

The Geopolitics of Juan Perón: A New Order for an Imperfect World

by

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Dedication

To all the people and nations of the world.

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Abstract

In 1973, Juan Domingo Perón (1895-1974) proposed a new world order to the Non-Aligned Movement, shortly before returning to the Argentine presidency after eighteen years in exile. He was Argentina's most important modern figure but divisive. The military toppled Perón in 1955, and then outlawed him and Peronism. They considered his nationalism and authoritarian methods fascist nightmares, and United States officials passed similar judgments despite his victories in democratic elections. Today, his ideas continue to influence Argentina, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Vatican, yet, his authoritarianism and origins in a dictatorship taint his legacy. Influential media and scholars use him as a reference for a new nationalism that features populism, "me first" foreign policy, and the emergence of xenophobic governments in Western democracies. However, I argue that this misses the point—Perón enacted specific programs for specific contexts, but his core concepts transcend this and continue to offer practical solutions to problems related to development and imperialism today. He argued that the earthly satisfaction of all individuals and nations has a spiritual and material component, and that social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty can ensure them. I trace how he crafted a post-imperial vision over four stages in a decades-long analysis of a nation at odds with itself amid a contentious international context. As the colonial world order collapsed, he saw an opening for mass democracy to initiate an era of pacifist cooperation in which humanity could reach its full potential. This is a timely intervention in the study of Perón and Peronismo because the existing historiography often overlooks or ignores that his vision has value.

Introduction

The world must be structured in new ways, with new political, economic, and social content.

—Juan Perón, Speech on National Defense from the Military Point of View, June 1944

In 2019, Alberto Fernandez was elected president of Argentina, and with his victory, Peronism returned to power after a few years spent in opposition to the neo-liberal president Mauricio Macri. The different reinventions of Peronist leaders have been the most dominant political force in Argentina since 1945, when a mass movement asked for the release of Juan Domingo Perón (1895-1974), an army colonel who rose to the vice presidency in a nationalist military regime during the Second World War. However, he was incarcerated by his peers at the war's end and, shortly after his release, he won election to the presidency and would become Argentina's most important figure in the twentieth century. As Matthew Karush and Oscar Chamosa explain, the significance of Perón in Argentina's politics is hardly surprising since virtually "all accounts of Argentina's modern history have identified the first Perón regime, from 1946 to 1955, as the critical turning point" in the country's recent history.¹ He "transformed Argentina's economy, its social structure, and its political culture in ways that continue to shape Argentine reality."² For the purposes of this dissertation, I understand Perón as an intellectual who was looking for a metaphysical understanding of the nation that would help enable national

¹ Matthew B. Karush and Oscar Chamosa, eds., *The New Cultural History of Peronism: Power and Identity in Mid-Twentieth-Century Argentina* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 1–2.

² *Ibid.*, 2.

development in the tumultuous twentieth-century world. In his reckoning, society must value human life over material gain, and liberal individualism must give way to greater concern for the collective.

The historiography itself demonstrates Peronism's continued relevance. Since academic works on Peronism started in the 1950s with the sociological studies of Gino Germani and Torcuato Di Tella, followed by *Estudios sobre los Orígenes del Peronismo*, a classic book written by Miguel Murnis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, the abundance of material created a perception for some that "research on Peronism has been exhausted or that the subject is passé," in the words of Eduardo Elena.³ However, Elena also argued that, to the contrary, the study of Peronism "shows few signs of stagnation."⁴ Over the last twenty years, new publications have expanded beyond the traditional interest in the study of the working class that was associated with the history of Peronism to focus on new topics such as "the Peronist state and its methods of rule," the history of the Peronist Party, issues related to social assistance, and "histories of religion, commerce, the media, industries, and intellectual life, among other topics."⁵ Elena notes that as the result of this scholarly effort, "we have a far more nuanced understanding of the politics of Peronist rule. Rather than a smoothly running machine, the regime can be better seen as a constellation of state agencies, party organizations, and close allies---a concentration of forces marked by overlapping aims, partially realized projects, and internal rivalries."⁶ This kind of renovation has been a pattern in the scholarship produced on Perón and Peronism in the first decades of the twenty-first century.⁷

³ Eduardo Elena, "New Directions in the History of Peronism," *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 25, no. 1 (January 2014): 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 20-22.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁷ Guillermo Gasió, *El Vínculo de Unión: Ejército, Policía y Pueblo en los Orígenes del Peronismo* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Teseo, 2012); Valeria Manzano, *The Age of Youth in Argentina: Culture, Politics, and Sexuality from*

In relation to my dissertation, the most influential body of work has been the emergence of studies on the culture of Peronism. Elena notes that topics once "considered superficial or mere rhetoric" are now "lively sites of academy scrutiny."⁸ This opening of the field led to the combination of "cultural history methodologies" with greater awareness of "Peronism's presence in a different social and material context."⁹ Karush and Chamosa agree with Elena's characterization and insist that "there is a great deal more to be done. The structural determinism of earlier scholarship has been largely discarded, and scholars now appreciate the contingent political dynamics that helped shape the movement in its early days."¹⁰ They see a new direction in the field inspired by the influence of "new cultural history" that started to be relevant in Latin America by the end of the twentieth century.¹¹ While this approach has been less relevant among historians of Argentina, Karush and Chamosa edited a volume in 2010 about the *New Cultural History of Peronism* that applies "cultural history as a way of studying politics."¹² Their goal was to move "beyond a voluntarist understanding of the state by revealing how large cultural and commercial processes shaped specific policies."¹³ My work pursues the same objective.

My work follows in the footsteps of this kind of approach, but with a different topic and methodology in mind. I trace a specific aspect of Peron's thought that has been neglected by the new studies that have emerged over the last twenty years. I focus on how Peron's thinking about

Perón to Videla (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Natalia Milanese, "The Guardian Angels of the Domestic Economy: Housewives' Responsible Consumption in Peronist Argentina," *Journal of Women's History* 18, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 91-117; Mariano Ben Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón: A Cultural History of Perón's Argentina* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2003); Leandro Sessa, "Del APRA a FORJA y de FORJA al Peronismo: Reflexiones sobre las Redes del Aprismo en Argentina a través del Itinerario Político e Intelectual de Francisco Capelli," *Pluriversidad*, 2 (2018): 93-120; Gerardo Tripolone, "Perón, Schmitt y la Relación Entre Política y Guerra," *Revista de Reflexión y Análisis Político* 22, no. 1 (April-September 2017): 87-109; Nathan Widener, *Perón's Political Radio Melodrama: Peronism and Radio Culture, 1920-1955* (master's thesis, Appalachian State University, 2014).

⁸ Elena, "New Directions in the History of Peronism," 25.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁰ Karush and Chamosa, *New Cultural History of Peronism*, 10.

¹¹ Elena, "New Directions in the History of Peronism," 25.

¹² Karush and Chamosa, *New Cultural History of Peronism*, 10.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 13.

the world order evolved in the twentieth century as the nineteenth-century liberalism, which had been the foundation of modern Argentina, collapsed. Scholars have dealt with some related topics. For example, Federico Finchelstein has recognized how fascist ideological penetration and its local synthesis contributed to a pattern in which the coup of 1976 and the military's "Dirty War" (1975-1983) against the citizenry found some of their violent roots.¹⁴ Following on these kinds of studies, I recognize the importance of anti-imperialism, the Third Position, and the need to develop a post-liberal approach to international politics, but I approach these subjects differently. As Karush and Chamosa did with their topics, I do not consider Perón an intellectual who resisted and adopted ideas promoted by the most advanced countries, or a perfunctory military officer who did not question what he was taught. I consider that in the construction of his version of a new world order, he used his own experiences and the notions that circulated in his Argentine context, and how they could be related to the world as it underwent significant transformations during the Great Depression, the Second World War, the onset of the Cold War, and the Global Sixties. In brief, I take Perón as an example of how the identity of Argentina became intertwined with the international events that took place in the twentieth century.

What is Peronism?

Perón used three concepts as the guiding lights by which he reconfigured the nation and its politics in Peronism: social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty. Perón called this *socialismo nacional cristiano* (Christian "national socialism," which is not to be confused with Nazism, see footnote), and believed that applying these concepts to national

¹⁴ Federico Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 10; Federico Finchelstein, *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War: Fascism, Populism, and Dictatorship in Twentieth Century Argentina* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1-4.

circumstances would create a "perfect" balance among the nation's various interest groups.¹⁵ In his "Organized Community" social model, he called on Argentines to abandon individualism in favor of a corporative state structure to advance a more harmonious national functioning. In practice, *Justicialismo*, as he called Peronism, was an alliance between an authoritarian state and the lower classes, especially the working class.¹⁶ Given what he saw in Argentine society and the world during the Depression, he believed integrating the working class into the national life was required to prevent communism from gaining influence. His state removed communists from union leadership, grouped labor into an umbrella union, arbitrated in favor of labor in disputes with the capitalist sector, enacted a flurry of social reforms, and, as political opposition mounted, curtailed individual liberties. Health care, public education, and infrastructure were drastically improved and expanded to the entire nation. The government approved all foreign trade and rerouted "excess" profits into social welfare programs and the nationalization of vital sectors of the economy. His regime also obscured the differences between patriotism and nationalism in a program to indoctrinate society.¹⁷

I focus on Perón's application of his theory to Argentina's social order and how he thought about the international order as the world experienced significant changes during the twentieth century. His foreign policy was neutral, pacifist, and non-aligned, which he called the "Third Position," to highlight how its social model was neither capitalist nor communist. He

¹⁵ Perón's "national socialism" is not to be confused with Nazism, though at this time, Perón used vague terms to discuss socialism; James P. Brennan, ed. *Peronism and Argentina* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1998), 5. My interpretation is that Perón used this term to discuss various forms of governments that he believed corresponded to the will of the people in consideration of the unique circumstances of each nation.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 5-6; Mark A. Healey, *The Ruins of the New Argentina: Peronism and the Remaking of San Juan after the 1944 Earthquake* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 4-14; Ernesto Semán, *Ambassadors of the Working Class: Argentina's International Labor Activists and Cold War Democracy in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), 1-20.

¹⁷ Daniel K. Lewis, *The History of Argentina* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 100; Luis Alberto Romero, *A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, trans. James P. Brennan (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 104; Jill Hedges, *Argentina: A Modern History* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 124.

espoused the reorganization of domestic, regional, and global "units," or entities, that would dramatically reconfigure Argentina and how it fit into the world.¹⁸ He proposed that Latin America unite into a non-aligned continental-state, which would function as a defensively oriented power center capable of safely navigating the Cold War by disavowing liberalism and its geopolitical allegiances. In this scenario, the new bloc would shield the people of Latin America from capitalist imperialism, without succumbing to the equally imperialist Soviet model that Perón considered an overreaction to capitalist excesses.¹⁹

Liberals, especially socially conservative military leaders that favored laissez-faire trade policies, were concerned about Argentina's geopolitical placement in the world and Perón's military-like mobilization of Argentine society. They likened Perón and his "Third Position" to barbarism and a regression to Argentina's chaotic past.²⁰ Liberals believed his geopolitics would leave Argentina isolated, administratively weak, and likely to succumb to communism.²¹ In short, their liberal position was as irreconcilable with Perón's vision as it was with Marxism. Despite liberal objections and attempts to derail his project, Peronist Argentina was achieving results, and he won widespread national support when the gross domestic product and standard of living rose dramatically.²² However, Argentina also became an international pariah, thanks partly to United States efforts to discredit Perón as a fascist and his regime as totalitarian.²³

¹⁸ Juan Perón, *La Política Internacional Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: 1948) 3-13.

¹⁹ Juan Perón, speech at the Annual Armed Forces Comradeship Dinner, July 5, 1953, in *Perón Habla a las Fuerzas Armadas, 1946-1954* (Buenos Aires: Secretaría de Prensa y Difusión de la Presidencia de la Nación, 1955), 97-112.

²⁰ Pedro Aramburu, *La Revolución Libertadora: Discursos del Presidente Provisional de la República Argentina y del Vicepresidente Contraalmirante Isaac F. Rojas en 12 Meses de Gobierno* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Secretaría de Prensa de la Presidencia de la Nación, 1956), 80.

²¹ Aramburu, *Revolución Libertadora*, 53-54; José Antonio Sánchez-Román, "La Nación, Peronism, and the Origins of the Cold War in Argentina," *Culture & History Digital Journal* 4, no. 1 (2015): 1, accessed September 1, 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2015.004>; Hedges, *Argentina*, 117; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 99.

²² Hedges, *Argentina*, 122.

²³ Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 105.

Today, Perón and his ideology continue to influence a wide range of political thought. In an article published by the *Washington Post* in 2017, Dirk Moses, Federico Finchelstein, and Pablo Piccato describe Perón as a "former fascist" who turned into a populist authoritarian.²⁴ Perón was among a wave of populist leaders in the region that addressed social problems, but I complicate this by studying his foreign policy, which is where he excelled beyond this group. It must also be noted, that while some link Perón to the right-wing nationalism embodied by President Trump, others link him to Pope Francis, who conservatives see as troublingly left-wing.²⁵ The Pope himself cites Perón's influence on his ideas for social reforms and links this to the Liberation Theology that progressive young clergy promoted in Latin America starting in the 1960s.²⁶ In most of the region, advocates of Liberation Theology reconciled Christianity and Marxism, while in Argentina, this movement associated itself with Perón the anti-communist, and Peronism.²⁷ Diana Tussie and Pablo Heidrich described Nestor Kirchner, the former Argentine president who partnered with Hugo Chávez in Latin America's post-neoliberal order in the early 2000s, as part of the Peronist party that was able "to go from the historical populist

²⁴ A. Dirk Moses, Federico Finchelstein, and Pablo Piccato, "Juan Perón Shows How Trump Could Destroy Our Democracy Without Tearing It Down," *Washington Post*, March 22, 2017.

²⁵ Sara Schaefer Muñoz and Mercedes Alvaro, "Pope's Social Message Puts Him on Tricky Terrain in South America," *Dow Jones Institutional News*, July 5, 2015; Uki Goñi, "The Peronist Roots of Pope Francis' Politics," *New York Times*, August 12, 2015; David Luhnow, "Latin America Worries About 'Trumpismo'; Donald Trump's brand of authoritarian populism carries echoes of strongmen, such as Hugo Chávez and Juan Perón," *Wall Street Journal*, March 18, 2016; "What Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin have in common: Beyond satire," *Economist*, March 23, 2016; A. Dirk Moses, Federico Finchelstein and Pablo Piccato, "Juan Perón Shows How Trump Could Destroy Our Democracy Without Tearing It Down," *Washington Post*, March 22, 2017; Benedict Mander, "Peronism on a Roll after Papal Blessing: Argentina, Opposition rebound Healing of Divisions Spurred by the Pontiff Boosts Party Ambitions for Return to Power," *Financial Times*, August 20, 2019; "Poverty, priests and politics: the FT's explanation of the return of Peronism," *CE Noticias Financieras*, English ed.; Miami, October 10, 2019; "The Pope, Peronism and the Use of the Poor," *CE Noticias Financieras*, English ed.; Miami, November 24, 2019.

²⁶ Uki Goñi, "The Peronist Roots of Pope Francis' Politics," *New York Times*, August 12, 2015; Benedict Mander, "Poverty, priests and politics: why Peronism is back in Argentina," *Financial Times*, Oct 10, 2019.

²⁷ Juan Perón, letter to Juan García Elorrio, March 1, 1970, in *Cristianismo y Revolución* 4, no. 23, (April 1970): 4; Michael Dodson, "Priests and Peronism: Radical Clergy and Argentine Politics," *Latin American Perspectives* 1, no. 3, Argentina: Peronism and Crisis (Autumn, 1974), 68; Juan Perón, carta a los Sacerdotes del Tercer Mundo, August 1970, in *Obras Completas XXV Tomo I* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1997), 133-135; Hedges, *Argentina*, 190; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 186; Michael A. Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland: Religion and Politics in Argentina* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 111.

nationalism of Perón to the neoliberal right-wing policies of (former president) Carlos Menem."²⁸ These contrasts should make us think about how it was possible to be a fascist in the 1940s and, with the same ideas core ideas, emerge in the 1960s as a youth leader of a faction of the radical left, only to be resurrected as an influence at the peak of neoliberal rule in the 1990s, and then again in Latin America's "Pink Wave" rejection of neoliberalism with Kirchner. The answer to this question is at the core of this thesis, and in my chapters, I analyze the influences and transformations that led to Peron's post-liberal, postcolonial, and post-imperialist thinking.

Historical Context

The Argentine context that Perón developed in was that of a promising country in the interwar years, one which first stagnated and then fell into decline. The material gain and liberal individualism that he rejected were dominant paradigms during Argentina's rise to prominence that began toward the end of the nineteenth century. By 1910, Argentina was in a *belle époque* and boasted the world's fourth-highest gross domestic product, a boom that occurred in an export-based economic model that was common in the region and liberal free-trade policies. Putting Argentina's vast stretches of undeveloped land and abundant resources into use was critical to this development.²⁹ However, an oligarchy of wealthy landowners took shape by 1880, and when they were not visiting their "summer" homes in places like France and England, they used their political power to ensure their continued prosperity with little concern for society in general.³⁰ A look beyond the streets of the affluent center of Buenos Aires at this time, the so-

²⁸ Diana Tussie and Pablo Heidrich, *Post-Neoliberalism and the New Left in the Americas: The Pathways of Economic and Trade Policies* (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 37.

²⁹ Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America, 4th ed.* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), 74-77; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 53-54; Hedges, *Argentina*, 28-40.

³⁰ Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 66-67; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 4; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 80.

called "Paris of Latin America," would reveal widening social divisions. Poor preparation for rapid urbanization resulted in the emergence of *villas miserias* (misery villages), areas where recent arrivals improvised shantytowns with whatever materials they could scrounge.³¹ Since the late-nineteenth century, massive waves of European immigration arrived the clashed with Argentina's traditional *gaucho* (cowboy) culture, while the indigenous peoples who survived the genocidal "Conquest of the Desert" (1878-1885) campaigns found themselves excluded from the national life.³² Argentina was a wealthy, stagnating, and socially divided country. Its economy suffered after the First World War, and the military, trained in nineteenth-century Prussian military thought, was called upon to repress postwar socio-economic agitation.³³

Regarding the international order, which Perón regularly analyzed, the Latin American context in which he initially developed was dominated by British and United States imperialism. Argentina was considered an "informal" part of the British Empire due to the neo-colonial relationship that existed between the two. Argentina came to rely on this single market, and a

³¹ Juan Perón, interview by Enrique Pavón Pereyra, in Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Yo Perón* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Sudamerica, 2018), 55; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 13.

³² Hedges, *Argentina*, 28-29; Tulio Halperín-Donghi, *The Contemporary History of Latin America*, trans. John Chasteen (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 188-189; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 70-71; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 6-8, 16, 19-21; Alain Rouquié, *The Military and the State in Latin America*, trans. Paul E. Sigmund (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 86; Augusto Bunge, *El Ideal Argentino y el Socialismo* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Librería de La Vanguardia, 1916), 24; Ariel de la Fuente, "'Civilización y Barbarie': Fuentes para una Nueva Explicación del Facundo," *Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana "Dr. Emilio Ravignani,"* 3, no. 44 (Primer Semestre 2016): 143; Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, *Conflicto y Armonías de Las Razas de América* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: D. Túniz, 1883), 19; David Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History, and Its Impact* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 44-45, 58-59; Ricardo Rojas, *La Restauración Nacionalista: Informe Sobre Educación* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ministerio de Justicia e Instrucción Pública, 1909), 71; Martha Ruffini, "'Hay que Argentinar la Patagonia': Miradas sobre la Nación y la Ciudadanía en Tiempos de Cambio, 1916-1930," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 68, no. 2, (July-December 2011): 660.

³³ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 66; Hedges, *Argentina*, 38-39; George Pope Atkins and Larry V. Thompson. "German Military Influence in Argentina, 1921-1940," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 4, no. 2, (November 1972): 257-258; Robert A. Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), 3-4; Rouquié, *Military and the State in Latin America*, 79-80; Ernesto López, *El Primer Perón: El Militar Antes Que El Político* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Capital Intelectual S.A., 2009), 31; Enrique Dick, *La Profesionalización en el Ejército Argentino (1899-1914)* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 2014), 115.

consistent stream of British ships carried its natural resources back across the Atlantic.³⁴ Most of Latin America aligned with the United States, especially after the First World War, but many nationalists and anti-imperialists in the region argued that this alignment came as a consequence of being trapped in a condition of semi-colonial subjugation.³⁵ In places like Cuba, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, relations with the United States were closer to colonialism. The United States began to respond to these criticisms as the 1930s approached with the "Good Neighbor Policy," which built economic domination through softer neo-colonial structures.³⁶

The onset of the Great Depression created significant changes that impacted political thought in Argentina, Latin America, and the rest of the world. When the retraction of foreign trade hit the export-based economy, the Argentine oligarchy secured its position with the help of the military, who overthrew the populist government that struggled to withstand the financial hurricane. The "Infamous Decade" (1930-1943) ensued, which was marked by the oligarchy's corruption, fraud, and reliance on political repression, and this clarified that international issues

³⁴ A. G. Hopkins, "Informal Empire in Argentina: An Alternative View," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 26, no. 2 (May, 1994): 469-484; David Rock, "The British in Argentina: From Informal Empire to Postcolonialism," supplemental issue, *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 27, no. 1 (2008): 49-77.

³⁵ José Martí, "Nuestra América," *Revista Ilustrada* (New York), January 10, 1891; José Enrique Rodó, *Ariel*, 1900, [FundaciónBiblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes](http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/ariel--0/html/fedf72f8-82b1-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_2.html), accessed September 8, 2019, http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/ariel--0/html/fedf72f8-82b1-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_2.html; Rubén Darío, "El Triunfo de Caliban," 1905, Biblioteca Virtual Universal, 2003, accessed September 8, 2019, <http://www.biblioteca.org.ar/libros/155.pdf>; Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 12; José Santos Zelaya, *The Revolution of Nicaragua and the United States* (Madrid, Spain: Bernardo Rodríguez, 1910), 7; Manuel Ugarte, "The Future of Latin America," (Lecture, Columbia University, New York, NY, 1912); Salvador R. Merlos, *América Latina Ante el Peligro* (San José, Costa Rica: Impr. de G. Matamoros, 1914), 6; Roberto Domenech, *Méjico e El Imperialismo Norte Americano* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: La Leonesa, 1914), 118-119; Manuel Ugarte, *El Destino de un Continente* (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Mundo Latino, 1923), 2-3; Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in American Imperialism* (New York, NY: B. W. Huebsch and the Viking Press, 1925); Lucio Moreno Quintana, *El Sistema Internacional Americano* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Facultad de Derechos y Ciencias Sociales, 1925), 222.

³⁶ Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 214-215; Grace Livingstone, *America's Backyard: the United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror* (New York, NY: Zed Books, 2009), 8-9; Lars Schoultz, *In Their Own Best Interest: A History of the U.S. Effort to Improve Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 9.

affected local realities.³⁷ The global decline in trade led to discussions about new economic models, and some capitalists took the opportunity to develop the internal market through import substitution industrialization, which led to the growth of the working class.³⁸ However, the emerging labor sector lacked effective political representation or organization, and while Argentina's economy staged a recovering, worker's wages fell.³⁹ The debate about Argentina's direction in these years of global change created a split between "liberal" and "nationalist" military leaders. While nationalists favored protectionist economic policies and rejected a perceived peripheral position in the Western order, liberals promoted the continuation of the traditions they believed had made Argentina prosperous.⁴⁰ The rise of new nationalistic ideologies like fascism and Nazism complicated matters because both systems gained adherents among populaces looking for a new form of governance as liberal models around the world floundered.⁴¹ As the Depression gave way to the Second World War, concerns grew in

³⁷ Donald C. Hodges, *Argentina 1943-1987: The National Revolution and Resistance* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), 19-24; Patricia Marchak, *God's Assassins: State Terrorism in Argentina in the 1970s* (London, UK: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 51; David Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 214-217; Francisco Cantú and Sebastián M. Saiegh, "Fraudulent Democracy? An Analysis of Argentina's 'Infamous Decade' Using Supervised Machine Learning," *Political Analysis* 19, no. 4, (2011): 409-433; Gerardo Della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor, "Economic Recovery from the Argentine Great Depression: Institutions, Expectations, and the Change of Macroeconomic Regime," *The Journal of Economic History* 59, no. 3, (1999): 567-599.

³⁸ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 65-68, 88; Hedges, *Argentina*, 88; Joel Horowitz, ed., *Argentine Unions, The State & the Rise of Perón, 1930-1945* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1990), 28; Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 11; Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, 232.

³⁹ Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 16-17, 28; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 66-67; Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 11; Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, 233.

⁴⁰ Michael Goebel, *Argentina's Partisan Past: Nationalism and the Politics of History* (Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 10-11, 17; Robert A. Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1980), 216; Deborah L. Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 119-120; Daniel C. Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War": An Intellectual Biography* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1991), 44-45; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 63, 101-102; Hedges, *Argentina*, 51-52, 67; Paul H. Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals: The 'Dirty War' in Argentina* (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2002), 23-24; John W. Green, *A History of Political Murder in Latin America: Killing the Messengers of Change* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015), 116; Alberto Spektorowski, "The Ideological Origins of Right and Left Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1943," *Journal of Contemporary History* 29 (1994): 162.

⁴¹ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 96; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 60-61; Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 42-43; Goebel, *Argentina's Partisan Past*, 98; Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War"*, 33; Jo McConahay, *Tango War: The Struggle for the Hearts, Minds, and Riches of Latin America during*

Washington, D.C., about South America's susceptibility to Nazi subversion. Government officials linked this suspicion to the effects of Nazi propaganda in Europe, decades of German military instruction in South America, and the emergence of fascist and quasi-fascist movements with the related use of public spectacle in countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.⁴²

The Argentine Army executed a coup in June of 1943, as the United States pressed Argentina over its continued neutrality and a left-wing political coalition, *Unión Democrática*, consolidated, which military nationalists claimed might spark a civil war.⁴³ After the nationalist faction ensured its control in the new regime, Perón rose to the vice presidency, where his proposal became public record and official policy. He used his power to create a program of social reform and harnessed nationalist populism, which culminated in his democratic rise to the presidency in 1946.⁴⁴ A wide range of influential political and business figures in the United States and Argentina characterized him as fascist, and he was made a pariah in the region, which hindered his foreign policy vision.⁴⁵ By this time, it was clear that the United States had transitioned from hemispheric hegemony into a global superpower, and it had a different future in mind for the world. Policymakers in Washington concluded that, given the world's increased

World War II (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2018), pt. 6, loc. 24-38, Introduction, Kindle; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 115; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 159-160; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 232-233.

⁴² Ronald C. Newton, *The "Nazi Menace" in Argentina, 1931-1947* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), xvi; Uki Goñi, *Perón y los Alemanes: La Verdad sobre el Espionaje Nazi y los Fugitivos del Reich* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ed. Sudamericana), 1998, 30-34, 121; Max Paul Friedman, *Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin America in World War II* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 56-57; McConahay, "The Fight for Southern Skies," in, *Tango War*, loc 84-340, Kindle.

⁴³ Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU), "G.O.U. Bases," in Robert A. Potash, *Perón y el G.O.U.: Los Documentos de una Logia Secreta* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Sudamericana, 1984), 26; GOU, "GOU Coordinador 14," in *ibid.*, 157; GOU, "La Situación Internacional Argentina," in *ibid.*, 193; GOU, "Situación Interna," in *ibid.*, 198-199.

⁴⁴ Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 93; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 140; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 95; Hedges, *Argentina*, 82-84.

⁴⁵ US Secretary of State, Telegram to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics Except Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia, June 22, 1944, 835 01/335a: Circular Telegram; US State Department, Top Secret for the President from Stettinius, Edward Stettinius, Jr., MR-OUT-253, February 23, 1945; US Office of Strategic Services, New Trends Toward Totalitarianism in Argentina: January-February 1945, M. & A. Number 2965, March 10, 1945.

interconnectivity, as demonstrated by the Depression and the war, it needed a new model.

Perón's nationalist vision and authoritarianism contrasted with the ideal of "free trade among free nations" that the Western allies were advancing for a new postwar order. This also involved dismantling the European empires and the colonial order, which would become a much-contested process.⁴⁶

The Soviet Union also had a universalist vision for the world, and the Cold War began to take shape with tensions that frequently centered around the decolonization process. Under the Soviet system, a backward agricultural state transitioned into an industrial powerhouse, destroyed the Nazi war machine, and became a superpower within three decades. This point meshed with the frustration many nations felt after decades of unfulfilled promises for development in the capitalist order, which resulted in a new openness toward the socialist development model in the postwar era that also promised equality and social justice.⁴⁷ Struggles for independence and desires to establish sovereign states outside of the capitalist order became entangled with the East versus West dynamic of the Cold War, which often intensified both. Southeast Asia became a focal point of this drama when communists vied for power throughout much of the region. After China established a socialist government in 1949, the United States adopted a policy of containment to stop the hemorrhaging of nations out of the capitalist order. Then the Korean War broke out in 1950, which threatened to escalate into another world war, this time with the devastating capabilities of nuclear weapons.

⁴⁶ David Rock, ed., *Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 30, 46, 51-52; Alan McPherson, *Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America since 1945* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006), 11; Benn Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Wood: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 1-2; Eric Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 10-13, 16; María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo, *The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the Age of Development* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 19-21.

⁴⁷ Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 1-21.

Anti-imperialists in Latin America, who had decades of intellectual precedent, linked their aspirations for development and disdain for neocolonial structures to the struggles against the empires taking place in the colonies.⁴⁸ However, Washington considered the region safely within its sphere of influence, while it also recognized that access to its resources was pivotal as the Cold War became a global affair. To ensure Latin America remained in the capitalist order, the United States consolidated its position as the hemispheric leader by sponsoring a series of military treaties, sending aid to compliant governments, and the establishment of a new international forum, the Organization of American States.⁴⁹ Nationalist regimes in the region were ostracized at the behest of the United States, and, in 1954, its Central Intelligence Agency orchestrated a coup against the democratically elected government in Guatemala due to fears in Washington that a left-wing nationalist government there was becoming a "communist bridgehead" in the region.⁵⁰ As the Cold War intensified, Perón remained defiant toward Washington and pursued a strategy to integrate Latin America and consolidate a non-aligned coalition of sovereign states as a "Third Position" outside of the bipolar world order.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Harry E. Vanden, "Imperialism," in *José Carlos Mariátegui: An Anthology*, ed. Harry E. Vanden (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2011), Adobe PDF eBook; Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 117-119; Jairo Agudelo Taborda, *Debates sobre Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo* (Bogotá, Colombia: Escuela Latinoamericana de Cooperación y Desarrollo, 2012), 22-23; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 50-52; Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 3-4; Dietmar Rothermund, *The Routledge Companion to Decolonization* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 270-271; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 39-40; Edward E. Rice, *Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 66; Teresa A. Meade, *A History of Modern Latin America: 1800 to the Present* (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2011), 350-351; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 247-248; Robert J. C. Young, "National Liberation Movements," in *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2016), Adobe PDF eBook; Young "Marxism and the National Liberation Movements," in *ibid.*

⁴⁹ Livingstone, *America's Backyard*, 23-38; Schoultz, *In Their Own Best Interest*, 8-11.

⁵⁰ Stephen Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 42-49; Livingstone, *America's Backyard*, 26-28; Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 16-17; Patrick Iber, *Neither Peace Nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 99-100; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 146-148; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 392; Meade, *History of Modern Latin America*, 441.

⁵¹ Juan Perón and Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, *Mensaje a Los Pueblos de América de los Presidentes Peron e Ibáñez, Afirmación de un Destino Común* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, 1953), 32-

However, during Perón's administration, political opposition from influential minority groups mounted, and he fled into exile after the military overthrew him in 1955. However, the coup did not dramatically affect popular support for Peronism, which remained the nation's largest and most organized political movement. Army liberal Pedro Aramburu (1903-1970) used dictatorial authority to restore Argentina's traditional social organization, free-trade policies, Western liberalism, and, critically, he committed the nation to the network of United States-led military treaties. His regime intended to erase the "fascist" Perón and his "foreign," "barbaric" ideas from Argentina's psyche to ensure that neither he nor his supporters would endanger the nation again.⁵² In 1957, the military government encountered a new expression of imperialism that it would use to consolidate Argentina's realignment and ensure that neither Peronismo nor any other emancipatory ideology could change this. The French military trained the Argentine military on French Counterinsurgency (FRCOIN) theory, which dichotomized political challenges. FRCOIN theory held that those seeking to enact changes that fell outside of the political parameters that the "standing order" would accept were now seen as "terrorists" working on behalf of a Soviet/Russian plot for world domination, while those fighting to sustain the standing order became heroes of Western civilization.⁵³

The French dichotomy related to France's status as a struggling imperial power, the process of decolonization, and the bipolar tensions of the Cold War. The French government resisted national liberation movements to various degrees. The most intense location of French

33; Juan Perón, *Mensaje del Presidente de la Nación Argentina General Juan Perón al Inaugurar el 89º Periodo Ordinario de Sesiones del Honorable Congreso Nacional: Conceptos Doctrinarios* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Secretaría de Prensa de la Presidencia de la Nación, 1955), 54.

⁵² Aramburu, *Revolución Libertadora*, 12; Joseph S. Tulchin, *Argentina and the United States* (New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1990), 111; Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 5; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 265; Hedges, *Argentina*, 170; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 115; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962*, 228-230.

⁵³ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (1961; repr., Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1985), 5, 16, 113-115.

resistance was in Algeria, where the military fought a Muslim nationalist movement that hoped to end over a century of colonial domination. The officers who fought against Algerian independence were the dichotomy's primary architects, and they conflated their loss in Indochina, to communists guerrillas who leveraged aspirations for national liberation to gain popular support, with the non-communist nationalist movement in Algeria.⁵⁴ The Argentine military synthesized this communist-nationalist conflation to its rejection of Peronism, which resulted in them viewing the domestic political situation as part of a global war against communism.⁵⁵

The French were not alone in their efforts to preserve their "standing order." Scholarly recognition that the Cold War brought a contentious edge to the process of decolonization has contributed to the reframing of this period as the Global Cold War.⁵⁶ The recent declassification of often scandalous documents in Western States has fueled numerous investigations into the counterinsurgencies as practiced by specific countries. The British, Portuguese, Belgians, and Dutch all engaged in brutal counterinsurgencies around the world in attempts to prevent the

⁵⁴ Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare From Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964), 25-29; Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (1977; repr., New York, NY: New York Review of Books, 2006), 168; Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 99; Martin Evans, "Undeclared War 1945–59," in *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 78, Adobe PDF eBook; Douglas Porch, *The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force* (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 570.

⁵⁵ Daniel Mazzei, *Bajo el Poder de la Caballería: El Ejército Argentino, 1962-1973* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Eudeba, 2012), 131-142; Eric Stener Carlson, "The Influence of French 'Revolutionary War' Ideology on the Use of Torture in Argentina's 'Dirty War,'" *Human Rights Review* 1, no. 4 (2000): 71; Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War,"* 95; Marnia Lazreg, "Algeria as Template: Torture and Counter-Insurgency War," *Global Dialogue* 12, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 1-10; US Department of State in Buenos Aires, "ARA Monthly Report: The 'Third World War' and South America," Harry W. Schlaudeman, July 1976.

⁵⁶ Westad, *Global Cold War*, 4-5, 99; Brands, *Latin America's Cold War*, 1-10; David Engerman et al, eds., *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 1-15; Joao Martins Filho, "Military ties between France and Brazil during the Cold War, 1959-1975" *Latin American Perspectives* 41, no. 5 (September 2014): 167-183; Aldo Marchesi, *Latin America's Radical Left: Rebellion and Cold War in the Global 1960s* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1-12; Amitav Acharya, "Idea-shift: How Ideas from the Rest are Reshaping Global Order," *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 7 (July 2016): 1156-1170.

dismantling of their colonial empires.⁵⁷ However, a growing body of literature is being developed that reveals that counterinsurgency was a coordinated international response and a vital arm of imperialism. This includes studies that analyze how counterinsurgency efforts continued in the post-Cold War era, especially concerning the "War on Drugs" the United States has pursued in Latin America.⁵⁸ Recent scholarly works on counterinsurgency, and the responses to it, have reframed counterinsurgency as a phenomenon that occurs along a North-South axis, which coincides with the emergence of a growing body of work that helped transition the traditional East-West narrative of the Cold War toward the Global Cold War view.⁵⁹

The United States' inconsistent responses to ideological challenges complicated its claim that it was the leader of the "free" world. It funded French efforts in Indochina in the early 1950s, overthrew the democratically elected nationalist government in Iran in 1953, then supported national liberation in Algeria in the late 1950s, before deploying troops to fight in Vietnam in the 1960s. In Latin America, Washington's efforts to prevent a "communist bridgehead" in the hemisphere failed when the Cuban Revolution, which took power as a nationalist movement in

⁵⁷ Marguerite Feitlowitz, *A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1-11; Bart Littikhuis and A Dirk Moses, *Colonial Counterinsurgency and Mass Violence: The Dutch Empire in Indonesia* (London, UK: Routledge, 2014); Deane-Peter Baker and Evert Jordaan, *South Africa and Contemporary Counterinsurgency: Roots, Practices, Prospects* (Claremont, South Africa: UTC Press, 2011); John P. Cann and Bernard E Trainor, *Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974* (Solihull, UK: Helion & Company Ltd, 2012); Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History* (New York, NY: Zed Books, 2002), 224-229.

⁵⁸ Frederick H. Gareau, *State Terrorism and the United States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on Terrorism* (Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, Inc., 2004), 1-12; Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 1-20; Geoffrey Till, *The Real "Long War": The Illicit Drug Trade and the Role of the Military* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2013); Jonathan D. Rosen, *The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2014), 1-12.

⁵⁹ Laleh Khalili, *Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counter-Insurgency* (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); Craig L. Arceneaux, *Bounded Missions: Military Regimes and Democratization in the Southern Cone and Brazil* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 1-20; David J. Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (Brunswick, Australia: Scribe Publications, 2013), 1-16; Melanie Anne Collard, "From Algeria to Argentina: The Transfer of the French Savoir-Faire in the Making of Official Torturers" (PhD diss., King's College, London, 2014, 1-15; Fernando López, *The Feathers of Condor: Transnational State Terrorism, Exiles and Civilian Anti-Communism in South America* (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 32-91.

1959, aligned with the Soviet Union two years later. The experience prompted tighter state security measures throughout Latin America. However, the success of guerrilla warfare in Cuba inspired many frustrated, radicalizing leftists to adopt the armed struggle as a path to political power. It also prompted the United States to engage in numerous counterinsurgency efforts in the region, which it executed with little regard for human rights in the process.⁶⁰

Scholars see the unrest in Latin America in the 1960s as part of the "Global Sixties," a term that reflects two recent historiographical developments. The "long decades" periodization recognizes that historical phenomena do not correspond to traditional calendar divisions, while scholars have increasingly investigated the influence of transnational links in history. The long 1960s is synonymous with increased political activism around the world and, frequently, brutal state responses. In this regard, 1968 is the most noted, including the May student revolt in Paris, Vietnam War protests, the "police riot" at the Democratic National Convention in the United States, the Tlatelolco Massacre in Mexico City, and social protests that escalated in Poland, Yugoslavia, and especially Czechoslovakia's "Prague Spring."⁶¹ However, examples of related political unrest in the world started before 1960 in places like Cuba. They also continued after 1969, as was the case in Argentina and several other Latin American states, where political violence related to calls for socio-economic change continued into the 1970s and beyond. Access to new archives since the Cold War ended, and the digital transfer of countless documents, has spurred the development of this field. Scholars have used this access to expand our

⁶⁰ Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 5; Stephen Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 1-3; Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, The United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 46-49; Schoultz, *In Their Own Best Interests*, 216-271.

⁶¹ Marchesi, *Latin America's Radical Left*, 1-20; Eric Zolov, "Introduction: Latin America in the Global Sixties," *The Americas* 70, no. 3 (January 2014): 349-362; Jonathan C. Brown, "To Make the Revolution: Solidarity and Divisions among Latin American Guerrillas in the 1960s," *Asian Journal of Latin American Studies* 28, no. 1 (2015): 1-25.

understanding of the multi-level approach of military training, military aid, secret deployments of troops, and support for dictatorships that Washington used to defend capitalism.⁶² Archives run by various private organizations provided access to the "other side of the story" that proved critical to my project.

Access to new and existing archives Argentina and the United States, as well as with sources recently made available online, helped me see how many sides came into contact during these global struggles, and how this affected Perón's reading of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. He linked Argentina's struggles against the military and its harsh methods to ongoing struggles of various sizes and intensities against the status quo in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the rest of the Americas. In this context, he publically called his supporters to arms in 1968 in what he framed as a global push for change, and they responded, while various non-Peronist leftists also organized to confront the state.⁶³ A downward spiral of political violence and military responses ensued, which Perón frequently analyzed in interviews and articles intended for public consumption as he mounted an improbable political comeback against a dictatorship that defended free-trade policies.⁶⁴ The military finally relented after their heavy-handed methods created widespread opposition that manifested in riots, labor agitation that forced the economy to its knees, and the emergence of numerous guerrilla movements.⁶⁵

⁶² Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: US Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1992), 161-363; Livingstone, *America's Backyard*, 39-49; Rabe, *Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 1-3; Grandin, *Empire's Workshop*, 46-49; Schultz, *In Their Own Best Interests*, 216-271.

⁶³ Juan Perón, *Hora del Pueblos* (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Norte, 1968), 142-143; María José Moyano, *Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969-1979* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 23; Richard Gillespie, *Soldiers of Perón: Argentina's Montoneros* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1982), 56-60.

⁶⁴ Juan Perón, interview by Carlos María Gutiérrez, "Perón and his Concept of the Argentine Revolution," *Marcha*, February 27, 1970, in *Obras Completas XXV Tomo I*, 27-39; Juan Perón, "Un Mundo Nuevo Se Nos Viene Encima," *Panorama*, June 30, 1970, in *ibid.*, 69-74; Juan Perón, interview by Miguel Pérez Gaudio, "Justicialismo es un Socialismo Nacional Cristiano," *Aquí y Ahora*, December 1970, in *ibid.*, 79-84; Juan Perón, interview by Emilio Romero, "Diez Años en España," December 1970, in *ibid.*, 85-90; Perón, Interview by Francisco Cornicelli, *Bases*, April 22, 1971, in *ibid.*, 101.

⁶⁵ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 180-182, 188; Hedges, *Argentina*, 180-181, 187-188;

Political negotiations ensued to define what Perón's return and the restoration of democratic politics would look like, and guerrilla violence continued to escalate to ensure the dictatorship kept its word.⁶⁶ The military wanted Perón to face the political chaos, which they believed would require him to take extreme measures that would destroy the "myth" of Peronism.⁶⁷ However, when Perón returned to power in late 1973, he was already seventy-eight and suffered from health issues that had developed during his eighteen years in exile. He died within months of taking office, and political tensions piqued over the following years as revolutionary violence gripped the nation. The military seized power once again in 1976 and waged a French-counterinsurgency style "Dirty War" on the citizenry in an attempt to forever rid Argentina of "subversive" Peronist and Marxist thought, which resulted in thousands of dead and "disappeared," global repudiation, and a wound on the national psyche that remains open.⁶⁸

Argument, Methodology, and Scope

I argue that, when we pay attention to all these events together, instead of as separate issues, we can understand how Peron developed as a thinker and the originality of some of his ideas. This is a long-term study of how his ideas about the strategic organization of the world evolved in a period that included the decline of old empires after the First World War, the destruction of liberal capitalism after the 1929 crash, the Second World War, the emergence of bipolar global superpowers and their efforts to dominate the reordering of the outgoing colonial

James P. Brennan and O. Pianetto, *Region and Nation: Politics, Economy and Society in Twentieth Century Argentina* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 219-220; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 131; Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 15.

⁶⁶ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 180-182, 194-196; Hedges, *Argentina*, 187-188, 193-195; *Cristianismo y Revolución* 4, no. 30 (September 1971), 9, 13; Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 16; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 131.

⁶⁷ Alejandro Agustín Lanusse, *Confesiones de un General: Memorias* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Planeta Espejo de la Argentina, 1994), 164.

⁶⁸ Junta Militar, El Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, March 24, 1976, Document A4-00-00-08-01-00-002, EDIFICIO CÓNDOR Archive, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

order, decades of decolonization wars, and the revitalization of emancipatory movements in the 1960s. This dissertation is an global intellectual history that engages the cultural and geopolitical circumstances that Perón worked in to enrich the historiography with an analysis of how he developed and adapted his anti-imperialism over time. As with any intellectual, Perón made decisions with incomplete information and made mistakes in an imperfect process, which is especially apparent in some anti-Semitic beliefs that he asserted during the latter stages of his life. What makes his case interesting, other than his remarkable political odyssey, was his ability to synthesize specific aspects of various ideologies and schools of thought to his vision, while ignoring others, which helps explain why he, more than any peer, became such a complicated, inspirational, and enduring yet controversial symbol. By expanding the scope of analysis from the early twentieth century through to 1973, I recognize a historical arc to Perón's anti-imperialism that the historiography overlooks.

I argue that Perón's development as an influential anti-imperialist and national development thinker progressed through four distinct phases. This is a new periodization of Peronism that helps us understand his geopolitical vision and historical legacy. These phases are: the formative years (1911-1930), the militaristic era (1931-1941), the non-aligned pacifist era (1942-1955), and the more radical post-coup stance that appealed to a new generation of Argentine nationalists. I use this delineation to explain how Perón analyzed at the national, regional, and global levels, and adjusted his thinking in relation to the changes he saw. I argue that the shifts he made were based on his cultural context, military analysis, skill as a historian, interpretation of zeitgeist, egalitarianism, and spiritualism. He saw the latter two in terms of his interpretation of Christianity and secular humanism, and used them as guidelines for creating a better tomorrow. Perón's emancipatory vision matters because of the symbolic power of his

legacy, his accurate predictions related to the processes at work during the Cold War, and because of the points he raised that remain relevant today, which I address in the conclusion.

As a military thinker who specialized in the study of international power dynamics, I argue that Perón was an original and first-rate analyst of international events and their impact on Argentina, Latin America, and the world at large. At a time when many nations were picking sides in the Cold War, Perón espoused neutrality, pacifism, and non-alignment in a "Third Position" that would be neither capitalist or communist. However, this was not to be confused with an isolationist model in that he sought to expand Argentina's foreign trade. He believed that states should forge trade deals with a spirit of brotherly cooperation. In particular, he believed that Argentina should engage in mutually beneficial trade within its region, which would help reduce the impact of imperialist pressure and the vulnerabilities of single-market economic dependency. His position was unpopular with United States government officials, but widely supported in Argentina, and tied to the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War. I argue that the plasticity of his ideas is what explains his durability among various ideological orientations. It was his methodic adaptation to world changes that also makes his ideology malleable to present circumstances. His thought was rooted in the fragility of the international order, and his constant adaptation gave multiple meanings to his ideas. In my analysis, he synthesized his efforts to renew national development in Argentina to the creation of a harmonic world order, which was a remarkable turn.

This is an extremely important contribution to the new wave of studies on Peronism because, as is evident in the recent works mentioned above, very few pay attention to Perón and Peronism as it relates to the international perspective of what we now call Global History. For example, studies on the Non-Aligned Movement typically do not mention Perón, though some of

his ideas are manifested in its composition. This is unfortunate because he presented these ideas to global audiences, such as when the British Broadcasting Corporation aired his 1947 speech on "Economic Cooperation and World Peace" and his address to the 1973 Conference of Non-Aligned States.⁶⁹ In this regard, the intersection of intellectual, cultural, and global history allows us to create a different way to understand international exchanges that is more than a study of policies of diplomatic efforts, since it reflects on the intimate aspects of Perón's social and cultural life, the result of these experiences, how they shaped the world he saw, and the relationships that they created.

I believe that this type of study will be more common in the future and that it is already surfacing in relevant new works. For example, in 2018 an article that entangles Argentine and Egyptian history through the figures of Perón and Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) was published. The author, Lily Pearl Balloffet, concludes that "Argentine people and politics were influential in the Egyptian revolutionary project" because they offered "a discursive model, intellectual base and demonstration of Global South solidarity with Egypt." She traces "lines of transmission and influence in the realm of political theory and praxis made possible by pre-existing traditions of anti-imperial activism and through diasporic networks linking South America to the Arabic-speaking Eastern Mediterranean."⁷⁰ My dissertation presents the other side of this coin because it traces the specific nature of Perón's anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and unique brand of emancipatory practices, and how he related them to the

⁶⁹ Juan Perón, *Por la Cooperación Económica y la Paz Mundial* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Subsecretaría de Informaciones, 1947), 5-15; Juan Perón, *Actualización Política y Doctrinaria para la Toma del Poder* (video lecture, Cine Liberación, Madrid, Spain, June, July, and September of 1971), published in digital print in (Buenos Aires, Argentina: El Ortiba, 2006), accessed January 31, 2020, http://www.elortiba.org/old/pdf/peron_act.pdf; Juan Perón, Message read in Perón's name at the 4th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers, Algeria, September 7, 1973, in *Perón: Discurso Completos* (San Isidro, Argentina: Megafón, 1987), 61-76.

⁷⁰ Lily Pearl Balloffet, "Argentine & Egyptian History Entangled: From Perón to Nasser," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 50, no.3 (August 2018): 576.

formation of a new world order that would end the suffering inherent to underdevelopment and the practices of foreign oppression.

Structure

To explain my argument, chapter one analyzes the ideas circulating in Perón's context during his formative years, which was the first phase of his anti-imperialism. I start with his most direct experience, which was that of a career officer in the Argentine Army. I then expand to the national, regional, and global contexts. Perón frequently used this pattern to explain his ideas, which is to say he emphasized the connectivity of these contexts that increasingly defined the times in which he lived. This involved meshing existing research on the early-twentieth-century Argentine Army with new archival research, including analysis of military personnel records and the publications that Perón's peers, mentors, and other notable contemporaries produced.

Perón's direct context as an army officer was critical because this is where he absorbed the lessons of Prussian military theorists as they were delivered to him by the German military instructors that Argentina's government hired to professionalize the army.⁷¹ Divergence from their instruction, which was both nationalist and imperialist, was not tolerated. My research also provides new examples of how Prussian theories influenced or overlapped with ideas in the military journal articles, military school theses, and civilian sources that circulated in Perón's context. Perón also developed his ideas in response to his Argentine and Latin American culture, where the nationalism that informed German instruction meshed with existing regional manifestations that were based on anti-imperialist thought that sometimes included militaristic notions. The German, Argentine, and Latin American lines of thought all emphasized the

⁷¹ Rouquié, *Military and the State in Latin America*, 76; Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 258-265; White, *German Influence in the Argentine Army*, 5-6; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945*, 3-4; López, *Primer Perón*, 31.

importance of harnessing the potential of the youth, a notion that would stay with Perón throughout his life.

Chapter one ends with the start of the second phase of Perón's anti-imperialism, in which he proposed a national development model that was the product of his years of military training, archival research, and personal experiences. During his professorship at Argentina's top military training institute, the *Escuela Superior de Guerra* (ESG, Superior War School), from 1930 until 1936, he taught future leaders of the Argentina military his vision for national development, which was, confusingly, both imperialist and anti-imperialist. He explained to his students how a militaristic national development model could create a new regional power center, something which many believed South America needed to oppose United States imperialism. He argued for a coordinated social, economic, and political program to transition Argentina into a military power, so that it could build the prestige required to lead the region in the imperialist world order of the interwar years. Chapter Two examines how he updated his vision in the late 1930s. He did so in response to the rise of fascism and the new imperialist competition between the United States and Axis powers in Latin America, which exacerbated existing rivalries to the point that various permutations of regional warfare looked likely as the Great Depression began giving way to the Second World War. In this confusing period, some of his pre-existing notions overlapped with aspects of fascist ideology, but also clashed with others. He maintained a militaristic vision for development, which was tied to the ideological uncertainty and geopolitical strains that were important to his profession as an expert on national defense.

Chapter three follows Perón's entrance into the third phase of his anti-imperialist thought, which was a period of sweeping change in his thinking that corresponded to domestic, regional, and global developments during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. In this

period, Perón transformed from a military theorist writing and teaching within this domain to a public figure whose speeches began to draw attention not only in Argentina but also in the United States. The narrative begins with Perón's assignment to Italy in 1939, where he analyzed Mussolini's regime in action. He returned to Argentina in early 1941 with what was a controversial conclusion in his professional context. Though the swastika flew over much of Europe and the Third Reich seemed invincible to many, Perón informed the general staff, all trained by Germans like himself, that despite the undeniable gains fascism was making it did not fit Argentina's circumstances. As the war developed, Perón continued his analytical reflection to arrive at a model that corresponded to his nation's unique conditions.

In 1943, with the United States building airfields in neighboring Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, Perón led a group of colonels in the overthrow of Argentina's corrupt liberal order. Part of his plan was an effort to form a regional power center by creating a coalition of states to resist imperialism, but he was outranked and lacked the influence or power to realize his goal in the military government. However, Perón rapidly rose in stature within the nationalist regime and became vice president in 1944. In his capacity as a national leader, Perón publicized his opinions on the future. His vision continued to propose national development as a defense against imperialism, which reflected his belief that the United States would represent a more serious threat than ever after the war. In 1944, he promoted economic cooperation with neighboring states to reduce Argentina's exposure to imperialism and introduced important modifications for his vision in the postwar context that he would promote for the rest of his life. He argued that the world must modify its existing social, economic, and political structures to reduce the emphasis on materialism, or imperialist competition between the materialist doctrines of the United States and the Soviet Union would potentially start another world war. He campaigned for president on

a platform of social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty, which would be at the heart of a non-aligned "Third Position" for national development that rejected and avoided the bipolar conundrum.

The fourth chapter analyzes how Perón's third phase of anti-imperialism achieved full maturity during the Cold War, as presented in writings, a global radio broadcast, and presidential speeches from 1946 until his overthrow in 1955. He championed a new model of anti-imperialist national development and advocated, to Argentina and the entire world, a program of pacifist non-alignment, which marked a substantial departure from his militaristic past. He linked Argentine and Latin American aspirations for development in the face of Cold War imperialism to the process of decolonization by characterizing all developing nations as pawns of imperialisms in the superpowers' geopolitical chess match for world domination. He argued that due to Latin America's abundant resources and political division, the region would become enslaved unless it learned to rely on itself by creating a new, defensive, multi-state coalition capable of resisting imperialism. He believed that this process must correspond to popular wills of the nations involved and argued that economic cooperation would help build this will. He held that when the other nations of Latin America saw the increased rates of development in the integrated region, they would naturally seek to join the union in a process he believed must eventually culminate in the formation of the "United States of South America." In his reckoning, giving the people what they desired—peace and prosperity—was the lynchpin to achieving freedom and development. However, the military's 1955 coup against him brought the third phase of his anti-imperialist vision to an abrupt halt.

Chapter five analyzes Perón's post-coup anti-imperialism, which was the fourth and final stage of his progression. It looks at speeches, correspondence, books, films, and other media

related to the liberal restoration in Argentina, the global emergence of emancipatory and revolutionary politics in the Cold War, and Perón's geopolitical analysis during his years in exile. For eighteen years, the Argentine military, dominated by liberals, refused to allow open democracy because they knew it would mean Perón's return. I argue that Perón's new geopolitical views and his proposal to align Argentina outside the Western sphere ranks among the most significant aspects in the causal hierarchy of factors that led to the military's stance. They adopted an imperialist worldview that positioned Peronism as part of a communist plot for world domination. In response, Perón related liberal intransigence against his nationalist movement to the imperialist backlashes against social movements taking place around the world in the 1960s and saw the brutal methods used to preserve the status quo at home and abroad as a linked imperialist effort to prevent humanity's political and social evolution. Domestically, he embraced radicalized youth and the armed struggle as components that would contribute to the restoration of a social justice order in Argentina. He envisioned himself, perhaps reluctantly, as the leader required to channel the nation's vigor toward this goal. This would enable him to restore Argentina's Third Position policy, which he now viewed as a global anti-imperialist movement that had manifested in the Non-Aligned Movement and increased socio-political upheaval in both the capitalist and communist orders. Perón concluded that wide-ranging integration in developing regions and collaboration among those regions could consolidate a new world order defined by social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty. This completed his transition from an anti-imperialist military thinker, who responded to national and regional concerns, to a post-imperialist thinker with a universal vision for world peace.

Chapter One

The Roots of Peronism, 1910-1934

Juan Domingo Perón (1895-1974), who would go on to be Argentina's most important twentieth century figure, spent the majority of his life trying to update Argentina's understanding of what a nation was and how it might prosper in a tumultuous world. Throughout his life, he adjusted his ideas based on his interpretation of new circumstances in a changing world. He enrolled in the military in 1911, and spent the next decades witnessing the global slugfest between imperial powers, while his nation and region suffered from imperialist aggression as well. His efforts began in earnest in the early 1930s while he was assigned to the *Escuela Superior de Guerra* (ESG, Superior War School) in Buenos Aires, Argentina's top military academy. In this chapter, I argue that as Argentina suffered through the initial impact of the Great Depression, he professed a new way to his students as the training institute. Perón was a gifted theoretician and professor, and he selected specific ideas to advance after analyzing them in relation to new contexts, rather than merely absorbing and regurgitating ideas he had encountered and the training he received. I trace the influence of domestic and transnational ideas, along with consideration of realities that were relevant to his context, and analyze how he applied them as he developed a new national development model that would make Argentina capable of succeeding in the world's imperial order. I argue that the militaristic yet anti-imperialist model he advocated was the first expression of his popular, but controversial, future ideology: Peronism.

German Instruction and Life in the Argentine Army

Perón was born in 1895 and spent the majority of his childhood in Argentina's southern Patagonia region. Interviews with Perón and his military evaluations indicate that he had the makings of a proper army officer who was a bright student and enjoyed reading, which his father encouraged. Perón displayed martial prowess in the rugged terrain of Patagonia. His father gave him a rifle around his eighth birthday, which he used on hunts with local indigenous boys.¹ His mother had indigenous bloodlines, and some of his hunting buddies may also have been his cousins.² His parents instilled him with a sense of egalitarianism and respect for people from various economic and ethnic backgrounds, a trait that would remain central to his thinking throughout his life.³

Perón moved to cosmopolitan Buenos Aires, the epicenter of Argentina's *belle époque*, in 1910 to study medicine. His father, a reserve army officer and the son of a doctor, recommended this path.⁴ When Perón arrived in the capital, the city was celebrating the centennial of the 1810 May Revolution that initiated Argentina's struggle for independence from Spanish colonial rule. The patriotism on display had an impact because Perón and some enthusiastic friends left public school to begin army officer training.⁵ He gave his oath of service to the nation on March 1,

¹ Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *El Hombre del Destino* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Abril Educativa y Cultural, 1973), 18-19; Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando, 1895-1942* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Espiño, 1952), 27; Juan Perón, interview by Torcuato Luca de Tena, in Torcuato Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón: Relato Autobiográfico* (Barcelona, Spain: Editorial Planeta, 1976), 20.

² Perón, interview by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 21; Juan Perón, interview by Enrique Pavón Pereyra, in Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Yo Perón* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Sudamerica, 2018), 23; Juan Perón, "Memorias 1," in *Obras Completas 25 Tomo 1* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1988), 48.

³ Pavón, *Hombre del Destino*, 1; Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 25; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón* 28-29; Juan Perón, interview by Tomás Eloy Martínez, in Tomás Eloy Martínez, *Las Memorias del General* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Planeta, 1996), 21.

⁴ Perón, interview by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 30; Perón, interview by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 20; Pavón, *Hombre del Destino*, 1-2.

⁵ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 31; Perón, interview by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 21; Pavón, *Hombre del Destino*, 18.

1911, and volunteered for the rigors of infantry life.⁶ As remains common among infantrymen throughout Western militaries, he glorified the *esprit de corp* of the infantry, calling it the "Queen of Battle."⁷ His experiences scouting the wilds of Patagonia prepared him for the austere conditions of field exercises. He was an army fencing, boxing, and skiing champion who also excelled in hand-to-hand combat and gymnastics.⁸ However, according to early evaluation reports, his real talents were in instruction and command.⁹

Yet, Perón's enlistment almost never happened. Many policymakers in Buenos Aires subscribed to the idea that the indigenous and those of mixed-heritage were "savage" and "semi-savage," respectively, and unfit for an officer's commission.¹⁰ Latin America's first classic, *Civilización y Barbarie* (*Civilization and Barbarism*), embodied this. This book was written by the former Argentine President Domingo Sarmiento (1811-1888), who emphasized that the culture of civilization was indelibly linked to national development and proposed that Argentina was at a crossroads. He argued that the nation must choose "to be or not to be savages," which he saw as a "struggle between European civilization and indigenous barbarism."¹¹ He characterized the mixed-blood *gauchos* (cowboys) of Argentina's interior regions as vestiges of the colonial

⁶ Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires.

⁷ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 46.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 41, 45; Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida Para el Mando*, 34, 88-89; Perón, interview by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 31; Juan Perón, letter to Commander of 2nd Company, 1924, Archivo Perón Vence al Tiempo, accessed September 11, 2019, <http://www.peronvenceal tiempo.com.ar/peron/cartas-de-peron/463-carta-a-cdte-2o-compania-1924>.

⁹ Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires.

¹⁰ Alain Rouquié, *The Military and the State in Latin America*, trans. Paul E. Sigmund (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 86; Augusto Bunge, *El Ideal Argentino y el Socialismo* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Librería de La Vanguardia, 1916), 24; Ariel de la Fuente, "'Civilización y Barbarie': Fuentes para una Nueva Explicación del Facundo," *Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana "Dr. Emilio Ravignani,"* Tercera Serie, Núm. 44 (Primer Semestre 2016): 143; Sarmiento would first consider the indigenous savage and the gaucho semi-savage, in *Facundo*, 28, but would change his opinion to see this condition as a cultural development state rather than racial state in book published later, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, *Conflicto y Armonías de Las Razas de América* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: D. Tüñez, 1883), 19.

¹¹ Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, *Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism: the First Complete English Translation*, trans. Kathleen Ross (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 35, 59.

past and "Christian savages" who rejected progress.¹² He argued, "the principal element of order and morality upon which the Argentine Republic relies today is the immigration of Europeans."¹³ Sarmiento called for opening Argentina's borders to European immigration and its waterways, which would help with the development of its vast lands.¹⁴ Waves of hopeful European immigrants, predominantly from Italy and Spain, came to find prosperity.¹⁵

Historian Ariel de la Fuente explains that the "civilization and barbarism" perspective that Sarmiento advanced was a common and enduring sentiment, especially among the powerful cosmopolitan elites of Buenos Aires.¹⁶ Its influence motivated a series of genocidal campaigns, known as the "Conquest of the Desert" (1878-1885), to clear the indigenous from Argentina's untamed reaches and government-subsidized European immigration to help develop the land.¹⁷ However, cohabitation and miscegenation during the period of Spanish rule meant that many *criollos*, Argentina's long-standing inhabitants, as opposed to recent European immigrants, had indigenous bloodlines. This was especially true in frontier territories like Patagonia, the home of Perón's mother.¹⁸ He hid his indigenous heritage to join the officer corps, but the lesson was clear: Argentina was a divided nation.¹⁹ He knew that other, patriotic Argentines, friends with physical signs of mixed heritage and his indigenous hunting partners, were barred from the

¹² *Ibid.*, 51.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 248.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹⁵ Jill Hedges, *Argentina: A Modern History* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 28-29; Tulio Halperín-Donghi, *The Contemporary History of Latin America*, trans. John Chasteen (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 188-189; Daniel K. Lewis, *The History of Argentina* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 70-71; Luis Alberto Romero, *A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, trans. James P. Brennan (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 6-8.

¹⁶ Sarmiento, *Facundo*, 68-69; Fuente, "Fuentes para una Nueva Explicación del Facundo," 135-136.

¹⁷ Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 138; Hedges, *Argentina*, 22; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 160.

¹⁸ Pavón, *Hombre del Destino*, 2; Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 18; Perón, interview by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 20; Perón, interview by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 20.

