

Book Reviews

Colonel Michael D. Kohn

Edward M. Roche
Henley-Putnam University

Keely M. Fahoum
Henley-Putnam University

David G. Popp
University of Leicester School of Law

Donald J. Goldstein
Henley-Putnam University

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss>



Part of the [Defense and Security Studies Commons](#)

pp. 81-96

Recommended Citation

Kohn, Colonel Michael D.; Roche, Edward M.; Fahoum, Keely M.; Popp, David G.; Goldstein, Donald J.; Iannucci, Stephen; and Roberts, Mark J.. "Book Reviews." *Journal of Strategic Security* 2, no. 1 (2010) : 81-96.

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.1.5>

Available at: <https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss1/5>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@usf.edu.

Book Reviews

Abstract

The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad by Steven K.O'Hern.

Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing by Tim Shorrock.

The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America by James Bamford.

Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership: A Practical Guide by Gary Berntsen.

Executive Measures, Terrorism, and National Security—Have the Rules of the Game Changed? by David Bonner.

The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture by Ishmael Jones.

The Lost Spy: An American in Stalin's Secret Service by Andrew Meier.

Threats to Homeland Security: An All-Hazards Perspective. Edited by Richard J. Kilroy, Jr.

Authors

Colonel Michael D. Kohn, Edward M. Roche, Keely M. Fahoum, David G. Popp, Donald J. Goldstein, Stephen Iannucci, and Mark J. Roberts

Book Reviews

***The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad* by Steven K. O'Hern. New York: Prometheus Books, 2008. ISBN: 978-1591026709. 292 pages. \$25.95 (hardcover)**

The Iraq War quickly evolved from a "shock and awe" battle into an insurgency. History tells us that effective counterinsurgency (COIN) requires good intelligence. With a war that has lasted six years, one must ask how good was the intelligence in Iraq? Not the pre-war intelligence about which war critics still complain, but, instead, the intelligence used in fighting the insurgents and other foes that arose after the fall of Baghdad.

In addressing this question *The Intelligence Wars* suggests the U.S. intelligence effort in Iraq yielded mixed results. The author boils down the answer and sets the mission for the book in two sentences: "While those who serve in the intelligence field are often unsung heroes, they are held back by a system that is defective and dangerous. That is the story of this book."

Author Steven K. O'Hern uses examples from his experiences as the director of the Strategic Counterintelligence Directorate, a hybrid intelligence unit in Iraq composed of personnel from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to illustrate his observations and criticisms. Although the book arises out of O'Hern's experiences leading a unit that conducted source operations against insurgents and conducting other counterintelligence operations, it is not a memoir. The book also relies on articles written by other Iraq War veterans to support his main points. The author explains intelligence operations against an insurgency in a way that is useful to practitioners and readers interested in current events.

A key argument of the book is that human intelligence (HUMINT) is underutilized and mismanaged because the military prefers technically based intelligence (satellites, intercepting phone calls, etc.) instead of recruiting spies. Intelligence officers and consumers of intelligence should be interested in the difference in attitudes regarding HUMINT. According to *The Intelligence Wars*, senior military intelligence officers rarely have practical experience in developing and using HUMINT while at the same time, professional journals and front-line veterans frequently declare that human intelligence is absolutely critical to fighting an insurgency. O'Hern contrasts the intelligence establishment's lip service about the importance of HUMINT with the actions of ground commanders who

Journal of Strategic Security

improvised and created intelligence operations that relied on human sources when intelligence assets didn't deliver the actionable intelligence that infantry commanders needed.

"Stovepipes," the tendency of intelligence units to up-channel but not share information across organizational lines, is another problem discussed by O'Hern. Many writers have described the failure to share information at the national level, but *The Intelligence Wars* describes those failures at the field level with vivid examples of how that failure affects the Iraq war effort. The book also provides examples of the bureaucratic culture of the intelligence community that stifles effective intelligence collection. The examples of stovepipes and red tape described by O'Hern will have a familiar ring to intelligence officers but will probably surprise the average citizen.

