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## An Evaluation of Florida's Zika Response Using the WHO Health Systems Framework: Can We Apply These Lessons to COVID-19?

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**Abstract**

33 **Objectives:** From 2016 to 2018 Florida documented 1,471 cases of Zika virus, 299 of which were  
34 pregnant women (Florida Department of Health, 2019). Florida's response required unprecedented rapid  
35 and continuous cross-sector communication, adaptation, and coordination. Zika tested public health  
36 systems in new ways, particularly for maternal child health populations. The systems are now being  
37 challenged again, as the Coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic spreads throughout Florida. This qualitative  
38 journey mapping evaluation of Florida's response focused on care for pregnant women and families with  
39 infants exposed to Zika virus.

40 **Methods:** Fifteen focus groups and interviews were conducted with 33 public health and healthcare  
41 workers who managed outbreak response, case investigations, and patient care in south Florida. Data  
42 were thematically analyzed, and the results were framed by the World Health Organization's (WHO)  
43 Healthcare Systems Framework of six building blocks: health service delivery, health workforce, health  
44 information systems, access to essential medicines, financing, and leadership and governance (World  
45 Health Organization, 2010).

46 **Results:** Results highlighted coordination of resources, essential services and treatment, data collection,  
47 communication among public health and healthcare systems, and dissemination of information.  
48 Community education, testing accuracy and turnaround time, financing, and continuity of health services  
49 were areas of need, and there was room for improvement in all indicator areas.

50 **Conclusions:** The WHO Framework encapsulated important infrastructure and process factors relevant to  
51 the Florida Zika response as well as future epidemics. In this context, similarities, differences, and  
52 implications for the Coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic response are discussed.

53 **Key words:** Zika virus; Coronavirus; COVID-19; Miami-Dade County; Florida; Health systems  
54 framework; Pregnancy

55 **Significance:** During infectious disease outbreaks, public health systems work in concert with multiple  
56 national, state, and local health, communication, and environmental systems to prevent spread and to  
57 mitigate morbidity and mortality. Much was learned from the 2015 Zika pandemic. These lessons should

58 be applied to address the much larger COVID-19 pandemic. The WHO Building Blocks of Health  
59 Systems provides a framework for planning, action, and evaluation.

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## Introduction

Zika virus is a vector-borne disease transmitted by mosquito bites from the species *Aedes Aegypti*, contact to bodily fluids such as during sex, or congenitally from mother to fetus. Zika exposure during pregnancy can result in fetal loss or a range of birth defects from microcephaly to less apparent sequelae such as hearing loss or speech delay (Rasmussen, et al, 2016; Rice et al, 2018). Zika infection is also known to be associated with Guillain- Barré Syndrome in adults, resulting in long-term neurological symptoms (Mlakar, J., et al., 2016; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2018; Krauer et al., 2017). It is estimated that only 20% of individuals infected with Zika experience symptoms. Among symptomatic patients, symptoms such as mild fever, rash, headache, joint pain, conjunctivitis and muscle pain are most common (CDC, 2018).

In 2015, the first cases of Zika were identified in the Americas, including the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico, and by 2016 the U.S. Virgin Islands and the states of Texas and Florida had identified cases of Zika that were infected through mosquito-borne transmission. During this time, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) released guidelines for testing symptomatic patients and pregnant women regardless of symptoms, recommendations for avoiding mosquito bites and sexual transmission, and urged pregnant women to postpone travel to areas of active transmission by mosquitos (Petersen et al., 2016; Oster, 2016; Staples et al., 2016). On July 29, 2016, Florida announced that the first locally-acquired cases of Zika via mosquito transmission had been identified in Broward and Miami-Dade Counties. Due to local Zika transmission, the CDC declared Miami, Florida the first and only cautionary travel location in the continental U.S. on August 1, 2016 (CDC, 2016a). A timeline of events is illustrated in Figure 1. Throughout 2016, Florida had 218 locally-acquired Zika cases via mosquito transmission, more than any other state (CDC, 2019). Florida's efforts to respond to the local Zika outbreak was a collaboration of multiple agencies (examples displayed in Figure 2) and included state-sponsored testing for any pregnant woman beginning August 3, 2016. The magnitude of the Zika outbreak in Florida and unique scale of public health and healthcare response prompted this evaluation of Florida. Leveraging the six building blocks of the WHO Health Systems Framework, the purpose of this evaluation was to assess

86 the cross-sector collaboration and adaptations among systems of care in Florida during the Zika outbreak  
87 in order provide recommendations for response to future outbreaks. The framework was chosen to guide  
88 analysis after data had been collected because of its applicability and adaptability to various contexts.

