a far cry from a discussion of anticipating one’s death, it may not be all that different from the phenomenological methods of formal indication and destruction.22

Lee Braver demonstrates the utility of translating authenticity as properness: “…

Heidegger thinks that most of the time we live in ways that are inappropriate to the kinds of beings that we are, so we need to appropriate our lives, which are already our “property,” to do

22 See GA 71: 154-161.
what is proper to our way of being…”23 Recall that Heidegger determines the being of Dasein in the same way that Aristotle does, by looking to what is special, or idion. Idion is another way of speaking about what is proper to the thing, what is its own. In Latin, the standard interpretation of idion is proprium, which is the word Heidegger also translates to eigentlich in Sein und Zeit.24 Using this formulation, we can take Pindar’s famous phrase “become who you are” and reimagine in as “appropriate your property properly.”25

All in all, proper seems to speak to the way that an encounter attends to the particularities of that being. “Properseness” may be a loaded term in English, but so is “authenticity.” When it comes to translating Heidegger, there is no perfect translation. The best we can hope for is a term which is flexible and demonstrates its relationship to terms which share a common root. This echoes Heidegger’s own considerations found in 1924 when he is considering the method for translating Aristotle into German:

A word can be expressly and directly stamped as a term at one with the discovery and apprehension of a matter to be understood thus and so. However, it is also the case that an already customary word can be given a determinate meaning in addition from out of investigative research into a matter, in such a way that the additional meaning stands in some relation of lineage to the already customary meaning, that therefore an aspect of meaning which is co-understood inexplicitly in the customary meaning acquires a thematic role in the terminological meaning, which is in question in a determinate way in the express use of the word as a term.26

Here Heidegger speaks of two ways of generating terms: Either we create the term out of nothing, selecting a word which fits the matter, or we look at an existing word to see if this additional meaning fits with the lineage of its present meaning. It is clear that Heidegger did this

23 Braver, Heidegger Thinking of Being, 24.
24 Special thanks to Mor Segev for reminding me of this.
25 Braver prefers “Appropriate your property appropriately.” Here we can see that I have appropriated his line.
26 GA 18: 344/233.
when he established *eigentlich* as a technical term. Perhaps we should follow his lead by selecting a word which has its meaning inexplicitly co-understood within it.

In what follows, I’d like to consider a few selections from *Being and Time* which talk about Dasein’s *eigentlich* Being, and demonstrate how they come to light when retranslated:

German: Das Seiende, dem es in seinem Sein um dieses selbst geht, verhält sich zu seinem Sein als seiner eigensten Möglichkeit.  
M&R: That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility.  
JJP: That entity, which goes around this self in its own being, relates itself to its being as its most proper possibility.

In defining the self, we see Heidegger immediately begins to use the language of *eigen*, as an attempt to identify the *idion*, the special function or feature of Dasein. He identifies this self-relation as mineness, something which we all have as beings which carry out our own possibilities.

Continuing on in the same paragraph, we can see that Heidegger continually uses the language of *eigen* to speak about the peculiarities of Dasein:


M&R: And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and

27 SZ: 42.  
29 SZ 42-3.
never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic—that is, something of its own—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness.  

JP: And because Dasein at each moment is essentially its ownmost possibility, this entity can ‘choose’ and win itself; or lose itself in the sense of never or only ‘seemingly’ winning itself. Dasein can have lost itself and not yet have won itself, only insofar as it is possible for it, according to its essence, to be proper Dasein, to ap-prop-riate itself. The two modes of being of properness and improperness – these expressions are meant terminologically in the strict sense of the word – are grounded therein, that Dasein is generally determined through mineness.

We can see here the first time that Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit are introduced as technical terms in Being and Time. By utilizing the English term “proper,” and its family of terms, we are able to draw a connection between the eigen of Eigentlichkeit and the eigen in zueigen, here translated as proper and a-prop-riate respectively. This is helpful for demonstrating the etymological root of these concepts and to signify to us that Heidegger’s uses of these terms are linked.