Active and former intelligence officers and those in training will appreciate the lessons of the chapters on human intelligence operations. O'Hern, a retired Air Force Reserve colonel who spent his military career as an investigator and counterintelligence officer, details what it takes to be a good source or asset handler. The advice is practical and would benefit those who handle sources and assets and senior officers who manage the handlers. Whether a veteran or new to intelligence, the direct writing style holds the reader's interest even when the book is describing the political situation in Iraq or details of recruiting and managing a source.

The Intelligence Wars is also the fullest account to date of how Iran introduced the explosively formed penetrator (EFP) weapon into Iraq, even surpassing the account in the Army's Combating Terrorism Center's report on Iranian strategy in Iraq released in October 2008. O'Hern describes how a conscious decision by senior U.S. military intelligence officers to ignore the threat posed by Iran in 2005 enabled the Iranian effort to train Shiite militiamen and import EFPs. The sophisticated attack on the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala, Iraq in January 2007 carried out by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies highlighted the earlier failure to aggressively deal with Iran's efforts.

In the final chapter of the book, O'Hern makes several recommendations to cure the problems described. Some will debate the effectiveness of his recommendations, but perhaps the most valuable aspect of *The Intelligence Wars* is its clear description of what one intelligence unit encountered in fighting an insurgency. As Bart Bechtel, a retired CIA Operations Officer (and Henley-Putnam University Assistant Chief Academic Officer) notes in the foreword, it is important to record both good

and bad observations to be read by those who will fight in the future. Officers and NCOs who do so provide the foundations for better decisions and leadership for the next generation.

This well-documented book is a must read for students of intelligence, counterintelligence, and human source operations, especially those who may deploy to war zones in the future. It describes the difficulties encountered in running a multi-agency intelligence organization in a war theater and also reminds us of the cost of such operations. The book is dedicated to nine U.S. Army soldiers and Air Force Office of Special Investigations special agents who died while serving in Iraq at the Strategic Counterintelligence Directorate or other assignments. Ironically, two were killed when an EFP struck their light armored vehicle during an intelligence collection mission.

Colonel Michael D. Kohn, USAF (Ret.)

***Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing* by Tim Shorrock. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008. ISBN: 978-0743282246. \$27.00.**

This book focuses on the outsourcing of intelligence and what the author terms the "Intelligence-Industrial Complex." In recent years, the intelligence community (IC) has increasingly relied on private companies not only to build its collection infrastructure but also to do its fundamental work of analysis.

Shorrock has uncovered a giant but secretive \$50-plus billion-dollar industry that has grown up servicing the IC. He argues that now our government is so dependent on private companies, there is no way to turn back.

He paints a picture that to some might be disturbing. The outsourcing industry gobbles up 70 percent of all intelligence spending. It is dominated by small number of elite super-firms ("primes"), followed by a second-tier group of smaller companies serving as subcontractors to these giants. The leading primes include such entities as Booz, Allen & Hamilton, CACI, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), BAE Systems, and Lockheed Martin. These companies are able to snag the massive multiyear contracts, and then in order to get the work done, squeeze the subcontractors. The "primes," therefore, are gatekeepers who exercise more power than they should.

Journal of Strategic Security

Shorrock views security clearances as more a source of economic power than as a true safeguard. In the highly classified world of intelligence, employees are vetted under DCID 6/4 (which ensures their spouse is not a foreigner) and given humiliating "full lifestyle" polygraphs that track their most intimate sexual practices. Cleared employees are at a premium, and accordingly demand premium salaries. More questionably, even security-background investigations are outsourced, sometimes to companies that will benefit financially from having their own employees cleared.