89 The WHO Health System Framework provides a structure for describing the multifaceted  
90 response of Florida's health system to locally-acquired Zika. This framework embodies the needs of a  
91 health care system and has been used to evaluate the strengths and challenges as well as assess the benefit  
92 of changes to healthcare systems across the world (Chakravarty, et al, 2015; Howard et al., 2014; Roshan,  
93 Hamid, & Mashhadi, 2018; Sayinzoga & Bijlmakers, 2016; Acharya et al., 2017; Appiah, et al., 2018;  
94 Helena, 2016; Manyazewal, 2017). Though some suggest that there are limitations in using WHO  
95 building blocks for analyzing dynamic, complex and inter-linked system impacts (Mounier-Jack,  
96 Griffiths, Closser, Burchett, & Marchal, 2014), this broad framework was suitable for guiding analysis  
97 specific to infectious disease outbreak response, with modifications to evaluate how patients are  
98 connected with care and the quality of service at the community level (Sacks et al., 2019).

99 Each of the WHO's six building blocks (service delivery, health workforce, health information  
100 systems, access to essential medicines, financing, and leadership/governance) is vital to meeting the needs  
101 of a population, with specific considerations during epidemics or other disasters (Sacks, et al., 2019;  
102 Manyazewal, 2017; WHO, 2010). The health *service delivery* component focuses on evaluating access to  
103 health care delivered efficiently to those who need it. *Health workforce* measures whether the available  
104 resources of a system adequately respond to health care needs. *Health information* systems involve the  
105 timeliness, accuracy, and use of health facility data, individual level patient data for clinical and system  
106 decision-making, and population level data, surveillance, and education. Sufficient access to essential  
107 *medicines and medical equipment (products, vaccines, technologies)* is also evaluated. Lastly, the  
108 *financial stability* of a health care system and whether the *leadership/governance* has created policies for  
109 a suitable health care and adequate public health emergency response is measured (WHO, 2010). These  
110 building blocks are interconnected such that without any one block, health care systems will fail to  
111 provide suitable care for the population. As in the case of Zika in the U.S., the current state of COVID-19

112 highlights the demand for these principles in a comprehensive system of response. Less than four years  
113 later, we are experiencing a pandemic of monumental proportions. As of June 7, 2020 the U.S. has  
114 identified 1.9 million cases of novel coronavirus (COVID-19), including 100,217 in Florida with 3,173  
115 deaths (Florida Department of Health, 2020). It is an unprecedented outbreak leading to response efforts  
116 rapidly adjusting to an event that is seemingly changing daily. The CDC reported that older individuals  
117 and those with pre-existing medical conditions are at a greater risk of complications and that it may be  
118 difficult for an individual to be tested for COVID-19 (CDC, 2020a). Significant findings from the  
119 evaluation of Florida's response to the Zika outbreak parallel the challenges that the U.S. response to  
120 COVID-19 is currently encountering; establishing government-sponsored laboratory testing, maintaining  
121 accurate messaging to the public based on the most current research, and establishing recommendations  
122 for those that are most vulnerable. As such, results from this evaluation helped us to understand Florida's  
123 Zika response so that insights could be useful in managing future disasters, such as the current COVID-19  
124 pandemic.