¹⁹ Perón, interview by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 21-22; Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida Para el Mando*, 18; Family history was also important, as at this time becoming a military officer was still associated with being from a family of good standing.

officer corps. This personal experience would intersect with the military training he received regarding national unity, which will be covered shortly.

Nationalism was surging during the Centennial Celebrations of 1910, which exposed more social division in Argentina. David Rock notes a rise in anti-Semitism after an anarchist of Russian and Jewish descent killed a Buenos Aires police chief.²⁰ Rock and Historian Luis Romero discuss how gangs of men called "good boys" combed city streets looking for foreigners to accost during the celebrations.²¹ A nationalist Argentine journalist Ricardo Rojas (1882-1957), who was influential with several student associations and whom historian Mariano Ben Plotkin places amid a surge of nationalist writers, wrote *La Restauración Nacionalista (The Nationalist Restoration)* in 1910, which was published by the government.²² In this text, Rojas rejected the policy of mass immigration on the basis that European liberal cosmopolitanism was dissolving Argentina's national character, which, quite the opposite of Sarmiento's ideals, he associated with *gaucho* and indigenous culture.²³ Rock notes that Rojas espoused establishing "patriotic education" for children and that Catholic nationalists hoped to "spiritualize" a "society corrupted by materialism."²⁴ Plotkin notes that the National Education Council responded with a program of "patriotic education" that aimed to inculcate patriotism in the offspring of recent immigrants.²⁵

Upon joining the army's officer corps, Perón's received instruction at the *Colegio Militar*, the training academy for junior officers, that was founded on the nationalistic Prussian-German

²⁰ David Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History, and Its Impact* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 58-59.

²¹ Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 55; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 17.

²² Richard J. Walter, "The Intellectual Background of the 1918 University Reform in Argentina," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 49, no. 2 (May 1969): 237-238; Mariano Ben Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón: A Cultural History of Perón's Argentina* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2003), 7.

²³ Ricardo Rojas, *La Restauración Nacionalista: Informe Sobre Educación* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ministerio de Justicia e Instrucción Pública, 1909), 71; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 44-45; Martha Ruffini, "'Hay que Argentinizar la Patagonia': Miradas sobre la Nación y la Ciudadanía en Tiempos de Cambio, 1916-1930," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 68, no. 2, (July-December 2011): 660.

²⁴ Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 56.

²⁵ Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 4.

(PG) school of military thought.²⁶ Alain Rouquié and Carlos Camacho note the Argentine government, as well as others in the region, invited German instructors in response to the lessons of the Triple Alliance War (1864-1870), in which Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil confronted Paraguay, and the War of the Pacific (1879-1884), which pitted Chile against Peru and Bolivia.²⁷ Rouquié explains that military leaders concluded that victory in the contemporary era required a national effort, which made national organization critical. Argentine leaders, along with many in the West, considered the German military to be the foremost experts in this field after their triumph in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) and Germany's rise as a formidable nation.²⁸

Scholars indicate that most Western militaries incorporated elements of the PG system into their own, including conscription, trained reserves, the composition of the general staff, professional military education, organization, and tactics.²⁹ PG theories were appealing because they advanced a new understanding of the "nation." According to Azar Gat, an authority on the history of Western military thought, their approach was unique because PG thinkers sought to

²⁶ Azar Gat, a historian of Western military thought, explains that the early founders of PG school fought in the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), to include: Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), Georg Heinrich Berenhorst (1733-1814), Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755-1813), Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher (1742-1819), and Constantin von Lossau (1767-1848). Numerous officers continued this school, to include: Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1891), Karl von Bülow (1846-1921), Friedrich von Bernhardi (1849-1930), and Colmar von der Goltz (1843-1916). Azar Gat, "The Reaction against the Enlightenment: A New Perspective on Military Theory," in *A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 141-157 and Gat, "The German Military School: Its World-View and Conception of War, 1815-1914," in *ibid.*, 314-381.

²⁷ Rouquié, *Military and the State in Latin America*, 77-78; Carlos Camacho Arango, "Síntesis y Perspectiva de los Estudios de Transferencias Militares Europeas en Suramérica, 1890-1940," *Revista de Historia Iberoamericana* 4, no. 2 (2011): 44.

²⁸ Rouquié, *Military and the State in Latin America*, 76-77; Perón mentioned to his biographer Pavón that Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Paraguay had German instructors, while Brazil, Colombia, Nicaragua and "other countries" received French instruction, Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 50.

²⁹ Gat, *History of Military Thought*, 314; Rouquié, *Military and the State in Latin America*, 77-84; French instructors were used in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, while Germans worked in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru (after the First World War), and Chile. Only the armies of Chile and Argentina were strictly Prussian-led, and the Argentine Navy, though it had a German naval attaché, linked itself with the British, who had helped found the organization, George Pope Atkins and Larry V. Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina, 1921-1940," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 4, no. 2, (November 1972): 259; Deborah L. Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 120; Camacho, "Síntesis y Perspectiva de los Estudios de Transferencias Militares Europeas en Suramérica," 43; German instructors also helped reform and modernize the militaries of Japan and the Ottoman Empire, Elizabeth B. White, *German Influence in the Argentine Army, 1900-1945* (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991), 2-3.

become Europe's hegemonic power in the age of imperialism. He argues that their theories originated in the German rejection of certain Enlightenment ideals, a belief that Germans were racially superior, and the calculated practice of *Realpolitik*.³⁰ Prussian leaders linked the state, the military, and the people into a unified and focused expression of national power, and they got results.

Regional tensions, suspicions, and ambitions also motivated professionalization in South America. Scholars note that Argentine leaders worried that Brazil and Chile might ally against Argentina. Chile started receiving German military instruction in 1890, which gave them a jump on professionalization but also created concerns about Chile's potential territorial ambitions.³¹ Similarly, Brazil and Chile questioned Argentine ambitions, and an arms race ensued.³² Scholars explain that Argentina's government hoped German instruction would help them survive a potential two-front war. Perón later added that the military was also considered vital to maintaining internal security as fissures developed in society.³³ German instructors arrived in

³⁰ Gat, *History of Military Thought*, 349-350; Gat argues that the PG school of thought was authoritarian, fundamentally conservative, and rejected the rationalism of the Enlightenment.

³¹ José Ingenieros, *La Evolución Sociológica Argentina: De La Barbarie Al Imperialismo* (Buenos Aires: Librería J. Menéndez, 1910), 100, 103; Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 259-260; Robert A. Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), 2; Rouquié, *Military and the State in Latin America*, 77, 80; White, *German Influence in the Argentine Army*, 2; Camacho, "Síntesis y Perspectiva de los Estudios de Transferencias Militares Europeas en Suramérica," 42, 44; Enrique Dick, *La Profesionalización en el Ejército Argentino (1899-1914)* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 2014), 64-70.

³² Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 16; Rouquié, *Military and the State in Latin America*, 77; Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 259-260; Camacho, "Síntesis y Perspectiva de los Estudios de Transferencias Militares Europeas en Suramérica," 44-45; Hernán Cornut, "Pensamiento, Profesionalización Militar y Conflicto en el Ámbito del ABC a Principios Del Siglo XX," *PolHis* 10, no. 20 (July-December 2017): 130; Cristian Andres Di Renzo, "La Comunidad Imaginada por Estanislao Zeballos: Entre la Defensa de la Soberanía Nacional Argentina y la Instigación de los Conflictos por Medio de las Armas," *Conjuntura Austral* 9, no. 45 (January-March 2018): 52; A big source of tension was related to potential political fallout over control of the vital Río de la Plata in regards to Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and tension over the islands at the southern tip of the continent in regards to Chile.

³³ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 66; Camacho, "Síntesis y Perspectiva de los Estudios de Transferencias Militares Europeas en Suramérica," 44-45; Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 259-260; This was important because, after independence, Argentina suffered through decades of civil war before adopting its republican constitution in 1853. Even after this, several rebellions had taken place. The Radical Civic Union political party uprising in 1905 even garnered support from many young army officers, White,

Buenos Aires in 1899 and began transforming the militia-based military, a vestige of the colonial era, into a modern institution based on ideals of service to the nation, obedience to hierarchy, and professional discipline. Within a year, the German cadre successfully lobbied for Argentina to enact conscription, secured near-total control of Argentina's armaments program, revamped the officer training program, and founded the ESG.³⁴ German theories were well-received, despite the haughty arrogance and chauvinism of some instructors, which the longevity of German instruction in Argentina reflected.³⁵ George Atkins and Larry Thompson note that by the time Perón and his cohort began training, German instructors had controlled training for over a decade and would continue to until the Second World War, save for a hiatus during the First World War.³⁶ Rouquié and Robert Potash indicate that top Argentine officers also trained in Germany, including future nationalist dictator José Felix Uriburu (1868-1932). Upon his return from Germany, Uriburu became the ESG commandant and continued to support their curriculum despite Germany's loss in the First World War.³⁷

Perón, a self-proclaimed "Germanophile," excelled under German instruction.³⁸ An evaluation report from his third year of service reveals that his superiors marked him for instructor duty based on his keen comprehension of history. Two years later, while still a

German Influence in the Argentine Army, 9.

³⁴ Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 257-258; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 3-4; Rouquié, *Military and the State in Latin America*, 79-80; Ernesto López, *El Primer Perón: El Militar Antes Que El Político* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Capital Intelectual S.A., 2009), 31; Dick, *Profesionalización en el Ejército Argentino*, 115.

³⁵ Rouquié, *Military and the State in Latin America*, 76; Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 265; White, *German Influence in the Argentine Army*, 5-6.

³⁶ Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 258; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 3-4; López, *Primer Perón*, 31.

³⁷ Perón's Personnel File indicates that he attended the *Colegio Militar*, the academy for all lieutenant training, from 1911 until late 1913, Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires; Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 258; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 2, 4; Rouquié, *Military and the State in Latin America*, 80; White, *German Influence in the Argentine Army*, 11; Camacho, "Síntesis y Perspectiva de los Estudios de Transferencias Militares Europeas en Suramérica," 50.

³⁸ Juan Perón, letter to parents, November 26, 1918, accessed March 2, 2020, <http://archivoperonista.com/documentos/correspondencia/1918/carta-peron-sus-padres/>.

lieutenant, his firm command style was also noted, which would help him lead in the classroom.³⁹ Perón listened closely and admired his German instructors' prestige, military bearing, and "Prussian military spirit."⁴⁰ Later in his life, he explained to his cardiologist that Prussian thought deeply influenced his first presidency (1946-1952).⁴¹ While Perón's recollections were sometimes embellished or politically motivated, my analysis confirms that the PG school impacted his ideological formation. According to Gat, the PG school advanced ideas that were a "Counter-Revolution" to French rationalism to resurrect aspects of German Romanticism. PG thinkers explored the "role of war in human reality" and the strength of the nationalism that awoke among Germans in response to the influence of the French Revolution.⁴² Perón's publications show, in the essence of his ideas and through direct citations, that two Prussians had the most evident impact on his thinking. They were Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), his self-professed favorite, and Colmar von der Goltz (1843-1916).⁴³

German ESG instructors professed Clausewitz's ideas and the *Círculo Militar*, Argentina's private officer's club, published a Spanish translation of his masterpiece *On War* in 1922.⁴⁴ An essential Clausewitzian influence, which Perón frequently cited, was the maxim "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means."⁴⁵ Clausewitz's theories about the

³⁹ Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires.

⁴⁰ Perón, interview by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 23; Perón, letter to parents, November 26, 1918.

⁴¹ Pedro Ramón Cossio and Carlos A. Seara, *Perón Testimonios Médicos y Vivencias: 1973-1974* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Lumen, 2006), 76.

⁴² Gat, *History of Military Thought*, 314-315.

⁴³ Pavón, *Preparación de un Vida para el Mando*, 68; Juan Perón, *Apuntes de Historia Militar: Parte Teórica* (1932; repr., Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1951), 103, 105-106, 131-132 for examples of Clausewitz quotes, 119, 141, 162-164 for Goltz quotes. Perón also quotes dozens of other notable German-Prussian thinkers, to include Otto von Bismarck, Helmuth von Moltke, and Friedrich von Bernhardi.

⁴⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *De la Guerra* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Círculo Militar, 1922); Ignacio Martín Cloppet, *Perón en Roma: Cartas Inéditas (1939-1940): Amores y Política* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Fabro, 2015), 71.

⁴⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (1832; repr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 69; The following are examples of Perón directly citing Clausewitz's maxim, Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 131-132; Enrique Rottjer and Juan Perón, *Las Operaciones en 1870* (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1939),

arrival of a new kind of warfare also influenced the Argentine. Azar Gat and Robert Foley note that Clausewitz credited Napoleon for innovating "modern war," which emphasized national preparation and the concentration of forces *en masse* to unleash devastating power. Clausewitz recognized how powerful the revolutionary *leveé en masse* was, and his suggestion to emulate this was well-received in military circles.⁴⁶ The notions regarding national preparation and the importance of channeling concentrated power toward specific objectives would be central to Perón's thinking, as seen in the books he published in the 1930s that I analyze later in this chapter.⁴⁷ He recovered the wartime application of this theory to advocate domestic policies that would channel national vigor into national development during times of peace.⁴⁸

While Clausewitz's ideas provided firm foundations for Perón's ideas, Goltz's elaboration of these theories became the girders of the conceptual framework he built early in his career. Goltz's professional experiences during his assignment as a lieutenant in the general staff during Prussia's campaign toward German unification informed these theories.⁴⁹ He undoubtedly learned from the high-ranking officers, who noted his aptitude. He rose rapidly through the ranks, became a noted professor of military history, and was considered an expert on forging a mighty nation.⁵⁰ The Ottoman Empire hired him to modernize its military after he published A

19.

⁴⁶ Robert T. Foley, *German Strategy and the Path to Verdun* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 14; Gat, *History of Military Thought*, 202.

⁴⁷ Juan Perón, *El Frente Oriental de la Guerra Mundial en 1914*, in *Obras Completas 1* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1997), 180-181, 200; Juan Perón, *Apuntes de Historia Militar: Parte Teórica*, in *Obras Completas 3* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1997), 143; Juan Perón, *Apuntes de Historia Militar: Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, in *Obras Completas 4* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1997), 29-31; Rottjer and Perón, *Operaciones en 1870*, 50.

⁴⁸ Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 200.

⁴⁹ Eduardo Vior, "Estudio Introductorio," in Colmar von der Goltz, *Impresiones de mi Viaje a Argentina: Conferencia Dictada en la Sede Central de la Liga Germano-Argentina para la Promoción de los Intereses Económicos en Berlín*, trans. Eduardo Vior (1911; repr., Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Biblioteca Nacional, 2015), 15; Foley, *German Strategy and the Path to Verdun*, 25.

⁵⁰ A. H. A., "Preface," in Colmar von der Goltz, *The Nation in Arms*, trans. Philip A. Ashworth (1883; repr. London, UK: W. H. Allen and Company, 1887), v; Vior, "Estudio Introductorio," 15; Goltz's influence is recognizable throughout the West. US President Theodore Roosevelt subscribed to Goltzian theory, as elaborated on in an article

Nation in Arms as Europe near the end of the nineteenth century.⁵¹ In general, his works were well-circulated, and *Nation In Arms*, a military classic, was a primary, yet controversial, text for Argentine officers.⁵² Perón cited the concept of a "nation in arms" throughout his adult life. Scholars note that Goltz turned down Argentina's request to personally oversee professionalization because his mission in Turkey, a German ally, was incomplete at the time.⁵³ However, he trained some of the German officers who instructed in Argentina and sent his protégé Alfred Arent to establish Argentina's ESG in his stead.⁵⁴ In 1910, Goltz led the Kaiser's diplomatic mission to commemorate Argentina's centennial festivities, and Perón mentioned to his biographers that Goltz inspected the ESG during this trip.⁵⁵ Goltz's son, Friedrich, was a professor of military history and tactics at the ESG at the time.⁵⁶ The writings of numerous intellectuals—military and civilian—from Argentina and Latin America show overlap with Goltzian ideas, as will be shown shortly.⁵⁷

Nation in Arms reveals Goltz's acute awareness of contemporary geopolitics. His interpretation of the world order led him to conclude that as "long as earthly nations strive after

by D. de T., "Roosevelt y el Militarismo," in *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas, Tomo Primero* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Imprenta y Librería de Mayo, 1910), 439-441.

⁵¹ Goltz's thinking links to the rise of the "Young Turks," who were critical to the movement to secularize Turkey. Some point to Goltz's emphasis on national unity as an antecedent of Turkey's genocide of Armenians. Furthermore, Goltz's ideas can also be traced forward to the rise of German Nazism.

⁵² David Pion-Berlin, "Turkish Civil-Military Relations: A Latin American Comparison," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (June 2011): 298; Patricio Silva, ed., *The Soldier and the State in South America: Essays in Civil-Military Relations* (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001), 18; White, *German Influence in the Argentine Army*, 10.

⁵³ White, *German Influence in the Argentine Army*, 4-5.

⁵⁴ Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 259; Dick, *Profesionalización en el Ejército Argentino*, 512.

⁵⁵ Perón, interview by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 36; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 52.

⁵⁶ Friedrich von der Goltz spent a large portion of his career instructing in Argentina, from 1906 through 1914, and again from 1918 until 1930; Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 259; White, *German Influence in the Argentine Army*, 10, 15; Dick, *Profesionalización en el Ejército Argentino*, 515; Cornut, "Pensamiento, Profesionalización Militar y Conflicto en el Ámbito del ABC a Principios Del Siglo XX," 132; Vior, "Estudio Introductorio," 12.

⁵⁷ Later in this chapter, I will demonstrate Goltz's influence on notable Argentine and Latin American intellectuals.

earthly goods," to secure "peace and respect" for posterity, war is imminent.⁵⁸ The idea that nations were pitted against each other in competitions over vital resources was prevalent in the politics and popular scientific ideas of his age, including Social Darwinism. Goltz saw national preparation and unity as the prescription for success amid imperial competition.⁵⁹ He conceived of strength in material and spiritual, or "moral," terms.⁶⁰ He noted that an armaments industry "contributes very materially to success" and that economic planning should reflect this.⁶¹ He argued that the "will to conquer," or the strength of spirit in the chaos of battle, would determine the outcome if the opponents were roughly equivalent in terms of material assets.⁶² Goltz argued that the state must "completely fuse military life into the life of the people" to cultivate this will through a process of militarizing society that began with indoctrinating the youth.⁶³ He positioned the youth, who would do the bulk of the fighting should war erupt, as the "strength of the nation" and the embodiment of national spirit.⁶⁴ Goltz also argued that the national spirit must be consolidated under a strong leader, preferably a "dictator," to achieve its full potential.⁶⁵ This civil-military fusion, sustained by state policies designed to imbue nationalist fervor in the youth, would enable the leader, at any moment, to unleash enormous power in support of achieving national objectives. Rivals would think twice before taking aggressive action.

Foley notes that Goltz espoused the militarization of society based on his analysis of the second half of the Franco-Prussian War.⁶⁶ After Prussia decimated France's Imperial Army in two decisive battles, a radical republican government rose under Leon Gambetta (1838-1882),

⁵⁸ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 283.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁶⁰ In Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 113, Perón characterized the "moral" components as the characteristics of the nation, policy, patriotic index, and the personal influence of the leader, pertains to Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 11.

⁶¹ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, viii, 222.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 119.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 4, 13.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 2; Foley, *German Strategy and the Path to Verdun*, 30.

⁶⁵ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 119, 381, 383.

⁶⁶ Foley, *German Strategy and the Path to Verdun*, 14-15.

who channeled the resilient national will to continue fighting.⁶⁷ Foley explains that Goltz and Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1891), the Chief of the German General Staff and another prominent theorist of the PG school, analyzed the war after the war and concluded that a "nation in arms" was a powerful weapon if adequately prepared.⁶⁸ Goltz argued that the French ultimately lost because their improvised citizen armies could not overcome Prussia's highly trained, motivated, well-armed, and well-led forces.⁶⁹ Serious military theorists accepted Goltz's notion of preparing the entire nation, through indoctrination and conscription, to unleash the maximum spiritual strength of a nation.⁷⁰

Nation in Arms embodied the spiritualism of the PG school of thought, which Gat explains was an essential part of the German Romanticism movement. Gat notes that the conservative aristocrats of the Prussian officer corps, like Goltz and Moltke, developed this line of thinking along military lines based on their experiences fighting the French.⁷¹ Gat and Foley agree that the PG school rejected French rationalism, which tried to produce "winning" tactical and strategic formulas.⁷² An influential contingent in the PG school, to include Goltz, saw war as a "sphere of clashing wills, rising emotions, uncertainty, and confusion," a time and place of contestation where those with the strongest *will* triumphed over materially superior foes.⁷³ These theorists believed nationalism contained a spiritual energy that, if tapped, empowered the "will to conquer" necessary for victory.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ Ibid., 25.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 4-5.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 25.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 25-26.

⁷¹ Gat, *History of Military Thought*, 325.

⁷² Ibid., 332-335; Foley, *German Strategy and the Path to Verdun*, 1; Perón will touch on this theme in Rottjer and Perón, *Las Operaciones en 1870*, 50, where he suggests that German spiritualism combined with its material strength enabled their triumphs.

⁷³ Gat, *History of Military Thought*, 315.

⁷⁴ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 119.

The spiritualism of PG theory meshed with ideas emanating from prominent intellectuals in Perón's cultural context. Three famous Latin American intellectuals specifically appealed to the region's youth to engage their spirits toward the fulfillment of the region's potential. In "Our America," the martyred Cuban poet and revolutionary José Martí (1853-1895) called upon the youth of Latin America to be "one in spirit and intent" in the face of Yankee materialism.⁷⁵ A similar plea came in 1900 from the Uruguayan intellectual José Enrique Rodó (1871-1917), who dedicated his influential work, *Ariel*, to the "Youth of America."⁷⁶ Nicaragua's national poet, the journalist Rubén Darío (1867-1916), wrote "The Triumph of Ariel" in 1905, which was an artful reflection of Rodó's call for united spiritualism to repel Yankee materialism.⁷⁷ The intersection of imperialist and nationalistic German instruction with the anti-imperialism of Latin American nationalism and regionalism also informed Perón's early intellectual development.

Imperialism, Nationalism, and Development in Perón's Context: 1910-1925

Imperialism defined the world order in which Perón developed as a young officer. Industrialized nations, primarily European, subjugated most of Africa and Asia to colonial rule by 1900. Eric Hobsbawm and Andrew Porter explain that a combination of factors inspired the imperial impulse. These factors included financial ambitions, strategic concerns, efforts to secure

⁷⁵ José Martí, "Nuestra América," *Revista Ilustrada* (New York), January 10, 1891.

⁷⁶ José Enrique Rodó, *Ariel*, 1900, [Fundación Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes](http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/ariel--0/html/fedf72f8-82b1-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_2.html), accessed September 8, 2019, http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/ariel--0/html/fedf72f8-82b1-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_2.html.

⁷⁷ Rubén Darío, "El Triunfo de Caliban," 1905, Biblioteca Virtual Universal, 2003, accessed September 8, 2019, <http://www.biblioteca.org.ar/libros/155.pdf>; Numerous Latin American and North American anti-imperialist intellectuals at the time saw Nicaragua in a similar light as Cuba, which was considered a *de facto* US colony, examples include the following José Santos Zelaya, *The Revolution of Nicaragua and the United States* (Madrid, Spain: Bernardo Rodríguez, 1910), 7; Manuel Ugarte, "The Future of Latin America," (Lecture, Columbia University, New York, NY, 1912); Salvador R. Merlos, *América Latina Ante el Peligro* (San José, Costa Rica: Impr. de G. Matamoros, 1914), 6; Roberto Domenech, *Méjico e El Imperialismo Norte Americano* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: La Leonesa, 1914), 118-119; Manuel Ugarte, *El Destino de un Continente* (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Mundo Latino, 1923), 2-3; Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in American Imperialism* (New York, NY: B. W. Huebsch and the Viking Press, 1925); Lucio Moreno Quintana, *El Sistema Internacional Americano* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Facultad de Derechos y Ciencias Sociales, 1925), 222.

resources deemed vital to national interests, national prestige, and a paternalistic sense of obligation to "civilize" the less developed, which included proselytization.⁷⁸ Japan gained recognition as a rising power in East Asia after winning the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). The United States was the leading power in the Western Hemisphere, and Latin America was its main area of influence.

The United States' imperial turn began in 1898, which sparked much debate.⁷⁹ The victory in the Spanish-American War saw Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands transferred to its control. By 1925, the year Perón would begin the most theoretical phase of his officer training, the United States had intervened in Latin America eleven times, including meddling in internal political affairs, military invasions, and lengthy occupations in Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua.⁸⁰ Greg Grandin and Lars Schoultz explain that the motives centered on a paternalistic sense of moral "responsibility" that coincided with financial and national security concerns, especially regarding control of the Panama Canal.⁸¹ The canal allowed the United States to rapidly transfer its navy between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, which was critical to its ability to project force abroad. As such, it jealously guarded the canal's strategic waterborne approaches, especially in the Caribbean Basin. President Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) issued a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904, which declared that

⁷⁸ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire: 1875-1914* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1987), 9-12; Andrew Porter, *European Imperialism, 1860-1914* (London, UK: MacMillan Press LTD, 1994), 17-21.

⁷⁹ Alfred Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1897); W. P. Trent, "In Re Imperialism," *Sewanee Review* 6, no. 4 (October 1898): 461-499; Andrew Carnegie, "Americanism Versus Imperialism," *North American Review* 168, no. 506 (January 1899): 1-13; Walter Wellman, "Shall the Monroe Doctrine Be Modified?" *North American Review* 173, no. 541 (December 1901): 832-844; Beckles Wilson, *The New America: A Study of the Imperial Republic* (London, UK: Chapman & Hall, 1903); John Cummings, "Democracy and Reaction by L. T. Hobhouse," *Journal of Political Economy* 14, no. 3 (March 1906): 181-184; Burdette Gibson Lewis, "Our Trade Relations with Latin America," *Journal of Political Economy* 14, no. 10 (December 1906): 602-613.

⁸⁰ This included meddling in internal political affairs, military invasions, and in particular long-term occupations in Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua.

⁸¹ Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, The United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books), 2006, 1-2; Lars Schoultz, *In Their Own Best Interest: A History of the U.S. Effort to Improve Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 32.

the United States would regulate the hemisphere, lest European nations try to colonize vulnerable Latin American states.⁸² Alan McPherson notes that south of the Caribbean Basin, United States imperialism was characterized by political or financial pressure, which included meddling in internal affairs.⁸³ Many South Americans believed some combination involving the region's three most influential states, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, should push back.⁸⁴

José Ingenieros, a prominent Argentine doctor who was a leader in terms of scientific ideas of his day, suggested that Argentina must assume the role of regional power in South America in his 1910 publication *La Evolución Sociológica Argentina: De La Barbarie Al Imperialismo (Argentine Sociological Evolution: From Barbarism to Civilization)*.⁸⁵ He believed the only way to end European economic colonization and prevent "imminent Yankee tutelage" was to enact the "economic forms that characterize superior civilization as accentuated in white countries: capitalism."⁸⁶ He cited Japan and the United States as examples of how industrialization created the prestige required to hold sway "in the world political balance" and exercise "guardianship" over a region. He discussed competition for leadership against the "intensely militarized" Chile and what he considered a racially confounded Brazil. He concluded that Argentina's "vast territory, fertile land, temperate climate, (and) white race" represented decisive advantages.⁸⁷ To rationalize Argentina taking the imperialist turn, he evoked the moralizing tone of the European notions of the *mission civilisatrice* and the "white man's

⁸² Theodore Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress for 1904, House Records HR 58A-K2, Records of the U.S. House of Representatives, Record Group 233, Center for Legislative Archives, US National Archives.

⁸³ Alan McPherson, *Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America since 1945* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006), 9-11.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 8; Prominent examples include Martí, "Nuestra América"; José Enrique Rodó, *Ariel*; Rubén Darío, "El Triunfo de Caliban."

⁸⁵ Walter, "Intellectual Background of the 1918 University Reform in Argentina," 251; Walter cited two additional books as further evidence of Ingenieros' nationalism, *Sociología Argentina* (1908) and *La Evolución de las Ideas Argentinas* (1918).

⁸⁶ Ingenieros, *Evolución Sociológica Argentina*, 73, 97.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 98-103.

burden," but urged for a path of "pacifist imperialism," which he saw as tutelage to "extend the benefits" of "evolved civilization" to South America's "inferior races."⁸⁸ Ingenieros later rescinded his imperialist vision, but in 1910 his ideas intersected with the nationalism that was brewing amid the centennial celebration and the expansion of imperialism as a new historical development in the world at the time.

Scholars note that after the First World War began, intellectuals and statesmen in the Western Hemisphere advocated Pan-American cooperation.⁸⁹ President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) pledged to end the United States' imperialism in the region as its financial, industrial, and cultural interests flooded into space left by Europe's withdrawal. However, two proposals for Pan-Americanism existed, one under the leadership of the United States, and another that featured ethnic considerations. Andrés Rivarola links the latter to a belief that Germany's rise to power was an example of what uniting people of a similar race or culture into a single political entity could accomplish.⁹⁰ Renzo Ramírez adds that many Latin American intellectuals preferred the idea of regional cooperation along ethnic lines to United States leadership. As early as 1903, when the United States' interference in Colombia resulted in the region of Panama declaring

⁸⁸ Ibid., 46, 94-95, 102; Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (1977; repr., New York, NY: New York Review of Books, 2006), 4; Robert J. C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2016), 80-81; Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden: The United States & The Philippine Islands, 1899," in *Rudyard Kipling's Verse: Definitive Edition* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1929).

⁸⁹ Santiago Perez Triana, "The Rule of Barbarism the Culmination of the European System," *Journal of American History* 9, no. 1 (Jan-Feb-March 1915): 13; Santiago Perez Triana, "America for Americans," in *ibid.*, 80; The *Journal of American History* 9, no. 1 (Jan-Feb-March 1915) was titled "Articles published in connection with the Pan-American Financial Conference, Washington, D.C., May 24-29, 1915," and almost the entire issue expresses this sort of view; Rómulo S. Naón, "Speech Presented by Dr. Rómulo S. Naón April 29, 1915, at the Carnegie Institute in Pittsburgh," in *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas, Tomo X*, ed. Rodolfo Rivarola (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Imprenta y Librería de Mayo, 1915), 218-222; Robert E. Speer, *The Unity of the Americas: A Discussion of the Political, Commercial, Educational, and Religious Relationships of Anglo-America and Latin America* (New York, NY: Missionary Education Movement and Laymen's Missionary Movement, 1916), 26; Elihu Root, *Latin America and the United States*, eds. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1917, 36; Schoultz, *In Their Own Best Interest*, 54.

⁹⁰ Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano, "América Latina y el Nacionalismo Continentalista," *Anales* 12 (2010): 57-58; The notion of a "United States of South America" had existed in the continent since the nineteenth-century wars for liberation from Spain, but US aggression increased the appeal of this notion in the politically divided continent.

independence from Bogotá, South American diplomats proposed the formation of a new center of power in the region.⁹¹ Brazilian statesman Barón de Rio Branco (1845-1912) proposed that Argentina, Brazil, and Chile engage in a collaborative effort to ensure stability south of the equator, which would help keep the United States out.⁹² Scholars note support for this idea gained momentum in 1914 when diplomats from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile mediated after United States Marines occupied Veracruz, Mexico.⁹³ The three leading states in South America signed the "ABC Pact" in May 1915.

Two prominent Argentine statesmen offered their opinions on the ABC Pact to the public. Rómulo S. Naón (1875–1941), Argentina's ambassador to the United States and its delegate in the United States-Mexico mediation, argued that Pan-American cooperation represented the antithesis of Europe's bellicose divisions. He recommended educating the region's youth to fortify Pan-American sentiment and advance the hemisphere's "transcendental mission," which overlapped with Goltz's emphasis on the youth.⁹⁴ Carlos Becú (1879-1924), a lawyer, professor of International Rights, and statesman of note published *El "A.B.C." y sus Concepto Político y Jurídico (The "A.B.C." and its Political and Juridical Concept)*. He explained that the pact's combined influence could resolve regional disputes, obviate United States interference in the region, and ensure peace between the three states.⁹⁵ Becú espoused the "pacifist imperialism" that Ingenieros suggested, but ceded that military intervention might

⁹¹ Renzo Ramírez Bacca, "Historiografía Latinoamericana de la Primera Guerra Mundial: Los Casos de Argentina, México y Colombia," *Folios* 2, no. 41 (Primer Semestre, 2015): 192.

⁹² Rivarola, "América Latina y el Nacionalismo Continentalista," 69.

⁹³ Juan Pablo Scarfi, "In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898-1933," *Diplomatic History* 40, no. 2 (April 2016): 198; Domenech, *Méjico e El Imperialismo Norte Americano*, 118-119; David Sheinin, "Flaccid Anti-Americanism: Argentine Relations with the United States at the Turn of the Century" (Prepared for Delivery at the 1997 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Continental Plaza Hotel, Guadalajara, Mexico, April 17-19, 1997), 9, accessed October 5, 2019, <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA97/sheinin.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Naón, "Speech Presented by Dr. Rómulo S. Naón April 29, 1915, at the Carnegie Institute in Pittsburgh," 219-222; Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 2.

⁹⁵ Carlos A. Becú, *El "A.B.C." y sus Concepto Político y Jurídico* (Buenos Aires: Librería La Facultad, 1915), 27-28.

sometimes be required.⁹⁶ The following year, Argentina's new president, Hipólito Yrigoyen (1852–1933), appointed Becú as his Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Many nationalists supported Yrigoyen's presidential campaign, and Perón claimed to be among the nationalists who voted for him in Argentina's first general election with universal male suffrage.⁹⁷ Joel Horowitz explains that Yrigoyen's Radical Party campaign used "*gauchos* on horseback" and other traditional images, together with Catholic images, to evoke a "semi-mythic past" that appealed to nationalists.⁹⁸ Horowitz adds that Radical nationalism was inclusive, which was important in a nation with many recent immigrants.⁹⁹ Rock says that conservatives criticized Yrigoyen's *obrerismo* (workerism) as too left-wing, but many nationalists appreciated the Radicals' concern for their fellow citizens.¹⁰⁰ Yrigoyen's nationalist supporters backed neutrality during the First World War, which was true of most elected politicians and the influential newspapers *La Nación* and *La Prensa*. While socialists tended to slander German militarism, the general conclusion was that neutrality was better for the nation than participating in European wars.¹⁰¹ Elizabeth White indicates that archival documents from wartime Germany show that Pro-German army officers had to pressure Yrigoyen to maintain neutrality after German U-boats sank two Argentine ships.¹⁰² Perón's position is uncertain, but as

⁹⁶ Ibid.,9; Ingenieros, *Evolución Sociológica Argentina*, 97.

⁹⁷ Perón, interview by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 38.

⁹⁸ Joel Horowitz, *Argentina's Radical Party and Popular Mobilization, 1916–1930* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press), 2008, 50, 201; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 60-62; Nationalists tended to link Catholicism to the national culture.

⁹⁹ Horowitz, *Argentina's Radical Party and Popular Mobilization*, 7.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 202; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 56-57.

¹⁰¹ Horowitz, *Argentina's Radical Party and Popular Mobilization*, 50; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 29; Stefan Rinke, *Latin America and the First World War*, trans. Christopher W. Reid (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 109-111, 146; Some interpreted Argentina's strict neutrality as support for the German Empire, Cornut, "Pensamiento, Profesionalización Militar y Conflicto en el Ámbito del ABC a Principios Del Siglo XX," 153.

¹⁰² White, *German Influence on the Argentine Army*, 22-23; Rinke, *Latin America and the First World War*, 109-110.

a nationalist and a Germanophile, he probably supported neutrality.¹⁰³ The United States and Brazil, on the other hand, broke hemispheric unity regarding neutrality and declared war in 1917 over similar U-boat attacks.

After Brazil declared war, another expression of Pro-German nationalism surfaced in Argentina that was relevant to Perón's context. María Tato explains that Gonzalo de Reparaz (1860-1939) published *Nuestra Guerra: La Coalición Contra la Argentina* (*Our War: The Coalition Against Argentina*) in Buenos Aires under the pen name "Pedro de Córdoba."¹⁰⁴ The original Córdoba (1482-1521) was an anti-imperial symbol that Reparaz used to advance ulterior motives.¹⁰⁵ Reparaz's nationalism was ironic because he was a Spanish journalist living in Argentina at the time. In *Nuestra Guerra*, he pretended to be an Argentine and only admitted the book was his years later.¹⁰⁶ Based on her analysis of Reparaz's publications from this period, Tato argues he sought to exploit trepidations over Brazil's alignment with Washington and knew that appealing to concerns over United States' imperialism would provoke nationalists. He hoped to advance the Kaiser's influence in Argentina, which he believed would undermine Washington's efforts for Pan-American unity. Tato explains that members of Argentina's German immigrant community agreed with his ploy and that *Nuestra Guerra* was among several of his propaganda pieces that they financed for publication.¹⁰⁷

In addition to its pro-German function and anti-United States agenda, *Nuestra Guerra* demonstrated adherence to Goltzian theories on building a defensible nation in the context of

¹⁰³ Perón, letter to parents, November 26, 1918.

¹⁰⁴ María Inés Tato, "Pasiones Germanas, Pasiones Españolas: La Actividad Intelectual de Gonzalo de Reparaz en Argentina durante la Gran," *Anuario IEHS* 31, no. 2 (2016): 111.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 105, 111. Pedro de Córdoba was the first priest to denounce Spain's exploitative *encomienda* system imposed on the indigenous during Spain's colonization in the New World.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 105

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 111-112. Tato argues that Reparaz believed a German victory would harm the interests of two states who hurt Spain: Britain and the United States. Spain and Britain were enduring rivals, while the United States had stripped Spain of the remnants of its global empire in 1898.

looming imperialism. Reparaz did not see the First World War as a "war to end all wars" and warned that the Western Hemisphere had yet to tap its energy.¹⁰⁸ He prophesied an outbreak of hostilities in South America based on the perception that Argentina was rich but weak, and therefore an attractive target, which overlapped with Goltz's notions regarding the economic motives that led to war.¹⁰⁹ Reparaz denounced United States-led Pan-Americanism as a "charade" to secure Argentina's riches and characterized Brazil's alignment with the United States as a betrayal of Latin America.¹¹⁰ Reparaz wrote that Washington's "divide and conquer" strategy revealed its "I am American and you are the bread" attitude toward Latin Americans.¹¹¹ He warned that war might erupt at any moment against the "likely coalition" of United States agents—Chile, Brazil, Uruguay—and urged Argentina to adopt policies along Goltzian lines, including preparing all "able men" for war.¹¹² He also advocated government policies to harmonize the internal order and mitigate strains related to "mass mobilization."¹¹³ Finally, he recommended forming regional blocs of Latin American states to oppose imperialism.¹¹⁴

We can surmise, given *Nuestra Guerra's* circulation, controversial nature, pro-German intent, overlap with Goltzian ideas, and funding from German immigrants, that German instructors mentioned the book to Argentine officers.¹¹⁵ Argentine military planners, who considered Brazil and Chile threats, required little prodding in this direction.¹¹⁶ Reparaz's ideas

¹⁰⁸ Pedro de Córdoba, (Pen Name of Gonzalo de Reparaz), *Nuestra Guerra: La Coalición Contra la Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: La Gaceta de España, 1917), 1.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 3, 21.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 3, 7.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 70-72; Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 2-4.

¹¹³ Córdoba, *Nuestra Guerra*, 71; Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 383.

¹¹⁴ Córdoba, *Nuestra Guerra*, 75-78; Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela would be in the "Equatorial Bloc," and the rest of Latin America would fall into the "Central American Bloc" or "Southern Bloc."

¹¹⁵ Tato says that 5,000 copies of *Our War* circulated and caused a diplomatic problem when word of its contents reached Sao Paulo; Tato, "Pasiones Germanas, Pasiones Españolas," 118. German officers were not teaching in Argentina at the time *Nuestra Guerra* was published, but they returned after the war ended.

¹¹⁶ Perón noted to his biographer that he did training exercises around the city of Paraná, which according to my strategic analysis is a likely axis of riverborne advance should Brazil invade Argentina from the State of Paraná, in

on the imperialism of the United States, regional war, and national development corresponded to concerns of the growing faction of nationalist officers in the army, including Perón. Germany's surrender a year later ended the war, but regional tensions and concerns over imperialism remained.

After the Armistice, Perón mailed his parents a letter to express his geopolitical opinions. His letter exhibited nationalism, knowledge of Argentina's history with British imperialism, and the influence of German instruction. With disappointment, he noted that he would have preferred that German militarism had triumphed. He criticized how the "English impose their Naval supremacy on the World and tyrannize the seas" as a hindrance to "universal trade." He took heart at the end of the letter and predicted that the United States and Britain would clash over trade interests in the Western Hemisphere and that the northern giant would best the "perfidious Albion."¹¹⁷ Despite this, he did not mention Pan-Americanism.

The social implications of the First World War and its aftermath had a wide-ranging impact. Michael Goebel explains that as war-torn European states struggled to recover, nationalist ire grew in their colonial possessions.¹¹⁸ Young intellectuals from the colonies came in contact with Latin Americans studying and working abroad in cities like Paris and London, where they began to exchange ideas. Together, they linked the violent enforcement of colonial domination with subtler forms of imperialism that hinged on the threat of force.¹¹⁹ Historian Erez Manela notes that nationalists around the world took heart in President Wilson's advocacy of "self-determination" after the war. Their frustration returned when the United States abandoned

Brazil. Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 54.

¹¹⁷ Perón, letter to parents, November 26, 1918. "Perfidious Albion" was a derogatory term used to criticize Britain's foreign policy as treacherous and imperialist.

¹¹⁸ Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 12.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

this policy and opted out of the new League of Nations, which many hoped would provide influential backing for decolonization.¹²⁰

Domestic socio-economic tensions were also significant, especially in Europe. Liberal governments in Britain and France struggled to reconfigure wartime economies, while the defeated states experienced acute problems. Perón noted this and cited the Bolshevik Revolution as a signal that the working class would be a valuable political force in the world to come. He believed Germany's socialist-inspired November Revolution and calls for self-determination from various ethnicities within the Austro-Hungarian Empire were examples that power of popular politics was gaining momentum against the rule of elites.¹²¹ Shortly after the war, the disenchanted socialist and war veteran Benito Mussolini led 30,000 supporters, who were mainly disgruntled veterans, in the "March on Rome," which began the world's first experiment with fascist governance.¹²² Scholars report that Perón was interested in social movements, read works by Karl Marx and other left-wing intellectuals, and wrote a critical essay on communism and socialism as the First World War raged.¹²³

Social tensions in Argentina flared during this period. Rock notes that nationalist criticisms regarding "foreign" and "revolutionary agitators," often aimed at leftist workers organizations, increased during the war.¹²⁴ Plotkin adds that after the Bolshevik Revolution, conservatives cited Yrigoyen's pro-labor policies as evidence that he was a secret communist, which resulted in many nationalists, who were still an unorganized minority faction, dropping

¹²⁰ Erez Manela, "Introduction," in *The Wilsonian Moment* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2, Adobe PDF eBook.

¹²¹ Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 182-183, 184; Miguel Barrios, "El Continentalismo de Perón en la Globalización," Argentine Center of International Studies, Working Papers - Programa Defensa y Seguridad, 2017): 10-11.

¹²² Patricia Knight, *Mussolini and Fascism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003), 17-18.

¹²³ Pavón, *Preparación de un Vida para el Mando*, 68; Norberto Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída, 1893-1955* (Buenos Aires: Colihue, 2005), 67; Marcelo Camusso, "Perón y sus Maestros: Formación para la Acción," Escuela de Ciencias Políticas para el 6º Congreso Argentino de Ciencia Política Rosario 5-8 de Noviembre de 2003), 10, accessed May 2, 2018, <http://www.pjchaco.com.ar/images/PDF/LibrosPeron/Peronysusmaestros.pdf>.

¹²⁴ Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 64.

their support for him.¹²⁵ Scholars note that anti-communist sentiment in Argentina was surging, strongly linked to xenophobia, especially anti-Semitism, and nationalist organizations such as the extremist militia *Liga Patriótica Argentina* formed in response to the revolution in Russia.¹²⁶

Perón was aware of the growing divisions within Argentine society and how they contradicted the internal unity Goltz emphasized. Based on his observations and experiences, However, he interpreted Argentina's circumstances differently than xenophobes did. He had grown up in an impoverished region with little foreign influence, and while stationed in Paraná (1913-1918), he often saw people living in squalor during field exercises.¹²⁷ He later cited these experiences as having sparked his desire to help his compatriots and said this was when he began to research government responses to the poverty in Argentina.¹²⁸ Scholars note that Argentina had the world's fourth-highest gross domestic product at the time, but income inequality was enormous.¹²⁹ In 1918, Perón was transferred to Buenos Aires shortly before President Yrigoyen deployed the military in response to escalating workers' strikes in January 1919.¹³⁰ We cannot be sure of Perón's actions in the ensuing *Semana Trágica* (Tragic Week), which saw hundreds die in what he later called a "war among brothers."¹³¹ He reported xenophobic attacks, accusations of Bolshevik infiltration, anti-Semitism, and paramilitary violence, which scholarly research

¹²⁵ Ibid., 56-57; Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 6.

¹²⁶ David Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 216; Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 7; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 40; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 33-34; Federico Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 66.

¹²⁷ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 51-52; Paraná sits on the banks of a major estuary of the Río de la Plata.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 48-50, 52; Pavón, *Preparación de un Vida para el Mando*, 78; Perón, interview by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 35.

¹²⁹ Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America, 4th ed.* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), 74-77; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 53-54; fourth highest gross domestic product and income inequality; Hedges, *Argentina*, 28-40.

¹³⁰ Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires.

¹³¹ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 62; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 31; Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, 202.

confirms was government-sanctioned.¹³² Perón opined that far from being directed by Moscow, workers were merely trying to improve their lot.¹³³ Fear-mongering about communism continued over the following years, but Latin American intellectuals recognized the United States, operating outside of the League of Nations, as the most evident foreign threat.¹³⁴ Perón explained to his biographer how the army was under "strong German influence" and that he had yet to comprehend the socio-political situation.¹³⁵ It is probable that he followed orders and later regretted this, an experience not uncommon to infantrymen deployed into action, especially against their fellow citizens.

Later in 1919, Argentine nationalist intellectual Francisco Bayón published *Dogma Nacional*. The author argued that the power of the United States was formidable, functioned outside of League of Nations' restraints, and had the backing of a growing body of politicized merchants and capitalist politicians.¹³⁶ He argued that it was Argentina's providential duty, as a

¹³² Scholars note that the Tragic Week gave Manuel Carlés, an anti-Yrigoyen Radical Party member and ESG professor, the impetus to organize the paramilitary groups into the anti-labor and ultranationalist "Argentine Patriotic League,"; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 64; Edgardo J. Bilsky, *La Semana Trágica* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1984), 161; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 55-56, 65, 71; Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, 202; Paul H. Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals: The 'Dirty War' in Argentina* (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2002), 136; Franziska Yost, "'Glory to the Russian Maximalists!': Reactions to the Russian Revolution in Argentina and Brazil, 1917-22," *Revolutionary Russia* 31, no. 2 (November 2018): 253; Teresa A. Meade, *A History of Modern Latin America: 1800 to the Present* (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2011), 389-390; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 31-34; Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 66; Joel Horowitz, ed., *Argentine Unions, The State & the Rise of Perón, 1930-1945* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1990), 57-58.

¹³³ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 61, 64; Scholars note the plight of the working class in Buenos Aires had deteriorated due to the economic strains brought on in Argentina and elsewhere related to the First World War, Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 36; Bilsky, *Semana Trágica*, 159. No sign of Bolshevik sponsorship for the strikes has surfaced.

¹³⁴ Estanislao S. Zeballos, *La República Argentina en la Liga de las Naciones* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: La Prensa, 1921), 99; Richard Stratton Lambert, *Modern Imperialism* (New York, NY: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1928), 80; César Díaz, *Liga de las Naciones y la Actitud Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Imprenta Mercatali, 1921), 86; Orestes Ferrara y Marino, *El Panamericanismo y la Opinión Europea* (Paris, France: Le Livre Libre, 1930), 296.

¹³⁵ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 66; Given this, I believe he followed whatever orders tumbled down the chain of command.

¹³⁶ Francisco Félix Bayón, *Dogma Nacional: A la Juventud Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Imprensa Europea de M. A. Rosas, 1919), 46, 53-54.

power reaching "European" proportions, to oppose imperialism.¹³⁷ Like Ingenieros and Becú, he proposed a pacifist tutelary role in the region but warned that such "progress and civilization" must be backed by military strength in the imperial world order.¹³⁸ Bayón recommended an organized national effort along Goltzian lines. He argued that, with its abundant resources, Argentina had but to seize the opportunity and that the first step was to "educate the youth" and instill them with "strong spirits, materially and morally."¹³⁹ He emphasized that industrialization was required to balance "natural and industrial wealth," and noted that similar policies helped Germany and the United States become "formidable nations" in the imperial world order.¹⁴⁰

Increased military strength would create regional tensions, and Bayón saw the Río de la Plata, or River Plate, as a likely flashpoint. He argued along Goltzian lines that war typically had "geographical-economic" causes.¹⁴¹ The river represents a natural, defensible border for Argentina, but this created tensions in the region because Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay also wanted access.¹⁴² Neighboring states criticized Argentina as imperialist in this regard. They believed Argentina had ambitions to reunite the lands of the former River Plate Viceroyalty of the colonial era through the "Zeballos Doctrine," a long-standing, controversial diplomatic claim of jurisdiction over almost the entire Río de la Plata estuary.¹⁴³ Bayón denied such "geographical aspirations" and countered that the government had long neglected foreign policy for too long.¹⁴⁴

He advocated shrewd "international economic policy" to ease suspicions and foster "Spanish-

¹³⁷ Ibid., 18, 26.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 19, 66; Ingenieros, *Evolución Sociológica Argentina*, 17; Becú, "A.B.C.," 9.

¹³⁹ Bayón, *Dogma Nacional*, 16, 18-19; Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 2.

¹⁴⁰ Bayón, *Dogma Nacional*, 52-54; Ingenieros, *Evolución Sociológica Argentina*, 40.

¹⁴¹ Bayón, *Dogma Nacional*, 46; Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 386.

¹⁴² Bayón, *Dogma Nacional*, 21, 46, 60-64.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 13-14, 30; José Guillermo Guerra, *El Doctor Zeballos y el Imperialismo Argentino* (Santiago, Chile: Imprenta Santiago-Esmeralda), 1923, 404; Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, *Por la Defensa Nacional: Discurso Pronunciado el Día 31 de Agosto de 1923 en la Cámara de Senadores* (Montevideo, Uruguay: La Industrial), 1923, 7; Gustavo Ferrari, *Estanislao S. Zeballos*, (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Los Diplomáticos, 1995), 36, accessed September 5, 2019, <http://www.cari.org.ar/pdf/diplomaticos09.pdf>; The former Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata consisted of Argentina, Bolivia, Chilean territories, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

¹⁴⁴ Bayón, *Dogma Nacional*, 13-14, 30, 46.

American fellowship" in the region.¹⁴⁵ Perón was assuredly aware of tensions and ideas related to the Río de la Plata's effects on relations with neighboring states. He served in Paraná (1913-1918) and then the Chaco Territory (1919-1920), which both sit on the banks of the Paraná River, a Río de la Plata estuary that formed a border with Paraguay (see figure 1.1).

In 1923, Manuel Ugarte (1875-1951), a prolific writer, socialist, and respected Argentine intellectual, published *Destino de un Continente (Destiny of a Continent)*. He dubbed the United States the "New Rome" and called its three-tiered program for domination "the most perfect tool of domination" ever.¹⁴⁶ The three tiers were "financial pressure, international guardianship (embodied by the Roosevelt Corollary), and political oversight" from local facilitators.¹⁴⁷ He considered imperialism a natural urge of powerful nations and assailed Latin America's meek responses for created an inviting atmosphere that only "abstraction of law" protected.¹⁴⁸ Ugarte believed a united Latin America would be capable of resisting Yankee imperialism and considered the grouping of peoples who shared cultural and racial links completely justifiable, even if it required some military action.¹⁴⁹ He urged that Brazil be included in this vision to avoid creating disequilibrium in the region that would nudge Brazil to further align with the United States.¹⁵⁰

Ugarte discussed the power of the spirit, touching on Martí's "Our America," Rodó's *Ariel*, and noted that "moral force eventually overcomes all material forces," which overlapped with Goltz's view on the importance of the national spirit.¹⁵¹ Ugarte envisioned a "new humanity" rising in Argentina and Latin America and prophesied that the "will of its children"

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 42, 55-56.

¹⁴⁶ Manuel Ugarte, *El Destino de un Continente* (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Mundo Latino, 1923), 200-201.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 207.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 2-3, 188-189, 196, 414.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 1-2.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 337.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 416-418.

would make the dream of union a reality.¹⁵² Two years later, Mexico's outgoing Minister of Culture, José Vasconcelos (1882-1959), published *The Cosmic Race*, which proposed a similar future for Latin America.¹⁵³ As part of Latin America's upsurge, Ugarte conceived of a national effort in Argentina that ran along Goltzian lines. He supported calls to organize Argentina's foreign and economic policy that would replace its tradition of "constant improvisation."¹⁵⁴ He discussed mobilizing national wealth, in peace just as in war, to place Argentina's abundant resources in "service of a higher purpose."¹⁵⁵ Ugarte emphasized that within the context of regional unification, Argentina must maintain its national culture. He noted that Germany maintained its identity during its industrialization and that Japan assimilated "Western progress over four decades; not to place itself behind other nations, but precisely to compete with them, to avoid subjugation, (and) to defend its culture."¹⁵⁶ Ugarte's vision was promising, but ultimately political tensions in Latin America continued.

Perón the Student and the Escuela Superior de Guerra: 1925-1930

Perón was promoted to captain at the end of 1924 and attended "Alumni" training at the ESG from April 1925 through January 1929.¹⁵⁷ This training was more theoretical than his earlier training as a lieutenant. He carried the ideas covered in the first two sections into this environment and evaluated them within the context of this training. In his first year, he edited a chapter on "Military Morals" for an officer's instruction manual, which Guillermo Gasió notes

¹⁵² Ibid., 421.

¹⁵³ José Vasconcelos, *La Raza Cosmica: Misión de la Raza Iberoamericana* (1925; repr., Buenos Aires, Argentina: Biblioteca Virtual Universal, 2003), 22, accessed September 22, 2019. <http://www.biblioteca.org.ar/libros/1289.pdf>.

¹⁵⁴ Ugarte, *Destino de un Continente*, 335; Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 2.

¹⁵⁵ Ugarte, *Destino de un Continente*, 416-418.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 314-315, 421.

¹⁵⁷ Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires.

had a "Nietzschean" tone.¹⁵⁸ Alumni training included a field exercise in the northwestern Jujuy region, along the Chilean border (see figure 1.1).¹⁵⁹ This deployment likely included mock combat scenarios and discussions about the threats Chile could present.¹⁶⁰ Perón's professional reviews show that he excelled at the alumni course, but later he recalled in an interview that he went from being "discussed" by the army's "highest echelons," to "tolerated," which he attributed to their disdain for his ideas and his lack of "proper pedigree."¹⁶¹ However, he received backing from two Argentine ESG professors of German extraction, Mayor Carlos von der Becke (1890-1965) and Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Rottjer(1891-1959).¹⁶²

Perón first met Becke during his training at the War College before the First World War.¹⁶³ By the time Perón arrived at the PSG, Becke had translated seven works by Prussian military theorists for publication, including Friedrich von Bernhardi's *The War of the Future*, which prophesied another world war as the most likely scenario for the foreseeable future.¹⁶⁴

Perón counted these Prussian authors among his favorites, so he surely talked with Becke about

¹⁵⁸ Pavón, *Preparación de un Vida para el Mando*, 93-97; Guillermo Gasió, *El Vínculo de Unión: Ejército, Policía y Pueblo en los Orígenes del Peronismo* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Teseo, 2012), 28.

¹⁵⁹ At this time, the region that is today's Jujuy Province was part of the Gobernación de Los Andes, which was the equivalent of a "territory" such as the Oregon Territory of the United States.

¹⁶⁰ Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires.

¹⁶¹ Perón's professional records reveal his ESG evaluators considered Perón healthy, energetic, dedicated, suited for command, well-prepared, studious, intelligent, "of elevated military moral," respectful, gentlemanly, disciplined, passionate, and affable, Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 78. This is also indicative of Perón's intimate professional setting. In large militaries, general officers do not typically discuss the potential of captains or below.

¹⁶² Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 45-46.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 50; Pavón, *Preparación de un Vida para el Mando*, 39.

¹⁶⁴ These books were: Karl von Bülow, *Maniobras y Ejercicios de Combate en Gran Escala*, trans. Carlos von der Becke (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Talleres Gráficos y Casa Editora "Juan Perrotti," 1919); Julius K. L. Mertens, *Táctica y Técnica de los Pasajes de Ríos: Enseñanzas de Guerra y Experiencias de Paz*, trans. Carlos von der Becke (Buenos Aires, Argentina: La Plata, Olivieri y Dominguez, 1919-20); Karl Litzmann, *Excursiones Tácticas*, trans. Carlos von der Becke (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ferrari Hnos., 1920); Friedrich Otto Löffler and Abraham Schweizer, *Táctica: Manual para la Conducción e Instrucción de Combate*, trans. Carlos von der Becke (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ferrari Hnos., 1920); Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, *El Reglamento de Ejercicios para la Infantería a la Luz de la Historia de Guerra*, trans. Carlos von der Becke (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ferrari Hnos., 1921); Friedrich von Bernhardi, *La Guerra del Futuro: Según las Experiencias de la Guerra Mundial*, trans. Carlos von der Becke (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ferrari Hnos., 1921); William Balck, *Evolución de la Táctica en la Guerra Mundial*, trans. Carlos von der Becke (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ferrari Hnos., 1922); "Experiences and Lessons of the War," in Albert Shaw, ed., *Review of Reviews and World's Work, Volume 63* (New York, NY: Review of Reviews, 1921), 447.

their theories, and Perón's first book cited notes from Becke's history lessons at the ESG.¹⁶⁵ Becke would be sent to Berlin in 1930 to serve as the military attaché, where he attended the *Kriegsakademie* (War Academy) and witnessed Adolf Hitler's rise to power during the Great Depression.¹⁶⁶ Becke later referred to Perón as "the Master Teacher," and they stayed in contact throughout their careers.¹⁶⁷

Rottjer chaired the ESG's history department and became Perón's mentor as the latter wrote his captain's course thesis.¹⁶⁸ Rottjer was a nationalist who subscribed to PG thinking, as evinced in a presentation he gave on the Cisplatine War (1825-1828), during which Argentina and Brazil battled over that land that eventually became Uruguay.¹⁶⁹ When Perón published books for in-class use in the 1930s, Rottjer approved them as chair. Years later, Perón replaced Rottjer as the department chair, probably with his mentor's blessing.¹⁷⁰ The two co-authored a book in 1939.¹⁷¹ Rottjer helped guide his protégé's archival research with a focus on Argentina's economic history, and the intellectual exchanges between professor and student helped shape the latter's understanding of the modern nation and Argentina's role in the world order.¹⁷²

Given Perón's interest in economics, it is likely he read *Hacia la Unión Aduanera y Monetaria de la América Latina* (Towards the Customs and Monetary Union of Latin America), an influential booklet published in 1926. The author, Eliodoro Yáñez (1860-1932), a Chilean

¹⁶⁵ Pavón, *Preparación de un Vida para el Mando*, 68; Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 71; Barrios, "El Continentalismo de Perón en la Globalización," 13; Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 33.

¹⁶⁶ Military Service Record, Carlos von der Becke, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires.

¹⁶⁷ Pavón, *Preparación de un Vida para el Mando*, 64; Perón appointed Becke to the Pan-American post in 1946, "Pan-America Post is Filled by Peron: Gen. von der Becke Represents Argentina on Defense Board - Friendly Act Seen," *New York Times*, September 20, 1946.

¹⁶⁸ Camusso, "Perón y sus Maestros," 13; Perón's thesis "The High Peru Campaigns" was technical.

¹⁶⁹ Enrique I. Rottjer, *La Operaciones de la Guerra del Brasil y la Batalla de Ituzaingó* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Escuela Tipográfica del Colegio "León XIII," 1927), 6-10. Rottjer discusses the passions of the military (6), their work to safeguard vital national interests (6), valor (7), using the military to achieve political objectives (8), the feelings that animated nations (8), the "internal political situation" (10), and similar themes.

¹⁷⁰ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 159.

¹⁷¹ Rottjer and Perón, *Operaciones en 1870* was published in 1939.

¹⁷² Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 119; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 83.

journalist, lawyer and politician, described the benefits of joint economic models and listed the United States, unified Germany and Italy, and the autonomous commonwealths of the British Empire as examples.¹⁷³ He noted that multinational steel conglomerates were forming in Europe to compete with US Steel.¹⁷⁴ According to Yáñez, Latin America should emulate United States policy, where each state enjoyed nation-wide free trade with limited federal oversight.¹⁷⁵ He believed Latin American states isolated themselves from each other and that the natural progression of capitalist economics ordained that each would fall to "one powerful economic conglomerate or another" if they did not work together (see figure 1.2).¹⁷⁶ The booklet included a response by Alejandro Bunge (1880–1943), a socialist, notable professor, proponent of industrialization, statesman, and Argentina's leading economist.¹⁷⁷ Bunge largely agreed with Yáñez and suggested starting with a "unified customs system" for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay.¹⁷⁸ The exclusion of Brazil continued the pattern of divergent opinions on a theme that was important to military thinkers and proponents of regional unification. Rivarola links text to a renewed interest in *continentalismo*, continental integration, in the postwar context.¹⁷⁹

During Perón's second year at the ESG, the Army's *Estudios y Comunicaciones de Información (Information Studies and Communications)* journal published an Alumni course thesis by Captain Antonio Berardo. His analysis of the United States' Civil War and the First

¹⁷³ Eliodoro Yáñez, *Hacia la Unión Aduanera y Monetaria de la América Latina*, articles from *La Nación* of Santiago, Chile, November 9 and 11, 1926, 3-4.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 8; Of course, this was not precisely accurate regarding US federal power, but in 1925 the US Federal Government had much less reach than it does today.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

¹⁷⁷ Bunge's father served on Argentina's Supreme Court, and his brother Carlos Octavio was a noteworthy intellectual.

¹⁷⁸ Bunge, letter on November 13, 1926, in Yáñez, *Hacia la Unión Aduanera y Monetaria de la América Latina*, 19-20.

¹⁷⁹ Rivarola, "América Latina y el Nacionalismo Continentalista," 68.

World War concluded that these were national slugfests that incorporated "every available method of action" to destroy the opposition's "capacity to wage war and its will to win."¹⁸⁰ He noted wide-ranging national efforts to reduce the "spiritual and moral vigor" of the enemy's civilian populations.¹⁸¹ He also emphasized a direct link between national and military morale, which made taking steps to maintain the "internal front" critical.¹⁸² His ideas on national efforts and internal unity were textbook Goltz, and his publication in the army's journal indicates that his thesis was well-received.¹⁸³

In 1927, Goltz's son Friedrich was once again teaching at the ESG, where he arranged for the translation and publication of *Nation in Arms* for use at the academy.¹⁸⁴ However, not every officer emphasized German ideas and scholars note that General Ramón Molina (1882-1958), who trained in Germany for two years, published a critical article in the *Revista Militar (Military Review)* journal. Potash notes that "Molina bitterly attacked the German officers, cast doubt upon the authenticity of their expertise, and implored his fellow officers" to have confidence in their abilities.¹⁸⁵ Molina's article coincided with a minor dip in German influence after infighting at the ESG resulted in fewer German instructors.¹⁸⁶ However, Perón noted in an interview that he read the new translation of *Nation in Arms* while at the captain's course.¹⁸⁷ He said that Goltz's concepts of a "nation in arms" and "total war" profoundly influenced his ideas regarding "subordinating industrial growth and the general economy to national interests and objectives,"

¹⁸⁰ Antonio Berardo, "Similitudes entre la Guerra Civil Norteamericana 1861-1865 y la Guerra Mundial 1914-1918," *Estudios y Comunicaciones de Información* 4, no. 17 (June 1926): 314-315.