The amount of outsourcing may surprise some. Shorrock provides one example after another, leaving the reader with an appreciation of the extent of government dependency on these for-profit outsiders. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was built entirely by subcontractors, and despite the sensitivity of its work, it is more than one-half manned by private-sector employees. Likewise, more than half of CIA's entire budget is spent on for-profit contractors, and its "number of contract employees now exceeds the agency's full-time workforce of 17,500." NSA's "industrial base of contractors" in 2001 was 144 companies; by 2006, it was 5,400 companies. Eighty-five percent of the country's intelligence budget is spent by the Department of Defense, but at least "35 percent of the staff at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)...[are] contractors." For the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), in charge of "photoreconnaissance and eavesdropping satellites," a whopping 95 percent is outsourced.

For the companies, these opportunities have paid off. The growth rate of this industry consistently has been in the double digits. For example, "[b]etween 2002 and 2006, CACI...more than tripled its revenue, from \$564 million a year to nearly \$2 billion."

Shorrock attempts to undermine the fundamental assertions of the outsourcing lobby. The practice is supposed to be less expensive for the government, but the reality demonstrates otherwise. Salaries, for instance, are much higher on the outside. Why pay a person more than a million dollars annually when a government employee with the same skills gets around \$100,000? Shorrock provides numerous examples in which a government employee resigns from his job, then returns to the same desk the next day doing the same work—but as a private-sector employee pulling in a salary up to four times higher than before. In other words, the government trains while private enterprise reaps the benefit. Ultimately, outsourcing is not a low-cost solution, it is a high-cost solution, sometimes to levels that only charitably might be described as "abusive."

In addition, Shorrock describes as "disturbing" the emergence of revolving-door relationships. Before becoming Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell was making more than \$2 million per year as a vice president for Booz, Allen & Hamilton—a company for which James Woolsey, a former Director of Central Intelligence, serves as president. Shorrock gives many similar examples and suggests that as these individuals pass back and forth from government to industry, they are responsible for either handing out lucrative contracts to their former firms or using their pre-existing IC relationships to learn which contracts will be let and then exploiting this information to place their bids.

Shorrock's methods of research reflect a combination of his skills as an investigative reporter and the mistakes made by cleared individuals supposedly trained to keep their mouths shut. He discovered the highly secret IC budget not by digging up "leaks" from overly-talkative analysts, but because a spokesperson for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released the information on the Internet in a spreadsheet attached to a PowerPoint presentation.

A critic of Shorrock might argue that *Spies for Hire* goes too far by suggesting too many overtones of conspiracy. His view is that something is wrong with so much money passing through hands, and he sees the system as being grossly corrupt, a coven of thieves. The reality, however, is that many services, such as launching satellites, have always been performed by private companies under highly regulated government contracts, and that most subcontractors work on razor-thin margins more reflective of patriotism than profiteering. On the other hand, some of his criticism seems to hit home, particularly about salary inflation and inbred government-business relationships. Shorrock's most valuable contribution is that for the first time in print someone has pieced together a map of the companies that have taken over so much of the intelligence establishment.

The final chapter, "Ideology, Oversight, and the Costs of Secrecy," reviews a number of policy options being discussed to reform the acquisition process, wrest away power from the primes, and re-establish government control. Reform, says Shorrock, is crucial because in the IC, unlike lobbying in Congress, the high level of secrecy guarantees there is zero regulation. To that end, some observers are calling for a new wave of "insourcing" to reverse the tide. All are waiting to see what the next administration will do, if anything. Someone there will need to read this book.

Edward M. Roche is Research Professor of Intelligence Technologies at Henley-Putnam University.

Journal of Strategic Security

***The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America* by James Bamford. New York: Doubleday, 2008. ISBN: 978-90-385-52132-1. 416 pages. \$27.95 (hardcover).**

Only three books of substance have been written about the National Security Agency (NSA). All were written by James Bamford. This is his third. It is a must-read for anyone interested in the intelligence world.