### 125 **Methods**

126 Florida's response to the Zika public health emergency was evaluated using a descriptive  
127 qualitative case study design, which aims to describe an event, case, or phenomena of interest in its  
128 authentic context by utilizing reports, observations, and interviews (Yin, 2003). A journey mapping  
129 (Cruickshank, 2011; Johnston & Kong, 2011; Zomerdijk & Voss, 2010) approach was used; the  
130 evaluation team follow Florida's process maps (FDOH, 2017) for serving pregnant women and infants  
131 affected by Zika virus, and conducted semi-structured interviews and focus groups with agency staff at  
132 each step. The evaluation team consisted of the principal investigator (PI) who has a PhD in public health,  
133 two other public health faculty, and bilingual graduate students trained and experienced in community-  
134 based qualitative research. The team wa diverse in terms of gender, nationality, race and ethnicity, and  
135 training (community health, epidemiology, medicine, and infectious disease).

136 We used purposive and snowball sampling to recruit participants via email who met the inclusion  
137 criteria as a current employee of their respective agency and with an active role in the care of Zika-



138 positive patients or Zika outbreak management in Florida (Table 1). The PI was known to several of the  
139 participating agencies, though not specifically with interviewed staff. Prior to conducting interviews or  
140 focus groups, participants were informed of the goal of the evaluation, that their participation was  
141 voluntary, and gave verbal consent to participate in a single conversation up to 90 minutes.

142 The PI recruited participants by contacting representatives of agencies involved in the response,  
143 including agencies listed on Florida Department of Health (FDOH) process maps and others in the  
144 community who work with maternal and child populations. Semi-structured interviews and focus group  
145 participants were conducted in-person or by phone. Participants were asked to describe: the system of  
146 referrals and services for Zika-affected mothers and infants in the community or state (key  
147 partners/agencies, what happens when a pregnant woman or a newborn is identified with Zika infection);  
148 how well they feel the system is working; and challenges/gaps, strengths, and recommendations for  
149 system improvement. To protect the anonymity of participants, no personal identifiers were collected. The  
150 purpose of the evaluation (to understand and evaluate the systems of care response to the Zika epidemic),  
151 the interviewer's role as an outside evaluator (not an employee or representative of the Department of  
152 Health), and assurance of confidentiality were reiterated prior to each interview or focus group.  
153 Discussions were audio recorded, professionally transcribed verbatim, and reviewed for accuracy.  
154 Detailed notes were taken for interviews with one public health agency who requested to not be recorded;  
155 a debrief of the notes was audio recorded and transcribed, then coded along with direct audio transcripts.  
156 The evaluation team determined that saturation was reached when all identified stakeholders/services  
157 sectors were interviewed and themes were repeated (no new themes emerged).

158 Verbatim transcripts were reviewed with audio files for accuracy. Following an initial read-  
159 through of the transcripts, the evaluation team determined that an overarching framework (beyond  
160 challenges, strengths, and recommendations) would facilitate coding and interpretation. The WHO  
161 framework was most aligned with the themes that emerged from data collected. Therefore, a codebook,  
162 which included a hybrid of *a priori* and emergent codes, was developed and tested on one transcript. Two  
163 trained research assistants conducted coding to establish agreement, then coded the remaining transcripts

164 independently. MAXQDA software (VERBI Software, 2017) was used to review and categorize the  
165 transcripts according to the six building blocks of the modified framework. Transcripts were analyzed for  
166 themes matching the WHO Health System Framework for principles. As with previous studies using this  
167 framework, the definition of each building block was modified to appropriately evaluate Florida's system  
168 of response to Zika (Mounier-Jack, Griffiths, Closser, Burchett, & Marchal, 2014). Results were shared  
169 with community stakeholders via webinar and in the form of a final report. Further review of the results  
170 identified how challenges/gaps, strengths, and recommendations observed in the evaluation of Florida's  
171 response to Zika can be applied to the COVID-19 outbreak response.

## 172 **Results**

173 Participants in 15 focus groups and interviews consisted of 33 physicians, nurses, project  
174 coordinators, program directors, professors, epidemiologists, researchers, case managers, care  
175 coordinators, and professionals from various point of care and outbreak management systems in Florida  
176 (Table 1). The building blocks were clearly reflected in participant comments (Table 2) as shown in the  
177 system journey map. The evaluation of Florida's Zika response, in alignment with WHO's six building  
178 blocks for an effective response during an epidemic, is presented below. The results emphasized the  
179 cross-sector, multi-level collaboration and communication that occurs during a dynamic and rapidly  
180 evolving crisis, such as the Zika epidemic (Figure 3). System challenges, strengths, and  
181 recommendations, as well as insights into the COVID-19 response are also discussed.

