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Foreshadowing Future Slaughter: From the Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966 to the 1974–1999 Genocide in East Timor

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The failure of the international community to act on the legal and moral imperative to stop, punish, and prevent genocide and other mass killings has led to the establishment of genocidal regimes that institutionalize genocide as a tactic of repression and power consolidation. One such repeat offender regime was the New Order government of Indonesia, which committed mass killings of known and alleged communists throughout Indonesia in 1965–1966 and later carried out a genocidal, colonial occupation of East Timor. I demonstrate parallels between the actors, tactics, and discourse of the communist killings and the Timorese Genocide. The failures of domestic resistance and international pressure to punish the New Order after 1966 allowed génocidaires to retain power and reinforced their belief in the acceptability and effectiveness of genocidal tactics. The Indonesian case illustrates the necessity of punishment for genocide to preclude a culture of impunity that encourages both previous and new offenders.

Key words: genocide, Indonesia, East Timor, New Order, communists, impunity

Genocide and Repeat Offenders

After World War II, as the full extent of the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis during the Holocaust came to light, there was a sweeping sentiment of “Never again.” Never again could a state be allowed to attempt such human destruction. The Nuremberg trials brought convictions for crimes against humanity, the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) was adopted in 1948, and memorials were built around the world. Yet, in a sense, the Holocaust itself was an example of “again.” Not only did it come in the wake of the Armenian Genocide,¹ but Germans themselves had already committed genocide in the twentieth century through their slaughter of the Herero and Nama peoples of German South-West Africa.² Scholars have identified many parallels in examining these cases, with the German experience in South-West Africa having acted as a testing ground for ideas and methods later “perfected” by the Nazis.³

While Isabel Hull has found a common military culture in Germany oriented toward seeking “final solutions,”⁴ the genocide in Africa was committed by the regime of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Holocaust by the Nazis, with the Weimar government separating the two. Later in the century, one regime was allowed to commit not one but two mass killings, each of which can be argued to be cases of genocide. Within the span of a decade, the New Order regime of Suharto in Indonesia organized both the killing of hundreds of thousands of Communists and alleged leftists within Indonesia from

1965 to 1966—hereafter referred to as “the Killings”—and then, in 1975, invaded East Timor, which was subjected to a brutal, 24-year occupation. To my knowledge, there has yet to be a detailed, direct comparison of these two cases.⁵ Following the example of the German cases, this article examines the characteristics and methods of the Killings and the occupation campaigns in East Timor to find similarities and to determine what role the Indonesian experience in the Killings played in shaping later actions in East Timor. Based on this case comparison, I also explore the implications of impunity for the organizers of the atrocities, and how this impunity has led to a normalization of genocidal policies in Indonesia, which may be seen today in the ongoing conflict in West Papua.

I first turn to the story of the Killings, how they were committed, and who was responsible. This discussion is followed by the history of the invasion and subsequent occupation of East Timor, in which I make note of the violent practices and discourse that carried over from the 1965–1966 Killings, highlighting the similarities in anti-Communist sentiment, military tactics, targeting of women and ethnic Chinese, biological rhetoric of infection and extermination, and post-violence impunity. I then assess whether or not these cases were or should be considered genocide, and what implications they hold for the prevention and further study of the crime.

The Indonesian Killings

Indonesia’s New Order regime came to power in 1965 in the wake of a complicated and much-debated event. Since independence from the Dutch in 1948, Indonesia was led by Sukarno,⁶ whose charismatic leadership enabled him to balance the power of the country’s political parties and the highly influential military. The key tenet of Sukarno’s political program, called *Guided Democracy*, was *Nasakom*, which stood for “nationalism, religion, communism.”⁷ While this principle served as part of Sukarno’s shrewd political balancing act, he did in fact attempt to move the country to the left, for instance by withdrawing from the United Nations and building closer ties with Communist states in Asia. It is undeniable that the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was a great beneficiary of Sukarno’s policies: the PKI had been excluded from government until 1957, but, with Sukarno’s emphasis on *Nasakom*, began to hold bureaucratic and political offices and also gained influence in the military, especially in the air force, with which it shared a dislike of the army.⁸ The PKI used its newfound influence to promote policies such as land redistribution and the arming of workers and peasants to form a “fifth force” that would counter the power of the army, navy, air force, and police. The issue of land redistribution was particularly contentious, with the PKI and its affiliates sometimes using “direct action” land occupations to dispossess landowners, and both party activists and landowners resorted to violence in the competition for land.⁹ The land reforms came in the early 1960s, at a time of economic crisis that was exacerbated by Sukarno’s misguided policies and had “left Indonesia as one of the poorest countries in the world, its name conjuring up much the same connotations of chaos and misery that the names of the Congo and Sierra Leone conjure up today.”¹⁰ The great economic decline and increasing tensions between political parties led to an atmosphere of uncertainty, strained even further by Sukarno’s increasing health problems and six attempts on his life.¹¹

The tensions finally boiled over on 1 October 1965. While there is much uncertainty regarding the facts,¹² what is certain is that on the night of September 30, a group of middle-ranking officers—who became known as the 30 September Movement (G-30-S) and were led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung¹³—kidnapped and murdered six generals of

the military high command and one lieutenant and also fatally wounded the six-year-old daughter of General Abdul Haris Nasution, the Minister of Defense. The G-30-S announced that they had undertaken this action to counter a plan by right-wing military leaders to seize power from Sukarno and that they were forming a Revolutionary Council to help govern the country.¹⁴ Major-General Suharto, commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), quickly mobilized troops to crush the rebel officers. By evening on October 1, Suharto, collaborating with other army officers, was in control of Jakarta.

The true role of the PKI in events surrounding G-30-S might never be known, but most scholars agree that while the PKI might have been peripherally tied to the plotters and some elements of the party expressed support for the group, the party was not responsible for G-30-S.¹⁵ Public perception, however, was that the PKI was behind G-30-S, and Suharto and his clique moved quickly to promote and exploit this viewpoint. As Robert Cribb writes, Suharto “took steps to consolidate the already widespread public presumption that the PKI had masterminded the coup (and was probably planning further actions) and encouraged rumors that the communists had been planning to torture and murder their enemies.”¹⁶ Suharto and Nasution had been pushing the murdered generals to take more action to check the PKI’s growing influence and preserve military autonomy,¹⁷ and, now in power, they seized the opportunity to fulfill this desire. Public sentiment was inflamed by the exhumation of the bodies of the murdered generals and a public funeral for Nasution’s daughter.

Rumors were spread through the press that the generals had been tortured and mutilated, with their eyes gouged out and their genitals cut off by members of Gerwani, a women’s association affiliated with the PKI. The Gerwani members allegedly followed this orgy of violence by participating in a literal orgy.¹⁸ These claims were proven false by the official autopsies conducted on October 4 and 5 after the bodies were exhumed,¹⁹ and Sukarno attempted to speak out against journalists writing “untrue things,”²⁰ but Suharto and the military had already seized the momentum. The autopsy results were never publicly released, and so anger and fear were cultivated and directed toward the PKI. Marshall Green, the US ambassador to Indonesia at the time, aided these efforts, recommending “increased covert efforts ‘to spread the story of the PKI’s guilt, treachery, and brutality,’ although he was unsure of the evidence of the PKI’s role,”²¹ while the British and Malaysians also worked to inflame anti-Communist sentiment.²² Many Indonesians were also reminded of the Madiun affair of 1948, when a small Communist group rebelled against the larger Indonesian army during the fight for independence from the Dutch.²³

Through the media and official statements, the PKI were not only blamed, but systematically dehumanized. G-30-S was dubbed *Gestapu* by Brigadier General Sugandhi, amalgamating the Indonesian name *Gerakan September Tigapuluh* with the connotations of the German Gestapo clearly in mind.²⁴ Especially in light of the false stories about Gerwani actions in the killing of the generals, PKI members and supporters were painted as “bloodthirsty and sexually sadistic monsters”²⁵ and “scurvy mongrels [who] put their slimy claws on the innocent souls of our children.”²⁶ One paper printed a cartoon showing the PKI and associated organizations as lizards lapping up the blood of the murdered generals.²⁷ The success of this propaganda is exemplified by one killer’s remark, “I did not kill people. I killed wild animals.”²⁸