Although *The Shadow Factory* covers much information already known about NSA, it also contains a few revelations that have generated news headlines (and a new suit by the ACLU). The controversy has centered around NSA's practice of eavesdropping on conversations between U.S. citizens in Iraq and their families stateside. These sometimes intimate and highly personal conversations not only were recorded, but were transcribed and stored forever in NSA's giant computer banks. Bamford argues that this policy broke U.S. law and places the blame on former NSA chief Michael V. Hayden, who became the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in May 2006. The litigation is pending and is certain to go on for years.

For those interested in the continuing debate over the Fourth Amendment and the right to privacy, these revelations take top billing. But *Shadow Factory* has more information, much more.

Bamford takes the reader on a *tour de force* of NSA's astounding technical accomplishments: computers, communications systems, complex databases, modeling algorithms, the list goes on and on. He reports that the amount of information being stored by NSA is growing by four petabytes per month. This is equivalent to adding "nearly one billion four-drawer filing cabinets full of documents...[or] twenty-four trillion pages of text" each year. He adds that NSA may start measuring its storage in exabytes (1,000,000,000,000,000 bytes)—which works out at about 8,000 Libraries of Congress. Bamford also discusses how NSA is building massive data-processing and intelligence-analysis installations throughout the United States. He observes that the agency's use of electricity at its original Fort Meade complex off Maryland Route 32 is so great it is straining the power grid of the entire region. In addition, he reviews how NSA scientists have been responsible for major breakthroughs in supercomputing, cryptography, and analysis.

This information is in sharp contrast to how petty bickering inside the intelligence community prevented capture of the 9/11 hijackers. The NSA for a long time had been listening in on a key al-Qa'ida safe house in

Yemen, but somehow the intelligence "dots" were never connected. When 9/11 happened, the NSA was getting its news not from its billions of dollars' worth of high-tech infrastructure spanning the globe, but from CNN. Indeed, at this perilous time, fearing an attack on its own Fort Meade facility, the NSA went so far as to evacuate its personnel.

It is easy to conclude that Bamford is a severe critic of the NSA. After all, he is a plaintiff in the ACLU's case claiming invasion of privacy. He says that the NSA is collecting massive amounts of information, but that "almost none of it is used."

Nevertheless, Bamford also reveals a different side. He describes the database-mining operations that are sifting through this ocean of data and picking out slim threads that lead to actionable intelligence. He notes that within three hours after the 9/11 attack, the NSA was already focusing on critical hijacker communications around the world. Bamford never argues that NSA should not be there, or that it is incompetent. He seems to recognize the critical role NSA plays, and the incomprehensible complexity of the information it handles. And he certainly has a substantial admiration for NSA's capabilities.

Instead, Bamford's complaint is about how NSA is used (or in the case of the hijackers, how the agency was not used). His criticism centers on the NSA leadership under General Hayden, of whom he paints a picture of a man too deferential to power, and who over-reacted to the terrorist threat and in a panic bypassed U.S. law.

After years of research, Bamford has a complex relationship to his subject. It is a relationship of fear, but also of admiration. His core message is that such a powerful tool must be used in the right way, consistent with our Constitution. It is only by remaining true to our founding principles that the United States can avoid becoming an Orwellian nightmare. On the other hand, behind its barriers of secrecy, when NSA is used correctly, it can be an indispensable and very powerful protector of the Republic.

Edward M. Roche is Research Professor of Intelligence Technologies at Henley-Putnam University.

Journal of Strategic Security

***Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership: A Practical Guide* by Gary Berntsen. Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2008. ISBN: 978-1-59797-254-3. 154 pages. \$19.95 (hardcover).**

National security and intelligence challenges have grown and changed significantly since September 11, 2001. Prior to that, U.S. policymakers and intelligence-community leaders were prepared to tackle more conventional opponents (such as post-Cold War Russia), but were not ready to deal with the loosely connected and largely franchised elements of al-Qa'ida (AQ) and other terrorist groups seeking to destabilize the U.S. and its forces operating overseas.