### 182 **WHO's Six Building Blocks**

183 **Service Delivery.** *Service delivery* was facilitated by collaboration among local agencies and  
184 supported by strong federal, state and local coordination (examples illustrated in Figure 2). For example,  
185 the CDC and agencies in the FDOH leveraged existing disease surveillance systems to manage outbreak  
186 investigations and establish a registry of Zika-positive pregnant women. This registry was utilized to  
187 share information with health care providers and case managers to confirm that they had been connected  
188 with access to care. Additionally, prenatal and pediatric health care providers worked together, and  
189 reported cases to FDOH's Bureau of Epidemiology. Locations with evidence of local transmission from

190 mosquitos were reported to the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and local districts  
191 within the Florida Coordinating Council on Mosquito Control to reduce mosquito breeding.

192 **Health Workforce.** Patient referrals were noted to be advantageous within the community-  
193 embedded, competent *health workforce* (case managers, perinatal home visitors, health care, and social  
194 services providers). Experts (e.g., Zika care team at the hospital) made themselves available to their  
195 colleagues for consultation. Interagency communication was essential in reducing duplicative patient  
196 outreach and disseminating new guidance and program protocols. Those in the workforce at the forefront  
197 of Zika response were trained, knowledgeable, and in many cases bilingual or trilingual to meet the needs  
198 of Spanish- and Creole-speaking families in the Miami-Dade area.

199 **Health Information System.** The *health information system* relied on Bureau of Epidemiology  
200 outbreak response staff who provided updates to health care providers as new guidance was continuously  
201 modified by the CDC (Figure 3). Further, disease investigations systems already being used by the  
202 Bureau of Epidemiology and data collection in place at the Florida Birth Defects Registry at the time of  
203 the outbreak quickly created surveillance and adapted protocols and provided updates on the numbers of  
204 identified cases. Public information systems also encompass health education to the community at large,  
205 which relies on partnerships among experts, public health agencies, social services and the media.

206 **Essential Services.** Access to some *essential services* such as testing, care and follow-up was  
207 facilitated by state agencies. State-funded laboratory testing was made available to pregnant women,  
208 health care providers, and case managers. Home visiting, social services, care coordination, and  
209 healthcare providers were able to support women and families, regardless of income. Early intervention  
210 services eligibility criteria was expanded for infants affected by the virus. There were hopes that a vaccine  
211 for Zika virus could be developed, though this did not come to fruition.

212 **Funding.** *Funding* at the state level provided for testing pregnant women, additional outbreak  
213 management staff and case managers, an educational campaign by the FDOH, and longitudinal research  
214 at a major hospital in Miami-Dade County. Financial barriers to care were also leveraged by engaging  
215 existing safety net programs, such as Healthy Start Coalitions and health departments.

216           **Leadership and Governance.** All of these efforts were supported financially and  
217           administratively through *Leadership and governance*, which acted quickly at the federal, state, and local  
218           levels in partnership to provide information and support, public education, Zika prevention supply kits,  
219           disease surveillance, specialized health care and testing.

220           **Challenges, Strengths, and Recommendations**

221           Among the reported gaps was a lack of investment in a vaccine and numerous concerns regarding  
222           the accuracy and timing of laboratory testing. Participants noted questions, concerns, and ethical  
223           dilemmas related to pregnant women receiving false positive results, determining when to get tested, and  
224           the issue of confirmatory testing taking several weeks as the pregnancy progressed, thereby limiting  
225           options for follow-up care decisions. Other reported gaps included reliance on symptomatic Zika-positive  
226           patients seeking health care and for health care providers to order appropriate laboratory testing to  
227           identify index cases in areas where local transmission might not have been identified. Another challenge  
228           was the high cost for testing male or non-pregnant patients (particularly as the virus is also sexually  
229           transmitted). Additionally, it was suggested that timing of laboratory results should be shortened and that  
230           a system of care for Zika-positive patients should be created that is similar to HIV-positive patients. Other  
231           barriers included difficulty in identifying the source or location of exposure in some patients, and a lack  
232           of public awareness of the range of congenital abnormalities caused by Zika exposure. In fact, the parents  
233           of many infants identified with Zika at birth did not return for follow-up care, even though it was known  
234           that health effects were likely to appear later in infancy or childhood.