As proof of concept, let us entertain a few more quotes from Heidegger’s works that may help us see the value of this alternative translation. Below will provide the German, the Macquarie and Robinson translation, and my own translation utilizing the language of properness. First, let us look to a discussion of disclosedness, a crucial part of the analytic of Dasein where Heidegger lays out our unique ability to disclose our own being to ourselves:

German: Die letztgenannte Möglichkeit besagt: das Dasein erschließt sich ihm selbst im eigensten und als eigenstes Seinkönnen. Diese eigentliche Erschlossenheit zeigt das Phänomen der ursprünglichsten Wahrheit im Modus der Eigentlichkeit. Die ursprünglichste und zwar eigentlichste Erschlossenheit,

---

30 Heidegger, Being and Time, 68/42-3
in der das Dasein als Seinkönnen sein kann, ist die Wahrheit der Existenz. Sie erhält erst im Zusammenhang einer Analyse der Eigentlichkeit des Daseins ihre existenzial-ontologische Bestimmtheit.  

M&R: The possibility just mentioned means that Dasein discloses itself to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality-for Being. This authentic disclosedness shows the phenomenon of the most primordial truth in the mode of authenticity. The most primordial, and indeed the most authentic, disclosedness in which Dasein, as a potentiality-for-Being, can be, is the truth of existence. This becomes existentially and ontologically definite only in connection with the analysis of Dasein's authenticity.  

JJP: This recently mentioned possibility means: Dasein discloses itself to itself in its most proper [eigentsten] and as its most proper [eigenstes] potential for being. This proper [eigentliche] disclosedness shows the phenomena of the most original truth in the mode of properness [Eigentlichkeit]. The most original and admittedly most proper [eigentlichste] disclosure, that as Dasein, it can be its potential for being, is the truth of existence. This first becomes existentially-ontologically determined in in the context of the analysis of Dasein’s properness [Eigentlichkeit].  

Once again, utilizing proper maintains a level of continuity sorely missed by the Macquarrie and Robinson translation. Notice that the relation between eigensten, eigenstes, eigentlich and Eigentlichkeit are all adequately captured by my translation. It is much clearer that what is special about Dasein’s ability to disclose entities is that it has the ability to disclose itself as a discloser. We only come to understand this by unpacking and analyzing authentic Dasein.  

Now let us look at some quotes from those sections which troubled Macquarrie and Robinson and forced them to ignore technical uses of eigentlich. Here Heidegger is talking about the paradigmatic form of Being, what is “really real,” for Descartes:  

German: … schreibt [Descartes] der Welt gleichsam ihr »eigentliches« Sein vor.  

---

32 SZ: 221. Original emphasis.  
33 Heidegger, Being and Time, 264.  
34 SZ: 221. My translation.  
35 SZ: 96.
M&R: Instead [Descartes] prescribes for the world its ‘real [eigentliches]’ being…  

JJP:  … [Descartes] prescribes, so to speak, the world’s “proper” being.

In this example, replacing “real” with “proper” does not do much to change the meaning of the sentence, since real and proper are somewhat synonymous. It does, however, draw our attention to the possibility that Heidegger believes that, within the history of philosophy, there are competing traditional conceptions of what it means to be a proper being. Even if we disagree with Descartes, we can accept that what he saw as the proper being was that which constantly endured.

Lastly, we will look to how “proper” might work in the more existentialist contexts. In the following (rather large) quote, we find Heidegger discussing the way that death as possibility provides the reflective catalyst which breaks down our worlds:


M&R: [Death as individualizing] makes manifest that all Being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us when our ownmost potentiality-for-being is the issue. Dasein can be authentically itself only if it makes this possible for itself of its own accord. But if concern and solicitude fail us, this does not signify at all that these ways of Dasein have been cut off from its authentically Being-its-Self. As structures

