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The Domestic Reality of Foreign Policy: The 1994 Clinton Administration Response to the Crises in Rwanda and Haiti

Camara Kemanini Silver
University of South Florida

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The Domestic Reality of Foreign Policy: The 1994 Clinton Administration Response
to the Crises in Rwanda and Haiti.

by

Camara Kemanini Silver

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
with a concentration in government
School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Earl Conteh-Morgan, Ph.D.
Peter Funke, Ph.D.
Lawrence Morehouse, Ph.D.
Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.

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Keywords: presidency, post-cold war, news media, interest groups, public opinion

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Dedication

I have to thank my husband, James Michael Howerton, who never gave up on me, and is the source of inspiration.

When I was 13, my mom rented a movie called Hotel Rwanda. Yes, a film is a reason why I wanted to learn more about the Rwandan genocide. Critically looking at popular culture can light the flame for future research.

The most credit goes to my amazing mother, Veronica Bell, who rented the film in 2004n on a Friday evening. There is no rule book for raising two sons; my mom has always encouraged my intellectual curiosity. After watching the film, I couldn't help but wonder how, in a post-Holocaust world, another genocide could occur. This question has been the focus of my entire academic career.

This dissertation is for Shamari Silver, who had to endure my ramblings about school for years, and for my Mom and Grandma-Joyce Spell always supported me and sacrificed so much for my education. My uncle Roland Eugene Salter and Aunt Eulu Salter helped raise me as a toddler, I am forever grateful for their act of love. Lastly, I cannot forget my incredible parents in-law-Kathy Howerton and James "Jim" Dale Howerton, who would drop me off and retrieve me from the airport for when I would travel to conduct research interviews.

One close friend needs to be acknowledged in dedication to Gabriel Sanchez Jr., a good friend since the tenth grade. We went to King High School together, we

worked our first job together, we went to Saint Leo together, and the list goes on and on. We pushed each other to reach greatness.

I also dedicate my dissertation to the Upward Bound program, which helped pay for my ACT/SAT registration and college applications. Upward Bound is a pre-college program that supports first-generation and low-income students get into college. I would never have learned about this program if it wasn't for my terrific guidance counselor, Mrs. Holt-Smith, who recommended the program to me. Also, I would like to thank Mrs. Simone Reddick, who, as my academic advisor, helped me navigate through the uncertain terrain of the college application process. Thank you to the late Dr. Douglas Astolfi of Saint Leo University, who saw potential in me by purchasing a suit for me and inciting my curiosity by supervising my bachelor's thesis focused on the Rwanda Genocide.

Lastly, this dissertation is dedicated to the future students of Upward Bound; I hope this paper provides you with proof that you can indeed accomplish your dreams. I always tell my Upward Bound students, "If you do not dream big, then who will do it for you?"

For

My Mom (Veronica Bell), my Grandma (Joyce Spell), Upward Bound students, St Leo University students, University of South Florida students, and for anyone with a fluency disability like me because "your voice matters."

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Throughout my life, educators have played a pivotal role in cultivating my thirst for knowledge. I would like to thank Marcia Austen, Kimberly Leach from Letchworth Central School, who fostered an inclusive learning environment.

When I was a King High School student, even though academic success seemed bleak for me, I had various teachers' support. Amanda Perez, Jennifer Soprano, Karly Dell, Bijaya Bose, Brodrick Rivers, Benjamin Burnett, and David Edwards told me that anything was possible as long as I had a thirst for learning.

Since 2013, I have been perhaps the longest-serving graduate assistant for USF Upward Bound Program. If it were not for the dedication, mentorship, and help from Raymond Cabrera, I would have given up a long time ago. I would also like to thank my terrific colleagues -Lawanna Hair, Carrie Blaustein, Evelyn Keeton, and Morris Martin. The Upward Bound staff cheered me on from completing my Master's in Africana Studies to the defense of my doctoral dissertation.

I cannot forget to mention Saint Leo University, which allowed me to attend a university. As stated in my dedication, this dissertation started as a bachelor's thesis under Dr. Astolfi. If it were not for: Reggie Hill, Dr. Heather Parker, Dr. Tyson Anderson, Dr. David Persky, Dr. Anthony Epositio, Dr. Jack McTague, I would not have ever gained the academic background that made completing a Ph.D. possible.

My graduate studies at the University of South Florida have helped me become a more polished scholar. I am grateful for having the opportunity to have completed a

Master's of Africana Studies, where I learned valuable interdisciplinary research methods that I have used to complete my dissertation. I took a class on Haiti with Dr. Kersuze Simeon-Jones, who introduced me to Haiti, one of the cases my dissertation focuses on concerning Rwanda. My Master's thesis, which was "The U.S. Response to Genocide in Rwanda: A Reassessment," would become the blueprint for my dissertation. Dr. Edward Kissi, who was my Master's thesis director, was a tremendous help. Dr. Kissi is a kind scholar who helped me realize that I had an interest in international relations.

Moreover, I would like to thank the School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies (SIGS), who allowed me to admit me as part of the 2015 cohort of students. Dr. Bernd Reiter, who was then the graduate director, gave me a chance by accepting me, and I truly grateful for that. Dr. Reiter referred me to the McKnight Fellowship, and I appreciate what the Florida Education Fund has done to fund my graduate studies. SIGS represents interdisciplinary studies, and my research is an embodiment of that. I want to thank Dr. Steven Roach, who help refine and expand my knowledge on human rights issues. I am thankful for everyone in the 2015 Ph.D. program student cohort, but I want to spotlight Dragana Mvros, whom I took most of my doctoral classes; she has been a trusted colleague and a great friend.

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Abstract

Domestic politics steered The 1994 Clinton Administration's response to the violence in Rwanda and Haiti. This dissertation takes a novel approach by employing a case study method to gauge the political capital of domestic variables such as the news media, interest groups, and public opinion. This dissertation argues that domestic variables' presence and absence can explain foreign policy outcomes in a post-Cold War era. The fear of another version of a "Black Hawk Down" forced the Clinton Administration to streamlined its support in foreign policy decisions requiring domestic input. The 1994 crises in Rwanda and Haiti offer two case studies where policymakers can examine the power of the news media, interest groups, and public opinion to influence foreign policy decisions. The narrative of the news coverage, interest groups, and public opinion provided the Clinton Administration with the political support it needed to use ground troops to restore "democracy" in Haiti. At the same time, the Clinton Administration echoed the public reluctance to get involved in Rwanda. The Clinton Administration's support of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 to provide troops to Haiti resulted in eliminating the military Junta. In contrast, the Clinton Administration did not support American troops on the ground in Rwanda, and the violence escalated into genocide

Chapter 1: Introduction

Abstract

Chapter One introduces the need to include domestic variables in the foreign policy decision-making process. Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy is a case study that analyzes the Clinton Administration's decision-making calculus in its 1994 involvement in Rwanda and Haiti. I examine the role of three domestic variables: the news media, interest groups, and public opinion to determine the power of domestic politics in the foreign policy decision-making process. To make my case that domestic politics are important in the foreign policy -decision-making process. I look at the political climate of 1994. Still, I bring in -Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and Role Theory to demonstrate that domestic voice matters in foreign policy decisions in a post-Cold War.

Post-Cold War American Domestic Expansion: Substantive Focus

In 1994, the Clinton Administration made two significant contrasting decisions regarding foreign humanitarian crises. One is the unwillingness to provide American ground troops during the genocide in Rwanda. In comparison, the second decision is advocating American armed Intervention to restore Jean Aristide as president of Haiti following a violent military coup that removed him from power on September 30. 1991 (The New York Times 1991: hereafter NYT). These two events defined Clinton's foreign policy decisions. The conclusion supported a policy of "inaction"

regarding Rwanda and "action" regarding Haiti. The 1994 American domestic political atmosphere influenced the Clinton Administration's decision-making process. The power of three domestic factors of foreign policy directly impacted the Clinton Administration's decision-making process:

1. News media
2. Public opinion
3. Interest groups

These domestic variables played a central role in the Clinton Administration's supporting Intervention in Haiti and not in Rwanda. This dissertation uses Rwanda and Haiti's events as case studies while also examining the three specific domestic factors mentioned and shines a light on domestic politics' significance on foreign policy decisions.

These two case studies, Rwanda and Haiti, demonstrate a relationship between the American public and the Clinton Administration's foreign policy decision-making process involving humanitarian crises. The Clinton Administration's calculus in determining whether to intervene with armed forces or not was a political reflection on a disastrous peacekeeping effort in Mogadishu, Somalia (commonly known as the Battle of Mogadishu). In October 1993, Somali rebel forces ambushed and killed 18 U.S. Army Rangers as part of a US-led armed assault named Operation Gothic Serpent (Armstrong, 2009). During the mission, the loss of American life ignited outrage among the American public, which restrained the Clinton Administration's commitment to providing military support to U.N. missions that were not in the U.S.'s political interest.

In this dissertation, I critically analyze why the Clinton Administration in 1994 did not intervene in Rwanda during an ongoing humanitarian crisis that resulted in genocide but sent American armed forces to Haiti to restore the pro-American president, Jean Aristide. I examine how the news media, public opinion, and interest groups influenced these foreign policy decisions.

This dissertation focuses on domestic variables, specifically the news media, public opinion, and interest groups, impact American foreign policy. As case studies, I examine the reaction of the U.S. to two humanitarian crises that took place in 1994—the Rwandan genocide and the military Junta's coup in Haiti—to gauge the influence of domestic politics. As discussed earlier, the end of the Cold War, coupled with Bush's New World Order doctrine, changed the U.S. foreign policy focus from Containment to upholding global human security. After the 1992 election of Bill Clinton, the U.S. furthered the New World Order's idea by focusing on expanding democracies and free markets (Dumbrell, 2002).

The following section briefly discusses the political, historical background of the two case studies of this dissertation, the Rwandan genocide, and the Haitian military coup, to better comprehend the context behind the United States' reaction to both.

Political Development of Rwanda

Rwanda's path to genocide involved the legacy of the Kingdom of Belgium's colonialism, which created lasting divisions between the two main ethnic groups, the Hutu and Tutsi. Mahmood Mamdani's (2001) *When Victims Become Killers*:

Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda provides a post-colonial history of the divisions between the Hutus and Tutsis and explains the genocide in Rwanda was due to a mounting tension brought on by the Belgian colonists. After Germany's defeat in World War I, Germany was forced by the League of Nations to hand Rwanda over to Belgium (Mamdani, 2001). Belgium nationalized the two ethnic groups and imposed European standards of colorism and eugenics onto them. Scott Strauss (2004), in *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Genocide*, argues Europeans did not invent the two groups but saw the Tutsis as the superior race. The colonists reconceptualized the two groups by issuing identity cards based on color tone, nose length, and height. The Tutsis were seen as more elegant and "European-looking" because of their light skin tone, thin nose, and tall stature, and were given governmental jobs by the Belgians (Strauss, 2004).

When Belgium pulled out of Rwanda in the 1960s, the Hutus' as the biggest ethnic group, gained control of the Rwandan Government. The Rwandan independence movement of the 1960s solidified the Hutus' place as the ruling group in Rwanda, but unrest between the two groups persisted for decades. Moreover, the liberation of Africans from their European colonizers was a microcosm of the wave of Pan-Africanist thought in the 1950s and 1960s that helped bring Rwanda's Belgium rule to an end (Malisa & Nhengeze, 2018). The social and political inequalities Belgium introduced to Rwanda produced the Rwandan Revolution in the early 1960s (Silver, 2015). The Hutus ousted the Tutsi majority, and, once in power, Tutsis rebelled in a series of conflicts(not to be confused with a crisis) against the Hutu-led government.

The aftermath of the Hutus' grab for power led to decades of tension among the ethnic groups. The violence in Rwanda bled into the 1990s resulting in a Civil War. The two sides included the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Hutu government. The Arusha Accords gave the perception that the Civil War came to an end in August 1993. The perceived peace agreements were hosted by the US, France, and the Organisation of African Unity(OAU) and supervised by the United Nations(The U.N.) (The Rapporteur Report, 2014). The Arusha Accords effectively ended the fighting, acting as a thin peace agreement between the Hutu government and the RPF by establishing a power-sharing agreement between the two political factions (Silver, 2015). Peace did not last long. On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, a Hutu, was assassinated, and this event is credited as the immediate cause of the genocide (Gourevitch, 2010). However, before the assassination, there is evidence the Interahamwe militia—a paramilitary organization operating under the Hutu government's support—was already preparing to round up and kill Tutsis' (Stanton 2004)

The US was a strong supporter of Rwanda's United Nations Assistance Mission (UNAMIR) and its peace process in Rwanda. Still, this peace process between the Hutu-led Government and the Tutsi-led RPF occurred after the U.S. had re-evaluated its role in global peacekeeping operations due to its botched peacekeeping effort in Somalia (Barnett, 2002) (Silver, 2015).

Political Development of Haiti

Haiti's political instability can be traced back to the early nineteenth century when the African slaves liberated themselves and became an independent state in

1804 (Coupeau, 2008) (Gaffield, 2007). Before Haiti becoming independent, French Saint-Domingue shared its half of the island with the Spanish colony San Hispaniola Santo Domingo for over one hundred years and was populated mainly by slaves from Africa to work the sugar plantations (Coupeau, 2008). The harsh treatment of the African slaves by the French was the primary cause of France losing control of its colony.

The United States' interest in Haiti started when President Guillaume Sam's rule came to an end in 1915 (Coupeau, 2008). Rosalvo Bobo's occupation, who was an anti-American, came into power (Coupeau, 2008). The goal of the United States was to create a Haiti with American-installed politicians with pro-American leanings. The U.S.' occupation's broader goals were to restore the economy, keep the country safe by creating a police force—the Gendarmerie d'Haiti—and establish medical facilities (Schmidt, 1995). American financial firms dominated the Haitian economy at the time. Haiti's most significant benefactors were the National Citibank of New York, which held stock in Haiti's two largest American companies (Schmidt, 1995). There are multiple debates on the influence of America's occupation of Haiti. Some scholars posit the U.S. played a decisive role in restoring democracy in Haiti. In contrast, other scholars argue the U.S.' goal was not to promote democracy but to ensure a dominant American monopoly of Haiti's goods by excluding European powers.

Haiti's American occupation is quintessential to this dissertation because it shows what the U.S. is willing to do when the political instability is too close to the United States to ignore. Moreover, as Brenda Gayle Plummer stated in (1985), "The

Afro - American Response to the Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934," domestic actors such as Booker T. Washington, the NAACP, tried to get the nation to challenge "why" the U.S. was occupying Haiti in the first place. By 1930, there was a significant population of about 500 Haitians living in New York City (Plummer, 1985). Due to a growing Haitian community in the United States, Haitian journalists such as Joseph Mirault wrote extensively about Haiti's American occupation issues in the early 20th century.

Although Haiti's American formal occupation ended in 1934, Haiti was still strategically important to the United States. The location and closeness are how Gilbert Loescher and John Scanlan (1984) characterized U.S. interests by stating, "Strategically situated between the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, Haiti has long been regarded as within the sphere of American influence" (Loescher & Scanlan, 1984). Major political issues stemmed from Haiti's American occupation, including American domination of industries in Haiti, the rise of the Haitian military as part of the political process, and the migration of Haitians of all social classes to other states. Before removing President Aristide in 1991, Haiti was plagued by decades of dictatorships, including Francois Duvalier (Papa Doc) and Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc) (Schmidt, 1995) (Trouillot ,1990).

In 1991, Haiti had its first open and democratic election. The elected candidate was Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who ran on a platform against inequality with strong anti-military overtones. After seven months of Jean Aristide's election as president of Haiti, he was deposed by the military. The military coup showed Haiti's democracy's weaknesses and alarmed some of its regional neighbors, such as the

United States. Haiti's indefinite future caused concern to the United States, which prompted the Bush presidency to enact the Kennebunkport Order.¹ The Kennebunkport Order forced Haitian refugees were traveling by sea to return to Haiti without offering political asylum requests (Henderson, 1992). Immigration would be the primary variable regarding American involvement in Haiti.

The Clinton Administration's response to Rwanda and Haiti's violence are connected because they both occurred soon after the failed peacekeeping effort in Somalia. The creation of PDD-25 in the wake of the peacekeeping disaster in Somalia halted and refocused the support of future American-led peacekeeping operations (Silver, 2015). The Clinton Administration's handling of Somalia, 1993 is and politically reflected in the Administration's subsequent response to Haiti and Rwanda in 1994. This dissertation will go beyond the internal narrative of how Rwanda and Haiti arrived at near-anarchic turmoil but will focus on the question of American Intervention and how domestic politics influences foreign policy decisions.

Theoretical Framework

This dissertation aims to determine how domestic politics influence the direction of American foreign policy issues, examine domestic forces such as interest groups, the news media, and public opinion, and assess their influence on the foreign policy decision-making process. I employ the theories and approaches to understand better the foreign policy decision-making process, including Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), role theory, and the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT). Foreign policy analysis explains how foreign policy is conducted; role theory describes how

¹ President George H.W Bush, 41st President of the United States

the state sees itself within a broader international system. DPT examines how internal mechanisms within democracies constrain the executive in public policy actions. While their other determinants outside of domestic for foreign policy inputs such as external sources, individual sources, and government sources, this dissertation will focus on domestic sources of foreign policy (McCormick,2018).

All of these approaches and theories are necessary for determining how domestic politics influence foreign policy. In the United States, foreign relations are handled primarily by the government's executive branch—the president acts as the military commander-in-chief and is supported by a large team of foreign policy and defense advisers (Shea et al., 2018). Moreover, the president can quickly act through executive orders, while Congressional gridlock can cause responding to international crises slow. Accordingly, I am focusing on the three domestic categories—the news media, interest groups, and public opinion—influence the executive branch's judgment regarding foreign policy issues. Using FPA, role theory, and DPT, I will better understand the influence these domestic forces have on the foreign policy decision-making process.

Foreign Policy Analysis

As discussed in *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Toolbox* (2018) by Morin Jean-Frédéric and Jonathan Paquin, foreign policy analysis (FPA) is the "continuous interaction between actors and their environment" (Jean-Frederic and Paquin 2018). FPA is not a theory but an approach to understanding the decision-making process. Moreover, the FPA approach places a premium on contemplating the role of

domestic politics in the foreign policy decision-making process as Kaarbo (2015)

states:

FPA refers to a complex, multilayered process, consisting of the objectives that governments pursue in their relations with other governments and their choice of means to attain these objectives...Thus foreign policy encompasses the complicated communications within governments and amongst its diverse agents, plus the perceptions and misperceptions, the images of other countries, and the ideologies and personal dispositions of everyone involved. An important part of the study of foreign policy has been the nature and impact of domestic politics. (p. 191)

Pluralism is an issue FPA contributes to the foreign policy decision-making process. A democracy with competing interests of various social groups is a pluralist state. Levin and McCourt (2018) state that pluralism is "a normative position which values that diversity, given the public vocation of social science." The diversity of different political actors makes up the domestic apparatus that influences the government's decisions, including foreign policy matters(Jean-Frederic & Paquin, 2018). Further, pluralist states rarely have a domestic consensus on foreign policy matters. By having distinct "culture and identities, subjectivity, and domestic institutions," in the United States of America, various interest groups will think differently on foreign policy issues and campaign for decisions best serve their interests (Kaarbo, 2015). Domestic actors matter because each societal group in states with checks and balances has different material interests. By viewing pluralism through the lens of FPA, we can view interest groups, the news media, and public opinion as influencing factors in the foreign policy decision-making process.

Concerning pluralism, FPA considers varying interest groups' function as fulfilling a particular void in public policy. Some of these interest groups have more

power than others. Interest groups have a more decisive influence over the foreign policy decision-making process by providing financial support to candidates and getting them elected or re-elected (Alden & Aran, 2017). Interest groups can also help provide political support for government leaders. FPA is essential because if interest groups threaten withdrawal of financial aid or verbal support from a president, they may be obliged to succumb to the groups' demands. Interest groups represent different American population segments such as race, age, class, and gender on various policy issues.

Role Theory

Role theory examines states' roles in an international context. In the foreign policy decision-making process, role theory, like FPA, focuses on why states behave the way they do in the global system. Role theory, as mentioned in *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavior International Relations* (2011), links "psychological processes and social processes in world politics." States determine how to interact with each other depending on their domestic climate.

If the state's role in the international system is predicated on its domestic culture, foreign policy may appear a two-step game. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-level Games" (1988) examines in understanding foreign policy; it will always be a two-tier game. There are competing forces in the domestic sphere that can impact the state's role on the international stage.

Role theory also connects the self-identity of a state with its role in the international system directly. The domestic needs of a state can impact the

subsequent actions in the global system. Domestic power is an area this dissertation focuses on because it can function as several actors influence the more significant state's identity; therefore, role theory examines the interaction of constraints placed on the distribution of power and interests (Walker, 2011). It appears for a government to concede on its role in the international system, internal analysis of the state must be conducted by the executive branch first to see what the government goals the state wants to pursue.

The recognition of role theory is imperative to this dissertation because I am examining the influence of a nation's domestic climate on its international affairs, such as engaging in war, humanitarian interventions, etc. Therefore, the direction in which states interact globally may derive from democratic states' policymakers who answer the public. Holsti (1970) contributed the scholarship of the domestic politics influence on foreign policy in his article, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." A critical question Holsti wrestles with is, "What are the sources of role conceptions held by policymakers?" (Hoslsti, 1970)" It can be inferred an external war beyond the control of a state can still trigger domestic groups to express their views of the proper course of action policymakers need to take.

Holsti posits the domestic climate of a country is evolutionary because it's constantly changing; therefore, national roles change as well—which is also a notion posited by FPA. Morin and Paquin discussed the correlation between FPA and role theory is more robust when states construct a national identity (Morin & Paquin, 2018).

Holsti alludes to domestic sources' factor into the foreign policy decision-making process. The sources that are mentioned:

Location and major topographical features of the state; natural, economic and technical resources; available capabilities; traditional policies; socio-economic demands and needs as expressed through political parties, mass movements, or interest groups; national values, doctrines, or ideologies; public opinion "mood"; and the personality or political needs of key policy-makers (p. 246).

Role theory shares a lot in common with constructivism, such as their view on the above sources' expectations. Interest groups, the news media, and public opinion views on foreign policy are constructed based on the current and past political history.

How does a country determine it wants to prevent the human suffering of another country? That is a question constructivist such as Luke Glanville (2003) have taken up. A government would also intervene in another's domestic affairs drives role theory into a constructivist's terrain. Maintaining norms is the contention issue when considering international humanitarian intervention efforts (Glanville, 2003).

Glanville identifies three different society norms: prohibitive, which governs legal norms of prohibitive behavior; permissive, which governs legal norms of permitted behavior; and prescriptive, which regulates legal norms of expected behavior. I focus on prescriptive norms when viewing the question of how domestic politics influenced the U.S.' reaction to the Rwandan genocide and the coup in Haiti. If a country's political climate changes, then it may lead to "the changing norms of a state's interests and may create new interests" (Digression 2014). Previous state interests are usually relegated to issues in the past and current political feelings. For example, the United States' failed 1993 military peacekeeping mission in Somalia

was the immediate cause of the Clinton Administration's cautious reaction to both Rwanda and Haiti.

Regarding domestic norms' influence on Humanitarian Intervention, Glanville(2003) provides a rationale of the decision-making process below:

The general problem is that Intervention, even when it is justified, even when it is necessary to prevent terrible crimes, even when it poses no threat to regional or global stability, is an imperfect duty—a duty that doesn't belong to any particular agent. Somebody ought to intervene but no specific state in the society of states is morally bound to do so . . . The massacres go on, and every country that is able to stop them decides that it has more urgent tasks and conflicting priorities; the likely costs of Intervention are too high (p 252-252).

The statement above deconstructs the domestic calculus behind other states' decision-making process by stating the political climate in a society is a factor in their decision to intervene. The United States, post-Somalia, no longer wanted the burden of being the world's sole police force. The Clinton Administration also wanted to refocus his Administrations's attention away from foreign policy and other healthcare issues (Fallow, 1995).

If such norms prohibit a state's Intervention, what factors might influence a country to intervene in another country's humanitarian crisis? It is interesting Glanville argues states can both comply with their norms while providing humanitarian aid to another country(Glanville, 2003). The problem is how the state recognizes its morality when debating Humanitarian Intervention. Glanville cites the Rwandan genocide as an example of prescriptive norms. He states the call for invention was taken seriously regarding Rwanda when a few states, such as New Zealand and the Czech Republic sounded the alarm a genocide took place(Glanville, 2003).

In understanding the domestic role in foreign policy, constructivists possess an essential component in comprehending role theory because of the belief a state's interest can be socially constructed; therefore, the domestic interests derive from what the society thinks is important. Role theory builds on what constructivists have built on by stating, "Agents.....are embedded in the social and cultural institutions of the states they represent as foreign policy decision-makers" (Breuning, 2012). The issue on the domestic side is what role the country should play in the international community. There is a relationship between a state's political environment and the interests of the state. Holsti states foreign policy behavior stems "primarily from policy makers' role conceptions," domestic needs, demands, and critical events or trends in the external environment" (Holsti 1970). The overall political climate also plays a prominent role in a democratic country's foreign policy matters.

Democratic Peace Theory

The institutional explanation of how the public has a voice in foreign policy issues starts with democratic states' structure. It is theorized democratic states are less likely to go to war with each other. Democracies usually have regular elections for the top government positions, competitive political parties, and basic human rights (Griffiths et al., 2014). The idea that the executive can be constrained, in a nutshell, is Democratic Peace Theory(DPT). John M. Owens(1994) postulates the philosophy of liberalism created the Democratic Peace Theory. He explains the following:

Liberal democracy is a state that instantiates liberal ideas, one where liberalism is the dominant ideology and citizens have leverage over war decisions. That is, liberal democracies are those states with a visible liberal presence, and that feature free speech and regular competitive elections of the officials empowered to declare war (p. 89).

Liberalism focuses on the idea that a state's domestic interests drive the foreign policy decision-making process (Moravcsik, 2008). Moreover, states embody the demands of the domestic population regarding foreign policy-related matters. The executive branch's idea being constrained by the domestic community has been studied in regime type theory, the DPT, and variants of liberalism. Even though these theories represent more of an I.R. theory, the various theories discussed are indispensable in understanding a democratic state's behavior toward the international stage.

In understanding the moral ramifications of a democratic country's decision to intervene or not, analysis is needed in understanding democratic countries' stance on Intervention to protect human rights and their overall position on the war. Kant's *Perpetual Peace* theory states countries that share republican constitutions remain in a perpetual state of peace.

Kant's stance on a theory of universal hospitality may sound cosmopolitan due to the idea republican conditions are more likely to be peaceful. Kant is relevant to this dissertation because of the debate on non-democratic states that may act. Moreover, the regime-type of the country may indicate how the international community treats the state.

Kant pays close attention to how the domestic population is concerned with war. Kant states:

[I]f the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared (and in this constitution, it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future.²

Kant understands the domestic population plays a role in international Intervention because of the price of war. The domestic population of a country is significantly impacted when the government is involved in a war. A vital domestic causality in any war or peacekeeping operations is the loss of life and the economic burdens of funding a war. These burdens give the domestic population an incentive to be vocal about getting entangled in international crises.

Michael Doyle's 1983 article, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," expands on Kant's theory and gives rise to the DPT to explain how democratic countries get involved in a war. In his article, Doyle draws from Kant, stating the three factors for perpetual peace are the following: All states must be republics, States will gradually establish peace among themselves by the expansion of a specific union, All states must respect a cosmopolitan law about how they treat foreigners in their midst. (Doyle, 1983).

Further, Doyle posits various forces push liberal regimes toward peace—citizens in a liberal state must personally bear the costs of going to war, and liberal republics respect replies and expect to be respected by them(Doyle, 1986). In his second article, Doyle states that democracies' constitutional features make their

² <http://web.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/web%20publishing/KantOnPeace.htm>

regime types very different because their societies are more involved in the decision-making process. He continues democratic states are less likely to go to war because they must answer to their citizens. Citizens pay for wars through their taxes. Moreover, citizens elect their leaders through open elections, which causes foreign policy issues to be debated out in the open.