235           The CDC was a cornerstone of Zika response by frequently updating guidance as research  
236           developed and quickly communicated those changes in a clear and systematic manner. This pipeline of  
237           reliable communication from the federal level to individual health care providers and patients was noted  
238           to be essential. It facilitated state and local decision-making to prioritize resources and efforts during the  
239           Zika response and should be utilized during the response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

240           Further recommendations were to increase mosquito control efforts to reduce the risk of  
241           exposure; this includes continuing to encourage public support of actively minimizing the presence of

242 standing water to reduce mosquito breeding sites. It was also suggested that mosquito breeding grounds  
243 be better understood to reduce the risk of disease.

#### 244 **Insights into COVID-19 Response**

245 Lessons learned from Zika include the importance of coordination across sectors and levels,  
246 resilience at the local level, an effective testing strategy, policy and funding to support all levels of  
247 prevention and treatment, and effective risk communication. While cross-level coordination and  
248 communication, united messaging, and testing strategies seem to have worsened during the COVID-19  
249 pandemic, local response in Florida was strong. Many agencies continue to provide uninterrupted services  
250 through telehealth and community-based efforts, from COVID-19 prevention messaging, to social  
251 services, and local food distribution centers to offset the impacts of school closures and widespread  
252 unemployment. The state and local health departments and community agencies have a history of  
253 working together. Additionally, local and state jurisdictions put policies in place – some faster than others  
254 – to prevent the spread of the virus. Agencies still look to the CDC and WHO for guidance.

255 As mentioned by Mounier-Jack et al. (2014), the coordination of activities by the health  
256 workforce can improve the health outcomes of the population. Cross-sector collaboration in Florida was  
257 evident when response efforts resulted in timely laboratory testing, surveillance, and dissemination of  
258 guidance, and coordinate patient care, as noted by evaluation participants. These strengths of Florida's  
259 Zika response should be echoed in the COVID-19 response. Florida has seen exponentially more COVID-  
260 19 confirmed cases than of combined locally-acquired and travel-acquired Zika cases in 2016. Both Zika  
261 and COVID-19 spread rapidly across international borders. On March 16, 2020 the CDC issued a warning  
262 for all global travel, illustrating that this large scale pandemic requires equally greater response (CDC  
263 2020b). Specifically, this evaluation emphasized the value of collaboration, coordination, and  
264 communication across federal, state, and local levels as well as among agencies within each level.  
265 Unfortunately, collaboration across levels has been stilted throughout COVID-19; policy and messaging  
266 have not been consistent across states, or even within states.

267           Community resilience is enhanced by strong social ties and networks. Leveraging these  
268 communication and partner networks facilitated rapid implementation under complex dynamic  
269 conditions. Certainly messaging impacts risk perceptions; as one public health professional explained in  
270 the case of Zika, *“I think a lot of people realize ‘mosquito, mosquito, mosquito’ but they’re not*  
271 *necessarily thinking of these others – or they’re thinking, ‘I’m not pregnant. Why does it matter to me?’”*  
272 This point was also made by another practitioner, *“Lessons have been learned in terms of HIV or*  
273 *hepatitis that if the messaging is not targeted to people who are married, who have higher income, they*  
274 *don’t believe they’re at risk, it’s a missed opportunity.”* Various policies of quarantine and community-  
275 wide isolation are being enforced across the U.S. and the state as a measure to prevent the spread of  
276 COVID-19, emphasizing the crucial roles of state and at the local level leadership in creating,  
277 communicating, and enforcing policy, and the federal level for creating and disseminating research-based  
278 guidance. During COVID-19, CDC was not supported as the cornerstone of information and we have not  
279 seen the “pipeline of reliable communication from the federal level to individual health care providers and  
280 patients” observed in the Zika response, which is crucial for facilitating state and local decision making.  
281 Public risk perceptions have also been inconsistent, as the impacts of COVID-19 on vulnerable  
282 populations, such as pregnant women, infants/children, and others with underlying health conditions is  
283 still largely unknown. Similar to Zika, the perceptions of risk are low as majority of cases are  
284 asymptomatic; COVID19 has also been largely communicated as a risk only to elderly populations. To  
285 add to the complexity of the situation, COVID-19 prevention messaging has been subsumed within  
286 political messaging, conflating the two in the minds of some segments of the population.