As the tactics and strategy of AQ and its affiliates have evolved, the American intelligence and counterterrorism community has struggled to keep up—let alone stay one step ahead—by relying less on Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and more on other tools in the intelligence arsenal. AQ and its sub-groups have in turn returned to traditional methods of communication and transferring money, materiel, and personnel to frustrate high-tech methods of detection and interception. For this reason, HUMINT henceforth might be a more optimal method of collecting threat information and deterring future attacks.

In *Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership*, Gary Berntsen, a retired senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer with over twenty years of experience, addresses these issues by arguing that the intelligence community requires a drastic shift in mindset and must reach out to human assets who can penetrate stateless terror networks.

During a recent publicity event at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., Berntsen unapologetically argued that the HUMINT and counterterrorism communities have failed to address the nation's interests. His hope was that the new President would rapidly familiarize himself with the intelligence and counterterrorism assets at his fingertips and would impose sufficient oversight within each organization to ensure synergy among all parties working towards the common goal of keeping Americans safe at home and abroad.

Berntsen's book also provides a basic overview of the intelligence community, describes how it is structurally organized, and discusses the role of the CIA, along the way pointing out the administrative, operational, and theoretical deficiencies standing in the way of the latter working efficiently. Elsewhere, he covers the importance of covert action and

demands that Washington elites take a stand on the subject one way or another to avoid legal confusion and needless delays. He asserts that the President needs an in-depth understanding of how the Clandestine Service works, in particular source handling and recruitment. He argues against the use of the polygraph as a screening tool for hiring personnel and claims it "does more harm than good" by weeding out the most valuable applicants to the Service: those with expertise and experience in Middle Eastern and Central Asian languages. One of Berntsen's more controversial recommendations is to end the ban on homosexuals serving in the military, especially if they serve in such a vital career field as linguistic cryptanalysis. He also recommends service academies make one of the Middle Eastern languages mandatory for its cadets while recommending that ROTC and other academy members spend at least a year in that region absorbing cultural, societal, and relationship norms. Berntsen emphasizes an aggressive stance with "enemy combatants" and pushes for more, not less, pressure on detainees.

Finally, Berntsen summarizes his suggestions as bullet points at the end of each chapter, making it easier for the reader to retain the most important points made. Usefully, he provides a reputable recommended-reading list to allow the reader to educate himself about subjects ranging from counterinsurgency to terrorism and U.S. foreign policy. He also includes a glossary and references to past CIA leadership.

Human Intelligence is a useful resource for those either not familiar or just becoming acquainted with the U.S. intelligence organizations and their role in counterterrorism. Berntsen uses his years of experience in the Clandestine Service to buttress his recommendations to improve HUMINT and counterterrorism efforts. It is certainly an excellent book for those just beginning their careers in these fields.

Where Berntsen falls short, however, is in his discussions of the Middle East, specifically the dynamics of secular versus non-secular governments in the Arab world, religious education, mending relationships between all levels of law enforcement and Muslim-American communities, and the true facts underlying prisoner exchanges between Israel and its neighbors. It is apparent that while Berntsen has extensive experience in the field, his academic expertise appears limited to operational and tactical HUMINT and counterterrorism. Consequently, he lacks theoretical or strategic-level acumen of the Middle East and Central Asia.

Journal of Strategic Security

Nevertheless, while Berntsen may not hold the foreign-policy credentials of a statesman, his real-world career in the Clandestine Service more than qualifies him to provide a framework from which to build better and more powerful HUMINT and counterterrorism organizations.

Keely M. Fahoum, is an instructor with Henley-Putnam University.

***Executive Measures, Terrorism, and National Security—Have the Rules of the Game Changed?* by David Bonner. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2007. ISBN 978-0-7546-4756-0. 388 pages. \$124.95 (hardcover)**

David Bonner, a law professor at University of Leicester School of Law, presents an in-depth assessment of the measures used by the British government to combat terrorism throughout the years, both at home and in the colonies. The author not only lists the attempts of the government to react to threats against the homeland, he paints a critical portrait of the effects those executive actions have on the human rights afforded citizens and inhabitants of the United Kingdom (U.K.) as guaranteed by domestic law, European Union (EU) treaties, and United Nations (UN) conventions and agreements.