On humanitarian interventions, Doyle writes the United States' political process puts the domestic poor's needs in the United States above the foreign poor's needs (Doyle, 1983). Doyle also realizes states that do not respect their citizens' rights may not adhere to a universal standard of human rights (Doyle, 2005). Understanding divisions in how states within the international community understand human rights is critical because it will explain individual country responses to humanitarian crises abroad.

In Bruce Russett's 1995 book, *Grasping Democratic Peace*, Russett states democracies with organized political systems, in general, operate under restraints that make them more peaceful, but only in their relationships with other political systems (Russett, 1995).

Russett points out two essential models to illustrate his thoughts: the cultural/normative and institutional models. The normative model states that decision-makers will follow the same crisis resolution norms as those developed by the domestic political process (Russett, 1995). In democracies, decision managers expect to resolve disputes by compromise and nonviolence, respecting others' rights and continued existence. Stable democracies respect other democracies. Because of the separation of powers, the institutional model constrains leaders in democratic

states; this separation means power is not channeled through one person. There are multiple branches making decisions. In this model, checks and balances act as safeguards to ensure one branch does not exercise or abuse its power over the other branches(Russert, 1995). Checks and balances would explain the expanded congressional oversight after an enormous loss of life in Vietnam.

Moreover, regarding democratic peace, there are two arguments within the Democratic Peace Theory regarding the characteristics of peaceful states. Dyadic peace means democratic regimes are only peaceful with each other. Monadic peace means democracies are peaceful in their relations with all countries(Russert, 1995). Previous research shows when addressing the escalation of international crises, democratic peace is primarily a dyadic process. Democracies determine what type of state they are dealing with and adjust their techniques accordingly, and democracies believe fellow democracies will not use force. Like Doyle, he uses Kant as a foundation by conjecturing the more democracies there are in the world, the more peaceful. Still, he does not explain if democracies can apply the same democratic cultural norms to non-liberal states (Russert, 1995).

Also, the Democratic Peace Theory(DPT) primarily focuses on interstate wars. DPT does not account for democracies taking action against non-democracies that are imposing human suffering. Intervention is an area of contention in the DPT. When a state should involve itself in another's matters, the issue is an issue I will address in the following sections.

The issue of why a democratic state would get involved in a crisis abroad is the focus of this dissertation because democratic states have been involved in

numerous disputes throughout history for many reasons. In this viewpoint, democracies will not go to war with each other, but non-democracies are part of the Democratic Victory Theory. David Lake's 1992 article, "Powerful Pacifists," states democracies are most likely to prevail in wars with autocratic states. Lake also says democracies tend to devote more resources to security to attract more significant societal support for their policies(Lake, 1992). Democracies turn their battles into ideological wars; thus, there is a case to be made democracies are more likely to go to war.

In "Democracies at War," Reiter and Stam explain how democracies win all their wars: they are better at choosing their wars strategically, and they have superior military power because democratic culture produces better-skilled fighters(Reiter & Stam, 2008). The idea democratic states believe they are more likely to win wars is why democratic states would get involved in wars.

Democratic states do have limits when it comes to getting involved in wars. Reiter and Stam explore what I mentioned earlier that the American public sensitivity to casualties; for instance, after the Battle of Mogadishu, the United States scaled back its peacekeeping operations. Politicians recognized the power of positive public opinion in the wake of Somalia. Ambassador Robert Oakley, a U.S. special envoy to Somalia, indicated: "We have studied Vietnam and Lebanon and know how to get rid of Americans, by killing them, so public opinion will put an end to things" (Reiter & Stam, 1995). Reiter and Stam studied xenophobia in the United States, explicitly asking whether Americans care about foreign blood being spilled because of the loss of life may divide the public on whether the government should intervene or not

(Reiter & Stam, 2008). The issue of racial differences brings up even more questions. If a democratic state is willing to go to war because of ideological reasons, do race relations matter more than genocide? Are there limits to ideological arguments as to what is a good cause and if it serves the U.S.'s interest? The majority of wars in which the United States engaged in the twentieth century were ideological wars to halt communism's spread because the U.S. saw it as a direct threat to capitalism.

As established earlier, pluralism acts as a constraint on American foreign policy issues. Congress and the president must answer to their varying constituents, and when foreign policy affects constituency adversely, politicians are more reluctant to pursue a course of action. David J. Lorenzo explores three normative binaries that help explain the motivators behind a state's decision to go to war (or not): an exceptionalist/non-exceptionalist binary, a moral/practical binary, and a conservative/reformer binary (Lorenzo, 2018). Lorenzo took these three categories and made them even more specific to explain a state's pluralist principles better when considering war. These principles include defensive nationalism, defensive pragmatism, moral exceptionalism, moral universalism, non-interventionism reform, and non-interventionist traditionalism (Lorenzo, 2018). These motivating forces may often clash with one another among pluralist groups in a country and, subsequently, restrain a state from engaging in war. Indeed, the United States may be a democracy, but not everyone shares the same foreign policy views.

The Clinton Doctrine as a Paradox in post-Cold War Politics

Clinton's foreign policy doctrine was based on idealism. It viewed the United States as the world's moral compass in Bush's New World Order. It carried out this vision by engaging in peacekeeping efforts to expand democracies and free markets worldwide (Lorenzo, 2018). This Wilson-inspired doctrine would highlight and promote democracy promotion. The Clinton Doctrine highlights Kant's spirit of the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) because the Clinton Administration initially had peacekeeping as a significant component of his foreign policy platform. The Clinton Doctrine was a fundamental departure from the Containment policies part of most of the presidents of the United States foreign policies of the Cold War era. Unlike the 1990s, there was a lack of a perceived security threat like Communism was the tangible element of the Cold War. The Clinton Administration, concerned with the perceived threat being rogue states, can explain the concept of securitization(Søndergaard 2015).

However, Clinton's response to Haiti and Rwanda's crises might be seen as a contradiction to this version since the Administration weighed the benefits of intervening in each crisis to what the United States could gain. John Rawls (1970), in "A Theory of Justice," argues all societies view human security as a fundamental right. Therefore, whether liberal states and non-liberals can agree is essential to the entire international community(Rawls, 1971). The contradictions of the Clinton Administration's actions regarding humanitarian Intervention did not make his doctrine a stable foreign policy platform because the U.S. would place a hierarchy on fundamental rights based on American domestic concerns.

In a Cold War lens, stability was a constant stalemate between two superpowers s the U.S. and the USSR. Now with the perceived defeat of the USSR, the fear of the unknown may be the issue. In the 1990s, the E.U. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were strengthened, and according to Francis Fukuyama, democracy would become the world's defeat regime type due to the defeat of the Soviet Union(Fukuyama, 1992).

The Clinton Doctrine, in Clinton's first years of office, however bold and idealistic, faced the issue of how the U.S. finds its role in a post-Cold War where the Soviet threat does not exist. The U.S. appeared to be the sole superpower with a powerful military. It did not matter when it felt like most of Clinton's foreign policy, as Henry Kissinger said, "a series of seemingly unrelated decisions in response to a specific crisis(Dumbrell, 2002). Dumbrell said despite some of the coherent nature of the Doctrine because it at first championed a peacekeeping platform but slightly altered it to "selective engagement," the Doctrine had a consistent goal and was to go after "rogue states." Combating going after "rogue states" does not always entail military action because it could just be economic action.

Moreover, the idealistic Clinton Doctrine had an aggressive stance on democracy promotion abroad. Democracy expansion may be domestically perceived as the U.S. another long "Vietnam" War. The Clinton doctrine's core element argues for "liberal hawkism." President Clinton's first actions were to expand the peacekeeping operation in Somalia with more assertive goals. The Clinton Administration wanted to improve the poor conditions in Somalia caused by warlords'

high-jacking the aid. Domestic pressure would force President Clinton to have a long-term foreign policy that did not include repeating the Vietnam War mistakes.

There is a consensus that the Clinton Doctrine was coherent because of an apparent lack of focus since the Clinton Administration altered its reliance on peacekeeping following the death of American Army Rangers in Somalia, 1993, which put the issue of crucial element "democratic enlargement" into question(Dumbrell, 2010).

In expanding on a connection to explain Clinton's hesitation on peacekeeping after Somalia, John Dumbrell, again but in a different article, states, Clinton had a strong. Transatlantic foreign policy. Democratic enlargement could also mean strengthening alliances with the U.N. and the North Atlantic Trade Organization(NATO). The Clinton Doctrine has consistently with democratic and market enlargement in countries in the transatlantic. This element of the Clinton Doctrine the preference to issues in the Atlantic. Vice President Al Gore clarifies a call for a more robust NATO in January 1994, when he stated the "security of the states that lie between Western Europe and Russia affects America's security" (The Baltimore Sun, 1994). The expansion of NATO could imply that even countries in the Atlantic ocean near the U.S. but not about nature may garner more attention from the U.S. than countries farther away.

Moreover, having solid domestic support was his campaign centerpiece when he beat President George H.W Bush, who did not live up to his economic promises. The Clinton Doctrine was concerned with protecting democracy abroad and upholding it within the United States. The Clinton Doctrine would mostly approach

foreign policy in a two-tier game approach by getting domestic approval and international support. For Clinton to thoughtfully respond to international crises, the Clinton White House sought domestic permission after. The Clinton Doctrine shows domestic acceptance is the first stage of deciding what foreign policy issues to pursue.

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), role theory, and Democratic Peace Theory(DPT) help explain the pluralistic relationship between the public and its government. The connection between domestic issues and a government's foreign policy decisions is essential to define. Having a more robust understanding of a foreign power's actions on the international stage may lead to better diplomacy between those states and because "Cabinets, legislatures, and the public was often more belligerent than the government heads they were supposed to constrain" (Owens, 1994). Even government agencies, along with the public, can help constrain executive decisions made by the president responsible for foreign policy matters. A dispute FPA has with liberalism is the following question: How can we assume the government will listen to the public?

Elections provide a bullhorn for the public's concerns regarding foreign policy matters because they force standing presidents and presidential candidates to address these concerns. Elections guarantee politicians will work on the issues that are relevant to their constituents because "voters prefer governments which deliver favorable outcomes to those which deliver unfavorable outcomes" (Schultz, 1998). Political crises increase domestic participation in the foreign policy decision-making process because volatile events such as war concern everyone. The impact of the

general election cycle on foreign policy decision-making is relevant to this dissertation because it directly explains why the Clinton administration's decision to intervene in one of our case studies—the coup in Haiti.

This theoretical section lays the groundwork for the dissertation's literature review, focusing on understanding how domestic issues influence foreign policy decision-making. Foreign policy analysis (FPA) focuses on agents and actors influence foreign policy decisions; Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) views the system of checks and balances and elections as vital elements in the foreign policy decision-making process. Furthermore, role theory explains how the U.S. sees itself within a global context. By looking through the lens of these three theories, we can take a step closer to understanding the major factors that influence a democracy's foreign policy decision-making process, including public opinion, the media, and pluralist interest groups.

Research Questions and Unit of Analysis

This dissertation's central research question is: How did domestic variables influence the Clinton Administration's foreign policy response towards Haiti and Rwanda's 1994 humanitarian crises? These domestic forces include interest groups, public opinion, and the news media. Three supporting questions to this dissertation include:

1. Why did the United States support military action in Haiti but not in Rwanda?
2. What role did the public play in supporting military Intervention in Haiti versus Rwanda?

3. In what ways do domestic pluralist groups communicate their foreign policy views to the government?

Hypothesis

I hypothesize that the news media, interest groups, and public opinion played a critical role in the Clinton Administration's 1994 decision-making calculus in considering US-led armed Intervention in Rwanda and Haiti. The presence and non-presence of the news media, interest groups, and public opinion create a domestic reality that constrains or gives the American president additional political capital to decide whether to get the U.S. involved in global crises.

The Clinton Administration's non-response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 was both a strategic move for President Clinton politically and a response to the American public's unwillingness to go through another disastrous mission like the botched effort in Somalia the year before. However, Haiti's coup concerned the U.S. concerning, precisely the number of Haitian refugees trying to enter the United States by boat to escape the military regime's instability. The U.S. public did not want to take on these refugees; thus, Clinton, still consumed with his reelection in 1996, and foreign policy issues in Clinton's best interest became a priority.

The U.S. news media coverage of the two events differed significantly as well. In Rwanda's case, the American news did not cover Rwanda as a severe crisis that could escalate to a genocide. There was an effort to downplay the mass killings, as the media was hesitant to draw Americans into another military crisis as they had in Somalia, which ended with 18 American troops' deaths (Dallaire, 2017). In the case of the U.S. intervention in Haiti, however, the media constantly bombarded viewers with

the operation, championing the military's power over the Junta(Center for Law and Military Operations, 1995).

Concepts and Definitions

Public Opinion

Definition:

Public opinion can be summarized as public attitudes on various topics. More specifically, "Public opinion is the aggregate views of individual adults on matters of public interest" (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). In foreign policy crises , public opinion can expose public concerns on war, humanitarian Intervention, and diplomacy. Researchers capture public opinion through various methods, including surveys, polls, and focus groups (Morgan & Fellows, 2008). In conjunction with captured intelligence and cabinet advisers, conventional wisdom results from these public opinion metrics help the government decide its agenda. Operationalized:

I examine surveys from polling websites from 1993–1996 focus on the following words or phrases: Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, U.S. involvement, United Nations, mid-term elections, general election, disapprove, and approval. Based on statements, memos, and other interagency communication during the Clinton Administration, I determine if public opinion played a factor in the U.S. responses to Haiti and Rwanda.

News Media

Definition:

The news media works as a medium, transmitting information to the masses. The news media's working definition manifested in print news, the internet, and

broadcast journalism. CNN's creation as the first 24-hour news channel caused an expansion of the news media that could operate continuously Hoge, 1994). This dissertation looks at the changing purpose of the news media as an influencing variable.

Operationalized:

I examine news media not just as a political actor but as a political institution because of news media's ability to influence viewers and policymakers alike. This study demonstrates a connection between news media and policymakers' decisions based on what is covered. Also, the media makes the government more transparent in its handling of foreign policy matters. Therefore, presidents may be concerned with just catering to the demands of the elites.

Interest Groups

Definition:

A broad definition of interest groups is "as auxiliary actors that stand between the government and the mass public, tied to the governmental decision-making system by channels of communication" (Trice, 1978). When there exists a lapse of government attention about a specific public policy, interest groups voice their concerns.

Operationalized:

The success of interest groups is their ability to influence politicians on issues that concern them. Did the president intervene in Haiti because of the actions of TransAfrica's Randall Robinson? That is the connection I hope to unearth, a

relationship concerning foreign policy matters between interest groups and the president.

Constraints/Variables (Domestic)

Definition:

There are two types of constraints or variables in foreign policy relations—external and internal. External constraints originate internationally and may include conflict, crises, or genocide (just to name a few) and have domestic implications. Internal constraints are domestic conflicts that may be institutional products, such as checks and balances and the separation of powers. Moreover, domestic sources can include interest groups, mass media, and public opinion.

Operationalize:

Why did President Clinton authorize military force to restore President Aristide in Haiti but did not want military intervention in Rwanda? The answer, plainly stated, is that the president does not have unchecked power in the U.S. and is constrained by various domestic sources and other government institutions. I will use the term constraint to imply that they can alter foreign policy as a "source" or "variables."

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process

Definition:

According to Brulé and Mintz (2010) -Foreign policy decision-making is the "Choices made by individuals, small groups, or coalitions representing nation-states result in policies or strategies with international outcomes" (Brulé & Mintz, 2010). The

foreign policy decision-making process reveals the thought process of policymakers concerning issues of foreign policy.

Operationalize:

As accurately stated in "The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making" (2008), Jonathan Renshon and Stanley Renshon ask the question my dissertation hopes to answer. "How accurately do world leaders and their close advisors understand both the international system in which they operate and the strategic options are available to them?" The answer can be world leaders have to start with the domestic climate first. My dissertation does not exclusively examine leadership styles, a foundation in decision-making theories and how the domestic environment shaped leaders' responses. How did public opinion, the media, and interest groups factor into the Clinton Administration's actions?

Crisis

Definition:

A crisis is a "disruptive" event. Moreover, in International Relations: Key Concepts, a crisis is defined as "brief period when one or more parties to a conflict perceive an imminent threat to vital interests and a very short time to react to the threat" (Griffiths et al, 2002).

Operationalize:

My dissertation focuses on how the Clinton Administration responded to two separate humanitarian crises. I do not conflate the term crisis with war, conflict, and genocide. Those are different terms with various meanings. Moreover, the Clinton Administration may have perceived Rwanda and Haiti's events as a crisis, and other

political actors may have perceived the crisis as a civil war, ethnic conflict, and genocide. Moreover, the events in Rwanda meet the textbook definition of genocide. In my discussion, the Clinton Administration may have perceived Rwanda's crisis as a continuation of the 1992 Civil War. Still, the violence in Rwanda is consistent with the U.N. Convention on Genocide that defines genocide as Article 2 of the Convention defines genocide as "... any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group." Genocide is a legal crime that merits a moral obligation for Intervention.

International Community

Definition:

The international community is a collection of states, and the term international community but typically means it's a unitary actor(Ellis, 2009).

Operationalize:

I agree that the international community operates more as a social unit; not just countries are next to each other. The international community is more than a collection of international organizations because of basic norms, such as the right to life; everyone should agree to abide by a government. If countries are just physical neighbors but share no values on genocide and other crimes that threaten human security, then the world would be in a perpetual state of turmoil. The debate on why we need consensus on gross violations of human rights is out of this dissertation's scope. The focus of this paper examines crises in which Americans accept the

government's decision to intervene militarily. As I will argue, it appears the U.S. operates in its national interests and not the international community's interests

U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations-PDD-25

Definition:

A turning point of the Clinton's White House American foreign policy platform, titled "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" (PDD-25), was developed after the tragic loss of American life during the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993. PDD-25, in summary, states the U.S. must make more robust choices in supporting peacekeeping efforts with military force, reduce the cost of such interventions, and, most notably, for this dissertation, ensure the president is more attentive to the views of Congress and the American public.³

Operationalize:

The president's cooperation with Congress and the American public is crucial to my dissertation because the president stated their opinions matter when presenting PDD-25. I view the news media, public opinion, and at times, Congress as an outlet for the public to have their views heard.

The Contribution of this Dissertation

This dissertation will contribute to the discussion concerning just how important domestic sources are to American foreign policy decision-making. As

³ Also known as "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations."
<https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm>

Haiti's case study showed us, geographical proximity is a concern that can increase domestic levels of involvement as a sense of urgency and security come into play. On the other hand, Rwanda is thousands of miles away, is an economically insignificant country, and therefore the outcome of its crisis would not affect the United States' interests. Geographical proximity is not the sole external factor determining armed Intervention; economic interest, close allies' security, and broader diplomatic strategies play essential elements. I hope that this dissertation contributes to the idea that domestic influencers, chiefly the news media, public opinion, and interest groups, can unite to become a potent power that directs policymakers' foreign policy agenda.

Domestic Power

If the news media, public opinion, and interest groups share a similar narrative, they form a powerful domestic coalition. This paper posits it may take a combination of domestic actors to influence the president's foreign policy agenda. This domestic agreement on foreign policy issues can penetrate and surpass other political actors such as Congress.

Treating domestic variables on the same level as external variables as constraints to the president's foreign policy agenda is the scholarship's main contribution.. Constitutional protections such as freedom of the press and the right to assemble are additional constraints on the president. In an institutional framework, voting is the platform in which public opinion matters most. The news media, interest groups, and public opinion can strong-arm the president and Congress in foreign policy matters.

A clear example of domestic variables constraining the president is just after the tragic loss of American life in Somalia; the American public was outraged because of the botched mission. This outrage became the motivation for President Clinton to reverse American foreign policy to focus more on strategic peacekeeping operations and intervene only when necessary. His subsequent foreign policy change in peace operations, PDD-25, manifests this public's constraint on the president.

Moreover, this dissertation hopes to point to clear examples to deconstruct the state's motion as just a black box, as argued by structural realists. U.S. involvement in international affairs is predicated by the various forces within the U.S. and out. Therefore, the diversity among pluralist domestic factions is a factor influence foreign policy decisions as well.

The international political climate is an additional factor in a state's decision to engage in armed crisis. For example, the tolerance of war, the global economy, major natural disasters—these can all act as external constraints on a president's decision to intervene in an international affair. Throughout my dissertation, I have defined external vs. internal variables but have focused on domestic variables. The Vietwar War was a watershed moment for domestic politics because it is the first uncensored war to be broadcast directly into American households during mealtime. The Vietnam War produced the Vietnam Syndrome, and the debacle in Somalia created foreign policy terms as the Mogadishu Line. It is possible to galvanize the American public due to an external event outside the U.S. Tragic wide-scale loss of American soldiers generates an expected public response. The political climate is the intersection of

public opinion, elections, the news media, and ethnic interest groups. Therefore, understanding the current political environment is essential in any study of U.S. involvement in military crises

This dissertation aims to make a strong case that domestic variables such as the news media, interest groups, and the public can influence foreign policy decisions. I am looking at the American public's role in influencing the president and what the president does on the international stage.

Chapter Summary

This chapter provided a blueprint for the dissertation, which examines domestic considerations in the foreign policy process by exploring two political crises in 1994—Rwanda and Haiti. I have provided the background for Rwanda's and Haiti's political turmoil and discussed how their political crises attracted international attention. I framed the U.S.' responses to Rwanda and Haiti in the context of the post-Cold War era when the U.S. was the world's sole superpower. I have juxtaposed Foreign Policy Analysis, Role Theory, and Democratic Peace Theory as tools in theoretically understanding foreign policy issues and creates the opportunity for there to be a domestic reality to foreign policy decisions. The main argument is domestic considerations can explain why the president gets involved or does not get involved in foreign crises.

In contrast, the opposite can be attributed to the U.S.'s response to Haiti's political upheaval. The idea the news media, interest groups, and public opinion can

form a powerful domestic coalition can explain many foreign policy decisions made by previous presidents. If there is no consensus in these distinct domestic groups, the lack of a domestic coalition can justify presidential inaction.

Chapter 2: The Case for Domestic Politics in American Foreign Policy

Abstract

This chapter is a literature review of the scholarship of the domestic sources of American foreign policy to understand the Clinton Administration's involvement in Haiti and Rwanda's political crises. The literature review will assess how presidents considered these three variables: the news media, public opinion, and interest groups in the foreign policy decision-making process. Moreover, this chapter will analyze the academic scholarship that addresses the US response to Rwanda and Haiti's violence.

The Clinton Administration 1994 response to supporting military intervention in Haiti, but exercising military restraint is not an isolated case in American Foreign Policy. In the last chapter, I discussed: Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Role Theory, and Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) as a theoretical argument that since the United States is a democracy, domestic sources be considered such as the news media, public opinion, and interest groups in foreign policy issues. The influence(or lack of) of the news media, public opinion, and interest groups are central to understanding the Clinton Administration's response to Rwanda and Haiti's violence.

The intellectual, political history of the debate of what voice the American citizen has in foreign policy literature should start with a review of the U.S Constitution. The U.S Constitution defines the president's role concerning foreign policy in Article II, Section 2, as the armed forces' commander-in-chief (Ramsey & Vladeck, 2020). Understanding the constitution's legal language is essential because the document sheds light on who, in theory, has control of war declarations. Congress and presidents are answerable to their constituents. Furthermore, the First Amendment in the U.S Constitution puts a premium on public participation in the government. The public's political importance of having a foreign policy voice is demonstrated through public opinion, interest groups, and the news media.

The Constitution is vague about who has control over foreign policy. Congress has the power to declare war and raise/ finance armies(Ramsey & Vladeck, 2020). In theory, the president provides guidance on crises, and Congress declares and finances wars (Article 1 Section 9 Clause 7). U.S. Constitution - Article 1 Section 9 states, "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law" (Article 1 Section 9 Clause 7). There is a constitutional relationship between the Presidency and Congress. Congress can limit the presidential power regarding foreign policy by exercising the power of the purse. The Constitution could imply that Foreign policy matters are a collaborative effort between the President and Congress. Still, some presidents have exercised their war powers without the consent of Congress. Cyrus Vance (1984) calls the constitutional relationship between Congress and the President is also called the "Twilight Zone,"

which usually means that the president acts unilaterally. The President and Congress's political communication gap leaves room to analyze how the news media, public opinion, and interest groups impact foreign policy.

The debate over who has constitutional control over the foreign policy decision-making process does not answer what political actors can influence foreign policy decisions. Gerhard Casper (1976) has suggested that the constitution does not provide clear guidance; therefore, the executive branch has been able to have a more considerable influence on foreign policy issues. Casper states that "How recent Presidents have conducted the United States foreign and defense policy suggests an absence in the practice of constitutional constraints and the presence of surprisingly few political constraints" (Casper, 1976).

The rationale behind Congress having an active role in foreign policy is more than a mechanism to ensure that the President abuses power. Still, the public has greater access to their Congressmen/women because they are directly answerable to their district or state constituents. As Lindsay states (1992), domestic politics are usually taken to account when Congress talks about foreign policy-related matters because of the Vietnam War (Lindsay, 1992). I propose that Congress is not permeant sideline on foreign policy matters. Still, public opinion, interest groups, and the news media can influence Congress to influence the President on foreign policy concerns.

If Congress is not the only variable that could impact the foreign policy decision-making process, which influences the president?

The First Amendment of the US Constitution states:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances(Article 1).

The First Amendment stresses Americans' importance, not being limited to speaking what is on their mind and assemble peacefully. Due to the American Constitution's inclusion of the average citizen in political affairs, this is a reason why the news media, public opinion, and interest groups can be powerful.

Despite the President being in control of the armed forces and having a more considerable amount of foreign policy analysts, the domestic population can still constrain the President's actions. Hodge and Nolan (2017) state that the American political climate internally and externally determines the hierarchy of foreign policy matters. The American presidency's dominance in foreign policy issues stems from being the most capable federal government branch to handle international crises. The American President has a considerably more decisive impact on foreign policy due to: being the direct link to the U.S Armed-Forces, appoint officials that oversee foreign policy issues, and the power to negotiate and provide readily executive orders can solve problems similar to treaties. (Krent, 2015). The executive branch has not to deal with the political gridlock in Congress, and therefore, the executive branch is the most powerful choice in ending an international crisis. The presidency, which can also serve as a source for foreign policy, has to weigh choices from an individual(the President) seeking re-election and grappling with making the public happy.

American foreign policy decisions can alter and direct how the international community responds to a crisis. The post-Somalia shadow weighed not only on the US, but the new direction President's more Clinton retreat from providing support from committing American troops in peace peacekeeping operations that were not in its strategic interests parlayed the international community's response in handling peace operations(Knnan, 2013). In 1994 the Clinton Administration response to Rwanda and Haiti's crises highlighted the importance of domestic reality response in foreign policy crises.

The early 20th century innovations in communication technology such as the radio transformed the American presidency. During the Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) presidency, FDR expanded the presidency's scope by steering both domestic and foreign policy(Leuchtenburg, 1995). At the start of World War 2, Congress pursued an isolationist policy of not getting involved in World War 2.

Japan bomb's Pearl Harbor, and President Roosevelt's declaration of war against Germany, Japan, and Italy would be the last time the president asks Congress for formal authorization for war. During Roosevelt's presidency, the US's political conditions, such as the Great Depression and the Second World War, led to a much powerful presidency.

The Presidency, Foreign Policy, and Domestic Variables

This section aims to review the literature on how my three domestic variables- the news media, public opinion, and interest groups have influenced President's views on foreign policy-related matters, starting with the first "modern." In the wake

of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt responded to the crisis by escalating it to Congress for a war declaration President. Moreover, this section will look at select Presidents beginning with President Roosevelt to understand the role of domestic attitudes in the foreign policy decision-making process. I will be looking at the literature of American presidents' foreign policy from 1945 to 1993 that shows how the news media, public opinion, and interest groups transformed how the US government conducted foreign policy matters. By analyzing the literature, I see how interconnected public opinion, the news media, and interest groups are to each other and influence foreign policy.