¹⁸¹ The belligerents targeted each other's financial, industrial, and agricultural systems, *ibid.* 314-315.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 354.

¹⁸³ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 365, 381.

¹⁸⁴ Colmar von der Goltz and Friedrich von der Goltz, *La Nación en Armas: Un Libro Sobre Organización de Ejércitos y Conducción de Guerra en Nuestros Tiempos* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Tip. de L. Bernard, 1927); Vior, "Estudio Introductorio," 12n.

¹⁸⁵ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 93; Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 266.

¹⁸⁶ Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 268.

¹⁸⁷ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 84.

which is evident in his future publications.¹⁸⁸ Industrialization continued to be a frequent topic for civilians and military leaders. Javier Villanueva notes that Alejandro Bunge, who opined on Yáñez's call for regional economic integration, argued that Argentina's development had plateaued in 1908 and urged industrialization to spark a "new process of growth."¹⁸⁹ Historian Arthur Whitaker adds that General Enrique Mosconi, head of the recently nationalized oil industry, linked industrialization to national defense.¹⁹⁰ Mosconi was an influential leader and also supported the idea of regional unification to oppose imperialism.¹⁹¹ Perón would also adhere to all these ideas.

1928 proved to be a watershed year in Argentine civil-military relations. Hipólito Yrigoyen won a second presidency by a two-to-one margin, but scholars note that officers of all ranks were disgruntled.¹⁹² Yrigoyen cut the defense budget, micromanaged military purchases, showed favoritism, and forced General José Uriburu (1868-1932), an influential leader and devout Germanophile, to retire.¹⁹³ Potash notes with irony that Uriburu cited his professional, apolitical stance when he rejected a request from nationalist officers to help sabotage Yrigoyen's campaign to return to the presidency in 1927.¹⁹⁴ Federico Finchelstein reports that fascist ideas from Italy were beginning to make headway among nationalists by this time and that the "ultranationalist" Uriburu appreciated Mussolini's authoritarianism, his political alliance with the

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 84.

¹⁸⁹ Javier Villanueva, "Economic Development," in *Prologue to Perón: Argentina in Depression and War, 1930-1943*, eds. Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. Dolkart (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), 59.

¹⁹⁰ Arthur P. Whitaker, "An Overview of the Period," in *Prologue to Perón*, 21; Oil was the first significant sector of Argentina's economy to be nationalized and Mosconi was the first officer appointed to head it.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 21.

¹⁹² Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 29; White, *German Influence in the Argentina Army*, 62; Alberto Spektorowski, *The Origins of Argentina's Revolution of the Right* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 63.

¹⁹³ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 33-37; López, *Primer Perón*, 32.

¹⁹⁴ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 38.

Vatican, his quest for autarchy, and his efforts to implement a corporative model.¹⁹⁵ In January 1929, Perón transferred to the Chief of Staff's office, where he bore witness to the anti-Yrigoyen intrigue growing in the heart of army politics.¹⁹⁶ The sudden crash of the United States' economy later that year sent shockwaves throughout the world and found Argentina ill-prepared to face its consequences.

When the Great Depression hit Argentina, the export-import economy struggled as global commerce and foreign investment plummeted.¹⁹⁷ Scholars note that the initial impact exacerbated income inequality and led disillusioned Argentines to consider alternatives like anarchism, fascism, Marxism, and socialism.¹⁹⁸ Leading army officers concluded that the aging Yrigoyen was incapable of dealing with Depression-related issues, in addition to their existing complaints, and believed Argentina was becoming vulnerable after Germany's economic freefall hindered arms procurement.¹⁹⁹ No one knew when a recovery might occur and the economy in a gulch in 1930, conservatives called on the military to overthrow Yrigoyen.²⁰⁰ The retired general José Uriburu led the September 1930 coup d'état and as dictator sought to enact institutional changes, scuttle democracy, and reorder society on a corporative model.²⁰¹ However, his vision

¹⁹⁵ Finkelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 52, 57, 68; In Italy, Mussolini dissolved parliament and replaced it with a board of representatives from different sectors of society who were little more than subordinate subject matter spokesmen, Knight, *Mussolini and Fascism*, 21-22, 65-67.

¹⁹⁶ Perón, "Lo Que Yo Ví," in *Obras Completas I*, 98-99; Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires.

¹⁹⁷ Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State, & the Rise of Perón*, 1; Whitaker, "An Overview of the Period," 1, 5; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 65; Spektorowski, *Origins of Argentina's Revolution of the Right*, 94; Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, 213.

¹⁹⁸ Whitaker, "An Overview of the Period," 2; Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 12; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 57; Daniel C. Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War": An Intellectual Biography* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1991), 27; Hedges, *Argentina*, 56-57.

¹⁹⁹ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 3; White, *German Influence in the Argentina Army*, 69; Dick, *Profesionalización en el Ejército Argentino*, 57-58; Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. Dolcart, "Political Developments," in *Prologue to Perón*, 46; Hedges, *Modern Argentina*, 57.

²⁰⁰ Argentina's economy staged a comeback during the Depression because industrialization finally began when investors recognized the potential for profit available if they provided products for internal consumption. However, dependency on foreign trade subsided slowly, Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 65.

²⁰¹ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 93-94; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 55-57; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 60-61; Tulio Halperín-Donghi, *La Argentina y la Tormenta*

had limited support and resulted in a nationalist-liberal political split because many officers continued to support liberal economics and democracy, especially in the Navy, Marines, and the army's cavalry, and Uriburu's co-conspirator General Augustín Justo (1876–1943).²⁰² This ideological split marked the beginning of a rift within the military that continued to exist for the remainder of Perón's career. National and international traumas influenced his thinking and steeled his resolve. He played a supporting role in the coup chauffeuring higher-ranking officers. In his official report after the coup, he justified his participation on the basis that the failures of Yrigoyen's government were creating conditions for "collectivism" to gain an unacceptable degree of support. He noted that though the military now held political sway, captains like himself wielded little influence. He would bide his time, exchange ideas, and build a coalition immune to the pressures of "foreign money and politics."²⁰³ He soon thereafter received the opportunity to build such a coalition.

Expounding the Theory: Professor Perón, 1931-1934

Perón transferred to the ESG as a professor of military history from 1930 through 1936, which was in keeping with the recommendations found in his professional evaluations.²⁰⁴ This chapter has shown ideas he was exposed to as he prepared a three-year curriculum that would explore the meaning of a "nation" and development in the world's imperialist order. He was part of a growing nationalist movement in the army, and many of his peers were anti-imperialists, but

del Mundo: Ideas e Ideologías entre 1930 y 1945 (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2013), 13; Spektorowski, *Origins of Argentina's Revolution of the Right*, 11; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 90-92.

²⁰² Finkelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 68; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 51-57; White, *German Influence in the Argentina Army*, 65-66; Spektorowski, *Origins of Argentina's Revolution of the Right*, 84; Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 12.

²⁰³ Perón, "Lo Que Yo Ví," 98; This was a reference to the increase in support for socialist politics, Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 12.

²⁰⁴ Perón reported to the ESG on December 1, 1930, and worked there through January 21, 1936, Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires.

he now had a pulpit from which he could disseminate his ideas to future military leaders. As a student at the ESG from 1925 through 1929, Perón was trained to apply PG thought as an analytical tool, and this section will show how he applied this in the three books he published from 1931 through 1933 for use as textbooks in his classes. He used militaristic German theories with their imperialist tones in his formulation of an anti-imperialist development model. PG ideas represented a proven blueprint, embodied by Germany's unification and rise to power, for national development. Goltz, in particular, discussed channeling the spirit of the youth into a cohesive unit capable of creating a strong nation, and some of his ideas aligned with ideas that Latin American intellectuals proposed. These points of validation, set amid the collapse of liberal capitalism, contributed to his conclusion that Argentina needed a new order.

In the introduction of Perón's first book, which started his three-year curriculum, he explained his principal pedagogical aims. He wanted to train young officers to examine situations that led to the war. He argued that "modern officers" needed to understand the "modern concept" of a "nation in arms," lest Argentina find itself unprepared when the call to arms sounded.²⁰⁵ In keeping with his inquisitive nature, he encouraged discussion and later described his personal experience in the ESG's atmosphere of intellectual exchange as that of a "professor-student."²⁰⁶ These three books were thematically linked and fundamental to his goal to build a consensus that he first reported that he would mere weeks before his professorship.

Perón chose specific themes to explain his vision. His first book was *El Frente Oriental en la Guerra Mundial (The Eastern Front of the World War)*, published in 1931. He selected this topic because it allowed him to analyze political conditions inherent to the world's imperial order, and to analyze three states that tasted defeat in this order: Russia, Austro-Hungary, and

²⁰⁵ Perón, "Prólogo," *Frente Oriental*, 143-144.

²⁰⁶ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 93.

Germany. Having established what he considered liabilities in the first year of his curriculum, he established his general theory in book two, *Apuntes de Historia Militar: Parte Teórica (Notes Regarding Military History: Theoretical Part)*, which analyzed military victories and theories from military thinkers, especially from the PG school. It was well-received in Argentina, in the region, and won an award at the Exposition of Rio de Janeiro.²⁰⁷ In 1933, he published *La Guerra Ruso-Japonesa (The Russo-Japanese War)*, which analyzed Japan's rise to power. As mentioned previously, a number of intellectuals cited the Japanese example when they discussed Argentina's circumstances as they related to nation-building.²⁰⁸ Japan's rise to power was the first by any country, aside from the United States, outside of Europe, and, just as he selected *Frente Oriental* to analyze failures, he selected the Russo-Japanese War to show a success.

As a professor, Perón conceptualized the world order along nationalist, Goltzian lines and considered imperialism as the cause of war along Clausewitzian lines. He wrote that war was the byproduct of competition over resources required to "satisfy" material "needs," and cited the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War to support a conclusion that all "modern warfare" had a "political-economic character."²⁰⁹ This interpretation of the logics of imperialism echoed Goltz's argument that the root cause of modern war was "earthly nations" seeking to secure "earthly goods" vital to national survival in a competitive world.²¹⁰ Perón acknowledged that diplomacy sometimes helped prevent imperialist wars, but he believed this only forestalled the inevitable because war and politics existed on the same spectrum, as proposed by Clausewitz in *On War*.²¹¹ In *Frente Oriental* and *Parte Teórica*, Perón noted how European diplomacy created

²⁰⁷ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 147.

²⁰⁸ Ingenieros, *Evolución Sociológica Argentina*, 98-99; Ugarte, *Destino de un Continente*, 314-315, 421.

²⁰⁹ Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 152-155, 165-168; Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 3-4.

²¹⁰ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 386.

²¹¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 69; Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 126, 139, 141.

an ever-increasing "disequilibrium" in power leading up to the Great War.²¹² He described a process where states with similar political interests colluded with each other until Europe had consolidated into two antagonistic blocs, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, which set the stage for war as a final resolution after diplomacy eventually failed.²¹³ Perón wrote that most smaller "satellite" states began to feel threatened and aligned with one bloc or the other for protection, while a handful walked a delicate tightrope of neutrality.²¹⁴ This discussion of how forming blocs of rivaling states created a power disequilibrium that would cause an eventual breakdown of diplomacy and war corresponded to Clausewitzian theory. It also meant the formation of Spanish-speaking blocs of state in Latin America, as suggested in *Nuestra Guerra*, would create the sort of disequilibrium in the region, especially regarding Brazil's exclusion, that would ultimately require bellicose resolutions.

In keeping with PG theory, Perón professed that the "original character" of "modern war" was characterized by national efforts and the concentration of force *en masse* to unleash devastating power.²¹⁵ In *Parte Teórica*, he traced the origin of this change to the Napoleonic Wars, as had Clausewitz and Goltz.²¹⁶ Perón wrote that the concept of the "nation in arms," which he heavily cited, was not a new theory, but a theory he was applying to a new context. He explained that advances in transportation and logistics meant war could spread across the world, including to Argentina.²¹⁷ He argued that nations must "be willing to give everything" toward the goal of civic-military preparation because "modern war has imposed" the need to maintain a constant state of readiness.²¹⁸ This notion echoed Goltz's claim that a nation, "for the sake of its

²¹² Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 140-142.

²¹³ Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 153-155; Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 153-161.

²¹⁴ Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 165-168.

²¹⁵ Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 124, 131-132.

²¹⁶ Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 122; Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 2-3; Clausewitz, *On War*, 139.

²¹⁷ Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 140-142.

²¹⁸ Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 126, 140-142.

existence or self-preservation," must be ever prepared to defend itself.²¹⁹ Perón understood that politicians often ignored the military when it called for policies such as these, often because of insufficient revenue or a naive level of trust regarding foreign ambitions.²²⁰ He countered that "the lessons of history that are thrown into oblivion are expensive" and that defeat might mean national extinction.²²¹

Perón used Goltz's theory that poor preparation, low national spirit, and inadequate national unity to explain defeat in war. He argued that France made a fatal mistake in 1870 when it declared war because its military was ill-prepared to face the organized Prussians. The Argentine suggested that Germany lost the First World War because the "entire nation" was "strategically, politically, economically, and morally" exhausted, the latter representing a collapse of the national spirit.²²² He called the Austro-Hungarian Empire's composite monarchy "anachronistic" because it lacked a unified national identity behind which the realm's various ethnicities could rally.²²³ Perón's argument that multi-ethnic states held uncertain loyalties echoed a claim Goltz made in *Nation in Arms*.²²⁴ Regarding Russia's 1905 loss against Japan, Perón pointed to poor national morale, which he considered a byproduct of a divided society that lacked the national spirit to support the Czar's war.²²⁵ Perón's belief that low morale at home translated to low motivation within the military aligned with Goltz's view that the outcome of a war was something "the passions of the nations" decided.²²⁶ The use of examples that came after the Franco-Prussian war, which was critical to the development of Goltz's theories, demonstrated

²¹⁹ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 14.

²²⁰ Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 125.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 140-142, 145.

²²² Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 140-142; Nazis often described the "surrender at home" as the cause for German defeat, but Perón published this idea in 1931, before the Nazis rose to power. Furthermore, this was a common belief among many military figures, especially German military theorists who fought in the First World War.

²²³ Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 182-183.

²²⁴ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 381.

²²⁵ Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 18.

²²⁶ Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 18; Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 2.

Perón's belief that the concepts presented in *Nation in Arms* remained relevant in the twentieth century.

Perón's prescription for the contentious world order also reflected Goltz's ideas. Goltz advocated keeping Germany perpetually "in arms" using programs like conscription and indoctrination to militarize the populace, and he considered soldier and citizen "convertible terms."²²⁷ Goltz believed the states and the military must also be "convertible" in pursuit of national objectives, which he saw on the war-military spectrum proposed by Clausewitz.²²⁸ Perón argued it was an "essential necessity" to prepare "the entire country, in a form able to, when the moment comes, convert itself into a nation in arms."²²⁹ The idea of a "national war machine" is an apt way to describe Perón's plan for converting a country into a "nation in arms" when the time came. A machine is a combination of parts that act as a tool designed for a specific task or tasks. In Perón's context, Argentina's primary national objectives were to prepare for the possibility that war could erupt in the region in the immediate future, and to forge a nation capable of confronting the persistent threat that imperialism posed.

To function as a "war machine," Argentina would require power, properly assembled parts, and effective application, which is to say, leadership. Goltz held that the youth were the strength of the youth give the military the internal drive it needed to triumph in chaotic times.²³⁰ Perón echoed this, saying that "only the state that sustains itself through the strength and unanimous will of its children can accomplish great things." In *Frente Oriental*, he compared pre-war demographics and related them to the nation's ability to endure wars before he argued along Goltzian lines that investing in "national education" paid dividends because conscripts

²²⁷ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 4, 14, 391.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

²²⁹ Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 143.

²³⁰ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 2.

must arrive for military training in good physical and mental condition. The Argentine wrote that an effective national education program would emphasize cultural development, literacy rates, and hygiene. In *Frente Oriental Front*, the professor claimed the Germans knew how to "light the soul" in support of grand patriotic ideals and noted that Germany cultivated its youth for military service well in advance of the war.²³¹ He also discussed how Japan, whose military modernization also relied on German instructors, instituted a full-spectrum program of "patriotic education" that "exalted" the warrior spirit during its development.²³² Thus, the nation's youth provided spiritual energy to power the national war machine, but the state must cultivate this energy through programs dedicated to the indoctrination, training, and health of the nation.

If the nation were to convert into a war machine, it must be properly organized to work as a unit. In Perón's conceptualization, the three most significant pieces were the nation, the military, and the state. The nation served in the military, the state's tool to achieve national objectives. According to Goltz and Perón, this meant military and state policy must be inseparable.²³³ The latter wrote, because "war is the continuation of politics by other means," the government's relationship to the military must be seen in this spectrum as "two personalities that understand each other and serve each other." He argued that they "must march together... during peace and war," for the good of the nation. Perón explained that the "political serves the military during peace to create the best possible conditions for the war," and the military was the state's tool during warfare to "impose its true political objective," the national objective, on the opposition.²³⁴ Perón later said Goltz's concepts profoundly impacted his ideas "to subordinate industrial growth and the country's general economy" toward national interests and

²³¹ Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 179-181.

²³² Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 180; Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 162-163; White, *German Influence in the Argentine Army*, 2-3.

²³³ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 16, 390.

²³⁴ Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 144.

development.²³⁵ The organization of society that this model featured remained a critical component of his thoughts on the social order for the rest of his life.

Perón's theory called for a strong leader to direct a united national war machine, just as a machine operator directs their machine. He argued that it was wise to abandon democracy during warfare and suggested that decades of changes in the nature of warfare made Argentina's 1853 Constitution a "bit antiquated."²³⁶ He approved of how the politically advanced Europeans enacted dictatorship during wars, rather than returning to the outdated political monarchy system.²³⁷ His wording reflected Goltz's argument that kings ruled through individual decree while dictators responded to the national will.²³⁸ Perón's advocacy of dictatorships in wartime reflected Goltz's view that this was a better way to engage the national spirit. However, no leader could operate a national war machine that had fallen to pieces.

Perón gleaned from historical failures and successes that the new reality of "the nation in arms" meant the "'internal front' had acquired decisive importance," which meshed with Goltz's claim that only the "national unity of states protects them from forcible dismemberment."²³⁹ He explained that "the nation must unite the mind, the hearts and souls, as well as all physical forces and material powers" before and during the hostilities.²⁴⁰ He wrote that state policy must resolve internal dissent before war arrived, or disruptions between capital and labor, especially in critical defense industries, might "break the warrior spirit" of the nation.²⁴¹ He considered national unity the state's top priority, though it would prove elusive. He was well aware that Argentina was not a homogenous state like Germany, which is where the emphasis on national unity that was

²³⁵ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 78.

²³⁶ Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 163, 175.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 163.

²³⁸ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 383.

²³⁹ Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 200; Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 381.

²⁴⁰ Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 223.

²⁴¹ Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 162.

prominent in all his training meshed with his inclusive and egalitarian view. In this regard, Perón's belief that it was the state's responsibility to harmonize the nation, which was socially divided in numerous ways, would remain a major theme throughout his political career that was central to his future advocacy for social justice.

Perón poured years of research and analysis into these three books. Considering the content of his ideas and his post-coup statement about coalition building, I argue that Perón wrote these books with a purpose. He recognized that Argentina existed in a tumultuous world and believed that war was an inevitable eventuality. He wanted to ensure that his fellow officers understood that in the contemporary era, warfare required a total effort, and failure to prepare adequately might have dire consequences, including possible national extinction. He believed that this preparation would allow a strong leader to convert an organized nation into a war machine powered by its spiritual energy, which he argued was critical in the imperialist world order. Though Perón was still modifying his vision, these three books were the first printed representation of his political program, which was marked by nationalism and militaristic PG theory, but also inspired by his anti-imperialist agenda.

The Japanese Model

The teaching points in Perón's third book, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, merit extra attention because, at this point, he was an expert in military theory and geopolitical analysis making his closing arguments to his students. His case study of the war emphasized concepts of profound importance to his program for national development in the imperial world order. Though Perón did not specify it in writing, I argue that five points indicate that he selected the war as an analogy of Argentina's and Latin America's contemporary circumstances. The first point is that

he likened Manchuria's topography to that of Argentina's border regions, which made the tactical and strategic analysis of the campaign useful.²⁴² Perón dedicated the majority of the book to a review of military maneuvers, which was his professional duty and relevant to the prospect of war in the region.²⁴³

Second, I argue that Perón highlighted China's experience with imperialism to demonstrate why Argentina must adopt a new national development model. The professor explained how imperialist powers imposed a series of trade concessions on China in the nineteenth century. In the process, the Chinese nation lost its sovereignty because the concessions created autonomous zones under foreign control, to include the islands of Macau and Hong Kong. When a foreign war broke out over Chinese resources in Chinese territory, it caused the Chinese people to suffer. Perón used the examples of imperialist penetration in China and the Russo-Japanese War in China to suggest what fate might fall upon unprepared nations in the imperial world order.²⁴⁴ Would an imperial power forcibly partition Argentina or other parts of Latin America? The United States had already carved out autonomous zones in Cuba, Panama, Dominican Republic, and Haiti. Or perhaps war between two imperial powers might break out in Argentina or elsewhere in Latin America over conflicting interests? As noted earlier, Perón suggested as early as 1918 that the United States and Britain might clash over trade interests in the region.²⁴⁵

A third, analogous point is that Perón configured his analysis of Japan as a counterpoint to the Chinese experience. He described Japan as an industrializing nation seeking to meet its growing material needs and "superpopulation" problems. He identified taking control of

²⁴² Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 14.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 75-229.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 4-7.

²⁴⁵ Perón, letter to parents, November 26, 1918.

Manchuria as Japan's way to meet this national objective, but noted that an imperial backlash was looming. Perón explained that "Russia, Germany, and France" worked against Japan to protect their interests in the region, which was a statement that was easily relatable to describing the imperialist motives of the United States or any other powerful state.²⁴⁶ Donald Calman notes that Japan's development started around 1968, during its Meiji Restoration.²⁴⁷ In the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), it handily defeated the Chinese Qing military and was widely recognized as the region's most potent state. Calman notes that days after China signed control of much of Manchuria to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the three European states staged the "Triple Intervention" to reverse this.²⁴⁸ Perón wrote that these "compromising foreign impositions" from the West compelled Japan to pay China an indemnity, evacuate Manchuria, and pledge to respect Chinese borders. He explained that the European ploy was successful because the "Japanese Government could not oppose their might," which is to say, their imperialism.²⁴⁹ Historian Rotem Kowner explains that this experience played a significant role in Japan's march toward the Russo-Japanese War.²⁵⁰

Fourth, Perón wrote that Japan enacted long-term policies that related to its unique circumstance, including the existence of imperialist threats in the region, to create the conditions required to "realize the just aspiration of an industrious and civilized people," which is to say, to achieve the national objective.²⁵¹ He argued that Japan's military and militarism were critical to its ability to establish itself as a regional power.²⁵² He counted the Japanese infantry among the

²⁴⁶ Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 3-5.

²⁴⁷ Donald Calman, *The Nature and Origins of Japanese Imperialism: A Reinterpretation of the Great Crisis of 1873* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), 3.

²⁴⁸ Calman, *Nature and Origins of Japanese Imperialism*, 3.

²⁴⁹ Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 4-5.

²⁵⁰ Rotem Kowner, *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 375.

²⁵¹ Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 3.

²⁵² Calman explains that nationalism, a belief in its racial superiority, and that the Empire must become the center of

world's best after they instituted a long-term modernization program that included military training from the French and, from 1873, the Germans. In the Argentine's view, the Japanese people were the "antithesis of the Russians, they loved their army," gave all they could to the Emperor, and viewed war in a "holy" light. He wrote that Japanese patriotism, "extremely sober customs," and "superior morale" made their youth prime material for the military's ranks. According to this analysis, Japan's army, fortified by the national spirit, was "a robust organization, strongly tempered, where one can observe a harmonious equilibrium, completely homogenous and united."²⁵³ Japan's planners were correct. The military was called into action again in 1904 to resolve the political dispute with Russia over control of Manchuria.

Perón concluded that Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War consolidated its position as a regional power and satisfied the nation's material needs.²⁵⁴ In doing so, it was the first non-Western state to outmaneuver Western imperial powers. Like other intellectuals of his era, he saw Japan's rise in the face of imperialism as an example of what a vigorous and united nation could achieve, and he believed this was an example that Argentina could follow. The Peronist officer Colonel Horacio Ballester later confirmed that the professor used this lesson at the ESG to demonstrate the efficacy of his theories on national development.²⁵⁵ Later in life, Perón frequently said that he and his peers saw Japan as an example of how to "introduce modifications" to prepare the nation adequately for success in the imperial world order, a process that he expected would require forty to fifty years in Argentina.²⁵⁶

Fifth, Perón's emphasis on Japanese national unity was significant because he considered Argentina a divided nation, but he believed the right policies could rectify this. Through

the universe powered Japanese ambitions. Calman, *Nature and Origins of Japanese Imperialism*, xxi, 60.

²⁵³ Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 29-31.

²⁵⁴ Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 4.

²⁵⁵ Horacio Ballester, "Presentación," in Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, xv.

²⁵⁶ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 60-61, 66.

research, personal experiences, and various operational deployments around the country, he had identified vast gulfs between the poor and the rich, rural and urban society. He believed these divisions were the outcome of Argentina's semi-colonial conditions that decades of the oligarchy's liberal economic policies created.²⁵⁷ Having come from a frontier zone, he was aware of how indigenous and *criollo* tradition clashed with the cosmopolitan modernity of Buenos Aires. His next book was about the indigenous Araucanian, who the state massacred during the "Conquest of the Desert," though some survivors lived in both Argentine and Chilean Patagonia. By placing them in the national historiography, he made the daring proclamation that "yes, these are our people too!"²⁵⁸ For Perón, national unity was impossible while rejecting Argentines of indigenous and or mixed heritage, like members of the maternal side of his family. Inclusive social policies would be required to unify the nation.

Guerra Ruso-Japonesa was the culmination of Perón's three-year curriculum. In the first year, he identified characteristics of failed nations in *Frente Oriental*, emphasizing how poor organization, unity, and national spirit were common traits among defeated nations. In the second year, he discussed successful policies from the past in *Parte Teórica*. His case study of Japan, and China, allowed him to demonstrate how policies that led to success and failure, respectively. The Japanese model was literally his textbook example of national development in the contemporary world.

²⁵⁷ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 25-26, 43-45, 59, 90-92, 94.

²⁵⁸ Juan Perón, *Toponimia Patagónica de Etimología Araucana (1934-36)* (1936; repr., Buenos Aires, Argentina: Hernandarias, 1998).




Figure 1.1. Map of Argentina circa 1916.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁹ "La Argentina en torno a 1916," accessed September 29, 2019, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1c/Nuevo_mapa_de_la_Republica_Argentina_%281914%29.jpg




Figure 1.2. Latin America's self-imposed trade barriers. Inside cover of Eliodoro Yáñez' booklet.²⁶⁰

²⁶⁰ Yáñez, *Hacia la Unión Aduanera y Monetaria de la América Latina*, 2.

Chapter Two

Perón, The "Infamous Decade," and Clouds of War

The Great Depression was an era brimming with uncertainty and new ideas during which Argentina's situation deteriorated in many ways. This was especially true regarding its unresponsive and corrupt democracy, which many claimed was selling the nation out to foreign capitalists.¹ New expressions of nationalism emerged in Latin America during this period, including a left-wing anti-imperialist movement, while the rise of fascism as a nationalistic development model in the region and around the world had unsettling effects. Geopolitical pressures exacerbated existing foreign policy concerns, including multi-party imperialist penetration in the region that many worried might precipitate a broader war over the region's geopolitical alignment as Germany, Japan, and Italy all tried to assert their place in the region to gain access to its markets and resources.²

¹ Jill Hedges, *Argentina: A Modern History* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 47-48; Joel Horowitz, ed., *Argentine Unions, The State & the Rise of Perón, 1930-1945* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1990), 15-17; David Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 217, 224; David Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History, and Its Impact* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 91; Luis Alberto Romero, *A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, trans. James P. Brennan (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 73; Juan Perón, interview by Jorge Crespo, in Jorge Crespo, *El Coronel* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ayer y Hoy Ediciones, 1998), 144; Daniel K. Lewis, *The History of Argentina* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 85.

² Tulio Halperín-Donghi, *The Contemporary History of Latin America*, trans. John Chasteen (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 195-196, 216, 233; Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America, 4th ed.* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), 52-53, 85, 201; Teresa A. Meade, *A History of Modern Latin America: 1800 to the Present* (Chicester, UK: Wiley, 2011), 406; Robert A. Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), 96, 107; Ronald C. Newton, *The "Nazi Menace" in Argentina, 1931-1947* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), xvi-xvii; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 60-61, 88; Federico Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 36-38, 42-43, 65;

During this time, Juan Domingo Perón (1895-1974), a mid-ranked army officer, continued to advocate his the early version of his alternative national development model, which became known as Peronism. In this period, he refined his ideas based on his analysis of these changing circumstances. This chapter analyzes Perón's intellectual response to changes taking place in Argentina, Latin America, and the world in the 1930s. I argue that he numbered among those who recognized the dangers facing Argentina and believed the existing political order was incapable of taking the necessary steps to alleviate it. At the end of this period, Perón collaborated with his mentor, Enrique Rottjer (1891-1959), to outline a program to enact change in response to this. They worked in the context where imperialist competed for the region's resources and the threat of a new world war loomed heavily in Europe and Latin America. Perón felt the need for change was enormous because Argentina's wealth of resources and political weakness made it a target for imperialist interests that could well result in Argentina going to war. Their efforts resulted in *Las Operaciones en 1870 (Operations in 1870)*, which they published in early 1939. I argue that Perón and Rottjer intended to convince Argentine officers that Argentina must rise to its potential and become a regional power to defend the sake of the nation in these harrowing times.

The "Infamous Decade" and Political Stagnation in Argentina

The collapse of the capitalist system in the Great Depression was the second major failure of the liberal order, the initial failure being the First World War. Western governments desperate to stop the cycle of declining demand and rising unemployment began to intervene in their

Mariano Ben Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón: A Cultural History of Perón's Argentina* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2003), 3; Hedges, *Argentina*, 88; Ramón Grosfoguel, "Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America," *Views from the South* 1, no. 2 (2000): 1-28, 335; Uki Goñi, *Perón y los Alemanes: La Verdad sobre el Espionaje Nazi y los Fugitivos del Reich* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ed. Sudamericana, 1998), 33-34.

economies. Scholars describe Argentina's circumstances as moderate compared to the suffering that took place in the United States, but still significant, especially in the early years. The economy was dependent on exportation, and after dropping commodity prices combined with the dip in foreign demand, unemployment and inflation rose, while those who kept their jobs often saw their wages decrease.³ Argentina's economic decline during the Depression stressed existing social divisions. Perón taught history at the *Escuela Superior de Guerra* (ESG, Superior War School) in Buenos Aires from 1930 through 1936, was aware of these divisions through the observations he made in his youth in the Patagonian frontier and on operational deployments around the country.⁴ He noted gulfs between the rich and the poor, urban and rural society, and the European-inspired cosmopolitan modernity of Buenos Aires versus the traditional lifestyles of the indigenous and *criollo*, the long-standing inhabitants of mixed heritage, inhabited Patagonia and Argentina's interior.⁵ In 1936, he published his fourth book, which was on the Araucania, the indigenous people of Patagonia that the Argentine state destroyed during the "Conquest of the Desert" in the 1870s and 1880s. Including them in the national historiography was related to the indigenous blood on his maternal side, but also reflected his inclusive view of the nation and reminded the Europhile elite that Argentina was not Europe.⁶

³ Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 73-74; Hedges, *Argentina*, 44-45; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 83; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 57; Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 26-28.

⁴ Perón served at the Escuela Superior de Guerra from December 1930 until 1936, Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires.

⁵ Juan Perón, interview by Enrique Pavón Pereyra, in Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Yo Perón* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Sudamerica, 2018), 25-26, 43-45, 59, 90-92, 94; Perón, interview by Crespo, in Crespo, *Coronel*, 96-97.

⁶ Juan Perón, *Toponimia Patagónica de Etimología Araucana (1934-36)* (1936; repr., Buenos Aires, Argentina: Hernandarias, 1998); Juan Perón, interview by Enrique Pavón Pereyra, in Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Yo Perón* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Sudamerica, 2018), 23; Perón, "Memorias 1," in *Obras Completas 25 Tomo I* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1988), 48; Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, *Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism: the First Complete English Translation*, trans. Kathleen Ross (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 68-69; Ariel de la Fuente, "'Civilización y Barbarie': Fuentes para una Nueva Explicación del Facundo," *Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana "Dr. Emilio Ravignani,"* 3, no. 44 (Primer Semestre 2016): 135-136; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 75; Hedges, *Argentina*, 26-27; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 60.

During his assignment at the ESG, Perón saw the working poor huddled in *villas miserias*, shanty towns that people desperate for shelter improvised after liberal governance failed to address rapid urbanization in the previous decades.⁷ During the Depression, internal migrations to Buenos Aires mostly came from Argentina's rural zones, which created a juxtaposition of shanty-town neighborhoods populated by *cabecitas negras* (black heads) and affluent neighborhoods, often separated by little more than train tracks or a busy avenue.⁸ "Black heads" was a derogatory term for people with darker complexions and other physical manifestations that resulted from centuries of miscegenation. The working class lacked political representation and felt isolated from society.⁹ Perón later told biographers that, by this time, he believed the oligarchy's liberal trade policies were responsible for semi-colonial conditions in Argentina that reinforced such social and economic divisions.¹⁰

Today, Argentina's Great Depression is known as the "Infamous Decade" (1930-1943) for its scandalous politics. A military coup d'état established a dictatorship in September 1930, but the ultra-nationalist, traditionalist, authoritarian policies of general-turned-dictator José Uriburu (1868-1932) proved unpopular. However, various intellectuals saw some merit in his plans to reorder society into a corporative order and restructure state institutions, though most disapproved of the brutality of his regime (see figure 2.1).¹¹ Uriburu allowed elections in April

⁷ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 55.

⁸ Natalia Milanese, "Peronists and Cabecitas: Stereotypes and Anxieties at the Peak of Social Change," in *The New Cultural History of Peronism: Power and Identity in Mid-Twentieth-Century Argentina*, eds. Matthew B. Karush, and Oscar Chamosa (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 76-77; Ernesto Semán, *Ambassadors of the Working Class: Argentina's International Labor Activists and Cold War Democracy in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), 8-9; Michael Goebel, "Argentina's Partisan Past: Nationalism, Peronism and Historiography, 1955-76" (PhD diss., University of London, 2000), 73-74.

⁹ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 77-78; Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, The State, and the Rise of Perón, 1930-1945*, 2; Hedges, *Argentina*, 57; Halperín-Donghi, *The Contemporary History of Latin America*, 219.

¹⁰ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 25-26, 43-45, 59, 90-92, 94; Perón, interview by Crespo, in Crespo, *Coronel*, 139.

¹¹ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 62; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 90-91; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 57; Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 12.

1931, but he annulled the results when the Radical Party, which he had just ousted from power, swept to victory. Uriburu was outmaneuvered by the liberal General Agustín Justo (1876-1943), a leading co-conspirator in the 1930 coup d'état. Justo took power in a fraudulent election later that year and the Radical Party abstained from political participation in protest.¹²

Justo's administration was the first in a series of corrupt governments under the *Concordancia* (Agreement) coalition. The *Concordancia* was organized and dominated by wealthy landowners and businessmen connected to foreign trusts, which is to say, the liberal elite who prioritized foreign trade and investment for the sake of their portfolios.¹³ Scholars note that they used fraud and repression to prevent effective opposition.¹⁴ The *Concordancia* generally supported free trade but intervened in the economy to assist the growth of import substitution industrialization, which led to the rise of a small, "neo-conservative" *Concordancia* sub-faction of industrialists.¹⁵ When convenient, small concessions for social relief were granted in return for congressional support for unpopular bills.¹⁶ The working class was growing as a result of industrialization, but lacked meaningful political representation and felt isolated by society.¹⁷ The Radical Party held a convention in 1934 and, after a contentious debate, decided to end their political boycott. They were the only party capable of challenging the *Concordancia*, but many nationalists within the party saw participation as collaboration, as did nationalists in general. The return of the Radicals led the *Concordancia* to use more blatant fraud to maintain its power,

¹² Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 59; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 91; Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 14; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 65.

¹³ Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 17; Hedges, *Argentina*, 47; Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, 217.

¹⁴ Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 91; Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 15-17; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 73; Hedges, *Argentina*, 47.

¹⁵ Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 28; Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 11; Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, 232; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 65-68.

¹⁶ Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 16-17, 28; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 66-67; Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 11; Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, 233.

¹⁷ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 77-78; Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 2; Hedges, *Argentina*, 57; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 219.

which created growing resentment in the nation.¹⁸ However, even after making the controversial decision to return to politics, the Radicals were not fully in agreement on how to proceed.

The Radical Party founded the journal *Hechos e Ideas* (Facts and Ideas) to elaborate on their positions as Argentina and the world searched for answers in the Depression years. Perón likely read this journal. Radicalism had a history of support in the army's officer corps, and he voted for the Radical's most historic leader, the deposed president Hipólito Yrigoyen (1852-1933), at least once.¹⁹ Early issues of *Hechos e Ideas* showed that prominent party members espoused changes similar to those Perón proposed in the books he published as an ESG instructor. In "Obligatory Civil Conscription," Angél R. Soler, a Radical Party intellectual, called for patriotic training to unleash Argentina's "spiritual power" and to cultivate the nation's "mental constitution." He outlined a "civil conscription" program to educate the youth on the "richness of the spirit" and provide training in the arts and sciences. He called the energy of the youth "a source of incalculable wealth" that could benefit the nation if state policy applied it to programs like infrastructure development.²⁰ These notions aligned with Perón's ideas regarding the importance of the youth, national spirit, and organized plans for national development.²¹

Carlos Noel, a prominent Radical Party member and former ambassador to Chile, advocated an "organized society."²² He warned that adopting fascist or communist models would

¹⁸ Arthur Whitaker, "Overview of the Period," in *Prologue to Perón: Argentina in Depression and War, 1930-1943*, eds. Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. Dolkart (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), 5; Falcoff, "Intellectual Currents," in *ibid.*, 126; Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 11. Joel Horowitz indicates the return of the Radicals forced the *Concordancia* to engage in more blatant fraud to maintain power, Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State and the Rise of Perón*, 17-19; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 79-80.

¹⁹ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 8-9; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 22; Juan Perón, interview by Tomás Eloy Martínez, in Tomás Eloy Martínez, *Las Memorias del General* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Planeta, 1996), 38.

²⁰ Angél R. Soler, "La Conscripción Civil Obligatoria," *Hechos e Ideas* 1, no. 4, (September 1935): 345-347.

²¹ Juan Perón, *El Frente Oriental de la Guerra Mundial en 1914*, in *Obras Completas 1* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1997), 179-181; Juan Perón, *Apuntes de Historia Militar: Parte Teórica* (1932; repr., Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1951), 126, 140-142; Juan Perón, *Apuntes de Historia Militar: Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, in *Obras Completas 4* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1997), 29-30.

²² Carlos M. Noel, "Política y Economía" (speech at the Teatro Independencia, Mendoza, April 7, 1935), in *Hechos*

destroy the most important political gain since independence: the popular vote.²³ Argentina adopted universal male suffrage in 1912, and since 1916 the Radical Party controlled the presidency through three electoral victories until the military's coup in 1930. Noel proposed a new, "authentically Argentine" development model. The national leader would be an "authentic expression of the unions" and implement a "coordinated economy" that featured a syndicalism model, where labor and capital would collaborate to balance their interests as partners. He argued this would ensure workers maintained their dignity while still allowing Argentina to avoid the pitfalls of capitalism or communism, which corresponded to Perón's theory that the state must harmonize society, as he espoused at the ESG.²⁴ It would be hard to classify the Radical Party proposals to mobilize the youth and socioeconomic restructuring as liberal approaches.

Though some Radicals were considering solutions outside of the ideological confines of liberalism, the overwhelming bulk of *Hechos e Ideas* articles were pro-democracy, defended liberalism, and harshly criticized Marxism, fascism, and Nazism.²⁵ In conclusion, the *Concordancia* used fraud and violence to lay claim to the ideals of liberal democracy, while Argentina's most capable challengers, the Radicals, also sought to maintain liberal democracy.

e Ideas 1, no. 1 (June 1935): 32-34.

²³ *Ibid.*, 31.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 32-35; Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 162. Noel argued this would prevent the atomization of the individual seen in communism and the cycle of economic downturns that was seen in the liberal order.

²⁵ Editor, "A Través del Mundo," *Hechos e Ideas* 1, no. 1 (June 1935): 177-179; Noel, "Política y Economía," 31-32; Georges de Leener, "Economía Liberal y Economía Dirigida," *Hechos e Ideas* 1, no. 3 (August 1935): 201-218; Editor, "A Través del Mundo," *Hechos e Ideas* 1, no. 3 (August 1935): 278-279; Gaetano Salvemini, "El Capital y el Trabajo en Italia Fascista: Tercera Parte," *Hechos e Ideas* 1, no. 3 (August 1935): 253-266; Sincero, "La Muerte Se Llama Fascismo," *Hechos e Ideas* 1, no. 5, (November 1935): 9; Gustav Cassel, "Del Proteccionismo a través de la Economía Dirigida," *Hechos e Ideas* 1, no. 5 (November 1935): 96; Nicolas Butler, "Las Ataques contra Liberalismo," *Hechos e Ideas* 1, no. 6 (December 1935): 174-175; Eduardo Laurencena, "Comunismo, Fascismo, y Democracia," *Hechos e Ideas* 2, no. 18 (January-February 1937): 18-43; Silvano Santander, "La Esencia Antiliberal de los Extremismos," *Hechos e Ideas* 2, no. 19 (March 1937): 160-166; Gaetano Salvemini, "Bajo el Signo del Fascismo," *Hechos e Ideas* 2, no. 19 (March 1937): 184-208; Antonio Zozaya, "El Liberalismo: Libertad y Individualismo," *Hechos e Ideas* 2, no. 20 (April 1937): 231-249; Antonio Paniagua Picazo, "La Guerra Está Próxima," *Hechos e Ideas* 3, no. 25 (December 1937): 398-400, 404; Jacques Kervyn de Meerendre, "Ensayo Sobre el Liberalismo Económico," trans. editor, *Hechos e Ideas* 4, no. 29 (July-August 1938): 348-374; Orestes D. Confalonieri, "La Dictadura Fascista en España," *Hechos e Ideas* 4, no. 29 (July-August 1938): 401-425.

Like many nationalists, Perón was convinced that neither group offered meaningful solutions to Argentina's problems. However, the *Concordancia's* grip on power was unassailable throughout the 1930s, which left little hope for political renewal.

Nationalist Rebuilding

The disdain that nationalists felt for the *Concordancia* piqued in response to the 1933 Roca-Runciman Treaty, which secured vital beef export rights with Britain and halted the precipitous decline taking place in what remained Argentina's leading economic sector.²⁶

However, critics from several orientations lambasted the concessions granted to Britain in return, including policies that favored British financing and lowered trade barriers for British merchants.²⁷ Nationalists, including Perón, saw Roca-Runciman as an example of the landowning oligarchy's tradition of "selling out" Argentina's sovereignty, development potential, and natural resources.²⁸ In 1934, two nationalist brothers, Jose and Rodolfo Irazusta, published *La Argentina y el Imperialismo Británico* in response.²⁹ The duo argued that the oligarchy's liberalism was foreign to Hispanic culture and the basis of their decadence and alienation from society at large.³⁰ They condemned Argentina's negotiators throughout the post-independence years for their submissive admiration of European liberalism and their desperation to please

²⁶ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 83-84; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 115-116; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 70.

²⁷ Hedges, *Argentina*, 48; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 83-84; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 115-116; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 70.

²⁸ Perón, interview by Crespo, in Crespo, *Coronel*, 144; Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, 224; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 85; Hedges, *Argentina*, 48.

²⁹ Rodolfo Irazusta and Julio Irazusta, *La Argentina y el Imperialismo Británico: Los Eslabones de una Cadena, 1806-1833* (Buenos Aires, Editorial Tor, 1934), 7-9; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 83-84; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 115-116; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 70; Olga Echeverría, "De la Apelación Antidemocrática al Colonialismo como Argumento Impugnador de la 'Oligarquía': Los Hermanos Irazusta en el Génesis del Revisionismo Histórico Argentino," *Prohistoria* 3, no. 8 (Spring 2004): 176; Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 128.

³⁰ Juan Manuel Romero, "FORJA y el Antiimperialismo en la Argentina de los Treinta," *Foros de Historia Política* (Programa Interuniversitario de Historia Política. 2017), 9; Goebel, "Argentina's Partisan Past," 49.

British capital for personal gain.³¹ The brothers supported military rule and corporativism as an alternative.³² The authoritarian and traditionalist perspective the Irazusta brothers espoused typified right-wing nationalism, but it lacked broad popular support despite the fervor its adherents demonstrated.³³

The economic woes caused by the Depression and the *Concordancia's* reluctance to address social issues provided a context for forward-looking nationalist ideas to gain ground, including left-wing nationalism. A prominent example of this was an organization that dissident nationalist Radical Party youths founded, FORJA (*Fuerza de Orientación Radical de la Juventud Argentina*), an acronym that means "forge."³⁴ *Forjistas* rejected the party's return to the corrupt *Concordancia* political system. In 1935, they published a manifesto that laid claim to the Yrigoyenist (named after Argentina's first populist president) mantle, condemned the Radical Party's collaboration with "economic oligarchies," and warned of an imminent *Concordancia* plot to establish a "political dictatorship."³⁵ FORJA specified many grievances, including the institutionalization of central banking, mismanagement of revenue to the "benefit of foreign capitalism," military repression, violations of press and individual liberties, awful trade and oil policies, British control of national infrastructure, the Roca-Runciman Treaty, Argentine participation in the League of Nations, and the severing of diplomatic relations with the Soviet

³¹ Irazusta and Irazusta, *Argentina y el Imperialismo Británico*, 200.

³² Michael A. Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland: Religion and Politics in Argentina* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 30; Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 128; Federico Finchelstein, *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War: Fascism, Populism, and Dictatorship in Twentieth Century Argentina* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 23; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 78.

³³ Goebel, "Argentina's Partisan Past," 52-53.

³⁴ FORJA was primarily comprised of university students and recent graduates who supported class harmony within a democratic system, Whitaker, "Overview of the Period," 15, 23; Falcoff, "Intellectual Currents," 126; Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, 229; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 122; Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 9-11; Romero, "FORJA y el Antiimperialismo en la Argentina de los Treinta," 3.

³⁵ Fuerza de Orientación Radical de la Joven Argentina (FORJA), *Manifiesto del Grupo FORJA (Fuerza de Orientación Radical de la Joven Argentina) Aprobado en su Asamblea Constituyente del 29 de Junio de 1935*, June 29, 1935, Archivo Histórico, accessed October 1, 2019, <http://archivohistorico.educ.ar>; Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 9.

Union.³⁶ The anti-imperialist ideas they espoused combined with new ideas of popular democracy that did not rely on Europe and the Catholic Church for direction.

FORJA condemned what they considered the ongoing "feudalization" of Argentina for the benefit of foreign monopolies. They resented Argentina's semi-colonial relations with Britain, and increasingly, the United States' imperialism, and declared, "We are a colonial Argentina, we want to be a free Argentina."³⁷ FORJA supported democracy and democratic elections, which set them apart from right-wing nationalists, who blamed democracy for Argentina's woes.³⁸ *Forjistas* argued that "emancipation" was only possible if national sovereignty and popular sovereignty were synonymous.³⁹ FORJA espoused progressive socioeconomic adjustments to protect the nation and enable development in accordance with the national will, policies that Perón prioritized in his ESG lessons and supported throughout his subsequent political career. Support for these policies gained momentum, particularly among the energetic youth, who Perón and influential anti-imperialist Latin American intellectuals like José Martí (1853-1895), José Enrique Rodó (1871-1917), Rubén Darío (1867-1916), and Manuel Ugarte (1875-1951) believed represented the region's hope for the future.⁴⁰ FORJA was a local manifestation of enduring, but evolving, anti-imperialist sentiment in Latin America. They focused on the socio-economic effects of imperial capitalist penetration rather than the more

³⁶ FORJA, *Manifiesto del Grupo*, <http://archivohistorico.educ.ar>.

³⁷ FORJA, *Manifiesto del Grupo*, <http://archivohistorico.educ.ar>; Falcoff, "Intellectual Currents," 126; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 122.

³⁸ FORJA, *Manifiesto del Grupo*, <http://archivohistorico.educ.ar>; Goebel, "Argentina's Partisan Past," 16; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 60-61; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, xix.

³⁹ FORJA, *Manifiesto del Grupo*, <http://archivohistorico.educ.ar>. As the years progressed, the FORJA movement grew and after the Second World War was absorbed into the future Peronist movement, Whitaker, "Overview of the Period," 16; Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. Dolkart, "Political Developments," in *Prologue to Perón*, 44; Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 10.

⁴⁰ Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 179-181; Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 162-163; ; José Martí, "Nuestra América," *Revista Ilustrada* (New York), January 10, 1891; José Enrique Rodó, *Ariel*, 1900, Fundación Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes, accessed September 8, 2019, http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/ariel--0/html/fedf72f8-82b1-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_2.html; Rubén Darío, "El Triunfo de Caliban," 1905, Biblioteca Virtual Universal, 2003, accessed September 8, 2019, <http://www.biblioteca.org.ar/libros/155.pdf>; Ugarte, *Destino de un Continente*, 421.

traditional responses to blatant United States' military intervention, which had scaled down in the 1930s under President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor policy."⁴¹ The entire region suffered from imperialist penetration and similar ideas garnered widespread support in Latin America.

Scholars identify Peru's *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA, American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) movement as the first organized expression of leftist, nationalist, anti-imperialism in Latin America.⁴² APRA took shape in 1924, under the leadership of the political exile Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre (1895-1979). Haya de la Torre opposed Peru's Leguía dictatorship for its corruption and continued support of liberal economic policies.⁴³ Like Perón did in his 1933 book *Russo-Japanese War*, Haya de la Torre linked China's experiences with imperialism to the plight of divided Latin America.⁴⁴ The *Aprista* leader believed economic imperialism was decimating the region's nascent middle class and advocated Latin American integration, solidarity with the world's oppressed, state intervention in the economy, and economic nationalism.⁴⁵ Scholars note that Haya de la Torre hoped to build APRA into a regional force, and *Aprista* ideas spread through the region at the university level through foreign exchange programs.⁴⁶ These ideas appealed to many university students, who typically had middle-class origins and worried about their prospects during the Depression, including founding

⁴¹ Harry E. Vanden, ed., *José Carlos Mariátegui: An Anthology* (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2011), 268. Juan Esteban Godoy, "FORJA, y su Denuncia al Imperialismo Británico en el Manifiesto al Pueblo de la República," *Historia y Frontera*, 2 (2014), 4, 7, 9, accessed November 8, 2019, <http://historiayfrontera.org/ojs-2.3.8/index.php/historiayf/article/view/24>.; Romero, "FORJA y el Antiimperialismo en la Argentina de los Treinta," 8.

⁴² Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 195-196; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 201; Meade, *History of Modern Latin America*, 406.

⁴³ Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 200.

⁴⁴ Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 134; Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 4.

⁴⁵ Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 201.

⁴⁶ Leandro Sessa, "Del APRA a FORJA y de FORJA al Peronismo: Reflexiones sobre las Redes del Aprismo en Argentina a través del Itinerario Político e Intelectual de Francisco Capelli," *Pluriversidad 2* (2018): 6-7; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 220; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 201; Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 133.

members of FORJA. The manifestation of this leftist nationalist youth movement in the region corresponded to the ideas that Martí, Rodó, Darío, and Ugarte had espoused. It also overlapped with the Prussian military theory that the youth are the strength of a nation, which Perón supported.⁴⁷ In Argentina, FORJA would become an energetic component of his future political coalition, but in the mid-1930s, it was a splinter group.⁴⁸

Fascism, a New Nationalism

As the 1930s wore on, fascism gained recognition as a potential replacement for liberal models in many places, including Argentina, which added another strain of nationalism to the list of alternatives.⁴⁹ As Perón modified and promoted his ideological blueprint, fascism was becoming the world's most prominent nationalistic ideology, but the nature of fascism was still in question, even if the Italian manifestation was proving to be brutally imperialist. Fascists exalted the past like right-wing nationalism, but also proposed socio-economic policies like autarchy, state intervention in the economy, and the corporative model that left-wing nationalists from FORJA and APRA, and even Radicals, espoused.⁵⁰ Scholars debate whether Perón was a fascist, quasi-fascist, or something else.⁵¹ In the late 1940s and beyond, he would face accusations that

⁴⁷ Colmar von der Goltz, *The Nation in Arms: A Treatise on Modern Military Systems and the Conduct of War*, trans. Philip A. Ashworth (1883; repr., London, UK: Hugh Rees Limited, 1914), 2; Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 179.

⁴⁸ Whitaker, "Overview of the Period," 15-16; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 123-124; Romero, "FORJA y el Antiimperialismo en la Argentina de los Treinta," 2.

⁴⁹ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 61; Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 65; Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 3.

⁵⁰ Noel, "Política y Economía," 31-35; Editor, "A Través del Mundo," 177-179; Leener, "Economía Liberal y Economía Dirigida," 201-218; Editor, "A Través del Mundo," 278-279; Salvemini, "El Capital y el Trabajo en Italia Fascista: Tercera Parte," 253-266; Sincero, "La Muerte Se Llama Fascismo," 9; Cassel, "Del Proteccionismo a través de la Economía Dirigida," 96; Norberto Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída, 1893-1955* (Buenos Aires: Colihue, 2005), 127.

⁵¹ James P. Brennan provides a thorough historiographical examination of this controversy. He listed several scholars that consider Perón to have been fascist, to include Carlos Fayt, Paul M. Hayes, Paul H. Lewis, Juan José Sebrelli, and Gary W. Winia, in James P. Brennan, *Peronism and Argentina* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1998), 4.

he was fascist, especially from liberals.⁵² While liberals and Marxists quickly identified fascism as an authoritarian disaster, others were still trying to understand the new phenomenon.⁵³ To be clear, fascism overlapped with some of the ideas Perón already supported and developed, which made it an intriguing alternative, and understanding it was complicated due to the changes taking place in European fascism, as well as various manifestations of fascist and quasi-fascist governments and movements emerging in his region and the world.

Fascism, the Prussian-German School of Thought, and Latin American Nationalism

Some of the overlaps between Perón's thinking and fascism existed in the concepts German professors in Argentina had preached at the ESG since 1900, which included a metaphysical view of the nation, alignment of the military and the state, and an emphasis martial power.⁵⁴ Scholars note that after the Nazis took power in Germany, German instructors at the ESG were free to discuss their support for Hitler and his program.⁵⁵ After liberal governance failed in Germany, Hitler's rise to power emphasized the "folk," the "will to power," and a metaphysical conceptualization of the nation as an enduring entity that must take precedence

⁵² United States Government, *Blue Book on Argentina: United States Government Official Indictment of the Fascist Regime in Argentina* (New York, NY: Greenberg, 1946); Hedges, *Argentina*, 116; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 112; Lewis, *The History of Argentina*, 97-98.

⁵³ Arthur Rosenberg, "Fascism as a Mass-Movement." *Historical Materialism* 20 (1934): 144-189; Alexander De Grand, *Italian Fascism: Its Origins & Development* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), xiii; Noel, "Política y Economía," 31-35; Leener, "Economía Liberal y Economía Dirigida," 201-218; Salvemini, "El Capital y el Trabajo en Italia Fascista: Tercera Parte," 253-266; Sincero, "La Muerte Se Llama Fascismo," 9; Cassel, "Del Proteccionismo a través de la Economía Dirigida," 96; Butler, "Las Ataques contra Liberalismo," 174-175; Laurencena, "Comunismo, Fascismo, y Democracia," 18-43; Santander, "La Esencia Antiliberal de los Extremismos," 160-166; Salvemini, "Bajo el Signo del Fascismo," 184-208; Confalonieri, "La Dictadura Fascista en España," 401-425.

⁵⁴ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 1-11; Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 314-315; George Pope Atkins and Larry V. Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina, 1921-1940," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 4, no. 2, (November 1972): 257-258; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 3-4; Alain Rouquié, *The Military and the State in Latin America*, trans. Paul E. Sigmund (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 79-80; Ernesto López, *El Primer Perón: El Militar Antes Que El Político* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Capital Intelectual S.A., 2009), 31; Enrique Dick, *La Profesionalización en el Ejército Argentino (1899-1914)* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 2014), 115.

⁵⁵ Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina, 1921-1940," 271.

over the individual. A belief in the metaphysical strength of the Italian nation was central to Mussolini's imperialist ambition to restore "Roman" preeminence in the Mediterranean and beyond.⁵⁶ Perón adhered to the concepts of the power of the national spirit, which corresponded to decades of German instructor before the establishment of the Third Reich and the anti-imperialist ideas from prominent Latin American intellectuals that circulated in his context in the decades prior to Mussolini seizing power in Italy.⁵⁷ Fascism also espoused strict hierarchy, social reorganization, capable leadership, which all appealed to the Argentine, but Mussolini's regime experienced mixed results in these areas.⁵⁸ In this period, Perón's national development vision, as he first explained it in 1931, also emphasized a hierarchical organization of society, subordinating the economy to politico-military goals, and the importance of strong leadership.⁵⁹

Perón later admitted that he admired Mussolini's leadership, which was on display in public spectacles seen in newsreels at the time.⁶⁰ Bonnie Smith notes that fascists "ruled by spectacle," and the fervor Mussolini elicited at rallies shows that many supported his imperialist vision.⁶¹ Like the Argentine, Mussolini ascribed agency to mankind, and both men cited Otto von Bismarck as an example of a leader whose "strength of will" achieved results.⁶² Fascist leaders tapped into the nation's energy and presented the appearance of being able to channel it.

⁵⁶ Giuseppe Finaldi, *Mussolini and Italian Fascism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 77; Patricia Knight, *Mussolini and Fascism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003), 46; Bonnie G. Smith, *Europe in the Contemporary World: 1900 to the Present* (Boston, MA: Bedford/St.Martin's, 2007), 218-221.

⁵⁷ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 381; Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 179-181.

⁵⁸ De Grand, *Italian Fascism*, xiii-xvi; Smith, *Europe in the Contemporary World*, 218-220.

⁵⁹ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 381; Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 179-181.

⁶⁰ Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 21; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 119-120; Smith, *Europe in the Contemporary World*, 219; Benito Mussolini, "A Aventura Imperialista de Mussolini na Absinia" (video), posted Mar 30, 2013, accessed November 1, 2019, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FwS5ZZ-jaHk>.

⁶¹ Smith, *Europe in the Contemporary World*, 219; British Pathé, "Roma Aka Mussolini Speaking To Massed Crowds In Rome (1936)" (video), directed by British Pathé, accessed March 3, 2020. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mJA2fk8KoQg>.

⁶² Benito Mussolini, "Doctrine of Fascism,"

<http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/Germany/mussolini.htm>; Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 144-145.

In this regard, Perón later noted that this interested him as a social phenomenon.⁶³ Imperial Japan, which Perón and other Argentine intellectuals saw as a potential model for development, was often considered a fascist state based on its emphasis on nationalism, rejection of liberal individualism, and imperialist policy.⁶⁴ Japan's rise was deeply tied to its adherence to Prussian military theories, and not coincidentally. Japan, like Argentina, had hired German instructors to modernize its military.⁶⁵ Perón, who wrote on Japan's national development, was trained by Germans, and worked with German instructors at the ESG, certainly knew this.⁶⁶

Fascism in the Context of Failed Liberal Orders

Fascism claimed to be a "Third Way" in the world order precisely as Perón was looking for a new way for Argentina. Fascists positioned their ideology "between capitalism and communism," but early on, it was also criticized for alignment with the interests of capitalists.⁶⁷ Amid the Depression-era failures of liberal, capitalist orders, fascist or quasi-fascist governments and movements emerged in several European and Latin American states.⁶⁸ Argentine nationalists loathed communism, which was making gains in the labor sector, whose plight the ruling

⁶³ Perón, "Memorias I," in *Obras Completas 25 Tomo 1*, 56-57; Juan Perón, interview by Torcuato Luca de Tena, in Torcuato Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón: Relato Autobiográfico* (Barcelona, Spain: Editorial Planeta, 1976), 28; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 113, 118.

⁶⁴ José Ingenieros, *Evolución Sociológica Argentina: De la Barbarie al Imperialismo* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Librería J. Menéndez, 1910), 98-99; Manuel Ugarte, *El Destino de un Continente* (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Mundo Latino, 1923), 314-315; Horacio Ballester, "Presentación," in Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, xv; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 60-61, 66.

⁶⁵ Donald Calman, *The Nature and Origins of Japanese Imperialism: A Reinterpretation of the Great Crisis of 1873* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), 175.

⁶⁶ Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 4-5, 29-31.

⁶⁷ De Grand, *Italian Fascism*, xiii; Federico Finchelstein, *From Fascism to Populism in History* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2019), 35; Rosenberg, "Fascism as a Mass-Movement," 144-189; Karl Korsch, "Theses toward a Critique of the Fascist Conception of the State," *Gegner* 6 (1932), Marxist Internet Archive; Clara Zetkin, Resolution on Fascism, Communist International Executive Committee, 1923, Marxist Internet Archive; Antonio Gramsci, "The Two Fascisms," *Ordine Nuovo* 25 (August 1921), Marxist Internet Archive.

⁶⁸ This included Portugal, Spain, France, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, and Paraguay.

Concordancia neglected.⁶⁹ Nazi and Italian fascist propaganda tried to persuade the region the directed economy model was the answer.⁷⁰ In Argentina, fascist ideas appealed primarily to a small minority of conservative Catholics and supporters of the late Uriburu, who had espoused a corporative model based on the Italian example during his short reign.⁷¹ Even in the United States, the bastion of liberalism in the Western Hemisphere, prominent public figures sympathized with fascism.⁷²

Perón certainly noticed the appeal that fascism had among youths, which historian Robert Paxton attributes to a "generational revolt against the elders," their dogmatic adherence to liberalism, and also rejected the materialism of communist doctrine as an alternative.⁷³ Scholars explain that many youths worried about their futures and found fascism's emphasis on the strength of the youth empowering.⁷⁴ Some of the social and economic structural changes of fascism, including the corporative order, state intervention in the economy, and autarchy, overlapped with the ideas that already existed in the leftist nationalism of the *Aprista* and FORJA youth movements.⁷⁵ Scholars note that by the mid-1930s, youths in Argentina, Brazil, and other Latin American states were joining fascist and quasi-fascist *integralista* organizations. The latter

⁶⁹ Knight, *Mussolini and Fascism*, 2, 8, 14; Finchelstein, *From Fascism to Populism in History*, 43; Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 36; De Grand, *Italian Fascism*, xiv; Finaldi, *Mussolini and Italian Fascism*, 7-8; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 22-23; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 221; Hedges, *Argentina*, 56; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 59-61.

⁷⁰ Knight, *Mussolini and Fascism*, 37; Smith, *Europe in the Contemporary World*, 264; De Grand, *Italian Fascism*, 91; Finaldi, *Mussolini and Italian Fascism*, 94; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 96; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 60; Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 9, 42-43.

⁷¹ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 96; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 60; Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 9, 42-43.

⁷² This included the industrialist Henry Ford and the famous pilot Charles Lindbergh, Seva Gunitsky, "These are the three reasons fascism spread in 1930s America — and might spread again today," *New York Times*, August 12, 2017.

⁷³ Paxton, *Anatomy of Fascism*, 62.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 5; Knight, *Mussolini and Fascism*, 66; Michael Burleigh, *The Third Reich: A New History* (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2000), 212-213; Smith, *Europe in the Contemporary World*, 265-266.