Great Britain has a long history of common law, legislation, and judicial rulings to guide executive actions against terrorism, all of which are concisely presented by Bonner to build a base for understanding the "how" and "why" such measures are enacted. While the events of September 11, 2001, appear as a "benchmark" of sorts to separate modern actions from historical counterterrorism measures, the long history of terrorism attacks against the U.K on her home soil is also presented. The latter is an aspect often overlooked in contemporary works. Terrorist acts outlined date from before World War One, include World War Two, and continue until the recent "Troubles" in Northern Ireland. British colonial officials also combated separatist attacks after 1945 in Malaysia, Cyprus, and Kenya.

Such events, the executive measures utilized, their effects on terrorism, and just as important, their impact on human rights, are examined in a manner that both a layman and a professional can understand. The wide range of examples presented heighten the reader's understanding of terrorist events and the broader consequences of a "War at Home" on a population far better than the usual method of cataloguing the actions of a single group (such as al-Qa'ida).

Of particular interest to readers from the law enforcement and military communities is the attention paid to how terrorist acts affect the operations of both police and military intelligence. The author highlights the physical effects on military and law-enforcement assets owing to attacks and bombings. Also examined are the mental effects of terrorist penetration of intelligence services during indigenous operations.

Most assessments of the counterterrorism executive actions undertaken by the United States are limited to monographs in legal journals—ones written by legal professionals for their peers. The few assessments that appear outside of those journals are generic in nature and are, truth be told, of little use to the homeland-security professional. In contrast, Bonner's interpretation of British executive measures, and their effects on terrorism, homeland security, and the legal rights of British nationals, satisfies both the legal and the homeland-security communities while being admirably suited for academic and practitioner use.

David G. Popp is an advanced post-graduate student at the University of Leicester School of Law.

***The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture* by Ishmael Jones. New York: Encounter Books, 2008. ISBN: 978-1594032233. 350 pages. \$27.95 (hardcover)**

The Human Factor is not an ordinary "kiss and tell" memoir; neither is it like the flood of books blaming the intelligence community for the failures of 9/11, the second Iraq War, the rise of radical Islamism, and the spread of nuclear technology to such rogue states as Iran and Pakistan (should the latter fall victim to Muslim militants). It also is not a deeply analytical study of how these failures arose or how they could be prevented in the future. *The Human Factor* is instead an extended, self-reported psychological study of how at least some of America's "best, brightest, and bravest" have been systematically demoralized and driven quietly from public service.

Ishmael Jones is a *nom de plume* for a clandestine case officer in the most secret part of the CIA: the non-official-cover operatives, known as NOCs. These officers operate overseas without diplomatic immunity, often in the most dangerous assignments. If caught they are disavowed by the Agency, although they are often traded for foreign spies arrested in the U.S. NOCs lack the protection of international conventions covering the treatment of diplomats caught "spying" and can be tortured, imprisoned, or even exe-

Journal of Strategic Security

cuted. It would be an understatement to say that this is an inherently stressful job. Divorce, alcoholism, infidelity, and confusion about self-identity are standard hazards of the profession. As one former colleague of mine told me after his cover was blown and he had to seek other employment, "your entire life is a lie. You use your family, your assets/agents, your friends, and your colleagues all to persuade the citizen of another country to betray his homeland. His life is in your hands, but the *persona* that you reveal to him is a lie and you are supposed to remember which side you are working for."

Who is Ishmael Jones and is anything in the book verifiable? Except for some extensive quotations from the public record, much of it well-trod ground, the answer is No. This limits the utility this book might have had as an accurate guide to the real problems faced by the Clandestine Service and how they might be remedied.