President Roosevelt Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality.

In *Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War Against Nazi Germany* (2004), Casey makes a case for domestic inclusion in the foreign policy decision-making process because FDR believed that Americans shared his views regarding the threat of Nazism. As Lipperman states, the issue becomes how the president can mobilize the public on foreign policy issues not related to wars that may spill over to American soil. According to Casey (2004):

In Lippmann's conception, when a foreign threat emerges most Americans initially lag behind their leaders in recognizing potential danger, since to them it appears too remote to warrant U.S. involvement. In order to shake the public from this torpor, the government has to engage in a vigorous crusade. This it does by depicting the enemy as "altogether evil" and thereby inciting the masses "to paroxysms of hatred." In adopting this course, American leaders are able to forge a popular consensus behind the war effort (p. xiv).

Even though Casey's argument may conjecture that the president needs to influence the public on foreign policy issues, it gets at the point of considering the people in foreign policy-related matters. In *Cautious Crusade*, the author uses

process tracing to link public opinion to policymakers. The policymakers interpret the public's needs, and then the impact of public opinion data is analyzed to determine what effect the public has (Casey, 2004). FDR uses domestic sources such as the news media mobilizing the public by writing stories about the war effort. Moreover, interest groups such as the Society For The Prevention of World War III (SPWW3), which held rallies that protested over German atrocities against its victims, were regularly attended by Congressmen (Casey, 2004). The scholarship for examining the news media, public opinion, and interest groups is not a recent development because the domestic inclusion goes back to World War 2.

President Truman Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality.

President Harry S. Truman's focus on including domestic opinion in his foreign policy decision-making process kept expanding the impact of the news media, public opinion, and interest groups. Conversely, as Thomas Paterson (1979) states, public opinion polling suggested that Americans favored an "activist" foreign policy platform to combat the Soviets during the Cold War (Paterson, 1979).

Studying President Truman's use of foreign policy sheds light on whether public opinion represents the American people. As Paterson(1979) explains, public opinion may only be the "elite view of foreign policy issues."

They constituted the small number of Americans who studied the foreign news, who traveled abroad, who had knowledge, who spoke out. They held positions in American society that commanded authority and insured influence—journalists, businessmen, labor leaders, intellectuals, and members of various interest and citizen groups. They produced the "public opinion" on foreign policy issues that counted (p. 6).

The issue of whether the public represents only an elite portion of society is a fair critique of my argument that public opinion can dictate foreign policy. To correct the issue of just looking at public opinion, unlike other literature, I juxtaposed public opinion, along with the news media and interest groups as domestic sources of foreign policy. In “The Truman Doctrine Speech: A Case Study of the Dynamics of Presidential Opinion Leadership” (1978), the article references that 84% of Americans did listen to or read Truman’s speech on his foreign policy platform (Paterson, 1979). This detail is indispensable because the public was attentive to the news. Therefore, the news media is a political actor that can influence foreign policy.

The Cold War discussion in the literature provides insight that this period strengthened domestic support regarding foreign policy issues because of the Vietnam War protests. Ambrose in *Rise of Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938* (2010) illuminates that during World War II, Congress was in control of foreign policy? The post-World War II, when the Republicans took control of the Congress, the Republican majority wanted to focus on lower taxes, and demobilization. Therefore with the new domestic agenda that the Republicans had, this would “severely restricted the Truman’s Administration’s ability to carry on the Cold War (Ambrose 2010). However, with the looming threat of communism, President Truman was able to get bi-partisan support as the fear of communism grew, and containment would become a major cornerstone of American foreign policy (Ambrose 2010).

During the Cold War, the actions of the US can be explained by internal and external variables. Historically, foreign policy has been an issue of the Presidency and Congress. After WWII, the Cold War created an uncertain environment where

Americans would turn to their political leaders to solve the global threat of communism. Noting the impact of communism is dynamic for this dissertation because communism was an issue that penetrated American borders; therefore, it became an issue that impacted Americans' daily lives.

The Truman Doctrine wanted to contain communism, and Truman implemented his policy without consulting Congress. Eisenhower, even though he had congressional support, would inform Congress but not consult with them. Moreover, due to the changing demographics in the United States and the growing political influence of minority groups in the United States, Congress is not the only group that can influence foreign policy matters. For example, the United States recognition of Israel can be attributed to President Truman wanting the support from Jews in the US during his re-election campaign. Scholars such as Bruce Russett have stated that the president takes the public's temperature to see how they feel about international issues while also gaining congressional support (Russett & Deluca, 1981). This is called the "triangle of force," where the president has two contends with domestic and congress on foreign policy-related issues.

President Johnson Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality

President Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency saw an escalation of the Vietnam War. At first the Vietnam War received bipartisan support during the "Gulf of Tonkin's" incident because of the concern of communism expanding (Meernnik, 1993). The Vietnam War brought a paradigm shift in foreign policy studies because of the prominence of the news media, interest groups, and public opinion disapproval of the war effort. Scholars such as Lunch and Sperlich (1981) state that even though

respondents in one of the surveys conducted that most people thought that the Vietnam War was a mistake, they still submitted US involvement (Russett & Deluca, 1981). The scholars note that by the end of the Vietnam War, there was a clear public consensus that the US should not be involved in the Vietnam War. The rising number of American casualties “activated” the American consciousness against the US involvement in Vietnam. Lunch and Sperlich uphold the idea that Americans will initially “rally round the flag.” Yet, public sentiment is fluid, and public support changed due to the growing number of American soldiers dying (Lunch & Sperlich, 1981). At the start of the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam, the president had 61% support for the Vietnam War, and by 1971, only 28% supported American involvement in Vietnam (Lunch & Sperlich, 1981).

How did public opinion penetrate the oval office during the Vietnam War? While keeping in mind, that the Vietnam War is considered the first “Television War” (Spector, 2006). American saw the horrors of the Vietnam War broadcasted in there homes during the evening news. Melvin Small in (1987) ” Influencing the Decision Makers: The Vietnam Experience,” states “ citizens have written letters and telegrams, convened meetings, demonstrations, and marches, published petitions, broadsides, and manifestos, and formed organizations to do all of the above in an attempt to influence their government.”

The Vietnam War increased the journalists' objective nature, as Halin (2005) states that the “journalists became more inclined to report information critical of

official policy” (Hallin, 2005). By a content analysis, Halin shows that even though the Vietnam War, journalists were able, for the most part, to remain objective. Herman & Chomsky, (2002) connect the news media with public opinion because the Vietnam War's negative news coverage helped broaden opposition against it (Herman & Chomsky, 2005). Moreover, interest groups play a dominant role in influencing foreign policy because Congress represents the US; therefore, there will be different factions within Congress with other interests.

The Vietnam War challenged some of the dominant structural views in American foreign policy that disregards public opinion as part of the decision-making process. The American public has a role in shaping foreign policy decisions. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) were first looking at the importance of an engaged citizen.

The idea that in a democracy, the culture supports public debate on public policy issues is proof that domestic politics have a foreign policy role (Almond and Verba 1963). For Almond and Verba, social scientists cannot separate the public from analyzing public policies. However, as Katz and Powlick note in response to Almond and Verba (1998), does public opinion become activated?

In "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam" (1967), Verba contend for the president to implement large-scale military operations, they need the American public's consent. Moreover, scholars in "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam" used data from different cities in the United States to make their conclusions about the public opinion implications on the foreign policy process. The scholars make a

novel contribution that the president can sideline the popular public opinion view in favor of what the elites want. President Johnson was aware of the public's growing discomfort; however, he would increase the US military presence in Vietnam.

The Vietnam War was viewed as the first televised war that was uncensored; this idea does not mean the American public is attentive.

In "War and the Inner Circle: Democratic Elites and the Politics of Using Force," (2015) contends that even though the public was not well-informed regarding the latest reports on the Vietnam War. Much of the activism regarding opposing the Vietnam War came from the college scene; young people is just one part of American society. Not everyone in the US is up to date on foreign policy; therefore, "rarely informed enough to hold leaders accountable" (Rosati et al., 2015).

President Johnson ran on a less aggressive foreign policy platform versus Barry Goldwater (Matthews, 1997). The Vietnam War still produces questions regarding the role of public opinion. President "Johnson feared political punishment if he withdrew from Vietnam more than if he engaged in war" (Downes, 2009). President Johnson's evolving stance on the Vietnam War means that domestic politics had to play some role; an alternative explanation of public support could only represent what elites wanted regarding the Vietnam War. President Johnson wanted to continue implementing policies in his Great Society programs; therefore, he would need a majority of support from his democrat party base.

President Nixon Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality

The academic scholarship concerning domestic influence over foreign policy-related issues is evident in President Nixon withdrawing troops from Vietnam. Ambrose states that the Nixon doctrine dealt with the Vietnamization policy, which turns over military control to the South Vietnamese (Ambrose & Brinkley, 2011). Nixon knew that “ for the sake of American domestic tranquility, he had to cut back on the American commitment to Vietnam, which meant, in turn, accepting an outcome short of victory” (Ambrose & Brinkley, 2011). Nixon knew the war was not winnable and was concerned about losing domestic support. In “Differing Evaluations of Vietnamization” (1998), Scott Sigmund Gartner cites that even though most of the public outrage came from the left, even Republicans in President Nixon’s political base wanted the US out of the Vietnam War (Gartner, 1998). Moreover, that President Nixon wanted the anti-war movement to end, and ending the draft would make middle-class youths lose their interest in protesting the war(Glass, 2012).

President Carter Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality

At the end of the Vietnam War, domestic politics have become a perceived, trustworthy, independent variable. The news media, public opinion, and interest groups have all influenced foreign policy matters. President Carter’s rationale for making human rights the leading platform of American Foreign Policy because of the correlation between the democratic tradition of the United States, and protecting freedom (Schmitz & Walker, 2004).

At the start of President Carter's presidency, he promised a foreign policy agenda "that the American people both support... and know about and understand"

(Katz, 2000). President Carter's position on human rights consisting "of 'the right to live under a rule of law that protects against cruel, arbitrary and degrading treatment, to participate in government and its decisions, to voice opinions freely, to seek peaceful change (The Department of State Bulletin 1977). This idealist Wilson foreign policy states that American foreign policy principles should transplant American domestic values to the rest of the world. Kraig examines the foreign policy of the Carter presidency as a tragedy because it is impossible to fulfill. Kraig examines the Carter presidency problem as similar to what scholars said about Wilson in that Carter tried to impose his moral views on the world (Kraig, 2002). Moreover, Schimitz and Walker (2004) stated that the irony in President Carter fully implement his foreign policy agenda came from domestic backlash human rights was not on the top of the list of priorities for some policymakers.

The Carter presidency's importance in understanding American foreign policy's domestic constraints is to know how public opinion impacted Ronald Reagan's loss. On average, Carter's average public opinion rating was around 47 percent(Katz, 2002). The question becomes, why did Carter ignore the public concerns about his foreign policy. The answer lies in the "Carter Administration's mistaken assumption that public opinion on foreign policy was grounded in emotions and malleable to presidential leadership" Moreover, Carter believed that the data gathered from public opinion sources was incoherent and did not follow a narrative. Ultimately, Carter's White House did not give him an accurate assessment of his foreign policy's American public's feelings.

Yes, his overall foreign policy platform had an idealistic cache because he felt that people in the world had the same right to life as Americans did. In the 1970s, the United States was still healing from the hard-fought Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. President Carter believed, like President Wilson, the US actions represent the gold standard for human rights policy.

In President Carter's implementation of human rights as the centerpiece for his foreign policy platform, he never addressed how the United States would play that role internationally. Moreover, what was missing from his human rights platform was how national security interests would be factored into his advancing democratic change. The consensus with Carter's foreign policy is that consistent polling showed that the public was for the United States to maintain an active military and that the threat of arms was still a concern of the American people. The literature that discusses the Iranian Hostage Crises is a critical case in demonstrating what can happen when a President ignores the public because of the high volume of news coverage; it heightens public opinion and interest groups that advocated intervention. Therefore, in "Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis" (1989), "the news media covered the hostage crisis dominated the national conversation regarding foreign policy."

The telecommunications expansion of TV's power on foreign policy decision-making by providing unfiltered news documenting the was already occurring because of the Vietnam War. The Iran Hostage Crises heightened the study of television news's impact on the foreign policy decision-making process because of the wall-to-

wall coverage of Iran's crises. The emotions of seeing the American Embassy in flames could have constructed a feeling of resentment among Americans. The three major networks' content analysis during the Iran Hostage crisis demonstrates a changing the political narrative of coverage that changed drastically when Iranian protesters took people, hostages, because a hostage crisis turned into a human drama news story. Furthermore, ABC News created Nightline, a new news program that could keep the public informed about the embassy's crises. President Carter would subsequently lose to President Reagan in 1981.

President Reagan Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality

The Ronald Reagan presidency(1981-1989) is characterized as being a great communicator and was “in tune” with public attitudes(Sigelman & Whissell, 2002). Reagan utilized television to convey his feelings on major foreign policy issues, such as the US involvement in Lebanon in 1983. Before the US involvement in Lebanon, the American public believed that President Reagan did not have a clear agenda (Gilboa, 1990). Before the invasion, President Reagan gave a televised speech-- Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada--that could sway public opinion. In his remarks, Reagan addressed the public concerns by noting the region's strategic interest in the West (Welch, 2003). The debate over the effectiveness of Reagan's televised addresses to the public is more contentious than positive. Empirical studies(2003) that have tested whether the televised speeches changed public opinion are slim.

The Reagan doctrine aimed to have a global collation to curtail the Soviet Union's expansion. His "policies toward anti-Communist resistance groups varied

considerably" (Gilboa, 1990). However, Pach reassesses the Reagan Doctrine (2006). President Reagan's foreign policy had to reassure: "Congress and the public that they sought not 'open-ended, sterile confrontation' but 'stable and constructive' long-term relations with the Soviets" (Pach, 2006). President Reagan The Reagan administration was concerned about the spread of communism but understood the issues the American public would have with American soldiers engaged in another crisis. President Reagan used guerilla fighters in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets and did not use American soldiers. His doctrine champions the use of covert operations to curb Soviet influence.

Moreover, President Reagan's Administration had to contend with issues of immigration. Understanding immigration is essential because, in 1981, the US entered a recession; therefore, immigrants who often scapegoated were the focus of a task force. President Reagan started to understand immigration issues in the US.

President Bush Foreign Policy and the Domestic Reality: Fog of a post-Cold War America

The George H. W Bush Presidency (1989-1993) saw the Cold War's formal end. The literature that explores the American incursion into Somalia starts with the Bush Administration. During President Bush (41st President) Administration, two pivotal peacekeeping operations originated from the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 678 occurred: the First Gulf War(1990-1991) that included Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. The operation results were to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991; the Unified Task Force was tasked with ensuring humanitarian aid delivery to Somalia. The President called the Iraq

invasion of Kuwait the “defining moment” in setting a new foreign policy for a “new world order.”⁴ The United States could operate freely now as the sole world superpower.

Moreover, it is imperative to understand that the UN could be of use. The US strategically used the UN to accomplish its goals by having the UN set a deadline for Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait. In regarding Congress as constrained, President Bush knew that he had to keep Congress in the loop, and even though it was not a war declaration, he asked Congress for the use of force in clearing Iraq from Kuwait. Bush used Congress as an asset in accomplishing his goals because he was fearful of the constraint of Truman's actions in Korea (Ambrose & Brinkley, 2010).

What is crucial in the staging of the post-Cold War issue would be Bush's Speech before a Joint Session of Congress in which he spoke of a “New World Order.” Ambrose summarizes President Bush's actions as being the world policeman. However, Melanson is more cautious in stating that Bush viewed the US as a world police force. In a post- Cold War era, the First Gulf War was a test that the US could be active in international crises that do not evolve to a long-term military engagement turning into another Vietnam War. Since the US defeated communism, this gave room for operations in Iraq and Somalia. What remains central in President Bush's strategy was that he was concerned with removing Iraq from Kuwait, not occupying Iraq, and having Saddam Hussein stand trial. Bush was involved with swift action that had a clear timeline of objectives and an exit strategy.

⁴ Bush, George, writer. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit." Transcript. In Address by the President. September 11, 1991.

The first Gulf War in the early 1990s shattered the Vietnam Syndrome, but a shadow still lingered on any decision the president would make on foreign policy issues. But the use of American soldiers in a military crisis is important enough for President Bush to say, "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all" (Melanson, 2015). Melanson's ideas are a prelude to the US being the world superpower. Bush stated that there would be more democratic revolutions, room for democratic growth only if the US were the world leader.

The public opinion polls following the first Gulf War were favorable, but the American public was still concerned about military forces. However, Melanson states that people could be persuaded when there were national interests at risk. As Jentleson argues (1992), economic interests can sway public opinion that US intervention variables in the first Gulf War stemmed from oil concern.

The end of the Cold War in 1991 saw an explosion of domestic variables as part of the decision-making process, such as the news media, public opinion, and interest groups. Since American peacekeeping in Somalia was one of the first primary military operations after the Cold War, the American public response to commit to another military may seem promising, but it's still uncertain. In the wake of the disaster of US involvement in Somalia, the Army Rangers' deaths activated the publics' fear of another Vietnam War occurring.

President Clinton Foreign Policy, and the Domestic Reality

Domestic politics' political arguments can be a defining factor in the foreign policy decision-making process draw on public opinion, interest groups, and the news media. The literature will cover the changing post-Cold War perceptions of public opinion, the news media, and interest groups. This section will explain how interest groups, the news media, and public opinion influenced how President George H.W Bush and President Bill Clinton intervened in Somalia. The rationale for including Somalia as part of the literature is inherent because disastrous American involvement in Somalia was predicated on interest groups, public opinion, and the news media. This section will also provide a framework for the idea that interest groups, public opinion, and the news media can work as a domestic system.

In the 1990s, cultural life in the United States was changing because of the growing access to telecommunications, which allowed people to access information faster. By the 1990s, some scholars report that at least 30% of American families had cable access(Carey & Elton, 2010). Cable channels provide additional niche channels such as MTV, CNN, Disney, and others. The sociological imagination that Mills stated that people react to the environment.

Public opinion is paramount in American politics because public opinion can impact policymakers' decisions. Barbara A. Bardes and Robert W. Oldendick's book Public Opinion examines the fundamentals of how public opinion data is collected and how it contributes to American politics. Concerning foreign policy, the authors contend that Americans rank the most critical foreign policy priorities as relevant to them (Bardes & Oldendick. 2017). The authors build on their argument by giving the

history of foreign policy and public opinion. Bardes and Oldendick use examples such as the Vietnam War to highlight that Americans wondered what relevance the crisis had to them (Bardes & Oldendick. 2017).

The changing political, cultural norms of post-Cold War American foreign policy that challenge the idea that military power should be the foremost source of influence is Joseph Nye's soft power coinage. Nye (2008) defines soft power as "getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them." Therefore, soft power is predicated on the preference of "others." The national interest can explain foreign policy issues' American cultural relevance; public opinion can help understand the decision-making process (Nye, 2008). For instance, Nye states that "Part of America's soft power grows out of the openness of its society and polity and the fact that a free press, Congress, and courts can criticize and correct policies" (Nye, 2008).

Concerns that the U.S. military in a post-Cold War era did not have a tangible threat such as the Soviet Union caused attitudes that defense spending such be cut (Frank, 2012). The values over what is a military necessity have changed. The ambiguity over defense budget spending after the Cold War is essential in understanding the U.S.'s future role because it raises a fundamental question if the U.S. does use military force for what interest? Understanding countries' political values are vital in analyzing political participation such as public opinion, news media, and interest groups

President Clinton came to office in 1993 with an already expanded attentive public because of telecommunications' growth. Regarding public opinion, polling is viewed as the most common form of public opinion. Research shows that the issue with public opinion polls is that, yes, Americans answer questions related to foreign policy. Still, at times, the average American may not be as well-versed in foreign policy issues (Powlick & Katz, 1998). This issue is addressed in latent foreign policy constructs because survey polls do not get to the public concerns' underlying problems. Yes or no answers do not tell policy-makers the “why” question.

The Power of the Domestic Reality in Foreign Policy Decisions

Domestic Reality: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

“Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision Making” By Knecht and Weatherford examines the issue of whether presidents listen to public opinion on foreign policy issues. Like Holst, the authors are trying to debunk that American public opinion is sporadic (Knecht & Weatherford 2006). The research address how attentive is the American public when it comes to foreign policy concerns (Knecht & Weatherford, 2006). The search shows that Presidents care about what the American public thinks about foreign policy issues. Optimistic public opinion rewards presidents with political capital in approval 708 (Knecht & Weatherford, 2006). Positive public support will increase their political power. The authors do ask, does public opinion impact foreign policy? The authors state that it deals with the foreign policy event (Knecht & Weatherford, 2006).

The literature exposes that American public opinion on foreign policy-related issues can be stratified by race. African Americans were among the most consisted groups in lobbying the Reagan Administration in stopping Apartheid in South Africa.

Barbara Bardes and Robert Oldenick flesh out how public opinion data is measured and how it impacts American public policy issues such as foreign policy. The first step in understanding public opinion and its relevance to American foreign policy is how information is disseminated to the American public.

Domestic Reality: News Media and Foreign Policy

Robert Entman's book *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S Foreign Policy* examine how the news media frames news of foreign policy significance. This book is taking a bold leap by asserting that this is the primary way Americans get their information. Entman uses a cascading model to demonstrate how data related to foreign policy is framed. The foreign policy issues start at the policymakers, then move to the journalists and the public (Entman, 2007). The Cold War's early years made it easy for presidents to control the media, which limited the range of news media (Entman, 2007). Entman states the end of the Cold War let journalists become more liberated(Entman 2007). Entman says that since elections do not bound journalists, they are free to be the activist voice by covering issues such as interventions that included Bosnia and Somalia.

As a democracy, journalists can be viewed as an invisible branch of the government(Braernan, 1985). Historically, the news media has been a government watchdog, which can be traced back to the Tea Pot Dome Scandal news media

coverage. Throughout the 20th century, the news media has been pivotal in uncovering the Vietnam War's truths. Moreover, the news media can directly cause pressuring the US government to intervene in foreign policy-related issues.

The watershed moment in the news media's elevation influence on government policies would be the Vietnam War. As Strobel states in *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations* (1997), this was America's first "living-room war." The news media coverage of the Vietnam War allowed millions of Americans to get updates on the war. An essential contribution of the history of the news media and the Vietnam War was that journalists could offer commentary such as Walter Cronkite. The latter said that "It seems now to more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam will end in a stalemate" (Strobel, 1997). Strobel summarizes the Vietnam War literature by concluding, "Many have seen Vietnam as a 'television war.' They argue that the vivid and mostly uncensored day-by-day television coverage of the war and its brutalities profoundly impacted public attitudes(Strobel, 1997). The poll data does not support such a conclusion. They clearly show that whatever impact television had, it was not enough to reduce support for the below the levels attained by the Korean War when TV was in its infancy until casually levied far surpassed those of the earlier war" (Strobel, 1997).

The catalyst for public outrage was the growing number of casualties in Vietnam; this also became Somalia's case (1992-1993). The news media is a way for Americans on foreign policy-related issues. The news media did not frame the death of the American soldiers in Vietnam in a positive context as WWII and South Korea.

The birth of cable news such as the Cable News Network (CNN) had created a new space for the news media where Americans could get constant updates on breaking news. CNN's first test coverage for covering wars was the first Gulf War. CNN was able to provide round the clock coverage into the unfolding events in Iraq. (Strobel, 1997). 61% percent of Americans thought CNN did the best job among the TV networks (Strobel, 1997).

Moreover, between 1982-2004 the daily newspaper circulation in the United States was about 59 million (Peterson, 2019). About 71% of people would read the newspaper more than once. During these years, there were over 50,000 journalists out in the field. A good majority of the United States was concerned enough to read newspapers daily consistently. Due to the high numbers of Americans reading newspapers, I can see where my two case studies fall within them.

Strobel summarizes that the Cold War ended freed the American media from the status quo agenda, US/Soviet Union relations (Strobel, 1997). The media coverage of different issues concerning crises, such as humanitarian interventions, is an example of the news media's freedom to frame stories their way instead of the Cold War's status quo. During the post-Cold War, the news media and the international community often clashed on how news media covered the peacekeeping operations (Strobel, 1997). An example of the tense relationship between the US media and the UN was in Bosnia because the UN blocked journalists' access to specific regions because of an understand the UN and Bosnian government had with each other. For instance, the UN refused the release of a video showing Bosnian Croats blow up an ancient bridge in Mostar (Strobel, 1997).

Does the American public care about issues of U.S foreign policy? The literature consensus follows the elite-centric model that contends that Americans are ill-informed on U.S foreign policy issues. Scholars that support this claim are Holsti, Knecht, and Weatherford. The elite-centric model that Holst states vary from two political theories. His realist claim for the impact of U.S foreign policy and public opinion states that it does little to influence U.S foreign policy. The realist opinion also says that the public is often ill-informed on foreign policy issues (Holsti, 2004). If public opinion does seep its way into the decision-making process within the realist school, it will have ill consequences. Holst demonstrates that this theory's variant would be the "CNN Effect" (Holsti, 2004). The "CNN Effect" is contributed to the Clinton Administration getting involved in crises such as Bosnia that did not pose any strategic value to the United States. Moreover, realists such as George F. Kennan states that Americans are emotional when examining other nations' internal conflicts (Holsti, 2004).

The liberal school states that public opinion should be at the center of the foreign policy decision-making process (Holsti, 2004). Holst says the liberal tradition to this stance on public opinion has gone back to Jeremy Bentham, his work "Public-Opinion Tribunal," which is called public opinion to be the sole remedy for the government (Holsti 2004). The end of the Cold War saw an explosion of Americans' access to U.S foreign policy issues due to the availability of 24-hour news channels such as CNN.

Furthermore, another domestic variable that adds to the domestic consensus in the United States is interest groups. Political mobilization is predicated on

individuals who share like-minded attitudes; they either form interest groups or pressure groups. As Baumgartner and Leech states (1998) that interest groups spring up out of disturbances that are going on. The importance of interest groups can also be traced back to Alex De Tocqueville's works, who saw the rise of different groups as an inspiration for upholding the virtues of democracy. Lastly, as the US becomes more diverse, minority groups need to be broadly represented. Interest groups can be the link between group concerns and the political institutions of the US. From a research perspective, locating interest groups can be difficult because not all issues act in a collective sense. In *Interest Groups and Lobbying: Pursuing Political Interests in America* (2016), Holyoke unearths the complexities of the diversity of interest groups related to mobilization. Holyoke (2016) states:

American society is extremely diverse, and so the number of different interests that are felt intensely enough to motivate people to form an interest group is probably unknowable. Not every individual interest leads to a mobilized interest group, often only because there are not enough other people who share the same interest to form a group, or because people with similar interests are too geographically dispersed (though today this is not the barrier it used to be). (p. 12)

Domestic Reality: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy

Since telecommunications have enhanced how Americans receive information, interest groups cater to specific policy issues due to the diversity and pluralism in the US. As mentioned earlier, the First Amendment to the constitution gives freedom of speech and peacefully assemblies. Still, Founding Fathers such as James Madison, who contributed to Federalist No. 10, provides cadence to interest groups because it is part of the American political process.

In *A History of The U.S. Political System: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions* (2010), the chapter “ The Rise of Modern Interest Group Politics: Progressive Era Origins,” Tichenor and Harris state three significant variables of interest groups: (1) the aggregate number of organized interests; (2) the variety of organized interests; and (3) the nationalization of organized interests.