Also of central importance was the view of Communists as atheists, both immoral and exercising a corrupting influence on Indonesian society. In the wake of the coup,

the military newspaper *Angkatan Bersendjata* characterized the campaign against the PKI as a holy war, writing that “the sword cannot be met by the Koran . . . but must be met by the sword.”²⁹ The equation of Communism with atheism also served to further dehumanize PKI supporters, since “belief in the one God’ is the first of the five principles which comprise the Pancasila, the national ideology contained in the Preamble to the Constitution. Thus for its enemies the PKI was automatically disqualified from inclusion in Indonesia.”³⁰

Seeking to organize the anger they had built up and lacking the troop strength or intelligence necessary to destroy the PKI using military forces alone,³¹ military leaders met with younger leaders of anti-Communist parties and religious organizations, and banded together to form the militant Action Front to Crush the Gestapu (KAP-Gestapu), which began holding protest rallies. Having whipped the non-Communist population into a furor, military leaders decided to begin releasing the anger. At the funeral of Nasution’s daughter, “as if by pre-arrangement, a high naval officer gave Moslem student leaders a one-word signal, *sikat*, which means ‘sweep.’”³² The next day, on October 8, after a KAP-Gestapu rally filled with anti-PKI speeches, a group of members of Muslim student organizations marched to the PKI headquarters, which they attacked and burned. Harold Crouch argues that while the mob had not sought permission for this action from military or KAP-Gestapu leaders, “it is likely that they had been assured by junior army officers that the senior generals would not be displeased if the PKI building were ‘spontaneously’ attacked by the ‘people.’”³³ Brian May, however, found that the PKI building was destroyed “while soldiers blocked the approaching streets and firemen looked on.”³⁴ Rumors were spread that the PKI had been compiling death lists and planning a purge of non-Communists, creating fears that it was a situation of “kill or be killed.”³⁵

In the days after the funeral and attacks on PKI headquarters in Jakarta, the first massacres of PKI supporters began in heavily Muslim Aceh, with troops from the regional military command and Muslim youth groups hunting people down and killing them. According to some accounts, the families and household servants of PKI cadres were also among the “several thousand” killed, and Brigadier General Ishak Djurasa, the commander in the area, described Aceh as “the first region to be cleansed of counter-revolutionary G.30.S elements.”³⁶ By December, Djurasa told the press that “the PKI is no longer a problem for Aceh because the region has been entirely purged in a physical sense of PKI elements.”³⁷ In the second half of October, mass killings of alleged PKI supporters began in Central and East Java,³⁸ with military forces arming, training, and supporting youth groups, mainly from Muslim and Christian organizations.³⁹ In Central Java, according to Sarwo Edhie, the officer in command of the anti-Communist operations there, the massacres were initiated by his troops from the Army Paracommando Regiment (RPKAD), which traveled from village to village, massacring alleged Communists, sometimes killing the entire population of a village (except infants) if it was suspected of being fully in support of the PKI.⁴⁰ Edhie’s RPKAD moved out from Jakarta through Central and East Java and finally to Bali, organizing massacres along the way.⁴¹ Sensing that his units were too small to attack all the alleged Communist villages in the province, Edhie began delegating more responsibility to civilian youth, nationalist, and religious groups: “We gave them two or three days’ training, then sent them out to kill the Communists.”⁴² The troops also gave some of their prisoners to civilian anti-Communist groups, who killed them with knives and sickles.⁴³

This pattern manifested itself across all the regions of the slaughter: civilians, usually part of larger organizations,⁴⁴ carried out the majority of the killings, but they had support, weapons, and training from the military, which still directly participated in many of the killings. While there were existing tensions between PKI supporters and anti-Communists across Indonesia, Aceh was an exception: in most regions, as in Central Java, the massacres did not begin until after the arrival of troops.⁴⁵ In Bali, it was only after the replacement of the governor, a radicalization among the local military establishment, and the arrival of troops from Java in early December that massacre of PKI supporters began. To polarize the population in Bali, propaganda teams spread the message through rural areas that “there are only two possible alternatives; to be on the side of the G-30-S or to stand behind the government in crushing the G-30-S.”⁴⁶ Village authorities in particular were exhorted to promote the purge of the PKI, and some of them used “institutions of communal responsibility and labor” to carry out the killings.⁴⁷ One older Muslim leader considered the killings by Ansor, a leading Muslim youth group, as “the will of God; at the same time he said that Ansor had ‘fulfilled the command of the army.’”⁴⁸

It was difficult for PKI members and affiliates to resist the tide of violence, as almost all of them had been completely in the dark about the events of September 30. Instead, there was bewilderment and a scramble for survival. A communist youth organization member recalled, “We were confused. The leaders of the organization didn’t know what to do. There was a curfew, so I didn’t stay at home. I slept in the backyard along with other friends. We didn’t know anything. After a few nights we went our different ways, trying to save ourselves.”⁴⁹ Though there is evidence of some villages, especially in Java, organizing for defense against the anti-Communist onslaught, most of those targeted offered little resistance in the face of death.⁵⁰

Killings took place throughout the country, but the worst-affected areas were Aceh, Bali, Central Java, East Java, and Northern Sumatra. The massacres were committed with extreme brutality.⁵¹ While the military tended to shoot those Communists they took prisoner, common methods of killing by civilians were beating, throat cutting, and decapitation. Some particularly enterprising killers in Cirebon in West Java constructed a guillotine to expedite their work.⁵² According to one report, victims were given knives and told to kill themselves; if they refused, they were shot in the back.⁵³ Corpses were often dumped into rivers and, as described by an eyewitness in Central Java, “the departure of corpses from the Kediri region down the Brantas achieved its golden age when bodies were stacked together on rafts over which the PKI banner proudly flew.”⁵⁴ There were so many bodies flowing downstream that barriers were put up to keep them out of irrigation channels; in Surabaya, corpses “became a danger to public health when ebbing tides deposited them on river banks.”⁵⁵ Where there were no rivers, bodies were dumped into mass graves, sometimes dug by the victims themselves.

And who were these victims? To be certain, many of those killed were, in fact, PKI members, or members of closely aligned organizations; others, however, were only marginally affiliated with the PKI and the permissiveness of the situation led to violence being used to solve more localized disputes as well, which played out along religious, ethnic, economic, and personal lines.⁵⁶ Youth organizations in Java traveled from village to village using lists⁵⁷ and informants to root out “Communists,” but “teachers and other village intellectuals were especially common on the lists of victims.”⁵⁸ In some massacres, children were killed and it was common to kill the families of alleged PKI

supporters in order to prevent future retribution.⁵⁹ Leslie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma found in Bali that most of those killed as Communists “went to their deaths denying such affiliation” and often “the label ‘communist’ was attached to victims and, by extension, to their family and friends and even casual acquaintances once they were dead, as an after-the-fact explanation of their fate.”⁶⁰ The powerful demonization and dehumanization of “Communists” allowed the misapplication of that label to be used as a justification for killing people “over land, over inheritance, and over more personal problems such as long-remembered insults or sexual jealousy.”⁶¹ Thus, in a campaign supposedly based on ideology, thousands were killed for “reasons that had little or nothing to do with ideology.”⁶² Killings over land were often rooted in the PKI’s land reform campaigns and the more general conflict between landowners and peasants. In one region of Sumatra, Javanese transmigrants were killed by the local population,⁶³ while elsewhere, “on the first day of the mass killings, one army officer in civilian dress cheerfully left Kediri city, carrying a machine-gun, to shoot squatters who had refused to get off his untilled land.”⁶⁴ Ethnic Chinese were also targeted, in some cases due to their mother country’s Communism, and in others for localized, economic reasons. Cribb argues, though, that the murders and riots against Chinese during the Killings were not out of proportion with prior and later eruptions of violence against Chinese in Indonesia,⁶⁵ and scholarly and media accounts have tended to give highly inflated estimates of Chinese deaths.⁶⁶