Instead, we are left with what appears to be an anonymous book of gripes by an unhappy ex-employee. Yet the vividness of the narrative of Jones's career strikes a truthful chord when we compare it to other sourced and CIA-authorized accounts that are every bit as scathing of the intelligence community's shortcomings. Many of his stories, too, demonstrate a wry sense of humor in difficult circumstances and are quite amusing. As one wag said, "even if these stories aren't true, they ought to be." What we do know from the public literature is that the Agency has been the source of enormous, wasteful spending, poor accounting, sloppy security practices, and self-serving management. Jones gives us a rare bottom-up view of these problems, a welcome contrast to the more top-down academic critiques produced by college and university professors.

The biggest failure of the book is that Jones, writing at the end of his career, comes across as embittered, arrogant, self-serving, vengeful, and potentially violent. Even so, his story is a mandate for corrective action. For this we are indebted to him for baring his soul so publicly.

Unfortunately, Jones's self-professed aversion to virtually any kind of management (which he lambastes on almost every page) makes his proposals to reform Agency management practices of limited value. He admits that he never personally served in any senior management post. Therefore it is not surprising that he fails to connect the pressures that senior management faces to the operational frustration he and others are forced to endure. His lack of experience in the maelstrom of the Washington interagency process leaves him insensitive to the conflicts among intelligence agencies and between the intelligence community and the executive and legislative branches.

Worse, Jones gives carelessly short shrift to the value of technical means of collection, such as space-based assets, signals analysis, military collection, and the rest of the collection apparatus of the United States. This leads him to commit factual errors in the book, in particular his inaccurate allegations about the state of knowledge of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs—matters well-documented in the press critiques and the post-9/11 Congressional investigations.

Jones is right, nevertheless, when he states that heavy-handed management led to intelligence failures—but that is true of almost every large institution's failures. His suggestions for flattening management have already been implemented in the wake of criticism of the CIA restructuring in the wake of 9/11, although not as thoroughly as many would prefer. His notion of shifting all domestic-based intelligence to the FBI demonstrates his lack of understanding of how dysfunctional the *Bureau* is as an intelligence agency when it comes to foreign threats. The 9/11 disaster was ample proof of that as is the continuing bleed of vital technology information to Chinese intelligence operatives and agents in the U.S. His suggestion to shift foreign intelligence to the military is undercut by the tragic example of Pearl Harbor (which led, ironically, to the very creation of the CIA).

In conclusion, Jones has written an entertaining and instructive volume which has a definite place in the study of the intelligence process. Like every other study of what is inherently a secret business, however, it must be taken with several large grains of salt. It is a pity what happened to Jones. He and we deserve better. The numbers of stars in the foyer of CIA headquarters testify to the ultimate sacrifice of many brave and competent personnel—and we should be wary of failing to honor the "walking wounded" who too often suffer in vain.

Donald J. Goldstein is an adjunct Professor at Henley-Putnam University.

***The Lost Spy: An American in Stalin's Secret Service* by Andrew Meier. W.W. Norton and Company, 2008. ISBN 978-0393060973. 304 pages. \$25.95 (hardcover)**

Few people today are old enough to recall the American struggle with the anarchist and socialist movements of the early twentieth century. Andrew Meier's journey through Isaiah "Cy" Oggins's life as the son of Russian Jewish immigrants, as Ivy League student at Columbia University, and his

Journal of Strategic Security

eventually fatal attraction to the Left before 1914 aims to jog their memories.

Meier was not able to establish a sole motivation for Oggins's attachment to radical politics from his early adult years. There is no single defining event that makes him "turn" to Moscow. Nevertheless, it appears that Oggins was always fascinated by anti-government movements of various colors and subsequently became bewitched by espionage—and the intrigues that are part-and-parcel of an operative's life.

After Oggins married Russian-born Nerma Berman—a woman with a still more intense taste for radicalism than even her husband—there was no turning back. Disappointingly, Meier's extensive research cannot precisely identify the recruitment of Oggins and his wife into the Russian intelligence service. Most likely, his contacts at Columbia University initiated the introductions.