Interest Groups have clout with all branches of government: Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. The two main government branches relevant to my study regarding interest groups are Congress and the Executive Branch(Harris, 2010)(Ambar, 2010). Congressmen/women, especially in the House of Representatives, Congressmen/women typically listen to constituency concerns since they have frequent elections. The Executive Branch may appear to be more challenging for interest groups to penetrate. Still, suppose the political environment is fragile. In that case, the President will need support from non-government actors such as interest groups since the President represents the entire nation, then the President has to have broad appeal. Interest groups can help the President advance public policies if it's in the respective interest groups' interest. Moreover, if the President is seeking reelection, interest groups can offer political support because interest groups represent various populations.

The Congressional Black Caucus(CBC) is one of the oldest black interest groups in the US that dates back its roots to 1871. The CBC's original purpose was to strengthened communication because of black representatives and the House of Representatives leadership(Erhagbe, 1995). CBC has evolved over the issues to focus on foreign policy-related issues-particularly in Africa. In “The Congressional

Black Caucus and the United States Policy Toward Africa: 1971-1990," (1995), Erhagbe states that the CBC's success regarding foreign policy issues was modest. I think that the success of CBC relies on building coalitions among other interest groups. CBC does influence because it is a congressional interest group that can directly influence foreign policy. After all, the CBC has a direct link since all of its members are in Congress.

However, for Rwanda and Haiti, most of the activism from Interest groups stem from ethnic interest groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus and the TransAfrica. In *Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy* (2008), David Paul and Rachel Paul tackle the importance of ethnic lobbies in foreign policy issues. One of the most successful African-American interest groups that focus on foreign policy is TransAfrica, founded in 1977(Gerhart, 1999). The organization has had considerable influence on US relations with countries in Africa and the Caribbean. Moreover, TransAfrica was the first African-American interest group that solely focused on foreign policy-related issues.

The success of the ethnic groups often is predicated on how close they are to the decision-makers in power, such as Congress and the Executive Branch. Some interest groups such as TransAfrica have offices in Washington, D.C. Additionally, it is essential to remember that interest groups may share other goals with other interest groups so that interest groups may form coalitions. I will demonstrate that when I discuss the Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica. How much power does an ethnic interest group have? As the U.S. becomes more ethnically diverse, the impact of ethnic interest groups may be more significant. Moreover, during the

Clinton Administration, both TransAfrica and CBC tried hard to dismantle American foreign policy's perceived racism because Africans are not seen as equals (Leanne, 1998).

Case 1-Literature- Clinton Administration Response to Rwanda, 1994

The Clinton Administration's response to the genocide in Rwanda was predicated on the events in Somalia. The literature agrees that the US's inaction to use the military was 18 Army Rangers(Barnett 2004) (Annan, 2013). Scholars such as Doyle and Sambanis (2003) characterized the US's inaction because “Rwanda genocide was the stepchild of the disaster in Mogadishu.” The American perception of Rwanda's violence was seen as another opportunity for the US to get involved in unnecessary wars.

The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War(2006) in Rwanda by Scott Straus mentions The 1993 Arusha Accords as crucial in ending the civil war that had taken place in Rwanda over three years. The Arusha Accords were constant statutes and frameworks in place through which a stable and all-inclusive government would be adopted and continuously developed(Straus, 2006). Through the Arusha Accord, the Rwanda Patriotic Front – which was generally Tutsi – and the Hutu government were provided with a political platform to reform politics and productively share power (Straus, 2004).

The Clinton Administration was well aware of the events leading up to and shaping the Arusha Accord (Power, 2004). However, they invested minimal – if any – diplomatic and international relations resources to ensure that the country would

stick to the Arusha Accord precepts and come out strong and build a better and productive country. Suppose the Clinton Administration had invested in the political stability of Rwanda during and after the Arusha Accords. In that case, there is a possible chance that the world would have never played host to the infamous genocide.

There were several challenges experienced by the peacekeepers and international observers in Rwanda. In investigating and reporting, the peacekeepers faced difficulties birthed from the secretary general's current government position. Apart from being the secretary-general, Jacques-Roger Booh Booh also served as the special envoy to Rwanda. In 1994, the State Department provided a report, which detailed the threat of ethnic cleansing within Rwanda's borders. Suppose the policymakers in America were aware of the looming threat of ethnic cleansing in Rwanda. In that case, the Clinton administration should have done much more to ensure that the genocide did not occur.

Here are the primary debates that the literature tackle: what intelligence the US had in Rwanda, UN and US differences in Rwanda intervention, and what could the US have done, and why did the Clinton Administration be reluctant about getting involved.

Alan Kuperman's book *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention* discusses the U.S. involvement in Rwanda. His book focuses on three circumstances that the U.S. could have intervened to stop Rwanda's genocide; he combines these three scenarios with lessons learned from Rwanda. The flawed logic of looking at if the

U.S. government could have intervened means that the Clinton Administration already had the political capital to garner support, which the Clinton Administration did not have. By the end of April, any efforts to continue the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) would be futile(Kuperman, 2001). Also, Kuperman states that for maximum intervention, the U.S. would have to provide 15,000 troops. Rendering 15 000 soldiers in Rwanda paints a problematic picture that a full-scale intervention following the disastrous peacekeeping in Somalia would have been brutal(Kuperman, 2001). Moreover, there would have been casualties, and that would have lost American support, which would be another foreign policy failure for President Clinton.

Samantha Power *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* look at the chronological history of the United States' reaction to genocide over the twentieth century. She gives a foreign policy analysis over why the US government reacted to the crises. Regarding the problems in Rwanda, she explores why the US acted slowly to stop the genocide. Power debunks Rwanda's intelligence issue and states that the US had operational intelligence throughout Rwanda's crisis. Power breaks away from Alan Kuperman, who blamed the intelligence failure as a primary reason why the US did not aggressively act to stop the genocide. Power was able to her connection to get intelligence reports, memorandums, and briefing that revealed what the US knew at the time. For instance, she mentions a Commission report from 1993 that states:

The commission's March 1993 report found that more than 10,000 Tutsi had been detained and 2,000 murdered since the RPF's 1990 invasion. 10 Government-supported killers had carried out at least three major massacres

of Tutsi. Extremist, racist rhetoric and militias were proliferating. The international commission and a UN rapporteur who soon followed warned explicitly of a possible genocide(p. 228).

The issue that the U.S. knew little about is wrong. In essence, Power validates Rwanda's lack of strategic value as the reason for the Clinton Administration's inaction in Rwanda. Correspondingly, Power highlights how Congressional Power of the purse meant that Congress over half a billion dollars because of what Power describes as an "insatiable UN appetite for missions" (Power 2002). Regarding the aftermath of Somalia, Power notes that republicans thought Clinton was too trusting of the UN (Power, 2002). The immense contribution of Power's work is her acknowledgment of the role that PDD-25 played in the decision-making process.⁵ Based on the PDD-25 guidelines, Rwanda did not meet US requirements for supporting a peacekeeping operation.

Power contends that “ Domestic political forces that might have pressed for action were absent” (Power, 2001). Power makes the point that perhaps the presence and (absence) of domestic variables can make the issues seem “clear.” The Clinton Administration had to grapple with handling the crisis in Rwanda could have been handled differently if domestic sources made considerable attention that the president would respond.

Michael Barnett's *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda* focuses on the dilemma that the United Nations (UN) Security Council faced during the genocide in Rwanda. Barnett highlights the American role in the Security Council

⁵ PDD-25 is also known as "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm>

while discussing the crisis in Rwanda. Barnett agrees that the end of the Cold War gave UN relevance again (Barnett, 2002). Barnett argues that the 1993 US Somalia debacle compelled the Clinton Administration in the wake of public outrage to amend its policy on multilateral peacekeeping operations that would directly affect the United Nations. Furthermore, Barnett states that the UNAMIR could not maintain the Arusha Accords' implantation because of the lack of local resources in Rwanda (Barnett, 2002). Force Commander Romeo Dallaire did not have enough military support.

Barnett also shares the information of a cable that Dallaire sent to New York. An informant told Dallaire that the Hutu Government was making a Tutsi's list and moderate Hutus, and the Interahamwe was stockpiling weapons. The country was at an immediate threat of mass murders. Kofi Annan, who oversaw the UN peacekeeping department, told Dallaire not to raid the warehouse where the weapons were and turn over the intelligence to the Hutu government. Kofi Anan clarifies his position in his memoir *Interventions: A Life in War and Peace* that the international community had no "appetite" for humanitarian interventions because of the US in Somalia (Annan, 2013).

Twenty million dollars became a concern that hindered the Clinton Administration's support of a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, not because of the cost but because President Clinton did not want to justify another peacekeeping operation to Congress. Barnett states(2002):

The countries that were most sensitive to the cost of the operation were those that were expected to pick up the largest part of the bill. In short, the United States, which according to the UN's assessment rate would absorb one-third

of the total cost. The Clinton administration was less worried about its total share, which amounted to \$20 million, than the fact that it would have to justify the operation and its cost to an increasingly hostile Congress. Congress would want to know why the UN was setting up another operation and why it cost as much as it did. (p. 71)

Barnett agrees with the Kuperman intelligence gap because he states that the Clinton Administration did not believe that Rwanda's crises had derived into a genocide. Consequently, the US did not take Romeo Dallirares cables earnestly. Furthermore, when the President carrying Hutu President Habyarimana was shot down, Somalia's images came up; thus, the US wanted to close the UNAMIR operation. During the outbreak of violence in April, the US interests were to support a complete withdraw of the UNAMIR(Barnett, 2002). Barnett also gives insight into how the Clinton Administration wanted to manipulate and strong-armed the UN Security Council to protect the Clinton Administration's stance on de-strengthening the United Nations. The vehicle that the US used to indicate UN policy was PDD-25. What makes Barnett work even more important is that he agrees with Power that even though PDD-25 was signed in May, it was informally in effect. Barnett (2002) states:

For several months the Clinton administration's tough love strategy, which was designed to keep congressional critics of the UN and the administration at bay, had been on display. Above all else, this meant limiting the peacekeeping bill and shrinking the number and expense of those operations that did not involve American national interests. This strategy was in full force in its policy toward Rwanda(p. 101).

Barnett states that Clinton had to show Congress that he could take hardliners' problematic humanitarian crisis approach (Barnett, 2002). Barnett determines that the US shared part of the moral accountability for the Rwandan

Genocide and that the US response was in fear of another Somalia. Moreover, the UN failed because of the Security Council's veto power; the member-states entertained the US as they were trying to see if the events in Rwanda merited being considered genocide or just a continuation of the 1992 Civil War. In 1998, President Clinton apologized in Rwanda 1998 for the international community's inaction, including African nations, to stop the violence in Rwanda (Bartnett, 2002).

Case Study 1-The Role of the News Media

Regarding the news media response to Rwanda, the literature presents a census that there was a lack of American coverage. During the early stages of framing the story in Somalia, NGOs were present on broadcast news, making a case for intervention. NGO's to the media that was not happening to Rwanda. As Kuperman pointed out, Western media attempted to scapegoat the failure of intervention to the international community. Still, the media shares the blame because the industry failed to mobilize the public (Chaon, 2007). It is important to note that the political climate towards supporting peacekeeping operations did change. Strobel's analysis of the US news media coverage in Rwanda is drastically different from Somalia and Haiti. Strobel uses data from Vanderbilt University to show the number of times that the US media mentioned Rwanda. In summary, the American news media appears not to have the political will in covering Rwanda's violence.

The Media and the Rwanda Genocide(2007) address the impact of the coverage or lack of news coverage in stopping the genocide. Steven Livingston states that Rwanda's news coverage reflects the recent loss of life in Somalia. The

outcomes of Somalia was a factor in American news media coverage regarding Rwanda. American policymakers blamed Somalia's news media coverage for forcing the U.S. to intervene (Livingston, 2007). U.S. policymakers did not want that to be an excuse to intervene in Rwanda.

Moreover, Livingston states that when the genocide in Rwanda was occurring, these were the international stories being covered: the refugee crises in Haiti and Nelson Mandela(Livingston, 2007). Livingston gets to the issue at hand, and that is if the news content has a role in foreign policy affairs. Interestingly, Livingston states that most of Rwanda's news coverage was not about the genocide but the refugee crises. As the genocide in Rwanda stopped, and now it was time to deal with the aftermath.

"Who Failed in Rwanda, Journalists or the Media?" (2007) continues the conversation on what role the news media had in not giving substantive coverage to Rwanda. Chaon mentions journalists' background as being a cause of the lack of news coverage because of the simple truth that journalists are not genocide experts. Chaon (2007) states:

Most journalists are not experts in genocide. Many of them – myself included – arrived in Rwanda with very little knowledge of the country. So, it was tempting, especially at the beginning, to speak of the civil war, of these massacres as a perverse return of a civil war, and to link these massacres to previous massacres since 1959. We failed to understand that the killing was something totally new, that this was not a continuity of what had happened before.

During those first few days in April, special correspondents were much more likely to use words like 'chaos', 'anarchy' and 'furore'. They were reporting on a resumption of the civil war. In the field, it was easy to be confused and view the massacres as a 'side effect' of the fighting (p, 162)

Chaon makes the argument that the news media reflected the overall American sentiment regarding Rwanda. Just like the politicians, the news media did not understand the totality of not covering Rwanda as a genocide. Most all the evening news coverage from the “Big Three” Networks-ABC News, CBS News, and NBC News rarely called the violence in Rwanda a “genocide.” Most of Rwanda's American evening news coverage tried to code the crisis as “Civil War.”

Linda Melvern's chapter “Missing the Story: The Media and the Rwanda Genocide” in *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide* blames the reporters' competence in covering the story. During the height of the genocide in April, newspapers such as the *New York Times* were calling the situation “uncontrollable spasm of lawlessness and terror” (Melvern, 2007). Melvern contends that for the West, Rwanda was not worth the coverage. Alan Kuperman always noted that the West was portraying Rwanda as a civil war. The news media was not getting and quoting the right amount of death totals. Also, he notes that the reporters focused on the capital Kigali which only accounts for 4% of the Rwandan population (Kuperman, 2007).

The glaring issue is the lack of wall-to-wall coverage of Rwanda's genocide because it was not an American news story. The shadow of Somalia impacted the news coverage of international events. The issue is that does the media share in the same cosmopolitan nature that, on paper, the Clinton Doctrine champions? The problem is that news outlets choose to cover the problems that will increase ratings, and at times crises abroad do not merit the news media's attention. As Roger Silverstone stated:

The baseline of my argument is that the world's media are an increasingly significant site for the construction of a moral order, one which would be, and arguably needs to be, commensurate with the scope of global interdependence. Insofar as they provide the symbolic connection and disconnection that we have to the other, the other who is the distant other, distant geographically, historically, sociologically, then the media are becoming the crucial environments in which a morality appropriate to the increasingly interrelated but still horrendously divided and conflictful world might be found, and indeed expected(p. 8).

It appears that, at times, the media can be an extension of government, which does not mean that the media is not an independent institution that operates on its own. Coverage of the Rwandan genocide could have produced the "CNN Effect," which critics say was the reason why the US intervened in Somalia. In 1994, crises in Africa, which does not cause any immediate American border issues. At the time, Roger Silverstone characterized the media's lack of coverage because some of the news media did not see the Rwandan genocide hurting the international system (Silverstone, 2013).

The New York Times (NYT) is frequently mentioned in the literature as covering the Rwandan Genocide. The *New York Times* has been cited as the paper of record. It has a track record of raising awareness of Larry Kramer's constant critique of the government during the early stages of the AIDS epidemic. The question becomes, what was the American news media coverage in 1994? The NYT, who reported on this issue, published numerous papers. However, criticisms arise on what more NYT could do, such as posting more images. It is unclear on the impact of paper news in 1994 because of the growing power of 24-hour news

coverage and the increased use of improved technology that allows fast communication from abroad.

The literature presents an argument that coupled with American disinterest, the continent does not have the technological foundation to support journalists. Fair and Parks (2001) summarize issues in coverage of the Rwanda genocide by stating:

For media organizations, coverage of Rwanda's 1994 genocide was challenging. Logistically, U.S. news media had to scramble to gain entry into a country where conditions were deteriorating rapidly. Organizationally, because few U.S. newsgroups support regular reporting from Africa and still fewer operate bureaus on the continent, scarce resources for international reporting had to be redirected from regions thought to be of greater geopolitical and/or cultural interest to American consumers. Journalistically, U.S. reporters were dropped into a region where they knew little, and where their government advocated disinterested noninvolvement. Hence, reporting on the Rwandan genocide was typical of U.S. coverage of Africa generally. Journalists relied on stereotypes (p.36).

A percent of the American media covers international issues such as the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, and Somalia. In April 1994, during the genocide's height, the American press was being dominated by Nirvana lead singer Kurt Cobain's death. The trend from the literature is that American media involves Americans. Such international crises that receive the most news media coverage involved military American Armed Forces.

The news media response to the Rwandan genocide from existing literature draws the argument that I am making that concerning the other factors, the news media can influence the foreign policy decision-making process. As I will examine in my case study chapters, the absence of the media can send signals to policymakers that the coverage of issues like in the previous year-1993, images of starving

children dominated the news, and the US intervened. In retrospect, concerning Rwanda,

Despite the media being absent in Rwanda, some conclusions can be made beyond the mischaracterization of Rwanda's violence being merely tribal. Still, only the West is capable of solving Rwanda's problem (Thompson 2007). However, this "problem" has been downplayed by the media as the violence being part of the civil war status-quo element. Tribal wars, warring clans, and sporadic violence are may what the press thinks about Rwanda, which is similar to Orientalism (Harrow, 2005). The lack of understanding of Belgium's ethnic divides and colonialization made Rwanda even harder to explain to viewers. The problem becomes, "Does the West want to intervene in Rwanda?"

The West intervened in Somalia because of the wall-to-wall coverage of violence in the country. It is not a question that the news media did not report the crisis; perhaps other stories captured Americans' attention. An answer could be that Rwanda was not experiencing issues that could be fixed by "aid," such as health crises. Western writers tend to focus on topics such as "AIDS" more than physical violence. In the case study concerning Haiti, the AIDS epidemic brought news media attention to Haiti because of a theory that patient zero came from Haiti.

Peter Viggo Jakobsen provides an analysis of UN humanitarianism following the end of the Cold War. This article is essential because some of Jakobsen's cases are Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda, critical to this study. Jakobsen starts by stating that the end of the Cold War saw a new type of humanitarianism: peace enforcement

operations and military force. Jakobsen weighs factors such as national interest, humanitarianism, and the CNN effect as factors for UN support of peacekeeping operations (Jakobsen, 1995). The CNN effect is a theory that the mass constant media coverage of crises impacts foreign policy states. For example, the author fails to demonstrate how national interests played an important factor in these operations' outcome. Furthermore, Jakobsen states that Rwanda invoked Somalia's images to the American public (Jakobsen, 2000).

Print and Television news is how news agencies presented the events in Rwanda to the American public. In the following chapters, I will analyze *the New York Times*' importance because the newspaper was one of the mediums that attempted to cover Rwanda's violence. From the available literature, *the New York Times* is characterized in "Representation or misrepresentation? *The New York Times*'s framing of the 1994 Rwanda genocide" (2010) as trying to downplay the level of violence in Rwanda. Historically, the news media has benefited from agenda-setting; newspapers can help steer the public into paying close attention to "news of value."

Scholars can do textual analysis to explain a narrative that dominated *the New York Times* coverage of Rwanda's political violence. Tendai Chari's textual analysis reveals how many articles *the New York Times* dedicated to informing the public about the genocide brewing in Rwanda. Chari's analysis is novel because of the attempt to argue that the western news media is often portrayed as victims needing "Western Saviors" to help stop their suffering. Perpetual anarchic conditions is a standard narrative that dominates how the west views Africa(Chari, 2010). The

preparators of the genocide often used machetes and other sharp objects during the violence. Readers can view the NYT coverage of the brutal nature of the genocide as stereotypical because Chari contends that the paper coverage of Africans as “savages.”

The role of the media absence during the Rwandan genocide is essential because prominent interest groups such as Human Rights Watch concern that there was a lack of American media coverage in Rwanda. As an official from the Human Rights Watch in the LA Times commentary -“So where are the journalists?” Due to varying views on the news media's role in Rwanda, that is one of the reasons why the news media is an independent variable in this study.

Case Study 1-The Role of Interest Groups

Interest groups have been cited as a potential domestic source for American foreign policy decisions. As defined in Chapter 1, interest groups are like-minded individuals trying to lobby for change. A subfield within the interest groups' impact on the foreign policy decision-making process understands ethnic interest groups. Ethnic interest groups are defined by Ambrosio (2002) as "politically relevant social divisions based on a shared sense of cultural distinctiveness." Due to Rwanda and Haiti immigrant's presence in the US, it is imperative to look at the lobbying efforts of groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus(CBC) and TransAfrica.

Hadest notes that the African-American community had a lack of interest in the crises in Rwanda. The article "Erosion of American National Interests" conveys the importance of understanding a states' domestic culture helps explain its role in foreign policy issues. For instance, "For an understanding of American foreign policy, it is necessary to study not the interests of the American state in a world of competing states but rather the play of economic and ethnic interest America domestic politics" (Huntington, 1997). The U.S.'s evolving domestic interest is vital because Huntington, a prominent realist, understands the impact of ethnic politics in the U.S. This idea is explored more in the edited book *Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*.

In the chapter "Identity, African-Americans, and U.S. Foreign Policy: Discerning Reactions to South African Apartheid and the Rwandan," Fran Scott and Abdullah Osman examine the African-American community reaction to those two events. Black Americans have always felt a close kinship to Africa. However, at the end of the 20th century, policymakers such as Randall Robinson has admitted that African-Americans had little knowledge about Africa(Scott & Abdullah, 2002).

Concerning this dissertation, the 1990s is essential in understanding African-America to issues in Africa. There were various issues in the 1990s, such as civil wars, genocide, starvation, and natural resource exploitation (Scott & Abdullah, 2002). Scott and Abdullah's chapter engages in ethnic interest groups' power because it shows that the American-American community-supported more sanctions in South Africa. Black American activism in South Africa is due to the increasing number of black Congressmen/women (Scott & Abdullah, 2002). African-

Americans could relate to Blacks' struggles in South Africa because of the similarity between Apartheid in South Africa and racial segregation in the US. What made the African-American voice heard on the issue of Apartheid was different interest groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and most important the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). The CBC proposed over 30 pieces of legislation opposing Apartheid (Scott & Abdullah, 2002). This activism culminated in 1986 Congress passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAA) (Scott & Abdullah 2002). The CAA prohibited investment or loans to Africa and prevented goods from coming into the US from South Africa (Scott & Abdullah, 2002).

The African-American reaction to Rwanda's genocide was different because the black community was ambivalent about that issue. Like Hadeest, Scott and Abdullah agree that there was a lack of interest among African-Americans about the US taking a more active role in Rwanda (Scott and Abdullah 2002). Interestingly, the authors note Rwanda's distinction as a black-on-black issue and not a black on white political problems such as South Africa (Scott & Abdullah 2002). Congressmen Alce Hastings, a Democrat from Florida who was a member of the House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, recalled that Rwanda was not a vital interest to African-Americans. Hastings states that "Africa seems so far away, and there is no vital interest my constituency sees." This critical because Hastings's actions of being vocal on this issue rely on his constituency seeing the genocide as a problem or not.

The literature discusses that the Human Rights Watch(HRW) sounded the alarm that Rwanda was about to experience political violence(Straus, 2019).

TransAfrica and CBC seemed concerned about Rwanda's violence, but the interest groups did not advocate aggressively for military intervention like Haiti.

Scott and Abdullah also examine the CBC's actions to force the Clinton Administration into a more active role in stopping the genocide. CBC's limited efforts were writing letters to President Clinton to support former UN Secretary Boutros-Ghali and the Organization's call for additional troops. The letters came with a caveat on American involvement because they would have come from neighboring African countries and not the US. Other actions include the CBC boycotting a White House conference on Africa as a sign of protest to Clinton African policies. As Scott and Osman note, it is unclear if the CBC would have helped Rwanda's people. Scott and Osman also examine other Congressmen/women's actions regarding the genocide. Most notably, Carol Mosely-Braun, a Senator from Illinois who called for military intervention as the last, advocated economic sanctions(Bergbower & Schmitt, 2015). The CBC position's bottom line is that the Organization was one of the few that supported the Clinton Administration to take a more aggressive response to the carnage occurring in Rwanda. Rwanda's CBC response shows that there was not an urgency in the black community to get involved.

Case Study 1-The Role of Public Opinion

Norms drive public opinion; therefore, it is essential not just to analyze public opinion but also to understand the political culture in 1994. As Martha Finnemore stated (2002), "the pattern of intervention cannot be understood apart from the changing normative context in which it occurs." The literature surrounding Americans'

public response to Rwanda shows Americans as being disinterested in Rwanda because of Somalia's anxiety climate in Washington, D.C. As summarized in the literature, the American public's initial response right after Somalia showed mixed support for intervention. The literature references the loss of life in Somalia, 1993, to the US, not supporting military response. A robust military response could not happen because of Rwanda's proximity to Somalia and the lack of distance between Rwanda and the US. However, as Berinsky (2009) states as I echoed the "casualties hypothesis," the view that the American people will shy away from international involvement in the face of war deaths." A leery public already premediated the shadow of the looming genocide in Rwanda from the loss of life in Somalia. In a "Solution From Hell" (2004), Wertheim states:

Americans did not yet feel their government had a duty to attempt forcible intervention to stop genocide. That norm was still developing. The administration did have humanitarian interventionist impulses, displayed before the Somalia debacle, and a low- to midlevel interagency task force on Rwanda convened to gather intelligence and devise intervention scenarios (p. 153).

Public opinion in the US response to genocide in Rwanda was ambivalent. The literature suggests that the public did not favor intervention. As Burkhalter (1994) "It takes a certain degree of a public and congressional clamor to capture his attention - and a high degree when the crisis is in Africa." The connection between public opinion and the Clinton Administration, " public opinion is needed to support my argument that public opinion and the media and interest groups' silence did not compel the Clinton Administration to use military force like Haiti.

Case 2-Literature- Clinton Administration Response to Haiti, 1994

Domestic support is what separates the two case studies apart from each other. There was domestic support for the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti vs. Rwanda. The United States did not want a recurrence of American casualties in Somalia, so The Clinton Administration's involvement in Haiti required domestic support (Livingston & Eachus, 2010). Haiti's political problem for the removal of President Jean Artiside triggered an immigration crisis in the United States.

Regarding the Clinton response, this literature review covers why Clinton intervened in Haiti:

- An influx of Haitian refugees
- The base of support for intervention (as highlighted in the ethnic interest group sections)
- Regional stability

The 1990 Presidential election in Haiti saw President Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the country's first democratically elected president (Coupeau, 2008). President Aristides's election was a perceived political watershed moment in Haitian history because of its history of dictatorships and isolation from French colonialism. When President Aristide became president, he promised equality and took a robust anti-American stance (Coupeau, 2008).

Numerous political and economic problems plagued the Presidency of Aristide. As Steve Coupeau (2008) notes in Haiti's History, most of Haiti's budget depended on foreign loans, but President Aristide was resistant to globalization. The unemployment rate was at 80%. Haiti lacked a stable police department, and this

void was filled by the Army, who became the representative face of coup supporters(Coupeau, 2008). Haiti still had old hardliners from the Duvalier dictatorship who had much say in the government and now harbored hatred toward President Aristide. Haiti's political climate, already tense, was acerbated by a rival faction bill within Aristide's government. The new political power gave President Aristide six months to make all necessary public administration changes and magistracy.

In the year following his election, the chief problem that President Aristide needed to correct was expanding the military. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Haiti's political developments before the Aristide presidency were challenging, but its goal was ideal since its inception. The United States had established the army in 1915 because of Haiti's US occupation and its domestic order source. However, now its goal was to protect against the external enemy(Dupuy, 2018). As Alex Dupuy (2018) explains, there were no conditions for Haiti's democracy in 1990. The idea of a head of government heading dictating political and economic participation rules was a threat for the elites. The military was part of the elite, which gave the elites political agency to take political action against Aristide. Tonton Macoute (military unit in Haiti) did not tolerate the social reforms that Artiside wanted.