⁷⁵ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 88; Hedges, *Argentina*, 88; Finaldi, *Mussolini and Italian Fascism*, 83; Knight, *Mussolini and Fascism*, 66; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 233; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 52-53, 201; Grosfoguel, "Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory," 335.

advocated full integration of the social and political order, were organized along paramilitary lines, and resembled similar movements that existed in Catholic European nations. In Latin America, these groups were generally small and isolated to certain ethnic communities, primarily German, but represented local manifestations of the energy of the youth that were highly organized and publicly demonstrated in parades and rallies.⁷⁶ Perón discussed the significance of national vigor and the strength of the youth in his early 1930s books, and continued to throughout his career.⁷⁷

By the late 1930s, fascism was widely condemned. Western liberals rejected it, which in Argentina's case is evident in numerous *Hechos e Ideas* articles.⁷⁸ Much of the working class around the world stood against it, including Argentina's Socialist Party, which had made gains during the Depression.⁷⁹ As the 1930s wore on, Mussolini's imperialism created geopolitical crises that Perón surely analyzed, including the invasion of Ethiopia that received broad condemnation, as well as confrontations with the British in the Mediterranean.⁸⁰ In 1937, Italy

⁷⁶ Michael Goebel, *Argentina's Partisan Past: Nationalism and the Politics of History* (Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 98; Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War,"* 33; Jo McConahay, *Tango War: The Struggle for the Hearts, Minds, and Riches of Latin America during World War II* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2018), pt. 6, loc. 24-38, Introduction, Kindle; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 115; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 159-160; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 61; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 232-233.

⁷⁷ Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 162; Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 31; Enrique Rottjer and Juan Perón, *Las Operaciones en 1870* (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1939), 50; Grupo de Oficiales Unidos, "La Situación Internacional Argentina," in Robert A. Potash, *Perón y el G.O.U.: Los Documentos de una Logia Secreta* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Sudamericana, 1984), 209; Juan Perón, "Factores Guerreros, Marzo 13, 1952" in *Descartes: Política e Estrategia (No Ataco, Crítico) 1951-1953*, 146-147, La Baldrich Digital Archive, accessed February 1, 2020, <http://www.labaldrich.com.ar/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Pol%C3%ADtica-y-Estrategia-Descartes-Per%C3%B3n.pdf>, Adobe PDF eBook.

⁷⁸ Leener, "Economía Liberal y Economía Dirigida," 201-218; Salvemini, "El Capital y el Trabajo en Italia Fascista: Tercera Parte," 253-266; Sincero, "La Muerte Se Llama Fascismo," 9; Cassel, "Del Proteccionismo a través de la Economía Dirigida," 96; Butler, "Las Ataques contra Liberalismo," 174-175; Laurencena, "Comunismo, Fascismo, y Democracia," 18-43; Santander, "La Esencia Antiliberal de los Extremismos," 160-166; Salvemini, "Bajo el Signo del Fascismo," 184-208; Confalonieri, "La Dictadura Fascista en España," 401-425.

⁷⁹ Julio Godio, *El Movimiento Obrero Argentino (1930-1943): Socialismo, Comunismo, y Nacionalismo Obrero* (Buenos Aires: Argentina: Gráfica Yanina, 1989), 210-211; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 85; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 75; Rosenberg, "Fascism as a Mass-Movement," 144-189.

⁸⁰ In 1923, Italy seized the island of Corfu from Greece. In 1925, Italy made Albania a *de facto* protectorate, and it would later completely conquer the state. After successfully expanding Italian control in north African territories,

joined the ranks of the imperialist states that rejected the League of Nations: Japan, Germany, and the United States.⁸¹ Many believed the imperialist aims of Italy and Germany would precipitate another disastrous world war. Given Perón's adherence to the theory that war was an inevitable outcome of geopolitical competition, he was undoubtedly among them, which had repercussions on his anti-imperialist national development thinking, as we will see.

The Impact and Implications of Fascism in Latin America

German influence in South America and regional support for fascism were reaching new heights in the late 1930s, which had unsettling effects. It was apparent that fascist regimes were working to shift the balance of power in the region, which had frightful implications for the hemispheric and global balance of power.⁸² Argentina's neighbors and the United States wondered if Argentina would align with England or the Third Reich, given the respective economic, military, and in the case of the latter, immigrant community ties that existed.⁸³ Renewed tensions related to existing Latin American political differences also contributed to growing fears that war may strike the region. An *Hechos e Ideas* article discussed a press campaign of the influential Chilean newspaper *La Aurora*, which insisted Argentina was plotting to seize Chile's Patagonia region, which was a long-standing tension between the two neighbors.

Mussolini invaded Ethiopia in 1935. In 1936, he joined Hitler in sending troops to Spain in support of Franco, and according to scholars wanted to turn Spain into a client state. This was part of Mussolini's desire to re-establish the Mediterranean Roman Empire," Knight, *Mussolini and Fascism*, 84; Finaldi, *Mussolini and Italian Fascism*, 85-86.

⁸¹ Germany and Japan left the League of Nations in 1933, and the United States never participated.

⁸² Carleton Beals, *The Coming Struggle for Latin America* (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1938), 60, 68-71; Goñi, *Perón y los Alemanes*, 33-34; Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 36-38; US National Security Agency, German Clandestine Activities in South America in World War II, ed. David P. Mowry, 1989, 1, accessed February 19, 2020, http://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-histories/german_clandestine_activities.pdf.

⁸³ Halperin-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 216; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 85; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 107; Ronald Newton points out that Argentina had a 250,000 person German-speaking population that was seen as a potential "fifth column," and a "Nazified Argentina would be a 'bridgehead' for further Nazi subversion among Argentina's weaker and even more susceptible neighbors," Newton, *"Nazi Menace" in Argentina*, xvi-xvii.

The journal's editor countered that Latin American states must avoid conspiracy theories and the imperialist competition that led Europe to devour itself in the First World War.⁸⁴

At the time, Perón was Argentina's military attaché in Chile and told his superiors in Buenos Aires that his Chilean counterparts assured him *La Aurora* was not working in coordination with the Chilean government or military.⁸⁵ He advised for Argentina to remain quiet on the topic, rather than risk provocation.⁸⁶ The Argentine met Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1877-1960) in Chile. Ibáñez was a prominent nationalist army officer who served as Chile's president twice, once before Perón's assignment to Chile and again during Perón's second administration in the 1950s.⁸⁷ Like the Argentine, Ibáñez received German training, supported social welfare, and believed in organized social orders.⁸⁸ The intellectual connection between the two officers was significant enough that they would collaborate to implement Latin American economic cooperation later in their lives.⁸⁹

Hechos e Ideas provides valuable insight as to how challenges to the liberal order were viewed in Argentina. An editorial fretted over German "imperialist political penetration" in Latin America. It concluded that Germany's directed economy allowed it to rapidly gain ground on England, the United States, and Japan, despite a late entry into the region.⁹⁰ Imperialist

⁸⁴ Editor, "Argentina y Chile," *Hechos e Ideas* 2, no. 21, (May 1937): 381-382.

⁸⁵ Perón served in Chile from January 22, 1936 through March 23, 1938. Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires (AGE); Juan Perón, "Memorándum, Chile (5-VII-37): Sobre la Campaña del Diario *La Aurora*, Referente a las Intenciones Imperialistas Argentinas," in *Obras Completas* 4, 215-216.

⁸⁶ Perón, "Memorándum, Chile (5-VII-37)," 215-216.

⁸⁷ In the 1950s, Ibáñez was Perón's greatest foreign ally in efforts to forge Latin American unity.

⁸⁸ Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 224; Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 259-260; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945*, 2; Rouquié, *Military and the State in Latin America*, 77, 80; Elizabeth B. White, *German Influence in the Argentine Army, 1900-1945* (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991), 2; Carlos Camacho Arango, "Síntesis y Perspectiva de los Estudios de Transferencias Militares Europeas en Suramérica, 1890-1940," *Revista de Historia Iberoamericana* 4, no. 2 (2011): 42, 44; Dick, *Profesionalización en el Ejército Argentino*, 64-70.

⁸⁹ Juan Perón and Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, *Mensaje a Los Pueblos de América de los Presidentes Peron e Ibáñez, Afirmación de un Destino Común* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, 1953).

⁹⁰ Editor, "La Expansión Alemana en Sud América," *Hechos e Ideas* 2, no. 21, (May 1937): 383.

penetration was not a new development, but in keeping with Perón's belief that imperialist competition led to war, the introduction of new imperialisms vying for dominance could have severe repercussions. Several articles proposed that a regional conflict centered around ideological differences was brewing.⁹¹ One was titled "The Battle for Influence in Brazil" addressed German efforts to dominate Brazilian culture and concerns that Brazil's *Estado Novo* (New State) government might align with fascism.⁹² Brazilian dictator Getúlio Vargas had recently enacted a flurry of nationalist policies and was collaborating with the fascist Integralist Party.⁹³ The Integralists were Brazil's first large-scale social movement and the hemisphere's largest fascist movement. They promoted alignment of the state, the military, and society, much as German military instruction in the region had for decades, though Brazil's Integralists were also intellectually related to the nationalist *Estado Novo* dictatorship in Portugal.⁹⁴ Argentina's liberals were concerned about the rapid development of such ground surge in a traditional rival, and they were not the only ones who believed war might come to the region.

In 1938, in *The Coming Struggle for Latin America*, an anti-imperialist American journalist named Carleton Beals analyzed imperialist competition in Latin America. Beals was considered an expert on Latin America. He published several works on the region in the 1930s, some of which were translated into Spanish.⁹⁵ Beals reported that Italy, Germany, Great Britain,

⁹¹ Editor, "A Través del Mundo," *Hechos e Ideas* 1, no. 9, (March 1936): 68-78; Editor, "A Través del Mundo," *Hechos e Ideas* 1, no. 10, (April 1936): 163; Antonio Paniagua Picazo, "La Guerra Está Próxima," *Hechos e Ideas* 3, no. 25, (December 1937): 397-404.

⁹² Henri Hauser, "Lucha de Influencia en Brasil," *Hechos e Ideas* 3, no. 23, (July 1937): 213-218.

⁹³ Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 160; Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914-1945* (New York, NY: Taylor & Francis, 2000), 346; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 233-234.

⁹⁴ Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 160; Payne, *History of Fascism*, 346; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 233-234.

⁹⁵ Carleton Beals, *The Crime of Cuba* (Philadelphia, PA: Philadelphia Lippincott, 1933); Carleton Beals, *Fire on the Andes* (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott, 1934); Carleton Beals, "Aprismo: The Rise of Haya de la Torre," *Foreign Affairs* 13, no. 2 (January 1935): 236-246; Carleton Beals, "Totalitarian Inroads in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs* 17, no. 1 (January 1938): 78-89; Carleton Beals and Carlos Mérida, *Banana Gold* (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1932); Carleton Beals, Clifford Odets and the Provisional Committee for Cuba, *Rifle rule in Cuba* (New York, NY: Provisional Committee for Cuba, 1935); Carleton Beals and Diego Rivera, *The Mexican Maze* (Westport,

and Japan, which he considered fascist, were competing with the United States in Latin America.⁹⁶ He called Japan a "factor to be reckoned with" due to recent waves of Japanese immigration to the region and a state-sponsored push to secure resources and markets.⁹⁷ He warned that Italian influence was "strong in Brazil, overwhelming in Perú, important in Argentina, and potent in at least four other countries," which he linked partly to Italian immigration in the region. Beals warned that if Italy coordinated with Germany and Japan, fascism would be an "expanding force" that might "well bring the European struggles to American shores."⁹⁸ At the time, Italy was not a part of the German-Japanese Anti-COMINTERN (Anti-Communist International) pact.

Beals considered Germany an organized, capable, and determined threat. He reported that Germany's directed economy "artificially pumped up" its position using "government-controlled purchasing" and trade subsidies.⁹⁹ He warned that the Nazis also had ideological and geopolitical motives.¹⁰⁰ He noted that the German Foreign Office pushed anti-Bolshevik, anti-democracy, and anti-Jewish propaganda throughout the region and discussed Hitler's program for "the spiritual unity of the race." Beals wrote that in "Brazil, Argentina and elsewhere, second and third generation Germans" were "enthusiastically reclaimed as spiritual subjects" of Nazi Germany. He reported that Gestapo agents kept German immigrant communities in check.¹⁰¹

Historian Ronald Newton notes that the Nazi threat in Argentina was not a "phantom conjured

CT: Greenwood Press, 1931); Carleton Beals, *La Próxima Lucha por Latinoamérica* (Santiago, Chile: Zig Zag, 1942); Carleton Beals and Diego Rivera, *Panorama Mexicano: Luchas, Costumbres y Supersticiones de un Pueblo Heroico* (Santiago, Chile: Zig-Zag, 1942).

⁹⁶ Beals, *Coming Struggle for Latin America*, 352.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 30, 44.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 104.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 60.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 69.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 60-61, 67-69.

from thin air," though he adds that poor coordination hampered their efforts.¹⁰² Beals estimation that Germany's "Teutonic Latin-American crusade" might integrate the region into "Germany's proposed defensive line" created a frightening geopolitical scenario.¹⁰³

Beals warned that Germany was well-positioned in Latin America, unlike during the First World War, when it blundered strategically.¹⁰⁴ He wrote that the "equivalent of strong Nazi regimes" ruled several Latin American states.¹⁰⁵ He identified Brazil's *Estado Novo* as one, but suggested Brazilian nationalism might preclude alignment with European fascism.¹⁰⁶ He added that Latin American military officers coveted German training, admired the "click-heels correctness" of "Teutonic discipline," and those who trained in Germany - as many Argentine and Chileans had - returned as "Nazi addicts."¹⁰⁷ Beals predicted that if Hitler failed to shift Latin America into his sphere of influence, he would look to "plunge" the region into conflicts that would restrict Allied access to the region's critical raw materials.¹⁰⁸

Beals believed that the United States' poor policy in the region also led to fascist gains, especially its support for dictatorships that protected the interests of the elite.¹⁰⁹ He warned that Latin Americans would remember this as a betrayal of the people.¹¹⁰ He then suggested England might not align with the United States due to conflicting trade interests, which Perón noted as early as 1918.¹¹¹ He also characterized imperialist competition in Latin America as part of a

¹⁰² Newton, "Nazi Menace" in *Argentina*, xv.

¹⁰³ Beals, *Coming Struggle for Latin America*, 83.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 85; Zimmermann Telegram, 1917; Decimal File, 1910-1929, 862.20212/82A (1910-1929), and Decoded Zimmermann Telegram, 1917; Decimal File, 1910-1929, 862.20212/69, General Records of the Department of State; Record Group 59; National Archives, Our Documents Archive, accessed February 16, 2020, <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=60>.

¹⁰⁵ Beals, *Coming Struggle for Latin America*, 85.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 66, 71.

¹⁰⁷ Beals, *Coming Struggle for Latin America*, 46, 74; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 4; Atkins and Thompson, *German Military Influence in Argentina*, 259; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 88.

¹⁰⁸ Beals, *Coming Struggle for Latin America*, 85.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 247, 274, 314-315.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 274.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 130-132; Juan Perón, letter to parents, November 26, 1918, accessed March 2, 2020,

struggle to change the global balance of power. Rather than an intercontinental invasion, he predicted the use of proxy initiatives, including "propaganda-war, trade-war, armament sales, (and) subtle undercover intrigue." He claimed that the divided states of Latin America were "allied" to one imperialist power or another and that they might descend into warfare to determine the region's alignment.¹¹² Beals indicted Argentina as the most likely to initiate hostilities.¹¹³ He lambasted Argentine President Roberto M. Ortiz (1886-1942) for using "bayonets and fraud" to ensure a totalitarian "military, Conservative and Fascist clique" remained in power in the fraudulent elections of 1937.¹¹⁴ Scholars indicate that the *Concordancia* used violence and fraud to ensure Ortiz's victory.¹¹⁵ Beals believed the regime's "imperialist" intentions were "undeniable," as evinced by attempts to control the raw materials in neighboring states, an aggressive stance toward Uruguay for aligning with Brazil, and Argentina's enduring insistence that it control the Río de la Plata estuary.¹¹⁶ This was not a wild accusation. Claims of Argentine imperialism and voices in support of imperialism existed in the region for decades.¹¹⁷ From Washington's perspective, Beals painted a grim reckoning on the horizon.

The future envisioned in *The Coming Struggle for Latin America* was Perón's nightmare.¹¹⁸ It was published while Perón and his mentor, Colonel Enrique Rottjer, worked

<http://archivoperonista.com/documentos/correspondencia/1918/carta-peron-sus-padres/>.

¹¹² Beals, *Coming Struggle for Latin America*, 352.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 324-337.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 249, 319-320; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 98; Horowitz, *Argentina Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 18; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 80.

¹¹⁵ Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 221; Hedges, *Argentina*, 50; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 89.

¹¹⁶ Beals, *Coming Struggle for Latin America*, 324-337.

¹¹⁷ Ingenieros, *Evolución Sociológica Argentina*, 46, 94-95, 102; José Guillermo Guerra, *El Doctor Zeballos y el Imperialismo Argentino* (Santiago, Chile: Imprenta Santiago-Esmeralda), 1923, 404; Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, *Por la Defensa Nacional: Discurso Pronunciado el Día 31 de Agosto de 1923 en la Cámara de Senadores* (Montevideo, Uruguay: La Industrial), 1923, 7; Gustavo Ferrari, *Estanislao S. Zeballos*, (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Los Diplomáticos, 1995), 36, accessed September 5, 2019, <http://www.cari.org.ar/pdf/diplomaticos09.pdf>.

¹¹⁸ As a member of the military, Perón would have probably known if Argentina had plans to start a war in 1938, as Beals suggested, but he did not mention it to his biographers. Despite some sectors of Argentine society and the military sporadically calling for aggressive foreign policy, Argentina did not invade another country in the twentieth

together as guest instructors at the Naval ESG.¹¹⁹ The competition among foreign powers was apparent, if not exaggerated, in the minds of the two nationalist, anti-imperialist officers. Perón taught his students that imperialist competition eventually but inevitably brings war, and the prospect of imperial competition drawing Latin America into warfare was conceivable.¹²⁰ The situation represented a potential re-enactment, on Latin American soil, of his analysis of China's dilemma before and during the Russo-Japanese War. In 1933, he taught that China lost its national sovereignty in the nineteenth century because it was politically divided. He also noted that imperialist competition over Chinese resources resulted in the Chinese people falling victim during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).¹²¹ Like China, Latin America was an abundant source of raw materials that was divided, vulnerable, and the site of imperialist competition. Given the prevalence of autocratic regimes in Latin America, one leader could initiate hostilities.¹²² Who was to say that, perhaps at the behest of British interests, President Ortiz might not make a tremendous blunder like this? Even if Latin Americans did not start a war, by this time, most recognized that the prospect of another world war was becoming increasingly likely. In either case, Argentina was at risk.

Operations in 1870, an Anti-Imperialist National Development Model

In early February 1939, Lieutenant Colonel Perón and his mentor Colonel Enrique Rottjer published *Operaciones en 1870*, which focused on the PG school's greatest triumph:

century.

¹¹⁹ Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando (1895-1942)* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Espiño, 1952), 150; Perón began instructing at the Naval ESG on May 7, 1938, Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires (AGE).

¹²⁰ Goltz, *Nation in Arms*, 386; Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 153-155, 165-168.

¹²¹ Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 4-5.

¹²² Argentina was not a clear dictatorship, but the regime did not respond to the will of the people. Regarding neighboring states, Bolivia was under a military government since 1936, Uruguay since 1933, Vargas's auto-coup d'état took place in 1937, while the situation in Paraguay was uncertain after Rafael Franco's dictatorship was overthrown in 1937.

Prussia's political-military campaign to unify Germany. This topic had been their subject matter during a 1938 collaboration as guest professors at the Naval ESG, which Perón recommended they publish.¹²³ Perón's writing style is evident throughout the book, and it centered around ideas from his two significant Prussian influences: Carl von Clausewitz and Colmar von der Goltz. In the introduction, they emphasized that their goal was to present a method of analysis that students could apply to the analysis of other contexts, especially regarding the relationship between politics and war.¹²⁴ They incorporated specific, demonstrable points in their lesson that related to national development in a context where war was likely, such as Argentina and the world faced at the time. I argue that how these points coincided with Argentina's contemporary context was not accidental. *Operaciones en 1870* was their formal presentation of an anti-imperialist national development model as the world hurtled toward war.

Perón and Rottjer's analysis of European politics before the Franco-Prussian War mirrored the analysis seen in the three books he published as a professor in the early 1930s. They characterized Prussia's political ambitions as a response to national aspirations, which was the same language Perón used to explain Japanese territorial expansion in *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa* (*Russo-Japanese War*).¹²⁵ They cast unification as the product of the "political brilliance of Bismarck," who interpreted the national will and maintained "strict harmony" between the state and military to this end.¹²⁶ Perón had first espoused the notion of a strong leader channeling the national will in his theoretical book, *Parte Teórica* (*Theoretical Part*).¹²⁷ The authors described national unification as an enduring dream of the German people, but claimed that the

¹²³ Rottjer and Perón, *Operaciones en 1870*, 17; Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 148-150; According to Perón's military record, he taught at the Naval ESG from May 7, 1938 through February 15, 1939, Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires (AGE).

¹²⁴ Rottjer and Perón, *Operaciones en 1870*, 19.

¹²⁵ Rottjer and Perón, *Operaciones en 1870*, 50; Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 3.

¹²⁶ Rottjer and Perón, *Operaciones en 1870*, 50.

¹²⁷ Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 163.

competition over leadership between Austria and Prussia prevented it.¹²⁸ These circumstances were relatable to South America, where Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were seen as rivals for regional leadership.

Perón and Rottjer outlined Bismarck's three-stage plan to unify Germany under Prussian leadership. They detailed his three-stage process of winning national favor that included removing foreign interests from the region, becoming the hegemonic power within German lands, and, finally, defending "Germany" in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). They noted that Prussian leaders predicted their efforts to change the status quo would provoke Austria and France, who stood to lose from the reconfiguration of the region's balance of power.¹²⁹ Perón and Rottjer quoted Clausewitz's statement that "Germany can reach political unity in one way only, through the sword, when one state subdues all the others." They also quoted Bismarck, who similarly declared that Germany unity "was achieved with the sword and only the sword has maintained it."¹³⁰ To achieve this goal, Prussia had to become a martial power.

The professors asserted that Prussian leaders aligned state institutions to respond to the national will and put the military at the nation's service. This included a decades-long program designed to persuade the people to appeal to Prussia "to rise and take leadership of the German states," which they argued put the state at the service of the national will. Perón and Rottjer charted the beginning of Prussia's "material growth" to the rule of Friedrich Wilhelm I (1713-1740) and claimed that "spiritual apogee" was achieved under Frederick the Great (1740-1786). The professors noted that conscription was instituted in 1813 to ensure "all the citizens could be trained for future war" after humiliating defeats in the Napoleonic Wars.¹³¹ They explained that

¹²⁸ Rottjer and Perón, *Operaciones en 1870*, 44-45.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 45, 48-49.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 50.

from 1861 onward, Bismarck, the new chancellor, ensured the military and government were aligned with the national will during the remaining years of process.¹³² Among other initiatives, they noted that Bismarck championed policies for economic expansion and industrialization to augment Prussian military capabilities.¹³³ They noted that this plan reflected the Clausewitzian notion that war was "the continuation of policy through other means."¹³⁴ This related to Perón's argument in the early 1930s that the state and military must be aligned to achieve objectives.¹³⁵

Perón and Rottjer argued that Prussia's timely interpretation of the national will forged the German Empire and noted that this created a considerable shift in the regional balance of power. They called victory in the culminating event, the Franco-Prussian War, an important chapter in the new era of "national wars."¹³⁶ They held this campaign as an example of how to consolidate a new center of power despite the attempts of a foreign power, France, to perpetuate political division and vulnerability. Perón and Rottjer noted that the new strength of the united German nation shifted the balance of power and peace reigned in Germany for decades as a result.¹³⁷ *Operaciones en 1870* reiterated the concepts Perón advanced in his ESG books, which were influenced by the PG school of thought. He recognized German national development under Prussian leadership was a multi-generational endeavor. He believed it demonstrated that a state, in the hands of strong leaders, could overcome obstacles and challenges imposed by a foreign power, or powers, to consolidate a sovereign nation-state. Applying this concept to Argentina and Latin America's circumstances in the contemporary world order, as I argue the authors intended, uncovers relevant analogies, lessons, and conclusions.

¹³² Ibid., 42.

¹³³ Ibid., 58.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 41.

¹³⁵ Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 144.

¹³⁶ Rottjer and Perón, *Operaciones en 1870*, 41.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 48-51.

As Perón and Rottjer wrote in their introduction, their work represented an analytical model that students could apply to other contexts. Though they did not specify it in writing, the professors intended for the concepts they advanced in *Operaciones en 1870* to be applied to the Argentine context vis-à-vis national development and imperialism. Prussia created strength through unity, which prevented foreign powers from imposing their will on the nation. This sentiment also echoed Perón's treatment of China in *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, which demonstrated the consequences of failing to unify in opposition to imperialism. Like the divided German states and China, Latin America faced a massive problem: it too was divided.

To make matters worse, Latin America's division coincided with increasing imperial competition, as detailed in *Coming Struggle for Latin America*. This matched with the PG theory that imperialist competition provoked political strife that would eventually lead to war, which we know Perón believed. As a result, he saw Latin America as a likely warzone. In the face of this threat, the two professors were posing a question. Would Latin America continue to accept imperialism as had China? Or would some nation in the region respond in the Prussian manner? Latin Americans had mulled over how to oppose imperialism for decades. Though many parties endorsed creating a power center in Latin America, a lack of consensus existed regarding how it would look.¹³⁸ Some considered Argentina a state with the potential to become the region's leading power.¹³⁹ Forging a new power center in South American required a plan. Perón and Rottjer's treatment of national unification in *Operaciones en 1870* indicated that they considered the Prussian program a blueprint for success. If the Prussian example was followed, the first

¹³⁸ There was the suggestion that Argentina, as the "whitest" and therefore most capable South American state, become the region's benevolent imperial power. An Argentina-Brazil-Chile Pact would create a new power center in Latin America that would be responsible for upholding regional stability and preventing European colonization, in accordance with an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine designed to also keep the United States out of South America.

¹³⁹ Ingenieros, *Evolución Sociológica Argentina*, 98-99; Francisco Félix Bayón, *Dogma Nacional: A la Juventud Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Imprensa Europea de M. A. Rosas, 1919), 18, 26.

stage of the plan was for one state to emerge as the leading power in the region. The leading state would use its power to forge a more robust, larger nation-state that could oppose imperialism.

I argue that at this point in 1939, the professors' intent in *Operaciones en 1870* was imperialistic on the regional level, which was a response that aligned with the tenets of Prussian military theory, but this conflicted with their anti-imperialism. In the previous decades, nationalists and anti-imperialists like José Ingenieros, Carlos Becú, and Francisco Bayón had espoused a sort of "sub-imperialism" within the region to forge a new power center.¹⁴⁰ The most explicit example was Manuel Ugarte, a prolific writer, socialist, and respected Argentine intellectual who published *Destino de un Continente (Destiny of a Continent)* in 1923. He believed a united Latin America would be capable of resisting Yankee imperialism and considered the grouping of peoples who shared cultural and racial links perfectly justifiable in the face of foreign imperialism, even if it required some military action.¹⁴¹

How Perón and Rottjer envisioned the final manifestation of a new power center in the region is unclear, but it started with Argentina reaching its material and spiritual apogee. Perón believed Prussian success was based on this, and in his 1933 book *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, he taught that Japan's emergence as a regional power was achieved this way.¹⁴² The emphasis Perón and Rottjer placed on Prussia's long-term plans for military armaments, especially industrialization, related to the material side of this. Perón and other military leaders had espoused industrialization, with military applications, since 1931.¹⁴³ The Prussian model included strong leadership that guided efforts to prepare the nation war and cultivate the national spirit through conscription, which Perón espoused as an instructor at the ESG in the early

¹⁴⁰ Ingenieros, *Evolución Sociológica Argentina*, 17; Becú, "A.B.C.," 9; Córdoba, *Nuestra Guerra*, 75-78; Bayón, *Dogma Nacional*, 19, 66.

¹⁴¹ Ugarte, *Destino de un Continente*, 1-2.

¹⁴² Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 3; Rottjer and Perón, *Operaciones en 1870*, 41.

¹⁴³ Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 149; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 23-24.

1930s.¹⁴⁴ Following this prescription, Perón believed Argentina could gain recognition as a leading state. The ultimate selling point of Argentina forging a new power center in the region was the new capacity to oppose imperialism. This was imperialism to oppose imperialism, much as seen in Japan's rise to power in East Asia in the decades prior.

Perón and Rottjer's program was militaristic, and some might consider the plan a precursor to imperialism, as had been the case with Prussia. However, this militarism did not mean Perón envisioned blazing a path of conquest through the continent. He had two clear goals: to make Argentina powerful enough to face the United States, or Germany and its partners, from taking control of Argentina, and to expel foreign interests, which would help inoculate the region from the threat of imperialist war coming to the region. Both of these points spoke to the importance of national sovereignty, which FORJA, APRA and nationalists in general, supported at a time when the United States and Axis powers vied for dominance over the region.

Perón's militaristic vision was also related to a practical consideration. As he noted, imperialist backlashes had historically occurred when new power centers threatened the interests of existing powers. In *Operaciones*, Perón and Rottjer argued that the French sought to derail Prussia's plan to unify Germany. In *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, Perón described how interested European powers connived against Japan's rise to prominence, with Russia going so far as to declare war.¹⁴⁵ If we transpose this concept to the Latin American context, we can see why he concluded that military strength was required. If an effort to create a new power center on the basis of national defense—Perón's professional *raison d'être*—began to achieve results, would the United States or another imperialist power intervene? A rival state, perhaps at the behest of the United States, might also object to the creation of a new power center under Argentine

¹⁴⁴ Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 179-180; Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 143.

¹⁴⁵ Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 4-5.

leadership. Perón believed the entire nation, or in the case that some regional bloc had formed, nations would be called into action if hostilities erupted. It was impossible to forecast when foreign intervention might occur, which meant a constant state of military readiness was indispensable to national development and the consolidation of a new power center. The use of analogy to discuss this theme is explainable, as well. As regional tensions rose during the lead up to the Second World War, publishing such an ambitious plan in writing would raise the hackles of imperialists and Argentina's nervous neighbors.

The contemporary international context when *Operaciones* was published also relates to my analysis of Perón and Rottjer's intent. At the time of publication in February 1938, Hitler had yet to entirely discredit his promise to stop territorial expansion once the areas populated by Germanic people had been united. He broke this promise with the invasion of Czechoslovakia one month later.¹⁴⁶ For those who agreed with the idea of race as a relevant point in regards to defining political borders, as was popular at the time, German expansion could be seen along the lines that Latin American anti-imperialist intellectual Manuel Ugarte advocated in the 1920s that was discussed previously. However, it must be noted that Perón had an inclusive view of the nation, thanks in part to his egalitarian upbringing and his partial indigenous heritage.¹⁴⁷ He was willing to consider Argentina part of the Latin American race, while liberals saw the country as a "European outpost" due in part to the massive European immigration the country had experienced since the 1870s.¹⁴⁸ Germany's actions were applauded at conservative nationalist

¹⁴⁶ Germany's global calls to people of German descent to return to the Fatherland made it believable that Hitler's goal was simply the unification of the people, at least among those who had not read *Mein Kampf*, were skeptics, or Nazi sympathizers.

¹⁴⁷ Perón, interview by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 21; Juan Perón, "Memorias 1," 48; Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *El Hombre del Destino* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Abril Educativa y Cultural, 1973), 1; Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 25; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón* 23, 28-29; Perón, interview by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 21.

¹⁴⁸ Richard Graham, ed., *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990), 3; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 70; Goebel, *Argentina's Partisan Past*, 4.

rallies in Argentina, though David Rock notes that these rallies included imperialist undertones.¹⁴⁹ Some nationalists in Argentina believed in the existence of a "creole" race, while others insisted on the identity of the *gaucho* as a cultural aspect, and those who sympathized with Nazism were yet another new strand of nationalists. Even so, Rock reports that Argentine "attitudes on race usually leaned toward being patronizing rather than aggressive."¹⁵⁰ Additionally, Germany's recent resurgence overcame the obstacles foreign powers imposed on Germany in the Treaty of Versailles. Critically, this resurgence included a strong leader who channeled the national will toward the achievement of objectives, which was a concept that the military training Peron received for decades had emphasized.¹⁵¹

The new German influence on Argentine army officers was evident in Colonel Juan Sanguinetti, a self-described Nazi, who presided over the book's commission an attaché assignment in Berlin, where he was decorated by the Third Reich.¹⁵² He believed Nazism was the only political system "capable of saving the world."¹⁵³ In 1938, while Rottjer and Perón worked on this theme, the latter accompanied Sanguinetti on assignment to Patagonia.¹⁵⁴ It is uncertain how Perón's conversations with Sanguinetti influenced *Operaciones*. What is known is that Argentina's High Command called on Perón for a special assignment in Europe to analyze the social phenomenon taking place there immediately after its publication.¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁹ When Hitler took control of the Saar and Sudetenland, 15,000 people attended a nationalist rally in Buenos Aires to demonstrate in favor of a more forceful foreign policy regarding territorial disputes with Bolivia and Chile, Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 117.

¹⁵⁰ Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 103.

¹⁵¹ Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 257-258; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 3-4; Rouquié, *Military and the State in Latin America*, 79-80; López, *Primer Perón*, 31; Dick, *Profesionalización en el Ejército Argentino*, 115.

¹⁵² Rottjer and Perón, *Operaciones en 1870*, 5; Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 112; Goñi, *Perón y los Alemanes*, 26; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 113.

¹⁵³ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 112; Goñi, *Perón y los Alemanes*, 26; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 113.

¹⁵⁴ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 113.

¹⁵⁵ Perón, interview by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 39; Perón, "Memorias 1," 56.

BANDO

Teniendo el movimiento militar que se ha constituido en GOBIERNO PROVISORIO de la NACIÓN como misión primordial la conservación del orden en mira de asegurar las más absolutas garantías de la vida, propiedad y seguridad de los habitantes de la Nación, previene al pueblo de lo siguiente:

1° Todo individuo que sea sorprendido en infraganti delito contra la seguridad y bienes de los habitantes, o que atente contra los servicios y seguridad pública, será pasado por las armas sin forma alguna de proceso.

2° Las fuerzas que tengan a su cargo el cumplimiento de este bando, sólo podrán hacerlo efectivo bajo la orden y responsabilidad de un oficial del Ejército de mar y tierra de la Nación. Los suboficiales que sorprendan a cualquier individuo en las condiciones antedichas, deberán detenerlo y someterlo de inmediato a la disposición del primer oficial a su alcance para su ejecución.

*URIBURU, Teniente General, Comandante en Jefe del Ejército y Presidente del Gobierno Provisorio.
EMILIO KINKELIN, Teniente Coronel y Secretario General.*

Figure 2.1. Uriburu Dictatorship's decree of summary executions. reproduction. It authorized military officers to use summary executions on anyone they believed was disturbing the peace.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ José Félix Uriburu, Bando Difundido por el Presidente de Facto Tras el Derrocamiento de Hipólito Yrigoyen, 6 de Septiembre de 1930, Documentos Escritos, Sala VII, Legajo 2520.

Chapter Three

Perón and Imperialism during the Second World War

In military life, as in everything, triumphs come from overcoming disadvantages and making them advantageous by an appropriate procedure.

—Juan Perón, letter to First Lieutenant Pedro Lucero, September 5, 1942

By 1939, Argentina had recovered from the Great Depression, despite its corrupt and repressive *Concordancia*, or Agreement, government.¹ Army Lieutenant Colonel Juan Domingo Perón (1895-1974) traveled on assignment to fascist Italy, where he examined the new order on a mission to provide Argentine High Command with an analysis of the global ramifications of the Second World War. Based on his experiences in Italy and the official training he received on fascist theory and practice, he concluded that fascism would not work in Argentina. He argued that Argentina needed to adopt a national development model that corresponded to its aspirations to break out of its peripheral role in the capitalist order, which the sitting government accepted. At the time, the country faced problems at home and from abroad. The physically ill and politically embattled president Roberto M. Ortiz (1886-1942) was losing support in nearly all sectors. A new group of industrialist rose within the *Concordancia* that provided some

¹ Joel Horowitz, ed., *Argentine Unions, The State & the Rise of Perón, 1930-1945* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1990), 15-17, 29-31; Jill Hedges, *Argentina: A Modern History* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 47; David Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 217; David Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History, and Its Impact* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 91; Luis Alberto Romero, *A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, trans. James P. Brennan (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 73; Arthur Whitaker, "Overview of the Period," in *Prologue to Perón: Argentina in Depression and War, 1930-1943*, eds. Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. Dolcart (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), 22-23.

challenges to the traditional oligarchy rule, but the labor sector remained neglected and thought it was agitating, it lacked united leadership.² The United States interpreted Argentine neutrality as a pro-Axis position and feared the Nazis were plotting to open an Axis front in Latin America, which resulted in Washington labeling Argentina a fascist state, which was followed by the introduction of United States military forces in neighboring states that raised fears in the Argentine military.³

Argentina's neutrality and international responses to it divided opinion. The military pursued autarchy and control of industries deemed vital to national defense, while the nationalist movement within the army began conspiring, based on their concerns that the government was opening Argentina to a dual threat.⁴ They feared the new "president-select" of the *Concordancia*, Robustiano Patrón Costas (1878-1965), an oligarch with substantial ties to British capitalists, would commit the nation to the Allied war effort.⁵ They also claimed that another election marked by corruption and violence might spark a revolutionary civil war, such as Spain had recently undergone, and nationalists warned that communists might seize power in the chaos.⁶

² Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 75-76; Daniel K. Lewis, *The History of Argentina* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 85; Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 29-35; Hedges, *Argentina*, 59-60.

³ Ronald C. Newton, *The "Nazi Menace" in Argentina, 1931-1947* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), xvi; Goñi, *Perón y los Alemanes*, 30-34, 121; Max Paul Friedman, *Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin America in World War II* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 56-57, 78-82; Jo McConahay, "The Fight for Southern Skies," in *Tango War: The Struggle for the Hearts, Minds, and Riches of Latin America during World War II* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2018), loc 84-340, Kindle; David Rock, "Argentina, 1930-1946," in *The Cambridge History of Latin America, Volume 8: Latin America since 1930: Spanish South America*, ed. Leslie Bethell (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 50.

⁴ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 85-87; Hedges, *Argentina*, 59-60; US Coordinator of Information. The Political Situation in Argentina. Latin American Section. Special Memorandum No. 12. December 3, 1941; US Coordinator of Information. Interoffice memo to William Donovan: Situation in Argentina. Preston E. James. December 19, 1941.

⁵ Robert A. Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), 180; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 133; Ernesto López, *El Primer Perón: El Militar Antes Que El Político* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Capital Intelectual S.A., 2009), 61; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 90; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 91.

⁶ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 75-77.

Colonel Perón worked with a group of like-minded officers to build a consensus for a coup d'état that he believed would mark the beginning of a new order in Argentina. The plan he devised called for reorganizing society, increased state control in the economy, and the creation of a new power center in the region. Though poorly planned, the coup was successful, well-received by society, and the army's nationalist faction ran the dictatorship.⁷ The colonel became the Secretary of Labor and Welfare and used his new authority in the regime to enact policies of social reforms that primarily benefited the working class and poor, who he came to realize would be valuable allies upon democracy's return in the postwar period. He accumulated additional charges over the next several months and became the Minister of War in early 1944.⁸

In 1944, the Allied invasion of Normandy and German military collapse on the Western and Eastern fronts clarified to most that the Axis was doomed. Washington's concerns that fascism might create havoc in South America subsided, but officials considered Argentina's military dictatorship and its rising star, Perón, new problems.⁹ The United States and Great Britain were planning a new economic order for the postwar era based on liberal free trade policies. However, Perón became vice president and outlined an alternative vision for Argentina, including state-driven industrialization, economic cooperation with neighboring states, and public denials of desires to achieve regional hegemony.¹⁰ By the time the war ended, he had

⁷ Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 93-95; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 91-93; Hedges, *Argentina*, 81-84.

⁸ Hedges, *Argentina*, 82-87; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 93-95; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 95-98.

⁹ US Secretary of State. Telegram to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics Except Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia. June 22, 1944. 835 01/335a: Circular Telegram; US State Department. Telegram to the President from the Acting Secretary of State. Joseph C. Grew. February 23, 1945; US State Department. Top Secret for the President from Stettinius. Edward Stettinius, Jr. MR-OUT-253. February 23, 1945; US State Department. Telegram to the President from the Acting Secretary of State. Joseph C. Grew. February 24, 1945; US State Department. Telegram to the President from the Acting Secretary of State. Joseph C. Grew. February 27, 1945; US Office of Strategic Services. New Trends Toward Totalitarianism in Argentina: January-February 1945. M. & A. Number 2965. March 10, 1945.

¹⁰ Juan Perón, "Significado de la Defensa Nacional desde el Punto de Vista Militar" (speech, Universidad Nacional de la Plata, Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 10, 1944), Archivo Peronista, accessed March 12, 2020,

widespread public support, but Washington rejected his vision and sought to end his program. The most obvious case of imperialist backlash came as he ran for president in 1946, when the United States Government attempted to destroy his credibility in a smear campaign and bolster his liberal opponent. Not only did this meddling fail, but it contributed to his victory in the February 1946 election by helping him consolidate public support.¹¹

In this chapter, I argue that Perón made significant modifications to his anti-imperialist vision during the Second World War. At the heart of this was his insistence that the world needed new social, economic, and political structures, which reflected the conclusions he made based on his experiences in Europe as it headed toward war. This also included his turn away from fascism by January 1941, despite the Axis' string of military successes. He continued to apply Prussian military theory to his geopolitical analysis and, in this regard, he continued to believe the state must plan development in relation to the realities of the world order. As a leading conspirator in the nationalist movement against the corrupt liberal government, he espoused industrialization to achieve autarchy and a corporative order for society. By 1944, he recognized that imperialism would continue to be a phenomenon driving world events, but he

<http://archivoperonista.com/discursos/juan-domingo-peron/1944/palabras-en-conferencia-sobre-significado-defensa-nacional-desde/>; Juan Perón, "Discurso en la Bolsa de Comercio" (speech, Bolsa de Comercio, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 25, 1944), Archivo Peronista, accessed March 12, 2020,

<http://archivoperonista.com/discursos/juan-domingo-peron/1944/discurso-en-bolsa-comercio/>.

¹¹ US State Department, *Blue Book on Argentina: Consultation among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation* (New York, NY: Greenberg, 1946); Robert A. Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1980), 39-45; Donald C. Hodges, *Argentina 1943-1987: The National Revolution and Resistance* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), 25; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 153; Daniel C. Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War": An Intellectual Biography* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1991), 34; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 98; Alan McPherson, *Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America since 1945* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006), 30; Stephen Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 13-14; Archivo Histórico RTA S.E., "Respuesta al Libro Azul Elaborado por Estados Unidos, 1946" (video source of audio clip), accessed October 1, 2016, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S6GhrJ3TDyg>; Robert D. Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas of Argentina* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), 181; Glenn Dorn, "Perón's Gambit: The United States and the Argentine Challenge to the Inter-American Order, 1946-1948." *Diplomatic History* 26, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 1-2, 4, 7; Teresa Eggers-Brass, *Historia Argentina, 1806-2004: Una Mirada Crítica* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Maipué, 2004), 498-499; Alberto Spektorowski, "The Ideological Origins of Right and Left Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1943," *Journal of Contemporary History* 29 (1994): 155.

also predicted that it would be defined by a bipolar ideological struggle, which we know today as the Cold War. Perón abandoned his militaristic vision of Argentina rising to become the regional hegemonic power, which reflected his understanding that the United States had progressed from being the leading hemispheric power to a global superpower. He continued to emphasize the importance of the national will and the need for strong leadership to reorganize the social order in a way that would harmonize the nation. He replaced his support for autarchy with plans to redirect economic relations to neighboring states, which would mitigate the nation's vulnerability to imperialist pressure while continuing to provide markets for increased industrial output. More significantly, he arrived at the three pillars of his ideology, which would become his slogan and the starting points of his thinking throughout the rest of his life: social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty. He called his ideology *Justicialismo*, but it quickly became known as Peronism due to his centrality.

Assignment: Italy, 1939-1941

Lieutenant Colonel Perón reported to the Minister of War General Carlos T. Márquez only days after he published *Las Operaciones en 1870 (Operations in 1870)*, which included his analysis on the social and political circumstances surrounding Prussia's nineteenth-century campaign to unify Germany. Perón and Márquez knew each other well, which was standard in the army's relatively small officer corps. The latter instructed Perón at the Colegio Militar before the First World War, and in the early 1930s, they taught together at Argentina's premier military academy, the *Escuela Superior de Guerra (ESG, Superior War School)*.¹² According to the United States embassy, Márquez supported democracy, but the Argentine military was politically

¹² Juan Perón, interview by Tomás Eloy Martínez, in Tomás Eloy Martínez, *Las Memorias del General* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Planeta, 1996), 39; Ignacio Martín Cloppet, *Perón en Roma: Cartas Inéditas (1939-1940): Amores y Política* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Fabro, 2015), 98.

split.¹³ Numerous factions existed, including those who defended economic liberalism and supported the Allies, hard-line conservative nationalists and some fascist sympathizers who advocated neutral alignment, but most officers were apolitical professionals who also backed neutrality.¹⁴

In the meeting, Márquez told Perón the war in Europe was inevitable and that no one could avoid the repercussions of this, which was worrisome to the colonel because he believed modern warfare had the potential to spread anywhere in the world.¹⁵ Márquez said Argentine attachés in Europe believed the coming war revolved around social issues and noted that the High Command needed more information to form a conclusion regarding the war's likely outcome and its geopolitical ramifications.¹⁶ He told Perón that his experience teaching "Strategy, Total War, and Military History" gave him the ideal skill set for this analysis and directed the colonel to select a duty assignment from a list of European countries.¹⁷ Perón chose Italy, and he later explained that his partial Italian heritage and his ability to speak Italian "almost as well" as Spanish, which he said would help him delve into the culture, influenced this decision.¹⁸ Márquez accepted the selection but urged Perón to visit Germany and speak to his

¹³ US State Department, "Nazi-Fascist Plans with Respect to Argentina," February 28, 1941, CIA Reading Room, <http://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp13x00001r000100030011-9>.

¹⁴ Juan Perón, interview by Enrique Pavón Pereyra, in Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Yo Perón* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Sudamerica, 2018), 130-131; Hedges, *Argentina*, 51-52; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 80-85; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 88-90.

¹⁵ Perón, interviewed by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 39; Juan Perón, "Memorias 1," in *Obras Completas 25 Tomo 1* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1988), 56; Juan Perón, *Apuntes de Historia Militar: Parte Teórica* (1932; repr., Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1951), 140-142.

¹⁶ Perón, interviewed by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 39; Uki Goñi, *Perón y los Alemanes: La Verdad sobre el Espionaje Nazi y los Fugitivos del Reich* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ed. Sudamericana, 1998), 26; Perón, "Memorias 1," 56.

¹⁷ Perón, interviewed by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 39; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 115; Norberto Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída, 1893-1955* (Buenos Aires: Colihue, 2005), 120; Perón, "Memorias 1," 56.

¹⁸ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 115; Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 120. The Perón surname has been traced to various formats in northern Italy and Sardinia, to include Peroni.

former German professors, who had instructed at the ESG.¹⁹ Perón accepted this, though he would not meet with them, but asked not to be recalled should Italy join the war.²⁰ He explained to Márquez that he "wanted to personally witness the country's attitude and the transformation of the character of its people" as it went to war.²¹

Perón's conversation with Márquez indicates that the political and military analyses he published in *Operaciones en 1870* were well-received. The concepts he promoted in the 1939 publication were militaristic. He saw the state, military, and the nation as inseparable and argued that a nation must be organized, mobilized, trained, and prepared to fight to achieve national objectives.²² However, his national development model was still an abstraction that needed structure. He considered Argentina's liberal model a failure and, while he was not a fascist, he was undoubtedly eager to investigate the changes Mussolini's regime made to Italy's social and economic orders, and he understood that culture was relevant to such analysis.²³ Had the High Command wanted to affirm that fascism was a great new model, they could have sent a self-avowed sympathizer.

Perón later gave his views on fascism, Mussolini, and his regime, as he recollected them from before his journey, in interviews and transcribed recordings. The Argentine sometimes embellished the past, whether for self-aggrandizement or political reasons. I believe the former was prominent with his talks with his biographer and secretary, Enrique Pavón Pereyra, who had a vested interest in helping his boss look successful and wise. Political concerns certainly

¹⁹ Juan Perón, interview by Torcuato Luca de Tena, in Torcuato Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón: Relato Autobiográfico* (Barcelona, Spain: Editorial Planeta, 1976), 26.

²⁰ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 113; Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando (1895-1942)* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Espiño, 1952), 198; Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 99.

²¹ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 113; Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 198; Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 99.

²² Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 25-26, 43-45, 59, 90-92, 94; Enrique Rottjer and Juan Perón, *Las Operaciones en 1870* (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1939), 41-42, 48-50, 58.

²³ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 60-66, 115-116.

factored into the interviews he gave in the 1970s because he was mounting his ultimate return to the presidency in 1973. I have considered this and purposely omitted his questionable statements from my analysis if I could not corroborate them, which in the case of Pavón was often possible with Perón's publication of bits of his memoirs in 1970.

In 1970, Perón discussed the need for socio-economic change in the late 1930s and the limited alternatives that existed at the time. He considered the Russian Revolution influential to the development of communism and said it had some influence on the social aspects of Peronism, but he argued that socialism would mesh more easily with Western nationalism. He said Italy was the birthplace of a new movement and provided him with an opportunity to analyze an ongoing experiment of socialism with a "nationalist character."²⁴ He noted that similar politics emerged in Germany and other places that were once "monarchies with socialist governments."²⁵ The Argentine said Mussolini "dazzled him," and he approved of how *il Duce* challenged Great Britain's dominance in Africa and the Mediterranean.²⁶ Perón appreciated challenges to imperialist powers because he was seeking to undo Argentina's semi-colonial conditions, which he believed decades of the oligarchy's facilitation of British and United States imperialist penetration created.²⁷ He did not address Mussolini's imperialism. If *Operaciones en 1870* was an indication of his feelings regarding imperialism, as I believe it was, Perón remained confused regarding imperialism, because while it was in keeping with the military training he received from German instructors throughout his career, it conflicted with his nationalist anti-imperialism. Either way, he must have felt immense anticipation as he sailed to Italy.

²⁴ Perón, interviewed by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 40; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 117; Perón, "Memorias 1," 56.

²⁵ Perón, interviewed by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 40.

²⁶ Peter Neville, *Mussolini* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 104; Patricia Knight, *Mussolini and Fascism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003), 97; Giuseppe Finaldi, *Mussolini and Italian Fascism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 85; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 119-122.

²⁷ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 60-66, 116.

Perón arrived in Genova, Italy, on April 28, 1939, and began writing a series of letters to friends and family in Argentina.²⁸ Historian Ignacio Cloppet published the text of the letters Perón sent to his sister-in-law, who proved to be a trusted confidant after his wife passed in 1938.²⁹ The letters provide invaluable insight on Perón's immediate perception of fascist Italy, the social context and functions of fascism, and the geopolitics leading toward a seemingly inevitable war. He posted from Rome the day after his arrival, noting that Italy was full of "order, discipline, patriotism," and that its system was functioning well. He wrote that the national spirit was buoyant despite problems in occupied Ethiopia and the specter of war over Europe, and dismissed press reports from the "miserable Yankees, French, and company" to the contrary as "propaganda."³⁰ His enthusiastic impressions revealed the preconceived notions he carried with him because he penned this letter within a day of his arrival.

Perón dispatched another letter from Rome a month later, days after Italy tied itself to the Axis in the "Pact of Steel."³¹ He wrote that, contrary to popular opinion in Argentina, Europe offered little innovation in the material order but exhibited much to "imitate in the spiritual order." He credited Mussolini's fascist state for "having long prepared society for war" in a campaign to fortify the national spirit. He compared Rome to his own "immeasurable Buenos Aires," and noted that though the two capitals had faults, these faults contributed to the formation of a "level of organization, order, and work" that other places could not easily emulate.³² The parallels Perón drew between Italy and Argentina related to a question over whether the social and cultural aspects of Italian-style fascism might fit Argentina. Italy was working on a project that bore distinct similarities to Argentina, especially in regards to the themes he had emphasized

²⁸ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 105.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁰ Perón, letter to Tizón from Rome, April 29, 1939, in Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 138-139.

³¹ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 117.

³² Perón, letter to Tizón from Rome, May 27, 1939, in Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 141-143.

since 1931 as a professor, including the importance of national spirit, subordinating the economy to national development, and organizing society.³³ Perón was certainly considering Mussolini's new model for Argentina.

Perón sent another letter the following day, in which he continued to draw cultural parallels by noting that Argentines and Italians shared many traits, especially industriousness. The Argentine said his professional training as a historian allowed him to recognize the significance of the "evolutionary" step the Italians were making. He called the Italian experiment the "resurgence of a great contemporary spiritual movement," which he argued was a "logical reaction to a century of communizing materialism."³⁴ This comment regarding "communization" reflected his belief that capitalist excesses pushed the unsatisfied toward communism. Having himself participated in political repression at the behest of the government, Perón dismissed criticism of the regime's brutality as a "journalistic ploy on the level of junk novels, because all politicians use violence."³⁵ He continued, explaining that he had "more faith in man than in doctrines" and added that strong, capable leadership was indispensable for a nation in crisis. He applauded Mussolini's dedication and clear definition of his movement because Perón believed correcting capitalist excesses required a leader capable of enforcing a "just proportion" between "the part of the population that produces (labor)" and the politically powerful, capitalist minority. He added in his 1939 letter that, "up to now, fascism maintains that just proportion," but he also

³³ Juan Perón, *El Frente Oriental de la Guerra Mundial en 1914*, in *Obras Completas 1* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1997), 180-181; Juan Perón, *Apuntes de Historia Militar: Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, in *Obras Completas 4*, 29-30 (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1997), 162-163; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 78, 84.

³⁴ Perón, letter to Tizón from Rome, May 28, 1939, in Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 144-145; When Perón used the term "communizing," he meant that the inequalities related to capitalist excesses drove some to look for an alternative system and many found such an alternative in communist ideology. This phrase will be seen again.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 144-145; Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 62-64; Edgardo J. Bilsky, *La Semana Trágica* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1984), 161; Paul H. Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals: The "Dirty War" in Argentina* (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2002), 136; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 31; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 65, 71.

warned the regime might fall prey to *personalismo* (cult of personality).³⁶ These notions reflected but praise for strong leadership but concern over how that could be problematic, which is ironic considering that Perón would remain an authoritarian throughout his life, and his centrality in the Peronist movement contributed to opponents classifying him a demagogue.³⁷

By late August 1939, Perón's social studies in the capital were complete, and he reported to the *Tridentina Alpini* (Italy's elite mountain troops) in Northern Italy.³⁸ His new unit assigned him to adjutant's duty in the unit's general staff, which allowed him to see how Italian officers operated during combat training.³⁹ He kept abreast of events in Argentina through European newspapers, exchanges with the other Argentine officers serving in Italy, and literature forwarded to him from a left-wing nationalist organization called FORJA.⁴⁰ A nationalist peer back in Argentina, Colonel Edelmiro Farrell, who served with the *Alpini* in the 1920s, also griped with Perón about Argentina's political conundrum in their ongoing correspondence.⁴¹ Perón mailed a letter to his uncle Conrado that criticized President Ortiz and claimed that only a nationalist government could stabilize Argentina amid the growing agitation in the labor sector.⁴² Argentina's alignment in the coming war under Ortiz was uncertain, and Perón criticized the political leader's ambiguity over an issue that divided national and military opinion.⁴³ Perón sent

³⁶ Perón, letter to Tizón from Rome, May 28, 1939, in Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 144-146.

³⁷ Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 102; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 118; Federico Finchelstein, *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War: Fascism, Populism, and Dictatorship in Twentieth Century Argentina* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 94.

³⁸ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 199; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 117; Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 121.

³⁹ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 201.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 205; Augusto Maidana, interview by Tomás Eloy Martínez, July 1974, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 105-106; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 117, 124-125; Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 123.

⁴¹ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 125; Nathan Widener, *Perón's Political Radio Melodrama: Peronism and Radio Culture, 1920-1955* (master's thesis, Appalachian State University, 2014), 36; Military Service Record, Edelmiro Farrell, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires (AGE).

⁴² Juan Perón, interview by Jorge Crespo, in Jorge Crespo, *El Coronel* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ayer y Hoy Ediciones, 1998), 177-178; Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 121-122.

⁴³ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 130; Hedges, *Argentina*, 51-52; Romero, *History of Argentina in*

a letter to a compatriot assigned to Bassano, Italy, expressing an eagerness to gain combat experience that he believed would boost his career.⁴⁴ The high spirits of the *Tridentina* soldiers, which he attributed to the populace's enthusiastic support, impressed him, but he wanted to see how this manifested in combat.⁴⁵

On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland several days after signing a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, but Mussolini remained neutral.⁴⁶ Perón mailed another letter to family in Argentina days later that focused on the Western Front, and wrote that he hoped his professional opinion would help balance the "corrupt and capricious information" Argentine received from the English media. He wrote that the war was "the second major political-social movement in reaction to the financial, political, and imperialist power of England and France," and that the First World War was the first such movement. He echoed Mussolini's criticism of a "century of liberalism," saying the "century of materialism" had led Europe to this precipice. He believed Poland's rights were being used as a pretense to challenge fascist gains and predicted that the conflict would ultimately determine the world's future political, economic, and social order.⁴⁷

Perón denounced how liberal capitalist materialism prioritized individualism and exalted capital, which often translated into greed, as well as Marxism that arose in response. He proclaimed, "only a resurgence of moral values can save" Europe but predicted it would take a

the Twentieth Century, 80-85; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 88-90.

⁴⁴ Combat experience is paramount for an infantry officer. However, given that Argentina had not been to war for decades, the only Argentine officers who had such experience were the few that saw combat while serving in foreign duty stations like Italy or Germany. Juan Perón, letter to Captain Augusto Maidana, August 4, 1939, Bassano, Italy, Perón Vence al Tiempo archive, accessed October 1, 2019, <http://www.peronvenceal tiempo.com.ar/peron/cartas-de-peron/469-carta-al-cpt-augusto-maidana-04-08-1939>. Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 199; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 117; Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 121.

⁴⁵ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 118-119.

⁴⁶ Sixteen days later, the Soviet Union invaded Poland and the Baltic States, as per the secret details of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact that were not revealed until after the war.

⁴⁷ Perón, letter to Tizón from Merano, Italy, September 8, 1939, in Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 151.

"century to reverse" the ills that an overemphasis on materialism had produced.⁴⁸ The Argentine believed the Allies held a material advantage but that Germany had "greater morale," which he believed powered the spirit.⁴⁹ He predicted Germany would win the continental war by May 1940, and France indeed surrendered only a month after his estimate. Perón worried that the war would drag on and spread across the globe because the German navy would never be able to conquer England through a seaborne invasion. As a result, he suggested that Argentina would eventually be forced to align with either fascism or democracy.⁵⁰ Russia's subsequent invasion of Poland and the Baltic States, per the Soviet Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany, would substantially alter the war's dynamics.

Days later, Perón's combat aspirations crumbled when his Italian commander reassigned him to Pinerolo, Italy, due to *Tridentina's* pending mobilization.⁵¹ The Argentine arrived in the small mountain town outside of Milan, on October 1, 1939, and attended school on fascist ideology before transferring to Combat Ski School in the Aosta border region with France in April 1940, where he took a second course in fascism.⁵² He described one course as "pure science," or theory, and the other as "applied science," or how the mechanics of the new model functioned.⁵³ Scholars of fascism note that the educational infrastructure built under liberal rule in Italy was transformed to build "new" men and women who were obedient and would excel in war.⁵⁴ Fascist theorists avoided fixed formulas and emphasized flexible policies that could adapt to the ever-changing world, which contributed to the difficulties some had in pinning down the

⁴⁸ Ibid., 151.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 151; Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 142; Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 18, 29-30.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 151-153.

⁵¹ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 200; Perón, interview by Crespo, in Crespo, *Coronel*, 184.

⁵² Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 200, 204; Perón, interview by Crespo, in Crespo, *Coronel*, 184-186.

⁵³ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 200, 204; Perón, interview by Crespo, in Crespo, *Coronel*, 186; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 118; Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 122-123.

⁵⁴ Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 143; Alexander De Grand, *Italian Fascism: Its Origins & Development* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 155.

ideology's nature.⁵⁵ Fascism was taught as a "moral and ethical system" that aimed to develop a "national consciousness."⁵⁶ The indoctrination process praised "courage, personal responsibility and initiative" and aimed to cultivate "an atmosphere of equality, emulation and solidarity."⁵⁷ This solidarity was for Italians only, as racial policies excluded Africans and the Jewish from society, which he did not address.⁵⁸

Shortly before Italy joined the war on June 10, 1940, Perón transferred to the Argentine Embassy to serve as an auxiliary attaché and witnessed the fervor "*il Duce*" created in his Roman audience when he announced the declaration of war.⁵⁹ As attaché, he traveled as an observer on short trips to Germany, the Soviet Union, Hungary, and the Dalmatian Coast. The Argentine also witnessed and lamented the aftermath of warfare, which he saw on trips to Spain and occupied France.⁶⁰ In December 1940, all of the Argentine officers in Europe were recalled to Rome, where they assembled for the journey home. They traveled as a group to Lisbon by train, and boarded a ship back to South America.⁶¹

⁵⁵ Federico Finchelstein, *From Fascism to Populism in History* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2019), 36.

⁵⁶ De Grand, *Italian Fascism*, 153.

⁵⁷ Knight, *Mussolini and Fascism*, 78.

⁵⁸ De Grand, *Italian Fascism*, 113-116.

⁵⁹ Perón, interview by Crespo, in Crespo, *Coronel*, 186-187; Francesco, "Mussolini's Declaration of War, 10 June 1940" (speech), produced by Pirames International, Srl, accessed March 3, 2020.

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTEN06p6Rqk>.

⁶⁰ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 201; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 126; Perón, interviewed by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 41; Perón, interview by Crespo, in Crespo, *Coronel*, 198-199; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 93; Miguel Barrios, "El Continentalismo de Perón en la Globalización," Argentine Center of International Studies, Working Papers - Programa Defensa y Seguridad, 2017): 8; Mark Falcoff, "Epilogue," in *Prologue to Perón*, 198; Hodges, *Argentina 1943-1987*, 11-12; Tulio Halperín-Donghi, *The Contemporary History of Latin America*, trans. John Chasteen (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 215. Perón seemed to have embellished his experiences, as indicated events in the timeline that contradict the laws of space and time. He said he visited the *Exposition Internationale* that took place in Paris, France in 1939, but this took place in 1937. He also said he personally met with Mussolini, which appeared to have also been a fabrication based on the dates provided. See Appendix for the itinerary of his travels that I produced based on the numerous sources available on his time in Europe.

⁶¹ Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires (AGE); Goñi, *Perón y los Alemanes*, 28; Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 161-163.

In interviews and recordings made during the 1960s and 1970s, while Perón was in exile in Spain, he reported that he the socioeconomic aspects of fascism intrigued him and that his Italian language skills allowed him to deeply "penetrate... into the system's fundamentals."⁶² He reported that Italy had great economists and he studied the system they were constructing in response to the new social and political conditions of the twentieth century.⁶³ Fascist training in economics focused on autarchy, import substitution industrialization, which was already ongoing in Argentina and much of Latin America at the time, and mass mobilization to advance national development.⁶⁴ Perón also explained his understanding of Italy's corporative order. He said that before Mussolini "the (Italian) nation was on one side and the worker the other, and the latter did not have any participation in the former," but Italy was exploring a new definition of democracy that used "popular organizations" to give the people "effective participation in the national life." He said that, through research and analysis, he "began to realize that the evolution" of the political process taking place in the twentieth century must recognize an increased role for the working class, though he was unsure whether corporative bodies or unions would achieve this.⁶⁵ He said fascism organized Italian labor using "internal commissions in factories" to help harmonize relations between capital and the workforce.⁶⁶ He asked his instructors why they emphasized organization and they explained that organization was vital as they restructured the nation, which led him to lament how Argentina's leaders had failed in this regard for a century.⁶⁷

Perón provided his reflections on Nazi Germany in his recordings.⁶⁸ Their posthumous release, apparently at his discretion, signals that he did not directly link these ideas to Argentina's

⁶² Perón, interviewed by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 28.