Women were singled out for especially brutal treatment. The myth of Gerwani members mutilating and killing the generals during the G-30-S incident enraged the population. “Communist” women were thus seen as savage monsters who were guilty not only of the alleged crimes against the generals, but, in the words of Suharto, whose “sadistic practices . . . had destroyed the identity of Indonesian women.”⁶⁷ Some of the anti-Communist slogans used were “‘Gerwani Tjabol’ (Gerwani Whores), ‘Gantung Gerwani’ (Hang Gerwani) and ‘Ganjang Gerwani’ (Crush Gerwani).”⁶⁸ In Bali, thousands of women were rounded up and taken to government offices to have their genitals examined for signs of sexual activity, which, it was claimed, could identify them as Gerwani members; these searches were frequently accompanied by rape.⁶⁹ In a gendered analysis of the Killings, Saskia Wieringa finds that in Indonesia’s sexually repressed society, the alleged brazen sexual transgressions of the Gerwani women were both arousing and infuriating to the young, often religious, men who comprised the majority of the killers.⁷⁰ The forms that violence against women took bear out this argument. A document received by the human rights group Tapol is particularly illuminating: a female PKI member was ordered to strip and had her “body and honor” burned before she was hacked to death; a newlywed Gerwani member was raped multiple times by an Ansor group and then was “slit open from her breasts to her vulva”; a woman nine months pregnant was killed, then had her stomach cut open and her child butchered⁷¹; another Gerwani leader was impaled through her vagina with a sharpened bamboo pole.⁷² These extremes of violence reflect the dehumanization caused by the Gerwani myth and also a reassertion of male power and control over female sexuality, eliminating those who would challenge it.⁷³

By late December, the fury and pace of the Killings had slowed as the military sought to consolidate violence under its control and restrain anti-Communist vigilante groups in order to prevent anarchy.⁷⁴ Massacres continued regularly into 1966, followed by a period of what the army called “mopping-up operations,” aimed at hunting down

the few remaining Communist cells.⁷⁵ These operations peaked with the massacre of hundreds of alleged Communist prisoners at Purwodadi in November and December 1968; Indonesian Institute for Human Rights Vice-Chairman Johannes Princen, who investigated the massacre, concluded that at least 860 prisoners had been beaten to death.⁷⁶ Hundreds of thousands of Communists and alleged supporters continued to be imprisoned and in some cases used as slave labor, while being given insufficient food and denied medicine.⁷⁷

It is uncertain how many people were actually killed during the massacres of 1965–1966. Cribb provides a comprehensive list of the varying death toll estimates, which range from 78,000 (from a late 1965 Indonesian government “fact-finding” commission) to 2,000,000.⁷⁸ More recently, Cribb has come to believe that the correct figure for those killed between October 1965 and March 1966 is approximately 500,000, while Dwyer and Santikarma argue that this is still an underestimation.⁷⁹ What is certain is that the PKI, which in 1965 claimed 3 million members and 20 million people in affiliated organizations,⁸⁰ was destroyed as a political force. The New Order government, however, still invoked the threat of Communism and continued to demonize all those associated with it. A “clean environment” policy was instituted, whereby the descendants of those who had been killed or imprisoned were considered “children of the PKI . . . ‘infected’ by ‘political uncleanness,’” and were discriminated against in employment, education, and social services.⁸¹ These policies held even for children born after 30 September 1965.⁸² There is also a sense that even after the physical elimination of the PKI, its pernicious spirit remains. As James Siegel writes,

Since the 1980s at least, Indonesian political leaders have spoken of organizations without form when implying presumed communist resurgence. The state has gone to great lengths to keep track not only of those communists released from years in prison, but also of their descendants. This seems to indicate fear of something they cannot locate, even when they know precisely who is a communist and who is the son or daughter of one.⁸³

In the aftermath of the Killings, with the elimination of the Communists from the political scene, the military—most specifically, the army—was free to consolidate its control over the government, deposing Sukarno in 1967 and officially transferring presidential power to Suharto. The army thoroughly penetrated all levels of government across Indonesia, allowing it to quickly snuff out any political challengers and to exercise complete control over policy.⁸⁴ Thus, many of the same officers who presided over the Killings were still in positions of power in 1974, at the beginning of Indonesia’s next episode of mass killing.

East Timor

Less than a decade after taking power and presiding over the purge of Communists, the New Order regime decided to embark on a mission of territorial expansion. Indonesia had taken control of the Dutch half of the island of Timor at independence, but the other side, East Timor, remained under Portuguese colonial rule. With the collapse of Portugal’s dictatorship in April 1974, the future of East Timor was thrown into question. There were three different visions for the future, each with its supporters in East Timor: independence, autonomous association with Portugal, or integration with Indonesia. There were also three major political parties in East Timor at this time: the

Timorese Democratic Union (UDT); the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT), which in September became the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin)⁸⁵; and the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti). The UDT and ASDT/Fretilin supported independence, while Apodeti favored integration with Indonesia.

Indonesia's foreign minister, Adam Malik, gave assurances of Indonesian non-interference in East Timorese internal politics, but the military officers who were truly in charge of the government had different ideas. They thought an independent East Timor would destabilize their country by sparking desires for independence among discontented ethnic groups on nearby Indonesian islands such as Ambon.⁸⁶ The military group, operating under and with the support of Suharto, included Major-General Ali Murtopo, Lieutenant-General Yoga Sugama, and Major-General Benny Murdani,⁸⁷ all of whom had served during the Killings. In order to facilitate the integration of East Timor, the group began using special forces troops, propaganda, and small numbers of internal supporters to destabilize East Timor in what was called *Operation Komodo*. The military group also exploited fears of Communism to push for the annexation of East Timor, with Sugama painting the UDT as socialist and Fretilin as Communist,⁸⁸ and the group going so far as to allege that ethnic Chinese Communists who had fled the Killings had relocated to East Timor to use the territory as a launching pad for further destabilization of Indonesia.⁸⁹ The Indonesians were able to infiltrate the UDT and used false claims about Fretilin to press the UDT into staging a coup in an attempt to seize control, which led to a short civil war in which Fretilin quickly defeated the UDT. The radio station Indonesia had set up to broadcast propaganda into East Timor falsely reported heavy fighting and atrocities committed by Fretilin, prompting many East Timorese living near the border to flee into Indonesian West Timor. Here they became pawns, used by Indonesia as evidence of the instability of East Timor, the threat it posed to Indonesia itself, and thus the need for intervention.⁹⁰ The plans for the destabilization and invasion were drawn up by Generals Murtopo and Murdani, members of the larger Javanese military clique that had risen to power with Suharto from 1965 onwards.⁹¹

The small remaining Portuguese military force and administration took refuge on the island of Atauro during the civil war, and when they did not return, Fretilin took full control of the government. Disappointed by the UDT's loss and the failure of Apodeti to gain traction, Indonesia decided to begin more active and direct military actions, attacking East Timorese towns. Fretilin had been biding its time on declaring independence, but after an intense Indonesian attack on the town of Atabae, the group's leadership decided that a full-scale Indonesian invasion was imminent and that the only possibility for staving it off would be to declare independence and so gain the protection of the United Nations. However, the United States and Australia—the two countries most invested in the situation (for geostrategic and economic reasons, respectively)—had come down in favor of an Indonesian annexation: the US to oppose the left-wing leanings of Fretilin and protect deep-water passages in the Timor Sea for its nuclear submarines and Australia in large part to protect oil exploration agreements and other economic ties.⁹² As one Australian official put it, “The plain fact is that there are only 700,000 Timorese; what we are really concerned about is our relationship with 130,000,000 Indonesians.”⁹³ So outside help was not forthcoming for the East Timorese.