Another problem he had to deal with was the economy. Economically, President Aristide was trying to reform a corrupt economic system. Even though he campaigned on an Anti-American platform, he worked with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Girard, 2002).

In the following year, Girard notes he was removed from power by the Haitian army under General Raul Cedras. A de facto military regime was created by the lack of political leadership stemming from President Aristide's exile. Emmanuel Constant working for the CIA, knew of his abuse of human rights, yet they continued dealing with him without protest but still supported the military junta (Girard, 2002). His actions contributed to the rise in power of the controlling army group and General Raul's army's terror. Furthermore, Girard argues that their past actions allowed them to free a known human rights abuser. In terms of implications, the US risked the world, knowing that they stood by as Haiti's economy weakened due to the closure of factories and a dying tourism sector. President Aristide was exiled for three years, a period within which the country descended into chaos characterized by mass violations of human rights. Karin Von Hippel in "Democratisation as Foreign Policy: The Case of Haiti" called the military rule barbarism. Von Hippel states:

During its tenure, the Cedras regime was responsible for various acts of barbarity, including the arrest, torture, murder, and destruction of property of thousands of ordinary Haitians and many prominent Aristide supporters. Three thousand Haitians were killed, tens of thousands were believed to be displaced while an estimated 300,000 were unable to live at home for fear of prosecution(p. 98).

Furthermore, the Haitian army's actions served to terrorize its helpless citizens due to the deep racial divisions within the region, thus necessitating foreign parties' intervention. Army officers executed children, raped the women of people they suspected to be guilty, and murdered priests within the localities (Girard, 2002).

In 1994, President Clinton made a direct threat to Haiti's militia and sent troops to the nation, reinstituting President Aristide in the process (Stotzky, 1997).

The United States intervened in Haiti to bring back democratic rule by giving a voice to its black, impoverished majority. Subsequently, Aristide had the help of UN forces. American troops moved in and received little resistance as they helped Haiti introduce a democratic rule, which started with President Aristide's reinstatement.

Because of Haiti's situation, many people fled the country, and the US experienced a problem with Haitian refugees. It is essential to understand this problem with Haitian refugees, and to do so, a review of legislation from the Carter Presidency is necessary. The Refugee Act of 1980 is one of the causes of Haitian immigration to the US. Reports indicate that 125,000 Haitian refugees came to the US. The problem that the influx of refugees created was a major cause of US intervention in Haiti in 1994(Von Hippel, 1995). In the early 1990s, there was an influx of refugees from both Cuba and Haiti. American patience was bleak, and Florida sued the federal government for 1 billion dollars because of the drain on social welfare problems(Von Hippel, 1995). President George HW Bush's solution to slowing refugees' influx to the US was the Kennebunkport Executive Order 13286. This order required the US Coast Guard "to enforce the suspension of entry of undocumented aliens by sea and the interaction of any define vessel carrying such aliens" (Dastyari, 2015).

The impact of this order, as Evelyn Cartright highlights in "The Plight of Haitian Refugees in South Florida," was that the Kennebunkport Executive Order became a US presidential campaign issue in 1992. President Clinton characterized this policy as immoral; he states that "it is a blow to the principle of the first asylum and America's moral authority in defending the rights of refugees worldwide" (

Dastyari, 2015). Clinton went further with his campaign rhetoric and said that the Clinton White House would reexamine forced repatriation policy (Opitz, 2002). When Clinton took office, the repatriation policy continued, but he wanted to increase the diplomatic dialogue between Haiti and the US. The executive order is imperative in its legal, political, and social reactions (Opitz, 2002). With help from the United Nations, the Clinton Administration created a timeline in which the military would return political control to Aristide (Opitz, 2002).

Another issue of Haitian refugees coming to the U.S. was the issue of HIV. Published in 1994 during a hostile time for being with HIV/AIDS, Ira J. Kurzban (1993) stated that in 1994 would be quantitated in Guantanamo Bay. Haitian advocacy groups, such as the Haitian Centers Council, complained that the U.S. rejected HIV-positive refugees without legal counsel (Kurzban 1993). Not only was immigration a chief concern of the U.S. intervention in Haiti, but scholars such as Framer (2002) stated that the "United States foreign policy discourse on Haiti constructed the Haitians as a threat to the U.S. population in terms of public health (carriers of HIV and AIDS)."

The literature summarizes that the US-led response to political upheaval in Haiti was not solely because of the rhetoric of protecting a country's democratic infrastructure but because of Haiti's proximity to the U.S. to refugee crises. Moreover, Jefferies (2001) states that "the U.S. invasion came as a result of pressure from lobbyists and interest groups." Since Clinton sidestepped Congress by intervening without Congress's consent, the question becomes what mechanisms forced the

Clinton Administration to intervene. Domestic support from interest groups, the news media, and public opinion compelled the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti.

Case Study 2-The Role of the News Media

As in late September was preparing to invade Haiti to restore President Aristide to office, almost one thousand journalists covered the story. However, the US's arrival in Haiti to include the first stages of US intervention was slow. Strobel states that journalists were where they wanted to do. For instance, CBS Evening News anchorman Dan Rather interviewed Lt. Gen Raoul Cedras, the U.S military's target, the day before US troops arrived (Strobel, 1997). The news media took cues from the coverage in Somalia and was careful not to reveal US strategy to the enemy by not using powerful lighting.

The American news media coverage of Haiti is one of the domestic constraints featured in this dissertation. I am contending that the Clinton Administration considered the American public in their actions. One of the most important events that show that the American public constrained Clinton because that, on October 11, the USS Harlan County was on its way to Haiti for an agreed-upon UN-approved intervention in Haiti. However, this was days after the death of the Army Rangers in Somalia. A CNN poll found that two-thirds of the public opposed Haiti's intervention thinking that this would be another Somalia (Strobel, 1997). Also, the news media had a role in how Americans processed the death of the army rangers in Somalia. The press showing images of a dead American being dragged in Somalia's streets stuck a chord with the American public.

An important issue that Strobel raises is the stiff relationship between the military and the press. Tense news media and American military relations stem from the Vietnam Wars news media coverage, which did not put the US military in a positive image because of stories like the My Lai massacre. All the military likes to cover all aspects of wars. Meanwhile, during Haiti's media coverage, the military spokesman said, "We didn't have anything to hide. We couldn't hide anything" (Strobel, 1997). Strobel makes the argument that the news media coverage in Haiti acted as a constraint on US intervention.

Strobel does not believe that the news media was responsible for the US intervening in Haiti. The big push for the Clinton administration was policymakers. As mentioned in the next section, ethnic interest groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus(CBC) and TransAfrica were fundamental in getting the Clinton Administration to use force in Haiti. The media did help create a pervasive presence in Haiti that forced the Clinton Administration to intervene (Strobel 1997).

Case Study 2-The Role of Interest Groups

Due to Haiti's prominence in the US, there has been a trend of community activism within Haitian ethnic enclaves about Haiti's issues. As mentioned earlier, Haiti's negative attention was heightened in the 1980s because of the HIV/AIDS epidemic; Haitian organizations marched in the streets because Haitians were added to high-risk groups of people that could contract HIV/AIDS(Wah and Pierre-Louis, 2004).

Haiti had 400,000 immigrants in places such as New York City Wah and Pierre-Louis, 2004). Haitians had American allies because of the prevalence of Haitians in the US. The interest group advocacy was a primary reason why the Clinton Administration restored Aristide to office in 1994. Götz-Dietrich Opitz's "Transnational Organizing and the Haitian Crisis, 1991-1994" examines different groups' advocacy efforts. The Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica put political pressure on the Clinton Administration (Opitz 2004).

The CBC had a significant influence on drafting American foreign policy towards Haiti. Pamphile (1999) stated that:

The Congressional Black Caucus, which had grown from twenty-six to forty members after the 1992 election, was a vital force in shaping Haitian policy. It created a special task force headed by Representative Major Owens of New York to coordinate activities related to the Haitian crises (p.56).

Charles Rangel, a Congressman from New York and CBC member, encouraged many people with political power in these interest groups to put political pressure on Clinton (Opitz, 2004). Opitz notes that one of the many goals of the Haitian Community in New York City was a resistance-embargo mobilization that would forcibly return President Aristide to power. Congressional members kept Haiti alive in DC by actions such as Randall Robinson's hunger strike in Spring 1994.

Opitz perceived that these interest groups did not have large bases of support. As stated earlier, what made the US intervening in Haiti difficult for the broader African-American issue was that it was not a black/white issue. The amount of Haitians in the US and its geographical position helped sway the Clinton

Administration. Moreover, potential election problems in the 1994 mid-term and 1996 presidential election were other reasons why President Clinton intervened in Haiti. As Opitz notes, a considerable number of Haitians now had US residency (Opitz, 2004). This situation caused anxiety for the Clinton Administration as many saw him as going back on campaign promises.

Furthermore, it is essential to note the comfort level of Haitians being in the United States. In Atepick's (1999) *Pride Against Prejudice: Haitians in the United States*, he explains how Haitians have always maintained political representation in the United States, but at this time, places like Miami had an increased presence.

Somalia still cast a shadow on the Clinton Administration decision-making process for Haiti. On October 11, 1993, in an intervention agreement with the U.N., the U.S. used the USS Harlan County, which was equipped with 225 US and Canadian soldiers, to help President Aristide return to power. As Girard (2004) notes: "The situation was even worse on the dock, where U.S. Embassy attaché Vicky Hudleston hoped to welcome the troops. As uniformed Haitian police stood by, members of Emmanuel Constant's Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) surrounded her vehicle, wielded machetes, chanted "remember Somalia," and assaulted Embassy spokesman Stanley Shrager. Nine T.V. news crews were there to film this scene and the Harlan County as it waited all day at sea for orders, and the ship's captain became concerned. The tragic impact of the U.S. connection in Somalia proved to make any other U.S. involvement complicated even though Emmanuel Constant, in an interview with "60 Minutes," Ed Bradley claimed that the Somalia signs were a ploy.

The Clinton Administration and Haiti” illustrate the CBC's influence on advocating a strong response to Haiti's military dictatorship. Even though a post-Somalia Congress did not favor Haiti intervention, the CBC wanted President Aristide to return to power(Pastor, 1996). “The Clinton Administration and the Americas: The Postwar Rhythm and Blues” also points to the CBC involvement in getting the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti. The CBC kept Haiti's situation on the Clinton Administrations' list by doing a hunger strike(Pastor, 1996). This action could be a reason why the Clinton Administration intervened. The CBC was also instrumental in getting the chief negotiator to the Haitian military replaced by Bill Grey, a CBC member.

Case Study 2-The Role of Public Opinion

Furthermore, the Clinton Administration did intervene in Haiti. Phillippe Girard in "Operation Restore Democracy" explores the political reasons why the US intervened. On September 15th, 1994, President Clinton appeared on TV to tell the United States that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 permitted the US to remove Haiti's military. According to President Clinton, the military junta violated the agreement that they would return Aristide to power. As a part of the mission, President Aristide did return office. Whether the public opinion was a domestic variable in the Clinton Administration intervention in Haiti is inclusive. In the fall of 1994, 78 percent of Americans thought Haiti's intervention should have Congress's support(Fatton, 2015).

In conclusion, why did domestic pressures force the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti? Robert Fatton's (2015) chapter *Haitian History: New Perspectives* explains the role of domestic pressures:

It is unlikely, however, that domestic interests represented a sufficiently powerful constellation of constituencies to force the issue. The Clinton administration had shown repeatedly that it could ignore and even alienate its allies in the African-American community at no real cost. Furthermore, while the Haitian refugees posed a political and moral dilemma for the president, they could be—and indeed were—rerouted to shores far away from Florida. Finally, with more than two-thirds of the U.S. public opposed to any military intervention, the Clinton administration had little to gain from invading Haiti and risking the loss of American lives. In fact, President Clinton himself thought a military strike against the “de factos” might well “ruin everything he had worked all his life to build(p.305).

President Clinton's pending refugee crisis is one of the main factors that caused the United States to intervene in 1994. Clinton stated, “Three hundred thousand more Haitians, 5 percent of their entire population, is in hiding in their own country. If we do not act, they could be the next wave of refugees at our door” (Optiz, 2004). The nightmare of a refugee crisis from Haiti is essential because it would be perceived that despite the image that the United States is trying to uphold democracy in Haiti, it is more of a security problem that the Haitians represent. The solution would be to fix Haiti's internal issues so people would not be tempted to come to the United States.

Patton (2012) quoted Laennec Hurbon, a prominent Haitian intellectual, that the intervention was a “Kantian idea of a human universal had begun to emerge as a concrete reality in the geopolitical sphere.” The literature gaps will address this in the gaps because President Clinton appealed directly to the UN, not Congress. Senate

Minority Leader Robert Dole said wasting an American life for Aristide's return was not worth it. The Clinton Administration barring an invasion was because of the lack of national interests, so Clinton appealed to the UN. The UN got more involved in the situation in Haiti than the US did. Patton is not sure why the US intervened in Haiti. Girard contends that there was no democracy to restore. According to PDD-25, the Haiti mission results in ware mission because "US planners defined 'exit strategy' in Haiti to mean 'the planned transition to the host nation of all functions performed on its behalf by peace operations forces'" (Reimer, 1997). President Aristide was in power, but General Cedras forced him to leave, and President Aristide was ousted from power yet again in 2004.

Gaps in the Literature: The Domestic Puzzle

This literature review has exposed many gaps; since this is a case study that examines domestic constraints' importance, I discussed the general literature on foreign policy and the three domestic, independent variables-news media, public opinion, and interest groups. Understanding regime type is essential because public opinion and media institutions thrive under democratic regimes, ensuring that public opinion and media organizations are a central part of the democratic process. In some non-democratic states, the media may be censored, and public opinion is not a part of the decision-making process. In the literature regarding democratic peace theory, public opinion is essential to the decision-making process because public officials are elected and rely on public support to keep their public office.

The literature review has attempted to show how the separation of powers constrains the president's actions. However, there is not enough literature that explicitly discusses American foreign policy interest in humanitarian Interventions. Some of the writing slightly mentions the lack of knowledge in Africa. This lack brings up more critical questions addressed in my alternative theories section in Chapter 1 regarding constructivism: how Americans perceives crises. The literature does not do a good job stating whether Americans understand war in the same humanitarian intervention view. Only Samantha Power in *Problem From Hell* alludes to the concern that the media did not frame Rwanda as a genocide. Still, policymakers were indifferent and saw Rwanda as a continuation of their Civil War.

President Clinton was influenced by the public outrage at the disastrous Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia that claimed American lives. The literature has a consensus that this tragedy forced the Clinton Administration to reexamine its foreign policy platform regarding humanitarian interventions. Therefore, the Clinton Administration's inaction in Rwanda was a political casualty because it lacked the US's strategic interest. Plus, the Somalia crises constrained the Clinton Administration's peacekeeping efforts in Somalia. The literature demonstrates that activism from the Black community was a factor in President Clinton's response to supporting a US-led UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti.

Regarding my three domestic, independent variables: the news media, public opinion, and interest groups, there are not many studies that focus on all three domestic sources collectively in foreign policy studies. Part of my dissertation will

look at each independent variable as a separate variable in my case studies, but I will analyze the interaction between them.

The literature is consistent with the premise that Americans are more inclined to advocate humanitarian intervention if there is some connection, such as geographic proximity, concerned groups, and strategic significance. The idea that elites are prone to exert more significant foreign policy influence changed at the end of the Cold War. The immigration wave in America is more inclined to advocate for their country of origin (Shalin, 1995).

A lingering issue that cannot be avoided is situated the Clinton Doctrine in Rwanda and Haiti. The Clinton Doctrine encourages the expansion of democracies and markets. The Clinton Doctrine is a platform that safeguards the institution of a “democracy” while not ignoring the concerns of the domestic population. The Clinton Doctrine expects domestic support in foreign policy issues. I discussed the Clinton Doctrine in Chapter 1, and I summarized the Clinton Administration's actions in this chapter. The chief tenants of the Clinton Doctrine include expanding democracies and markets in a globalizing world. However, these seem almost identical to George H.W Bush's New World Order platform. As Melanson notes, the Bush Administration knew that there would be a contingent of American forces in Somalia Clinton was inaugurated. It could also appear that Bush saw Operation Restore Democracy as an opportunity to rebuild Somalia's political subculture. Economic development that occurred in Haiti has been called “New World Imperialism” (Dupuy, 2007). Moreover, Haiti's economic interest and geographical interests were more interested since Haiti is close to the United States.

Since this dissertation is just a two-nation case study--Rwanda and Haiti, I left the discussion of NATO out of this dissertation because NATO and the Clinton years is usually seen through the crises in the former Yugoslavia. However, the expansion of NATO can be a potential problem for discussion and conclusions in this dissertation. If the Clinton Administration wanted a more robust NATO, does that mean that the administration cared about enlarging democracies, and perhaps Rwanda is an outlier?

The first case study about the US response to genocide in Rwanda demonstrates a substantial amount of literature about Rwanda's genocide. There are two themes in the broader literature about the internal causes of the genocide and the international community's response to the genocide. This dissertation is concerned with the global perspective, more particularly the United States response. The literature does examine what factors caused the Clinton Administration not to intervene in genocide in Rwanda. The primary cause is an external factor, which is a crisis. The Clinton Administration's handling of the Somalia crisis in 1993 that resulted in 18 Army Ranger deaths caused the Clinton administration to reexamine its position on peacekeeping support.

Further, the 18 Army Rangers' death caused the American public sentiment against other wars, such as the Vietnam War, to resurface. Moreover, American soldiers' media images being dragged in the middle of the street did not win over public support. It is important to note that President Clinton was in his first term of office, and the United States had not seen a Democrat two-term president since Franklin D. Roosevelt. President Clinton would take a cautious approach with his

foreign policy agenda; thus, Rwanda's genocide would be a casualty of Clinton's Administration policy regarding peacekeeping operations.

The literature regarding the scholarship on the US response to the rule of a group of high-ranking Haitian military Junta rule is not as substantial as that of the Rwandan case. There is literature that cites some of the Clinton Administration's response to Haiti as what happened in Somalia. The crises in Somalia caused the United States to be more strategic in selecting peacekeeping operations. Haiti fits that profile because if the United States had not intervened, it would have triggered a massive immigration crisis with thousands of refugees coming to the United States. Plus, unlike the Rwandan crises, there were vocal interest groups that were pressuring the Clinton Administration to intervene. Another issue that this dissertation discusses is the minority position that domestic politics can influence foreign policy decisions. It could be assumed that the Clinton presidency is an outlier

There has not been a direct study that has considered both the Rwandan and Haitian cases together. Both of these crises occurred in 1994, and they both demonstrate the willingness and extent of the Clinton Administration's stance on peacekeeping. These crises occurred during the same year, making this a critical study that examines how the American media, public opinion, and interest groups influenced the foreign policy decision-making process.

The Clinton Administration intervened to remove the military dictatorship in Haiti but did not intervene in Rwanda's genocide. The Democratic Peace Theory would examine the United States intervening in Haiti over ideological reasons that a

military coup should not overthrow a democratically elected president. The reasons for Clinton not intervening in Rwanda is not explained by the democratic peace theory nor by the Clinton Administration policy of Democratic Enlargement. The only explanation within the liberal theories would be the United States' internal democratic structure that made politicians accountable to the public.

The literature forces the question about the implementation of the Clinton Doctrine. Was the Clinton Doctrine just a naïve ideological experiment on Wilsonian idealism? There are gaps because the theoretical elements of liberalism prefer liberal states in the international system versus the Clinton Doctrine's application. The investigation for implementing the Clinton Doctrine emphasizes the spread of democracy. A lack of a democratic government could explain why the United States did not support intervention in Rwanda and supported a military intervention that brought the democratic President Jean Aristide's return in Haiti. The issue with the Clinton Doctrine is the absence of public opinion.

This vast amount of literature used so many varied sources, such as interviews, media coverage analysis, and document analysis. However, there are still no definitive conclusions that domestic constraints can impact foreign policy decisions. The only conclusion that can be made is that Somalia is a factor in the Clinton administration decision making process in 1994. Yes, there is much analysis, but there are still unanswered questions, such as a definitive answer as to why Somalia caused the media not to cover Rwanda, why was Haiti covered?

In 1994 there have been polls, news media reports, and interest groups that supported American Armed-intervention in both Rwanda and Haiti, but only Haiti

received Armed-intervention. This dissertation hopes to examine the following three domestic sources equally: news media, interest groups, and public opinion to determine if those domestic forces played a role in the foreign policy process. Going back to one of my central research questions - how did domestic sources influence the Clinton Administration's foreign policy response towards Haiti and Rwanda's 1994 humanitarian crises? Their literature has no firm comparative answer for all three domestic sources: news media, interest groups, and public opinion influence the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti but not Rwanda.

Moreover, this dissertation will highlight and expand on existing connections between the domestic sources that I mention: news media, public opinion, and interest groups. For instance, it is noted in works such as "Interest groups in the media: Bias and diversity over time" (2012) that for minority interest groups to get the news media's attention, they have to stage protest events to get a more significant news media presence. Connections between the news media, interest groups, and public opinion will be explored in the Haiti case study when I highlight how Transafrica had to stage a hunger strike to respond from the Clinton Administration.

All of the literature demonstrates that domestic influence has been critical in foreign policy since World War II. Moreover, three domestic sources appear in the vast foreign policy literature as essential variables: news media, interest groups, and public opinion. Rwanda and Haiti's 1994 crises have not been comparatively studied from the influence (or lack of) public opinion, interest groups, and the news media. Therefore, this dissertation will expand the conversation that domestic power sources in the United States can potentially dictate foreign policy.

Chapter Summary

The literature demonstrates that domestic actors can constrain the executive. I reviewed the American foreign policy relationship with the news media, public opinion, and interest groups. There are times that domestic actors can supersede the voice of Congress by appealing directly to the president. The literature shows that the political climate is essential in understanding the power of the domestic actors. For instance, despite domestic pressure about the U.S involvement in the Vietnam War, the Johnson Administration placed external variables such as the threat of communism over domestic variables such as the prevalence of protesters against the Vietnam War.

This dissertation will expand on the argument that domestic politics can influence foreign policy by simultaneously examining public opinion, the news media, and interest groups as one cohesive unit. I will add to the literature by adding a novel claim that, yes, domestic politics can influence the foreign policy decision-making process. Still, the domestic actors are more effective as a coalition.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research process of this dissertation. This study will assess whether domestic variables -news media, public opinion, and interest groups influence American foreign policy. This dissertation will examine two case studies that look at two foreign policy crises in the Clinton Administration that occurred during the same year: The military junta crises in Haiti and the Rwandan genocide, both occurred in 1994. These two cases demonstrate a causal relationship between domestic variables and the foreign policy decision-making process. Due to this dissertation's case study nature, I rely on debates (not the full list) such as *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wallstreet Journal* query search, the Vanderbilt News Television archives, and the Clinton Library, along with context from interviews I have collected from policymakers.

Introduction

This mix-method study will demonstrate that the news media, public opinion, and interest groups can influence Haiti and Rwanda's foreign policy decision-making process. The American public has often been cited as a reason for American policymakers' decision making in foreign policy. One of the primary

sources of information that Americans get their information about national/international issues is the media. This dissertation will use two contentious cases of 1994--the Haiti military junta and the Rwandan genocide. To understand why the Clinton Administration intervened in Haiti but did not in Rwanda can be partly explained by domestic constraints such as the American public and domestic considerations. I am writing this dissertation out of Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett's position that the American people can constrain foreign policy decisions, making the democracies less prone to war. The idea that policymakers should research foreign policy from domestic sources is not a new endeavor.

Philosophy of Research Design

The core of this research deals with how the Clinton Administration considered domestic sources-news media, public opinion, and interest groups during the decision-making process. The number of documents and interviews that will comprise this dissertation will make a strong but not absolute case that the Clinton administration considered the public their decision-making process. The quest for knowledge and truths will be backed up by argumentative evidence to not turn into a highly interdisciplinary studies normative dissertation. To figure out what roles the news media, public opinion, and interest groups played in the Clinton Administration's decision-making calculus it will require me to utilize field outside of political science such as media studies.

Research Methods in Politics (2008) underscores the importance of theory and laws in political science. I have attached myself to liberal thought, such as the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) and Foreign Policy Analysis(FPA). The theories

explain how the separation of powers/checks and balances constrains the president from acting pliantly in foreign policy matters. The dissertation is not the positioning of a new idea of how domestic politics influence the presidency. My dissertation is part of a new novel approach to foreign policy that considers its internal structure internationally. Robert Dahl in *Governs? Democracy Who and Power in an American City* asked his research question: "Given the existence of inequalities like these, who governs in a democracy?" (Dahl, 1961). I am sure that I am addressing my research question, which is similar to Dahl's in a mixed-method approach: What is the impact of the American public upon the government?"

Dependent Variable: -Political Culture of the US in 1994

Independent Variables: News Media, Public Opinion, and Interest Groups

According to most research method books in political science and Rogers *Piecework*, an independent variable is a cause (Pierce 2008; Vaus 2001). My independent variable is counter to Almond and Verba, who looked at civic culture as mutually constitutive. In *Research Design in Social Research*, Vaus explains these variables' need to interact with each other.

Regarding the horrific aftermath of the US experience in Somalia in 1993 shaped the US's political culture in 1994, the United States made it clear that they would support UN involvement in situations where the outcome was not viable or interfere with the US's interests. The fear of American lives being put at risk is necessary because the two cases Rwanda and Haiti, fit the framework of that statement. The situation in Rwanda was unstable, therefore, not viable for a peace

enforcement peacekeeping operation, and Haiti being geographically close to the United States posed problems.

Political will is an important intervening variable because, in the case of my dissertation, the intervening variable that is political will manifests itself in "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." (PDD-25). PDD-25 as an intervening variable is even more critical because of its language regarding public and congressional support. This dissertation argues that there are domestic constraints to American foreign policy because PDD-25 directly mentions the American public and congressional support.

Moreover, the high cost of peacekeeping operations can impact a peacekeeping operation's "political will." Also, the budget of the UN is essential in understanding the US decisions in 1994. According to this policy, the Clinton administration wanted to reduce the US contribution of peacekeeping funds to 25 percent. This would appear to give the US more control in the number of peacekeeping operations the UN would undertake. The United States would be more vocal on peacekeeping operations since their financial contribution was reduced.

Decoding Political Norms: An Interdisciplinary Endeavor

The dynamic fluid culture of the 21st century is essential to understand the social climate of the 1990s. It is vital to state that President Clinton inherited the presidency during a turbulent time. This dissertation is grounded in political science, but this research is concerned with understanding the domestic priorities in the early 1990s. Understanding how the American public grappled with perceiving Rwanda

and Haiti's issues will require understanding the "texts." As Couldry states, "Our cultural life is saturated by texts, especially media texts. Cultural studies cannot, therefore, do without textual analysis" (Couldry, 2000). The United States was grappling with the aftermath of the LA Riots, immigration issues, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The public social and political awareness of Rwanda and Haiti's events reflects the climate in the US. This dissertation wants to understand the "how and why questions" of power news media, interest groups, and public opinion influenced the Clinton Administration's response to 1994 events in Rwanda and Haiti from a postmodernist angle. Therefore, it is essential to examine the events in 1994 in the context of the time's current social reality. For instance, in "African-American Newspaper Coverage of the AIDS Crisis," African-Americans were impacted disappointed in the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Still, the mainstream media did not provide full coverage that showed there was inequality.

For decades, news agencies have been criticized for their lack of awareness in covering sensitive issues such as race. My dissertation looks at the role of the news media in the decision-making process. As Jenkins and Gadget argue (2011), "traditional mainstream news media serve up a view of the world that may not be representative of American pluralism and that diverse views about issues that affect our lives are often absent in traditional mainstream storytelling." As stated in my literature review, it is uncertain whether journalists are thoroughly informed about the events that they report on to the public.