⁶³ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 118; Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 122-123.

⁶⁴ De Grand, *Italian Fascism*, 106-110.

⁶⁵ Perón, interviewed by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 28-29.

⁶⁶ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 121.

⁶⁷ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 204.

⁶⁸ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 114.

situation. In the recordings, he noted that Germany was a "monstrous and exceptional nation as much as any Modern State."⁶⁹ He said its formidable organization created an enormous, perfectly-operating "machine."⁷⁰ He considered Nazi Germany a "state organized for a perfectly ordered community, for a nation that was also perfectly ordered; a community where the State was the instrument of those people, who it represented, in my judgment, effectively." He argued that Germany's reordered society represented "true popular democracy, true social democracy" and believed some variation of this would likely become the dominant "political format" in the future world order.⁷¹ The qualification regarding "some" solution is significant because though Perón admired the progress fascist states made, he also noted flaws. He noted that as the world's first experiment in national socialism, it was unrealistic to expect fascism to be flawless.⁷² He never addressed German or Italian imperialism, but the full brutality of Nazism, made unmistakably clear during the Nuremberg trials, horrified him.⁷³

Perón complained that journalists and politicians denounced Germany and Italy's "tyrannical systems" without "getting to the true core of the social phenomenon" taking place. He argued that, despite these criticisms, German Nazism and Italian fascism had been able to achieve results during a period in which liberal orders floundered. The Argentine explained that he conducted detailed studies of fascism's "social and political function" to understand how it reordered society and awakened the national spirit.⁷⁴ These were aspects he had long considered paramount to creating an effective national development model in the imperial order, as seen in

⁶⁹ Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 125.

⁷⁰ Perón, interviewed by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 28; Goñi, *Perón y los Alemanes*, 29.

⁷¹ Perón, interviewed by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 28-29.

⁷² Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 117-118; Perón, interview by Crespo, in Crespo, *Coronel*, 179.

⁷³ Hedges, *Argentina*, 88.

⁷⁴ Perón, interviewed by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 28-29.

his publications from the early 1930s.⁷⁵ He considered *socialismo nacional*, by which he meant any government that responded to national needs, as a new compromise in a world that needed "some intermediate solution" to prevent communism from eventually prevailing over capitalism.⁷⁶ He saw fascism as an attempt to address desires for socioeconomic change through the consolidation of a "third" way that exalted a metaphysical understanding of the nation and rejected the materialism of capitalism and communism.

Though Perón appreciated how fascism put the nation over individual material concerns, he concluded that the ideology, born amidst the circumstances of twentieth-century Europe, did not relate to Argentina's unique circumstances.⁷⁷ He concluded that Argentina needed a system that considered the realities of how imperialism held Argentina in semi-colonial conditions, whereas fascism was, among other things, borne in response to liberal materialism and European power politics.⁷⁸ At some point before 1952, Perón told his biographer that the experience in Europe led him and his compatriots abroad to conclude that the nation must protect its popular sovereignty to develop, which would require achieving autarchy "without appealing to any foreign recipes."⁷⁹ If his claim is valid, which I argue the documents he produced in 1943 in support of a military coup bear out, it was another example of how Perón rejected fascism before 1941. His autarchic aspirations aligned with ideas advanced by Argentina's left-wing nationalist FORJA organization that started in the mid-1930s and Peru's *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA, American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) movement, which influenced the nationalist left throughout Latin America since the 1920s.⁸⁰ Another reason he rejected fascism

⁷⁵ Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 223; Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 143; Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 29-31.

⁷⁶ Perón, interviewed by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 29.

⁷⁷ Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 127.

⁷⁸ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 129.

⁷⁹ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 205; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 124-125.

⁸⁰ Fuerza de Orientación Radical de la Joven Argentina (FORJA), *Manifiesto del Grupo FORJA (Fuerza de Orientación Radical de la Joven Argentina) Aprobado en su Asamblea Constituyente del 29 de Junio de 1935*, June

was his socially inclusive view of the nation, which derived from his mixed heritage, egalitarian upbringing, interpretation of Christianity, and belief that the socially exclusive policies of the traditional liberal governments created social imbalances to the detriment of national unity.⁸¹

Perón concluded that his experiences in Europe gave him a "completely clear panorama about what was happening in the world."⁸² He recognized that imperialism would continue to impose itself on the world in the postwar period, and that Argentina would be forced to the margins of the capitalist order in this process because imperialism would crush any attempt to introduce alternatives.⁸³ The Argentine did not address fascist imperialism, which is odd given his anti-imperialism, but his primary concern was how to achieve development when facing imperialist foes. His focus, as he stated before, during, and after his trip, was to evaluate how the socioeconomic changes proposed in fascism affected national development. While he did incorporate aspects of fascism in his future government, such as its pageantry, which also related to his military background, Italy was not the birthplace of Perón's political ideas, many of which predated fascisms rise or conflicted with prominent aspects of the ideology. Italy was where he saw an example of the corporative order in action, which numerous Argentine nationalists and even some liberal intellectuals had mulled over during the Depression.⁸⁴

29, 1935, Archivo Histórico, accessed October 1, 2019, <http://archivohistorico.educ.ar>. As the years progressed, the FORJA movement grew and after the Second World War was absorbed into the future Peronist movement, Whitaker, 16; Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. Dolkart, "Political Developments," in *Prologue to Perón*, 44; Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 10; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 88; Hedges, *Argentina*, 88; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 233; Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 4th ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), 52-53, 201; Ramón Grosfoguel, "Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America," *Views from the South* 1, no. 2 (2000): 335.

⁸¹ Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *El Hombre del Destino* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Abril Educativa y Cultural, 1973), 1; Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 25; Perón, interview by Martínez, in Martínez, *Las Memorias del General* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Planeta, 1996), 21; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 25-26, 43-45, 59, 90-92, 94; Perón, interview by Crespo, in Crespo, *Coronel*, 139; Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 182-183; Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 18.

⁸² Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 126; Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 127.

⁸³ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 126, 136; Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 127.

⁸⁴ Carlos M. Noel, "Política y Economía" (speech at the Teatro Independencia, Mendoza, April 7, 1935), in *Hechos*

Perón, the Army's Nationalist Movement, and the Second World War

Perón returned to Argentina in January 1941 and found his homeland in challenging times. The British Naval blockade of most of Western Europe cut trade more severely than it had during the Great Depression and the labor sector was agitating.⁸⁵ Public, political, and military opinion were divided over the war. Criticisms that United States-sponsored pan-Americanism and the economic imperialism of the Good Neighbor Policy represented "Yankee Machiavellianism" returned when the United States began openly aiding the Allies without consulting the Latin American states, who were expected to fall in line.⁸⁶ Great Britain bolstered the United States' position when it signed over most of its Western Hemisphere strategic holdings to the United States to maintain naval supremacy in the European theater. According to Jill Hedges, Argentine public opinion, though not well-represented by the fraudulent government, opposed the Axis but also shunned British and North American policies.⁸⁷ President Ortiz had fallen ill and his Vice President Ramón Castillo (1873-1944) was acting chief. Castillo was a deeply conservative man from an interior province with strong ties to the oligarchy.⁸⁸ He maintained Argentina's neutrality despite having Axis sympathies because the oligarchy, due to

e Ideas 1, no. 1 (June 1935): 31-35; Other examples include the ultra-nationalist dictator José Uriburu in the early 1930s, and from the left-wing, FORJA and APRA in the mid-1930s; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 88; Hedges, *Argentina*, 88; Giuseppe Finaldi, *Mussolini and Italian Fascism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 83; Knight, *Mussolini and Fascism*, 66; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 233; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 52-53, 201; Grosfoguel, "Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory," 335; Federico Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 52, 57, 68; Michael A. Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland: Religion and Politics in Argentina* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 30; Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 128; Finchelstein, *Ideological Origins of the Dirty War*, 23; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 78.

⁸⁵ Hedges, *Argentina*, 51; Rock, "Argentina, 1930-1946," 39; David Rock, ed., *Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 27, accessed October 1, 2016, <http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft567nb3f6;brand=eschol>.

⁸⁶ Rock, "Argentina, 1930-1946," 45; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 217.

⁸⁷ Hedges, *Argentina*, 52; Rock, *Latin America in the 1940s*, 25.

⁸⁸ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 141; Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 19; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 89; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 222; Hedges, *Argentina*, 51.

their ties with England, overwhelmingly favored the Allies, while most of the military advocated neutrality.⁸⁹ Castillo found himself politically isolated, especially after his efforts to make inroads into North American markets failed.⁹⁰

Upon returning to Buenos Aires, Perón arranged a series of confidential meetings with individual military leaders and small groups to share his conclusions about Europe. The intimate gatherings allowed him to gauge reactions and see who agreed with his conclusions, which was sensitive work due to political divisions in the military.⁹¹ He noted that Márquez appreciated his report on Italy, though he did not elaborate on why.⁹² Perón recounted that most of the general staff were convinced Germany had "already won" the war. He said pro-Axis officers, like Colonel Juan Sanguinetti, who sponsored the 1939 publication of the militaristic *Operaciones en 1870*, were annoyed by his prediction that the Axis might lose.⁹³ Perón recalled that some "praetorian" generals criticized his leftist ideas, which prompted them to ship him off to the army's mountaineering school in Mendoza.⁹⁴

Washington's for hemispheric solidarity after Pearl Harbor and Hitler's declaration of war on the United States in December 1941 failed when Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay

⁸⁹ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 142; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 222; Hedges, *Argentina*, 51.

⁹⁰ US Coordinator of Information, The Political Situation in Argentina, Latin American Section, Special Memorandum No. 12, December 3, 1941; US Coordinator of Information, Recent Developments in Argentina, Latin American Section, Special Memorandum No. 21, January 10, 1942; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 142; Horowitz, *Argentine Unions, the State & the Rise of Perón*, 19; Hedges, *Argentina*, 51; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 127-128.

⁹¹ Hedges, *Argentina*, 51; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 222; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 84-90; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 126-130.

⁹² Perón, interviewed by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 29-30; Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 130-131.

⁹³ Perón, interviewed by Crespo, in Crespo, *Coronel*, 179-180; Perón, interviewed by Luca de Tena, in Luca de Tena, *Yo, Juan Domingo Perón*, 29-30; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 127; Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 130-131.

⁹⁴ Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída*, 130-131; Perón, interviewed by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 42; Perón's records indicate that he was assigned to Mendoza on January 8, 1941, Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires (AGE). Perón's bold anti-Axis prediction as the Swastika flew over a vast European landscape may have irritated influential generals, but his mission in Italy was also designed to also prepare him for this assignment in Mendoza.

refused to break ties with Germany. Documents from the nascent United States intelligence community's Coordinator of Information Office, the precursor to the Office of Strategic Service and Central Intelligence Agency, revealed concerns that nationalists in Argentina's army might seize power and move the state to the "totalitarian" sphere.⁹⁵ The British defended their downtrodden trading partner's neutrality, which provided Castillo some political shelter.⁹⁶

However, British interests did not assuage Washington's concerns about Argentina or the region. Scholars note that North American media sources painted Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay as susceptible to subversion by a Nazi "fifth column" operating out of Buenos Aires. Reports circulated that leading Axis figures, including Mussolini and SS Chief Heinrich Himmler, envisioned a "Latin nexus" that ran from Italy through Spain to Argentina and beyond.⁹⁷ Such a grouping would put international shipping lanes in the Atlantic at risk. United States strategists and diplomats also worried that airfields used by German civilian airlines might be used to target the Panama Canal in the near future.⁹⁸ The United States slapped arms embargoes on Argentina and Chile but opened the "Arsenal of Democracy" to compliant states like Brazil as part of the Lend-Lease program.⁹⁹ In response, alarmists in Argentina's army called for military mobilization based on fears that a United States-backed Brazilian invasion was imminent.¹⁰⁰ In a replay of 1917, Brazil signaled its full alignment with the United States in 1942

⁹⁵ US Coordinator of Information, The Political Situation in Argentina, Latin American Section, Special Memorandum No. 12, December 3, 1941; US Coordinator of Information, Interoffice memo to Dr. Preston James: Possibilities of the Argentine Situation, John Fox, December 20, 1941; US Coordinator of Information, Interoffice memo to William Donovan: Situation in Argentina, Preston E. James, December 19, 1941.

⁹⁶ Rock, "Argentina, 1930-1946," 45-46; Hedges, *Argentina*, 52.

⁹⁷ Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism*, 16; Newton, "Nazi Menace" in *Argentina*, xvi; Goñi, *Perón y los Alemanes*, 30-34, 121.

⁹⁸ Newton, "Nazi Menace" in *Argentina*, xvi; Goñi, *Perón y los Alemanes*, 30-34, 121; Friedman, *Nazis and Good Neighbors*, 56-57; McConahay, "The Fight for Southern Skies," in *Tango War*, loc 84-340, Kindle.

⁹⁹ Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 90; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 85; Hedges, *Argentina*, 52; Raanan Rein, *Argentine Jews or Jewish Argentines?: Essays on Ethnicity, Identity, and Diaspora* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 70.

¹⁰⁰ Hedges, *Argentina*, 52; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 130; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Argentina*, 216.

when it declared war on Germany after a series of U-boat attacks. Chile and Uruguay maintained neutrality, but the latter broke ties with Germany at the behest of the United States. The United States intelligence community remained concerned about Argentina's policy of "isolation and non-cooperation," and the US Army Air Force began constructing airfields in Uruguay and Brazil.¹⁰¹ The introduction of American airpower in the region represented a serious threat and prompted new concerns that Uruguay might join in a Washington-led coalition against Argentina.¹⁰²

Perón was promoted to colonel and transferred to Buenos Aires, where he replaced Farrell as the Inspector of Mountain Troops.¹⁰³ He later told his biographer that he had continued to study "social phenomena," which reflected that the search for a new model continued after his time in Italy, and Italy's poor performance in the war certainly did not bode well for fascism.¹⁰⁴ In early 1943, the officer corps learned that the oligarch Robustiano Patrón Costas was the corrupt government's new president-select.¹⁰⁵ Patrón Costa supported neutrality, but nationalists believed his economic ties to Britain were compromising.¹⁰⁶ Perón later recalled that a group of colonels eagerly approached him in the capital, told him they agreed with his ideas, and urged that it was time to take action.¹⁰⁷ After some consideration, he agreed and began recruiting nationalist colonels and majors into a secret lodge, the *Grupo de Oficiales Unidos* (GOU, United

¹⁰¹ US Coordinator of Information, Recent Developments in Argentina, Latin American Section, Special Memorandum No. 21, January 10, 1942; US Coordinator of Information, Interoffice memo to James P. Baxter: Evidence of Argentine Cooperation and Non-Cooperation, Preston E. James, May 8, 1942; Pedro M. Cameselle-Pesce, "Forgotten Neighbors: The Challenge of Uruguay-United States Relations during the Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1929-1945" (PhD diss., Fordham University, 2016), 1, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

¹⁰² Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 169-170; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 90.

¹⁰³ Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires (AGE).

¹⁰⁴ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 126.

¹⁰⁵ Perón, interviewed by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 42; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 179.

¹⁰⁶ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 180; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 133; López, *Primer Perón*, 61; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 90.

¹⁰⁷ Perón, interviewed by Martínez, in Martínez, *Memorias del General*, 42; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 135.

Officers' Group).¹⁰⁸ Scholars note that Perón was the group's intellectual leader and say he authored most of its documents.¹⁰⁹ This marked his shift from theorist to policymaker. As he wrote the first GOU documents, Germany suffered a massive defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad. While this was a major turning point that drew the myth of German invincibility further into question, the war's outcome remained uncertain.

GOU documents blamed local facilitators, the oligarchy and the corrupt government, for putting Argentina in danger. The founding document indicated that the country's wealth made it an attractive target and said the "full decomposition" of the internal front made the country vulnerable.¹¹⁰ The GOU warned that another fraudulent electoral election might trigger a revolutionary civil war and that the communists might seize power.¹¹¹ They indicated that the *Unión Democrática*, a coalition that formed in 1941-1942 that had sweeping ideological support from the left and the center, was comprised of "communists, socialists, unions, democratic progressives, radicals, etc."¹¹² The GOU compared the Union to the leftist *Frente Popular* (Popular Front) coalition during Spain's brutal civil war, which the document characterized as a communist front.¹¹³ Chile had an anti-fascist *Frente Popular*, and similar organizations existed in several European countries during the 1930s. Moscow directed communists to silence their anti-fascism in 1939 after the *Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact* was finalized, which confused matters more,

¹⁰⁸ Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 127.

¹⁰⁹ Hedges, *Argentina*, 81; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 93; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 85; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*; 185.

¹¹⁰ Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU), "G.O.U. Bases," in Robert A. Potash, *Perón y el G.O.U.: Los Documentos de una Logia Secreta* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Sudamericana, 1984), 26.

¹¹¹ GOU, "G.O.U. Bases: Plan de Unificación," 26; GOU, "Situación Interna," in Potash, *Perón y el G.O.U.*, 198, 205-208.

¹¹² GOU, "Situación Interna," 198-199.

¹¹³ GOU, "G.O.U. Bases," 26-28; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 93; Barrios, "Continentalismo de Perón en la Globalización," 8; Falcoff, "Epilogue," 198; Hodges, *Argentina 1943-1987*, 11-12; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 215.

but Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union abruptly ended this stance.¹¹⁴ Tulio Halperín-Donghi indicates that Communist parties organized during the Depression took a "truly important political role in Brazil, Chile, and Cuba" and were "becoming at least a force to be reckoned with in a number of other countries from Argentina and Uruguay to Colombia and Venezuela."¹¹⁵ Marxists were not in a position to seize power. At best, they were in a position to be recognized in open political forums. Ironically, the military's coming coup fortified the *Unión Democrática* based on its opposition to the regime.¹¹⁶

The GOU saw it as their duty to respond to the "two-sided pressure" of capitalist and communist materialism.¹¹⁷ The GOU "renounced material goods" and "personal ambitions" as part of its mission to "spiritually and materially" unify the army officer corps.¹¹⁸ The GOU document claimed that their "spiritual Argentization" and the "implementation of new systems" would deprive Marxists of their talking points, thus reversing the decomposition of the internal front. They espoused a new development model that pertained to neither system, with the state playing the role of "social harmonizer." They called for the nationalization of Argentina's resources and laws to exclude corrupt "professional politicians," whose actions they believed engendered "social agitation," from the political process.¹¹⁹

A GOU document from early May 1943 was titled "Argentina's International Situation." It proclaimed that Argentina's neutrality corresponded with its traditional policy and its right to self-determination. The document called for autarchy to restore sovereignty to the nation, which reflected the conclusion Perón reached during his assignment in Italy.¹²⁰ However, this notion

¹¹⁴ Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 225-226.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 219.

¹¹⁶ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 95-98.

¹¹⁷ GOU, "Situación Interna," 201.

¹¹⁸ GOU, "G.O.U. Bases," 26; GOU, "GOU Coordinador 14," in Potash, *Perón y el G.O.U.*, 157.

¹¹⁹ GOU, "Situación Interna," in Potash, *Perón y el G.O.U.*, 209.

¹²⁰ GOU, "La Situación Internacional Argentina," in Potash, *Perón y el G.O.U.*, 191-192/191-192.

originally surfaced in Argentina in 1935, in the manifesto of the left-wing nationalist FORJA organization, whose ideas Perón followed.¹²¹ The GOU claimed that despite the war's global reach, Argentina's geographical isolation could allow it to sustain its neutrality, and its natural wealth—if protected—could sustain the economy outside of the Allies' trade network. It noted that other Latin American states were less fortunate and adopted anti-Axis dispositions as "a courtesy to the principle country," the United States, upon whom they were dependent. The document noted that compromised states worried that, should the Axis win, the repercussions for having backed the Allies would give neutral Argentina tremendous influence in the region.¹²² The GOU believed aligning with a "loser" might have negative repercussions in the post-war reckoning, but their emphasis on national sovereignty and the nation's geographic isolation signals that they planned to remain neutral.

The foreign policy document suggested forming a "Chile-Argentina-Paraguay Axis."¹²³ These three states were the only states that remained neutral in the region, and all had received training from German instructors.¹²⁴ The document claimed that forming such a bloc would see regional hegemony "pass into Argentina's hands," to the detriment of its chief rival, Brazil.¹²⁵ Singling out Brazil as a competitor for regional hegemony linked back to Perón's beliefs from the early 1930s that Argentina must become a regional power to oppose imperialism. To achieve this, he promoted military preparedness, but in 1943, he was becoming increasingly aware that

¹²¹ FORJA, *Manifiesto del Grupo FORJA*, <http://archivohistorico.educ.ar>; Plotkin, *Mañana es San Perón*, 9.

¹²² GOU, "Situación Internacional Argentina," 192-193.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 196.

¹²⁴ Brian Loveman, *For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 81, Adobe PDF eBook; George Pope Atkins and Larry V. Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina, 1921-1940," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 4, no. 2, (November 1972): 259-260; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 2; Alain Rouquié, *The Military and the State in Latin America*, trans. Paul E. Sigmund (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 77, 80; Elizabeth B. White, *German Influence in the Argentine Army, 1900-1945* (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991), 2; Carlos Camacho Arango, "Síntesis y Perspectiva de los Estudios de Transferencias Militares Europeas en Suramérica, 1890-1940," *Revista de Historia Iberoamericana* 4, no. 2 (2011): 42, 44; Enrique Dick, *La Profesionalización en el Ejército Argentino (1899-1914)* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 2014), 64-70.

¹²⁵ GOU, "Situación Internacional Argentina," 196.

Argentine strength would be insufficient to confront imperialism alone.¹²⁶ This proposal came in the context of Washington calling Argentina a fascist regime, allying with its traditional rival Brazil, and building airfields in neighboring states. In this context, the proposed "Axis" was a desperate defensive gambit against imperialism that configured Argentina as the leading state, which nationalist intellectuals in Argentina had touted for decades under less harrowing circumstances.¹²⁷

The military's coup on June 4, 1943, surprised the Argentine public, though most recognized that something had to change.¹²⁸ Despite being the "brains" behind the GOU, Perón was a colonel known only in military circles. Army Commander General Arturo Rawson made himself dictator based on his position, which Allied and the Axis diplomats interpreted as a sign that Argentina would align with the Allies because he demonstrated pro-Allied sentiments.¹²⁹ However, he lacked the support of the GOU and within three days, the nationalist General Pedro Ramírez (1884-1962), who supported neutrality, replaced Rawson. The US State Department became alarmed and oriented itself against the nationalist regime.¹³⁰

For the next three months, the army's liberals and nationalists jockeyed for control. After the nationalists consolidated power in October 1943, Perón's confidant Farrell became the new war minister. The general brought the colonel into the fold and quickly came to rely on his

¹²⁶ Horacio Ballester, "Presentación," in Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, xv; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Pavón, *Yo Perón*, 60-61, 66.

¹²⁷ José Ingenieros, *La Evolución Sociológica Argentina: De La Barbarie Al Imperialismo* (Buenos Aires: Librería J. Menéndez, 1910), 100-103; Pedro de Córdoba, (Pen Name of Gonzalo de Reparaz), *Nuestra Guerra: La Coalición Contra la Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: La Gaceta de España, 1917), 3-7, 70-72; Francisco Félix Bayón, *Dogma Nacional: A la Juventud Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Imprensa Europea de M. A. Rosas, 1919), 18-26.

¹²⁸ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 91-92; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 201; Hedges, *Argentina*, 59-60.

¹²⁹ Newton, "Nazi Menace" in *Argentina*, 299.

¹³⁰ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 205-206, 209; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 217; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 135-136; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 91-93; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 93-94; Hedges, *Argentina*, 82.

industrious subordinate.¹³¹ The war minister granted Perón multiple posts, which the colonel used to make social welfare and labor reforms. Perón's ideas and effective execution of a growing list of duties led to his rapid rise within the regime.¹³² He failed to consolidate a corporative board of representatives, but by the time he would run for the presidency in 1946, he had abandoned the idea of a corporative order and allied with labor. He removed communists from union leadership positions and began consolidating labor under an umbrella union, the *Confederación General del Trabajo* (CGT, General Confederation of Workers), which he then gave political backing. His popularity among the working class and poor began to grow when his programs reduced income inequality, improved standards of living, and alleviated labor agitation.¹³³ Dan Healey notes that Perón took the leading role in the regime's response to a devastating earthquake in the Mendoza province in January 1944, which leveled the adobe houses in the city of San Juan and left thousands homeless. He took to the nation's airwaves to announce the state's relief effort, promised to rebuild San Juan as a modern city, and promised that the regime's work in San Juan would soon be extended to the entire nation. The general public approved of his work, which Healey pinpoints as the moment that Perón's vision for national leadership became possible.¹³⁴

¹³¹ Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires (AGE); Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 210.

¹³² September 13, 1943, Perón became the Chief of the Secretary of the War Ministry. On October 27, he was assigned as president of the National Labor Department. On December 1, this officer was expanded into the new Secretary of Labor and Welfare. Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires (AGE); Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 91-93; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 93-94; Hedges, *Argentina*, 82.

¹³³ Ernesto Semán, *Ambassadors of the Working Class: Argentina's International Labor Activists and Cold War Democracy in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), 38; Hedges, *Argentina*, 89-94; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 97-98; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 85-86; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 141-144; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 93-94; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 227-228; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 223.

¹³⁴ Mark A. Healey, *The Ruins of the New Argentina: Peronism and the Remaking of San Juan after the 1944 Earthquake* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 3-14.

Perón versus the United States

In early 1944, a political scandal ensued that spurred Perón's rise in the regime. Scholars explain that a secret Argentine arms deal with Nazi Germany came to light while the United States arms embargo was still in place. President Ramírez acceded to Washington's demands that Argentina break ties with Germany on January 26, 1944, which nationalists considered a concession to imperialism, and Farrell replaced him as president within a month.¹³⁵ Farrell appointed Perón as the new Minister of War, which was a highly visible political position given the regional and global context.¹³⁶ Washington's suspicions that Argentina might open a southern front dissipated as the Allied victory became increasingly likely. The United States military issued reports that exhibited less strategic concern and began to mention Perón. Military attachés reported Argentine military maneuvers in the River Plate, but also noted that Argentina's "obsolete" navy made it extremely unlikely it was planning an attack.¹³⁷ Perón was considered a moderate compared to the regime's "Pro-Nazis" and hardliners, who reports noted were resigning or being placed under state arrest. Military intelligence reports from this period typically registered "Nothing to Report" in regards to Argentina, and often the entire region.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ Henry Morgenthau, *Diary Volume 706*, March 3-March 6, 1944, 39-40, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum, *Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.*, April 27, 1933-July 27, 1945; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 143; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 222; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 95.

¹³⁶ On February 24, 1944, Perón became interim War Minister, replacing Farrell. On May 4, and this became permanent. Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires (AGE).

¹³⁷ US Navy, Report from ALUSNA (American Legation United States Naval Attaché) Buenos Aires, Argentina, Number 201745 NCR 7311, July 21, 1944; US War Department, Memorandum 197 from US Military Attaché in Paraguay, Colonel Park, CM-IN-25022, July 29, 1944; US Navy, Report from ALUSNA (American Legation United States Naval Attaché) Montivideo (sic) Uruguay, Number 051513 NCR 6213, October 6, 1944; US War Department, Memorandum 243 from US Military Attaché in Paraguay, Colonel Park, CM-IN-24621, October 25, 1944.

¹³⁸ US War and Navy Departments, Army Navy Weekly Intelligence Report, Number 370, April 1, 1944; US War and Navy Departments, Army Navy Weekly Intelligence Report, Number 371, April 2, 1944; US War and Navy Departments, Army Navy Weekly Intelligence Report, Number 372, April 3, 1944; US War and Navy Departments, Army Navy Weekly Intelligence Report, Number 373, April 4, 1944; US War and Navy Departments, Army Navy Monthly Intelligence Summary, Number 12, April 4, 1944; US War and Navy Departments, Army Navy Weekly Intelligence Report, Number 376, April 7, 1944; US War and Navy Departments, Army Navy Weekly Intelligence Report, Number 377, April 8, 1944.

As War Minister, Perón ordered the fortification of the Río de la Plata and began writing a speech to explain his logic. Shortly before the speech, he mailed a letter to a peer in Chile, retired General Ramón Díaz, that related to the "Argentina-Chile-Paraguay Axis" he proposed during the GOU era. The colonel hoped the two countries would "close ranks" and stand "elbow to elbow" in defense of spiritualism and their patrimonies.¹³⁹ It is hard to imagine that Argentine strategists like Perón intended to align with Nazi Germany, whose defeat appeared likely by mid-1944. His proposed "Axis" coalition and river fortifications were defensive measures, which was his professional responsibility. From the regime's perspective, the likely enemy still seemed to be some coalition involving Brazil, Uruguay, and at least American air support, though no planning of this nature has surfaced.

Perón delivered his speech to the faculty of the National University of La Plata, outside of Buenos Aires, on June 10, 1944, which was six days after the successful Allied invasion of Normandy.¹⁴⁰ He outlined his plans for anti-imperialist national development in relation to current circumstances and the postwar order. He characterized warfare as the inevitable outcome of materialist competition over resources, as he had since 1931.¹⁴¹ He argued that the ongoing war would neither end imperialism nor resolve the differences between the "United Nations" and the Axis. He declared that the world must adopt new "political, economic, and social" structures in the post-war order, or more wars would ensue.¹⁴² This concept would be a defining point of his geopolitical vision for the rest of his life, as evinced in his subsequent speeches, a globally

¹³⁹ Perón, letter to General Don Ramon Diaz Diaz, March 14, 1944, accessed March 2, 2020, <http://archivoperonista.com/documentos/correspondencia/1944/carta-peron-al-general-ramon-diaz-diaz/>.

¹⁴⁰ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 247.

¹⁴¹ Juan Perón, "Significado de la Defensa Nacional desde el Punto de Vista Militar" (speech, Universidad de la Defensa Nacional, Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 10, 1944), Archivo Peronista, accessed March 12, 2020, <http://archivoperonista.com/discursos/juan-domingo-peron/1944/palabras-en-conferencia-sobre-significado-defensa-nacional-desde/>; Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 153-155, 165-168.

¹⁴² Perón, "Significado de la Defensa Nacional desde el Punto de Vista Militar," June 10, 1944.

broadcast radio address, books, and other publications.¹⁴³ Perón said Argentina was a pacifist nation and denied that it harbored ambitions for "political, economic, or spiritual hegemony," which marked a change from his 1930s militarism and the hegemonic aspiration evident in the GOU era.¹⁴⁴

Perón warned skeptics that imperialism was the true threat to Latin America, and that the region's political divisions and material wealth made it a target for nations seeking to "satisfy" material needs. Based on his belief that imperialism wanted to force "abject vassalage" on Argentina, Perón discussed modern warfare, which he recognized as total war. In this regard, he quoted *A Nation in Arms*, written by the influential Prussian military theorist Colmar von der Goltz (1843-1916), which, as the title indicates, predicted that future wars would involve the entire nation.¹⁴⁵ Perón said the First World War proved that nations applied their "maximum effort" in contemporary wars, including campaigns in "the seas, the air, the political, economic, financial, (and) industrial fields." He said that the "fifth column," by which he meant Marxist propaganda agents, engage in targeted subversion by infiltrating labor and spreading dissension with the aim of crippling Argentina's nascent armaments industry.¹⁴⁶ He said the free press and diplomatic immunity were fronts that were also used to protect insidious propaganda efforts designed to exploit social and political divisions within vulnerable nations.¹⁴⁷ The implication is that a strong state security apparatus must be created to protect the nation from foreign subversion. He declared that a modern nation must organize itself into a "strong machine,

¹⁴³ Juan Perón, *Por la Cooperación Económica y la Paz Mundial* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Subsecretaría de Informaciones, 1947), 5-15; Juan Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *Descartes*, 95-97; Juan Perón, "Lucha Contra los Pueblos, Julio 31, 1952" in *ibid.*, 197-199; Juan Perón, message read in Perón's name at the 4th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers, Algeria, September 7, 1973, in *Perón: Discurso Completos* (San Isidro, Argentina: Megafón, 1987), 61-76.

¹⁴⁴ Perón, "Significado de la Defensa Nacional desde el Punto de Vista Militar," June 10, 1944.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*; William Donovan and Edgar Mowrer, "Fifth Column Lessons for America," Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941.

¹⁴⁷ Perón, "Significado de la Defensa Nacional desde el Punto de Vista Militar," June 10, 1944.

capable of developing adequate plans for propaganda, counterpropaganda, and censorship, that protects the internal front" from consistent and enduring imperialist assaults.¹⁴⁸

Perón went on to describe the long-term efforts required to prepare the nation. He said a powerful leader must oversee national development. Before and during warfare, this leader would define objectives based on his interpretation of the will of the entire nation, which would ensure "no divergent opinions" could erode internal unity. This included drafting plans for setting the "great mechanism," the prepared nation, into motion when war arrived, and plans "to dismantle the warlike machinery" when peace returned. He said such plans would preclude the social tensions related to demobilization and thusly ensure continued internal unity. He said domestic policies must provide the military with a large pool of "healthy and strong" men, whose patriotic spirit would allow them to endure the "war of nerves" that typified conflicts in the contemporary era. He said conscription would ensure that these qualities developed in the "entire population without exception." As part of this effort, the state would also channel the youth into corporate entities that corresponded to changing national development needs.¹⁴⁹

Perón emphasized that Argentina must organize its economy in a way that recognized its significance in the Clausewitzian politics-war spectrum. He argued that the "economic assault comes before the military assault," and declared that the "mobilization and transformation of the country's economy" was necessary to withstand pre-war pressures. To this end, the state would "guide and protect" industrialization. He complained that Argentina was currently paying an unsustainable rate of "seven times" the real value of war materials, and declared that the nation must improve its fledgling armaments industry. The colonel advised that the state redirect the "flow of our trade to friendly nations" in the region, which would mitigate Argentina's

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

vulnerability to imperialist pressure. He said Argentina would apply its comparative advantages to "fairly acquire what we need for national development through trade."¹⁵⁰ This was the first time Perón spoke on the theme of economic cooperation, which was part of his vision for "humanizing capitalism," rather than a quest to maximize profits through exploitative foreign trade. Economic cooperation would become a hallmark of his foreign policy for the remainder of his career.¹⁵¹

Perón's new vision featured significant adaptations from his pre-war and GOU era visions. His plans were now fleshed out, especially concerning labor. He made foreign policy changes that related to Argentina's geopolitical context, which was that of an isolated, vulnerable state that faced severe criticism from Washington, which was now a global superpower. Though he discussed methods to create a formidable national defense, he promised a pacifist orientation and eschewed hegemonic ambitions. In place of autarchy, he called for the redirection of foreign trade to neighboring states through mutually beneficial trade. However, in 1944, his detractors considered this speech evidence that the military regime was a "pro-Nazi" organization.¹⁵² However, it was becoming increasingly clear in Argentina that Perón was the leader with the vision and strength to guide national development.

Perón rose to the vice presidency shortly after the speech, and scholars argue that he ran the government while his long-time boss, Farrell, remained the political figurehead.¹⁵³ After the

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Perón, *Por la Cooperación Económica y la Paz Mundial*, 7-9; Juan Perón, speech at the Annual Armed Forces Comradeship Dinner, July 5, 1953, in *Perón Habla a las Fuerzas Armada, 1946-1954* (Buenos Aires: Secretaría de Prensa y Difusión de la Presidencia de la Nación, 1955), 97-112; Perón, message read in Perón's name at the 4th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, in *Discurso Completos*, 61-76.

¹⁵² US Secretary of State, Telegram to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics Except Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia, June 22, 1944, 835 01/335a: Circular Telegram; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 144-145.

¹⁵³ Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 93; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 140; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 95; Hedges, *Argentina*, 82-84.

liberation of Paris, he addressed Argentina's Chamber of Commerce to explain his vision to skeptical business leaders as a new era approached. The United States and Great Britain hoped to define the postwar order with the Bretton Woods Accord, which all of South America signed except Argentina in July 1944. Historians note that the accord was designed to increase financial interdependence through reducing trade barriers, which planners hoped would foster development and prevent war.¹⁵⁴ Perón's general theme was that socio-political change must take place, as he proposed two months earlier.¹⁵⁵

To convince his capitalist audience, Perón evoked the communist threat, but he also provided compelling geopolitical insight. The vice president said Latin America's semi-colonial conditions created internal support for communism.¹⁵⁶ Marxist politicians in Bolivia and Chile had made gains during the war, while Brazil's President Getúlio Vargas used unions to reduce their influence. However, communism was legally banned from political participation in much of the region.¹⁵⁷ Though this could seem like a red scare tactic, he knew he needed to convince business leaders that he was anti-communist as his support for labor raised questions. Despite the pending Allied victory, Perón told the business leaders that the war was the second "decisive blow" against capitalism as a world system, after the loss of Russia as a "capitalist" country. He

¹⁵⁴ Rock, *Latin America in the 1940s*, 30, 46, 51-52; McPherson, *Intimate Ties*, 11; Louis T. Gordon, "Latin America in Postwar World," *Fourth International* 10, no. 5 (May 1949): 134-138, accessed October 1, 2016, Marxist Internet Archive; Benn Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Wood: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 1-2; Eric Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 10-13, 16; María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo, *The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the Age of Development* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 19; CQ Researcher, "United States Trade with Latin America," October 10, 1939, accessed October 1, 2016, <http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1939101000>.

¹⁵⁵ Juan Perón, "Discurso en la Bolsa de Comercio" (speech, Bolsa de Comercio, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 25, 1944), Archivo Peronista, accessed March 12, 2020, <http://archivoperonista.com/discursos/juan-domingo-peron/1944/discurso-en-bolsa-comercio/>.

¹⁵⁶ Perón, "Discurso en la Bolsa de Comercio," August 25, 1944.

¹⁵⁷ Rock, *Latin America in the 1940s*, 60-70; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 120-121; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 244-245; Teresa A. Meade, *A History of Modern Latin America: 1800 to the Present* (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2011), 388.

told the leaders that he doubted the compromises Western states had made in their domestic orders during the Depression were sufficient to prevent "pan-Russian anti-capitalism" from dominating Europe. He predicted a "third act" in the struggle against capitalism, and said Europe would again be the decisive arena in a struggle between the victorious materialist ideologies. He noted that Argentina was geographically positioned to avoid this and said the nation's abundant resources meant society could remain satisfied if a war severed trade routes, as both world wars had. He warned that slipping into a civil war, as Spain had, would negate these advantages.¹⁵⁸

In his speech, Perón warned that Argentina's business leaders the "postwar period will inevitably bring about an agitation of the masses," which he suggested might embolden Marxists.¹⁵⁹ The Soviet triumph in the war evinced that its system was viable, and scholars note that this helped attract people to Marxism after the war.¹⁶⁰ The vice president said the defense against communist "ideological penetration" required "effective and radical" socio-economic adjustments to overturn the "social injustice" that were the "causes of agitation."¹⁶¹ His anti-communist yet pro-labor stance was common knowledge by this point.¹⁶² He dismissed the paradoxical criticisms that he was both a "Nazi" and a communist as evidence that he was approaching a "perfect harmonization of forces" that would balance the interests of the "working, middle, and capitalists" sectors of society. He concluded by telling the business leaders that losing thirty percent of their profits now was preferable to losing "everything" to communists

¹⁵⁸ Perón, "Discurso en la Bolsa de Comercio," August 25, 1944.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Jane Hiddleston, *Decolonising the Intellectual: Politics, Culture, and Humanism at the End of the French Empire* (Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 6-7; Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 18-21.

¹⁶¹ Perón, "Discurso en la Bolsa de Comercio," August 25, 1944.

¹⁶² Hedges, *Argentina*, 90-91; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 85-86; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 93; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 141-143; Meade, *History of Modern Latin America*, 390-391; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 96.

later.¹⁶³ The business leaders rebuffed the vice president's entreaty in a manifesto published in *La Nación*, Argentina's leading liberal newspaper.¹⁶⁴

As the war in Europe came toward its conclusion, officials in Washington continued to provide conflicting reports on Argentina and Perón. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr., dismissed suspicions that Argentina was aiding the Axis as an "emotional feeling" without any factual basis. He added that, "whether we like it or not," Perón would likely win the postwar election.¹⁶⁵ The United States intelligence community considered the colonel a problem and warned of Nazi influence in the regime. On March 10, 1945, the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency, reported that the regime curtailed individual liberty at every turn and that pro-Nazi officers continued to hold critical government offices. The document specifically indicted General Carlos von der Becke and Colonel Carlos Sanguinetti, experts in Prussian-German military theory who had influenced Perón's professional development. It also likened Perón's economics to fascist Italy's corporative system.¹⁶⁶ As the war drew to a close, Washington moved to isolate Argentina at the Inter-American Conference held in Mexico City based on its continued refusal to declare war on Germany. The participants signed the Act of Chapultepec, which was a pledge for a hemispheric response to aggression against any American state, and Argentina's exclusion from the pact made the point clear.

¹⁶³ Perón, "Discurso en la Bolsa de Comercio," August 25, 1944.

¹⁶⁴ Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires, Manifiesto de las Cámaras de Empresarios del Comercio y de la Industria contra la Gestión de Juan Domingo Perón como Secretario de Trabajo y Previsión en Junio de 1945, *La Nación*, June 16, 1945, quoted in Carlos Altamirano, *Bajo el Signo de las Masas (1943- 1973)* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Emecé, 2007), 81-87, accessed February 20, 2020, [http://www.hechohistorico.com.ar/Biblioteca/Biblioteca%20del%20Pensamiento%20Argentino%20-%20Documentos/Tomo%20VI%20-%20Altamirano%20-%20Bajo%20el%20signo%20de%20las%20masas%20\(1943-1973\).pdf](http://www.hechohistorico.com.ar/Biblioteca/Biblioteca%20del%20Pensamiento%20Argentino%20-%20Documentos/Tomo%20VI%20-%20Altamirano%20-%20Bajo%20el%20signo%20de%20las%20masas%20(1943-1973).pdf).

¹⁶⁵ US State Department, Top Secret for the President from Stettinius, Edward Stettinius, Jr., MR-OUT-253, February 23, 1945.

¹⁶⁶ US Office of Strategic Services, New Trends Toward Totalitarianism in Argentina: January-February 1945, M. & A. Number 2965, March 10, 1945.

The Argentine regime mitigated Washington's concerns when it acceded to demands to declare war on Germany and Japan on March 28, 1945.¹⁶⁷ Despite promises that this would help restore relations, Spruille Braden, a cutthroat "free-market" liberal State Department official who loathed Perón's pro-labor stance, sabotaged the reconciliation.¹⁶⁸ Braden issued a report in April 1945 that characterized the vice president's policies an acute threat to "hemispheric security." Braden's appointment to the ambassadorship in Argentina a month later indicated that Washington took his warnings seriously.¹⁶⁹ Domestically, Perón was gaining popularity, but liberal army and naval officers startled by his rapid ascent conspired to arrest him on October 9, 1945. The labor sector spontaneously mobilized thousands to register their objection with the regime, which convinced President Farrell to release his colonel on October 17, 1945. He allowed Perón to deliver a speech from the balcony of the *Casa Rosada*, Argentina's presidential palace, to the throng that had assembled, an event that is known as the *Día de la Lealtad* (Day of Loyalty). He praised the ongoing "renaissance of the workers' conscience" and announced his presidential candidacy in elections scheduled for February 1946.¹⁷⁰ On December 31, 1945, the army hierarchy made Perón a general to show their support.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷ Poder Ejecutivo de Argentina, Declaración de guerra de la República Argentina a Alemania y Japón en 1945, Decreto 6945/45, March 28, 1945, accessed July 17, 2019, Archivo Histórico, http://cdn.educ.ar/repositorio/Download/file?file_id=b6973d9b-ea8d-4f38-ba71-53ba522ae6a2.

¹⁶⁸ US State Department, Top Secret for the President from Stettinius, Edward Stettinius, Jr., MR-OUT-253, February 23, 1945; Semán, *Ambassadors of the Working Class*, 45; Grace Livingstone, *America's Backyard: the United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror* (New York, NY: Zed Books, 2009), 21-22; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 98; "Democracy's Bull," *Time Magazine*, November 5, 1945. Braden was fiercely capitalist and defended the interests of Standard Oil during the Chaco War in the 1930s.

¹⁶⁹ Semán, *Ambassadors of the Working Class*, 44-45; Livingstone, *America's Backyard*, 21-22; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962*, 39-45; Marvin Goldwert, *Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1972), 92; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 153; Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War,"* 34-35; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 98; McPherson, *Intimate Ties*, 30; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 13-14; Spektorowski, "The Ideological Origins of Right and Left Nationalism in Argentina," 155; Dorn, "Perón's Gambit," 7.

¹⁷⁰ Hodges, *Argentina 1943-1987*, 25; Fernando Chino Navarro, "Día de la Lealtad: 17 de Octubre - El Discurso de Perón (1945)" (video), accessed March 3, 2020, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LgioET1B7FA>.

¹⁷¹ Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires.

Ambassador Braden was not deterred and, before the election, he published the *Blue Book on Argentina*, which branded Perón a "fascist."¹⁷² Perón countered that this a typical imperialism intervention in Latin American domestic affairs and labeled his *Unión Democrática* opponent José Tamborini a shill for the United States.¹⁷³ The voters responded to Perón's message and his political platform of social justice, economic independence, and national sovereignty. He won 52 percent of the vote in what was Argentina's first free and open election since 1928. His liberal opponent won only 42 percent, despite having the backing of the entire *Unión Democrática*, which had strengthened in opposition to the dictatorship since the early 1940s.¹⁷⁴ Braden's miscalculation fueled Argentine nationalism, yet he was selected to replace Nelson Rockefeller, a member of the family who owned Standard Oil, as Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs.¹⁷⁵ This appointment boded poorly for Peronist Argentina, and Braden published three additional books in 1946 explaining how the United States and liberalism would ensure order and prosperity in Latin America.¹⁷⁶ Perón's socio-economic vision, especially in regards to state control over foreign trade, did not align with the capitalist order's proposal for "free trade among free nation" as the model for post-war development on a global

¹⁷² US State Department, *Blue Book on Argentina*; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962*, 39-45; Goldwert, *Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina*, 92; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 153; Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War"*, 34; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 98; McPherson, *Intimate Ties*, 30; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 13-14.

¹⁷³ Archivo Histórico RTA S.E., "Respuesta al Libro Azul Elaborado por Estados Unidos, 1946" (video source of audio clip), accessed October 1, 2016, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S6GhrJ3TDyg>; Crassweller, *Perón and the Enigmas of Argentina*, 181; Dorn, "Perón's Gambit," 1-2, 4, 7; Eggers-Brass, *Historia Argentina*, 498-499; Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War"*, 35; Spektorowski, "The Ideological Origins of Right and Left Nationalism in Argentina," 155; Dorn, "Perón's Gambit," 7; "Democracy's Bull," *Time Magazine*, November 5, 1945.

¹⁷⁴ Hodges, *Argentina 1943-1987*, 25.

¹⁷⁵ Lars Schoultz, *In Their Own Best Interest: A History of the U.S. Effort to Improve Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 177; Dorn, "Perón's Gambit," 7; "Democracy's Bull," *Time Magazine*, November 5, 1945; "Spruille Braden: Our battling Assistant Secretary of States has lost round on to Argentina's Perón, but he and his cause have staying power," *Life Magazine*, March 23, 1946.

¹⁷⁶ Spruille Braden, *The Americas and World Order* (New York, NY: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1946); Spruille Braden, *Private Enterprise in the Development of the Americas* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946); Spruille Braden, *Our Inter-American Policy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946).

scale.¹⁷⁷ When Perón took the oath of office in June 1946, liberals were strongly opposed to his vision, Argentina was politically isolated, and the most powerful country in the world was attempting to disrupt the new regime.

¹⁷⁷ Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 19; Rock, *Latin America in the 1940s*, 30, 46, 51-52; McPherson, *Intimate Ties*, 11; Gordon, "Latin America in Postwar World"; Steil, *Battle of Bretton Wood*, 1-2; Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods*, 10-13, 16.

Chapter Four

President Perón and Cold War Imperialism

The world is currently experiencing the most intense and extensive stage of imperialism in history.

—Juan Perón, *Descartes: Política e Estrategia*

As the Second World War drew to its conclusion, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union held a series of meetings to divide Europe and Germany into Western and Eastern spheres of influence, which prompted future Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón (1895-1974) to predict by 1944 that capitalism and communism would be at each other's throats.¹ The prospect of another war was chilling after the experiences of the Rape of Nanking, the Holocaust, the Nuremberg Trials revealed the true extent of Axis war crime, the Allied fire bombings of German cities, and the United States' nuclear attacks on Japan, which created a new level of destruction. However, the Soviet Union's participation in the new United Nations (UN) buoyed hopes for peace. Europe's colonial possessions would not be allowed to vote in the new body, while Latin American states would each have a vote. Latin America's place within Washington's sphere of influence was not in question and the United States expected the region to align under its guidance.²

¹ Juan Perón, "Significado de la Defensa Nacional desde el Punto de Vista Militar" (speech, Universidad Nacional de la Plata, Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 10, 1944), Archivo Peronista, accessed March 12, 2020, <http://archivoperonista.com/discursos/juan-domingo-peron/1944/palabras-en-conferencia-sobre-significado-defensa-nacional-desde/>.

² Lars Schoultz, *In Their Own Best Interest: A History of the U.S. Effort to Improve Latin America* (Cambridge, MA:

The United States and the Soviet Union expressed support for decolonization, which buoyed hopes that the unfulfilled aspirations for self-determination might become a reality in the colonies. The former's support for decolonization began to waiver when insurgencies in China and Indochina vowed to establish socialist states. Both received support from the Soviet Union, which hoped to bring them, and their resources, into its sphere of influence. María Saldaña-Portillo explains that there was a growing openness to socialism in underdeveloped countries after witnessing the Soviet development model transition a backward agricultural state into the industrialized superpower that defeated the Nazi war machine. Liberation movement leaders in decolonizing nations often looked to the Soviet Union as a source of inspiration, as well as material support.³ China became a socialist state aligned with the Soviets in 1949, which was a devastating blow to the capitalist world. Communist insurgencies raged in much of Southeast Asia, and usually received support from China or the Soviet Union, which made the spatial dimensions of the Cold War a global affair.

Latin American anti-imperialists concerned with national development had long linked the region's semi-colonial conditions to those suffered in the colonies. After the First World War, an exchange of ideas among Latin American intellectuals and those from Europe's colonies occurred in lecture halls, universities, cafés, and rallies in metropolises like Paris. Prominent Latin Americans involved in these exchanges included Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, José Vasconcelos, José Mariátegui, Miguel Ángel Asturias, Carlos Quijano, and Argentines Manuel Ugarte and José Ingenieros. In various circumstances, they met future national liberation

Harvard University Press, 2018), 163-164; Grace Livingstone, *America's Backyard: the United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror* (New York, NY: Zed Books, 2009), 22-24; Teresa A. Meade, *A History of Modern Latin America: 1800 to the Present* (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2011), 419-420; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 245-250.

³ María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the Age of Development* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 18-21, 44.

movement leaders like Ho Chi Minh, future Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, future Senegalese President Leopold Sédar Senghor, among other intellectuals who Michael Goebel notes played "outstanding roles in their home countries' political and intellectual lives."⁴ Together, they came to see the similarities between the colonial subjugation and the semi-colonial conditions in China and Latin America as two heads of the same beast: imperialism.⁵

However, Latin America had prospered during the Second World War, and its leaders hoped this trend could continue. Tulio Halperín-Donghi notes that wartime trade booms also cemented the United States' economic hegemony over the region.⁶ Despite Secretary of State Joseph Grew's February 1945 report on the region's aspirations to do "more than produce raw materials and live in a state of semi-colonialism," no plans were made to integrate the region more gainfully into the postwar order.⁷ Given that many Latin Americans associated the suffering colonialism created in Africa and Asia to Latin America's dogged economic circumstances in the Western capitalist order, nationalists and anti-imperialists throughout the region looked for new alternatives, but this tended to manifest in left-wing nationalism rather than Marxism.⁸ Perón, Argentina's famous populist leader, was an example of a leader promoting a new development model. He was staunchly anti-communist but recognized the growing political significance of labor in industrializing nations. He was also a keen geopolitical analyst, and he concluded that fundamental changes must take place to prevent communism from gaining

⁴ Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 2-3, 132-133.

⁵ Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 19; Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 18-25, 44-58; Gilbert M. Joseph, ed., *In From the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2008), 18-25.

⁶ Tulio Halperín-Donghi, *The Contemporary History of Latin America*, trans. John Chasteen (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 247-248.

⁷ US State Department, Telegram to the President from the Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, February 23, 1945; US State Department, Telegram to the President from the Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, February 24, 1945; Schoultz, *In Their Own Best Interests*, 164.

⁸ Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 18-25, 44-58; Joseph, *In From the Cold*, 18-25.

support in Argentina, the region, and around the world.⁹ Over the last two years of the war, and he used his growing power in the military regime to build a base of political support by incorporating labor more meaningfully into Argentina's national life and handily won the country's first free and open election since 1928.¹⁰

Perón took the oath of office with majority support in congress on June 4, 1946. He continued to make significant reforms but promised "reconciliation for all" after a divisive campaign marred by United States' meddling against him.¹¹ Domestically, he pursued social justice, which emphasized racial, cultural, economic, and political inclusion for all so people could maintain their dignity. Women were granted suffrage and he took steps to humanize capital, including land redistribution programs and the introduction of consumer assurances to protect the poor (see figures 4.1-4.8).¹² He also mandated a minimum wage, set the work week to forty hours, gave labor his political backing, enacted national health care, and, among other measures that increased the standard of living, improved access to education and housing.¹³

⁹ Perón, "Significado de la Defensa Nacional desde el Punto de Vista Militar," June 10, 1944; Juan Perón, "Discurso en la Bolsa de Comercio" (speech, Bolsa de Comercio, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 25, 1944), Archivo Peronista, accessed March 12, 2020, <http://archivoperonista.com/discursos/juan-domingo-peron/1944/discurso-en-bolsa-comercio/>.

¹⁰ Jill Hedges, *Argentina: A Modern History* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 90-91; Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America, 4th ed.* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), 85-86; Luis Alberto Romero, *A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, trans. James P. Brennan (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 93; David Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History, and Its Impact* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 141-143; Meade, *History of Modern Latin America*, 390-391; Daniel K. Lewis, *The History of Argentina* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 96.

¹¹ Hedges, *Argentina*, 117; US State Department, *Blue Book on Argentina: Consultation among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation* (New York, NY: Greenberg, 1946); Robert A. Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1980), 39-45; Marvin Goldwert, *Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1972), 92; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 153; Daniel C. Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War": An Intellectual Biography* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1991), 34; Romero, *Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 98; McPherson, *Intimate Ties*, 30; Stephen Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin American: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 13-14.

¹² Raquel Quintana and Raúl Manrupe, *Afiches del Peronismo 1945-1955* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Eduntref, 2016), 31, 35-36, 42-43, 61, 64, 67.

¹³ Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 100; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 104; Hedges, *Argentina*, 124.

Perón's economic plan centered on applying Argentina's sizable agricultural and livestock surpluses to national development. He founded the Argentine Institute for the Promotion of Trade (IAPI) to manage all foreign trade, ensure the nation was not getting exploited in trade deals, and to channel "excess" profits toward industrialization and measures to build the internal market.¹⁴ With full oversight over foreign trade deals, the president began forging Argentine trade deals to neighboring states. His "Five-Year Plan" for national development prioritized industrialization and nationalized vital aspects of the economy, including the telephone company, a shipping line, and purchasing the British-owned railways in 1947 (see figure 4.9).¹⁵ Measures from the Peronist government to support industrialization included rationing and massive financial outlays that Argentina's "unusually solid financial condition" after the war helped. In 1949, congress approved changes to Argentina's constitution to consolidate these efforts. However, the president was polarizing. Most of the middle-class and nearly all of the upper-class rejected his policies and authoritarian methods.¹⁶

When the Korean War started in 1950, Perón resisted pressure from Washington to join in the UN effort against communist North Korea and its Chinese ally. In 1951, he survived an attempted coup led by military liberals, and despite a downturn in the economy, Perón won a second term in office in 1952 with sixty-three percent of the vote, which indicated that he had broadened his support though liberals complained about unfair elections.¹⁷ During this period, he wrote dozens of editorials to express his geopolitical and socioeconomic analysis of the Cold

¹⁴ Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 86; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 102-104; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 160; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 104.

¹⁵ Hedges, *Argentina*, 126; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 104; Quintana and Manrupe, *Afiches del Peronism 1945-1955*, 46.

¹⁶ Hedges, *Argentina*, 117; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 99-102; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 262-264.

¹⁷ Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 108; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 123-124; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962*, 122-124; Hedges, *Argentina*, 145; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 123.

War world as pressures began to mount against his presidency, especially from Washington, where influential politicians continued to assail him as a fascist.¹⁸ The domestic situation also deteriorated despite his popular support because an influential coalition of minority interests started to build against him, and by 1955 his days in office looked numbered. He survived another coup attempt in June of 1955, but failed to restore order and was overthrown in September. Perón fled the country to prevent a civil war, which started his eighteen years in exile.¹⁹

In this chapter, I argue that Perón adapted his anti-imperialist vision based on the new reach of imperialism in the Cold War and Argentina and Latin America's peripheral role in the capitalist order. He believed that—on the individual and international level—one entity violating another, economically or otherwise, deprived the other of its dignity and created disharmony. He believed superpower imperialism would cause another world war, but saw his "Third Position" foreign policy of pacifist non-alignment as a way for Argentina and the region to avoid the bipolar conundrum. Given the overwhelming might of the United States and its reconceptualization of the Monroe Doctrine in the Cold War, he knew Argentina could not become powerful enough to oppose imperialism alone, as he had believed it could have before the war.²⁰ He worked to increase regional economic integration to build the "Third Position" into

¹⁸ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 112-113; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 105.

¹⁹ Romero, *Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 129; Goldwert, *Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina*, 128; Manwoo Lee, *Argentine Political Instability since 1946: A Study of Crises of Authority and Equality* (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, Inc., 1969), 132; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 180; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962*, 187; Romero, *Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 129; Juan Per, "Bombing and Coup 1955 Argentina" (video), accessed March 3, 2020, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vgKMLza1RkQ>; comunidadbloguera, "16 de junio de 1955. El día que bombardearon Buenos Aires" (documentary), produced by Instituto Nacional Juan Domingo Perón, accessed March 3, 2020. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=79qMG8x0aEs>; MiTVMundo, "Perón Habla Después del Bombardeo del 16 de Junio de 1955 y la Quema," (video), produced by Canal 7 de Buenos Aires, 5:12, accessed September 1, 2016, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VBNqstQbO_Y.

²⁰ Horacio Ballester, "Presentación," in Juan Perón, *Apuntes de Historia Militar: Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, in Perón, *Obras Completas 4* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1997), xv; Juan Perón, interview by Enrique Pavón Pereyra, in Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Yo Perón* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Sudamerica, 2018), 25-26, 43-45, 59,

a viable, defensively oriented coalition of states. He rejected free-trade and emphasized orderly, brotherly cooperation as the path to development and a way to build the political will required for integration. I argue that these ideas reflected his extension of the core concepts of Peronism—social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty—to the international level. I will also show how the liberal rejection of Perón's policies, especially in regards to foreign affairs, influenced the military's 1955 coup and played a defining role in its post-Perón dictatorship.

Argentina, Latin American, and the New World Order

As Perón predicted in his 1944 speech to the Argentine Chamber of Commerce, two years before he took office, the United States' attention focused on the "Iron Curtain" dropping over much of Europe after the war.²¹ A communist insurgency in Greece prompted President Truman to reserve the right to take unilateral action to defend democracy abroad in early 1947, and his administration also announced the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe's economy.²² Regarding Latin America, the US Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Spruille Braden, worked to destabilize Perón's regime while the rest of the region was abandoned.²³ Perón's reticence to follow Washington's free trade and hemispheric defense priorities were

90-92, 94.

²¹ Perón, "Discurso en la Bolsa de Comercio," August 25, 1944; George Kennan, "The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, February 22, 1946," Document 475, *The Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VI, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, Office of the Historian, 1969); Nikolai Novikov, "Telegram from Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to the US, to the Soviet Leadership," trans. Gary Goldberg, September 27, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVP SSSR, f. 06. op. 8, p. 45, p. 759, published in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* #11, 1990, 148-154, accessed March 2, 2020, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110808>.

²² Harry S. Truman, "Truman Doctrine," (Presidential address, Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947).

²³ Schoultz, *In Their Own Best Interests*, 163-165; Ernesto Semán, *Ambassadors of the Working Class: Argentina's International Labor Activists and Cold War Democracy in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), 47-49.

primary points of contentions.²⁴ Ernesto Semán argues that Perón saw the Marshall Plan as an opportunity to create a "Latin American version" of the plan that would coincide with the efforts to help Europe recover. The Argentine president hoped to bolster trade among Latin American nations and sell Argentina's agricultural surplus in Europe, all through mutually beneficial exchanges, which would help both regions mitigate the United States' dominance over them.²⁵

Perón announced his postwar vision in a July 1947 radio address called "For Economic Cooperation and World Peace," which was broadcasted worldwide, including over the British Broadcasting Company's influential airwaves.²⁶ He told the global audience that after the destruction of two world wars, Argentina recognized that humanity longed for international peace and a new world order free from the "signs of crude exploitation," destruction, hate, and "condemnable social injustices." He said the world's domestic orders must abandon the capitalist excesses of the right and the totalitarian excesses of the left by enacting "political, economic, and social action" to "elevate social culture, dignify labor, (and) humanize capital."²⁷ He said state intervention could foster internal harmony, as his government did by placing the well-being of the nation over individual ambitions in search of a more balanced, and therefore, more satisfied society.²⁸ In this model, sufficient remuneration for each citizen's labor would ensure their material satisfaction, which would also allow them to keep their dignity, which would ensure their spiritual satisfaction.

²⁴ US Embassy in Argentina, Memorandum on Conversation with President Perón on the Evening of June 24, 1946, George S. Messersmith, 1946.

²⁵ Semán, *Ambassadors of the Working Class*, 51.

²⁶ Fermín Chávez, "Julio de 1947 Nació la Tercera Posición de Juan Perón," Red Nacional y Popular de Noticias, accessed January 5, 2020, <http://nacionalypopular.com/2008/07/07/julio-de-1947-nacia-la-tercera-posicion-de-juan-peron/>.

²⁷ Juan Perón, *Por la Cooperación Económica y la Paz Mundial* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Subsecretaría de Informaciones, 1947), 5-15.

²⁸ Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU), "Objeto: Producir un Informe," in Robert A. Potash, *Perón y el G.O.U.: Los Documentos de una Logia Secreta* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Sudamericana, 1984), 15-16; GOU, "GOU Coordinador 14," in *ibid.*, 157.

Perón's conceptualization of how to resolve problems in the domestic order had long intellectual roots. It related to his "Organized Community" model, which was a modification of the "organized society" discussed in Argentina during the Great Depression, to ensure the spiritual and material satisfaction of the nation, and also has a basis in his Christian interpretation of the value of the eternal soul.²⁹ Perón believed that state intervention that redistributed profits from the sale of nation's abundant natural resources would foster balanced development.³⁰ This related to his enduring argument that a satisfied nation could be a peaceful nation, which is evident in his publications during his early 1930s professorship at Argentina's *Escuela Superior de Guerra* (ESG, Superior War School).³¹ His patriotic sense of duty to the nation was also important. During the war, he espoused selfless service and abandoning material ambition as he worked to overthrow the corrupt, unpopular, and unresponsive liberal government.³² As previously noted, President Perón put these notions into action with social welfare programs that helped incorporate all of society gainfully into the national life. In regards to labor, he believed that a satisfied labor sector would be immune to communist ideological penetration and that less communist influence in the labor sector would also mitigate agitation in the domestic order. In effect, this was his way of taking a "problem," the unsatisfied masses, and adapting or compromising to make them assets, as he discussed in a letter to a confidant in 1942.³³

²⁹ Carlos M. Noel, "Política y Economía" (speech at the Teatro Independencia, Mendoza, April 7, 1935), in *Hechos e Ideas* 1, no. 1 (June 1935): 32-34.

³⁰ Perón, "Discurso en la Bolsa de Comercio," August 25, 1944.