The full-scale Indonesian invasion began on 7 December 1975, spearheaded by an assault on Dili from air, land, and sea. Fretilin prepared defenses in the city and

provided stronger resistance than expected, but the Indonesians almost immediately turned their full force against the civilian population. Indiscriminate massacres took place all over the city, with a large number of executions at the waterfront that included women and children. Indonesian forces had been told prior to the invasion that they were “fighting Communists in the cause of *Jihad* (Holy War), just as they had done in Indonesia in 1965” and the Timorese were presented as “backward, primitive, almost sub-human.”⁹⁴ There were many stories, John Taylor writes, “of entire families being shot for displaying Fretilin flags on their houses, of groups being shot for refusing to hand over their personal possessions, of grenades being rolled into packed houses, and of Fretilin sympathizers being singled out for immediate execution.”⁹⁵ There was no method to the madness; on one occasion, for example, Indonesian soldiers asked a group of 30 integration supporters what political party they belonged to, and then machine gunned them even after they answered “Apodeti.”⁹⁶ Even those East Timorese who fled into West Timor as refugees were targeted there, with their houses burned and perhaps thousands killed.⁹⁷

At a greater level than during the Killings, ethnic Chinese were targeted in Dili and elsewhere. During the initial attack on Dili, many of those executed were Chinese; after the assault on the city, a Catholic priest reported that 2,000 people had been killed in the first few days after the landing and 700 of them were Chinese.⁹⁸ Meanwhile, in the towns of Maubara and Liquiça, the entire Chinese population was killed.⁹⁹ This came despite many Chinese having been among the strongest supporters of Indonesian intervention.¹⁰⁰

Fretilin was forced to withdraw to the hills, taking thousands of civilians with them. Indonesian forces countered with brutal counterinsurgency campaigns from 1977 to 1979, using such indiscriminate weapons as rocket batteries and napalm.¹⁰¹ It was also alleged that Indonesian troops could be promoted for “acts of savagery against the Timorese population.”¹⁰² The goal of these operations was termed the “encirclement and annihilation” of Fretilin, and the US State Department called it Indonesia’s “final solution” for East Timor.¹⁰³ Food supplies in Fretilin-controlled areas were especially targeted and villages known or suspected of supporting the group were “systematically wip[ed] out.”¹⁰⁴ A priest in Dili described in November 1977 “the barbarities (understandable in the Middle Ages, and justifiable in the Stone Age), the cruelties, the pillaging, the unqualified destruction of Timor, the executions without reason” and expressed his fear that “genocide will come soon, perhaps by next December.”¹⁰⁵ Indonesian rhetoric promoted the biological extermination of the Timorese as it had with the PKI. Following massacres in 1976 in Remexio and Aileu in which all residents over the age of three were shot, the local people were described as having been “infected with the seeds of Fretilin.”¹⁰⁶

For those who managed to survive the encirclement and annihilation campaign, a cruel fate awaited: they were rounded up by Indonesian forces and transported to “re-settlement camps,” where they were not provided with and were prevented from growing sufficient food to survive, in addition to being used for forced labor. One priest wrote that “if the Indonesians were to allow Timorese people to move around freely and live where they like, there would be no shortage of food.”¹⁰⁷ Indonesian troops looted crops and livestock and robbed the pantries of houses.¹⁰⁸ Aid groups were systematically denied access to the population and whatever aid that did arrive was stolen by Indonesian soldiers and sold at inflated prices,¹⁰⁹ while one report found that there

was corn rotting away in warehouses in Dili.¹¹⁰ As a result, East Timorese starved and died of disease by the thousands.

In May 1981, Indonesia launched a new offensive code-named *Operation Security*, which the Defense Department also called “the ‘final’ or ‘decisive’ war.”¹¹¹ This operation was also one of encirclement, but this time the Indonesians tried a new method. Tens of thousands of men between the ages of 15 and 50—though sometimes as young as 9 and as old as 60—were ordered to march in front of Indonesian troops as they approached suspected Fretilin positions so as to force Fretilin soldiers to choose between shooting their countrymen and surrendering. This method, known as *pagar betis*, or “the fence of legs,” had previously been used in Indonesia to round up suspected Communists during the Killings.¹¹² One particular incident of note during this period was the massacre of over 400 people at Lacluta in September 1981, where the targets were mostly women and children, and the young were killed by smashing their heads against rocks.¹¹³ Beyond those who were actually killed during pagar betis sweeps, the operations took men away from their crops, exacerbating the food shortage and starvation. Pagar betis was also part of a plan to “Timorize” the war, in which some Timorese came to the Indonesian side in exchange for pay or the opportunity to loot, in addition to those forced to participate.¹¹⁴

Counterinsurgency operations continued throughout the 1980s, with fighting fluctuating at times, but Indonesian forces remaining brutal. For instance, in August 1983, the village of Malim Luro was looted by Indonesian troops who then bound over 60 men, women, and children, forced them to lie on the ground, and crushed them with a bulldozer.¹¹⁵ Indonesians discussed their intent to destroy Fretilin “to the third or fourth generation,”¹¹⁶ and food sources were still constantly attacked.¹¹⁷ It was also during the 1980s that Indonesia began a program of transmigration, bringing Indonesians from other islands and settling them in “the more fertile regions” of East Timor¹¹⁸; combined with voluntary migrants, by 1992 there were estimated to be 100,000 Indonesians living in East Timor out of a total population of 750,000.¹¹⁹ International attention was again focused on Indonesia after the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, when an estimated 273 peaceful protestors were killed,¹²⁰ but international outrage quickly dissipated. Meanwhile, the Indonesians continued attacking and torturing the East Timorese population and continued their practice of choosing ominous military code names including 1997’s *Operation Annihilation*, in which hundreds were rounded up, tortured, and in some cases killed in response to Fretilin attacks.¹²¹ Torture remained prevalent, with one post-conflict survey finding that approximately half of all East Timorese had suffered some form of physical, sexual, or psychological torture.¹²²

The opportunity to break the decades-long cycle of violence finally arrived in 1998 with an economic crisis in Indonesia that led to the forced resignation of Suharto. His successor, B. J. Habibie, made overtures toward peace and eventually decided to allow a referendum to choose independence or autonomy for East Timor, under the auspices of the United Nations. Yet his actions were contradicted by the military establishment, which was sending thousands of new troops into East Timor to sabotage the referendum. Troops worked with pro-Indonesian militias, arming and training them as they had in 1965, to embark on a campaign of destruction, with an Indonesian lieutenant-colonel calling for “the killing of pro-independence movement leaders, their children, and even their grandchildren.”¹²³ Hundreds of people were killed and tens of thousands fled their homes in response to the increasing violence. As Geoffrey Robinson argues,

the militias “provided a perfect cover for official efforts to disrupt, or affect the outcome of, the vote while simultaneously perpetuating the illusion that the fighting was among East Timorese,”¹²⁴ a continuation of the program to Timorize the violence. Yet with an extraordinary turnout estimated at 90%, the East Timorese people voted for independence. This outcome was obviously not the result the Indonesian military or militias had desired, and it was met with a campaign of total destruction—killing, rape, looting, and so forth¹²⁵—during which at least 150,000 people were taken into West Timor against their will.¹²⁶ Even after the referendum, the Indonesian military would not let East Timor out of its control and it was only with the intervention of a UN force in late September that the Indonesians finally left and widespread violence ceased.

As in the Killings, women were specifically targeted throughout the Indonesian occupation. In the aftermath of the initial attack on Dili in 1975, Indonesian forces demanded women to use for their pleasure, and women who were related to Fretilin members or were themselves members of associated organizations were singled out, like the targeting of Gerwani during the Killings; the women were then imprisoned, tortured, and raped, a pattern which continued in Dili for months.¹²⁷ Rape became used as a method of emphasizing Indonesia’s dominance of East Timor and a way to destroy Timorese communities.¹²⁸ Indonesia also embarked on a program of forced population control, using surgical sterilization, injections of Depo Provera contraceptive, and even infanticide.¹²⁹

Indonesia was seeking to control the already degraded population of East Timor. While estimates vary, the general consensus is that about 200,000 East Timorese died from direct killing, starvation, and disease as a result of the Indonesian incursions and occupation during 1974–1999.¹³⁰ The UN-mandated Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor found a minimum possible conservative death toll totaling 102,800: 18,600 ±1,000 killings or disappearances and 84,200 ±11,000 deaths due to hunger and illness beyond expected peacetime levels. It also reported that deaths due to hunger and illness could have been as high as 183,000, which would be consistent with an overall death toll of approximately 200,000.¹³¹ Clearly, as in the Killings, hundreds of thousands of people died and the Indonesian military bears the ultimate responsibility. But were these cases of genocide?