This dissertation attempts to understand what activated the public to become more vocal in 1994 concerning the Clinton Administration's actions to Haiti and

Rwanda. Bicchieri (2014) defines norms as "a behavior that is collectively approved or disapproved in a group or population and is enforced by sanctions."

Understanding social norms is crucial to this dissertation because of the connection that social norms have to political action. Social norms as a constructed phenomena are the precursor to understanding policy-making.

Case Study Approach and Case Selection: Methods

My dissertation's main objective is to determine the extent of news media, public opinion, and interest groups on the foreign policy process. As mentioned earlier, my research is drawing on three different theories/approaches to understand the extent of domestic power in the foreign-policy decision-making process. I am juxtaposing -Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Role Theory, and Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) to understand why the Clinton Administration intervened in Haiti but not Rwanda. I will compare public opinion, news media, and interest groups in both cases- Rwanda and Haiti.

This dissertation will follow a theory-guided(the connection of domestic variables to foreign policy decision) case study approach to answer the research question and prove that the news media, public opinion, and interest groups can impact the American foreign policy process. The impact and influence of the news media, public opinion, and interest groups in the two case studies will contribute to the theory that domestic politics can impact foreign policy. The case study method is defined as gathering and analyzing data as a particular example and then making broader generalizations based on the findings.

To prove the potentiality of American domestic politics influencing the foreign policy decision-making process, I look at an example of where domestic forces were instrumental in influencing the decision-making process. My case study approach will focus on an instrumental approach to case studies because I am looking at particular policies that reflect the argument that domestic politics impact foreign policy decision-making. Compton-Lilly (2012) states the power of instrumental case studies shows “the ability of researchers to connect local actors and practices to general policies and the ways those policies act on people and influence communities.”

While the crises in Rwanda and Haiti are separate, but they occurred in the same year, I can study both cases comparatively because the Clinton Administration used military force to intervene in Haiti but not Rwanda. The political climate of the US in a post-Somalia environment is directly related to both crises. Understanding the intent of political actors post-1993 should take the “cultural pulse” into consideration, which I refer to as what is perceived as usual. Journalists are bound by the “conditions of the cultural, political, and historical climate” (Allen, 2017).

The primary tool that I will use in evaluating domestic variables' role in foreign policy decisions will be using document analysis. Document Analysis is the "systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents—both printed and electronic material." I will be analyzing hundreds of documents, and the use of document analysis will allow me to pinpoint relevant information by using keywords to streamline my search. To determine what role the domestic plays in the foreign policy decision-making process concerning my cases, I need to identify keywords as codes.

I will be using two historical case studies from 1994--Rwanda and Haiti to prove the power of my three independent variables: news media, public opinion, and interest groups. Using a case study approach provides an intensive study of the news media's power, interest groups, and public opinion. The problem in this dissertation is determining if there are domestic sources of American foreign policy. Examples from case studies are needed to prove my argument that the Clinton Administration considered the American public when making foreign policy decisions. In the hopes of using case studies, political scientists can develop a domestic power theory by stating that public opinion, the news media, and interest groups can unite to form a powerful political domestic actor.

This dissertation will examine two case studies to prove a causal relationship; an approach referred to as the comparative method. In *Political Science: The State of The Discipline*, David Collier uses Arend Lijphart's as the analysis of a small number of cases entailing two observations key to permit a statistical analysis" (Collier, 1993). Two case studies will allow this dissertation to have a more in-depth analysis of independent variables- news media, interest groups, and public opinion play in American foreign policy. Two comparable case studies of states with similar political circumstances are needed, such as Rwanda and Haiti. Both have a predominately black population with a history of tensions in 1994. Amidst the implementation of PDD-25 that represented the public concerns for peacekeeping operations following the US disastrous peacekeeping operation in Somalia, this dissertation needed two case studies that the Clinton Administration was fearful of

the American public's backlash. The causal relationship of the domestic variables supports the selection of these two case studies.

Researching foreign policy decisions from the domestic level reflects the changing paradigm transformation in presidential decision-making in foreign policy issues that welcomes the study of domestic variables in foreign policy issues. The US's failures in Vietnam War created unprecedented public outrage; the power of the protests forced the United States into a period of isolation that would end until the US involvement in the first Gulf War in the early 1990s. The idea that the news media, interest groups, and public opinion are essential variables stems from the longstanding liberal-realist debate. Realism does not account for change, and structural variants of realism ignore regime types such as democracies as international peace factors. On the surface, the aftermath of the 18 Army Ranger's death in Somalia would provide the United States' rationale for not being open to supporting humanitarian interventions with peace enforcement features. In 1994, the United States sent US armed forces to restore order in Haiti, but the Clinton Administration did not do so in Rwanda. I am looking at my cases of why the US said "no" to Rwanda and "yes" to Haiti.

I break away from theories that dated theories of public opinion, such as the Almond-Lippmann consensus. Public opinion has been ignored as an essential factor in foreign policy research because average citizens are ignorant and cannot understand international crises

This dissertation's approach will not be purely bound to one traditional methodology, such as quantitative and qualitative, to analyze the news media's role,

public opinion, and interest groups. Due to this case study's complexity, I need to use different approaches to yield the same expected results. The analysis of domestic politics' impact in post-Cold War academic literature is a paradigm shift in understanding foreign policy outcomes, such as using theoretical frameworks such as DPT, Role Theory, and FPA. Using mix-methodologies examines if the Clinton Administration considered three domestic variables-interest groups, news media, and public opinion in their decision-making during the crises in Rwanda and Haiti. My research echoes the "transformative paradigm, which is a framework of belief systems that places a priority on social justice and human rights" because I will use mix-methods to unearth the role that domestic politics play in foreign policy decisions. (Doyle et al, 2019).

The inclusion of the news media, public opinion, and interest groups has been studied more in liberal theories of foreign policy that focus on regime type because of pluralism. Different political actors such as the news media, public opinion, and interest groups can act on a public policy issue or ignore it. This dissertation is not asking whether the United States should be involved in humanitarian interventions. Still, I am concerned about the extent that the news media, public opinion, and interest groups have in the foreign policy decision-making process.

Questioning the "record" is a primary way of analyzing issues in a case study. As SAGE states, documents are a "record of human activity" that can give political context problems (Olson, 2014). Since I want to know how the Clinton Administration came to its decision in 1994 regarding Rwanda and Haiti, I need to know what was said. The use of documents gives me the ability to see what was being discussed in

1994 and what context. Using documents, I endeavor to determine what these records can tell me about the connection linking the domestic and executive branch-foreign policy decision-making process. I will use documents from 1994 to analyze any documents involving the Clinton Administration's response to Rwanda and Haiti. These documents may be memorandums within different agencies, press briefs, news articles, television news broadcasts, interviews, and policy directives.

My dissertation is trying to make the argument that domestic variables can influence the foreign policy decision-making process. I am specifically looking at public opinion, news media, and interest groups. Since I am studying the news media as an influencer in the foreign policy decision-making process, I need to examine Rwanda and Haiti's media coverage. I am using the ABC News, NBC News, CBS News, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wallstreet Journal* to look at its news coverage regarding Rwanda and Haiti

Document analysis is only one tool in my mix-method approach to understanding domestic politics' role in foreign policy decisions. This dissertation examines if domestic politics such as a disgruntled public can influence foreign policy issues; therefore, interviewing policy officials such as politicians will be essential in this dissertation. While the literature states that the Clinton Administration did read the nation's pulse for foreign policy decisions following the debacle in Somalia, policymakers were expected to understand the political climate and the actions of the Clinton Administration. Therefore, this dissertation will be using elite interviewing in conjunction with other methods. In "Interviewing Political Elites," in *Doing Research in the Archives*, authors define political elites as "ex-Presidents and Cabinet

members; Senators and Representatives; Supreme Court Justices; White House, the executive branch and congressional staff; political party and congressional campaign committee officials; lobbyists and media personnel" (Peabody et al. 1990).

In "Political Science and Archival Research," Scott Frisch and Sean Kelly explain the available data in these archives, such as public opinion, electoral strategy, political party information, redistricting efforts, and career information on politicians (Frisch and Kelly, 2012). These authors state that quantitative methods have outshined archival research in political science; however, within the archives can be information that can be quantified. There is a relationship between doing archival research and content (textual) analysis. For example, examining the content of President Clinton's interviews in the context of this dissertation can be more beneficial if the scholar looks at the number of times that he mentioned either case-Rwanda and Haiti. In "The Search For the Elusive Executive," by Brandon Rottinghaus, this chapter shows why archival research is vital to this dissertation's objective. Rottinghaus asks: "So, do presidents lead or follow public opinion?" That question is the basis for this dissertation regarding the consideration of the domestic. Rottinghaus states that quantitative analysis usually answers this question.

Modern archival research- the use of online databases is essential because it dismisses the idea that the relevant scholarship should be satisfied with existing questions. The archives can find new answers to problems that have been solved with other research methods because of the vast quantity of archives' documents. The digitalization of some of the archives in *The New York Times*, *The Wallstreet*

Journal, *The Washington Post*, The Vanderbilt Television Archives, and Clinton Library will keep this dissertation from being a seven-year endeavor.

The advantages of document analysis described by Bowen are the availability of primary source mater, cost-related reasons, coverage, reliance, and coverage. A significant amount of the documents used in this dissertation comes from public records such as the Vanderbilt News Archives, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Wallstreet Journal*, and the Clinton Library. Moreover, I can see the documents as it was written in 1994, my interpretation of the documents may differ from others, but the information stays the same.

Counting patterns will be the primary tool used to discuss the impact of domestic variables in foreign policy. Looking at how many times the word “genocide” was used refers to Vivo counting. Vivo coding is defined as the “practice of assigning a label to a section of data” (Given, 2008). As Bazeley states in “ From Codes and Counts to Content Analysis,” counts are significant to mix-methods. The benefits of using counts include:

Use of counts communicates more effectively and reliably than does use of vague terms such as “most” or “some” to indicate more or less frequent occurrence of some feature in the text.

Counts can be viewed as reflecting the importance of various emergent themes and topics, although frequency and importance are not necessarily synonymous.

Counting summarises patterns in data, such as from comparative and relational matrix analyses, and can allow possible interrelationships to be more easily identified for further exploration (p. 3-4).

News as Archives

Table 1 1994 Print News Coverage of Case Studies

Print News Coverage 1994 Countries Coverage	Amount of Times the New York Times Covered the Country	Amount of Times the Washing Post Covered the Country	Amount of Times the Washing Post Covered the Country
Haiti	1468	1707	534
Rwanda	805	441	214

My chief task in completing my research is to specifically correlate the Clinton Administration to my three independent variables-News Media, interest groups, and public opinion. I will utilize *The New York Times*(NYT), *Wallstreet Journal*(WSJ), and *The Washington Post*(WSP) to gauge the impact that newspapers had in the policy-making process. Newspapers are defined as “systems of interconnected networks, created through communication” (Sylvie & Witherspoon 2002). I realize that news agencies make choices in what they use to cover because they are a business organization. As stated, the primary task is to organize information that is of use to its audience (Sylvie & Witherspoon 2002).

Table 2 Comparative Coverage of Select US Print News Mentioning "Rwanda" and "Haiti"

1994 Print News Coverage of President Clinton Public Opinion and Interest Groups	NY Times Amount of Times	Washington Post Amount of Times	The Wallstreet Journal Amount of Times
Key Query Words(Title)	Frequency	Frequency	Frequency
President Clinton	6516	7404	3345
President Clinton Public Opinion	802	358	159
President Clinton Human Rights Watch	121	85	33
President Clinton Public Opinion foreign policy	226	69	35
President Clinton Congressional Black Caucus	80	159	49
President Clinton Amnesty International USA	72	1	1
President Clinton Randall Robinson	29	57	57
President Clinton TransAfrica	13	42	42
President Clinton Rwanda	227	227	119
President Clinton Haiti	878	878	878

I have the task of making the argument that domestic sources had pivotal role in pushing the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti, and the lack of support reaffirmed the Clinton Administration's not to recommend military force in Rwanda.

Codebook Rules for query searches:

a. **Dates:** 01/01/94-12/31/94

- b. **Exclusion Words**-There are irrelevant phrases such as the “United States” that could be excluded because it does not show patterns.
- c. **Keywords as Codes**: President Clinton, President Clinton Public Opinion, President Clinton Human Rights Watch, President Public Opinion foreign policy, President Clinton congressional black caucus, President Clinton Amnesty International USA, President Clinton Amnesty International USA Rwanda, President Clinton Amnesty International USA Haiti, President Clinton Public Opinion Somalia, President Randall Robinson, President Clinton Transafrica.
- d. **Coding Technique**: Vivo coding
- e. **Analysis Approach**: The use of search engines, filtering devices, basic software Excel
- f. **Databases**: Clinton Library, The New York Times, Roper Center Archive, Vanderbilt Television News Archive, Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal




Figure 1 Rwanda and Haiti coverage in the News Media

Due to the violence occurring in Rwanda and Haiti in the early 1990s, I have to locate data; I will have to contend with available data in newspapers and government documents. I will use convenient data because *The New York Times* (The NYT), *The Washington Post*, and *The Wallstreet Journal* (WSJ) archives are available online. I will use *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wallstreet Journal* coverage of Rwanda and Haiti's crises by conducting a content analysis of searching for keywords: public opinion, interest groups, and other news agencies. I only use these sections in the print news: news, editorial, commentary. While I only look at the evening news "Big Three" News Networks: ABC News, CBS News, and NBC news.

I am looking at how domestic actors influenced the foreign policy decision-making process. The news media plays a role in the literature review because both the public and government rely on the media for information. The media role is essential because it theorized that the media reflects public opinion(Donsbach &

Patterson, 2012). The public relies on the media for up to date information about political crises. The news media can help set the agenda of various issues because the news media appeals directly to the public. As McComb stated:

The power of the news media to set a nation's agenda, to focus public attention on a few key public issues, is an immense and well-documented influence. Not only do people acquire factual information about public affairs from the news media, readers and viewers also learn how much importance to attach to a topic on the basis of the emphasis placed on it in the news. Newspapers provide a host of cues about the salience of the topics in the daily news – lead story on page one, other front page display, large headlines, etc. Television news also offers numerous cues about salience – the opening story on the newscast, length of time devoted to the story, etc. These cues repeated day after day effectively communicate the importance of each topic. In other words, the news media can set the agenda for the public's attention to that small group of issues around which public opinion forms (p. 1)
News media is central to daily life, shedding light on public policies (Flick &

Chamberlain, 2012). The use of the news media is imperative to this dissertation because it "understands media's influence and functions. Analyses need to link specific texts (e.g., news items) to the socio-political contexts and practices within which these are produced and embedded" (Flick and Chamberlain, 2012). The research tool to understand the impact of the media is content analysis. The use of the news media can accomplish the following:

News analysis can answer questions about how controversies surrounding issues of public concern are played out, who are identified as key stakeholders, and how their positions within the controversy are constructed. News analysis can also establish what issues and stakeholders are ignored and provide information about alternative representations that can be developed (Flick & Chamberlain, 2012, p.3).

In agreement with the Sage Handbook on Qualitative Research, the media is part of the decision-making process since there is a casual relationship between the audience, including policymakers and the news outlets themselves. News media is central to daily life, shedding light on public policies (Flick & Chamberlain, 2012). The use of the news media is imperative to this dissertation because it "understands media's influence and functions. Analyses need to link specific texts (e.g., news items) to the socio-political contexts and practices within which these are produced and embedded" (Flick & Chamberlain, 2012). The research tool to understand the impact of the media is content analysis.

By the numbers, *The New York Times*, compared to the other newspapers, only appears to have done a stellar job as a print newspaper on its news coverage on Rwanda and Haiti. Still, the evening news coverage is not comprehensive. My question becomes, why is that? From my review of the media sources, I analyze specific issues such as the crises in Rwanda being portrayed as a "tribal war." Moreover, the media use is just one tool I will use because I can use polling data to determine how the news media coverage influenced the public and what the policymakers responded to the coverage.

The strength in analyzing the news media is to determine there is a relationship. I am assuming that the result is some government (in)action. Part of the puzzle that I am trying to understand is if public opinion, interest groups, and the news media are separate and influence the public independently. Is the news media a continuation of public opinion or vice versa?

Table 3-Number of Times Where Polls Dedicated Questions to Rwanda and Haiti

Roper iPoll:Sample of 1994 Public Opinion Polls	Number of Questions	Studies/Datasets	First Date of 94 Poll
Rwanda	25	13	04/30/1994 - 05/03/1994
Haiti	343	76	1/15/94- 1/18/1994

The use of public opinion polls as a part of my mix-method approach may appear to be straightforward. Still, policymakers may interpret the public opinion polls differently depending on who reviews the poll results and how the questions are framed. Polls are intended to represent the rationale of voter insight into elections and public policy decisions. Public opinion polls are predicated on the idea that the results may shape the decision-making process. I am using polls to determine if they played a role in influencing the Clinton Administration's decision-making process on Rwanda and Haiti. In "Do Polls Influence Opinions? Investigating Poll Feedback Loops Using the Novel Dynamic Response Feedback Experimental Procedure," the issue on the extent of public opinion polls influence the opinion is examined. Public

opinion polls help political actors see where the public is thinking about various issues (Arnesen et al.,2017).

Studying public opinion can be done by researching the news media.

Journalists write on what the pulse of the nation is in their own view. As stated in *Public Opinion in the 21st Century: Let the People Speak?*(2006), Brooker states that:

The print media are also important as conduits of opinions from editorialists, columnists, and ordinary people who write letters to the editor. Most large newspapers print the opinions of their editors and run the articles of liberal and conservative columnists. Most also print letters to the editor that allow ordinary people the power to express practically any sort of opinion (Brooker, 2006)

Furthermore, due to my dissertation on domestic variables before-mentioned as news media, public opinion, and interest groups on American foreign policy, it would be negligent not to examine American attitudes on Rwanda and Haiti. I am looking only at select databases that express whether the US should have been involved in Haiti and Rwanda in 1994. I will admit that my polling data may not provide a conclusive answer that shows American concerns, so I analyze the polling results discussed in the news media.

I will be counting the frequencies of how public opinion is mentioned in the news media because I am trying to establish a connection between domestic politics and foreign policy. I need to see how the news media covered public opinion and how it differed in Rwanda's coverage and Haiti. Schulz asks a familiar question "A lasting question of public opinion research concerns the relationship between public opinion and media messages: Do news media mould [mold] or mirror public opinion?" That is a question that I hope to provide light to in doing content analysis.

Public opinion polls are relevant to this dissertation because they were done during a vulnerable time in the Clinton Administration. President Clinton came into office as the Democrat president since President Jimmy Carter. Few poll studies examine political phenomena during a non-presidential race. This dissertation is looking at political issues rather than the election itself.

Moreover, the polls' use is just one tool to understand how domestic politics influence foreign policy. What is not often explained in public opinion data is political awareness on a foreign policy issue. Richard Eichenberg (2018) examines this problem in "Public Opinion on Foreign Issues" by addressing citizens' political perceptions of what influences citizens' opinions. The consensus that Eichenberg challenges are that the public mostly aware of issues such as war.

An issue that I will address in the analysis of public opinion on Rwanda and Haiti is public opinion's coherence. As Eichenberg explains, if a person is against a political issue, all of their different responses should follow that same reasoning. That is one of the problems of polling data on Rwanda and Haiti. For example, some polls find positive reactions for the UN to keep and maintain world peace. Still, when a similar question is asked about American involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, the responses are negative. Also, sometimes, the wording of the survey may influence a particular reaction from the respondent

The use of public opinion polls will gauge the pulse of the public's stance on US involvement in Rwanda and Haiti. The issues of reliability in polling have been addressed. However, polls still shed light on what the public thinks as Eichenberg states that the public is more informed on global crises issues and that their

responses are rational. Besides, I understand that not all American society segments are represented in public opinion polls; therefore, public opinion polls may not reflect Americans' diversity.

Measuring Interest Groups

Table 4 Interest groups and Haiti coverage of the Print News-1994

Interest groups and Haiti coverage of the Print News-1994	NY Times	WSP	WSJ
Sections Selected: News, Commentary, and Editorial			
Keyword:	Frequency	Frequency	Frequency
Congressional Black Caucus	85	257	59
Congressional Black Caucus Haiti	24	64	19
TransAfrica	15	60	4
TransAfrica Haiti	15	51	3
Human Rights Watch	80	83	22
Human Rights Watch Haiti	8	12	2

Analyzing the impact of interest groups on foreign policy issues may appear hard. Still, I will use archival information from the print news sources to gauge how often the various interest groups advocated for Rwanda and Haiti intervention. To stay grounded, I will primarily look at the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), TransAfrica, and the Human Rights Watch to gauge how much attention was paid to getting the Clinton Administration to intervene in Rwanda and Haiti.

Integrating Elite Interviews

One of my methods of analysis will be from examining archival documents and numerical polling data. Nevertheless, I still have unanswered questions that documents and numbers cannot answer. After doing a preliminary analysis of the documents by looking for obvious patterns or themes to narrow down the information, I still have not addressed it (Nastow, 2019).

For me to understand the context and rationale in the decision-making process, I will conduct elite interviews. These people are designated as elites because they are "an individual who holds or has held some powerful position that has afforded the individual unique knowledge or information from a privileged perspective" (Nastow, 2019). I only targeted a select few government officials for elite interviewing because they are difficult to reach since high-ranking officials. The interviews will back up the evidence presented in my content analysis of domestic variables' role in the foreign policy decision-making process. The documents will provide what the perceived social reality was at the time, and so will the interviews. Elite interviews "can demonstrate unique views of reality, from a privileged or powerful standpoint; but triangulation with additional sources can provide insight into other perceptions" (Nastow, 2019). These government officials have served in the George H.W Bush and Clinton Administrations.

1. Prudence Bushnell- Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
2. Joseph Nye-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
3. High Ranking State Department Official
4. High Ranking Member in the House of Representatives.
5. Senior Member of the Clinton Administration

Elite interviews is a research tool that is prominent in foreign policy analysis. Conducting interviews with senior officials involved in the decision curve will help me understand my two case studies' thought process. I will interview only 5. I will choose these interviewees because they will answer questions that the documents and data cannot. I plan to interview after I have done a preliminary coding analysis of the papers. I plan on interviewing State Department Officials, journalists, and other policy officials.

Patterns and Frequencies

1. Number of times in which Rwanda or Haiti was mentioned in the “Big Three” channels television networks- ABC, NBC, and CBS
 - a. I will look at how long the segments were when Rwanda and Haiti have discussed the “Big Three Networks.
2. Number of times that The NYT , WSP, WSJP, mentioned various interest groups in the context of Rwanda and Haiti
3. Public Opinion will explore the general American attitudes regarding whether the Clinton Administration should intervene in Rwanda and Haiti.
4. I will examine various documents that show whether the Clinton White House heeded the concerns of the news media, public opinion, and interest groups.

A Compass For Domestic Power: Expected Results

I have explained how I will examine and measure by primary sources in proofing that domestic sources can influence the foreign policy decision-making process am not going to argue that I have a formula that denotes the American domestic power and influence on foreign policy because that would be a reach. One

could look at the prevalence of news coverage, the data from public opinion, and the pressure of interest groups to determine if the messages from all three elements unite to form domestic power.

Domestic Power




Figure 2 Domestic Power

The way my text art appears, one may conclude that I am prescribing a formula, but I am no. I suggest that if the news media covers a that reflects public opinion and support from interest groups that create domestic power.

I hope that I will answer my research question: How did domestic constraints influence the Clinton administration's foreign policy response towards the 1994 humanitarian crises in Haiti and Rwanda? All of my various ways of conducting research will unite. I will be examining the public opinion polls, and then I will see if the Clinton Administration changed positions based on public opinion. I will also be

looking to see if Washington, DC, relied on the news media and if interest groups played a role in political decisions.

Biases Subjectively, and Limitations

I do reconcile my "outrage" on how the Clinton Administration did not intervene in Rwanda regarding my dissertation. As an African-American male, I believe that sometimes the United States' involvement in Africa and the Caribbean occurs because of domestic racial issues in the US. Reminiscent of what Romeo Dallaire said in his memoirs, I would perceive that the US does consider race in interventions. I understand that this is a radical opinion, which is why I am sticking to government, opinion polls, and other archival sources. I do want to rely on arguments that are logically and solidly supported by sources. Additionally, it is essential to note that since I was only three years old when the crises of my dissertation occurred, I hope to be able to be more objective in my arguments than people who were living at the time.

Another potential problem of the dissertation is the lack of field experience in Rwanda and Haiti. I have not traveled to Rwanda nor Haiti. I know that being in the countries adds to the credibility of the scholar. I do not feel that the fact I have not physically traveled to my regions will be a significant weakness in presenting an accurate statement about domestic variables' issues on American foreign policy. My dissertation is an American foreign policy paper, and I am confident that I understand what the "cultural pulse" was in 1994.

From examining some of the early data, I have noticed that Republican politicians tended to be outspoken about any humanitarian intervention in 1994. If

that were the case, then the outcomes would already be determined. The three variables that I have selected, the news media, public opinion, and interest groups, will keep my dissertation's focus.

My dissertation uses a case study approach, which can mean that I am cherry-picking my cases. I chose two cases that occurred during the same year to demonstrate the American opinion's influence in foreign matters. I could have selected more recent cases, such as the genocide in Darfur, Libya. I could have even done a quantitative analysis of all the peacekeeping operations during the Clinton Administration. It was challenging to look for two cases in a year that show where the US government approved one case of peacekeeping and denied another case because of the American public.

How can it be proven that the American public is solely responsible for influencing foreign policy decisions? The realist assumptions will challenge this question: the state is the highest actor, and the government should ignore domestic considerations. There are questions such as the US intervening or not intervening based on security alone. The US has been known to intervene in a crisis to secure its security. When the US intervened in Haiti in 1994, the Clinton Administration could assume that a military dictatorship in the Caribbean could present unforeseen problems for the US.

Query Searches and its limitations

I understand that my data may not appear to be representative. Since I am making the case that the news media can be an actor in the foreign policy decision-

making process, I need to examine Rwanda and Haiti's news coverage. I mentioned earlier that *The New York Times* referenced Rwanda 696 times in 1994. A few articles that deal with the mountain gorillas of Rwanda might be the amount of my data size. I am confident that it's just not numerical data, but the context that the data provides helps me convey my domestic political argument.

Also, I do realize that my query search analysis how many times “Haiti” or “Rwanda,” was mentioned in *the New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wallstreet Journal* during 1994 may be perceived to be problematic because how does one know if all of the articles that featured the word “Haiti” focused on the 1994 crisis at the time.

Above are the number of times that the following countries: Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda were mentioned in the *New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wallstreet Journal*. I also added Canada and South Africa to demonstrate that *The New York Times* will cover other countries in an active political crisis. When Somalia dropped in coverage in 1994, it can be attributed to the fact that the US did not consider Somalia a significant issue in 1994. Therefore, due to the US not being in direct conflict with Somalia in 1994, the attention that *New York Times* gave Somalia was 50% less than the following years.

It may appear that my use of the print news is not an overall consensus of Americans' foreign policy. As noted, newspapers are events recorded by humans in their worldview.⁶ As discussed in “How Newspapers Reveal Political Power” (2015),

⁶ How Newspapers Reveal Political Power*

newspapers are often constrained in what they can cover because of competition. Therefore, the news media will focus on issues that are directly consequential to the public.

I understand that newspapers' costs will cut down on who is reading the newspapers, so I have numbers from the big network channels: ABC, NBC, and CBS. Also, I realize that my query search does not provide any content on the actual news story. That is okay for this dissertation because I have patterns in the headlines. I was able to use Wordstat that did a content analysis of the popular words of news media headlines.