³¹ Juan Perón, *El Frente Oriental de la Guerra Mundial en 1914*, in *Obras Completas I* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1997), 153-155, 165-168; Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 3-4.

³² GOU, "Objeto: Producir un Informe," 15-16; GOU, "GOU Coordinador 14," 157; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 73-74; Hedges, *Argentina*, 44-47; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 83; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 57; Joel Horowitz, ed., *Argentine Unions, The State & the Rise of Perón, 1930-1945* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1990), 17, 26-28; Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, 217.

³³ Juan Perón, letter to First Lieutenant Pedro Lucero, September 5, 1942, accessed March 2, 2020, <http://archivoperonista.com/documentos/correspondencia/1942/carta-peron-al-teniente-1deg-pedro-lucero/>.

In his worldwide broadcast, Perón linked his ideas for the domestic order to world peace by suggesting international collaboration to replace imperialist competition on that basis that replacing "antagonistic ideologies" with pacifist ideals would make sustainable peace possible. He espoused respecting the sovereignty of all nations, rendering aid to nations in need, economic cooperation, and actively working to foster lasting peace, which he based on the concepts of social justice for all, the economic independence of all nations, and the right to popular sovereignty to ensure this. To set an example, he dedicated Argentina's resources to Europe's "moral and spiritual rehabilitation" and the "material and economic rehabilitation of all the suffering nations." The Argentine believed that cooperation and generosity would help restore the material and spiritual satisfaction that imperialist aggression robbed from the aggrieved nations. He said that when the "living masses agitate" in pursuit of "social and economic tranquility," they permanently moved the world toward the "social evolution" required to initiate an era of world peace and harmony.³⁴ According to Perón, who was working to balance Argentine society, introducing balance to the international order would help humanity achieve this unstoppable aspiration for peace and equality, which was a theme he would continue to develop this theme over the remainder of his life.³⁵

Perón's speech to the world revealed a significant change in his thinking regarding national development in an imperial world order. His new vision, based on pacifism and organized or coordinated brotherly cooperation, replaced the militaristic views he had about national development before the war. A prominent reason for this change was his recognition

³⁴ Perón, *Por la Cooperación Económica y la Paz Mundial*, 5-15.

³⁵ Juan Perón, letter to Mr. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, July 1961; Juan Perón, interview by Enrique Pavón Pereyra, in Juan Perón and Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Coloquios con Perón* (1965; repr., Madrid: Editoriales Internacionales Técnicos Reunidos, S.A., 1973), 194-195; Juan Perón, message read in Perón's name at the 4th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers, Algeria, September 7, 1973, in *Perón: Discurso Completos* (San Isidro, Argentina: Megafón, 1987), 61-76.

that Argentina could not risk taking aggressive actions that might spark a military confrontation with the United States. In addition, this modification also related to a postwar resurgence of humanist thinking in response to the suffering caused by colonialism, world wars, and, in the new age, the potential for nuclear holocaust. Humanism is an enduring belief that humanity's capacity for critical thinking, empathy, and agency could drive change for the better.³⁶ Scholars argue that this sentiment was evident in President Roosevelt's vision for the post-war world order of "free trade among free nations," which was an intellectual cornerstone of Washington's support for decolonization and the Bretton Woods Accord in 1944 based on the notion that free trade was critical to development.³⁷ Of course, both of these programs were also beneficial to United States economic interests. Others espoused pacifism and social, political, and economic reforms that corresponded to Christian values.³⁸

Marxist intellectuals and leaders of the newly formed socialist states claimed they responded to humanist ideals in that they "liberated" societies from the excesses of capitalism, though this came at a horrific price in human lives in the Soviet Union and China. However, not all places that adopted this development model suffered from glaring social catastrophes.³⁹ In the colonies, many national liberation movements appealed to humanist values, which often corresponded to the republican ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity proposed by Western

³⁶ Jane Hiddleston, *Decolonising the Intellectual: Politics, Culture, and Humanism at the End of the French Empire* (Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 6-10; Arvind Rajagopal, "Communicationism: Cold War Humanism," *Critical Inquiry* 46, no. 2 (Winter 2020): 357.

³⁷ Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 18-19; Benn Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Wood: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 1-2; Eric Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 10-13, 16; David M. Newsom, *The Imperial Mantle: The United States, Decolonization, and the Third World* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), 1.

³⁸ Hiddleston, *Decolonising the Intellectual*, 6-7; Christian Ludwig Glossner, *The Making of the German Post-War Economy: Political Communication and Public Reception of the Social Market Economy After World War Two* (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 1.

³⁹ Steven Rosefielde, *Red Holocaust* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 13-15. Compared to the tens of millions that died in due to state repression in China and the Soviet Union, and the number who died during colonial occupations around the world, the socialist states in places like Cuba were relatively calm.

humanists.⁴⁰ Perón's humanism corresponded to secular ideals and his understanding of Jesus Christ's teachings about pacifism and social welfare. In 1948, he published *Argentina Foreign Policy*, in which he reiterated Argentina's dedication to these notions and called it a "Christian international social policy" program that, if adopted worldwide, would usher in an era of peace within which humanity to reach its full potential.⁴¹

The United States sent little aid to South America after the war and all funds to Argentina were stopped, but Perón worked to integrate South America's economies.⁴² His administration announced the "Perón Plan" for economic cooperation at the UN Conference on Trade and Employment in July 1947, only days after his global radio address on economic cooperation and world peace. Argentina offered affordable loans to neighboring states to replace the financing traditionally provided by North American or British capitalists at exorbitant rates. This would also help Argentina sell its products as its industrial capacity grew, which was important to his development plans.⁴³ To this end, the president signed deals to lower trade barriers with Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.⁴⁴ His radio address, the "Perón Plan," and his trade deals were steps toward integration of the regional economy, a concept envisioned in the 1920s by the leading economists of Chile and Argentina, Elisidorio Yáñez, and Alejandro Bunge, who held that it would protect the region from confounding foreign competition.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Robert J. C. Young, "Preface," in Jean-Paul Sartre, *Colonialism and Neocolonialism*, trans. Azzedine Haddour, Steve Brewer and Terry McWilliams (1964; repr., New York, NY: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), Adobe PDF eBook; Hiddleston, *Decolonising the Intellectual*, 6-7; Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 18-19.

⁴¹ Juan Perón, *La Política Internacional Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: 1948), 3-13.

⁴² US Aid, *US Overseas Loans and Grants*, <http://explorer.usaid.gov/>.

⁴³ Semán, *Ambassadors of the Working Class*, 51; United Nations, "Argentina's Representative to United Nations Trade Conference in Havana Announces 'Peron Plan'," accessed October 12, 2016, <http://www.unmultimedia.org/photo/detail.jsp?id=169/169221&key=33&query=independence%20south%20sudan&so=0&sf=date>.

⁴⁴ Claudio Maíz et al, *Unir lo Diverso: Problemas y Desafíos de la Integración Latinoamericana* (Mendoza, Argentina: Editorial Qellqasqa, 2010), 112-113.

⁴⁵ Eliodoro Yáñez, *Hacia la Unión Aduanera y Monetaria de la América Latina*, articles from *La Nación* of Santiago, Chile, November 9 and 11.

The pursuit of regional integration also reflected Perón's 1944 proposal to redirect Argentine trade routes to nearby states, which was his way to mitigate the effects of economic pressure from Washington during the world war.⁴⁶ The United States' intelligence agencies tracked his trade deals and reported that he told regional leaders that "South American countries should economically cooperate to protect our sovereignties."⁴⁷ His efforts also responded to the 1944 promise he made to business leaders that, as they surrendered more of their profits, he would work to ensure their increased output had markets.⁴⁸ In the years to come, Perón would continue to work toward greater integration, and he is credited for inspiring the "MERCOSUR," the South American trade bloc founded in 1991.⁴⁹

Perón explained his vision for regional economic cooperation at a press conference with Brazilian journalists in September 1947. He remarked that capitalism and communism were both imperialist and, as the Cold War intensified, repeated his warning that imperialist competition created most wars, which was a belief he had held since well before the Second World War.⁵⁰ The president told the reporters that if Brazil and Argentina could "learn to complement each other" outside of the dynamic of competition, it would help ensure peace in the region. Perón also expressed interest in building new cultural bridges over the undergirding of economic cooperation. He said this "brotherly" cooperation was Latin America's "new secret weapon,"

⁴⁶ Perón, "Significado de la Defensa Nacional desde el Punto de Vista Militar," June 10, 1944.

⁴⁷ US Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Report Argentina/Paraguay/Uruguay/Bolivia/Brazil: Comments of Perón on Economic Assistance, Document 25X1A6a, November 1947.

⁴⁸ Perón, "Discurso en la Bolsa de Comercio," August 25, 1944.

⁴⁹ Miguel Barrios, "El Continentalismo de Perón en la Globalización," Argentine Center of International Studies, Working Papers - Programa Defensa y Seguridad, 2017): 53.

⁵⁰ Juan Perón, "Esta Nueva Arma Secreta," (press conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina, September 21, 1947), in "Tercera Posición y Unidad Latinoamericana," ed. Fermín Chávez, 1984, 5-6, La Baldrich Digital Archive, accessed March 2, 2020, <http://www.labaldrich.com.ar/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Escritos-sobre-Tercera-posici%C3%B3n-y-Unidad-Latinoamericana-de-Juan-Domingo-Per%C3%B3n.pdf>; Juan Perón, letter to parents, November 26, 1918, accessed March 2, 2020, <http://archivoperonista.com/documentos/correspondencia/1918/carta-peron-sus-padres/>; Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 152-155, 165-168; Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 3-4.

which would be valuable in the unstable postwar world.⁵¹ Perón demonstrated a belief in regional self-reliance that famous anti-imperialists like José Martí, José Rodó, Ruben Dario, Manuel Ugarte, and José Vasconcelos had urged for decades.⁵² His efforts to include Brazil also revealed his new position on the long-standing question in Spanish America over whether the Portuguese-speaking nation was a rival or a partner.⁵³ During the war years, Perón saw Brazil as a rival because of its partnership with the United States.⁵⁴ This brotherly approach signaled his rejection of the enduring suspicion some nationalists advanced, which held that Brazil was a "tool" of United States imperialism.⁵⁵ Furthermore, if Brazil moved out of the United States' sphere of influence and embraced regional integration, it would have significant economic and military implications.

Perón's economic vision ran counter to the economic model that the United States planned before the end of the Second World War and pushed in its aftermath. Roughly half of the Latin America's trade was with the United States, and the Bretton Woods Accord was poised

⁵¹ Juan Perón, "Esta Nueva Arma Secreta," 5-6.

⁵² José Martí, "Nuestra América," *Revista Ilustrada* (New York), January 10, 1891; José Enrique Rodó, *Ariel*, 1900, Fundación Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes, accessed September 8, 2019, http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/ariel--0/html/fedf72f8-82b1-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_2.html; Rubén Darío, "El Triunfo de Caliban," 1905, Biblioteca Virtual Universal, 2003, accessed September 8, 2019, <http://www.biblioteca.org.ar/libros/155.pdf>; Manuel Ugarte, *El Destino de un Continente* (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Mundo Latino, 1923), 416-418; José Vasconcelos, *La Raza Cosmica: Misión de la Raza Iberoamericana* (1925; repr., Buenos Aires, Argentina: Biblioteca Virtual Universal, 2003), 22, accessed September 22, 2019, <http://www.biblioteca.org.ar/libros/1289.pdf>.

⁵³ José Ingenieros, *La Evolución Sociológica Argentina: De La Barbarie Al Imperialismo* (Buenos Aires: Librería J. Menéndez, 1910), 100, 103; Francisco Félix Bayón, *Dogma Nacional: A la Juventud Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Imprensa Europea de M. A. Rosas, 1919), 21, 46, 60-64; Ugarte, *Destino de un Continente*, 337; Alejandro Bunge, Letter on November 13, 1926, in Yáñez, *Hacia la Unión Aduanera y Monetaria de la América Latina*, 19-20; George Pope Atkins and Larry V. Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina, 1921-1940," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 4, no. 2, (November 1972): 259-260; Robert A. Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), 2; Alain Rouquié, *The Military and the State in Latin America*, trans. Paul E. Sigmund (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 77, 80; Elizabeth B. White, *German Influence in the Argentine Army, 1900-1945* (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991), 2; Carlos Camacho Arango, "Síntesis y Perspectiva de los Estudios de Transferencias Militares Europeas en Suramérica, 1890-1940," *Revista de Historia Iberoamericana* 4, no. 2 (2011): 42, 44; Enrique Dick, *La Profesionalización en el Ejército Argentino (1899-1914)* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 2014), 64-70.

⁵⁴ GOU, "La Situación Internacional Argentina," in Potash, *Perón y el G.O.U.*, 196.

⁵⁵ Pedro de Córdoba, (Pen Name of Gonzalo de Reparaz), *Nuestra Guerra: La Coalición Contra la Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: La Gaceta de España, 1917), 7.

to augment this. The accord was based on the notion of creating economic interdependence through free trade, which planners argued would help "free nations" build prosperity and also prevent war.⁵⁶ All of South America signed on to the plan at its inception in 1944, except for Argentina. Perón's alternative vision included executive branch economic oversight, especially regarding foreign trade, which the IAPI made a reality in his state. He believed developing nations must shrewdly manage their resources to ensure the collective benefited, rather than expecting development to occur in an environment where a menagerie of foreign capitalists and local facilitators were allowed to prioritize their interests. Latin American intellectuals had espoused economic interventions like this since the 1920s and 1930s.⁵⁷

In 1948, Washington reminded Perón and Latin America of its expectations in the postwar order. Marshall Plan stipulations that European states must spend United States aid on North American products cut Latin America out of the program, which dashed regional hopes of restoring trade with Europe to pre-war levels.⁵⁸ South America received less than three percent of United States aid worldwide in the late 1940s, and Mark Gilderhus explains that President Truman considered the Monroe Doctrine a long-term Marshall Plan for the region, and did not think additional provisions were necessary.⁵⁹ Scholars note that the United States bolstered its hemisphere dominance in this period through the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal

⁵⁶ McPherson, *Intimate Ties*, 11; Louis T. Gordon, "Latin America in Postwar World," *Fourth International* 10, no. 5 (May 1949): 134-138; Steil, *Battle of Bretton Wood*, 1-2; Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods*, 10-13, 16; Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 19; David Rock, ed., *Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 30, 46, 51-52, accessed October 1, 2016, <http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft567nb3f6;brand=eschol>; CQ Researcher, "United States Trade with Latin America," October 10, 1939, accessed October 1, 2016, <http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1939101000>.

⁵⁷ Bayón, *Dogma Nacional*, 21, 46, 60-64; Noel, "Política y Economía," 32-35; Arthur P. Whitaker, "An Overview of the Period," in *Prologue to Perón: Argentina in Depression and War, 1930-1943*, eds. Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. Dolkart (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), 21.

⁵⁸ Hedges, *Argentina*, 124; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 105.

⁵⁹ Mark T. Gilderhus, David C. LaFevor, and Michael J. LaRosa, *The Third Century: US-Latin American Relations Since 1889* (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 124-125; Joseph, *In From the Cold*, 22; US Aid, *US Overseas Loans and Grants*, <http://explorer.usaid.gov/>.

Assistance, a mutual defense treaty commonly known as the "Rio Pact," and the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS). Scholars maintain that at the first OAS conference, Latin America's socio-economic situation remained an afterthought while United States officials pushed "urgent measures" to counter the spread of communism in the hemisphere, a greatly exaggerated threat.⁶⁰ When Truman announced his "Point Four Program" for "improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas" at his inaugural speech in January 1949, seventy percent of United States investment in Latin America went to developing petroleum extraction. The Director of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Stanley Andrews, said in a 1970 interview that only about ten million dollars were sent to the region to help diversify development.⁶¹ The region was left to fend for itself but still expected to follow Washington's directives.

Perón the Editorialist: The "Descartes" Years, 1951-1952

Perón's "Five-Year Plan" for economic growth met with success, and by 1950 he enjoyed widespread popular support.⁶² Wages for skilled and unskilled labor rose twenty-seven and thirty-seven percent, respectively, and the related development of the internal markets contributed to a thirty percent increase in Argentina's gross domestic product.⁶³ However, the economy began to decline near the end of his first term. Scholars attribute the downturn to inflation, two years of poor harvests due to unfavorable weather, and economic pressure from

⁶⁰ Gilderhus, LaFevor, and LaRosa, *US-Latin American Relations Since 1889*, 124; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 256; Livingstone, *America's Backyard*, 24-25.

⁶¹ Truman Presidential Library, Background Essay on Point Four Program, Point IV Report Supplemental Information, Records for the Agency of International Development: Records of Gordon Gray, 1948-1952, accessed March 22, 2020, http://www.trumanlibrary.gov/public/InternationalAid_Handouts.pdf.

⁶² Juan Perón, *Acta de la Declaración de la Independencia Económica* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: National government publication, 1947); Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 102; Hedges, *Argentina*, 121-126.

⁶³ Hedges, *Argentina*, 122.

Washington, which, among other things, included the exclusion from participation in the Marshall Plan. Additionally, the expenses involved in industrialization coincided with a global decline in commodity prices, and the IAPI's reduced revenue meant the funds for industrialization had to come from financial reserves accumulated during the war. In good times and bad, Perón's second wife, Eva (1919-1952), spearheaded efforts to help the nation's poor with the Eva Perón Foundation, which helped fortify lower-class support.⁶⁴

Perón legally changed the constitution in 1949, which consolidated his social reforms and women's suffrage, but opponents criticized how the new document eliminated term limits.⁶⁵ Tulio Halperín-Donghi notes by this point, the "diverse forces of Peronism" had amassed into his party, which "guaranteed" the president's upcoming re-election.⁶⁶ Scholars add that liberal military leaders despised Perón's mobilization of society, the favoritism he showed Peronists in the military, and the ideological training he mandated for the military.⁶⁷ On September 28, 1951, liberal General Benjamín Menéndez (1885-1975) attempted a poorly planned coup d'état to prevent the president's re-election in November, but he lacked organized support and failed.⁶⁸ In response, Perón declared a "State of Siege," a legal provision that allowed him to suspend constitutional rights, which gave critics more ammunition to use against him but fewer ways to express their ire due to increased press censorship.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, he cruised to victory with sixty-three percent of the vote in the November 11, 1951 election. He had initially proposed Eva as his running mate, but as she had cancer, she renounced this opportunity. Eva died within

⁶⁴ Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 263-264; Hedges, *Argentina*, 139-143; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 99-100, 106-108, 119; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 105-106.

⁶⁵ Hedges, *Argentina*, 134-135.

⁶⁶ Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 263; Hedges, *Argentina*, 143.

⁶⁷ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962*, 112-117; Hedges, *Argentina*, 129; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 109.

⁶⁸ Hedges, *Argentina*, 145; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 123.

⁶⁹ Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 108; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 123-124; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962*, 122-124.

weeks of his re-election, and scholars note that a coalition of minority interests began slowly taking shape, which included leaders in Argentina's Catholic Church that resented how Peronist state institutions encroached on social welfare efforts that it traditionally led.⁷⁰

From 1949 through 1952, United States-Argentine animosity was constant. Perón faced a consistent effort to undermine him from Washington, including frequent comparisons to Mussolini and accusations from officials that he was a fascist, an "Argentine Hitler."⁷¹ The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 intensified Perón's anti-imperialist geopolitical thinking. Like many, he worried that the conflict might trigger the Third World War, which was consistent with his enduring belief that imperialist competition led to war that he was re-publishing as president.⁷² Washington pressured Latin American countries, and others from around the world, to join the UN effort against North Korea and its communist ally, China led, which exceeded the expectations of the 1947 "Rio Pact" for hemispheric defense. *Mundo Peronista*, a periodical under Perón's control, ridiculed the notion of sending Latin American troops to fight in Asia, depicted Truman as a villainous partner of Joseph Stalin, labeled failed coup leader Menéndez a shill for capitalists, noted capitalist abuses in Latin America, mocked racism in the United States while upholding Argentine inclusiveness, rejected communism, and promoted the tenets of *Justicialismo*, as the president called his ideology, in comparison to those of the materialist doctrines (see figures 4.10-4.24).⁷³

Perón expressed his anti-imperialist ideas more frequently in a series of editorials published from 1951 through 1952 in *Democracia*, a Radical Party newspaper that targeted the

⁷⁰ Hedges, *Argentina*, 144-145; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 109.

⁷¹ Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 105.

⁷² Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 153-155, 165-168; Juan Perón, *Apuntes de Historia Militar: Parte Teórica* (1932; repr., Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1951), 139-141.

⁷³ *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 7, (October 1951): 17, 20, 52; *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 8, (November 1951): 4; *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 11, (December 1951): 21; *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 12, (January 1952): 4; *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 17, (March 1952): 43; *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 22, (June 1952): 33, 37; *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 51, (October 1953): 49; *Mundo Peronista* 3, no. 67 (June 1954): 4.

educated middle class.⁷⁴ César Díaz notes that the president selected *Democracia* in hopes that his message would appeal to some of his "most fervent detractors" on an intellectual level.⁷⁵ Perón signed each article "Descartes," which was a strange tactic for a head-of-state, but it afforded him plausible deniability regarding his scathing criticisms of the United States. An article from *Time Magazine* shows that "Descartes" was receiving attention in the United States as well.⁷⁶ In this sense, his editorials were a foreign policy tool. Three themes dominated the "Descartes" writings: the formation of a bipolar world order, United States imperialism toward Latin America, and the rise of a third position in the bipolar world order, which Perón tied to the decolonization process. I analyze the editorials as a whole due to their thematic overlap, the short time frame within which they were published, and the similar domestic, regional, and global contexts within which he composed them.

The Cold War Order: Bipolar Imperialism and Satellites

Perón saw the Cold War as a deadly geopolitical chess match between Washington and Moscow, where nations were mere pawns forced into the two antagonistic blocs in what he called the "most intense" stage of imperialist competition in history.⁷⁷ He characterized the struggle as a "pre-war," where three methods compelled allegiance from "satellite" states:

"communist political imperialism" (totalitarianism), "anachronistic" colonialism, and Western

⁷⁴ César Díaz, "Cuando Perón fue Descartes 1951 - 1953," Facultad de Periodismo y Comunicación Social, Universidad Nacional de la Plata, accessed January 4, 2020, <http://perio.unlp.edu.ar/node/7410>.

⁷⁵ Díaz, "Cuando Perón fue Descartes 1951 - 1953," <http://perio.unlp.edu.ar/node/7410>.

⁷⁶ Editor, "Argentina: Keynote for '52," *Time*, June 18, 1951, accessed January 2, 2020, <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,814966,00.html>.

⁷⁷ Juan Perón, "Estrategia, Febrero 8, 1951," in *Descartes: Política e Estrategia (No Ataco, Crítico) 1951-1953*, 9-10, La Baldrich Digital Archive, accessed February 1, 2020, <http://www.labaldrich.com.ar/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Pol%C3%ADtica-y-Estrategia-Descartes-Per%C3%B3n.pdf>, Adobe PDF eBook; Perón, "Política y Estrategia, Marzo 1, 1951" in *ibid.*, 15-16; Perón, "Guerra de Corea, Mayo 24, 1951" in *ibid.*, 40-41; Perón, "Países Satélites, Agosto 30, 1951" in *ibid.*, 75-76; Perón, "Algo Más Sobre Confederaciones Continentales, Enero 24, 1952," in *ibid.*, 128-130; Perón, "Material Humano y la Guerra, Mayo 22, 1952" in *ibid.*, 171-173; Perón, "Oposición al Comunismo, Junio 5, 1952," in *ibid.*, 177-178; Perón, "Unilateralismo Técnico, Junio 12, 1952," in *ibid.*, 179-180; Perón, "Política Internacional y la Justicia, Julio 10, 1952" in *ibid.*, 189-190.

"economic imperialism."⁷⁸ He noted that the "central stars," the superpowers, rewarded compliant governments with aid money and "technical assistance," while the noncompliant were subjected to a "complex system" of persuasion, deception, and pressure designed to make them vulnerable.⁷⁹ Perón wrote that "almost no country in the world" could avoid this phenomenon, and that it would continue until one bloc collapsed after sabotage, "fifth column" propaganda efforts to divide societies, and proxy civil wars permanently tipped the scales toward one side.⁸⁰

The Argentine leader argued that the United States' support for unpopular governments created a "latent state of rebellion" in the compliant "satellite" states. He warned that these governments, who were "divorced" from the national will, would be incapable of channeling the national spirit into foreign causes, which ultimately undermined Washington's strategic vision because the unpopular governments would only be able to provide lackluster wartime contributions.⁸¹ The emphasis Perón placed on the importance of spirit and national will revealed

⁷⁸ Perón, "Estrategia, Febrero 8, 1951," in *Descartes*, 9-10; Perón, "Opinión Pública, Marzo 23, 1951," in *ibid.*, 22-34; Perón, "Guerra y la Destrucción, Abril 5, 1951" in *ibid.*, 26-27; Perón, "Agresión, Abril 12, 1951" in *ibid.*, 28-29; Perón, "Pueblo, la Libertad y la Guerra, Mayo 3, 1951" in *ibid.*, 34-35; Perón, "Dignidad de la Igualdad y la Vergüenza del Sometimiento, Mayo 10, 1951" in *ibid.*, 36-37; Perón, "Proximidad de la Guerra, Mayo 17, 1951" in *ibid.*, 38-39; Perón, "Imperialismo y la Guerra, Mayo 31, 1951," in *ibid.*, 42-44; Perón, "Política Internacional y Política Interna, Junio 28, 1951" in *ibid.*, 53-55; Perón, "Países Satélites, Agosto 30, 1951" in *ibid.*, 75-76; Perón, "Guerra Popular e Impopular, Febrero 14, 1952" in *ibid.*, 136-137; Perón, "Material Humano y la Guerra, Mayo 22, 1952" in *ibid.*, 171-173; Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in *ibid.*, 174-176; Perón, "Móviles Inconfesables, Junio 26, 1952" in *ibid.*, 184-186.

⁷⁹ Perón, "Agresión, Abril 12, 1951" in *Descartes*, 28-29; Perón, "Países Satélites, Agosto 30, 1951" in *ibid.*, 75-76; Perón, "Cuando el Diablo anda Suelto, Febrero 21, 1952" in *ibid.*, 138-139; Perón, "Material Humano y la Guerra, Mayo 22, 1952" in *ibid.*, 171-173; Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in *ibid.*, 174-176; Perón, "Oposición al Comunismo, Junio 5, 1952," in *ibid.*, 177-178; Perón, "Móviles Inconfesables, Junio 26, 1952" in *ibid.*, 184-186; Perón, "Política Internacional y la Justicia, Julio 10, 1952" in *ibid.*, 189-190.

⁸⁰ Perón, "Estrategia, Febrero 8, 1951," in *Descartes*, 9-10; Perón, "Política y Estrategia, Marzo 1, 1951" in *ibid.*, 15-16; Perón, "Opinión Pública, Marzo 23, 1951," in *ibid.*, 22-34; Perón, "Proximidad de la Guerra, Mayo 17, 1951" in *ibid.*, 38-39; Perón, "Política Internacional y Política Interna, Junio 28, 1951" in *ibid.*, 53-55; Perón, "Países Satélites, Agosto 30, 1951" in *ibid.*, 75-76; Perón, "'Quintas Columnas' Imperialistas, Noviembre 22, 1951" in *ibid.*, 105-107; Perón, "Algo Más Sobre Confederaciones Continentales, Enero 24, 1952," in *ibid.*, 128-130; Perón, "Guerra Popular e Impopular, Febrero 14, 1952" in *ibid.*, 136-137; Perón, "Material Humano y la Guerra, Mayo 22, 1952" in *ibid.*, 171-173.

⁸¹ Perón, "Opinión Pública, Marzo 23, 1951," in *Descartes*, 22-34; Perón, "Solidaridad Continental, Abril 26, 1951" in *ibid.*, 32-33; Perón, "Pueblo, la Libertad y la Guerra, Mayo 3, 1951" in *ibid.*, 34-35; Perón, "Dignidad de la Igualdad y la Vergüenza del Sometimiento, Mayo 10, 1951" in *ibid.*, 36-37; Perón, "Proximidad de la Guerra, Mayo 17, 1951" in *ibid.*, 38-39; Perón, "Política Internacional y Política Interna, Junio 28, 1951" in *ibid.*, 53-55; Perón, "Países Satélites, Agosto 30, 1951" in *ibid.*, 75-76; Perón, "Cuando el Diablo anda Suelto, Febrero 21, 1952" in

that he continued to apply concepts that he initially espoused in the early 1930s to his contemporary analysis.⁸² Perón asserted that so long as Washington backed dictators and practiced "exclusive laws, police persecutions, armed interventions, imperialist arrogance, poorly disguised colonization, (and) subjugation," its crusade against communism was like "plowing in the ocean" because the problems within the capitalist order remained unresolved.⁸³

Perón wrote that the West's "unsustainable" economic model, which was "confined to the dispossession of others in the colonial system or the capitalist regime," meant that the "exploited and mocked" nations saw the downfall of the metropole as their moment of liberation.⁸⁴ He noted that this was contributing to the capitalism's rapid loss of allies in Europe and Asia, where former colonies were adopting socialist development models, but he warned that those who embraced communism would find little relief in "exchanging one misery for another."⁸⁵ He said the strength and "centralized political direction" of the Soviet system exacerbated these effects and that Soviet ruthlessness would ensure states absorbed into the communist sphere were permanent additions.⁸⁶ He concluded that this meant communism would eventually triumph in

ibid., 138-139; Perón, "Material Humano y la Guerra, Mayo 22, 1952" in ibid., 171-173; Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in ibid., 174-176; Perón, "Móviles Inconfesables, Junio 26, 1952" in ibid., 184-186; Perón, "Política Internacional y la Justicia, Julio 10, 1952" in ibid., 189-190.

⁸² Perón, *Frente Oriental*, 179; Perón, *Parte Teórica*, 162-163.

⁸³ Perón, "Política y Estrategia, Marzo 1, 1951" in *Descartes*, 15-16; Perón, "Políticas Unilaterales, Julio 19, 1951," in ibid., 61-62; Perón, "Ideologías y la Guerra, Julio 26, 1951" in ibid., 63-64; Perón, "'Quintas Columnas' Imperialistas, Noviembre 22, 1951" in ibid., 105-107; Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in ibid., 133-135; Perón, "Economía de Fuerzas, Marzo 27, 1952" in ibid., 150-151; Perón, "Material Humano y la Guerra, Mayo 22, 1952" in ibid., 171-173.

⁸⁴ Perón, "Cooperación Económica, Abril 19, 1952" in *Descartes*, 30-31; Perón, "Ideologías y la Guerra, Julio 26, 1951" in ibid., 63-64; Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in ibid., 133-135; Perón, "Economía de Fuerzas, Marzo 27, 1952" in ibid., 150-151.

⁸⁵ Perón, "Estrategia, Febrero 8, 1951," in *Descartes*, 9-10; Perón, "Diplomacia y la Guerra, Junio 7, 1951," in ibid., 45-48; Perón, "Políticas Unilaterales, Julio 19, 1951," in ibid., 61-62; Perón, "Ideologías y la Guerra, Julio 26, 1951" in ibid., 63-64; Perón, "Conducción Política y de Guerra, Agosto 2, 1951" in ibid., 65-67; Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in ibid., 174-176; Perón, "Móviles Inconfesables, Junio 26, 1952" in ibid., 184-186.

⁸⁶ Perón, "Proximidad de la Guerra, Mayo 17, 1951" in *Descartes*, 38-39; Perón, "Dirección Unitaria y Comando Único, Junio 14, 1951," in ibid., 49-50; Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in ibid., 133-135.

the eventual third world war.⁸⁷ He warned that the "atomic medium, which already appeared in the last contest, will only precipitate and increase the destruction," and that consolidating a new order in the nuclear wasteland would probably require a "fourth war."⁸⁸

Perón lambasted how Washington attacked popular Latin American nationalist regimes that sought to avoid this mess. He said that for the US Government to demand allegiance through threats and pressure was "already a matter of war" and that anti-Yankee sentiment in Latin America was "self-defense" in the face of increasingly brazen imperialist acts.⁸⁹ Perón discussed how the "*Washington Post*, an unofficial body of the White House," labeled the electoral wins of the nationalist Chilean Carlos Ibañez and the leftwing populist Ecuadorian José María Velasco Ibarra as United States defeats.⁹⁰ Perón argued that the *Post's* "confessions" unwittingly revealed that this country considered itself party to the internal affairs of Latin American states.⁹¹ He called Washington's exclusion of Latin America from the Marshall Plan a "real economic assault" that embodied how expressions of goodwill from the United States faltered whenever its interests were at stake.⁹² He argued that though Washington created the Organization of

⁸⁷ Perón, "Guerra y la Destrucción, Abril 5, 1951" in *Descartes*, 26-27; Perón, "Diplomacia y la Guerra, Junio 7, 1951," in *ibid.*, 45-48; Perón, "Ideologías y la Guerra, Julio 26, 1951" in *ibid.*, 63-64; Perón, "Conducción Política y de Guerra, Agosto 2, 1951" in *ibid.*, 65-67; Perón, "Junta Interamericana de Defensa, Enero 31, 1952," in *ibid.*, 131-132; Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in *ibid.*, 133-135; Perón, "Economía de Fuerzas, Marzo 27, 1952" in *ibid.*, 150-151; Perón, "Material Humano y la Guerra, Mayo 22, 1952" in *ibid.*, 171-173; Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in *ibid.*, 174-176.

⁸⁸ Perón, "Guerra y la Destrucción, Abril 5, 1951" in *Descartes*, 26-27; Perón, "Diplomacia y la Guerra, Junio 7, 1951," in *ibid.*, 45-48; Perón, "Ideologías y la Guerra, Julio 26, 1951" in *ibid.*, 63-64; Perón, "Conducción Política y de Guerra, Agosto 2, 1951" in *ibid.*, 65-67; Perón, "Junta Interamericana de Defensa, Enero 31, 1952," in *ibid.*, 131-132; Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in *ibid.*, 133-135; Perón, "Economía de Fuerzas, Marzo 27, 1952" in *ibid.*, 150-151; Perón, "Material Humano y la Guerra, Mayo 22, 1952" in *ibid.*, 171-173; Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in *ibid.*, 174-176.

⁸⁹ Perón, "Solidaridad Continental, Abril 26, 1951" in *Descartes*, 32-33; Perón, "Política Internacional y Política Interna, Junio 28, 1951" in *ibid.*, 53-55; Perón, "Internacionalismo y Nacionalismo, Agosto 28, 1952" in *ibid.*, 206-208.

⁹⁰ Perón, "Países Satélites, Agosto 30, 1951" in *Descartes*, 75-76; Perón, "Confesión de Parte, Abril 17, 1952" in *ibid.*, 158.

⁹¹ Perón, "Confesión de Parte, Abril 17, 1952" in *Descartes*, 158.

⁹² Perón, "Cooperación Económica, Abril 19, 1952" in *Descartes*, 30-31; Perón, "Política Internacional y Política Interna, Junio 28, 1951" in *ibid.*, 53-55; Perón, "Política Internacional y los Partidos Políticos, Agosto 16, 1951," in *ibid.*, 71-72; Perón, "Efectos Económicos de la Guerra, Septiembre 27, 1951," in *ibid.*, 83-85; Perón, "Material

American States (OAS) on the pretense of "good neighborliness," the "deceptive" organization was really its mechanism to isolate noncompliant states.⁹³ He considered the OAS part of a web of unilateral "commissions," *sui generis* conferences, and Washington-sponsored agreements that helped the "prepare the ground" for Latin America's total subjugation.⁹⁴

Decolonization and Global Rebellion: The Hour of the Peoples

Perón argued that a "common conscience" of resistance against materialism and imperialism was forming around the world that would culminate in what he called the "hour of the peoples."⁹⁵ Perón, a historian, believed that massive social movements drove the process of "political evolution" in the world and cited the French and Russian Revolutions as examples of how the masses created new orders after superior doctrines took root in the hearts of "men and in collectives."⁹⁶ He argued that the ongoing imperialist competition driven by materialism was the newest chapter in the timeless struggle between the plans of "power usurpers" and the needs of the people.⁹⁷ In Perón's estimation, the next "hours of the peoples" would be a global rejection of imperialist competition, subjugation, and exploitation, which would remain a consistent theme in

Humano y la Guerra, Mayo 22, 1952" in *ibid.*, 171-173; Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in *ibid.*, 174-176; Perón, "Móviles Inconfesables, Junio 26, 1952" in *ibid.*, 184-186.

⁹³ Perón, "Solidaridad Continental, Abril 26, 1951" in *Descartes*, 32-33; Perón, "Consejos Internacionales, Septiembre 6, 1951" in *ibid.*, 77-78.

⁹⁴ Perón, "Efectos Económicos de la Guerra, Septiembre 27, 1951," in *Descartes*, 83-85.

⁹⁵ Perón, "Estrategia, Febrero 8, 1951," in *Descartes*, 9-10; Perón, "Política y Estrategia, Marzo 1, 1951" in *ibid.*, 15-16; Perón, "Conducción Política y de Guerra, Agosto 2, 1951" in *ibid.*, 65-67; Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *ibid.*, 95-97; Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in *ibid.*, 133-135; Perón, "Economía de Fuerzas, Marzo 27, 1952" in *ibid.*, 150-151; Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in *ibid.*, 174-176.

⁹⁶ Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *Descartes*, 95-97; Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in *ibid.*, 133-135; Perón, "Lucha Contra los Pueblos, Julio 31, 1952" in *ibid.*, 197-199.

⁹⁷ Perón, "Estrategia, Febrero 8, 1951," in *Descartes*, 9-10; Perón, "Política y Estrategia, Marzo 1, 1951" in *ibid.*, 15-16; Perón, "Conducción Política y de Guerra, Agosto 2, 1951" in *ibid.*, 65-67; Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *ibid.*, 95-97; Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in *ibid.*, 133-135; Perón, "Economía de Fuerzas, Marzo 27, 1952" in *ibid.*, 150-151; Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in *ibid.*, 174-176; Perón, "Lucha Contra los Pueblos, Julio 31, 1952" in *ibid.*, 197-199.

his ideas moving forward.⁹⁸ His conceptualization of the "hour of the peoples" also spoke to his enduring belief that people have the agency to change history by overcoming structural obstacles, such as governments, corrupt political leaders, and foreign powers. This was partially a reflection of his historical research. However, it was also associated with the spiritualism that circulated in pre-war twentieth-century Latin America, the context within which he originally formulated Peronism, and the postwar resurgence of humanism in the world.⁹⁹

Perón noted that discord against the "two crudely materialistic doctrines" was growing as people around the world recognized that the victory of either imperialism would only ensure its "impunity" and a dark future.¹⁰⁰ This corresponded with his argument that the rise of fascism in the 1930s was based on widespread dissatisfaction and his 1944 conclusion that the Second World War did nothing to resolve the world's primary shortcoming: an overemphasis on materialism in the world.¹⁰¹ The Argentine cited a flyer that protesters distributed at a UN General Assembly to link the clamor for self-determination in the colonies to movements for socio-economic change in the industrialized West and the rise of nationalist movements and governments in Latin America.¹⁰² It said: "The people want peace. The colonies must be free.

⁹⁸ Juan Perón, letter to Mr. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, July 1961; Perón, interview by Pavón, in Perón and Pavón, *Coloquios con Perón*, 194-195; Juan Perón, "El Asesinato de Ernesto "Che" Guevara," (letter to the Peronist Movement, Madrid, Spain, October 24, 1967); Juan Perón, *Hora de los Pueblos* (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Norte, 1968), 40-43, 47.

⁹⁹ Rodó, *Ariel*, http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/ariel--0/html/fedf72f8-82b1-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_2.html; Darío, "El Triunfo de Caliban," <http://www.biblioteca.org.ar/libros/155.pdf>; Bayón, *Dogma Nacional*, 16, 18-19; Ugarte, *Destino de un Continente*, 416-418.

¹⁰⁰ Perón, "Anticipo Para La Historia, Febrero 22, 1951," in *Descartes*, 13-14; Perón, "Políticas Unilaterales, Julio 19, 1951," in *ibid.*, 61-62; Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *ibid.*, 95-97; Perón, "Doctrinas Nacionales, Mayo 15, 1952," in *ibid.*, 168-170; Perón, "Lucha Contra los Pueblos, Julio 31, 1952" in *ibid.*, 197-199.

¹⁰¹ Letter from Perón to Tizón from Rome, May 27, 1939, in Ignacio Martín Cloppet, *Perón en Roma: Cartas Inéditas (1939-1940): Amores y Política* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Fabro, 2015), 143; Letter from Perón to Tizón from Rome, May 28, 1939, in *ibid.*, 144; Letter from Perón to Tizón from Merano, Italy, September 8, 1939, in Ignacio Martín Cloppet, *Perón en Roma: Cartas Inéditas (1939-1940): Amores y Política* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Fabro, 2015), 151; Norberto Galasso, *Perón: Formación, Ascenso, y Caída, 1893-1955* (Buenos Aires: Colihue, 2005), 127; Perón, "Significado de la Defensa Nacional desde el Punto de Vista Militar," June 10, 1944.

¹⁰² Perón, *Por la Cooperación Económica y la Paz Mundial*, 5-16; Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *Descartes*, 95-97; Perón, "Lucha Contra los Pueblos, Julio 31, 1952" in *ibid.*, 197-199; James E. Cronin, "When

And we say with them that we do not want to die for either Stalin or Truman. Oppressed from all countries, join in a real statement that represents a third front."¹⁰³ Perón proposed that if the growing number of various *tercera posiciones* (third positions), or nations that rejected capitalism and communism, united, the coming "hour of the people" would attain the momentum necessary to fulfill the world's aspirations for freedom and dignity.¹⁰⁴

The Argentine president suggested that all the nations thirsting for a world without "imperialism" and "ideological totalitarianism" should adopt the ideals of a superior doctrine—*Justicialismo*—to complete this historic mission.¹⁰⁵ He recognized that each country would need specific policies that reflected their unique circumstances and relationship to imperialism. He argued that the core *Justicialist* ideals of "social justice, economic independence, and political sovereignty," which aligned with the teachings of "Jesus of Nazareth," could be used to guide these local manifestations.¹⁰⁶ Perón wrote that "work, food, welfare, and social justice" were more effective against communist "fifth columnism" than imperialist weapons or military assistance.¹⁰⁷ He argued that Argentina's low communist index was a result of how his government, in correspondence with the national will, reformed the existing "colonial capitalist

Progressives Were On The March: The Postwar Era's Lessons for the Left" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 99 Issue 1, (January-February 2020): 169.

¹⁰³ Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in *Descartes*, 133-135.

¹⁰⁴ Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *Descartes*, 95-97; Perón, "Lucha Contra los Pueblos, Julio 31, 1952" in *ibid.*, 197-199.

¹⁰⁵ Perón, "Conducción Política y de Guerra, Agosto 2, 1951" in *Descartes*, 65-67; Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *ibid.*, 95-97; Perón, "Economía de Fuerzas, Marzo 27, 1952" in *ibid.*, 150-151; Perón, "Doctrinas Nacionales, Mayo 15, 1952," in *ibid.*, 168-170; Perón, "Unilateralismo Técnico, Junio 12, 1952," in *ibid.*, 179-180.

¹⁰⁶ Perón, "Diplomacia y la Guerra, Junio 7, 1951," in *Descartes*, 45-48; Perón, "Ideologías y la Guerra, Julio 26, 1951" in *ibid.*, 63-64; Perón, "Economía de Fuerzas, Marzo 27, 1952" in *ibid.*, 150-151; Perón, "Doctrinas Nacionales, Mayo 15, 1952," in *ibid.*, 168-170.

¹⁰⁷ Perón, "Política y Estrategia, Marzo 1, 1951" in *Descartes*, 15-16; Perón, "Diplomacia y la Guerra, Junio 7, 1951," in *ibid.*, 45-48; Perón, "Ideologías y la Guerra, Julio 26, 1951" in *ibid.*, 63-64; Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in *ibid.*, 133-135; Perón, "Economía de Fuerzas, Marzo 27, 1952" in *ibid.*, 150-151; Perón, "Doctrinas Nacionales, Mayo 15, 1952," in *ibid.*, 168-170.

regime" to end the exploitation of labor.¹⁰⁸ Perón believed that the desires of the masses could no longer be ignored and saw the changes he espoused in terms of his Christian faith.

Perón cautioned that integration was required, especially for Latin America, because the materialist orders would "ruthlessly" oppose any new vision that threatened the duopoly of the "Iron Curtain" and the "Dollar Curtain," which was a notion that would inform his ideas throughout the rest of his life.¹⁰⁹ It also reflected his concerns over the imperialist backlash, which can also be found in his 1930s publications.¹¹⁰ Perón concluded that if *Justicialismo* was adopted globally, it would resolve the overemphasis on materialism that inspired imperialist urges and the discord it created, which would preclude a third, and potentially even a fourth, world war.¹¹¹ Perón believed that, due to the intensity of Cold War imperialist competition, the only way this was possible was a mass rejection of materialist doctrines throughout the world's developing nations.

¹⁰⁸ Perón, "Estrategia, Febrero 8, 1951," in *Descartes*, 9-10; Perón, "Imperialismo y la Guerra, Mayo 31, 1951," in *ibid.*, 42-44; Perón, "Diplomacia y la Guerra, Junio 7, 1951," in *ibid.*, 45-48; Perón, "Conducción Política y de Guerra, Agosto 2, 1951" in *ibid.*, 65-67; Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in *ibid.*, 133-135.

¹⁰⁹ Perón, "Libertad, Febrero 3, 1951," in *Descartes*, 7-8; Perón, "Estrategia, Febrero 8, 1951," in *ibid.*, 9-10; Perón, "Anticipo Para La Historia, Febrero 22, 1951," in *ibid.*, 13-14; Perón, "Diplomacia y la Guerra, Junio 7, 1951," in *ibid.*, 45-48; Perón, "Sindicalismo en la Política Internacional, Agosto 9, 1951" in *ibid.*, 68-70; Perón, "Guerra Popular e Impopular, Febrero 14, 1952" in *ibid.*, 136-137; Perón, "¿De Qué Peligro Nos Hablan, Agosto 21, 1951" in *ibid.*, 204-205; Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *ibid.*, 95-97; Perón, "Tercera Posición, Noviembre 15, 1951" in *ibid.*, 100-101; Perón, "Preparación del Pueblo, Noviembre 15, 1951" in *ibid.*, 102-104; Perón, "'Quintas Columnas' Imperialistas, Noviembre 22, 1951" in *ibid.*, 105-107; Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in *ibid.*, 174-176; Perón, "Unilateralismo Técnico, Junio 12, 1952," in *ibid.*, 179-180; Perón, "Lucha Contra los Pueblos, Julio 31, 1952" in *ibid.*, 197-199; Juan Perón and Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, *Mensaje a Los Pueblos de América de los Presidentes Peron e Ibáñez, Afiración de un Destino Común* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, 1953), 17; Juan Perón, speech at the Annual Armed Forces Comradeship Dinner, July 5, 1953, in *Perón Habla a las Fuerzas Armada, 1946-1954* (Buenos Aires: Secretaría de Prensa y Difusión de la Presidencia de la Nación, 1955), 105-120; Perón, Message read in Perón's name at the 4th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers, Algeria, September 7, 1973, in *Perón: Discursos Completos* (San Isidro, Argentina: Megafón, 1987), 61-76.

¹¹⁰ Perón, *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa*, 5; Enrique Rottjer and Juan Perón, *Las Operaciones en 1870* (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1939), 41.

¹¹¹ Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in *Descartes*, 133-135; Perón, "Lucha Contra los Pueblos, Julio 31, 1952" in *ibid.*, 197-199.

Perón's application of the concepts of social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty to the global context as a way to create a non-imperialist world order, as first expressed in his 1947 global radio address on "Economic Cooperation and World Peace," deserves recognition in the intellectual historiographies of anti-imperialism, decolonization, and the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). Scholars of the NAM explain that the call for exploited workers and colonized nations to unite in common cause against the capitalist order originated at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920, but this was a universalist position with an aggressive alignment.¹¹² By the 1950s, this had featured support for armed insurgencies, participation in an arms race, and imperialist domination over many nations. Peronism, on the other hand, was universalist but non-aggressive. He believed his vision could peacefully replace the bipolar order in accordance with the will of the world's nations, which was in alignment with the UN charter.

In February 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru, a leading figure in India's national liberation movement and the formation of the NAM, indicated that India would adopt a pacifist non-alignment policy after gaining its independence, which preceded Perón's July 1947 speech on "Economic Cooperation and World Peace."¹¹³ However, Nehru's assertion of non-alignment did not include a vision for a new world order. Furthermore, Perón's view that economic cooperation would be the cornerstone of the new order preceded the 1955 Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned States, which is widely considered the first manifestation of the NAM, and exceeded its scope. Scholars note that while some diplomats proposed economic cooperation at the 1955 conference, the NAM made little progress in this regard until 1973.¹¹⁴ The principles for the

¹¹² Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boškovića, eds., *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade* (London, UK: Routledge, 2014), 1-2.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

¹¹⁴ Kaldone G. Nweihed, "El Legado de Bandung: Anticolonial y No Alineado," *Humania del Sur* 10, no. 19 (July-December 2015): 11; Amitav Acharya, "Idea-shift': How Ideas from the Rest are Reshaping Global Order," *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 7 (July 2016): 1158; Robert J. C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2016), 192; Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government

"promotion of world peace and cooperation" agreed upon in Bandung focused on political sovereignty, and historian Eric Zolov notes that the NAM was characterized by "individualized approaches to nationalist development" that featured little economic cooperation.¹¹⁵

The ABC Project: Perón and Latin American Unification

During Perón's second administration, which would be cut short by his overthrow in 1955, he made the integration of Latin America his primary foreign policy goal. It must be remembered that this vision was born in a context within which the United States was exerting pressure on Latin America to join the fight in the Korean Peninsula. This was the level where he could have the most influence in bringing about liberation from imperialism, which was a cause that he now conceptualized in global dimensions. The Argentine enhanced his conceptualization of regional integration in response to the global scope of superpower imperialism, which can be found in two articles he published in "Descartes" about "Continental Confederations" in December 1951 and January 1952.

The Argentine leader wrote that the intellectual point of origin for this plan was a proposal for an Argentina-Brazil-Chile (ABC) Pact, which Brazilian diplomat Barón Rio Branco suggested in 1903 as a vision to create a regional power center that would preclude the United States from intervening south of the equator.¹¹⁶ Perón wrote that in Branco's era, United States and British imperialism conspired against this plan to keep the blacks, mestizos, and natives of Latin America in a subservient role. In the contemporary era, the Argentine predicted that,

of Non-Aligned Countries, Economic Declaration, Fourth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, September 9, 1973, 57-74, accessed March 3, 2020,

http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/4th_Summit_FD_Algers_Declaration_1973_Whole.pdf.

¹¹⁵ Eric Zolov, "Introduction: Latin America in the Global Sixties" *Americas* 70, no. 3 (January 2014): 355; William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, *Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement: Principles vs Pragmatism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 17-18.

¹¹⁶ Perón, "Confederaciones Continentales, Diciembre 20, 1951," in *Descartes*, 114-116.

regardless of which postwar imperialism triumphed in the geopolitical game of chess, Latin America would be targeted for a "new form of colonial domination."¹¹⁷ He advocated self-reliance as the region's key to salvation in a "future pregnant with risks and dangers," argued that the region must manage its own defense, and proposed a treaty, the "Confederation of Latin American Nations," to this end.¹¹⁸ He believed this power center could tap the patriotic sentiments stirred during the defense of one's homeland to fortify the Latin American spirit.¹¹⁹ He believed that just as the superpowers could not realistically defeat each other in international conventional warfare, given that it would be impossible to defeat an entire foreign continent, let only defeat it. He declared that the notion of the "nation in arms" had transitioned to the era of "continents in arms."¹²⁰

Perón argued that the proposed confederation's shared security concerns would be a more robust bond than an alliance formed in the shadows of a superpower because "cooperation, not supremacy or hegemony," built viable alliances.¹²¹ He proposed the "ABC (Argentina-Brazil-Chile) Project" and envisioned it with a new mission that reflected the changes that the Cold War created in the world order, particularly concerning the new nature of United States imperialism.¹²² In the early part of the century, Washington's paternalistic understanding of the Monroe Doctrine meant the United States considered itself as the "protector" of the hemisphere.¹²³ The original ABC Pact would have made the three leading South American states jointly responsible for regional stability, which proponents hoped would stabilize the hemisphere

¹¹⁷ Perón, "Confederaciones Continentales, Diciembre 20, 1951," in *Descartes*, 114-116.

¹¹⁸ Perón, "Doctrina de Guerra, Julio 5, 1951" in *Descartes*, 56-57; Perón, "Algo más sobre Confederaciones Continentales, Enero 24, 1952," in *ibid.*, 128-130.

¹¹⁹ Perón, "Doctrina de Guerra, Julio 5, 1951" in *Descartes*, 56-57.

¹²⁰ Perón, " Opinión Pública, Marzo 23, 1951" in *Descartes*, 22-34.

¹²¹ Perón, "Algo más sobre Confederaciones Continentales, Enero 24, 1952," in *Descartes*, 128-130; Juan Perón, "Política de Mala Fe, Abril 10, 1952," in *ibid.*, 155-157; Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in *ibid.*, 174-176.

¹²² Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano, "América Latina y el Nacionalismo Continentalista," *Anales* 12 (2010): 69.

¹²³ Schoultz, *In Their Own Best Interest*, 106; Livingstone, *America's Backyard*, 12-14.

south of the equator and preclude North American interventions. In the Cold War, the United States re-positioned itself as the protector of capitalism in the disputed world order, which also led to a reconceptualization of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States saw itself as the rightful leader of Latin America and expected the region to provide support, resources, and soldiers, but otherwise left the region fend for itself.

Perón believed the ABC Project would alter the hemispheric dynamic. In a speech to military leaders, he argued that merging the military *and* economic strength of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile would catalyze the building self-reliance in Latin America. He told them that when the bloc started demonstrating economic prosperity and the ability to oppose imperialism, other nations would naturally seek to join the union.¹²⁴ That is to say, states joining the pact would do so following the mandate of the national will, rather than in response to imperialist coercion. The president also predicted that each time a new nation joined the pact, momentum would build toward greater Latin American integration. The region, working together toward national development and in defense of their common interests, would perform much better in both regards, in Perón's estimation, than it could at the political and economic mercy of the United States.¹²⁵ This marked his turn to a belief that the national will was no longer sufficient, in the era of "continents in arms," the *continental will* was required to oppose superpower imperialism.

Perón's closest ally in the ABC Project was the new Chilean President Carlos Ibáñez (1877-1960), who returned to power democratically in 1952 with support from the Popular Socialist Party, which was comprised of leftwing nationalists.¹²⁶ The Argentine knew Ibáñez from his assignment as Argentina's military attaché in Santiago in 1937, and they shared

¹²⁴ Perón, speech at the Annual Armed Forces Comradeship Dinner, July 5, 1953, in *Perón Habla a las Fuerzas Armadas, 1946-1954*, 97-112.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 97-112.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 97-112.

common ideological ground because they both received German military training, supported social welfare, and preferred a well-organized domestic order.¹²⁷ In early 1953, they co-wrote a book on the theme of Latin American cooperation and their mission to expel foreign imperialism.¹²⁸ The ABC Project faltered when Brazil backed out, despite a favorable initial response to the idea. Perón and Ibáñez forged ahead with the "Santiago Pact" in February 1953, which was an agreement to establish a common market and coordinate their nations' industrial sectors. The common market plan would abolish customs, taxes, tariffs, exchange margins, and other obstacles that stifled trade between the two countries in a planned process that would safeguard vulnerable economic sectors. Perón characterized this as a "realization of the Pan-American ideal of cooperation" between "brother nations."¹²⁹ In theory, they began tearing down the self-imposed wall separating Argentina and Chile, as depicted in a pamphlet on economic integration that prominent Latin American economists published about establishing a Latin American monetary and customs union during the 1920s (see figure 4.25).¹³⁰

Later that year, Perón gave a speech to his military officers about the ABC Project to gain their support. He argued that the region's political and economic fragmentation made the region vulnerable, which was a view Latin American intellectuals had been expressing for decades.¹³¹ The president noted that Latin America had the "largest reserve of raw materials and food in the world," which he saw as a blessing and problem. Perón told his officers that forming a

¹²⁷ Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 224; Atkins and Thompson, "German Military Influence in Argentina," 259-260; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945*, 2; Rouquié, *Military and the State in Latin America*, 77, 80; White, *German Influence in the Argentine Army*, 2; Arango, "Síntesis y Perspectiva de los Estudios de Transferencias Militares Europeas en Suramérica," 42, 44; Dick, *Profesionalización en el Ejército Argentino*, 64-70.

¹²⁸ US Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum on Letters of Carlos Ibáñez to President Perón, CIA-RDP82-000457R0092004500007-8, October 1951; Perón and Ibáñez, *Mensaje a los pueblos de América*, 31-33.

¹²⁹ Perón and Ibáñez, *Mensaje a los Pueblos de América*, 31-33; Perón, speech at the Annual Armed Forces Comradeship Dinner, July 5, 1953, in *Perón Habla a las Fuerzas Armada, 1946-1954*, 97-112.

¹³⁰ Yáñez, *Hacia la Unión Aduanera y Monetaria de la América Latina*, 2.

¹³¹ Perón, speech at the Annual Armed Forces Comradeship Dinner, July 5, 1953, in *Perón Habla a las Fuerzas Armada, 1946-1954*, 97-112; Córdoba, *Nuestra Guerra*, 75-78; Bayón, *Dogma Nacional*, 18, 26; Ugarte, *Destino de un Continente*, 2-3, 188-189, 196, 414; Yáñez, *Hacia la Unión Aduanera y Monetaria de la América Latina*, 10-11.

"continental-state" would protect the region from being consumed in the imperial world order and warned that "the year 2000 will find us united or dominated." Perón based his argument on his recognition that the world's leading powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—had already merged into continental-states and were competing for world dominance with their combined strengths. Unlike Washington, which used its influence to divide and divest Latin America, Perón assured his military that his proposal was defensive in nature. He also told his military leaders that Ecuador and Paraguay had recently agreed to sign the pact.¹³² The addition of these new participants validated his claims that the will to create a new power center in South America existed and that more nations would seek to join the pact of their own accord.

As the process gained momentum and Truman's term drew to an end, Perón reduced his criticisms of the United States. A thaw began in United States-Argentine relations, and Perón made conciliatory gestures to the new US President, Dwight Eisenhower (1890-1969), including a return to his *nom de plume* "Descartes" to thank God that the new president was calling for an armistice in Korea.¹³³ The article garnered the attention of the *New York Times*, and historian Stephen Rabe notes that, despite Eisenhower's lingering suspicion that Perón was a fascist, relations between the two governments began to improve.¹³⁴ The Eisenhower administration also adopted sought reconciliation and authorized a \$60 million development loan for Argentina.¹³⁵ Perón's optimism would prove to be short-lived when the ugliest example of imperialism in Latin America in decades happened in 1954. Eisenhower ordered "Operation PBSuccess," the CIA-

¹³² Perón and Ibáñez, *Mensaje a los Pueblos de América*, 7-19; Perón, speech at the Annual Armed Forces Comradeship Dinner, July 5, 1953, in *Perón Habla a las Fuerzas Armadas, 1946-1954*, 97-112.

¹³³ Rabe, *Eisenhower and the United States*, 37-38; Perón, "Nuevos Rumbos, Julio 30, 1953," in Perón, *Descartes*, 212-213.

¹³⁴ Special to the *New York Times*, "Columnist Peron Gives Thanks for Eisenhower," *New York Times*, Jul 31, 1953, accessed January 5, 2020, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/112673535?accountid=14745>; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 36-38.

¹³⁵ Hedges, *Argentina*, 153-154; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 121; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 38.

backed overthrow of Guatemala's democratically-elected, leftist-wing nationalist president, Jacobo Árbenz (1913-1971). After months of lobbying failed to prevent land reforms that affected North American corporate interests, the president rationalized this on the basis of an unacceptable amount of communist infiltration in the Árbenz government.¹³⁶

The coup signaled the start of Eisenhower's push to transition the hemisphere into a bloc dedicated to a global defense of "Occidental and Christian Civilization" against communism. However, scholars note that the coup reignited and intensified anti-United States sentiment throughout the region for years to come.¹³⁷ The coup pushed some over the edge and into a guerrilla training camp in Mexico, including the future guerrilla revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who had been working as a freelance reporter in Guatemala during the coup.¹³⁸ Eisenhower's vision ran contrary to Perón's proposal for self-reliant, regional *defense*, and the coup was another example of imperialism in defense of capitalist interests.

The Argentine president's response to the scandal in Guatemalan was to incorporate the nations of Central America into his vision, which risked provoking Washington because it repudiated competition for regional leadership. In a congressional address in early 1955, Perón said the "union and liberty of the Peoples of America" was the "primary objective" of Argentine foreign policy. He informed congress that Bolivia and Nicaragua had joined the Santiago Pact and that additional economic agreements with Chile would broaden the scope of regional

¹³⁶ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 42-49; Livingstone, *America's Backyard*, 26-28; Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 16-17; Patrick Iber, *Neither Peace Nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 99-100, 146-148; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 392; Meade, *History of Modern Latin America*, 441.

¹³⁷ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 42; Brands, *Latin America's Cold War*, 13-17; Harold E. Davis, *Latin American Diplomatic History: An Introduction* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), 244; Halperín-Dongi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 256-257; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 148-149; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 392; Meade, *History of Modern Latin America*, 443; Iber, *Cultural Cold War in Latin America*, 99-100.

¹³⁸ Westad, *Global Cold War*, 149; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 306; Iber, *Cultural Cold War in Latin America*, 100.

integration. Perón believed his efforts were making progress, despite the recent demonstration of United States imperialism in Guatemala.¹³⁹

However, not all backlash is foreign-born. Since the botched coup in 1951, Perón's enemies slowly grew in confidence and were influential despite being in the minority. Perhaps none were as influential as the Pope, who excommunicated Perón in June 1955 after a series of altercations between his supporters and Argentina's conservative Church. The navy, which was dominated by liberals, used the occasion as their moment to act.¹⁴⁰ Naval bombers took flight and executed a dramatic raid on the *Casa Rosada*, Argentina's presidential palace, to assassinate him. Unaware that Perón was not there, additional planes strafed the crowd that had assembled in the adjacent Plaza de Mayo, Argentina's most significant public space. The navy killed hundreds of civilians that day, but army loyalists kept Perón in power after some violent confrontations in the capital. After calm returned, Perón publicly condemned the navy's marines, who had been prominent in the attempted coup.¹⁴¹ His state security policies in the ensuing weeks became increasingly harsh, but his political survival was short-lived. Loyalists failed to respond to a new coup, and the army overthrew Perón on September 16. The deposed leader survived and fled Argentina to prevent a civil war, which he knew from his visits to post-civil war Spain would have destroyed many of the improvements that his administration had made for the nation.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ Juan Perón, *Mensaje del Presidente de la Nación Argentina General Juan Perón al Inaugurar el 89º Periodo Ordinario de Sesiones del Honorable Congreso Nacional: Conceptos Doctrinarios* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Secretaría de Prensa de la Presidencia de la Nación, 1955), 54, accessed October 1, 2016, Latin Americanist Research Resources Project.

¹⁴⁰ Lee, *Argentine Political Instability*, 132.

¹⁴¹ Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962*, 187; Romero, *Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 129; Goldwert, *Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina*, 129; Lee, *Argentine Political Instability*, 132; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 180; Juan Per, "Bombing and Coup 1955 Argentina" (video), accessed March 3, 2020, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vgKMIza1RkQ>; comunidadbloguera, "16 de junio de 1955. El día que bombardearon Buenos Aires" (documentary), produced by Instituto Nacional Juan Domingo Perón, accessed March 3, 2020. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=79qMG8x0aEs>; MiTVMundo, "Perón Habla Después del Bombardeo del 16 de Junio de 1955 y la Quema," (video), produced by Canal 7 de Buenos Aires, 5:12, accessed September 1, 2016, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VBNqstQbO_Y.