Meier discusses other interesting aspects of Soviet subversion, one particularly elaborate scheme being the wide-scale counterfeiting of U.S. currency. I should add that such counterfeiting of remains a serious problem today. International crime syndicates and at least one state-sponsored operation keep the United States Secret Service conducting investigations much as it did during the 1930s and throughout World War II.

Meier brilliantly frames for the reader the struggles of those tumultuous times alongside a biography of man, his family, and his ideals. That those very ideals would lead to his arrest and imprisonment (and murder) by his Russian friends was surely an irony at which even Cy Oggins might smile bitterly.

Stephen Iannucci is an instructor with Henley-Putnam University.

Threats to Homeland Security: An All-Hazards Perspective.
Edited by Richard J. Kilroy, Jr. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008. ISBN 978-0-470-07398-8, 381 pages. \$57.95 (hardcover).

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, self-proclaimed "experts" flooded the market with books and articles intended to establish their *bona fides* as homeland security or counterterrorism experts. Hastily written and rushed to press, some of these works were superficial and rehashed accounts of outdated doctrines. Many years later, self-professed "specialists" still issue books and articles offering panaceas to our

Homeland Security dilemmas. Although some of them are genuinely solid works with practical solutions, many are, at best, hack works. In welcome relief, *Threats to Homeland Security: An All-Hazards Perspective*, edited by Richard J. Kilroy, Jr., makes available to the truly interested reader a guide to help sort through the depth and breadth of the many elements that encompass the discipline known as Homeland Security.

Kilroy's anthology of essays is a well-constructed college-level textbook introduction to Homeland Security that smoothly provides a comprehensive framework, although any layperson seeking to better understand these issues will find the book a good foundation. Kilroy is a retired U.S. Army Intelligence and Foreign Area Officer (FAO) currently teaching International Studies and Political Science at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI). As editor, he brings in a number of academics from Southeastern universities—mostly East Carolina University (ECU)—to contribute chapters bound together topically.

The book provides a strategic framework and overview that serves as an umbrella under which to examine the many disciplines that comprise Homeland Security. Utilizing a decidedly non-linear approach, it weaves together the various facets of Homeland Security to show how the various components are interconnected. The book's method of presenting the material is intended to encourage critical thinking through the use of learning objectives for each section, "For Example" boxes throughout the book elucidate the material presented with historical case studies, as do pre-tests, self-checks to gauge comprehension, chapter summaries, definitions of key terms, post-tests, and practical exercises to give the reader/student many opportunities to apply what they've studied and read. The use of the now-neglected discipline of civics is laudable, as is the discussion of how to protect civil liberties/rights while trying to thwart those who would do us harm.

The book's approach is a non-partisan, holistic one covering a wide range of topics. In Chapter 1, John H. P. Williams (ECU) and Kilroy discuss the changing nature of national security, including the Cold War, the Post-Cold War era, and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In Chapter 2, Amy Blizzard (ECU) examines U.S. Homeland Security interests, including protecting people, infrastructure, the economy and our form of government. In Chapter 3, Kilroy provides an all-hazards perspective of natural and man-made disasters. Chapter 4 is Blizzard's conceptual framework for assessing threats, including analysis and risk management. Chapters 5 and 6 are Jeannie Grussendorf's (Georgia State University) respective examinations of state actors and terrorism and non-state actors and terrorism. Kilroy tackles cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare in

Journal of Strategic Security

Chapter 7. ECU's Alice Anderson deals with weapons of mass destruction in Chapter 8 and Daniel Masters (University of North Carolina at Wilmington) looks at domestic terrorism in Chapter 9. Carmine Scavo (ECU) closes the book with a discussion of enablers of mass effects, including information as a weapon, the media's role in the GWOT, the role of the Internet, and the role of educational institutions.

Overall, *Threats to Homeland Security: An All-Hazards Perspective* is a useful college textbook that can also guide the layperson towards a rudimentary understanding of the vastness of the many issues that comprise the various threats to our Homeland Security.

Mark J. Roberts currently serves with the Transportation Security Administration.