The Genocide Debate

Genocide, as defined by the Article 2 of the UNCG, is the

intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- a. Killing members of the group
- b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
- c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
- d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
- e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group¹³²

This definition excludes political and social groups, but many genocide scholars include these in their definitions of genocide. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn’s definition acknowledges victims that belong to “a group, as that group and membership in it

are defined by the perpetrator,” while Israel Charny includes as genocide any mass killing based on a shared characteristic, and Helen Fein argues that genocide is a “sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members.”¹³³

PKI members and the party’s alleged supporters would not meet the UN’s definition of victims of genocide since they were part of a political group and were targeted as such; however they could fit into the above definitions that allow for social or political groups. The overall target for extermination was the G-30-S movement, which was defined by the New Order as the PKI or “Communists” in general. The statements and actions of the military and the New Order government in encouraging and organizing the Killings show a clear intent to eliminate the PKI, and the equating of Communism with an infection and something heritable presents it as a problem that can be remedied through physical means—in this case, extermination. While the Killings cannot legally be considered genocide, they have been accepted as genocide under the wider definition that includes politicicide.¹³⁴ An alternate approach is to view Indonesia at the time of the Killings through Christian Gerlach’s lens—as an “extremely violent society”¹³⁵—in which the military, civil society groups, and individuals joined together to destroy the PKI for distinct, self-interested reasons, diffusing the intent required by the UNCG.

The case of East Timor is also nuanced. Ben Saul contends that the East Timorese cannot be considered a national group for the period prior to 1999, since their sovereignty had not been recognized.¹³⁶ I would argue, though, concurring with David Lison, that the support Fretilin enjoyed from the majority of the population and its declaration of independence in 1975 would constitute an exercise of the right to self-determination; thus, the East Timorese can be considered a national group.¹³⁷ Saul further argues that much of the killing was done by East Timorese against one another, so this might be considered a case of “auto-genocide”; however, the Indonesian policy of Timorizing the conflict demonstrates Indonesian intent behind this intranational violence. Indonesia’s systematic destruction of food sources and its failure to provide adequate subsistence alternatives would meet Article 2 (c)’s condition of “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction.” It was for this reason that the truth commission accused Indonesia of committing genocide by starvation.¹³⁸ The coercive sterilization and birth control programs were clearly aimed at preventing births within the group. In the words of one Timorese,

after at least 200,000 people have been killed off . . . any talk of over-population is . . . ludicrous. There’s absolutely no need for family planning, but it’s quite clear that the reason why the Indonesians are resorting to this kind of thing is because they want to kill off the Timorese and re-populate our country with their own people.¹³⁹

The targeting of Chinese in East Timor that reduced their population from about 20,000 at the time of the invasion to only a few thousand within a decade¹⁴⁰ also qualifies as a genocidal action as they were singled out due to their ethnicity.¹⁴¹ Overall, human rights violations by the Indonesian military and their auxiliaries in East Timor “were of a systemic nature, indicating a purpose beyond the destruction of individual victims.”¹⁴² Thus, I find that East Timor, too, was a case of genocide¹⁴³ and one that could be prosecuted based on the UNCG.¹⁴⁴

Conclusion

There were many parallels between the two mass killings committed by the New Order: the involvement of the same clique of generals; allegations of Communism; targeting of Chinese; gender and sexual violence; tactics like pagar betis and the delegation of violence to non-state actors; and a violent rhetoric of extermination, often couched in biological and genetic terms.¹⁴⁵ Another common factor is that there has been no prosecution of the perpetrators in either case. The Indonesian military's firm control over the government ensured prosecution would not take place after the Killings, and of the few officers brought to trial in Indonesia for atrocities committed in East Timor, most have been acquitted, and the few sentences handed out have been light.¹⁴⁶

The cases of the Indonesian Killings and the occupation of East Timor bear out Fein and Barbara Harff's findings that perpetrators of genocide are likely to commit it again as elites and the military become habituated to it.¹⁴⁷ The failure of the international community to sanction the New Order regime after the Killings emboldened it and gave it a sense of free rein in East Timor, bolstered by the material and political support of powerful Western allies. While the Killings served as an example that was emulated in East Timor, the impunity with which the New Order acted serves as an example to the world. Since the invasion of East Timor in 1974, the regimes of both Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milošević, for example, likely felt secure in committing multiple ethnic mass killings.¹⁴⁸

The Indonesian military's continued influence in the government and the country's continued policies of internal colonization and suppression of ethnic resistance mean that similar tactics and outcomes may be seen today in West Papua, where violence, transmigration, and cultural suppression have led many to conclude that genocide is ongoing.¹⁴⁹ The "secession" of East Timor has been used by the Indonesian military as a justification for harsh measures in West Papua, where Kopassus special forces units—the successors of Sarwo Edhie's Killings-era RPKAD and themselves responsible for many atrocities in Timor—are among the most active and have similar operational codenames, such as Clean Sweep and Annihilation.¹⁵⁰

There is continuity among Indonesian military and political leaders through the conflicts. Kopassus is currently led by Pramono Edhie Wibowo, son of Sarwo Edhie. In 1999, he led an anti-terrorism sub-unit of Kopassus that was accused of facilitating a deadly attack on the Catholic diocese office in Dili.¹⁵¹ Kopassus forces under Pramono were subsequently accused of committing human rights violations against Papuans.¹⁵² The current president of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is the son-in-law of Sarwo Edhie and in fact served three tours of duty in the military during "pacification" operations in East Timor.¹⁵³ Further, General Timbul Silaen, previously police chief in East Timor in 1999, was appointed to the same post in West Papua in 2003.¹⁵⁴ Scholars who speak Indonesian would likely be able to uncover many more officers with involvement in both the Killings and East Timor or East Timor and West Papua.

In the cases of both the Killings and the invasion and occupation of East Timor, Indonesia's neighbors and allies—in particular the United States, and Australia in the case of East Timor—had ample opportunity to oppose the violence and bring pressure to bear on the Indonesian government and military to halt their genocidal actions. Evidence even suggests that US opposition to the invasion of East Timor through a cutoff of military funding to Indonesia would have resulted in minimal damage to bilateral relations.¹⁵⁵ However, realpolitik, self-interest, and disinterest won out among the

Western powers, allowing the genocidal campaigns to proceed. While it is possible for individuals and civil society to intervene early in the process of genocide to try to halt it,¹⁵⁶ this private intervention is especially difficult in the authoritarian settings of most genocidal regimes, where information and opposition are tightly controlled. Thus, international intervention was needed to stop the Indonesian campaigns, and though it is those countries with the closest relations with the perpetrator government that have the most leverage, they also have the strongest disincentives to act.¹⁵⁷ In the cases discussed in this article, these close allies aided and abetted the ongoing genocides. Impunity and international inaction allowed the Indonesian government and military to view genocide as an acceptable tactic in the pursuit of power consolidation, territorial gain, and economic expansion.

Without international condemnation and punishment or domestic outcry, genocide becomes part of a repertoire of repression and control for regimes. Patterns of rape and massacre learned and used during the Killings were embedded in the institutional repertoire of the Indonesian military and state, then applied to East Timor. If genocide truly is “our era’s most heinous crime,”¹⁵⁸ the international community must act accordingly to ensure that genocidal regimes are punished for the atrocities they commit and that any steps toward reoffending are cut short.