¹⁴² Juan Perón, "Un Mundo Nuevo Se Nos Viene Encima," *Panorama*, June 30, 1970, in *Obras Completas 25 Tomo*

The Liberal Rejection of Perón

The military dubbed its coup the *Revolución Libertadora* (Liberating Revolution) and began to chart a new path for the nation.¹⁴³ Amidst the army's post-coup political infighting, army General Pedro Aramburu (1903-1970), rose to power in November of 1955. He was an ardent liberal and took part in the failed coup against Perón in 1951, though he was restored to service, as were many conspirators. After the 1955 coup, he became Commander-in-Chief of the Army and seized power from this position in a palace coup.¹⁴⁴ Aramburu wanted to undo Perón's policies and eradicate Peronism in Argentina.¹⁴⁵ He restored Argentina's 1853 Constitution by decree, which Perón had legally changed in 1949, dissolved state-controls over foreign trade and other Peronist institutions, and promised to eventually allow elections, though Perón and *Peronismo* were proscribed and outlawed.¹⁴⁶ In his capacity as *de facto* president, Aramburu produced several public defenses of the coup that defined Argentina's liberal future in direct contrast to Perón's vision.

Early into his dictatorship, Aramburu addressed the future leaders of Argentina's army in a speech at the *Colegio Militar*, the training academy for junior officers. He explained to the young men that "dictatorships use the corporate structuring of groups of men to desensitize them before all spiritual claims." He said that under this system, "each group stays converted in a mass, and the individual, dragged down, loses his personality" in favor of the collective. He

I (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1988), 69-74.

¹⁴³ Archivo General de la Nación, "Golpe de Estado de 1955, Asume el Poder Eduardo Lonardi," accessed October 1, 2016, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6hUKQG7Y9Ck>.

¹⁴⁴ Michael A. Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland: Religion and Politics in Argentina* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 5; Hedges, *Argentina*, 177; Michael Goebel, *Argentina's Partisan Past: Nationalism and the Politics of History* (Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 120-121; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 115; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962*, 124.

¹⁴⁵ Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 5; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 265; Hedges, *Argentina*, 170; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 115; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962*, 228-230.

¹⁴⁶ Casa Rosada, "Pedro Eugenio Aramburu (1955-1958)," accessed September 1, 2016. <http://www.caserosada.gob.ar/informacion/discursos/18-nuestro-pais/galeria-de-presidentes/438-pedro-eugenio-aramburu-1955-1958>.

promised his government would provide an "enabling environment" within which each citizen could "recover" their individuality. Aramburu's view of the struggle between individualism and collectivism reduced the question to a dichotomy that military liberals would uphold throughout the Cold War: the people could have the "freedom" of liberalism, which is to say, within the political parameters that the military would accept, or be enslaved to the collective under a "totalitarian," by which he meant Peronist, government. Aramburu also discussed individualism as it related to his restoration of the free-market economy. He said that after years of government intervention, Argentina needed "private initiative to invade our fields and cities." He remarked that it was "essential that each citizen knows how much he is worth" in relation to their efforts and their contribution to society, by which he meant that he would restore Argentina's traditional capitalist system of remuneration.¹⁴⁷

Aramburu gave a speech at the annual celebration of the Argentine Army, on May 29, 1956, which praised the figure of the soldier and how their job differed from the role individuals played in society. Aramburu affirmed that "respect for the hierarchy, that is discipline," was a military virtue that was unnecessary for society at large. The dictator expected society to respect "free institutions," which he described as the cornerstones of liberal democracy. To excuse his dictatorship, he asked the public to trust the military as they negotiated the country out of the chaos of Peronist Argentina in what he warned would be an imperfect process.¹⁴⁸ Aramburu rejected the collaborative national development efforts Perón espoused. In his liberal view, civilians would develop the nation following the liberal development model under the protection that the mobilized military provided. Ironically, the military dictatorship deeply curtailed

¹⁴⁷ Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, *La Revolución Libertadora: Discursos del Presidente Provisional de la República Argentina y del Vicepresidente Contraalmirante Isaac F. Rojas en 12 Meses de Gobierno* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Secretaría de Prensa de la Presidencia de la Nación, 1956), 42.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 79-80.

individual liberty, especially political thought that did not fit within the parameters it set.¹⁴⁹ For Peronists, Aramburu's ideas contradicted their belief that liberal individualism and materialism had created Argentina's pre-war quagmire.

Argentina's most prominent liberal newspaper, *La Nación*, shows that foreign policy concerns were an important theme in regards to the rejection of Peronism. Historian José Sánchez-Román's review of the newspaper reveals that the two most prominent liberal concerns were Perón's anti-United States posture and his efforts to centralize economic control.¹⁵⁰ Liberals believed these points pushed Argentina out of favor with Washington, and out of the Western capitalist order in general. The latter, however, was an unfair representation of Perón's trade policies because he did want to end trade with capitalist states, but began to redirect Argentina's trade to friendly, non-imperialist states in the region to mitigate exposure to imperialism and single-market dependency.

On March 16, 1956, six months after the coup, Aramburu gave a national address to "clearly fix the national position in the international order, to the end of maintaining and tightening the ties of friendship that link it with the world's civilized nations." He said that Argentina would always align with nations that "shed their blood in defense of liberty, democracy, and the empire of Justice," which was a reference to the efforts the West made to defeat fascism in the Second World War. Aramburu claimed that Argentina would work toward "continental unity," though his conceptualization of this significantly differed from Perón's in that the dictator described a process where cultural, rather than political, links would help eliminate regional distrust. The culture he evoked was that of the "Old World," whereas Perón

¹⁴⁹ Hedges, *Argentina*, 170-171; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 135-136; Paul H. Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals: The "Dirty War" in Argentina* (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2002), 8-9.

¹⁵⁰ José Antonio Sánchez-Román, "La Nación, Peronism, and the Origins of the Cold War in Argentina," *Culture & History Digital Journal* 4, no. 1 (2015): 1, accessed September 1, 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2015.004>.

sought to link Argentina to the rest of Latin America. Referring to the Cold War, Aramburu declared that Argentina "feels inextricably linked" to Europe and its destiny, promised to make Argentina "present again" among the free Western states, and vowed to "support the civilized world," the West.¹⁵¹ In saying this, Aramburu committed Argentina as a participant in a potential war against communism in Europe, which corresponded to Eisenhower's vision and overturned "Third Position" pacifist non-alignment.

Consideration of the Cold War context within which the dictatorship acted must also include the strategic implications of alignment with the United States and the West. Military liberals recognized the United States as the leading force against communism in the world, and being out of favor with Washington had already hurt the nation's military preparedness. For over a decade, Argentina had been prohibited from United States military training, armaments, and financial aid, while the rest of the region received these benefits.¹⁵² Furthermore, leaving the network of United States-led military treaties, as Perón's neutral, non-alignment policy demanded, would leave Argentina isolated and vulnerable in a worrisome time. As dictator, Aramburu issued decrees to reinsert Argentina into the West under contemporary liberal principles, especially free trade, and in the spirit of following Washington's lead. He ratified the OAS charter in 1956 and signed onto the United States-led International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank programs in 1957.¹⁵³ The US Government reacted favorably to the coup by providing aid to the new regime. Throughout the nine years of Perón's presidency, Argentina received \$16,120,881.¹⁵⁴ In 1956, the first full year without Perón, Argentina received

¹⁵¹ Aramburu, *Revolución Libertadora*, 53-54.

¹⁵² School of Americas Watch, "SOA-WHINSEC Graduates," School of Americas Watch, June 4, 2019, accessed March 2, 2020, <http://www.soaw.org/soa-whinsec-graduates/>.

¹⁵³ Joseph S. Tulchin, *Argentina and the United States* (New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1990), 111.

¹⁵⁴ US Aid, *US Overseas Loans and Grants*, <http://explorer.usaid.gov/reports>.

\$109,309,733, and the per-person average reached around \$5.67. However, this still lagged behind the regional average of \$9.32, and Chile received \$31.43 per person after Ibáñez accepted the IMF and agreed to Washington's policies on hemispheric defense, which disgusted Chilean nationalists (see figure 4.26).¹⁵⁵ The United States also reopened training opportunities for the Argentine military officers in 1956.¹⁵⁶

Liberal disdain for Perón's foreign policy has not received proper attention in the historiography of Perón's overthrow and the ensuing eighteen years of the military's refusal to accept Peronism, which mainly focuses on his domestic policies, especially regarding labor.¹⁵⁷ My intervention in this section demonstrates two aspects of why the military overthrew Perón that have received less attention. Aramburu's post-coup speeches and actions reflected liberal disagreements with how Perón's new social order corresponded to his worldview, and how his foreign policy advocated for Argentina and Latin America to be self-reliant. In contrast, liberals sought to affirm Argentina's allegiance to free-trade capitalism, the West, and the United States. Despite his ouster and the numerous regime claims that Perón was a tyrant, his ideas remained widely popular in Argentina, and his "minions," as the regime called Peronist, were the nation's largest and most organized political movement.¹⁵⁸ These two factors made Peronists a threat to the order that the liberal dictator defined. In June 1956, liberal fears piqued when a Peronist

¹⁵⁵ US Aid, *US Overseas Loans and Grants*. <http://explorer.usaid.gov/reports>; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 273-274; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 123.

¹⁵⁶ These positions were for majors and colonels, whereas the previous training had been for junior officers in technical fields. Among others, this included future dictators General Juan Carlos Onganía, and "Dirty War" leaders General Jorge Rafael Videla, Roberto Eduardo Viola, Emilio Massera. School of Americas Watch, "School of Americas Graduates," <http://www.soaw.org/notorious-soa-graduates/>.

¹⁵⁷ Hedges, *Argentina*, 166; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 89; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 129-130; Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, 158, 180-181; Brian Loveman, *For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 125; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962*, 187; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 111; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 264-265; Goldwert, *Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina*, 129; Lee, *Argentine Political Instability*, 132; James P. Brennan, *Peronism and Argentina* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1998), 216.

¹⁵⁸ Aramburu, *La Revolución Libertadora*, 21-22; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 135; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 114-116; Hedges, *Argentina*, 171.

coalition attempted a restoration. The dictatorship violently crushed the uprising, and Aramburu ordered summary executions for twenty-seven civilian and military conspirators.¹⁵⁹ The military's response changed the status of Peronists from political opposition to military targets, which was based, among other concerns, on the liberal rejection of any geopolitical reconfiguration away from the United States-led capitalist order.

¹⁵⁹ Teresa Eggers-Brass, *Historia Argentina, 1806-2004: Una Mirada Crítica* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Maipué, 2004), 539; Goldwert, *Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina*, 166; Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 9; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 115-116; Rodolfo Walsh, *Operation Massacre*, trans. Daniella Gitlin (1957; repr., New York, NY: Seven Stories Press, 2013), 1-8.



Figure 4.1. Peronist image promoting racial inclusion and Argentina's indigenous past. "Day of the Race."¹⁶⁰



Figure 4.2. Peronist image of a female *cabecita negra*, blackhead.¹⁶¹



Figure 4.3. Peronist image that promotes racial inclusion throughout Latin America. "America, a continent united in a similar yearning for Peace, Work, and Liberty."¹⁶²



Figure 4.4. Peronist image promoting cultural inclusion between Argentines and Chileans.¹⁶³

¹⁶⁰ Quintana and Manrupe, *Afiches del Peronism 1945-1955*, 61.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 64.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 35.



Figure 4.5. Peronist image promoting cultural inclusion of the *gaucho* and land reform. "You deserve a peaceful old age, become the owner of the land you work, the government will give you the aid you need."¹⁶⁴

Figure 4.6. Peronist image promoting cultural inclusion and land reform. "If you have been exploited do not allow your child to be, buy the land that you cultivate, the government will give you the aid you need."¹⁶⁵




Figure 4.7 and 4.8. Reproduction of Peronist images regarding sending "dishonest" merchants to prison.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 31.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 36.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 42, 43.



Figure 4.9. "Five-Year Plan: Molding the Greatness of the Nation."¹⁶⁷



Figure 4.10. Truman deceiving a Latin American peasant.¹⁶⁸



Figure 4.11. Latin American general ordering troops to fight in the Korean War.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 46.

¹⁶⁸ *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 17, (March 1952): 43.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.



Figure 4.12. Peronist cartoon of Truman and Stalin.¹⁷⁰




Figure 4.13. Peronist cartoon of Truman and Stalin strangling the non-European/White from bipolar positions.¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 23, (June 1952): 33.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*



Figure 4.14. Peronist cartoon showing a capitalist "child" using a liberal cavalry officer as a toy.¹⁷²



Figure 4.15. The hat worn by officers in Nazi Germany's ruthless and feared *Waffen-SS* units.



Figure 4.16. Peronist cartoon about the 1951 coup attempt, *El Golpe De Furca* ("furca" in the Argentine Criollo dialect means roughly a feint or distractions to allow a secret attack to succeed).¹⁷³

¹⁷² *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 7, (October 1951): 17.



Figure 4.17. Peronist cartoon of Latin Americans porting a "Yanqui" capitalist.¹⁷⁴




Figure 4.18. Peronist cartoon of the capitalist octopus strangling neighboring Uruguay.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Ibid., 20; definition of "furca," accessed October 24, 2016, <http://que-significa.com/significado.php?termino=furca>.

¹⁷⁴ *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 11, (December 1951): 21.

¹⁷⁵ *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 51, (October 1953): 49.



Figure 4.19. Peronist cartoon questioning racial lynching in the United States.¹⁷⁶
Figure 4.20. Peronist image showing the cultural inclusion of the *gaucho*.¹⁷⁷



Figure 4.21. Peronist image related to the Soviet Union and its "conduct of the masses."¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 9, (December 1951): 21.

¹⁷⁷ *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 7, (October 1951): 52.

¹⁷⁸ *Mundo Peronista* 3, no. 67, (June 1954): 4.



Figure 4.22. Peronist image depicting the "Forms of Capitalism."¹⁷⁹




Figure 4.23. Peronist graphic representation of three social orders. "Capitalism - Economic oligarchy in government, exploited people, enslavement and injustice; Justicialismo - Government of organized/mobilized people, free people, justice and liberty; Communism - Social 'proletarian' oligarchy in government, exploited people, enslavement and injustice."¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 6, (October 1951): 49.

¹⁸⁰ *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 8, (November 1951): 4.




Figure 4.24. Peronist graphic representation of three economic orders. "Liberal Economy - The economy remains open to private initiative, capitalism, exploitation, oppression, capitalist imperialism; *Justicialist* economy - Mixed economic guidance: Social and economic State and organizations, social economy, social well-being; Directed economy - Economy in the hands of the state, statism, interventionism, bureaucratic economic, paralysis of the economy, exploitation of man by the state."¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ *Mundo Peronista* 1, no. 12, (January 1952): 4.




Figure 4.25. An artist's depiction of Latin America's self-imposed trade barriers from the 1920s.¹⁸²

¹⁸² Yáñez, *Hacia la Unión Aduanera y Monetaria de la América Latina*, 2.




Figure 4.26. US Aid per person to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the South American average, 1946-1956.¹⁸³

¹⁸³ Robert Koch, "US Aid per Person to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile," created with data from US Aid, *US Overseas Loans and Grants*, <http://explorer.usaid.gov/>.

Chapter Five

Perón and the Hour of the Peoples

The Argentine Third Position, then, begins with dignifying the life of the individual in each national conglomerate. And it does so through social justice, that is, balancing within its bosom thanks to the supreme guardianship of the State, its two dynamic and antithetical forces: labor and capital.

—Juan Perón, *La Tercera Posición Argentina*

In a world convulsing from contested ideas, in full effervescence of the rebellious youth, with the backdrop of the Vietnam War or of the episodes that had developed in the French and United States universities in 1968, a large portion of the university students were bewitched by the idea of a strategic alliance with the Peronists.

—Liberal Dictator Alejandro Lanusse, *Confesiones de un General*

After the military overthrew the nationalist President Juan Domingo Perón (1895-1974) in 1955, the army's liberal leader, Pedro Aramburu (1903-1970), rose to power. The new dictator sought to erase Peronism from the national memory, restore Argentina's traditional free-trade capitalist economic policies, and assert the nation's geopolitical alignment with the United States. This task was complicated. Though Aramburu outlawed *Justicialismo*, as the deposed leader called his ideology, it remained the nation's most popular and organized political movement. Furthermore, the policies Aramburu proposed were irreconcilable with Perón's visions for an ordered society, cooperative economics, and pacifist non-alignment.¹ After an attempted Peronist

¹ Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, *La Revolución Libertadora: Discursos del Presidente Provisional de la República Argentina y del Vicepresidente Contraalmirante Isaac F. Rojas en 12 Meses de Gobierno* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Secretaría de Prensa de la Presidencia de la Nación, 1956), 42, 53-54, 79-80; Michael A. Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland: Religion and Politics in Argentina* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 5; Tulio Halperín-Donghi, *The Contemporary History of Latin America*, trans. John Chasteen (Durham, NC: Duke

restoration failed in 1956, Aramburu ordered the summary executions of twenty-seven participants, which signaled that the military would consider a nationalist movement its enemy, rather than political opposition.²

Argentine army officers studying in France at the time learned of a new military doctrine in development for use against clandestine organizations, French counterinsurgency (FRCOIN) theory. The French theory warned that in the nuclear age, communist subversives used nationalist fronts to wage unconventional war against Western states to avoid a confrontation that might precipitate mutually assured destruction.³ At the Argentine dictatorship's request, the French established a training mission in Buenos Aires, and Argentine military officers synthesized the warnings regarding internal subversion to their persecution of Peronist nationalists.⁴ The military allowed democratic elections in 1958, but Peronism remained illegal, and they forced the new president to give them a wide-ranging authority that turned Argentina into a police state under the banner of liberal democracy.⁵ The Cuban Revolution's transition from a national liberation movement to a socialist state aligned with the Soviet Union in 1961 had lasting repercussions in the hemisphere, which Perón analyzed from exile in Spain. President

University Press, 1993), 265; Jill Hedges, *Argentina: A Modern History* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 170; Daniel K. Lewis, *A History of Argentina* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 115; Robert A. Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-1962* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1980), 228-230.

² Paul H. Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals: The "Dirty War" in Argentina* (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2002), 9; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 115-116; Marvin Goldwert, *Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1972), 166.

³ Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare From Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964), 25-29; Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (1977; repr., New York, NY: New York Review of Books, 2006), 168; Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (1961; repr., Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1985), 99; David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, trans. John A. Nagl (1964; repr., Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 112, Adobe PDF eBook; Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 78, Adobe PDF eBook; Douglas Porch, *The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force* (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 570; Paul Aussaresses, *The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957*, trans. Robert Miller (New York, NY: Enigma Books, 2002), 41-42.

⁴ Eric Stener Carlson, "The Influence of French 'Revolutionary War' Ideology on the Use of Torture in Argentina's 'Dirty War,'" *Human Rights Review* 1, no. 4 (2000): 71.

⁵ Arturo Frondizi, Decreto Secreto 9880/58, Buenos Aires, November 14, 1958.

Kennedy targeted Latin America for a program to foster economic development and ensure social order called the Alliance for Progress (AFP). Over the next several years, dictatorships rose to power throughout the region, and the United States directly intervened in the Dominican Republic, sponsored brutal counterinsurgency in Guatemala, and trained Latin American militaries in counterinsurgency warfare.⁶ Many Latin American youth radicalized as democracy retreated in the region, and the example of the Cuban Revolution inspired them to adopt the armed struggle as a path to political power.⁷ In Argentina, the military executed coups in 1962 and again in 1966. The dictator who ruled from 1966 through 1970, Juan Carlos Onganía (1914-1995), promised to stabilize society by purifying its ideological content. He attacked the nation's autonomous university system, persecuted labor, and consolidated the military's counterinsurgent state and intransigence in regards to Perón.⁸

During this period, calls for social and economic changes from around the world turned into demands, as seen in the rise of the Third World Movement in the 1950s, the formation of the related Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), increased civil upheaval and guerrilla insurgencies in developing nations, and various degrees of religious backing related to the social reforms suggested at Vatican II (1962-1965). Left-wing intellectuals in Latin America linked the upheaval in their region to a global rebellion against imperialism.⁹ Perón watched and analyzed

⁶ Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1992), 166, 187-188; Kirsten Weld, *Paper Cadavers: The Archives of Dictatorship in Guatemala* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 8; Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 8-9, 49, 75, 85; Stephen Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 130-131; Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, The United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 95-97.

⁷ Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 301-303; Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America, 4th ed.* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), 417-421.

⁸ Hedges, *Argentina*, 184-186; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 137-138; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 127-130; Luis Alberto Romero, *A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, trans. James P. Brennan (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 173-178.

⁹ Domingo Arranz, "Argentina en la Crisis de Capitalismo," *Revista de la Liberación* 1 (First Trimester, 1963): 7;

as liberation movements fought foreign mercenaries and European forces in Africa, political upheaval rocked metropolises, revolutionaries in Cuba declared the need for "second and third Vietnams," and United States forces suffered through the Tet Offensive.¹⁰ As political instability peaked around the World in 1968, Perón called Argentines to arms in his book *Hora de los Pueblos (Hour of the Peoples)*.¹¹ Over the next three years, sustained labor agitation, a series of riots, and the emergence of Peronist and non-Peronist guerrilla movements destroyed the military's claims that they maintained an orderly society. In 1971, a new liberal dictator rose to power, Alejandro Agustín Lanusse (1918-1996), as political opposition to the regime consolidated. He recognized that the military's hold on power was untenable and began two years of negotiations to allow the return of democracy and Perón.¹² The exiled leader published his newest ideas for Argentina as the world stewed in turmoil, and guerrillas continued to press the military to ensure the dictatorship followed through with their promises.¹³ After eighteen years in exile, Perón returned to Argentina and the presidency in 1973, but he died seven months later.

María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo, *The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the Age of Development* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 47-48; Aldo Marchesi, *Latin America's Radical Left: Rebellion and Cold War in the Global 1960s* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press), 2018, 2-8; Paul J. Dosal, *Comandante Che: Guerrilla Soldier, Commander, and Strategist, 1956-1967* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2010), 214-215; Eric Zolov, "Introduction: Latin America in the Global Sixties," *The Americas* 70, no. 3 (January 2014): 353.

¹⁰ Ernesto Guevara, "Message to the Tricontinental," *Tricontinental*, April 16, 1967, in *The Awakening of Latin America*, ed. María del Carmen Ariet García (North Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 2013), 451-454.

¹¹ Juan Perón, *Hora de los Pueblos* (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Norte, 1968), 40-43, 47.

¹² Alejandro Agustín Lanusse, *Confesiones de un General: Memorias* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Planeta Espejo de la Argentina, 1994), 164-169; Hedges, *Argentina*, 180-181, 187-188; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 16, 73, 131; Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 15; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 180-182, 188, 193; James P. Brennan and O. Pianetto, *Region and Nation: Politics, Economy and Society in Twentieth Century Argentina* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 219-220; Montoneros, *Comunicado #4*, June 1, 1970; Malcolm W. Browne, "Aramburu Case Remains Puzzle," *New York Times*, June 21, 1970; Richard Gillespie, *Soldiers of Perón: Argentina's Montoneros* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1982), 104; Guillermo O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 207-209; Potash, Robert A. *The Army & Politics in Argentina 1962-1973* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 327-328.

¹³ Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 51; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 193-195; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 138-140.

This chapter considers Perón's views on the interaction of Argentina's domestic situation and the global context from the time of his overthrow in 1955 until his return to the presidency. In the first sections, I analyze the thinking that led to liberal army officers to create a police state to prevent his return and attack his supporters. They did so based on their FRCOIN-inspired belief that Marxists used nationalism as a front in a global plot, which the Cuban Revolution's alignment with the Soviet Union seemed to confirm for them. For the next two decades, the liberals who dominated the military and opposed Peronism operated on the premise that the struggle against Peronism was part of the Third World War, a "war against subversion." In the second section, I examine Perón's geopolitical analysis of the unrest of the Global Sixties. He predicted that the AFP would backfire and told Kennedy that widespread military abuses of this program would accelerate the rise of the "Hour of the Peoples," which was the Argentine's theory that the dissatisfied masses around the world would usher in a new era in human history with revolutionary means.¹⁴ In this sense, I argue that he came to see state repression in Argentina, Latin America, and around the world as linked phenomena well before his peers or sitting heads of state did.

In the third section, I explore how Perón sought to create a multi-generational movement to overthrow the regime based on the argument that Argentines must restore popular sovereignty through any necessary means, which included his embrace of the path of the armed struggle against repressive, minority faction rule in the late 1960s.¹⁵ I argue that this resulted in one of the most intriguing points in his story, because, with the help of radicalized clergy, he was able to extend his appeal to frustrated Catholic youths, despite having been excommunicated in 1955. In the fourth section, I analyze how he navigated "revolutionary warfare" and linked Argentina's

¹⁴ Juan Perón, letter to Mr. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, July 1961.

¹⁵ Perón, *Hora de los Pueblos*, 40-43, 47.

plight to the rise of the Third World Movement, which he argued corresponded to the pacifist, non-aligned "Third Position" he first advocated in the 1940s.¹⁶ He argued that the Third World Movement and the NAM reflected a new emphasis on the value of human life in the world that signaled a widespread rejection of both capitalist and communist materialism, which he believed could power a global post-imperial movement and make social justice a global reality.¹⁷

In 1973, shortly before his return to power, Perón proposed to the NAM Conference in Algeria that, to consolidate this new vision, the increasing number of states adopting a non-aligned stance, or a *tercera posición*, in the world must integrate into regional- or continental-states and coordinate with each. He believed this would enable them to survive the incredible reach of the inevitable imperialist backlash, consolidate popular sovereignty, and end the imperialism of the bipolar world order. In this sense, he completed the transition of his nationalist, pacifist vision into a universalist one. From his origins as a nationalist military thinker in Great Depression-era Argentina, this was a remarkable adaptation to national, regional, and global circumstances as the world convulsed amid the interrelated stresses of the contested decolonization process and the Cold War. I argue that Perón's foreign policy, which influenced his domestic vision and vice versa, was coherent and remained based on the core principles that he had espoused since the mid-1940s: social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty. He applied these concepts to his analysis of a world mired in conflict and responded with a proposal for a harmonic world order based on cooperation at the national, regional, and global levels. The Argentine undertook massive modifications over the years that this chapter also shows.

¹⁶ Juan Perón, *Por la Cooperación Económica y la Paz Mundial* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Subsecretaría de Informaciones, 1947), 5-15; Juan Perón, *La Política Internacional Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: 1948), 3-13.

¹⁷ Juan Perón, Message read in Perón's name at the 4th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers, Algeria, September 7, 1973, in *Perón: Discursos Completos* (San Isidro, Argentina: Megafón, 1987), 61-76.

The Argentine Military and the Internal Enemy

By the time of Perón's overthrow in 1955, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Nations, and the NAM had all announced support for decolonizing the old European empires. The superpowers were the most influential in this process, but their competition for the allegiance of newly independent states was creating tensions that threatened to escalate into nuclear war.¹⁸ Liberation movement leaders in decolonizing nations often looked to the Soviet Union for assistance and touted socialist development models, and many new nation-states left the Western sphere of influence upon independence to pursue a new path to development. María Saldaña-Portillo explains that there was a growing openness to socialism in underdeveloped countries after the Soviet development model transitioned a backward agricultural state into a superpower that defeated the Nazi war machine. The emancipatory promises of Marxism overlapped with enduring aspirations for liberation in the colonies, which also translated to Latin America, where many anti-imperialists associated imperialist colonialism to the neocolonial structures that plagued regional economies. However, nationalist alternatives were more prevalent in Latin America, as opposed to East Asia, where communist insurgencies rose to power in China, North Korea, and North Vietnam by 1954.¹⁹ As Perón predicted in 1951, this created an uncomfortable shift in the Cold War's balance of power, and the United States began to waiver on its support for decolonization.²⁰

In 1957, the anti-Perón, liberal faction of the Argentine military controlled the government and searched for a way to rid the country of Peronism. They came across FRCOIN

¹⁸ Daniel C. Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War": An Intellectual Biography* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1991), 95; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4-5, 99.

¹⁹ Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 18-21.

²⁰ Juan Perón, "Diplomacia y la Guerra, Junio 7, 1951," in *Descartes: Política e Estrategia (No Ataco, Crítico) 1951-1953*, La Baldrich Digital Archive, accessed March 11, 2020. <http://www.labaldrich.com.ar/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Pol%C3%ADtica-y-Estrategia-Descartes-Per%C3%B3n.pdf>, 45-48, Adobe PDF eBook; Juan Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in *ibid.*, 174-176.

theory, which focused on the threat posed by the internal enemy in the nuclear age. France's status as a struggling colonial power influenced FRCOIN theory. The French empire was rapidly unraveling despite government and military efforts to prevent this, which the United States sometimes aided (Indochina) and sometimes assailed (Algeria). In Indochina, communist *Viet Minh* cadres appealed to the peasantry's desire for national liberation during an eight-year struggle against the French (1946-1954), which decisively influenced the French military's understanding of "revolutionary warfare" during the Cold War.²¹ Less than a year after their humiliating loss at Điện Biên Phủ, many French military leaders who fought in Indochina were deployed to fight a national liberation movement in Algeria and they carried their Indochina experiences with them into the Algerian War (1954-1962). Influential French officers in Algiers linked minor, isolated incidents of nationalist-Marxist collusion against French colonialism to a grand Soviet campaign for global domination. However, the Algerian national liberation movement was not communist, nor did it have any communists within its leadership.²² As the French military theorized in this entangled Cold War-decolonization context, they developed new conceptualizations of guerrilla warfare and new methods for the fight.

One of the most prominent FRCOIN innovators was a French paratroop colonel named Roger Trinquier. He had years of experience in guerrilla warfare in Indochina and led the "Dirty War" counterinsurgency during the Battle of Algiers (1956-1957).²³ During this struggle, three liberal Argentine military officers studying in France, Carlos Rosas, Alcides López Aufranc, and Manrique Miguel Mom, were deployed to Algiers to learn the theory from Trinquier and to

²¹ Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare*, 25-29; Porch, *French Foreign Legion*, 570.

²² Horne, *Savage War of Peace*, 138, 168; Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 99; Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 112; Evans, *France's Undeclared War*, 78; Aussaresses, *Battle of the Casbah*, 41-42.

²³ Roger Trinquier, *The Indochina Underground* (Wright Patterson AFB, OH: Foreign Technology Division, 1984); Fall, "Introduction," in Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, xii; In the movie "The Battle for Algiers," the French counterinsurgency leader Colonel Mathieu is modeled on Trinquier, *The Battle of Algiers*, directed by Gillo Pontecorvo (Rialto Pictures, 1966), Blu Ray Video Disk (Argent Films Ltd., 2012).

witness FRCOIN methods in action.²⁴ At the time, Trinquier was already working on his book, *Modern Warfare*, a seminal work on counterinsurgency that was quickly translated for use by all western militaries, many of whom continue to rely on his theories.²⁵

In *Modern Warfare*, Trinquier positioned ideological challenges to the "standing orders" of Western states as a part of a communist plan to use "subversion" to destroy the West.²⁶ He explained that in nuclear era warfare the control of strategic terrain, which was critical in conventional war had been replaced by an "interlocking system of actions - political, economic, psychological, military," and that victory hinged on "winning the hearts and minds" of the civilian populace. He advised that guerrillas operating in "clandestine organizations" would use "terrorism" to undermine society's belief that the standing order could protect them. Trinquier warned that if the guerrillas patiently applied these techniques, they would eventually prevail as people turned their support to the insurgency. He wrote that guerrillas faced legal systems that were not designed to confront insurgency and cited how guerrillas crossed international borders to seek refuge as an example, which was a problem the French military faced in Indochina and Algeria.²⁷ Trinquier argued that defeat meant "sacrificing defenseless populations" to "unscrupulous" foes, which positioned the forces of the standing order as saviors.²⁸

Trinquier wrote that the "forces of order" must adapt their methods, which required the

²⁴ Military Service Record, Carlos Rosas, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires (AGE); Military Service Record, Alcides López Aufranc, AGE; Military Service Record, Manrique Miguel Mom, AGE; jabiero7, "Escuadrones de la Muerte. La Escuela Francesa" (video documentary), directed by Marie-Monique Robin, accessed September 17, 2014, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LRGf4G1XnI>.

²⁵ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*; Roger Trinquier, *La Guerra Moderna y La Lucha Contra Las Guerrillas* (Barcelona, Spain: Editorial Herder, 1965); Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War,"* 134-135; Charles Waterfall, "Trinquier and Galula: French Counterinsurgency Theories in the Algerian War and their Application to Modern Conflicts" (master's thesis, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008), 29-38; Seth Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2008), 9, 13, 106, Adobe PDF eBook; David Koch, interview by Robert Koch, 2014; Jason Michael Norton, "French-Algerian War and FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency: A Comparison" (master's thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2007).

²⁶ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 5, 16, 113-115.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 5-8, 16-19, 27.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

suspension of liberal democracy to the degree necessary to win the "unconditional support" of the nation.²⁹ He advocated methods for social control, including the "organization and control of the population, the creation of a broadly based intelligence service, and the establishment of an intelligence-action service," the counterinsurgents.³⁰ He argued that guerrillas were not entitled to the protections that the Geneva Convention granted enemy combatants because they operated outside of the laws of warfare. Trinquier prescribed torture to extract actionable intelligence expired from captured guerrillas before its usefulness, summary executions for armed guerrillas, and incarceration for those who were apprehended while unarmed.³¹ Trinquier noted that propaganda must convince the populace that the guerrilla is the antagonist, which, he argued, would isolate the guerrillas and force them into rural settings, where they would be exposed to the military's specially trained and numerically superior forces. He added that this also relocated the violence away from the eyes of the "sensitive public," which would weaken guerrilla propaganda efforts. According to the experienced French theorist, the military must control society, win the war of ideas, and act rapidly to completely "annihilate" their foes, or the insurgency would regroup in the shadows and resume their subversive campaign.³²

The transfer of FRCOIN theory to Argentina was rapid and thorough. This was due to the prominence of National Security Doctrine (NSD) thought in Western militaries during the Cold War, the Argentine military's synthesis of Trinquier's dichotomizing theory to their anti-Perón agenda, and the reinforcement of this idea from French experts in Argentina. NSD held that in an unstable world, internal dissidents were as dangerous as a conventional invasion and extreme

²⁹ Ibid., 8.

³⁰ Ibid., 44.

³¹ Ibid., 16-23.

³² Ibid., 48-49.

measures were justified against them in the name of national defense.³³ After the three Argentine officers trained under Trinquier reported on their experience and related it to Argentina's Peronist dilemma, the Argentine dictatorship requested a FRCOIN training mission, which the French established in Buenos Aires in 1957.³⁴ Argentina's top military journal, the *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra (RESG, Superior War School Review)*, shows the impact of FRCOIN theory. The first two French instructors in Argentina published articles in the journal in 1958 that condemned nationalist movements—which in the Argentine context must be recognized as Peronism—as a dangerous internal enemy.³⁵ The articles coincided with regional headlines about Fidel Castro's nationalist liberation movement in Cuba and the presence of Marxists in his retinue, which would have significant ramifications in the near future. The lessons French instructors imparted in Argentina about FRCOIN regularly appeared in the *RESG* for the next two and a half decades, including eight articles on the French and United States' experiences in Indochina and Vietnam, some of which filled entire issues.³⁶ Argentine officers published

³³ Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 74-78; David Engerman, "Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War," in *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War*, eds. David Engerman, David, et al (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 39; Gill, *The School of the Americas*, 61; Rabe, *Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 144; Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 34; Ariel Armony, *Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1997), 9; David Pion-Berlin, "The National Security Doctrine, Military Threat Perception, and the 'Dirty War' in Argentina," *Comparative Political Studies* 21, no. 3 (1988): 385; John W. Green, *A History of Political Murder in Latin America: Killing the Messengers of Change* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015), 134-135; David Sheinin, "Finding an Alliance: Rethinking Argentine-United States Cold War Relations," *MACLAS Latin American Essays* 16 (2002): 58.

³⁴ Carlson, "The Influence of French 'Revolutionary War'," 71.

³⁵ Patrice Naurois, "Una Teoría para La Guerra Subversiva," *Revista de le Escuela Superior de Guerra* 36, no. 329 (April-June 1958): 231-233; Patrice Naurois, "Guerra Subversiva y Guerra Revolucionaria," *Revista de le Escuela Superior de Guerra* 36, no. 331 (October-December 1958): 702; Robert Bentesque, "Acontecimientos de Laos," *Revista de le Escuela Superior de Guerra* 38, no. 339 (October-December 1960): 615.

³⁶ This is based on my archival research. I reviewed the *Revista de le Escuela Superior de Guerra* at the Argentine Army Library in Buenos Aires in 2018 and found several articles related to counterinsurgency in editions from each year starting in 1957 until 1982, including the following: Patrice Naurois, "Algunos Aspectas de la Estrategia y de la Táctica Aplicados por el Viet-Minh durante la Campaña de Indochina," *Revista de le Escuela Superior de Guerra* 36, no. 328 (February-March 1958): 97-128; Jean Nougues, "Características Generales de la Operaciones en Argelia," *Revista de le Escuela Superior de Guerra* 38, no. 337 (April-June 1960): 174-204; Bentesque, "Las Acontecimientos de Laos," 615-629; the entire January-February 1969 issue was dedicated to the First Indochina

numerous articles that synthesized Trinquier's theory into geopolitical analysis from the Argentine and Latin American perspective, including two by Mom, who trained with Trinquier in Algeria.³⁷ López Aufranc, also trained there, published an article on the theme of nationalist-Marxist conundrum as well.³⁸

Within less than a year of FRCOIN's introduction to Argentina, the regime created a counterinsurgent state. They allowed elections in 1958, but Peronism remained illegal. The new president, Arturo Frondizi (1908-1995), won with the help of an eleventh-hour endorsement from the exiled Perón. The military frequently challenged the new president's authority and shortly after the inauguration pressured him into signing FRCOIN principles into law in Plan *CONINTES* (*Conmoción Interna del Estado*), the "State Plan for Civil Unrest."³⁹ *CONINTES* activated Law 13.234, "Organization of the Nation for War Time," which partitioned the country into zones of control assigned to the three branches of the armed forces. Ironically, Perón established this law in 1948 over internal security concerns, though he never activated it.⁴⁰ Police organizations nationwide were subordinated to the armed forces in their respective zones to

War publication of Leopoldo Ornstein, *La Guerra de Indochina 1945-1954*, in *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* 47, no. 381 (January-February 1969); I. M. Jose L. Segade, "La Guerra en Vietnam," *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* 47, no. 384 (July-September 1969): 35-54; Edgardo B. Matute Bravo, "Algo Que No Se Debe Olvidar al Estudiar el Conflicto Franco-Indochino," *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* 47, no. 384 (July-September 1969): 99-127.

³⁷ Examples include: Miguel Ángel Montes, "Las Guerras del Futuro en la Era Atómica," *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* 35, no. 326 (July-September 1957): 374-393; Manrique Miguel Mom, "Guerra Revolucionaria: El Conflicto Mundial en Desarrollo," *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* 36, no. 331 (July-September 1958): 641-664; Manrique Miguel Mom, "Guerra Revolucionaria: Causas - Proceso - Desarrollo," *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* 37, no. 334 (July-September 1959): 489-515; Tomás A. Sánchez de Bustamonte, "La Guerra Revolucionaria," *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* 38, no. 338 (July-September 1960): 602-614.

³⁸ Alcides López Aufranc, "Guerra Revolucionaria en Argelia," *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* 37, no. 335 (October-December 1959): 611-648.

³⁹ Arturo Frondizi, "Decreto Secreto 9880/58," Buenos Aires, November 14, 1968; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 265-266; Deborah L. Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 31-35; Alain Rouquié, *The Military and the State in Latin America*, trans. Paul E. Sigmund (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 273; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 121.

⁴⁰ Juan Perón, Poder Ejecutivo, *Normas para la Organización de la Nación Para Tiempo de Guerra: Ley N° 13.234 del 1 de Septiembre de 1948, Tomo 8*, Anales de Legislación Nacional, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

ensure the unity of command that militaries rely on in war.⁴¹ Under *CONINTES*, state security forces interrogated over 2,000 civilian suspects, including the use of torture, and hauled them off to military courts.⁴² These steps aligned with Trinquier's counterinsurgency methods in the Battle of Algiers and his recommendations in *Modern Warfare*.⁴³ Peronists, who already lacked legal recourse, now risked becoming military targets.

Guerrilla movements based on the Cuban Revolution's example emerged in several Latin American states during the 1960s, but the first was the Peronist *Uturuncos* in 1959. While *CONINTES* was already in place, fifty *Uturuncos* tried to use the *foco* theory in a remote part of the Tucumán province. The Argentine revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara (1928-1967), Fidel Castro's Marxist lieutenant, developed the revolution's *foco* theory, which proposed that a small vanguard of revolutionary guerrillas could inspire a revolutionary will in any nation where capitalism was not working for the people.⁴⁴ However, the *Uturuncos* were poorly trained, failed to win local support, and were quickly apprehended by a state already stressing internal security.⁴⁵ Their ill-fated mission was alleged to have been ordered by a Peronist leader, John William Cooke, who had gone into exile in Cuba after Fidel Castro's national liberation movement took power in January 1959. Whether this was true was irrelevant because it aligned with the military's belief that Peronists could become radical leftist guerrillas.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Arturo Frondizi, Decreto 2628/60, Buenos Aires, March 13, 1960.

⁴² Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 12; Marchesi, *Latin America's Radical Left*, 27.

⁴³ Evans, "The 'Battle of Algiers' and its Aftermath: January," in *France's Undeclared War*, Adobe PDF eBook; Aussaresses, *Battle of the Casbah*, 71-73; Horne, *Savage War of Peace*, 183-207; Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 27-28, 69, 80.

⁴⁴ Ernesto Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare: Authorized Edition*, (1961; repr., Australia: Ocean Press, 2006), 13-14.

⁴⁵ Ramón G. Díaz Bessone, *Guerra Revolucionaria en la Argentina, 1959-1978* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Círculo Militar, 1988), 76; Miguel Etchecolatz, *La Otra Campana del Nunca Más* (Argentina: 1988), 47-48; Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 129; María José Moyano, *Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969-1979* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 21; Ernesto José Salas, *Uturuncos: Los Orígenes de la Guerrilla Peronista, 1959-1960* (Argentina: 2011), 1, 8-9, accessed March 10, 2020, <http://issuu.com/alejandrorojo/docs/uturuncos>.

⁴⁶ Osiris G. Villegas, *Guerra Revolucionaria Comunista* (1962; Repr., Buenos Aires: Bartolomé U. Chiesino, S.A., 1963), 68; Etchecolatz, *Otra Campana del Nunca Más*, 48; Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War,"* 95-96; Colonel (first

The Cuban Revolution's transition into a socialist state aligned with the Soviet Union in 1961 seemingly confirmed FRCOIN's warning that communists used nationalist movements as fronts to take power. Signs of this possibility first surfaced in 1958. As French instructors in Argentina warned about the dangers of nationalism, "Che" openly advocated forming a bloc of socialist Latin American states from within Castro's nationalist movement. After the success of the Cuban Revolution, Guevara enlisted the Argentine journalists Rodolfo Walsh and Jorge Masetti to found the *Prensa Latina* radio station in Havana, which broadcast revolutionary messages throughout the region.⁴⁷ Masetti had reported on the revolution in 1958 and joined it in the process. He was commissioned into the new Cuban army after the revolution, and deployed to Algeria with other Cuban revolutionaries to support the liberation struggle in 1959, two years after López Aufranc trained there with the French.⁴⁸ Cuba's revolutionary government grew increasingly at odds with the United States, and concerns that Castro might implement a socialist system became a reality after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961.⁴⁹ Argentine military leaders concluded that Cuba was a Soviet-proxy aiding subversion in Argentina, where class violence, often with nationalist tones from the Peronist movement, had risen after the revolution.⁵⁰ For the military's liberal leadership, configuring Peronism as a vehicle for global communism put two bogeymen in the same room, and they henceforth saw domestic and world politics through an "Argentinized" FRCOIN filter.

name unknown) Lorenzo, interview by Patricia Marchak, in Patricia Marchak, *God's Assassins: State Terrorism in Argentina in the 1970s* (London, UK: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 268.

⁴⁷ Ernesto "Che" Guevara, interview by Jorge Masetti, in *Awakening of Latin America*, 198-199; Jorge Ricardo Masetti, *Los Que Luchan y Los Que Lloran: El Fidel Castro Que Yo Ví* (Buenos Aires: Freedland, 1958).

⁴⁸ Rodolfo Walsh, "Prólogo," in Masetti, *Los Que Luchan y Los Que Lloran*, 15-16.

⁴⁹ Fidel Castro, "May Day Celebration: Cuba is a Socialist Nation," (speech, Havana, Cuba, May 1, 1961).

⁵⁰ Carina Perelli, "From Counterrevolutionary Warfare to Political Awakening: The Uruguayan and Argentine Armed Forces in the 1970s," *Armed Forces & Society* 20, no. 1 (1993): 30; Pion-Berlin, "National Security Doctrine," 388; Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War,"* 95-96.

One of the Argentine military's responses to Cuba's geopolitical realignment 1961 was to go from students of FRCOIN to regional proponents. Liberal military leaders organized the *Curso Interamericano de Guerra Contrarrevolucionaria*, Inter-American Course on Counterrevolutionary War, in October 1961, which forty officials from fourteen American countries participated in, including United States and Central American personnel.⁵¹ López Aufranc ran the course, approved the curriculum, and was promoted for his work. Colonels Robert Bentresque and Jean Nougès, the two French instructors stationed in Argentina at the time, led the training. They also published *RESG* articles that emphasized how valuable military intelligence was in the internal struggle.⁵² The liberal General Alejandro Lanusse, director of the *Escuela Superior de Guerra* (ESG, Superior War School director) at the time and dictator from 1971 to 1973, taught a course on Marxist methods for international expansion.⁵³ He told attendees that a new form of warfare—"internal warfare"—would be fought "without concern for the means, or scruples, or ethical principles," which echoed Trinquier's warning about the "unscrupulous" enemy in *Modern Warfare*, which was a primary text at the course.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Alcides López Aufranc, interview by Robert Potash, Buenos Aires, March 23, 1977, Robert A. Potash Papers, 1930-1991, [University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries Special Collections and University Archives](http://www.digitalcommonwealth.org/collections/commonwealth-oi:z603r9195), accessed March 11, 2020, <http://www.digitalcommonwealth.org/collections/commonwealth-oi:z603r9195>; Daniel Mazzei, "La Misión Militar Francesa en la Escuela Superior de Guerra y los Orígenes de la Guerra Sucia," *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* 13 (December 2002): 105-137; Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 143; Antonius C. G. Robben, *Political Violence and Trauma in Argentina* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 181-182; Julio Lisandro Cañón Voirin, "La Guerra Revolucionaria en la Perspectiva de las FF.AA. Argentina," *Revista Electrónica de la Asociación Española de Americanistas* 9 (2012): 8; Felipe Pigna, "Los Profesores Franceses de los Represores Argentinos," *El Historiador* online, 2015; "Anti-Guerrillas in Argentina," *Hays Daily News*, April 11, 1962, accessed March 13, 2017. This is a theme that I am continuing to develop with Daniel Mazzei in Argentina. Unfortunately, little documentation exists.

⁵² Horacio Verbitsky, *La Violencia Evangélica: de Leonardi al Cordobazo (1955-1969)* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Sudamericana, 2008), 127-128; Pigna, "Profesores Franceses," *El Historiador* online, 2015; López Aufranc, interview by Robin, in "Escuadrones de la Muerte"; Nougès, "Características Generales de la Operaciones en Argelia," 174-204; Bentresque, "Las Acontecimientos de Laos," 615-629.

⁵³ Mazzei, "Misión Militar Francesa," 130-131; US Central Intelligence Agency, *Argentina: Lanusse's Gambit*, Weekly Summary Special Report, December 10, 1971; Lanusse, *Confesiones de un General*, 38.

⁵⁴ Horacio Verbitsky, "Breaking the Silence: The Catholic Church in Argentina and in the 'Dirty War'," *Open Democracy*, July 28, 2005; Pigna, "Profesores Franceses," *El Historiador* online; Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 113-115; Neil MacMaster, "From Algeria to Abu Ghraib," *Race & Class* 46, no. 2 (2004): 8.

FRCOIN specialists in Argentina continued to advance the nationalist-Marxist conflation after the counterrevolutionary war course. Nougùès published an *RESG* article on the theme:

In Argentina, the social group most receptive to Marxist theories is limited to the intellectuals... their small numbers do reduce their capacity... After enlisting the masses under a nationalist flag, they can, more or less progressively, divert the movement towards Castroism, popular democracy and communism... a "Trojan horse" for communist penetration in Argentina.⁵⁵

The liberal Argentine General Osiris Villegas published *Guerra Comunista Revolucionaria* (*Communist Revolutionary War*), which suggested that nationalism led by a "profound tyrant," as liberals dubbed Perón, would eventually give way to communism.⁵⁶ He argued that Cuba's national liberation movement created a communist foothold in Latin America, and that communism was establishing similar footholds in decolonizing nations in Africa and the Middle East.⁵⁷ By this time, Algeria had achieved its independence and was a focal point for national liberation struggles in both regions, which also confirmed Perón's 1951 prediction that revolution stirrings would enter Africa via the Arab world.⁵⁸ Villegas was appointed Minister of the Interior shortly after publication. Carlos von der Becke, a military historian who had worked with Perón since the 1910s, wrote in the prologue that the war to prevent Soviet world domination had begun.⁵⁹ In early 1963, a classified military bulletin warned: "the army and its commanders must prepare to resist the psychological impact that will result from the presence of *Justicialist* tendency in a significant number of legislators... if we want to avoid seeing a large part of the

⁵⁵ Jean Félix Nougùès, "Radioscopia Subversiva en la Argentina," *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* 40, no. 344 (January-March 1962): 28-32.

⁵⁶ Villegas, *Guerra Revolucionaria Comunista*, 23; Mazzei, "Misión Militar Francesa," 28.

⁵⁷ Villegas, *Guerra Revolucionaria Comunista*, 68.

⁵⁸ DJNONOR ALGIERS, "Algiers Mecca of the Revolutionaries" (documentary), directed by Philip Sheppard, accessed March 1, 2020, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnNI9GXExr4>; Juan Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *Descartes*, 95-97.

⁵⁹ Dirección del Círculo Militar, "Prologue to 1962 edition," in Villegas, *Guerra Revolucionaria Comunista*, 9; Carlos Von Der Becke, "Prologue to 1963 edition," in *ibid.*, 15.

Justicialistas shift leftward toward Communism."⁶⁰ In this sense, nationalism was not only seen as a front that communists manipulated but as a set of ideas that led to communism.

The military was correct that their system was under assault. In 1962, Masetti, the journalist-turned-revolutionary who fought in Cuba and Algeria, infiltrated into Argentina with thirty guerrillas. He had orders from Guevara to create a *foco* in the Andes, as part of a plan to catalyze a widespread Latin American revolution. In early 1963, locals reported the guerrilla presence to authorities, and a counterinsurgency campaign called "*Operación Santa Rosa*" annihilated Masetti's *Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo* (People's Guerrilla Army).⁶¹ As has happened with the first *foco*, strict state security measures prevailed, but in 1966, the military once again decided to take direct political control.

General Juan Carlos Onganía seized power through the *Revolución Argentina*, which was the name he gave the 1966 coup. He emphasized internal security, is seen in a speech he gave at West Point in 1964, which Villegas partially drafted, that said the military must ensure "internal peace" and defend national tradition against "international communism."⁶² The new dictator promised to maintain order by mixing an "authoritarian shock treatment" with socioeconomic compromises. He gave economic policy control to liberals, ran a police state, and pushed

⁶⁰ Benjamín Rattenbach, "Boletín Militar Reservado del Ejército, 1963," in Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1963-1972*, 79.

⁶¹ Dosal, *Comandante Che*, 196-197; Walsh, "Prólogo," 15-16; Moyano, *Argentina's Lost Patrol*, 21-22; Rogelio Alaniz, "El Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo," *El Litoral* (Santa Fe, Argentina), October 23, 2013; Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 38; Luis Borelli, "El fin del 'Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo'," *El Tribuno* (Salta, Argentina), May 25, 2014; Bessone, *Guerra Revolucionaria en la Argentina*, 76-77; Lorenzo, interview by Marchak, in Marchak, *God's Assassins*, 268; Federico Carrizo and Gabriela Sánchez, "El Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo - Salta, 1963-1964. La Vanguardia del Che en Argentina," Universidad Nacional de Salta, accessed March 17, 2017, http://hblog.nuevaradio.org/b2-img/historia_egp.pdf; Luis Borelli, "La Guerrilla en Orán de 1964 (Primera Parte)," Informador Regional Online, San Pedro de Jujuy, Argentina, May 4, 2014, accessed March 17, 2017, <http://www.informadorregional.com.ar/index.php/nacio-intern/3074-la-guerrilla-en-oran-de-1964-primera-parte>.

⁶² Juan Carlos Onganía, "Hemispheric Security" (speech at the Fifth Conference of the American Armies, West Point Military Academy, West Point, NY, August 6, 1964); Michael Goebel, *Argentina's Partisan Past: Nationalism and the Politics of History* (Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 147.

conservative Catholicism in his campaign to "modernize" Argentina.⁶³ Within a month of seizing power, Onganía ordered the "Night of the Long Batons," a brutal crackdown on Argentina's autonomous university system that the military considered a haven for radical ideas. His forces killed one and injured dozens, which alienated many intellectuals, and contributed to radicalization in leftist organizations, especially at universities.⁶⁴

Onganía tapped the liberals who ran Argentina's 1961 FRCOIN course for influential positions. He appointed Lanusse Commander-in-Chief of the Army in 1968 and made López Aufranc the army's chief operations officer.⁶⁵ Lanusse expanded the state's counterinsurgency apparatus in a series of military manuals. In 1968, *Operaciones Sicológicas (Psychological Operations)* outlined a continuous propaganda campaign that used "face to face talks, print, radio, television, movies, and other media," and targeted the civilian sector, military conscripts, and subversives.⁶⁶ In 1969, Lanusse issued *Operaciones Contra La Subversión Urbana (Operations Against Urban Subversion)*, which provided detailed instructions on social control, including violent crowd control techniques.⁶⁷ In 1970, he approved the three-volume *Operaciones Contra Fuerzas Irregulares (Operations Against Irregular Forces)*, which was mostly a copy of a US Special Forces manual that was published after the Cuban Revolution that was informed by FRCOIN.⁶⁸ Onganía's liberal FRCOIN experts strengthened the

⁶³ Craig L. Arceneaux, *Bounded Missions: Military Regimes and Democratization in the Southern Cone and Brazil* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 31-40; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 173-176; O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*, 58-69.

⁶⁴ Moyano, *Argentina's Lost Patrol*, 18-20; Gillespie, *Soldiers of Perón*, 63; Valeria Manzano, *The Age of Youth in Argentina: Culture, Politics, and Sexuality from Perón to Videla* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 64-65.

⁶⁵ López Aufranc became director of the *Colegio Militar* in 1966 and Operations Officer in the Army Chiefs of Staff in 1968. Military Service Record, Alcides López Aufranc, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires.

⁶⁶ Ejército Argentino, *RC 5-2: Operaciones Sicológicas*, ed. Alejandro Lanusse (Buenos Aires: Boletín Público del Ejército, 1968), 37-47.

⁶⁷ Ejército Argentino, *RC-8-3: Operaciones Contra La Subversión Urbana*, ed. Alejandro Lanusse (Buenos Aires: Instituto Geográfico Militar, 1969), 37-39.

⁶⁸ Ejército Argentino, *RC-8-2: Operaciones Contra Fuerzas Irregulares*, ed. Alejandro Lanusse (Buenos Aires: Instituto Geográfico Militar, 1970); US Army. *FM 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces* (Washington, D.C.:

counterinsurgency apparatus to oppose Peronism, but he would fail to achieve the primary goal of the French military's theory: to win popular support.

Perón on Imperialist Ploys, Radicalization, and the Third Position in the 1960s

Perón arrived in Spain in 1960, where he spent the next decade analyzing decolonization struggles, upheaval in Latin America and abroad, the introduction of international programs that he considered imperialist ploys for dominance, and a growing rejection of bipolar politics. Seventeen African states achieved independence in 1960, while ten more continued to fight, including Algeria, which finally prevailed against the French in 1962.⁶⁹ In December 1960, the United Nations (UN) issued the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" to condemn wars waged to prevent decolonization as a "serious threat to world peace," which reflected the widespread fear that they could escalate into major conflicts due to Cold War tensions.⁷⁰ These struggles often had ideological components, and after decades of sluggish development in the Western order, some colonized nations adopted socialist governments and severed relations with the former metropole.⁷¹ However, the socialist

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1961); By 1961, Vietnam War correspondent/historian/journalist Bernard Fall was working with the US Government in relation to the French experience in Indochina, among other figures, including Paul Aussaresses, *Battle of the Casbah*, 167.

⁶⁹ Mark Philip Bradley, "Decolonization, the Global South, and the Cold War, 1919-1962," in *The Cold War: Volume I - Origins*, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (New York, NY: The University of Cambridge Press, 2010), 464.

⁷⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960, accessed January 30, 2020, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Independence.aspx>.

⁷¹ Nicholas Tarling, *Nationalism in Southeast Asia: If the People are with Us* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), 6; Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 3-4; Dietmar Rothermund, *The Routledge Companion to Decolonization* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 41-45; Edward E. Rice, *Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 66; Teresa A. Meade, *A History of Modern Latin America: 1800 to the Present* (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2011), 350-351; Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 178; Arthur Cotterell, *Western Power in Asia: Its Slow Rise and Swift Fall, 1415-1999* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 271-274; Yinghong Cheng, *Creating the "New Man": From Enlightenment Ideals to Socialist Realities* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009), 46-47; Barbara Bush, *Imperialism, Race and Resistance Africa and Britain, 1919-1945* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001), xi-xiii; Robert J. C. Young,

governments that formed in the postwar era usually did not firmly align with the Soviet Union, and the widening of the Sino-Soviet Split in the 1960s further revealed the myth of communist order solidarity. The 1961 consolidation of the NAM at the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries further complicated matters, in part because it was hosted by Yugoslavia, a socialist state that had maintained autonomy since the 1940s.

The UN declaration also overlapped with Perón's ideas, in particular to the notion that national sovereignty and self-determination were universal rights, which he addressed in a globally broadcasted speech in 1947.⁷² It indirectly related to a dissatisfaction that decades of Latin American nationalists and anti-imperialists discussed regarding the bonds of neocolonial structures.⁷³ However, the UN declaration did not address semi-colonialism, though the Cuba Revolution did, and this significantly impacted the Western Hemisphere. As the leader of the "free world" and the hemisphere's undisputed power, the United States' newly-elected President John F. Kennedy (1917-1963) announced the "Alliance for Progress" (AFP) in response to the Cuban Revolution's pro-Soviet re-alignment in 1961. Scholars note that Washington feared that the revolution, which brimmed with anti-imperialist sentiment, would inspire further revolutionary politics in Latin America. The president envisioned the AFP as a "Marshall Plan"

"Socialism and Nationalism," in *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2016), Adobe PDF eBook; Robert J. C. "Marxism and the National Liberation Movements," in *ibid.*

⁷² United Nations, *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Independence.aspx>; Perón, *Por la Cooperación Económica y la Paz Mundial*, 5-15; Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *Descartes*, 95-97; Juan Perón, "Lucha Contra los Pueblos, Julio 31, 1952," in *ibid.*, 197-199.

⁷³ Harry E. Vanden "Imperialism," in *José Carlos Mariátegui: An Anthology*, ed. Harry E. Vanden (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2011), Adobe PDF eBook; Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 117-119; Jairo Agudelo Taborda, *Debates sobre Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo* (Bogotá, Colombia: Escuela Latinoamericana de Cooperación y Desarrollo, 2012), 22-23; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 50-52; Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 3-4; James E. Cronin, "When Progressives Were On The March: The Postwar Era's Lessons for the Left," *Foreign Affairs* 99, no. 1, (January-February 2020): 169; Rothermund, *Routledge Companion to Decolonization*, 270-271; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 39-40; Rice, *Wars of the Third Kind*, 66; Meade, *History of Modern Latin America*, 350-351; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 247-248; Young, "National Liberation Movements," in *Postcolonialism*, Adobe PDF eBook; Young "Marxism and the National Liberation Movements," in *ibid.*

for the region that would provide funds to foster development and ensure political stability as the region experienced the associated social strains.⁷⁴ Kennedy's pledge coincided with the rise of "Modernization Theory," and he empowered the theory's chief proponent, sociologist Walt W. Rostow, to oversee plans for development in Latin America. Modernization Theory espoused a relatively static prescription for growth based on a stage-based process for economic development that hinged on "free trade" and other liberal premises. It was modeled after a flawed understanding of United State's economic rise that overlooked its use of protectionist policies during its development and the unique circumstances that every country faced.⁷⁵

Perón published an open letter to Kennedy in July 1961, which predicted that the AFP would have negative repercussions. The Argentine did not criticize the president, who was well-liked in Latin America, but called his program a mechanism to keep the region bound to the capitalist order in a peripheral role against the popular will. Perón believed the money that the AFP offered would tempt "sinister characters" to make exaggerated claims about communist advances and that local facilitators—the military—would use this to stifle change and the rise of the "Third Position." The Argentine argued that objections to this new geopolitical configuration motivated his enemies to overthrow him in 1955 and cited the *CONINTES* plan as an example of the praetorian methods local militaries use to resist such change.⁷⁶ He criticized the increased support for Frondizi's puppet administration as an example of how capitalism "wins governments," while ignoring the people of Latin America, a concept he first introduced in his writings during the early 1950s.⁷⁷ Perón wrote that the military arm of the AFP could not prevent

⁷⁴ Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 5; Rabe, *Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 1-3; Grandin, *Empire's Workshop*, 46-49.

⁷⁵ Rabe, *Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 25-28; Lars Schoultz, *In Their Own Best Interest: A History of the U.S. Effort to Improve Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 200-206; Engerman, *Staging Growth*, 3-11; Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 8-9.

⁷⁶ Perón, letter to Mr. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, July 1961.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*; Perón, "Política y Estrategia, Marzo 1, 1951" in *Descartes*, 15-16; Perón, "Solidaridad Continental, Abril

the coming of the "Hour of the Peoples," but he suggested Kennedy could affect how these changes would manifest if he redirected aid programs to address the social imbalances that led people to consider communism as an alternative.⁷⁸ In this sense, the change that Perón saw coming in "Hour of the Peoples" was unstoppable, but wise policies could steer the nature of this change away from Marxist models.

However, the prospect of development and financial aid the United States promised were convincing. Every member of the Organization of American States signed onto the AFP at the Punta del Este Conference on August 17, 1961, except Cuba, whose membership was soon revoked at the behest of the United States.⁷⁹ Scholars argue that aid money flooded in the region with little oversight on how it was spent so long as free-trade guidelines were followed. They also argue that as a result, the AFP was mostly a failure and that it incentivized dictatorship, as Perón had predicted before the program started.⁸⁰ A wave of dictatorships rose to power during the 1960s: Argentina (1966–1973), Bolivia (1964–1970), Brazil (1964–1985), Ecuador (1963–1966), Guatemala (1963–1966), Honduras (1963–1966), Panama (1968–1989), and Peru (1968–1980). The rise in dictatorships in Latin America during the 1960s was also related to the synthesis of existing National Security Doctrine concerns and the region-wide introduction of FRCOIN theory, and the course on the latter in Buenos Aires mentioned earlier was only the beginning. Kennedy pushed for a counterinsurgency doctrine and dedicated the Special Forces to this mission.⁸¹ Though FRCOIN article appeared in a United States military journal as early as

26, 1951" in *ibid.*, 32-33.

⁷⁸ Perón, letter to Mr. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, July 1961; Perón, "Sindicalismo en la Política Internacional, Agosto 9, 1951" in *Descartes*, 68-70; Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *ibid.*, 95-97.

⁷⁹ US State Department, *Charter of Punta del Este: Establishing the Alliance for Progress within the Framework of Operation Pan America*, The Department of State Bulletin, V. 45, July-Sept. 1961, accessed February 1, 2020, <http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015077198953&view=1up&seq=463>.