287           In relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, conducting effective and efficient large-scale testing has  
288 been one of the main challenges of the response to this current outbreak (Shah et al., 2020). Florida’s  
289 policy to offer state-sponsored laboratory testing for pregnant women shortly after the first locally-  
290 acquired Zika case was applauded. While Zika testing fell short in terms of meeting the need for testing  
291 among other populations, this focus on pregnant women raised awareness, improved access to services,  
292 and facilitated disease surveillance. Further, the evaluation found that direct access to health care

293 providers and case managers who were knowledgeable about Zika benefited patients. This access was  
294 made possible through a well-established referral network and communication among community and  
295 maternal child health services providers to reduce the burden on the patient.

296 COVID-19 affects the entire population, and amplifies risks and impacts on vulnerable  
297 populations. While rapid and accurate testing is still not readily available, case management and home  
298 visiting services (now offered virtually) and health care without cost barriers have the potential to  
299 similarly improve the COVID-19 response for women, children and families. Our health information  
300 systems for Zika relied on contact tracing and adaptation of protocols based on the number of cases. The  
301 number of cases of COVID-19 in Florida grew from 1 to over 100,000 in the span of just four months  
302 (Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, 2020). The need for health care is rising and the long term  
303 health effects are still largely unknown. Continued clinical research and epidemiologic surveillance will  
304 inform further public health response. Continuous and rapid adaptations to new information rely on a  
305 well-informed policy makers and leaders.

306 At the time of the evaluation, a tropical disease researcher noted that research for a Zika vaccine  
307 could be available in the future. A vaccine for Zika was never made available to the public, which was  
308 seen as a limitation of the response. Currently there is a global effort to develop vaccines for SARS-CoV-  
309 2, the coronavirus that causes COVID-19, however this will take time and significant investment (Chen,  
310 et al., 2020). Some recommendations during the evaluation of Florida's response to the local Zika  
311 outbreak was to reduce turnaround time for laboratory testing, encourage public education, and public  
312 support for prevention efforts. These efforts have clear benefits to helping any response to a biological  
313 disaster. Encouraging public education efforts and providing useful prevention tasks that use public  
314 participation has the potential to benefit given the more encompassing effect of COVID-19. Additionally,  
315 funding for research, equipment, testing, and economic relief have been provided for COVID-19  
316 response, though as in the case of Zika, the mechanisms for releasing adequate funds efficiently and  
317 quickly to all who need it remain a challenge.

318 **Conclusions**

319 Florida’s response to an outbreak of locally-acquired Zika showed strengths in making laboratory  
320 testing, health care, case management, an educational campaign, and frequently new guidance rapidly  
321 available. However, length of time for test results, lack of vaccine development, testing requirements for  
322 non-pregnant women, lack of public knowledge about sexual transmission, and many birth abnormalities  
323 associated with Zika were seen as setbacks. Recommendations included encouraging public support for  
324 prevention measures, increased knowledge about transmission, availability of testing and reduced  
325 turnaround time for laboratory results to reach patients. Unfortunately, although local and state agencies  
326 are now more experienced in these processes, the rapid exponential spread of the COVID-19 virus and  
327 confusion at the federal level have stymied improvements in these areas.

328 The purpose of this evaluation was to provide feedback of Florida’s response to the Zika  
329 outbreak to stakeholders. Parallels can be seen between the two pandemics in terms of a rapidly evolving  
330 situation, a need for testing and disease surveillance, concerns about health care, and a desire for a  
331 vaccine. The reports gathered from responders to the Zika outbreak in this evaluation led to informative  
332 lessons learned that can be applied to support the current response to COVID-19.

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334 **List of abbreviations**

335 CDC-Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

336 WHO-World Health Organization

337 FDOH- Florida Department of Health

338 COVID-19 – novel Coronavirus



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