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Notes

1. Hitler is famously reported to have asked, “Who still talks nowadays of the extermination of the Armenians?” Wendy C. Hamblett, “Guilty of Innocence or Nobody Remembers the Armenians,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 7,1 (2005): 129–44, 129.
2. See, for example, Ben Kiernan, *Blood and Soil* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2007), 374–90; Horst Drechsler, “Let Us Die Fighting”: *The Struggle of the Herero and the Nama against German Imperialism (1884–1915)*, trans. Bernd Zollner (London: Zed, 1980); Jon Bridgman and Leslie J. Worley, “Genocide of the Hereros” in *Century of Genocide*, 2nd ed., ed. Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny (New York: Routledge, 2004), 15–52.
3. See Mahmood Mamdani, “A Brief History of Genocide,” *Transition* 10,3 (2001): 26–47; Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 35–7. Robert Gordon argues that the Germans also committed genocide against the San people in South-West Africa in 1914. Robert J. Gordon, “Hiding in Full View: The ‘Forgotten’ Bushman Genocides of Namibia,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 4,1 (2009): 29–57, <http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/gsp.4.1.29>.
4. Isabel V. Hull, “Military Culture and the Production of ‘Final Solutions’ in the Colonies: The Example of Wilhelminian Germany” in *The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective*, ed. Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (New York: Cambridge UP, 2003), 141–62.
5. The similarity of the two mass killings is often mentioned in passing, for instance by Catherine Barnes, who characterizes the New Order government as a “genocidal regime.” Catherine Barnes, “The Functional Utility of Genocide: Towards a Framework for Understanding the Connection between Genocide and Regime Consolidation, Expansion and Maintenance,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 7,3 (2005): 309–30, 323. Geoffrey Robinson offers an interesting comparison of the role of militias in both the Killings and in East Timor. Geoffrey Robinson, “People’s War: Militias in East Timor and Indonesia,” *South East Asia Research* 9,3 (2001): 271–318.
6. Instead of having both a first and last name, many Javanese have only one name.
7. Nasionalisme, agama, komunisme. The Nasakom ideology “postulated that there were no fundamental conflicts between these three ideologies and that all three reflected different aspects of the Indonesian national personality.” Robert Cribb, “Unresolved Problems in the Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966,” *Asian Survey* 42,4 (2002): 550–63, 553.
8. Robert Cribb, “Genocide in Indonesia, 1965–66,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 3,2 (2001): 219–39, 229; Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1978), 84. While most

scholars see Sukarno as working closely with and promoting the PKI and its programs, Wertheim argues that, through Nasakom, Sukarno forced the PKI to moderate: "In order to be acceptable as partners, the communists had to water down much of their social and political radicalism. By making them share governmental responsibility, he had manoeuvred the communists into a somewhat precarious position if they wanted to criticize official policy." W.F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup," *Pacific Affairs* 39,1/2 (1966): 115–27, 118.

9. Jan Breman, "Bali's Killing Fields Thirty Years Ago," *Economic and Political Weekly* 31,16/17 (1996): 997–9; Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Indonesia: A Violent Culture?" *Asian Survey* 42,4 (2002): 582–604, 600–1; Geoffrey Robinson, "The Economic Foundations of Political Conflict in Bali, 1950–1965," *Indonesia* 54 (1992): 59–93, 77; Kenneth R. Young, "Local and National Influences in the Violence of 1965" in *The Indonesian killings of 1965–1966: Studies from Java and Bali*, ed. Robert Cribb (Clayton, Victoria: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash U, 1990), 63–99.
10. Cribb, "Unresolved Problems," 554.
11. Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 83.
12. Steven Drakeley describes it as "a classic and intriguing historical 'whodunit.'" Steven Drakeley, "Lubang Buaya: Myth, Misogyny and Massacre." *Nebula* 4,4 (2007): 11–35, 13.
13. Peter Dale Scott ("The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–1967," *Pacific Affairs* 58, 2 [1985]: 239–64) argues that Untung was a dupe and that both G-30-S and the reaction were designed to serve Suharto and the United States, a position which receives some support from Roger K. Paget ("The Military in Indonesian Politics: The Burden of Power," *Pacific Affairs* 40,3/4 [1967]: 294–314). Paget finds that "most of the insurrectionary units and their leaders had been under [Suharto's] former command" (298).
14. There are many accounts of the events of this "coup"; for a clear and succinct recounting of the known facts, see May, *Indonesian Tragedy*, 94–7.
15. See especially Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 94–125; May, *Indonesian Tragedy*, 103–20.
16. Cribb, "Unresolved Problems," 551–2.
17. Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 136.
18. For a closer analysis of the claims of sexual violence and impropriety, see Drakeley, "Lubang Buaya"; Saskia E. Wieringa, "The Birth of the New Order State in Indonesia: Sexual Politics and Nationalism," *Journal of Women's History* 15,1 (2003): 70–91. Gerwani members were also alleged to have prostituted themselves to soldiers in order to steal their weapons before killing and castrating them. Geoffrey Robinson, *Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1995), 293.
19. Ben Anderson, "How Did the Generals Die?" *Indonesia* 43 (1987): 109–34.
20. *Antara*, 13 December 1965, cited in Drakeley, "Lubang Buaya," 19.
21. Jaechun Kim, "U.S. Covert Action in Indonesia in the 1960s: Assessing the Motives and Consequences," *Journal of International and Area Studies* 9,2 (2002): 63–85, 77n31.
22. David Easter, "'Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling': Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia, October 1965–March 1966," *Cold War History* 5,1 (2005): 55–73, 63.
23. Drakeley, "Lubang Buaya," 17; Jean-Louis Margolin, "Indonésie 1965: un massacre oublié" [Indonesia 1965: a forgotten massacre], *Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée* 8,1 (2001): 59–92, 61. On Madiun, see Ann Swift, *The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1989).
24. Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 140. Michael Van Langenberg ("Gestapu and State Power in Indonesia" in Cribb, *Indonesian Killings*, 45–61, 48) notes the necessary intent behind the construction of the name *Gestapu*, since "Indonesian citation of dates normally follows the day/month/year format."
25. Drakeley, "Lubang Buaya," 21.
26. *Djakarta Daily Mail*, 11 December 1965, cited in Drakeley, "Lubang Buaya," 21.
27. *Duta Masyarakat*, 19 October 1965, cited in Van Langenberg, "Gestapu and State Power," 50.
28. *The Australian*, 22 April 1966, cited in Easter, "Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling," 69.
29. *Angkatan Bersendjata*, 8 October 1965, cited in Robinson, *Dark Side*, 281n18.
30. Drakeley, "Lubang Buaya," 21.
31. Christian Gerlach, *Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2010).
32. May, *Indonesian Tragedy*, 121.
33. Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 141.
34. May, *Indonesian Tragedy*, 121.
35. Cribb, "Unresolved Problems," 552; Hilmar Farid, "Indonesia's Original Sin: Mass Killings and Capitalist Expansion, 1965–66," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 6,1 (2005): 3–16; Van Langenberg, "Gestapu and State Power," 47; Young, "Local and National Influences," 80.

36. Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 143.
37. *Antara Ichtisar Tahunan*, 19 December 1965, cited in Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 143.
38. The PKI had previously been very strong in West Java, so anti-Communist violence there was relatively "mild." Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 142.
39. *Ibid.*, 143–52; Van Langenberg, "Gestapu and State Power," 49.
40. May, *Indonesian Tragedy*, 121–2; Cribb, "Genocide in Indonesia," 233.
41. Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 140–53; Scott, "Overthrow of Sukarno," 239–64
42. May, *Indonesian Tragedy*, 122.
43. *Ibid.*; Young, "Local and National Influences," 83.
44. There is also evidence of participation in the Killings by a violent, lumpen stratum of society that participated because of the opportunities for looting and other criminal activity that the disorder permitted. See Robert Cribb, "Introduction: Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia" in Cribb, *Indonesian Killings*, 1–44, 31–2; Robert Cribb, "The Indonesian Massacres" in Totten, Parsons, and Charny, *Century of Genocide*, 289–326, 238; and Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 153.
45. Breman, "Bali's Killing Fields," 999; Young, "Local and National Influences," 86.
46. Robinson, *Dark Side*, 293.
47. *Ibid.*, 299.
48. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After," 122–3.
49. Farid, "Indonesia's Original Sin," 7.
50. Cribb, "Genocide in Indonesia," 233–4; Margolin, "Indonésie 1965," 83–4.
51. For detailed information on the gruesomeness of the Killings in Central Java, see Anonymous, "Additional Data on Counter-Revolutionary Cruelty in Indonesia, Especially in East Java," in Cribb, *Indonesian Killings*, 169–76, an Indonesian report on the violence that was discovered by Tapol in the 1970s. See also the firsthand accounts provided in Cribb, "Indonesian Massacres," 289–326.
52. May, *Indonesian Tragedy*, 123.
53. Easter, "Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling," 61.
54. Pipit Rochijat, "Am I PKI or non-PKI?" *Indonesia* 40 (1985): 37–56, 44.
55. May, *Indonesian Tragedy*, 123.
56. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, "The Ontology of 'Political Violence': Action and Identity in Civil Wars," *Perspectives on Politics* 1,3 (2003): 475–94. Kalyvas succinctly describes the variance across regions in many people's motivations for killing: "in the southern Sumatra province of Lampung, the violence was caused by a conflict between local Muslims and Javanese transmigrant settlers. In some areas of Timor, the victims were Protestants, while in others they were followers of local cults; in Lombok they were Balinese and Chinese. The killings in Central and East Java were caused by hostility between local Muslim cultural-religious groups known as abangan; in Bali they were associated with long-standing rivalries between patronage groups" (478).
57. There are substantial allegations that United States officials provided lists of Communist sympathizers to Indonesian authorities so they could be killed. See especially Cribb, "Introduction," 7n11; Kim, "U.S. Covert Action," 78.
58. Cribb, "Genocide in Indonesia," 233.
59. *Vrij Uit*, 17 December 1966, cited in Robinson, *Dark Side*, 298; Cribb, "Introduction," 11.
60. Leslie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma, "'When the World Turned to Chaos': 1965 and Its Aftermath in Bali, Indonesia" in Gellately and Kiernan, *Specter of Genocide*, 289–306, 294.
61. *Ibid.*
62. Mark Mazower, "Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century," *American Historical Review* 107,4 (2002): 1158–78, 1173; see also Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2005), 142–3.
63. Cribb, "Introduction," 24; Kalyvas, "Ontology of 'Political Violence,'" 478.
64. Seymour Topping, "Indonesia Haunted by Mass Killing," *New York Times*, 24 August 1966, cited in Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After," 123.
65. Robert Cribb, "Bali, Editor's Introduction" in Cribb, *Indonesian Killings*, 241–8, 246; Cribb, "Genocide in Indonesia," 235. See also Charles A. Coppel, *Indonesian Chinese in Crisis* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford UP, 1983).
66. Robert Cribb and Charles A. Coppel, "A Genocide that Never was: Explaining the Myth of Anti-Chinese Massacres in Indonesia, 1965–66," *Journal of Genocide Research* 11,4 (2009): 447–65.
67. Drakeley, "Lubang Buaya," 24.
68. Wieringa, "Birth of the New Order," 80.
69. Dwyer and Santikarma, "'When the World Turned to Chaos,'" 298–9.
70. Wieringa, "Birth of the New Order," 70–91.

71. Anonymous, "Additional Data," 171–3.
72. Rochijat, "Am I PKI," 45.
73. On sexual violence against women in genocides more generally, see Allison Ruby Reid-Cunningham, "Rape as a Weapon of Genocide," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 3,3 (2008): 279–96, <http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/gsp.3.3.279>. In some Indonesian cases, violence against men also took a sexual form, as victims had their penises amputated presumably to avenge the alleged mutilation of the generals. They also became symbols of the repression of open sexuality as the severed penises of Communists were displayed outside one brothel. Rochijat, "Am I PKI," 44.
74. Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 154; Robinson, *Dark Side*, 296.
75. May, *Indonesian Tragedy*, 203.
76. *Ibid.*, 205–6.
77. Drakeley, "Lubang Buaya," 12.
78. Cribb, "Introduction," 12. See also Amnesty International, *Political Killings by Governments* (London: Amnesty International, 1983), 37–8.
79. Cribb, "Indonesian Massacres," 233; Dwyer and Santikarma, "'When the World Turned to Chaos,'" 290–1n2.
80. Cribb, "Introduction," 41.
81. Dwyer and Santikarma, "'When the World Turned to Chaos,'" 297, 299. See also Cribb, "Genocide in Indonesia," 236.
82. Vickers, *History of Modern Indonesia*, 159–60.
83. James T. Siegel, *A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counterrevolution Today* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1998), 5.
84. For example, Crouch, *Army and Politics*; John A. MacDougall, "Patterns of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Central Bureaucracy," *Indonesia* 33 (1982): 89–121; and Allan A. Samson, "Indonesia 1972: The Solidification of Military Control," *Asian Survey* 13,2 (1973): 127–39.
85. According to a member, "ASDT was formed to defend the idea of the right to independence; Fretilin was formed to fight for independence." John G. Taylor, *East Timor: The Price of Freedom* (New York: Zed, 1999), 33.
86. Barnes, "Functional Utility of Genocide," 317; Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *The War against East Timor* (London: Zed, 1984), 7; James Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed* (Milton, Australia: Jacaranda P, 1983), 109–10; James Dunn, "Genocide in East Timor," in Totten, Parsons, and Charny, *Century of Genocide*, 263–94, 267.
87. Dunn, *Timor*, 109.
88. Dunn, *Timor*, 169; Robinson, "People's War," 295.
89. *Melbourne Herald*, 5 September 1975, cited in Budiardjo and Liong, *War against East Timor*, 19.
90. Dunn, *Timor*, 183. Meanwhile, the refugees were held captive by the Indonesians, given little food, and committed to forced labor.
91. Peter Britton, "Indonesia's Neo-Colonial Armed Forces," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 7,3 (1975): 14–21, 15.
92. Budiardjo and Liong, *War against East Timor*, 10; Taylor, *East Timor*, 38.
93. Dunn, *Timor*, 141. Brad Simpson argues that anti-Communism was not so much a concern of the U.S. and Australia, as they were disinterested in East Timor's fate as a territory too small and economically insignificant to risk relations with the Suharto government. Brad Simpson, "'Illegally and Beautifully': The United States, the Indonesian Invasion of East Timor and the International Community, 1974–76," *Cold War History* 5,3 (2005): 281–315.
94. Taylor, *East Timor*, 70.
95. *Ibid.*, 69.
96. Dunn, *Timor*, 284; Amnesty International, *East Timor: Violations of Human Rights* (London: Amnesty International, 1985), 28.
97. Taylor, *East Timor*, 79.
98. Dunn, *Timor*, 285.
99. *Ibid.*, 286; Taylor, *East Timor*, 70.
100. John G. Taylor, "'Encirclement and Annihilation': The Indonesian Occupation of East Timor" in Gellately and Kiernan, *Specter of Genocide*, 163–87, 165–6.
101. Dunn, *Timor*, 211.
102. Budiardjo and Liong, *War against East Timor*, 27.
103. Taylor, *East Timor*, 84.
104. *Ibid.*, 28.
105. Dunn, *Timor*, 313.