36 Heidegger, Being and Time, 129.
37 SZ: 263-4.
essential to Dasein’s constitution, these have a share in conditioning the possibility of any existence whatsoever. Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being rather than upon the possibility of the they-self. The entity which anticipates its non-relational possibility, is thus forced by that very anticipation into the possibility of taking over from itself its ownmost Being, and doing so of its own accord.\textsuperscript{38}

JJP: [Death as individualizing] makes manifest that all Being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will break down \textit{versagt} when our most proper \textit{eigenste} potentiality-for-being is the issue. Dasein can be itself properly only if it makes this [proper potentiality-for-being] possible for itself out of it itself. The breakdown \textit{Versagen} of concern and caring-for does not mean that these ways of being are cut off from Dasein’s proper \textit{eigentlichen} Being-oneself. As essential structures of Dasein’s constitution, these belong as a prerequisite \textit{Bedingung} for the possibility of existence in general. Dasein is properly \textit{eigentlich} itself only so far as it projects itself up its most proper \textit{eigenstes} ability-to-be, as concernful being-alongside and caring-for being-with, but not towards a possibility of the they-self \textit{Manselbst}. The anticipation of its non-relational possibility forces anticipatory [Dasein] into the possibility of taking over its most proper \textit{eigensten} being from within itself.

Once again, the relationship between \textit{eigensten} and \textit{eigentlich} is on full display in this retranslation. The connection between \textit{Eigentlichkeit}, death, being-with, and being-alongside is clarified nicely in this quote. As discussed above, although we experience the breakdown of these horizons when we encounter death as a possibility-for-being which individuates, we ultimately must seize some project from these horizons once we resolutely choose our fate and become our most proper selves.

The advantages of translating \textit{eigentlich} and its family of terms as “proper” have been demonstrated. “Proper” works well in existentialist and non-existentialist contexts alike, and avoids some of the linguistic baggage associated with “authentic”, while drawing our attention to other words with the shared etymological root of \textit{eigen}. In fully defining this more

\textsuperscript{38} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 308.
comprehensive notion of *Eigentlichkeit*, I showed that translating our term as properness, and the family of words which accompany it, results in a clearer philosophical picture, free of the traditional baggage that has brought with it a misunderstanding of this term for generations.

6.4: CONCLUSION

In concluding the conclusion, perhaps it is best to restate where this project started. It began with the question “What does Heidegger mean when he says authenticity in *Being and Time*?” What we discovered was that the secondary literature has long focused on one particular mode of authenticity at the cost of missing the full phenomena of authenticity. The reason for this interpretation was linguistic as well as philosophical. After sorting out the linguistic side of this problem we set to uncovering the philosophical basis for this narrow interpretation of authenticity. By looking to the full phenomena of authenticity we were able to trace its origin back to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle. There we found Aristotle as the inspiration for both the methodological and applied sense of authenticity. We then brought this new theory to bear on the tradition of Heidegger scholarship where we found that our interpretation was able to account for more of the phenomena while explaining the shortcomings of these other interpretations. Lastly, in this concluding chapter, we entertained some possible directions for this new interpretation of authenticity as it relates to later Heidegger’s thinking and proposed a new translation for this technical term: properness.
REFERENCES

HEIDEGGER’S COLLECTED WORKS

Below is a list of citations from Martin Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe. The first page citation refers to the German edition of the text and the second page citation refers to its location in the English translation. All translations are assumed to be from these texts unless there is no English edition, or I specify otherwise. These works are listed in chronological order based on when Heidegger composed the original text:


OTHER REFERENCES


John Preston

From: Scott Campbell
Sent: Wednesday, October 5, 2022 12:55 PM
To: John Preston
Subject: Re: Publication Disclosure for Dissertation (Gatherings)

John,

Thanks for your message. I apologize for not responding sooner. I am on sabbatical in Germany and buried in a project. At any rate, yes, of course, you have my permission to use that material in your dissertation. Best of luck with your dissertation defense! Can you share the title of your dissertation? Is Lee the Director? It's been a long time since last we talked. I hope all is well. Take care.

Regards,
Scott