The rationale has been provided for the two states that I have selected, but why did I cherry-pick the news media's focus, public opinion, and interest groups to examine my cases' outcomes? The argument that I am making is that domestic actors can influence American foreign policy decisions. Domestic actors outside of the presidency on the institutional level can include the government branches such as Congress and the Judicial. Society is the focus of this dissertation. I want to explain the possibility of culture-shaping American foreign policy. As stated in the Foreign Policy Analysis Toolbox, there are three major societal actors-the American public, the media, and interest groups. There are some truths as to why I am covering certain media outlets such as *The New York Times* (NYT), *The Wallstreet Journal*(WSJ), and *The Washington Post* (WSP) and news organizations such as ABC, CBS, and NBC because the articles and summations of the evening broadcasts have been digitized and are easily accessible. It is known that CNN was heavily involved in these cases from the literature review, and I will do my best to use

the Clinton Library Presidential archives to uncover their involvement in news coverage. As a political scientist, I took a risk by choosing two case studies before the internet revolution, so most of the data will be primary sources that I can readily access.

Why Consider Public Opinion Data?

One of the issues that public opinion data shows is that sometimes it may not be a genuinely representative sample of how the public feels about a problem. The issue of public opinion polls is because the selection of the people surveyed may not be a total reflection of how the entire public feels about specific foreign policy issues. The value that I see in public opinion data is the numerical amount of times that pollsters considered asking how Americans think about Rwanda and Haiti. Suppose polling agencies devoted more time to understanding the public views on Rwanda and Haiti. In that case, that is important because it shows that one issue is dominating the public attention than the other.

Chapter Summary

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the processes I will use to demonstrate the influence of my three independent variables in foreign policy-related issues. I will use archival data that is readily available online. To understand why the Clinton Administration intervened in Haiti but not Rwanda, I will have to look at the nation's domestic pulse manifested in the data from the news media, public opinion, and interest groups. Moreover, I will juxtapose my archival findings with interviews from policy-makers directly involved in foreign policy decisions on Rwanda and Haiti. Also, the lack of coverage is a factor that I will look at in discussing the influence of the

news media, interest groups, and public. If more attention from the three independent variables is more important in one case over the other, that may show the public is concerned. Conversely, if there is a lack of attention in my three independent variables on one case, that may indicate that the public is not worried about the foreign policy issue.

Chapter 4 – The Clinton Administration 1994 Response to the Crisis in Rwanda

Abstract:

Chapter 4 will examine the impact of the news media, interest groups, and public opinion in the Clinton Administration response to Rwanda's 1994 violence. I look at each independent variable-news media, interest groups, and public opinion in determining whether these domestic sources either pushed the Clinton Administration for military intervention or pushed the Clinton Administration not to intervene.

Introduction: American Political Culture at the Fog of Genocide in Rwanda

The US rationale of the Clinton Administration's reaction to Rwanda's genocide resulted from the changing political culture where the American public witnessed the 18 Army Ranger's death in Somalia. Compounded the American casualties in Somalia, along with the recent memory of the Vietnam War, domestic support for humanitarian intervention would need to be reconsidered. Public opinion polls from October 7, 1994, USA Today showed a consensus that the nation wants troops to come home.⁷

⁷ <https://www.csmonitor.com/1993/1015/15183.html>

The fallout of the Battle of Mogadishu's debacle that resulted in American casualties placed some of the blame on the American news media's role. Following the defeat, the fault was being cast by George F. Kennan on television support because it triggered people's emotions in supporting foreign policy blindly. Kennan makes his thoughts on the negative role that television cameras have on the foreign policy decision-making process by stating(New York Times, 1993):

Having gone into Somalia like a savior, America does not seem to know how to get out. If we stay and try to bring some sort of law to a country that has known little of it, there are likely to be more pictures of American dead. (The more significant number of Somali dead will not, of course, receive as much attention.) If we leave, there will probably be new scenes of misery from that unhappy land unless its rulers, having learned a lesson, bar television crews (p. 26).

Kennan's critique of considering domestic sources in the foreign policy decision-making process is crucial because he is discounting public opinion's positive role in the foreign policy decision-making process. Moreover, the burden is now on the news media to cover important stories to the American people. Important issues could include commonly shared oppression, such as race.

Policymakers involved in the overall direction of Clinton's foreign policy platform-Madeline Albright place the blame of the debacle on the point that the partnership between the UN and the US was not clearly "straightened out." Moreover, the UN did not have the aptitude support to ensure the success of long-term peacekeeping operations.

The images of Americans dragged in Somalia's streets led to a decline in peacekeeping operations' public support. An October 19th, 1993 article-“Democracies Have to Fight Wars of Interest and Conscience” by Brian Beedham sheds light on the problem that democracies face. That is the issue of where the national interest lies. Beedham cautions policymakers on only looking at the strategic interest of potential peacekeeping operations.

Moreover, Somalia shows the power of the news media's role in foreign policy decisions. From the Clinton Library show from dates in October, the Clinton Administration surveyed ABC, CBS, and NBC's press clips. The news media coverage is essential to my argument that there is a connection between the public and the presidency.⁸ The Clinton Administration paid close attention to how the news media framed and coverage the debacle in Somalia.

In late 1993 following the death of 18 Army Rangers in Somalia, the Clinton Administration tightened its then assertive foreign policy platform-Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-13) that placed peacekeeping as its centerpiece in foreign policy.

In May 1994, the Clinton Administration rolled out its new stance on engaging in peacekeeping operations called PDD-25- “Reforming Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations.” This new policy directive is vital in understanding the Clinton Administration's response to violence in Rwanda and Haiti. PDD-25, according to Albright, would keep peacekeeping as an option if there was support at home to ensure long-term support of American-led peacekeeping operations.

⁸ <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47316>

The first significant point of reform for peacekeeping is that the US must make strategic peacekeeping decisions that will advance the United States' interest. The question of what constitutes American interests teased out in the 6th major issue of improvement that focuses on the role of cooperation “between the Executive, the Congress and the American public on peacekeeping operations.” This reform area is essential in understanding the prominent role that my independent variables will play in the foreign policy decision-making process. PDD-25 further states that the US support of long-term peacekeeping operations predicated on the “bipartisan support of Congress and the American people.” Moreover, PDD-25 was a reflection of the domestic attitudes towards peacekeeping. The subsequent Clinton Administration’s stance on peace operations designed to prevent “electoral punishment,” and the Clinton Administration’s decision-making process in Rwanda is a reflection of the American publics' concern for the United States involvement in peace operations” (Conteh-Morgan, 1998).

Early in the Clinton Administration's first term, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake outlined the Clinton Administration's goals, which replaced communism's emphasis on democratic enlargement (Friedman, 1993). In the same article from the New York Times, Mr. Lake also highlights healthcare as a top priority of the Clinton Administration. Meanwhile, another New York Times article, “United Nations Is Finding Its Plate Increasingly Full, but Its Cupboard Is Bare. On September 27, 1993, the article demonstrates that 6th, the Secretary-General of the United Nations-Boutros Boutros-Ghali, was concerned that the UN was taking too many peace operations that can handle (Foreign Policy, Left Unclear, 1993). In the

article, Mr. Anthony Lake commented that the entire Administration supports engagement and American leadership in the world(Foreign Policy, Left Unclear, 1993).

On May 6th, 1994 New York Times article- “New U.S. Peacekeeping Policy De-emphasizes Role of the U.N.,” summarizes the new policy directive-PDD-25 as constraining the United Nations role as a world policeman. PDD-25 is essential because, in 1993, the Clinton Administration placed a rank on peacekeeping as its centerpiece. Also, the policy directive is a reflection of issues of American peacekeeping in Somalia and Haiti. The main point made in PDD-25 is that the “United States cannot resolve the conflicts of the world but does not believe that the United Nations is capable of making and keeping the peace, particularly when hostilities still exist.”.

Some more considerations that the United States would focus on in debating whether to commit to peacekeeping includes(New York Times, 1994):

They include a threat to international security, including an urgent need for aid after widespread violence or rioting; a sudden interruption of a democracy, or a gross violation of human rights; consent of the parties; the availability of money and troops; a mandate appropriate to the mission, and a realistic strategy to end the mission(Section A, p. 1).

The Clinton Administration states that issues such as the sudden interruption of democracy, violence, and gross violations of human rights would be essential factors in the US supporting peacekeeping operations.

Rwanda: From the Shadow of Somalia to the Question of Rwanda

The Clinton Administration Response to Rwanda's violence came when the United States was rethinking its role in foreign affairs because of the botch peacekeeping in Somalia, 1993, that led to 18 Army Rangers' deaths.

The violence in Rwanda escalated to a legal definition of genocide. The tension centered on the issue of the balance of political power. At the start of the genocide in early 1994, Rwanda was controlled by its Hutu majority. The two main ethnic groups in Rwanda, the Tutsi and the Hutu, have experienced division, Belgium's colonization of Rwanda was partially constructed. After World War 1, Belgium's reorganized Rwanda's social structures led the Tutsi minority to run the country while the Hutus worked manual labor jobs. Belgium's reclassified the ethnic groups where light skin was classified as Tutsis, and darker people were issued Hutu identity cards.

The American news coverage of Rwanda's events occurred when telecommunications became more accessible because of the creation of 24/7 news channels such as CNN. The "Big 3" public networks covered Rwanda's events consistently less than the events in Haiti. The information gathered has been compiled by the Vanderbilt University Television News Archives service. I analyzed the coverage of the evening news that typically airs for 28 minutes Eastern Standard Time.




Figure 3 1994 Print News Coverage of President Clinton via Source: ProQuest

Table 5 1994 Broadcast News Coverage of Rwanda as a “Civil War” via Vanderbilt News Archives

Big Three Coverage of Rwanda as Civil War	NBC	CBS	ABC
	New s	New s	New s
Rwanda Headlines Per Network (Number of times Civil War Mention/Total Rwanda Headlines)	45/67	41/70	63/84
Percentage	67%	59%	75%

Interest Groups

Table 6 Interest groups and Haiti coverage of the Print News-1994 via Source: ProQuest: NYT, WSP, and WSJ

Interest groups and Rwanda coverage of the Print News-1994 Sections Selected: News, Commentary, and Editorial	NY Times	WSP	WSJ
Keyword:	Frequency	Frequency	Frequency
Congressional Black Caucus	85	257	59
Congressional Black Caucus Rwanda	1	8	1
Congressional Black Caucus Percentage of Coverage	1%	3%	2%
TransAfrica	15	60	4
TransAfrica Rwanda	0	3	0
TransAfrica Rwanda Percentage of Coverage	0%	5%	0%
Human Rights Watch	80	83	22
Human Rights Watch Rwanda	17	18	1
Human Rights Watch Rwanda Percentage of Coverage	21%	22%	5%

The Clinton Administration's lack of support in an aggressive intervention force, which may have stopped the Rwandan genocide can be seen through the little attention that interest groups gave Rwanda. Ambassador Prudence Bushnell commented that one of the few agencies that pushed for intervention was the Human Rights Watch (HRW). Other agencies concerned about Rwanda's violence included the Congressional Black Caucus(CBC) and TransAfrica. It is essential to understand

that even the absence of a substantial amount of interest groups showing concern for a crisis can able a government not to intervene because of the perceived lack of public support. Interest groups act as an extension of public opinion. This supports the narrative of the policy change reflected in PDD-25- that the US should support intervention if there is buy-in from Congress and the American public.

Moreover, this section aims to demonstrate a dialogue between the White House and various interest groups. Lastly, I will highlight that the White House did respond to the requests of these interest groups. Still, because of a lack of public interest, the Clinton Administration did not push for military intervention. In my discussion of Haiti and the role of interest groups, it is evident that the amount of public pressure from various interest groups supports a US intervention in Haiti.

Congressional Black Caucus Plea

Documents from the Clinton Library and George Washington University show CBC's effort to rally support the Clinton Administration to intervene in Rwanda to stop the killings. Moreover, CBC has expressed frustration that the US government has struggled with having a uniform policy of protecting human rights in Africa because there is a lack of respect in seeing Africans as equals.⁹

The CBC's actions may prioritize the interest groups' support in getting the Clinton Administration to stop Rwanda's genocide. As Wendy Theodore points out in "The Declining Appeal of Diasporic Connections: African American Organising for South Africa, Haiti, and Rwanda" (2008) points out the failure of CBC to get the

⁹ <https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/stable/pdf/1166823.pdf>

Clinton Administration to stop the genocide is a reflection of a waning connection that African-Americans have towards Africa.¹⁰ As mentioned, the US reluctance to stop.

Public Opinion

Table 7 1994 Public Opinion Polls Rwanda via iRoper Polls

Roper iPoll: Sample of 1994 Public Opinion Polls	Number of Questions	Studies/Datasets	First Date of 94 Poll
Rwanda	25	13	04/30/1994 - 05/03/1994

Based on just the headlines for the New York Times, it appears that Rwanda received more coverage in the context of the refugees versus the coverage that examines Rwanda as a genocide. In a rough estimate, the New York Times featured under 60 articles regarding Rwanda and public opinion.

Biting the Bullet: Contextualizing Domestic Variables and Theoretical Framework in the Aftermath of Rwanda

¹⁰ <https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600820801887447>

The Clinton Administration 1994 discussion on not supporting American forces indirectly intervening in Rwanda is not isolated to the US's tragedy in 199, Somalia. The spotty public opinion polls coupled with non-comprehensive coverage from the news media and non-consistent activism from interest groups. My dissertation examines how the news media, public opinion, and interest groups role in the Clinton Administration debates regarding intervention in Rwanda and Haiti.

As shown, the news media coverage did not effectively illustrate the fact that the violence in Rwanda was not a continuation of the 1992 Civil War between the Hutu government and the Rwandan Patriot Front (RPF). After Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana's plane shot down on April 6th, 1994, the Arusha Accords' already fragile peace came into question. Shortly after the president's death, the crisis became a one-sided war where the Hutu-led government and other paramilitary forces tried to eradicate all Tutsis from the earth's face. From the data on Rwanda's evening news coverage, only two out of the big three networks-ABC and CBS labeled the crisis as genocide. On April 28, 1994, the US State Department Christine Shelley answered a direct question on whether Rwanda rose to the legal definition of genocide.¹¹ Ms. Shelley response was: "...the use of the term 'genocide' has an exact legal meaning, although it's not strictly a legal determination. There are other factors in there as well.

In April 1994, the Clinton Administration made it clear that Rwanda's crisis was not a genocide. Coding the crisis as genocide may have increased international

¹¹ https://www.democracynow.org/2014/4/7/refusing_to_call_it_genocide_documents

pressure on considering a peace enforcement operation that would intervene on behalf of the Tutsi victimization.

Various presidents of the United States have made their comments on stating that another “Armenia,” “Holocaust,” and “Cambodia” from occurring again. In an indictment against the Germans accused of the war crimes in the Holocaust. The term has been stated that the twenty-four defendants during the Nuremberg trial “conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied territories” (Associated Press, 1945). President Truman wrote the first annual report regarding the UN to Congress, and he stated that America had been a symbol of “freedom and democratic progress to peoples less favored than we have been. We must maintain their belief in us by our policies and our acts,” (President Truman, 1949). Moreover, President Truman highlighted that the term genocide is considered a crime under international law. President Truman comments on the US backing the term genocide and perhaps helping to prevent another genocide.

On April 20, 1990, President George H.W Bush made a commented stating: The United States responded to the victims of the crime against humanity by leading international diplomatic and private relief efforts... On this 75th anniversary of the massacres, I wish to join with Armenians and all peoples in observing April 24, 1990 as a day of remembrance for the more than a million Armenian people who were victims. I call upon all peoples to work to prevent future acts of inhumanity against mankind, and my comments of June 1988 represent the depth of my feeling for the Armenian people and the sufferings they have endured(Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1990).

President George H.W Bush did not refer to the Armenian crisis as genocide. The hesitation of labeling crisis a genocide from Raphael Lemkin's creation dates back to Jimmy Carter, who, like President Bush, did not call the violence in Armenia

a genocide on May 16th, 1978. President Reagan was one of the first presidents to call the events during the Holocaust, Cambodia, and in Armenia a “genocide.”¹²

Theories of the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy in Examining The US Response to Rwanda

The Clinton Administration response to the genocide in Rwanda came at a changing shift in the public's role in foreign policy decision making. Ambassador Prudence Bushnell stated that domestic politics drive the foreign policy decision-making process. The epilogue of the end of the Cold War by scholars such as Francis Fukuyama said that countries after the Cold War would eventually embrace democracy.

Fukuyama was not entirely inaccurate when stating that democracy would be the norm because, based on my evidence, the domestic population in the United States became more politically conscious. I do not argue that in a post-Cold War, citizens are educated on complex issues such as genocide, military juntas, etc. The profound else of life lost in Vietnam resurfaced when the Army Rangers were killed in Somalia. The creation of PDD-25 reflects the importance of the American people's impact on the foreign policy decision-making process. Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) supports my idea that the domestic response to Rwanda's violence derived from a concern that further US support in peacekeeping operations may lead to another drawn-out Vietnam War. It appears that although the 1990s saw more global cultural divisions, in liberal states such as the United States, the public wanted to have an active foreign in deciding how the Clinton Administration would use troops.

¹² https://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.63/current_category.4/affirmation_detail.html

The Clinton Administration, in the shadow of role theory, refocused its foreign policy goals after the disaster in Somalia. The role of the United States, as mentioned in the PDD-25, is not to be the world police. The idea that the United States realizes that they cannot solve all of the world's problems is shown in the Clinton Administration's response to Rwanda's genocide. The country of Rwanda is small, and the perception was that there were no viable strategic gains that would sway the American public to intervene in Rwanda. As mentioned earlier, the Clinton Administration would not support an aggressive military task-force in early April to stop the one-sided killing by the Hutu-led government.

Perception of US Interest in Rwanda/ Policymakers Interview Response

Methods/Patterns of Activism used by Domestic Actors:

1. Isolated News coverage that presented the violence in Rwanda as a "Civil War."
2. Basic outrage from interest groups but no consensus that wanted intervention.
 - a. Ambassador Bushnell did point that the Human Rights Watch was one of vocal groups.
3. There was no majority of the American public that wanted intervention in Rwanda
4. A former House of Representative who was on the House Chair Committee of Foreign Policy that I interviewed represent ambiguous census that Washington D.C had on Rwanda.

The Clinton Administration's 1994 response to Rwanda's genocide occurred when the American public was still reeling from the loss of afflicted from the tragedy in Somalia that cost American fatalities. In my analysis early on, I made my case that the news media, interest groups, and public opinion show that the American public did not want the burden of potential long-drawn-out crises that leads to a conflict that would put Americans' lives right.

I interviewed various policymakers that were involved in the foreign policy decision-making process. Two of the policymakers who agreed to go on the record stated that the US response to Rwanda's genocide directly reflects the 1993 US involvement in Somalia. Ambassador Prudence Bushnell, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, stated that the “Domestic politics drive foreign policy” decision process.¹³ Moreover, I asked Ambassador Bushnell a question on which interest groups were invisible in trying to attention to Rwanda's violence, and she informed me that the Human Rights Watch(HRW) was one of the few interest groups that were vocal about violence in Rwanda. Ambassador Bushnell's statement backs up the data from various news outlets that showed HRW mentioned Rwanda more in the news vs. Haiti.

The confusion about Rwanda being an extension of the “Civil War” over a “Genocide” is backed up by the policymakers I interviewed. A high-ranking Democrat who sat on House Foreign Affairs Committee called the crises in Rwanda a “Tribal War.” Ambassador Prudence Bushnell told me she told Debra Winger, who played her in the HBO Film *Sometimes in April*(2005) accurately captured how politicians felt about Rwanda's violence in a post-Somalia world. From HBO Film *Sometimes in April*:

Politician: The rebel forces are “Tutu or Hutsi” [Hutu and Tutsi]

Ambassador Bushnell: Tutsi and Hutu

Politician: Which are the good guys?

¹³ Ambassador Bushnell was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs(1994-1996) and Ambassador to Kenya (1996 to 1999)

Ambassador Bushnell informed me that quote is based on real events, and Washington D.C was not equating the violence to be one-sided, and some policy policymakers were indifferent about the ethnic groups. Ethnic groups are a protected groups under the United Nations guidelines for the formula for genocide.

As noted earlier, the news media covered events in Rwanda consciously in the shadow of Somalia. The television news and print news often mischaracterized Rwanda's events: Tribal War, Ethnic Conflict, and Civil Wars. The Clinton Administration Press Briefings in 1994 did not devote a large of time discussing what the United States can do in Rwanda.

The Clinton Administration's framing of Rwanda's violence continued the news media's characterization of the violence as a "Civil War." Due to the violence not being viewed as "systemic" and "one-sided," coding the crises as a general conflict such as a "Civil War" gave the Clinton Administration cover in not labeling the crisis in its early days as a genocide. The Clinton Administration's refusal of calling the crisis a "genocide" is visible in a 1994 State Department Briefing conducted by Christine Shelley cautiously answered a question from Reuters correspondent Alan Elsner "How many acts of genocide does it take to make genocide?" Ms. Shelley replied by "Alan, that's just not a question that I'm in a position to answer" (Democracy Now, 2014).

The Clinton Administration inherited an activist foreign policy agenda because President George H.W Bush had the US military unblock the roads to allow humanitarian aid to come through. After all, warlords in Somalia were hijacking the humanitarian assistance being provided by the international community. By 1994, it

appears that special interest groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus, TransAfrica were preoccupied with the events going on in Haiti (which I get to in the next chapter.

TransAfrica failed to bring attention to the violence in Rwanda. When TransAfrica was mentioned in various news media, the food hunger strike by Randall Robinson was the defining policy event of TransAfrica in 1994, not the cr in Rwanda.

Public opinion polls point to Americans having negative attitudes towards intervention in Rwanda.

Chapter Summary

The lack of domestic pressure from the news media, interest groups, and public opinion led the Clinton Administration not to push for military force to stop the genocide in Rwanda, 1994. The domestic reality of 1994 showed that not many Americans wanted American troops on the ground in Rwanda. The Clinton White House was not pressured by the news media, interest groups, or public opinion to intervene in Rwanda. The human tragedy that resulted in genocide in Rwanda did not activate the domestic pulse in pressuring President Clinton to intervene in Rwanda. The combination of the three independent variables is essential to note. As demonstrated in the Haitian response-it, it took various domestic variables to push the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti.

Chapter 5: The Clinton Administration 1994 Response to the Crisis in Haiti

Abstract

Chapter five will examine the impact of the news media, interest groups, and public opinion in the Clinton Administration response to Haiti's 1994 violence. I look at each independent variable-news media, interest groups, and public opinion in determining whether these domestic sources resulted in the Clinton Administration's push for a US-led intervention to remove the military junta rule. The Clinton Administration had considerable domestic support to intervene in Haiti vs. Rwanda.

Clinton Administration and Haiti: From the Shadow of Somalia to Action

The political capital came from substantial news media coverage and various interest groups in advocating the Clinton Administration to use military force to reinstall President Jean Aristide to power. Moreover, due to Haiti's proximity to the US, there is more of a historical relationship between the United States and Haiti. Haiti's root issue is the country had suffered from instability for decades, and this heightened instability intensified when the Duvalier family was ousted from power in the 1980s(Morley & McGillion, 1997). In 1990, Haiti made history by having its first democratic election when a popular priest-President Aristide, won 60-70% of the vote(French, 1990). In September 1991, President Aristide's governance came to an

end when he was forcibly removed from office by a military coup(Impact of the September 1991 Coup, 1992). President George H.W Bush's policy in Haiti was ambiguous because of President Aristides' commitment to change Haiti's economy by empowering the poor.

Haiti's political instability is not just an isolated event because Haiti's instability was a campaign issue. Then-Governor Clinton referenced Haiti during the October 15th, 1992 debate moderated by ABC News Carole Simpson. Ms. Simpson asked Governor Clinton:

Question (by Simpson) Governor Clinton, the president mentioned Saddam Hussein. Your vice president and you have had some words about the president and Saddam Hussein. Would you care to comment?

Answer (excerpt): And number three, we need to be a force for freedom and democracy and we need to use our unique position to support freedom, whether it's in Haiti or in China or in any other place, wherever the seeds of freedom are sprouting. We can't impose it, but we need to nourish it, and that's the kind of thing that I would do as president — follow those three commitments into the future(Presidential Debate).

The 1992 Presidential Election in America saw the defeat of incumbent President George H.W Bush and President William Jefferson Clinton's election. At the start of his presidency, Secretary of State-Warren Christopher noted that Haiti's solution would include President Jean Aristide. (Kreps, 2007). Early on in the discussions, there was an attempt by the Clinton Administration to solve the political issue in Haiti internally by trying to offer a compromise that would please both the Haitian military and the economic elites of Haiti.

The direction of the Clinton Administrations' policy regarding Haiti changed in May 1994 when President Clinton signaled that military junta that “it was time for them to go.” Moreover, the cloud of Somalia seemed to be lifted from the discussion

of military options because President Clinton was now considering military force. The Clinton Administration's decision to intervene in Haiti can be perceived from domestic pressure leveled on the Clinton Administration from various interest groups. The literature acknowledges the importance of domestic support inside the United States as the political capital that President Clinton needed in justifying military intervention (Kreps, 2007).

News Media

The news media coverage differed in the number of times that The American news media mentioned Haiti and Rwanda in 1994. Haiti's political issues already activated Haiti's news media because the refugee crisis escalated into an immigration crisis in the United States. The Haitian refugee crisis in the United States, therefore, had become a social problem.

The news media has appeared not to cover Haiti as a third-world country struggling to maintain democracy. There was a balance of power issue in Haiti, which could be viewed as a "Civil War" was perceived to be "political instability." The refugee crisis that triggered an immigration crisis in the US penetrated the United States at the domestic level. People's lives were being impacted by the influx of immigrants coming to the US from Haiti.

The intense domestic connection between the Clinton Administration, interest groups, public opinion, and news media strengthen my position that these domestic variables influenced the Clinton White House to intervene in Haiti. TransAfrica and CBC's activism appears to have kept the crises in Haiti in the news. Randall Robinson, who was the director of TransAfrica, went on a hunger strike. I note that

this is important because the Clinton Administration was aware of Mr. Robinson's actions in bringing awareness to Haiti's story.




Figure 4 News Coverage-Haiti sources via ProQuest & Vanderbilt News Archives

Interest Groups

The impact of various interest groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus, TransAfrica, and other community groups has played a pivotal role in Haiti's Clinton Administration intervention. One of the most significant factors that pushed the Clinton Administration to intervene is the public hunger strike of Randall Robinson. Moreover, many community-based organizations in New York City advocated military force support in returning President Aristide to power. I agree that the strong support of interest groups and Haiti's news media coverage gave President Clinton the support he needed to send a military force in reinstating

President Jean Aristide to power. The advocacy from interest groups benefited from numerous local groups and national groups.

Table 8 1994 Print News Coverage of Interest Groups Mentioning of Haiti

Interest groups and Haiti coverage of the Print News-1994 Sections Selected: News, Commentary, and Editorial	NY Times	WSP	WSJ
Keyword:	Frequency	Frequency	Frequency
Congressional Black Caucus	85	257	59
Congressional Black Caucus Haiti	24	64	19
Congressional Black Caucus Percentage of Coverage	28%	25%	32%
TransAfrica	15	60	4
TransAfrica Haiti	15	51	3
TransAfrica Haiti Percentage of Coverage	100%	85%	75%
Human Rights Watch	80	83	22
Human Rights Watch Haiti	8	12	2
Human Rights Watch Haiti Percentage of Coverage	10%	14%	1%

Analysis of Interest Groups Coverage

The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) took a vocal and public role in rallying the Clinton Administration to stop Haiti's violence. The CBC's prominent role demonstrated in just the coverage of media outlets mentioning CBC's dismay of inaction by the Clinton Administration as part of restoring order in Haiti.

TransAfrica must be a significant domestic variable that pressured the Clinton Administration into intervening in Haiti. Randall Robinson, who was the executive director of the TransAfrica Forum, initiated a hunger strike in early April 1994 to get the Clinton Administration to hear Haitian political refugee asylum requests. There is a connection between the plea of Randall Robinson's hunger strike because of the Clinton Administration. In an opinion piece from the New York Times (1994), President Clinton is quoted as saying, "I understand and respect what he is doing" and added: "He ought to stay out there. We need to change our policy." Most of the 1994 news coverage of TransAfrica exclusively dealt with the political issues in Haiti.