106. J.S. Dunn, "The Dunn Report on East Timor: The East Timor situation—report on talks with Timorese Refugees in Portugal," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 7,3 (1977): 409–17, 412; Ben Kiernan, "War, Genocide and Resistance in East Timor, 1975–99: Comparative Reflections on Cambodia," in *War & State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, & the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century*, ed. Mark Selden and Alvin Y. So, (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2003), 199–233, 224.
107. Taylor, *East Timor*, 93.
108. Dunn, *Timor*, 324.
109. Budiardjo and Liong, *War against East Timor*, 74–81; Taylor, *East Timor*, 120–2.
110. Dunn, *East Timor*, 335.
111. Budiardjo and Liong, *War against East Timor*, 41.
112. Robinson, "People's War," 291. According to Robinson, *pagar betis* had been used before the Killings in the Indonesian military's counterinsurgency campaign against the Darul Islam rebel group in the 1950s.
113. Taylor, *East Timor*, 101.
114. For example, Robinson, "People's War."
115. Taylor, "Encirclement and Annihilation," 168.
116. Amnesty International, *East Timor*, 23. See also Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 580.
117. Taylor, *East Timor*, 150.
118. Taylor, "Encirclement and Annihilation," 172.
119. Derrick Silove, "Conflict in East Timor: Genocide or Expansionist Occupation?" *Human Rights Review* 1,3 (2000): 62–79, 69–70.
120. For example, Geoff Simons, *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 66.
121. *Ibid.*, 88.
122. J. Modvig et al., "Torture and Trauma in Post-Conflict East Timor," *The Lancet* 356,9243 (2000): 1763.
123. Ben Kiernan, "Cover Up and Denial of Genocide: Australia, the USA, East Timor, and the Aborigines," *Critical Asian Studies* 34,2 (2002): 163–92, 175.
124. Robinson, "People's War," 275.
125. For details, see Ben Saul, "Was the Conflict in East Timor 'Genocide' and Why Does it Matter?" *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 2 (2001): 477–522, 484; and Joseph Nevins, *A Not-So-Distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2005).
126. Dunn, "Genocide," 278; Taylor, *East Timor*, xxvii–xxviii. Dunn gives a higher figure of 250,000 East Timorese deported.
127. Dunn, *Timor*, 285–6, 302.
128. For example, Peter Carey, "Third-World Colonialism, the Geração Foun, and the Birth of a New Nation: Indonesia through East Timorese Eyes, 1975–99," *Indonesia* 76 (2003): 23–67; Christine Mason, "Women, Violence and Nonviolent Resistance in East Timor," *Journal of Peace Research* 42,6 (2005): 737–49; Miranda E. Sissons, *From One Day to Another: Violations of Women's Reproductive and Sexual Rights in East Timor* (Melbourne: East Timor Human Rights Centre, 1997). As in the Killings, there are also anecdotal accounts of sexual violence against men, for instance the public castration of a cousin of Fretilin President Nicolau Lobato. Carey, "Third-World Colonialism," 34.
129. Budiardjo and Liong, *War against East Timor*, 116; Matthew Jardine, *East Timor: Genocide in Paradise* (Tucson: Odonian, 1995), 62; Mason, "Women, Violence and Nonviolent Resistance," 737–49; Robert A. Rubinstein and Sandra D. Lane, "Population, Identity and Political Violence," *Social Justice: Anthropology, Peace and Human Rights* 3,3/4 (2003): 139–52, 145–6; Sissons, *One Day to Another*.
130. See Taylor, "Encirclement and Annihilation," 163n1, for a discussion.
131. CAVR, *Chega! The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste* (Dili: Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade, e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste, 2008).
132. *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/genocide.htm> (accessed 23 Aug 2012).
133. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1990), 23; Israel W. Charny, "The Study of Genocide," in *Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review*, ed. Israel Charny (New York: Facts on File, 1988), 1–19, 4; Helen Fein, *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective* (London: SAGE), 24.
134. See Cribb, "Genocide," 219–21.
135. Gerlach, *Extremely Violent Societies*.
136. Saul, "Was the Conflict in East Timor 'Genocide?'" 499.
137. David Lisson, "Defining 'National Group' in the Genocide Convention: A Case Study of Timor-Leste," *Stanford Law Review* 60,5 (2008): 1459–96.
138. CAVR, *Report of the Commission*.

139. Budiardjo and Liong, *War against East Timor*, 116.
140. Adam Kaye, "East Timor Depends on Jakarta's Largesse," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 August 1985, 20–3.
141. See Kiernan, "War, Genocide and Resistance," 202.
142. Lisson, "Defining 'National Group,'" 1489.
143. Some scholars also consider East Timor a case of cultural genocide given Indonesia's attempts to fill the territory with immigrants and instruct children only in Bahasa Indonesia, thus "[destroying] the distinctive culture of East Timor." Dunn, "Genocide," 263. On education, see also Budiardjo and Liong, *War against East Timor*, 109–13; and Taylor, *East Timor*, 127–30. Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr ("Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945," *International Studies Quarterly* 32,3 [1988]: 359–71), however, classify both the Killings and the violent occupation of East Timor as politicides, rather than genocides.
144. Kiernan, "Cover Up," 164, has a similar finding. Philip J. Curtin argues that prosecution under the UNCG could have been undertaken even on the basis of the 1999 post-referendum violence alone. Philip J. Curtin, "Comment: Genocide in East Timor? Calling for an International Criminal Tribunal for East Timor in Light of *Akayesu*," *Dickinson Journal of International Law* 19,1 (2000): 181–209.
145. The use of biological and genetic terms in arguing for a group's elimination is common across genocides, with Dutton, Boyanowsky, and Bond stating that "a common perception of genocidaires is that their target group is virus- or cancer-like. The notion of the threat spreading is common to these views, justifying extermination of the currently innocent." Donald G. Dutton, Ehor O. Boyanowsky, and Michael Harris Bond, "Extreme Mass Homicide: From Military Massacre to Genocide," *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 10,4 (2005): 437–73, 458.
146. Dunn, "Genocide," 286; Suzannah Linton, "Unravelling the First Three Trials at Indonesia's Ad Hoc Court for Human Rights Violations in East Timor," *Leiden Journal of International Law* 17,2 (2004): 303–61.
147. Helen Fein, "Accounting for Genocide after 1945: Theories and Some Findings," *International Journal on Group Rights* 1,2: 79–106; Barbara Harff, "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955," *American Political Science Review* 97,1 (2003): 57–73, 66.
148. In fact, Pol Pot took the Killings as a lesson that anti-Communists had to be dealt with sharply, lest the Cambodian Communist Party suffer the same fate as the PKI. This was one of the motivating factors behind the mass murder conducted by his regime. Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 36–7.
149. See, for example, Tracey Banivanua-Mar, "A Thousand Miles of Cannibal Lands: Imagining away Genocide in the Re-Colonization of West Papua," *Journal of Genocide Research* 10,4 (2008): 583–602; Elizabeth Brundige et al., *Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control* (New Haven: Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Center, Yale Law School, Yale U, 2004).
150. Banivanu-Mar, "Imagining away Genocide," 583–602; Geoffrey C. Gunn, *New World Hegemony in the Malay World* (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea, 2000), vi; Damien Kingsbury, "Australia's Renewal of Training Links with Kopassus: A Critique," *SDSC Working Paper* 387 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National U, 2004); Jaap Timmer, "West Papua," *Contemporary Pacific* 16,2 (2004): 409–19.
151. Mark Dodd, "Licensed to Kill," *The Australian*, 19 December 2005.
152. Human Rights Watch, "What Did I Do Wrong?: Papuans in Merauke Face Abuses by Indonesian Special Forces" (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009).
153. "Elections: A New President is Elected," *Tapol Bulletin* 177, Nov 2004, accessed 10 Apr 2011, <http://tapol.gn.apc.org/bulletin/2004-177.html#elections>.
154. Matthew Moore, "Top Police Post for Timor Accused," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 2 December 2003.
155. Simpson, "Illegally and Beautifully," 305.
156. Ervin Staub, *The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, and Groups Help and Harm Others* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), 309, 318.
157. Helen Fein, ed., with Orlanda Brugnola and Louise Spierer, *The Prevention of Genocide: Rwanda and Yugoslavia Reconsidered* (New York: Institute for the Study of Genocide, 1994).
158. Kenneth Roth, "Foreword," in *Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide*, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton (Berkeley: U of California P, 2002), ix–xi, x.