Public Opinion

Table 9 1994 Public Opinion Polls-Haiti via source-Roper iPoll

Roper iPoll:Sample of 1994 Public Opinion Polls	Number of Questions	Studies/Datasets	First Date of 94 Poll
Haiti	343	76	1/15/94- 1/18/1994

The amount of public opinion that showed positive support for the US to intervene in Haiti is much more significant than the amount of support given for Rwanda's intervention force.

The public opinion regarding whether the United States should intervene in Haiti is sporadic; the polls do not give us a definitive answer regarding the public being the primary catalyst of intervention. However, in a query search from Roper Polls, the word immigration was flagged 80 different times. In a poll by CBS News/New York Times Poll: September National Survey, 63% percent of the sample size believed that the United States should limit immigrants coming to the United States.¹⁴

Perception of US Interest in Haiti

Methods/Patterns of Activism used by Domestic Actors:

1. News coverage
2. Partial Congressional Support
3. Interest Groups
4. Hunger Strike
 - a. Randal Robinson
5. Sit-in's
 - a. April, 22, 1994, in front of the White House
6. business leaders Protest
7. Star Power- Paul Newman, Joanne Woodward, Jason Robards, Spike Lee, Jack Lemmon, Gregory Peck, Julia Roberts, Danny Glover, Susan Sarandon, Robert DeNiro, and Robin Williams.

Clinton Administration Reaction and Discussion on Haiti

The influence of the news media, public opinion, and interest groups helped push the Clinton Administration to help create a United Nations resolution-United

¹⁴ CBS News/New York Times Poll: September National Survey [Roper #31091415]

Nations Security Council Resolution 940. The resolution enabled the US to create Operation Uphold Democracy reinstalled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to office in 1994. The importance of Haiti's political struggle resonated with a lot more interest groups, compounded with the increased media visibility, and the mention of Haiti on public opinion polls gave the issues in Haiti more visibility.

The consistent political pressure from the CBC and TransAfrica gave President Clinton the political capital that he needed to lobby the UN to sanction the US government to lead a multilateral peacekeeping operation to return President Jean Aristide to power. May 1994 marks a quick departure from the inaction of the Clinton Administration. I hypothesize that the increase of coverage of the television news stations, coupled with the advocacy actions of various interest groups, and the fact that although the public opinion polls vary in showing American support, Haiti being included in the polling questions is just as significant.

On September 15, 1994, President Clinton addressed the nation from the oval office to tell Americans that the US would enter Haiti to remove the military dictators and bring back democratically elected President Jean Aristide. President Clinton said:

'We have tried everything,' Clinton asserted. 'We have exhausted diplomacy. Now the United States must protect its interests. The message of the United States to the Haitian dictators is clear: Your time is up. Leave now, or we will force you from power.' 'President Aristide has told me that he will consider his mission fulfilled not when he regains office, but when he leaves it to the next democratically elected president of Haiti (Santos, 1994).

How did President Clinton get to this discussion on whether or not to intervene in Haiti? Some of the answers can be found in the news media, interest groups, and public opinion polls.

There is clear evidence that the hard activism of the Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica helped give President Clinton the political capital that he needed to intervene in Haiti. Randall Robinson, the director of TransAfrica, went on a hunger strike to bring awareness in early 1994 to Haiti's Clinton Administration's ambiguous position. Mr. Robinson went on a hunger strike for 27 days (McAlevey, 1994). The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), another interest group, supported Mr. Robinson's hunger strike by appearing politically with Mr. Robinson on the hunger strike's first day. The hunger strike started on April 12, 1994, resulting in Mr. Robinson losing 13 pounds and hospitalization due to dehydration (McAlevey, 1994). However, according to Clinton's aids, Robinson's effort helped heightened political awareness of Haiti. The former envoy to Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo, said Robinson's actions put "pressure on the Administration" (De Witt, 1994). Most importantly, President Clinton directly commented on Mr. Robinson's actions when he said he respected Mr. Robinson's "conviction and courage and conscience " (De Witt, 1994).

Moreover, the Congressional Black Caucus supported Mr. Robinson's actions and faulted the U.S for not presenting a solid in early 1994 on restoring President Jean Aristide to power in Haiti. House of Representatives member Major R. Owens (Democrat from New York) stated that " We are upset, we are indignant, and we are declaring war on a racist policy" (De Witt, 1994). Rep. Owens, who is the head of Haiti's task force, drafted a letter to the Clinton Administration urging the White House to take Haiti as a "serious" matter (Merida, 1994). Moreover, news reports from the Associated Press, including an article from March 24, 1994, characterized

CBC comments on the Clinton Administration's reaction to Haiti as “ineffective” (Gedda, 1994).

On October 15, 1994, when President Jean Aristide departed Haiti to resume office, numerous essential members in the African-American presented to see President Aristide leave the US. The Baltimore Sun's Carl Cannon wrote:

The two presidents were standing in front of the West Wing before an audience that included numerous African-American political luminaries. Among them were the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin L. Powell, who helped negotiate Father Aristide's peaceful return; the Rev. Jesse L. Jackson, who plans to go to Haiti today; Rep. Kweisi Mfume, the chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, which made a priority of Haiti; and Randall Robinson, whose hunger strike over Haiti jolted the Clinton administration.¹⁵

On November 2, 1994, President Clinton met with members of the African-American moderated by Ed Gordan from Black Entertainment Television(BET) to discuss domestic politics, and the Clinton Administration response to Haiti came up during the forum. President Clinton, during the forum, said :

Every time I give a speech, I talk about the strength of our diversity; that one of the best things about what we did in Haiti was that America is the only country that could have gone to Haiti and produced a couple of hundred Haitian-American soldiers that could be down there speaking Creole to the people of Haiti as we prepared to wait for President Aristide to come back (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton, 1994).

Finding policymakers willing to talk on the record was the easy part; finding one that could exclusively attest to being involved in Haiti's decision-making process was harder.

¹⁵ <https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1994-10-15-1994288024-story.html>.

Chapter Summary

The Clinton Administration's response to the Haitian military dictatorship reflects the domestic population's concerns. The United States occupied Haiti in the early 20th century; therefore, Haiti has had a dependent relationship with the US. When President Clinton took office, the political situation in Haiti was already a 92 campaign issue.

In 1994, interest groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica began intensified political pressure on the Clinton Administration in intervening in Haiti. The 1994 publicized hunger strike of then director of TransAfrica-Randall Robinson forced the Clinton Administration's initial tragedy of bringing peace to Haiti. The Clinton Administration wanted a diplomatic solution. Therefore, the Clinton White House asked former President Jimmy Carter and General Collin Powell to serve as negotiators in reaching a peaceful solution in Haiti.

Moreover, TransAfrica had focused most of its attention on trying to convince the Clinton Administration to intervene in Haiti. Furthermore, the hunger strike of Randall Robinson's strategy of embarrassing the Clinton White House to intervene proved to be effective.

As noted, the news media played an indispensable role in giving attention to the crises in Haiti. One of Haiti's news coverage's recurring themes was that if Haiti is not stable, that will cause an immigration crisis that will negatively impact the United States. The news media was already "activated" because Haiti has been a political issue in the United States even before the military uprising occurred.

My argument deals with the idea that if there is a domestic will, that will help give presidents more political capital in selling an intervention. Pollsters thought it was essential to ask Americans over 300 questions regarding public opinion, and Haiti is essential. Public Opinion polls focused the American population on Haiti because when a question is asked, the pollster thinks it is warranted.

Chapter 6 The Domestic Reality of Foreign Policy:

Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the importance of the domestic sources of foreign policy. The Clinton Administration's responses to the crises in Rwanda, and Haiti, demonstrated that Clinton's foreign policy agenda was contingent on domestic approval. The case studies selected showed the prominence of domestic variables such as public opinion, the news media, and interest groups. In this chapter, I argue that the evidence I presented gives credence to domestic actors in the United States. The Clinton Administration response for both case studies was predicated on output from my three domestic variables: news media, interest groups, and public opinion.

Towards a New Framework? Analyzing the “Domestic Reality”

My dissertation places liberalism as the main framework that allows for the inclusion of the domestic variables discussed. Role theory, Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), and Foreign Policy Analysis(FPA) highlight the critical issue that my dissertation focuses on domestic/ internal sources: news media, public opinion, and interest groups. The separation of powers/checks and balances and the constitution gives the domestic population considerable agency in the foreign policy decision-making process.




Figure 5 Americans Perceptions

The case studies -Haiti and Rwanda demonstrate the power of the news media, interest groups, and public opinion to influence the foreign policy decision-making process. It is hard to isolate each independent variable because when public opinion, the news media, and interest groups are combined, they form a powerful political actor. It is important to note that Congressional support for Rwanda and

Haiti's US involvement was both mixed. In Haiti's case, the pressure was heightened due to the Congressional Black Caucus's advocacy work, and TransAfrica complied by the amount of coverage that Haiti's crises were receiving. Both CBC and TransAfrica are interest groups that focus on issues concerning minority groups. As mentioned earlier, most interest groups that use the media must stage protest events to focus on the news media(Berkhout, 2013).

Implications:

1. The news media “presents” the story for consumption based on demand.
 - a. The news media presented confusing representations of the “crises” in Rwanda.
 - b. The news media presented a consistent representation of the “crises” in Haiti
2. Public opinion is an “estimation” of public attitudes on a particular public policy issue.
3. Interest groups are interested in problems that are aligned with their interests
4. The news media can serve as the domestic vehicle to get awareness out on “Crises,” However, for the news media to be engaged their needs to be a willing audience. Other domestic variables can help express concerns about crises
 - a. Interest Groups
 - b. Public Opinion

The American public had a prominent role in steering the Clinton Administration's response to Rwanda and Haiti's violence. The answers are simple in that in the wake

of the 1993 tragedy in Somalia, it reminded Americans about the consequences of another Vietnam War. In 1994, two crises galvanized the world, Rwanda and Haiti. The United States experienced a loss of life in Somalia, which made humanitarian interventions a political causality. The post-Somalia Clinton Administration strengthened relayed more on domestic support in supported United Nations peacekeeping operations. In 1994, there was domestic support for intervening in Haiti over Rwanda because Haiti was more relevant to the United States. The issue of Haitian refugees was a campaign issue. Therefore, the news media, interest groups, and the public had a more considerable interest in intervening in Haiti versus Rwanda. In defense of my conclusions:

- The news media “presents” the story for consumption. The news media creates a climate of urgency based on predicting the interests of the story.
 - The fear of another Somalia and assessing American interest in the story
 - Rwanda is on the same continent as Somalia.
 - Haiti is closer to the US and has more Haitians in the US.

Interest groups have their “interests.”

- Interest groups will fight to advance their “interest,” and they choose issues that matter to their base.

Public opinion is “an opinion.”

- Public opinion is a snapshot in one segment of society thinks about an issue.

The Clinton White House, in a post-Somalia political reality, wanted domestic allies in any military intervention that would result in troops on the on-ground. The news media picks stories they want to show the American public and frame the story accordingly. The violence in Rwanda was frequently inaccurately portrayed as a “Civil War.” All three significant networks covered the violence in Rwanda as a continuation of the Civil War. In comparison, the news media portrayed the events in

Haiti as a security concern. Interest groups such as TransAfrica and the Congressional Black Caucus focused on pressuring the Clinton Administration to intervene. Therefore, the news media kept the spotlight on Haiti. Also, the United States has two news media levels: the local stage and the national stage. Depending on the location of cities, the ones close to Haiti may receive more local coverage. Therefore, Americans may regionally differ in their interests.

Moreover, public opinion was more consistent because the American public did not want American troops on Rwanda's ground. The increased Haitian population in the US, but more political coverage on the Clinton Administration. Public opinion polls showed that Haiti was on Americans' minds, partially because it showed up more on public opinion polls in 1994 versus Rwanda. Also, refugees are a more significant concern in the surrounding countries such as Haiti and the United States.




Figure 6 1994 Rwanda and Haiti Media Coverage via source-ProQuest

The news media is the first domestic catalyst needed because both the crises in Rwanda and Haiti received news coverage. There was extensive coverage in Haiti's case since 1993, and regarding Rwanda, when the president's airplane was shot down, American media reported on it. The "CNN Effect" can increase awareness so much that other political actors can get involved. The public then discusses the coverage of the events, and from there, various interest groups can heighten awareness of the news being covered. The public should have a fundamental understanding base on the news to form a public opinion.

Why Not Rwanda?-President Clinton Speeches and actions

President Clinton's Administration wanted a humanitarian peacekeeping operation that would not put American troops in harms way. There is debate about why President Clinton recommended the actions that he did in Rwanda. President Clinton Administration was characterized by the New York Times in June, 10, 1994 to stop calling the killings in Rwanda a "genocide," (Jehl, 1994).

June, 1994 President Clinton Speech About Increasing Aid in Rwanda

Let me be clear about this. Any deployment of United States troops inside Rwanda would be for the immediate and the sole purpose of humanitarian relief, not for peacekeeping. The men and women of our armed forces have responded to this tragedy with vigor and speed. They have already met the goals we set out last week. The Entebbe air hub is operating around the clock. The Goma airport is capable of operating 24 hours a day. Transportation between airfields and the refugee camps is vastly improved. And as I noted, we are expanding water supplies as quickly as we possibly can.

Why Haiti?

President Clinton has made numerous speeches regarding the US position in Haiti.

September, 1994 Address to Nation

Now the United States must protect our interests, to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, to secure our borders, and to preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere, and to uphold the reliability of the commitments we make and the commitments other make to us.

I know that the United States cannot, indeed we should not be the world's policeman, and I know this is a time, with the Cold War over, that so many Americans are reluctant to commit military resources and our personnel beyond our borders. But when brutality occurs close to our shores it affects our national interest and we have a responsibility to act.

Thousands of Haitians have already fled toward the United States, risking their lives to escape the reign of terror. As long as Cedras rules, Haitians will continue to seek sanctuary in our nation. This year, in less than two months, more than 21,000 Haitians were rescued at sea by our Coast Guard and Navy. Today, more than 14,000 refugees are living at our naval base in Guantanamo. The American people have already expended almost \$200 million to support them, to maintain the economic embargo, and the prospect of millions and millions more being spent every month for an indefinite period of time loom ahead unless we act. Three hundred thousand more Haitians,

five percent of their entire population, are in hiding in their own country. If we don't act, they could be the next wave of refugees at our door. We will continue to face the threat of a mass exodus of refugees and its constant threat to stability in our region, and control of our borders.

In the post Cold War world we will assure the security and prosperity of the United States with our military strength, our economic power, our constant efforts to promote peace and growth. But when our national security interests are threatened, we will use diplomacy when possible, and force when necessary. (President Clinton)

Question of the Impact of Public Opinion




Figure 7 1994 Public Opinion Polls via iRoper

The results for public opinion was mixed in both cases. Regarding the two cases- Rwanda and Haiti, there is no clear consensus from the public opinion polls that implies people felt one way or the other because of some methodological issues

beyond my control. The sampling issues with public opinion polls include the diversity of people taking the poll and what region the people were in when they answered the polling questions.

I think that the public opinion polls dates provide a clear message on what the American public was concerned about in regards to foreign policy issues. I only found in the Roper iPoll database that 25 questions were asked concerning Rwanda in 1994 compared to the 343 questions asked about Haiti. CBS, and ABC news only started asking questions concerning Rwanda later in the summer of 1994. The questions do not reflect the true nature of the level of violence such as labeling it a “genocide.” Moreover, the questions on Haiti increased after Randall Robinsons preceded with his hunger strike.

Although the polls' ambiguous nature does not discredit them from my argument, it is equally essential that “Haiti” questions were asked at a higher rate than “Rwanda.” Therefore, just the numerous times that Haiti's questions were asked can be viewed as a positive influence of including a public opinion as a domestic source of the foreign policy decision-making process.

The initial most formidable challenge of this dissertation was to find a method where I can prove that news media, public opinion, and interest groups played a role in the Clinton Administration’s response to the violence in Haiti and Rwanda. It was hard at first to be able to conclude that President Clinton considered non-traditional political actors such as the news media, interest groups, and public opinion without a “smoking gun.”

My “smoking gun,” for this dissertation is anytime in 1994 that the print news was recorded in any running record that President Clinton was concerned about the public opinion, interest groups, and the news media

Foreign Policy with A Domestic Reality: The Clinton Doctrine Reassessment

This dissertation aimed to demonstrate that domestic support matters when the president intervenes in foreign policy-related issues in American foreign policy. The Clinton Doctrine champions the promotion of democracy and the expansion of economic markets. Based on the research that I have conducted, the Clinton Doctrine is constrained by the public, but the Clinton Administration listened to the public's silence regarding Rwanda and the public's outrage in regards to Haiti. The Clinton Doctrine's overall aim was indeed to promote democracy and economic trade. Still, the caveat on the extent of how far the Clinton Doctrine was willing to go was predicated on the public will, similarly to the Powell Doctrine.

The Clinton Administration appeared to have listened to the public in intervening in Haiti, but not Rwanda. The Clinton Doctrine can evolve, such as when President Clinton was expanding the inherited Somalia crises to the Clinton Administration, making strategic choices based on the public pulse. The Clinton Administration's response to Rwanda and Haiti reflects his changing foreign policy that did not outright abandon humanitarian operations but strengthened the selection criteria-PDD-25. As the first two-term president in a post-Cold War era, the Clinton Administration laid the groundwork to ensure a somewhat public consensus in how the Clinton Administration responded to international crises. Although the Clinton Doctrine goes after rogue states, the extent and means may vary because Rwanda

and Haiti fit the rouge states model, but with Haiti being closer to the US than Rwanda, the public was more engaged in the crises in Haiti. The loud rhetoric on the issue of intervention in Haiti from the Congressional Black Caucus(CBC) and TransAfrica coupled with strong media coverage and public opinion polls met the requirements of PDD-25. Therefore, President Clinton intervened in 1994 to remove the military junta and restore President Jean Aristide.

Haiti and Rwanda's public perception of being a security threat(non-threat) to the United States was also an issue. Americans did not fully understand the context of why the violence in Rwanda merited a genocide, although the mainstream American news coded the violence in Rwanda as a continuation of the 1992 Civil War. Moreover, the government did not convene the American people that the Hutu government was waging a one-sided war against the Tutsis.

The lack of public awareness elucidates why the Clinton Administration did not recommend American military force in Rwanda. The news media covered Rwanda substantively less than Haiti. Moreover, the CBC and TransAfrica, who expressed outrage on Rwanda's violence, were more concerned with Haiti's intervening. Furthermore, the mixed results from public opinion polls did not strengthen the argument that the Clinton Administration should intervene. Based on my research, I can conclude that domestic power and consensus are the Clinton Doctrine's cornerstone.

Future Research

There are numerous other areas that I can expand upon in future work in how some of the domestic variables have evolved such as the rise of social media. Moreover, this dissertation could have been enhanced if more elite interviews were acquired but due to cost issues and availability, I only was able to conduct five.

The analysis of the domestic sources of foreign policy has been a fixture in the study of foreign policy in a post-Cold War era. My research suggests that the two cases that I examined, Rwanda and Haiti, indicate domestic debate in the United States on whether the Clinton Administration should intervene in Rwanda and Haiti. The first significant area could be diving deeper into how pluralism and constraints on the government can explain foreign policy decisions. I can use my three independent variables: news media, public opinion polls, and interest groups, to explore other case studies.

My dissertation is a case study on how domestic politics can impact foreign policy. Foreign policy support for US-led humanitarian decisions in peacekeeping operations often reflects what the “domestic reality” is willing to support. Within my dissertation, there are new themes that could be unearthed in future research. Queer studies are sometimes not examined for foreign policy cases. Regarding Haiti, since refugees were being discriminated against for HIV/AIDS status, this issue has the attention of various other interest groups. This is because of the impact of LGBTQ+ groups such as ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power) role in drawing attention to Haiti's issues.

Conclusion

This dissertation explores the hitherto unexamined Clinton Administration dilemma of responding to two major crises in 1994-the genocide in Rwanda and the political upheaval in Haiti. The Clinton Administration had to factor American public opinion on whether to support another humanitarian peacekeeping operation following the disastrous 1993 peacekeeping operation in Somalia. From the archival and content analysis, including interviews from top policymakers from the Clinton White House and other policymakers in 1994, it appears that the Clinton Administration wanted approval from the American public before committing the US to another peacekeeping operation in the wake of the 18 Army Rangers killed in 1993, Somalia.

The Clinton Administration had more positive political capital in using force in Haiti than in Rwanda. For Clinton, as a first-term president who wanted to be the first Democrat president to win reelection since Harry Truman, President Clinton needed domestic approval because the political stakes were too high. The Clinton Administration needed public support to justify its intervention in Haiti and not Rwanda. The Clinton Administration did not have the necessary domestic permission to intervene in Rwanda. The news media coverage, interest groups, and public opinion would be a compass for how the Clinton Administration would conduct foreign affairs in a post-Somalia world. The lack of public awareness from the news media, public opinion, and interest groups did not give the Clinton Administration the political support to intervene in Rwanda. Still, the public awareness stemming from intense news media coverage, vocal interest groups, and frequent mentioning of

Haiti in public opinions was enough political support for the Clinton Administration to intervene in Rwanda.

Finally, as a dissertation and contribution to the academic scholar, *The Domestic Reality of Foreign Policy: The 1994 Clinton Administration Response to the Crises in Rwanda and Haiti* not only underscores the importance that "domestic sources" has on the foreign policy because other sources exist such as external, psychological, decision environment, and among others. My dissertation focuses on how domestic variables can have an impactful role in influencing foreign policy decisions such as international crises. The Clinton Administration's ability due to powers in the executive branch can quickly respond to international crises while adapting (if needed) to meet the public's concerns.

This dissertation looks at the complex nature of how the United States deals with a crisis while considering domestic variables' role. In 1994, the Clinton Administration changed immediately tightened its grip on supporting peace operations. Moreover, this dissertation focuses on how the presidency can quickly adapt to domestic concerns in figuring out how to handle international crises. The Clinton Administration as the executive branch is more powerful because it can quickly end a crisis, which a dragged-out debate on a treaty could not. Lastly, when the president takes action to provide a hast solution to a crisis, it will direct how the international community responds. As a first-term president, it appears that President Clinton changed foreign policy directions in light of domestic pressure. The analysis

of President Clinton's argument strengthens my use of Democratic Peace Theory, Role theory, and foreign policy analysis because an international crisis can cause political crises. With the 1994 and 1998 elections looming, the Clinton Administration made difficult choices in strategically deciding the US's role in the 1994 crises in Rwanda and Haiti.

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Appendix A: IRB Protocol



RESEARCH INTEGRITY AND COMPLIANCE
Institutional Review Boards, FWA No. 00001669
12901 Bruce B. Downs Blvd., MDC035 • Tampa, FL 33612-4799
(813) 974-5638 • FAX (813) 974-7091

3/29/2019

Camara Silver, MA
USF School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies
Tampa, FL 33612

RE: **Exempt Certification**

IRB#: Pro00038354

Title: The Domestic Calculus of US Involvement in Humanitarian Crises: The Cases of Rwanda and Haiti

Dear Mr. Silver:

On 3/29/2019, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets criteria for exemption from the federal regulations as outlined by 45 CFR 46.104(d):

(2) Research that only includes interactions involving educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of public behavior (including visual or auditory recording) if at least one of the following criteria is met: (i) The information obtained is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that the identity of the human subjects cannot readily be ascertained, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; (ii) Any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research would not reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, educational advancement, or reputation; or (iii) The information obtained is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that the identity of the human subjects can readily be ascertained, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects, and an

IRB conducts a limited IRB review to make the determination required by 45 CFR 46.111(a)(7).

As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in the Belmont Report and with USF HRPP policies and procedures.

Please note, as per USF HRPP Policy, once the exempt determination is made, the application is closed in ARC. This does not limit your ability to conduct the research. Any proposed or anticipated change to the study design that was previously declared exempt from IRB oversight must be submitted to the IRB as a new study prior to initiation of the change. However, administrative changes, including changes in research personnel, do not warrant an Amendment or new application.

We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subjects research at the University of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "Melissa Sloan". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large loop at the end of the last name.

Melissa Sloan, PhD, Vice Chairperson USF Institutional Review B

Appendix B: Interview Invitation Email

Subject: Request to Interview You for a Dissertation Concerning Rwanda and Haiti Gentlemen,

I am Camara “Cam Silver a PhD candidate at the University of South Florida (USF). My dissertation concerns the US reaction the crises in Rwanda and Haiti and I would like to interview each of you to solicit your insights into the dissertation’s research question and key supporting questions. I am asking for your participation because you were key participants or observers to major elements of the research question and the supporting subordinate questions.

This is a voluntary study.

My research question is: How did domestic constraints the Clinton administration’s foreign policy response towards the 1994 humanitarian crises in Haiti and Rwanda? Supporting questions to this dissertation include: Why did the United States support military action in Haiti but not Rwanda? What role did the public play in supporting military intervention in Haiti versus Rwanda? What ways do the public communicate their foreign policy views to the government?

My hypothesis is: The Clinton administration’s response to intervene in Haiti but not Rwanda in 1994 was not only strategic but also a response to the American public’s unwillingness to go through another disaster mission like the botched effort in Somalia the year before. In this dissertation, the major hypothesis is: the US’ reaction to the crises in Haiti and Rwanda became a referendum on the Clinton Doctrine; thus, President Bill Clinton, still consumed with his own reelection in 1996, had to refocus and briefly extricate his commitment of non-strategic humanitarian peace enforcement operations from the Clinton Doctrine.

warfare as a strategic option for the nation.

Supporting questions are:

1. Why did the United States support military action in Haiti but not Rwanda?
2. What role did the public play in supporting military intervention in Haiti versus Rwanda?
3. What ways do the public communicate their foreign policy views to the government?

The specific questions I would like to ask you are listed below, but your responses may likely lead to follow-on questions. These questions might be repetitive each questions leads into bigger questions.

Question 1: In January 1994, did the Clinton Administration take a new approach in its peacekeeping foreign policy platform?

Question 2: How did the Clinton Administration arrive at its decision in 1994 not to intervene in Rwanda but to intervene in Haiti?

Question 3: To what extent did the Clinton Administration consider the public in their decision-making process?

Question 4: What other public forces push the Clinton administration to intervene in Haiti but not Rwanda? (interest groups, congress, etc)

Question 5: Do you believe that the 1994 mid-term elections, the 1996 presidential election factored into the Clinton Administration's decision-making process regarding Haiti and Rwanda?

Question 6: How often was the United Nations Operation in Somalia II mentioned by US government? What was the impact of the UNOSOM II on subsequent American foreign policy issues?

I may elect to ask other questions

Please read this form, sign it if you agree to participate, and scan/email it back to me.

Please also advise me on which dates and times would be best for you to conduct the interview. I intend to ask you for a phone call or a Skype interview, at your convenience or even in-person.

I want to also disclose to you that in addition to being a USF doctoral candidate – the role in which I am contacting you and conducting this interview.

My contact information is csilver@usf.edu. 813-244-5711

Sincerely,

Cam Silver

Appendix C: Contextual Quotes

"When our founders boldly declared America's independence to the world and our purposes to the Almighty, they knew that America, to endure, would have to change. Not change for change's sake, but change to preserve America's ideals; life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. Though we march to the music of our time, our mission is timeless. Each generation of Americans must define what it means to be an American."

-President Bill Clinton

"We cannot build our own future without helping others to build theirs"

-President Bill Clinton

"People around the world have always been more impressed by the power of our example than by the example of our power."

-President Bill Clinton

"Our democracy must be not only the envy of the world but the engine of our own renewal. There is nothing wrong with America that cannot be cured by what is right with America."

-President Bill Clinton