⁸⁰ Rabe, *Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 1-3; Grandin, *Empire's Workshop*, 46-49; Schoultz, *In Their Own Best Interests*, 216-271.

⁸¹ McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, 161-178.

1957, it did not make headway until the president became its advocate.⁸² Experts linked to Roger Trinquier, such as his primary executioner in the Battle of Algiers, Paul Aussaresses, facilitated the doctrinal shift in the US Special Operations community.⁸³ Special Forces soldiers then spread the doctrine to Latin American militaries in "mobile training teams" deployed throughout the region and at the School of the Americas in Panama.⁸⁴ Even Rostow, Kennedy's Modernization Theory guru, linked his theory to FRCOIN at speeches and in military journals.⁸⁵ The AFP's military component amplified the dichotomizing message of FRCOIN and influenced the wave of dictatorships that rose in Latin America predicated on a "red scare" response.

In 1962, the Argentine military ousted President Frondizi, who had been mainly compliant, on the basis that he was friendly with the left and inadequately confronted the Peronist threat.⁸⁶ By 1963, aid to Argentina increased tenfold under the AFP despite the coup, which was an early challenge to Washington's claims that the program would help protect democracy.⁸⁷ As numerous *focos* emerged in Latin America, this coup was also a reminder of the narrow political parameters military leaders in Argentina were willing to accept. In response to this, left-wing Argentine social scientists of various ideological affiliations banded together to

⁸² André Souyris, "An Effective Counter guerrilla Procedure," *Military Review* 36, no. 12 (March 1957): 86-90.

⁸³ Aussaresses, *Battle of the Casbah*, 20-26, 41-42, 167; Horne, *Savage War of Peace*, 201-202; Emily Langer, "Paul Aussaresses Dies at 95; French General Defended His Use of Torture Techniques," *Washington Post*, December 4, 2013; J. Patrice McSherry, "What Was Operation Condor?," in *Predatory State: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), Adobe PDF eBook; Paul Aussaresses, interview by Patrick Rotman, in "Algeria: The Intimate Enemy - Violences in the War of Algeria" (video documentary), directed by Patrick Rotman, accessed February 1, 2020, http://archive.org/details/Algeria_d; Commandant of the US Army School of the Americas, *Adelante: US Army School of the Americas, 1946-2000* (Fort Benning, GA: US Army School of the Americas, 2000), 12.

⁸⁴ Gill, *School of the Americas*, 8-9, 49, 75, 85; Rabe, *Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 130-131; Grandin, *Empire's Workshop*, 95-97; McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, 187-188; Gregory Weeks, "Fighting the Enemy Within: Terrorism, the School of the Americas, and the Military in Latin America," *Human Rights Review* 5, no. 1, (Oct-Dec 2003): 16-18.

⁸⁵ Walt W. Rostow, "Countering Guerrilla Attack," *Army* 12, (September 1961): 53-57; Walt W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Countries," *Marine Corps Gazette* 46 (January 1962): 46-49; Walt Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas," *The Department of State Bulletin* 45, no. 1154 (August 7, 1961): 233-238.

⁸⁶ López Aufranc, interview by Potash, March 23, 1977; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 314; Hedges, *Argentina*, 180-181; Goebel, *Argentina's Partisan Past*, 130.

⁸⁷ US Aid, *US Overseas Loans and Grants*, <http://explorer.usaid.gov/>.

produce the *Journal of Liberation (Revista de la Liberación)*. In the first issue, published in early 1963, the editor Domingo Arranz, a Trotskyist, invited collaboration from all "leftists intellectuals and militant politicians" involved in the "fraternal" mission against imperialism. The editor argued that it fell to Argentina's "anti-imperialist working class" to liberate the nation after the post-Perón leaders restored the country's semi-colonial role in the capitalist order.⁸⁸ Two articles in the first issue espoused various degrees of state-guided industrialization along the lines Perón engaged in during his administrations, which they argued would overcome the "economic submission" that turned Latin American states into colonies in the United States' economic empire.⁸⁹

The second issue confronted false democracy in Argentina and linked the national plight to anti-imperialist movements around the world. Articles lambasted Argentina's 1963 election as a "grotesque farce" because the military had once again proscribed Perón and Peronism.⁹⁰ It featured an interview with Norberto Jose Vázquez, a prominent Peronist union leader linked to the youth workers' movement. Like Perón, he said the United States disguised its attempts to "brake the revolutionary process" with terms like the "alliance for progress" and the "defense of the Christian Occident" against communism. He argued that "popular social structures" like Peronism were not atheist or communist threats because they reflected Christian social values. He noted that frustrated "African countries, Arab countries, Asian countries, and in America, Cuba," have all turned to "*socialismo nacional*" (national socialism, not to be confused with Nazism) to liberate themselves from "imperialist slavery" and reform their social orders.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Domingo Arranz, "Argentina en la Crisis de Capitalismo," *Revista de la Liberación* 1 (First Trimester 1963): 7.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 4; Carlos Astrada, "Penetración Imperialista y Cambio Social," *Revista de la Liberación* 1 (First Trimester 1963): 3.

⁹⁰ Domingo Arranz, "Qué Solución las Elecciones?," *Revista de la Liberación* 2 (Second Trimester 1963): 3-4, 44-45; Editor, "No Hay Salida Electoral: Editorial," *ibid.*, 5.

⁹¹ Norberto Jose Vázquez, "Opinion Los Dirigentes Gremiales," *ibid.*, 6-7.

Several additional articles discussed the international upheaval around the world, including essays from noted anti-imperialists like Jean-Paul Sartre, Frantz Fanon, Mao Tse-Tung, and Fidel Castro.⁹²

The *Journal of Liberation* featured many sociological studies that were influenced by Dependency Theory, in which left-wing social scientists from around the world argued that Modernization Theory was flawed.⁹³ This school of thought was not monolithic, but the consensus was that the nature of capitalist economic relationships between core and peripheral nations hindered development in the latter. The theorists argued that the exportation of raw materials from developing nations to industrialized centers resulted in trade deficits that stifled growth and innovation in the periphery. Periphery nations could buy new equipment from the core nations, which deepened existing deficits, or lose the ability to compete in the global market. The theory held that "enclaves," locals who facilitated the extraction of raw materials in developing nations, reinforced these neo-colonial structures to the detriment of the developing nations. In the broader scope, Dependency Theory held that these structural obstacles prevented developing nations from finding success by following Modernization Theory, which led to a conclusion that growth would only be possible if these structures were eliminated.⁹⁴ In Perón's

⁹² Jean-Paul Sartre, "Prólogo al Libro de Frantz Fanon 'Los Condenados de la Tierra,'" *ibid.*, 18; Victor Testa, "El Imperialismo Impide la Industrialización de los Países Atrasados," *ibid.*, 33-39; Raul Anibal Pannunzio, "La Alienación Política de las Izquierdas," *ibid.*, 40-45; Fidel Castro, "La Amenaza Imperialista Permanece: Discurso a las Mujeres de América," *ibid.*, 49-51; Luis Franco, "Ayuda Para el Subdesarrollo," in *ibid.*, 30-32; Editor, "Perspectiva Política del País," *Revista de la Liberación* 3, (First Trimester 1964): 3-5; Mao Tse Tung, "Declaración de Mao Tse Tung en Relación al Conflicto Panameño," *ibid.*, 6.

⁹³ Astrada, "Penetración Imperialista y Cambio Social," 3; Testa, "El Imperialismo Impide la Industrialización de los Países Atrasados," 33-39; Sebastián Herrera, "Carta y Respuesta sobre el Carácter de la Revolución," *Revista de la Liberación* 3 (First Trimester 1964): 9-11.

⁹⁴ Raúl Prebisch, "The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems" (essay presented to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, Lake Success, NY, 1950), 1-6; Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina: Ensayo de Interpretación Sociológica* (Lima, Peru: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1967), 1-10; Fernando Cardoso and José Luis Reyna, *Industrialización, Estructura Ocupacional y Estratificación Social en América Latina* (Lima, Peru: Centro de Estudiantes de Sociología, Universidad Nacional de San Marcos, 1966), 1-7; Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil* (New York, NY:

perspective, the "enclaves" and "structures" preventing development in Argentina and Latin America included the oligarchy, their military enforcers, and the political, military, and economic influences of imperialism.

The collaboration of Marxists and nationalists in *Journal of Liberation* revealed the radicalization of the left taking place at the intellectual level in Argentina. Though FRCOIN characterized nationalist anti-imperialism as a ploy in a global communist plot, shared desires to overcome imperialist and the collaboration it engendered, whether intellectual, tactical, or strategic, did not dissolve the differences among the various Marxists and nationalists groups. Guevarists, Maoists, Trotskyites, the orthodox Communist Party, and the nationalist left were not united. In particular, the orthodox Communist Party in Latin America followed instructions from Moscow to disavow the armed struggle, which conflicted with the revolutionary messages and missions emanating from Cuba.⁹⁵ Regarding nationalism, Perón considered Argentina an example of how nationalist policies could garner wider support than Marxism as a superior doctrine, as he had argued since the 1940s.⁹⁶ Despite his enduring exile, Peronism was easily the dominant leftist faction in Argentina and maintained a broad base of popular support.

Monthly Review Press, 1969), xi; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 293; Cristóbal Kay, *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), 13-15; Jorge Larrain, *Identity and Modernity in Latin America* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2005), 123-125; Saldaña-Portillo, *Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas*, 47-59, 103-4; Ricardo Cinto, "Reviewed Work(s): Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina, Ensayo de Interpretación Sociológica by Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto," *Demografía y Economía* 4, no. 2 (1970): 251-253.

⁹⁵ Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 302; US Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Policies and Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, SNIE 11/80/90-82, June 25, 1982, CIA Reading Room; Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 373.

⁹⁶ Juan Perón, "Significado de la Defensa Nacional desde el Punto de Vista Militar" (speech, Universidad Nacional de la Plata, Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 10, 1944), Archivo Peronista, accessed March 12, 2020, <http://archivoperonista.com/discursos/juan-domingo-peron/1944/palabras-en-conferencia-sobre-significado-defensa-nacional-desde/>; Juan Perón, "Discurso en la Bolsa de Comercio" (speech, Bolsa de Comercio, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 25, 1944), Archivo Peronista, accessed March 12, 2020, <http://archivoperonista.com/discursos/juan-domingo-peron/1944/discurso-en-bolsa-comercio/>; Juan Perón, "Esta Nueva Arma Secreta," (press conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina, September 21, 1947), in "Tercera Posición y Unidad Latinoamericana," ed. Fermín Chávez, 1984, 5-6, La Baldrich Digital Archive, accessed March 2, 2020, <http://www.labaldrich.com.ar/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Escritos-sobre-Tercera-posici%C3%B3n-y-Unidad-Latinoamericana-de-Juan-Domingo-Per%C3%B3n.pdf>.

Through continued correspondence with his movement, Perón also knew the Peronist labor movement was radicalizing. An example was a militant labor group that formed in 1963 under the leadership of John William Cooke, the *Movimiento Revolucionario Peronista* (MRP, Peronist Revolutionary Movement).⁹⁷ Headlines from their newspaper *Compañero* linked Argentina to a global struggle against imperialism (see figures 5.1-5.10).⁹⁸ In their August 1964 manifesto, they likened themselves to *montoneras gauchas*, cowboy militias that fought against liberals in Argentina's nineteenth-century civil wars. They advocated the inclusion of all races in Latin American society, Argentina's participation in the "universal" struggle against imperialism and colonialism, and a fight to the death for Perón's return.⁹⁹ The *Journal of Liberation* and the MRP demonstrated that the anti-imperialist movement Perón envisioned in the 1950s was gaining momentum in Argentina, as it was throughout the region.¹⁰⁰

Dissatisfaction with Argentina's political situation increased at the end of 1964. Perón declared he would return to Argentina, but the new President, Arturo Illía (1900-1983), publicly forbade this.¹⁰¹ Illía was a civilian collaborator in the 1955 coup against Perón, but as president, he was working slowly toward legalizing the Peronist party in a "Peronism without Perón"

⁹⁷ Marchesi, *Latin America's Radical Left*, 81.

⁹⁸ "No Hay Elección!" *Compañero*, June 7, 1963; "Laos: Otra Pesadilla Yanqui en el Sudeste Asiático," *Compañero*, May 5, 1964; "Vietnam: Tumba de Imperialismo Yanqui," *Compañero*, May 12, 1964; "La Revolución LatinoAmericano," *Compañero*, May 19, 1964; "Robar Todo, Quemar Todo, Matar Todo," Síntesis de la Nueva Política Yanqui, *Compañero*, June 2, 1964; "Estará Entre Estos el Castelo Branco Argentino?" *Compañero*, June 9, 1964; "Guerra al Regimen!" *Compañero*, August 11, 1964; "Criminal Agresión Yanqui a Vietnam," *Compañero*, August 11, 1964; "MRP: Regreso Incondicional de Perón: 'Organizar el Ejército Popular para la Lucha,'" *Compañero*, August 11, 1964; "En Argentina Se Quiere Instalar un Aparato Militar Yanquie para Reprimir al Pueblo," *Compañero*, August 11, 1964.

⁹⁹ Movimiento Revolucionario Peronista, "Declaración del Plenario del Movimiento," August 5, 1964, accessed February 5, 2020, Archive.org.

¹⁰⁰ Perón, "Estrategia, Febrero 8, 1951," in *Descartes*, 9-10; Perón, "Política y Estrategia, Marzo 1, 1951" in *ibid.*, 15-16; Perón, "Conducción Política y de Guerra, Agosto 2, 1951" in *ibid.*, 65-67; Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *ibid.*, 95-97; Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in *ibid.*, 133-135.

¹⁰¹ "Peron Plans to Return To Argentina This Year," *New York Times*, July 15, 1964; Jules Dubois, "Peron Will Not Return, Illia Insists," *Chicago Tribune*, September 14, 1964.

format.¹⁰² In December, Perón's return to Argentina was thwarted during his passage through Brazil, where the recently installed, Washington-backed military dictatorship intercepted him and sent him back to Spain. Like the liberals who dominated Argentina's military and politics, the Brazilian dictatorship subscribed to both the National Security Doctrine and FRCOIN.¹⁰³ In response, Argentine unions engaged in weeks of strikes.¹⁰⁴ Perón addressed the topic shortly thereafter in an anonymously published book called *Coloquios con Perón (Conversations with Perón)*. He conceded that his attempted return was perhaps premature, but argued that it had reasserted his presence into Argentine politics as the military connived to appease labor while it actually gave little ground.¹⁰⁵

Coloquios also revealed Perón's thoughts on Latin America's current relationship with the United States. He pointed out how local militaries stifled democratic efforts toward social progress throughout the region and cited the military aid provided under the AFP as a reason. He said Washington's participation in Latin American coups was an "open secret," just as seen in the series of dictatorships it backed in South Vietnam. He said that this started after Pentagon officials led AFP-related talks about "continental defense" with Latin American military leaders that turned the region's dictators into President Johnson's "viceroys" and their troops occupation armies. He used the term viceroy to link Latin America's current struggles against imperialism to

¹⁰² Dubois, "Peron Will Not Return, Illia Insists," *Chicago Tribune*, September 14, 1964.

¹⁰³ "Brazil Sends Peron Back to Spain," *Chicago Tribune*, December 3, 1964; "1964: 'Peron Stopped in Brazil,'" *New York Herald Tribune*, December 3, 1964; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 56; Joao Martins Filho, "Military ties between France and Brazil during the Cold War, 1959-1975," *Latin American Perspectives* 41, no. 5 (September 2014): 167; Ruth Blakely, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 94; Brian Loveman, *For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 37, Adobe PDF eBook; Garrard-Burnett, Virginia, et al, eds., *Beyond the Eagle's Shadow* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013), 151; Thomas Skidmore, "Origins of the 1964 Revolution" in *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1990), Adobe PDF eBook.

¹⁰⁴ "Brief Strikes in Argentina," *New York Times*, December 4, 1964; "Violence Erupts in Strike By Peronists in Argentina," *New York Times*, December 18, 1964.

¹⁰⁵ Juan Perón, interview by Enrique Pavón Pereyra, in Juan Perón and Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Coloquios con Perón* (Madrid, Spain: Editores Internacionales Técnicos Reunidos, 1973), 223-224.

its colonial past. He cited his peaceful, non-aligned administration as proof that a pro-United States stance, and the subservience this required, was unnecessary for development and suggested that, to the contrary, the region's true enemy was the United States' economic policies and political interventions.¹⁰⁶

Perón asserted that the Mexican Revolution marked the beginning of the process of Latin America's liberation from neocolonialism. He mentioned his "friend" José Vasconcelos, who wrote about the "Cosmic Race," which was his vision of the final mixed race in Latin America rising to create a new destiny for the region. He listed South American social movements that were marching toward that future: Chilean socialism, Argentine *Justicialismo*, and Brazil's *trabalhismo* (a labor movement), Bolivia's nationalist revolutionary movement, Paraguayan nationalist "*coloradismo*," and the leftwing nationalist *Aprista* movement in Peru. He characterized these movements and the unrest in Latin America as another wave in the Third World's efforts to wear down the duopoly that the United States and the Soviet Union sought to impose on the world.¹⁰⁷ He argued that the nations spurned their bipolar competition because people desired peace, not war driven by materialist motives. He said that as more nations gained control of their governments, which he considered a manifestation of the "Hour of the Peoples," the world's balance would increasingly shift in favor of an escape from the control of intransigent ideologies.¹⁰⁸

In 1966, an expression of global anti-imperialist sentiment took place at the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana, Cuba. Hundreds of liberation movement leaders, guerrillas, and government officials from over eighty nations attended. The overall goal was the destruction of capitalist imperialism, and Asian and African anti-imperialists expressed solidarity with Latin

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 51-52.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 54-56.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 194-195.

America's plight.¹⁰⁹ Latin American anti-imperialist thinkers, including Perón, had been connecting Latin America's plight to the struggle to end colonialism and neo-colonialism since the 1910s.¹¹⁰ The aggressive stance adopted at the conference exceeded the calls to reject bipolarity made at the 1955 Bandung Conference and the 1961 NAM conference. As Cuba hosted this event and Marxists played a leading role, it was a polarizing affair. Perón, an anti-communist who argued against "exchanging one misery for another," did not attend.¹¹¹

Several months later, Punta del Este hosted another OAS conference. Regional development and economic integration were prominent themes, as was the question of whether the AFP had "lost its way" that was posed by the Chilean President Eduardo Frei.¹¹² The conference was preceded by OAS amendments to expand hemispheric economic integration and a pledge to "prepare" the sectors of Latin America's population considered incapable of voting responsibly. Regarding Perón's concerns, the key developments at the conference were agreements to form a free-trade zone called the Latin American Common Market (LACM), accelerate industrialization, and modernize rural life.¹¹³ The latter was designed to increase the

¹⁰⁹ Zolov, "Latin America in the Global Sixties," 353; Marchesi, *Latin America's Radical Left*, 2-8; Dosal, *Comandante Che*, 214-215.

¹¹⁰ Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano, "América Latina y el Nacionalismo Continentalista," *Anales* 12 (2010): 69; Rodolfo Irazusta and Julio Irazusta, *La Argentina y el Imperialismo Británico: Los Eslabones de una Cadena, 1806-1833* (Buenos Aires, Editorial Tor, 1934), 7-9; Robert A. Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1928-1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), 83-84; Olga Echeverría, "De la Apelación Antidemocrática al Colonialismo como Argumento Impugnador de la 'Oligarquía': Los Hermanos Irazusta en el génesis del Revisionismo Histórico Argentino," *Prohistoria* 3, no. 8 (Primavera 2004): 176; Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 128; Rubén Darío, "El Triunfo de Calibán," 1905, Biblioteca Virtual Universal, 2003, accessed September 8, 2019, <http://www.biblioteca.org.ar/libros/155.pdf>; Manuel Ugarte, "The Future of Latin America," (lecture, Columbia University, New York, NY, 1912); Salvador R. Merlos, *América Latina Ante el Peligro* (San José, Costa Rica: Impr. de G. Matamoros, 1914), 6; Roberto Domenech, *Méjico e El Imperialismo Norte Americano* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: La Leonesa, 1914), 118-119; Manuel Ugarte, *El Destino de un Continente* (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Mundo Latino, 1923), 2-3; Lucio M. Moreno Quintana, *El Sistema Internacional Americano* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Facultad de Derechos y Ciencias Sociales, 1925), 222.

¹¹¹ Perón, "Estrategia, Febrero 8, 1951," in *Descartes*, 9-10; Perón, "Políticas Unilaterales, Julio 19, 1951," in *ibid.*, 61-62; Perón, "Ideologías y la Guerra, Julio 26, 1951" in *ibid.*, 63-64; Perón, "Conducción Política y de Guerra, Agosto 2, 1951" in *ibid.*, 65-67; Perón, "Móviles Inconfesables, Junio 26, 1952" in *ibid.*, 184-186.

¹¹² Lincoln Gordon, "Punta Del Este Revisited," *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 4 (July 1967): 625.

¹¹³ Organization of American States, "Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States (B-31), 'Protocol of Buenos Aires,' February 27, 1967.

region's agricultural production, which was a theme that the Argentine had long criticized as an imperialist scheme to keep Latin America as an agricultural reserve.¹¹⁴ The final clause promoted replacing "unnecessary military expenditures" with increasing funding for development, which signaled the decline of the AFP's emphasis on civic-military efforts.¹¹⁵

Perón gave his reaction to the Punta Del Este Conference in his 1967 book *Ahora o Nunca (Now or Never)*. He warned that the LACM, the free-trade proposal that Washington sponsored, was conceived in accordance with an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine within which "Latin America will be the horse and the United States the jockey." He referred to how his efforts for regional economic integration had been making headway "until imperialism," compliant "insiders," and the influence of Washington's "satellite states" replaced it with the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960. He argued that free-trade agreements like LAFTA left economically vulnerable nations exposed to imperialist exploitation and countered that economic integration must be devised locally, because "without independence and sovereignty," progress would be elusive. He cited the formation of the European Common Market in the late 1950s as an example of how a region could band together to protect its interests and predicted this was a baseline for "the United States of Europe," which today exists in the form of the European Union.

In place of blanket prescriptions for "free trade," Perón proposed an orderly process of economic integration. He proposed creating commissions to study each nation's unique economic circumstances and plan their integration through a system of lowered trade barriers in conjunction with measures to ensure cooperation and protect vulnerable economic sectors. He

¹¹⁴ Declaration of the Presidents of America, Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 14, 1967; Juan Perón and Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, *Mensaje a Los Pueblos de América de los Presidentes Peron e Ibáñez, Afirmación de un Destino Común* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, 1953), 16.

¹¹⁵ Declaration of the Presidents of America, Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 14, 1967.

argued that a plan designed and executed at the local level could lift Latin America to the "position that it deserves in world affairs" by providing the "foundations of the future United States of South America." He wrote that unification was necessary because overpopulation and "superindustrialization" were straining the world's reserves of food and raw material reserves, and that history had shown that "when the 'big' two have needed things" they take them by "hook or by crook."¹¹⁶ He concluded that the "year 2000 will find us united or dominated," which was a phrase he coined during his efforts to integrate Latin America in the early 1950s.¹¹⁷

Perón claimed a political "evolution toward new structures" was occurring that corresponded to his calls to curb individualism and materialism, which he introduced in 1944.¹¹⁸ He noted that despite the military intervention in Argentina, *socialismo nacional cristiano* (Christian "national socialism") was emerging in the West based on *Justicialismo* principles. He predicted that such models would replace the "old political, economic and social structures" of Western liberal capitalism. He referred to the social reforms that the Catholic Church proposed during Vatican II as evidence but warned that the developing world must cooperate to overcome the power of the "international synarchy" that he believed plotted to thwart the political evolution of humanity. He advised that this was evident in Argentina, where the "international synarchy" collaborated with local traitors, by whom he meant liberal military leaders, the oligarchy, and anyone else who aligned with foreign interests over those of the nation. He argued that without unity, the "international synarchy" would squash new third position governments one by one.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Juan Perón, "La Conferencia de Presidentes de Punta del Este," in *Ahora o Nunca* (Uruguay: Editorial Dialogo, 1967), 111-134.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.; Juan Perón, speech at the Annual Armed Forces Comradeship Dinner, July 5, 1953, in *Perón Habla a las Fuerzas Armada, 1946-1954* (Buenos Aires: Secretaría de Prensa y Difusión de la Presidencia de la Nación, 1955), 97-112.

¹¹⁸ Perón, "La Conferencia de Presidentes de Punta del Este," 111-134; Perón, "Significado de la Defensa Nacional desde el Punto de Vista Militar," June 10, 1944; Perón, "Discurso en la Bolsa de Comercio," August 25, 1944.

¹¹⁹ Perón, "La Conferencia de Presidentes de Punta del Este," 111-134.

The idea of an international synarchy is related to the xenophobic "Jews run the world" mantra that continues to exist among a wide variety of groups, from the poorest neo-Nazis to well-educated professionals, especially in the Middle East.¹²⁰ Luis Ronigera and Leonardo Senkman explain that the Latin American notion of the "international synarchy" was a belief that a "global network sustained by forces as diverse as capitalism, communism, Freemasonry and Zionism" conspired to "undermine the spiritual, material and territorial integrity of a country." They trace this term to beliefs held by some nationalists and conservative Catholics as far back as the 1920s, as well as anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that existed in regimes as different as Czarist Russia and Nazi Germany.¹²¹ Nazi "fifth column" propaganda in Latin America also pushed this notion in the 1930s.¹²² A 1966 letter reveals how Perón saw the "international synarchy." He wrote that Marxism and capitalism "march closely together," along with allies in Zionism, Freemasonry, and some conservatives in the Catholic Church.¹²³ Perón explained his view in a 1970 interview:

The synarchy formed from the two imperialist methods at the end of the Second World War in Yalta, when the two sides drew lines on a map to determine the spheres of influence. This plan was finalized at Potsdam. This is why Russia was fine with the United States invading the Dominican Republic and the United States was fine with how the Russians crushed the Czechoslovakian rebellion. It is hardly a secret.¹²⁴

Historians Michael Goebel and Federico Finchelstein, experts on ideology in Argentina, note that "the extreme Peronist right" often criticized "Frondizi, 'bolshevism' and the 'synarchy'" to

¹²⁰ I base this statement on my personal experience in the Middle East in the early 2000s during operational deployments with the US Army and discussions with friends from this region. The anti-Semitism I witnessed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait was generally linked to Zionism and included Nazi images.

¹²¹ Luis Ronigera and Leonardo Senkman, "Conspirationism, Synarchism, and the Long Shadow of Perón in Argentina" *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies* 17, no. 4 (July 2018): 434-436.

¹²² William F. Wertz, Jr., "The Nazi-Instigated National Synarchist Union of Mexico: What It Means for Today," *Executive Intelligence Review* 31, no. 28, (July 16, 2004): 60-71; Alvaro Delgado, *El Yunque: la Ultraderecha en el Poder* (Mexico City, Mexico: Plaza Janes, 2003); António Costa Pinto, *Latin American Dictatorships in the Era of Fascism: The Corporatist Wave* (New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), 37-45; Carleton Beals, *The Coming Struggle for Latin America* (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1938), 60-61, 65-69.

¹²³ Juan Perón, letter to Señor Dr. D. Carlos A. Disandro, August 30, 1966.

¹²⁴ Juan Perón, interview by Tomás Eloy Martínez, in Tomás Eloy Martínez, *Las Memorias del General* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Planeta, 1996), 56-57.

"denote a vaguely defined conspiracy against 'national' interests. Although not always explicit, the term had an anti-Semitic and anti-Masonic flavour." As is common among far-right groups throughout the West, far-right Peronists and non-Peronists engaged in anti-Semitic attacks, which Finchelstein links to the common conflation of "Judaism, Zionism, and '*sinarquía*'." Perón's belief in an international synarchy, which is inherently anti-Semitic, is puzzling because it clashed with his inclusive vision and egalitarianism. However, these beliefs circulated among Argentine nationalists, including figures associated with Perón.¹²⁵ His anti-Semitic assertion has undoubtedly and rightfully contributed to some of the negative opinions about him.

Four interrelated themes dominated Perón's geopolitical analysis and ideas in the wake of the Cuban Revolution. First, he believed that Peronism was an appropriate basis for the establishment of sustained global peace. Second, he argued that the ideology's flexibility meant it could be applied to the various circumstances facing the nations that were seeking a new way. Third, he advised that the "international synarchy" considered all national liberation movements as threats to their imperialist motives and used cons like the Alliance for Progress, the Tri-Continental Conference, and various free-trade agreements to sustain bipolarity. Finally, he expanded his belief that Latin America must integrate to oppose imperialism to a broader vision wherein a global anti-imperialist movement could usher in a new era in world history based on the concepts of social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty. The anti-imperialists would usher in a post-imperial era through pacifist means, as much as possible.

Perón's New Generation of Anti-Imperialists

After his foiled homecoming, Perón worked to create a multi-generational movement

¹²⁵ Goebel, *Argentina's Partisan Past*, 164, 178; Federico Finchelstein, *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War: Fascism, Populism, and Dictatorship in Twentieth Century Argentina* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 114.

capable of deposing Onganía's regime, restoring Argentina's Third Position, and consolidating this change. He gave a speech to the Peronist Youth in February of 1967 in Montevideo, Uruguay, which is a ferry ride away from Buenos Aires. He was there to work on the publication of his book *Ahora o Nunca*, but Uruguay was also a focal point of expatriate resistance to the dictatorships in neighboring Argentina and Brazil.¹²⁶ Perón told his youth audience that Argentina and Latin America must be analyzed in the global context. He said that youth around the world felt uncertain about their futures and were in "rebellion" against their current economic and political situations. He told the assembled youths that the rebellious environment in Argentina and abroad coincided with two interrelated processes: capitalism slowly "giving way to more humane" tendencies and continental integration. Regarding the demise of capitalism, Perón explained to the youth that two philosophies were competing to define the new order: Christianity and Marxism. He lamented that communist imperialism was leading the struggle against reactionary capitalism in the Americas, but he told the youth they had the power to overcome the synarchy and change this course.

Perón warned the youth that the ongoing political and social evolution would much create uncertainty but that they could avoid lapsing into civil war or the social catastrophes seen in Russia and China if they applied the core concepts of *Justicialismo* to their analysis of changing contexts. He urged the youth to combine their enthusiasm and energy with the wisdom, knowledge, and experience of the older generation, and to accept the guidance of the "marshal's staff," that is, the national leader. Regarding integration, he noted that Europe was already on this path and was strong enough to consolidate its integration alone, but he believed Latin America and the rest of the Third World needed to collaborate to consolidate their new orders.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Marchesi, *Latin America's Radical Left*, 50-55.

¹²⁷ Juan Perón, "Mensaje a la Juventud" (lecture, Montevideo, Uruguay, February 1967), in Perón, *Ahora o Nunca*,

In late 1967, Perón wrote an unsolicited eulogy for Che Guevara, who died fighting United States-trained counterinsurgents in Bolivia while using *foco* theory to start a regional "front" against "Yankee" imperialism that would be a "Second Vietnam" in the Andes.¹²⁸ Perón called Guevara a comrade whose war on "the Pentagon's puppet military" was helping to prompt the "hour of the peoples," but argued that guerrillas must coordinate their "national revolutions." Perón concluded by writing, "Peronism, consistent with its tradition and struggle as a National Movement, Popular and Revolutionary, pays tribute to the idealist, the revolutionary, Argentine guerrilla, Commander Ernesto 'Che' Guevara."¹²⁹ Guevara was a favorite of radicalized leftist youth in Latin America and Perón recognized the power of symbols, despite their political differences. Perón wanted to expand his coalition, and this reflected his enduring belief that if you could not ignore problems into going away, it was wise to adapt and make them assets.¹³⁰ Linking his movement to anti-imperialist struggles around the world was his striking point.

Perón's efforts to expand his appeal to the next generation found an ally in the Third World Priests Movement (TWPM), which was a religious movement led by young, left-wing clergy in Latin America known as *tercermundistas* (Third Worldists). They taught Liberation Theology, which asserted that the liberation promised in the Gospels should happen on Earth rather than in the afterlife.¹³¹ The movement expressed solidarity with those suffering under colonial and semi-colonial conditions around the world and linked its arguments to Dependency

61-87.

¹²⁸ Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 322; Dosal, *Comandante Che*, 277-278; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 318; Guevara, "Message to the Tricontinental," 451-454.

¹²⁹ Juan Perón, "El Asesinato de Ernesto "Che" Guevara," (letter to the Peronist Movement, Madrid, Spain, October 24, 1967).

¹³⁰ Juan Perón, letter to First Lieutenant Pedro Lucero, September 5, 1942, accessed March 2, 2020, <http://archivoperonista.com/documentos/correspondencia/1942/carta-peron-al-teniente-Iddeg-pedro-lucero/>.

¹³¹ "Manifiesto de Obispos del Tercer Mundo," in *Cristianismo y Revolución* 6-7 (April 1968): 42-46; Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 186; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 300; Kay, *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*, 14-15; Tim Noble, *The Poor in Liberation Theology: Pathway to God or Ideological Construct?* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 9; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 186.

Theory and the social reforms advocated during Vatican II (1962-1965), which Perón believed aligned with the core principles of *Justicialismo*. Though the TWPM was a minority position, their ideas spread rapidly from points of origin in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru through the Church's network of communication.¹³² Individual *tercermundistas* differed on what the "struggle" looked like. Some sought reform within the system, which dictatorships prevented, while others merged Christ's Gospel teachings and aspects of Marxist theory. Some took more radical steps like supporting guerrillas or fighting, such as a young Colombian named Camilo Torres (1929-1966), who became a martyr to many radicalized Christians after he fell battling Colombian security forces.¹³³ The Church hierarchy in Argentina remained conservative, but the TWPM concurred with Perón's social justice platform, which helped Peronism appeal to Catholic youth.¹³⁴ Perón cultivated ties with the movement on the basis that Justicialismo's principles were founded on "the same Gospel message" as Liberation theology, and they responded favorably.¹³⁵ This was remarkable because though the Papacy lifted Perón's excommunication in 1963, his reincorporation into Catholicism remained a secret until 1971.¹³⁶

The convergence of Peronist and *tercermundista* ideas in Argentina is evident in the journal *Cristianismo y Revolución* (*CYR, Christianity and Revolution*). The *tercermundista* seminarian Juan García Elorrio founded *CYR* after Juan Carlos Onganía seized power in 1966 and began pushing conservative Catholicism. Several *CYR* articles lamented the Church's

¹³² Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 110-113; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 300; Hedges, *Argentina*, 189; Noble, *Poor in Liberation Theology*, 11; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 185.

¹³³ Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 113, 130; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 185.

¹³⁴ Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 111; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 300; Hedges, *Argentina*, 189-190; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 186; Domingo Bresci, interview by Marchak, in Marchak, *God's Assassins*, 256-257.

¹³⁵ Juan Perón, "Letter to Juan García Elorrio, March 1, 1970," in *Cristianismo y Revolución* 23, (April 1970): 4; Michael Dodson, "Priests and Peronism: Radical Clergy and Argentine Politics," *Latin American Perspectives* 1, no. 3, Argentina: Peronism and Crisis (Autumn, 1974): 68; Juan Perón, Carta a los Sacerdotes del Tercer Mundo, August 1970, in *Obras Completas 25 Tomo I* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Docencia, 1988), 133-135.

¹³⁶ Paul Hofman, "Peron Is Rebuffed in Attempt to See Pope," *New York Times*, November 16, 1972.

declining influence amid modern materialism, which aligned with Perón's criticisms of this trend.¹³⁷ In 1968, *CYR* featured ten articles on "Revolutionary Peronism," twenty-three on the "armed struggle" in Latin America, and six about the Vietnam War. *CYR* also compared the Central Intelligence Agency to Nazis, and one issue's cover captioned a photo of a United States Marine struggling during the Tet Offensive: "The Defeat of Imperialism" (see figures 5.11-5.12).¹³⁸ Elorrio denounced the "inter-American police forces" who fought change and warned that Onganía's reactionary war on ideas was contributing to the formation of a revolutionary will in Argentina.¹³⁹ He published articles that linked Christianity, Peronism, and revolutionary struggles throughout the world in essays by strategists of revolution like Fidel Castro, "Che" and other Guevarist guerrillas, the Peronist John William Cooke, Kim Il Sung, Ho Chi Minh, and the French philosopher Régis Debray.¹⁴⁰ Elorrio exalted Torres' martyrdom against "permanent exploitation and violence," the "structures of colonialism," and "imperialist penetration," which was wording commonly used in Dependency Theory.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ "La Situación de la Iglesia," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 1 (September 1966): 3-6; Sergio Arce Martínez, "Misión de la Iglesia en una Sociedad Socialista," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 6-7 (April 1968): 47-55; Monseñor Iván Illich, "El Clero: Una 'Especie' que Desaparece," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 11 (November 1968): 16-23; Juan García Elorrio, "'Tiempo Social' en 'Estado de Sitio'," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 18 (July 1969): 24-25.

¹³⁸ *Cristianismo y Revolución*, 1968 entire year; "La Derrota del Imperialismo," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 6-7 (April 1968): cover; "Eviden CIA," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 25 (September 1970), 51.

¹³⁹ Juan García Elorrio, "El Signo Revolucionario," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 1 (September 1966): 24.

¹⁴⁰ Juan Perón, "Mensaje del General Perón," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 10 (October 1968): 3-6; C. Jaime Snoek, "Fermentación Revolucionaria en América Latina," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 1 (September 1966): 7; Camilo Torres, "Mensaje a los Estudiantes," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 2 (October-November 1966): 19; Bertrand Russell, "Las Avanzadas del Cuarto Reich," *ibid.*, 21-33; "Viet Nam," *Cristianismo y Revolución*, *ibid.*, 20; John W. Cooke, "Peronismo Revolucionario," *Cristianismo y Revolución*, *ibid.*, 14-15; Régis Debray, "América Latina: Teoría y Revolución," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 5 (November 1967): 24-26; Eduardo Galeano, "La Protesta en la Boca de los Fusiles," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 6-7 (April 1968): 22-26; Fidel Castro, "Prologo de Fidel al Diario de Che," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 8 (July 1968): supplementary pamphlet; Ernesto Guevara, "Táctica y Estrategia de la Revolución Latinoamericana," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 11 (November 1968): 24-29; Kim Il Sung, "Che Guevara," *ibid.*, 30-35; Fidel Castro, "Cuba y Vietnam," in *Cristianismo y Revolución*, *ibid.*, 39-49; Ho Chi Minh, "Republica Democratica de Vietnam, Independencia, Libertad, Felicidad," 20 (September-October 1969): 40-41.

¹⁴¹ Elorrio, "El Signo Revolucionario," 2.

La Hora de los Pueblos, Argentina, and Global Uprisings

In late 1968, Perón published *La Hora de los Pueblos (Hour of the Peoples)* to link Peronism to the revolutionary energy building in Argentina and the struggles against imperialism around the world. He argued that liberation struggles must coordinate to defeat the true enemy, imperialism, because the public struggle between the Western and the Soviets was a mirage.¹⁴² He explained that while the two powers cultivated fear to rally support, their true intent was to have bipolarity replace the colonial world order so they could divide the spoils. He cited capitalist-communist cooperation against fascism, Nazism, the 1945 Yalta Conference, and, in the contemporary era, their efforts to crush new manifestations of "*socialismo nacional*" as evidence that they colluded against the emergence of new orders.¹⁴³ This statement seemingly ignored Cuba's shift into the Soviet sphere, but the Argentine characterized the Cuban Revolution as a nationalist movement that aligned with the Soviets for the sake of survival.¹⁴⁴

Perón focused on United States imperialism, which was more relevant to Latin America's context. He wrote about a sequence of aggressive methods that Washington used to compel allegiance, which began with political threats and economic pressure, but, when deemed necessary, direct military action was used.¹⁴⁵ From 1898 through 1968, the United States backed coup d'états or engaged in direct intervention in Latin America thirty-eight times. During the Cold War, the pace had accelerated and spread to places like Korea, Iran, and Vietnam. Perón likened the Marine Corps, the United States' mobile reaction force that spearheaded interventions around the world, to the elite Praetorians who defended tyrannical rule in Ancient Rome.¹⁴⁶ He

¹⁴² Perón, *Hora de los Pueblos*, 7-21.

¹⁴³ Perón's "national socialism" is not to be confused with Nazism, though at this time, Perón used vague terms to discuss how he saw socialism as it manifested in unique national circumstances around the world; James P. Brennan, *Peronism and Argentina* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1998), 5.

¹⁴⁴ Perón, *Hora de los Pueblos*, 7-21.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 77.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

noted that the "sellout clique" running the Argentine military precluded the need for intervention in Argentina by defended imperialist interests *in situ* and *sua sponte*.¹⁴⁷

Perón argued that roughly three-quarters of the world sought "democratic constitutions outside the closed preserves of liberalism" and the Soviet sphere. He cited civil unrest in Poland, Hungary, Brazil, France's withdrawal from NATO, the May 1968 student uprising in Paris, and the Sino-Soviet Split as evidence that *socialismo nacional* was gaining momentum.¹⁴⁸ Perón declared that it was time to restore Argentina's Third Position and participate in the world's social and political evolution. He wrote that his generation created the doctrine for overcoming imperialism, but that the youth must see it through. He also argued that, in the face of dictatorial repression, violence against the regime was the only way to advance this cause.¹⁴⁹ Perón outlined "a two-stage operation" for liberation that called for armed aggression against the repressive regime and a period of "national reconstruction" after the regime capitulated.¹⁵⁰ He believed the zeal of the youth would be a valuable asset, and *Hora de los Pueblos* was his call to arms.

One group of youths to answer Perón's call was the *Montoneros*, a guerrilla organization founded and led by middle-class Catholic nationalist youths that would become Argentina's largest guerrilla faction.¹⁵¹ Despite having different social origins from the labor-based *Movimiento Revolucionario Peronista*, they also named their organization after the *montoneras gauchas* in recognition of the nineteenth-century nationalist militias.¹⁵² Perón's positions on social justice and his nationalist orientation appealed to them, while Liberation Theology,

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 7-8, 21-22, 41, 114.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 24, 40-47, 120.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 142-143.

¹⁵¹ Moyano, *Argentina's Lost Patrol*, 24-25; David Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 353-354.

¹⁵² Central Intelligence Agency (US), *History of the Montoneros in Argentina from March 1970 to Early April 1977*, May 27, 1977, accessed March 1, 2020, CIA Internet Reading Room, <http://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/HISTORY%20OF%20THE%20MONTONEROS%5B15515133%5D.pdf>.

especially at the university level, helped inspire their decision to fight.¹⁵³ Indeed, the *tercermundistas* validated the frustrated youths and provided a sense of spiritual and moral righteousness to their revolutionary ideals.¹⁵⁴ Collaboration between the TWPM and these young guerrillas is evident in *CYR* articles written by *Montoneros* that openly aligned with Perón and cited *Hora de los Pueblos*.¹⁵⁵ Mario Firmenich, a founding member and leader of the *Montoneros*, gave interviews in the 1990s and 2000s that confirmed Liberation Theology, which they learned about from *tercermundistas* at their schools and in *CYR*, put them in solidarity with the "nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa" that were "exploited by colonialism and imperialism." Firmenich said they believed the "Third World" movement was the manifestation of Perón's "Third Position" on a global level, agreed with his vision for regional integration, and his argument that liberation movements must collaborate to overcome imperialism.¹⁵⁶ Though Perón was yet to learn of the *Montoneros*, their emergence meant he had extended Peronism's appeal to the next generation in Argentina, and in particular, among radicalized, nationalist, leftist youths.

By this point, Argentine society was growing increasingly frustrated. María Moyano traces the formation of several guerrilla organizations to the late 1960s, including the *Fuerza Armada Peronista* (FAP, Peronist Armed Forces), which arose out of the labor movement and the Peronist Party.¹⁵⁷ However, Perón's ideology and methods did not appeal to other radicalized

¹⁵³ Moyano, *Argentina's Lost Patrol*, 24-25; Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987*, 353-354.

¹⁵⁴ Gillespie, *Soldiers of Perón*, 56-60; Mario Firmenich, interviewed by Felipe Pigna, 2002, accessed March 1, 2020, http://www.elortiba.org/old/docmon82.html#Entrevista_a_Mario_Firmenich.

¹⁵⁵ Perón, "Mensaje del General Perón," 3-6; "Solidaridad del Peronismo con Detenidos en Taco Ralo: Dice el General Perón en *La Hora de los Pueblos*," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 10 (October 1968): 7; "La Docta Montonera," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 28 (April 1971): 6-9; "Montoneros," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 30 (September 1971): 14-15; "Homenaje a Emilio Maza y demás Compañeros Caídos," *ibid.*, 16; "Nuestra Opción por el Peronismo," *Cristianismo y Revolución*, *ibid.*, 27-36.

¹⁵⁶ Mario Firmenich, interviewed by Felipe Pigna, 2002; Katy García interview with Mario Firmenich, 1995, accessed March 1, 2020, <http://www.elortiba.org/old/firme.html>.

¹⁵⁷ Moyano, *Argentina's Lost Patrol*, 23.

youths, who adopted Marxist positions but forswore the orthodox Communist Party's non-belligerent stance. Argentina's second-largest guerrilla group was the Guevarist *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* (ERP, People's Revolutionary Army), while the Marxist-Leninist *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias* (FAR, Revolutionary Armed Forces) were also prominent.¹⁵⁸ The ire growing among the nation's youth coalesced with labor dissent in a series of riots. The first was the *Cordobazo*, on May 29, 1969, during which university students and union workers spontaneously occupied the center of Córdoba, one of Argentina's most industrialized cities. After police killed a protester, the rioters erected barricades and burned government buildings and the offices of foreign corporations.¹⁵⁹ The army's commander, FRCOIN expert Lanusse, tapped his operations chief López Aufranc, who trained in FRCOIN under Trinquier in the Battle of Algiers, to quell the riot brutally.¹⁶⁰ Undeterred, union leaders and radicalized students planned riots in several industrial hubs. The broad social mobilization raised hopes that the regime could be defeated. The riots shattered Onganía's claim that he maintained order, and his hold on power, which already lacked popular support, began losing military support.¹⁶¹

In an early 1970 interview, Perón recognized that the military regime had lost the strategic initiative and provided his perspective. He said the world's anti-imperialist movement began in Argentina, but the imperialist backlash reversed this progress by isolating his state. Perón argued that this was what led Castro to align with the Soviet Union, and quipped that he would have been the first "Castro" had he accepted Soviet assistance when they offered in 1955. The Argentine said that the momentum had shifted in favor of non-alignment since then and

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹⁵⁹ Hedges, *Argentina*, 187-188; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 131; Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 15; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 180-182.

¹⁶⁰ Military Service Record, Alcides López Aufranc, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires; Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 15; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 180-182.

¹⁶¹ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 180-182, 188; Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 16; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 131; Hedges, *Argentina*, 181-180, 187-188; Brennan and Pianetto, *Region and Nation*, 219-220.

predicted that the new versions of national socialist models would eventually replace imperialism as the defining aspect of a new world order. He claimed that this evolution was unstoppable, but he would prefer for it to occur in an orderly, democratic process. He condemned the Argentine regime's refusal to accept that the evolution into the new era was afoot, and warned that if the people had to seize power violently, it would be necessary to expel the old order entirely. However, he expressed hope that the military, held captive by a handful of irresponsible officers, would capitulate before this point.¹⁶² Perón's use of warnings, alternatives for peaceful resolutions, and his discretionary approach regarding culpability reflected his awareness that the military's support would be vital to maintaining power in the future, as the numerous coups and palace coups in Argentina since 1930 proved.

Perón, the Armed Struggle, and a New World Order

The *Montoneros* opened their campaign against the regime on May 29, 1970, by kidnapping Pedro Aramburu, the former liberal dictator who led the failed effort to "de-Peronize" Argentina in the 1950s. This was a massive shock and received global attention because he had displayed presidential ambitions, including an unsuccessful presidential bid in the 1963 election. The *Montoneros* signed a communiqué that condemned the former dictator for his murderous reign, "Perón or Death! Long Live the Fatherland!" and executed him days later.¹⁶³ The *Aramburazo* had three effects relevant to the socio-political context and Perón's thinking. First, General Roberto Levingston replaced the disgraced Onganía, only to be replaced on March 22, 1971, by Lanusse, the chief architect of Argentina's counterinsurgency

¹⁶² Juan Perón, interview by Carlos María Gutiérrez, "Perón y su Concepto de la Revolución Argentina," *Marcha*, February 27, 1970, in *Obras Completas 25 Tomo I*, 27-39.

¹⁶³ Montoneros, letter to the people of Argentina, May 31, 1970; Montoneros, Communiqué #4, June 1, 1970; Malcolm W. Browne, "Aramburu Case Remains Puzzle," *New York Times*, June 21, 1970; To provide an example of US media bias against Peronism, they addressed former dictator Aramburu as "provisional president."

apparatus.¹⁶⁴ Second, Lanusse put the latter into war mode, though some military leaders believed they had already been fighting a "war against subversion" since as early as 1959.¹⁶⁵ Third, the *Montoneros'* widespread public recognition was critical to winning popular support, which they knew from their readings on revolution was required to topple the regime.¹⁶⁶ To further this effort, the guerrillas increased their operational tempo and published several letters that all pledged their dedication to Perón.¹⁶⁷ The deposed leader now knew he had a group of Peronist youths actively fighting the regime, as he had called for in *Hora de los Pueblos* in 1968.

Perón gave three interviews in relation to Argentina's new political context and how it was connected to political unrest around the world. When asked if Argentina would experience a popular revolution, he countered that overcoming the synarchy's opposition to "continental integration" was the priority. He explained that the synarchy, which he specified was composed of capitalism, communism, freemasonry, the traditional clergy, and local traitors, the liberal faction of the military, had plotted his overthrow in 1955 to prevent Latin America's integration. He told the reporter he did not resist because he did not want to see Argentina destroyed in a civil war or give the United States an excuse to send in the Marines, which would have hampered regional integration indefinitely. He said this experience taught him that liberation could only be consolidated through a program of continental collaboration and integration that corresponded to the will of the people.¹⁶⁸ He said the continental "revolution" to replace "neoliberalism" reflected *Justicialismo's* platform of economic independence, which he argued was the only way to

¹⁶⁴ Ejército Argentino, *Operaciones Sicológicas*; Ejército Argentino, *Operaciones Contra La Subversión Urbana*.

¹⁶⁵ Bessone, *Guerra Revolucionaria en la Argentina*, 7-8; Jorge Rafael Videla, "To the Argentine People," in Ricardo Angoso, *Jorge Rafael Videla se Confiesa: La Historia Jamás Contada de un Período Turbulento* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Lecturas para el Debate, 2012), 59; Villegas, *Guerra Revolucionaria Comunista*, 68.

¹⁶⁶ Gillespie, *Soldiers of Perón*, 50.

¹⁶⁷ Montoneros, Communiqué No. 5, June 15, 1970; Montoneros, "The Montoneros: Armed Wing of Peronism," September 1970, Marxist Internet Archive; "Abogados de los Montoneros Fijan su Posición," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 25 (September 1970): 81.

¹⁶⁸ Juan Perón, "Un Mundo Nuevo Se Nos Viene Encima," *Panorama*, June 30, 1970, in *Obras Completas 25 Tomo I*, 69-74.

consolidate the popular sovereignty required to enact social justice programs. He also remarked that the implementation of new *socialismo nacional* models in the region, and in places like Africa and the Nordic states, showed the malleability of *Justicialismo's* core concepts.¹⁶⁹

In 1971, the military finally relented in the face of broad, multi-generational opposition. Several guerrilla organizations targeted the regime. In February 1971, the *Montoneros* sent Perón a letter stating that they agreed with his stances in *Hora de los Pueblos*, supported increased solidarity against imperialism, and pledged to advance Argentina's transition toward *socialismo nacional* as a part of this struggle. They also requested that he lead the transition.¹⁷⁰ Perón addressed himself as "a fellow *Montonero*" in his reply days later, praised their actions, and accepted leadership of their "revolutionary warfare" against the regime.¹⁷¹ Weeks later, a broad coalition of Argentine political parties, including Peronism's traditional rival, the Radical Party, presented the dictatorship with a document called "*La Hora del Pueblo*" (The Hour of the People) that demanded the immediate return of democracy.¹⁷² After some attempts to stall, Lanusse signaled that Perón and Peronism would be allowed in Argentine politics again in the *Gran Acuerdo Nacional* (GAN, Great National Accord). Perón would be coming home, and elections were scheduled for early 1973. Lanusse, who loathed Perón, maneuvered to prevent Perón from running for office on the basis that he lived in Spain.¹⁷³ Perón accepted this and later told his doctor Carlos Seara "the truth is I did not come to Argentina to be president, I wanted to

¹⁶⁹ Juan Perón, interview by Miguel Pérez Gaudio, "Justicialismo es un Socialismo Nacional Cristiana," *Aquí y Ahora*, December 1970, in *ibid.*, 79-84; Juan Perón, interview by Emilio Romero, "Diez Años en España," December 1970, in *ibid.*, 85-90.

¹⁷⁰ Montoneros, letter to Juan Perón, February 9, 1971.

¹⁷¹ Juan Perón, letter to Montoneros, February 20, 1971.

¹⁷² Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 73; Gillespie, *Soldiers of Perón*, 104; O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*, 207-209; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 193; Potash, *Army & Politics in Argentina 1962-1973*, 327-328.

¹⁷³ Lewis, *Guerrillas & Generals*, 74; Halperín-Donghi, *Contemporary History of Latin America*, 354; Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina*, 41-42; O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*, 229; Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 95-96; Hedges, *Argentina*, 193; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 194-195; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 135; "14 Terrorist Suspects Are Slain In a Prison Break in Argentina," *New York Times*, August 23, 1972.

come to live peacefully, to be a figure to consult on macropolitical questions."¹⁷⁴ In his memoirs, Lanusse explained that he opted for Perón's return because he believed the political chaos would force Perón to define himself and thus dispel the mythical status that his name had acquired.¹⁷⁵ In the context of rising guerrilla activity and popular resistance, Argentine society recognized the GAN was a capitulation. However, guerrilla movements continued their attacks on the regime to ensure a complete victory.¹⁷⁶

From June through September of 1971, Perón issued a three-volume film entitled *Actualización Política y Doctrinaria para la Toma del Poder (Political and Doctrinaire Update for the Seizure of Power)*. Using a video format made his ideas easily digestible and allowed him to show the Argentine people that he remained fit for command after eighteen years in exile. In it, he updated the ideas he presented in *Hora de los Pueblos*, argued that the rise of nationalist socialist positions could not be seen as isolated events, and called the increase of "Third World anti-imperialism" the manifestation of the "Third Position." He told his supporters that a united Latin America could significantly advance this effort and inoculate the region against imperialism.¹⁷⁷ Perón published an article on his geopolitical vision in the Argentine news magazine *Primera Plana* on September 7, 1971, which characterized the bipolar imperial competition for global dominance as part of a historical progression. He explained that people had grouped themselves into a sequence of progressively larger entities over time: individuals, families, tribes, cities, primitive states, feudal states, nation-states, and finally into continental-states. He noted that the British historian Arnold Toynbee predicted this process would

¹⁷⁴ Pedro Ramón Cossio and Carlos A. Seara, *Perón Testimonios Médicos y Vivencias: 1973-1974* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Lumen, 2006), 76.

¹⁷⁵ Lanusse, *Confesiones de un General*, 164.

¹⁷⁶ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 194-196; Hedges, *Argentina*, 193-195; *Cristianismo y Revolución* Year 4, Issue 30 (September 1971), 9, 13.

¹⁷⁷ Juan Perón, *Actualización Política y Doctrinaria para la Toma del Poder* (video lecture, Cine Liberación, Madrid, Spain, June, July, and September of 1971), published in digital print in (Buenos Aires, Argentina: El Ortiba, 2006), accessed January 31, 2020, http://www.elortiba.org/old/pdf/peron_act.pdf, 2-7, 19.

eventually culminate in global integration and argued that the United States and the Soviet Union wanted to dominate this process so they could trap the world in a "new colonialism." He returned to a point he made in the 1940s, which held that the world lacked the resources to satisfy the materialist urges that drove imperialism and suggested there were two possible resolutions: biological suppression or enacting socio-economic changes. Citing the ongoing wars in the Congo and Vietnam, he wrote that imperialism used warfare as a genocidal tool against noncompliant populations to preserve the region's resources for its own consumption.¹⁷⁸

Perón argued that the socio-economic changes sweeping through Europe reflected the recognition that alignment with either superpower, and the warfare their imperialism created, was a mistake. He called the Paris revolts in 1968 the start of the "second French Revolution," and linked subsequent socio-economic changes, such as the socialist labor governments that formed in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, to the influence of this event. However, he argued that from the ideological and international perspectives, the changes in Europe were ultimately attributable to the "Third Position" that Argentina introduced twenty-five years earlier.

Regarding the domestic front, Perón warned that Argentina's ongoing "revolutionary war" might result in a civil war where a "war of attrition" featuring thousands of small victories would cause the regime's capitulation, but cautioned that "those who are perched on power and wealth" might not surrender. He predicted that sector by sector, society would turn its support toward the socio-economic change that Peronism espoused until victory was secured, one way or another.¹⁷⁹

A long-term analysis of Perón's ideas demonstrates that, in both his domestic and geopolitical analysis, he believed momentum was critical to overcoming undesirable power dynamics, and that the masses played an important role in this. Above, he argued that shifts in

¹⁷⁸ Juan Perón, "Habla Perón a Calzón Quitado," *Primera Plana* 449, September 7, 1971, Accessed January 20, 2020. http://www.elventanauta.com/pasadoenletras/revpp_sep1971_peron_pel.pdf.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

the balance of power in Argentina would slowly erode the regime's position. Returning to his writings in the early 1950s, he saw revolutionary warfare as a precursor to civil war that created shifts in the Cold War's balance of power, which would move ultimately favor communism unless a new model was introduced.¹⁸⁰ In his 1960s and 1970s thoughts, he believed incremental shifts, both in terms of Argentina's domestic situation and toward the onset of a new era in human history, would eventually tip the scales toward *socialismo nacional* in both settings. In this scenario, he believed that the power within the masses would create these shifts, which reflected the basic premise behind his 1950s "Hour of the People" vision.¹⁸¹ Presenting the domestic and international struggles in terms of a "North-South" axis, was, of course, not accurate because many groups existed in both settings that held different visions. However, the North-South dynamic more accurately described the plight of nations seeking to leave subservient roles in the Western order than the East versus West framing did.

As the March 1973 elections drew closer, Perón reiterated his plan, first expressed in *Hora de los Pueblos*, to restore order and engage in a planned process of change.¹⁸² Perón told *La Opinión*, a centrist newspaper, that "popular violence in Argentina is the consequence of the military dictatorship's violence," which also indicated his belief that political violence should end

¹⁸⁰ Perón, "Estrategia, Febrero 8, 1951," in *Descartes*, 9-10; Perón, "Política y Estrategia, Marzo 1, 1951" in *ibid.*, 15-16; Perón, "Opinión Pública, Marzo 23, 1951," in *ibid.*, 22-34; Perón, "Guerra y la Destrucción, Abril 5, 1951" in *ibid.*, 26-27; Perón, "Agresión, Abril 12, 1951" in *ibid.*, 28-29; Perón, "Pueblo, la Libertad y la Guerra, Mayo 3, 1951" in *ibid.*, 34-35; Perón, "Dignidad de la Igualdad y la Vergüenza del Sometimiento, Mayo 10, 1951" in *ibid.*, 36-37; Perón, "Proximidad de la Guerra, Mayo 17, 1951" in *ibid.*, 38-39; Perón, "Imperialismo y la Guerra, Mayo 31, 1951," in *ibid.*, 42-44; Perón, "Política Internacional y Política Interna, Junio 28, 1951" in *ibid.*, 53-55; Perón, "Países Satélites, Agosto 30, 1951" in *ibid.*, 75-76; Perón, "'Quintas Columnas' Imperialistas, Noviembre 22, 1951" in *ibid.*, 105-107; Perón, "Guerra Popular e Impopular, Febrero 14, 1952" in *ibid.*, 136-137; Perón, "Material Humano y la Guerra, Mayo 22, 1952" in *ibid.*, 171-173; Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in *ibid.*, 174-176; Perón, "Móviles Inconfesables, Junio 26, 1952" in *ibid.*, 184-186.

¹⁸¹ Perón, "Estrategia, Febrero 8, 1951," in *Descartes*, 9-10; Perón, "Política y Estrategia, Marzo 1, 1951" in *ibid.*, 15-16; Perón, "Conducción Política y de Guerra, Agosto 2, 1951" in *ibid.*, 65-67; Perón, "Hora de los Pueblos, Octubre 25, 1951" in *ibid.*, 95-97; Perón, "Comunismo, Rusia y el Imperialismo, Febrero 7, 1952" in *ibid.*, 133-135; Perón, "Economía de Fuerzas, Marzo 27, 1952" in *ibid.*, 150-151; Perón, "Política y Diplomacia Plutocráticas, Mayo 29, 1952," in *ibid.*, 174-176.

¹⁸² Perón, *Hora de los Pueblos*, 142-143.

when the dictatorship did.¹⁸³ In regards to his liberal opponents in the military, he knew that their doctrine, based on FRCOIN's dichotomy, taught that nationalist movements brought chaos and that Marxists could usurp power amid the confusion. Ironically, he promoted a coup against the corrupt government in 1943 based on the argument that "communists" would manipulate a left-leaning coalition to trigger a civil war and usurp power.¹⁸⁴ Now he believed that if continued Peronist guerrilla activity after the military abdicated would undermine his efforts, and the last thing he wanted was another coup d'état in this crucial moment when change seemed possible. In November 1972, he ordered "Peronist militants" to stand down when democracy was restored and the *Montoneros* agreed.¹⁸⁵ The *Montoneros* were integrated into leadership positions in the *Juventud Peronista* (JP, Peronist Youth), which was an influential branch of his new *Frente Justicialista de Liberación* (Justicialist Front for Liberation) Party.¹⁸⁶

Democracy returned to Argentina in March 1973, and though Perón was barred from running, he chose his loyal supporter Héctor Cámpora to run as his surrogate. As much as this irritated liberals in the military, who dreaded Cámpora's closeness with the left, they recognized that they could no longer maintain order. Cámpora easily won the election, was inaugurated in May, and promptly released almost all political prisoners, including captured guerrillas. Many of the released guerrillas openly vowed to resume their fight, which incensed military leaders of all political persuasions, especially those who participated in Lanusse's counterinsurgency.¹⁸⁷ At the 1973 annual military banquet, Cámpora echoed Perón's condemnation of the regime by telling

¹⁸³ Juan Perón, "Los Métodos Violentos," *La Opinión*, March 15, 1973.

¹⁸⁴ Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU), "G.O.U. Bases," in Robert A. Potash, *Perón y el G.O.U.: Los Documentos de una Logia Secreta* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Sudamericana, 1984), 26; GOU, "Situación Interna," in *ibid.*, 198, 205-208.

¹⁸⁵ Juan Perón, letter to Peronist Militants, November 16, 1972.

¹⁸⁶ Gillespie, *Soldiers of Perón*, 131-133.

¹⁸⁷ Gillespie, *Soldiers of Perón*, 125-126; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 145-146; Lewis, *Guerrillas and General*, 83-84; Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina*, 46-47; Hedges, *Argentina*, 199-200; Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 196-197.

the high-ranking officers that guerrilla attacks were a justified response to the regime's support of the oligarchy and imperialism.¹⁸⁸ Cámpora further irritated liberals by restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam.¹⁸⁹ Perón was displeased with Cámpora's audacity because, among other concerns, it strained his precarious relationship with the military. He ordered Cámpora to resign and returned to Argentina to run for the presidency.¹⁹⁰

Over one million Argentines gathered to celebrate Perón's June 20, 1973 homecoming. The JP, including the *Montoneros*, occupied a prominent position in the throng to demonstrate to Perón how their influence surpassed that of the traditional union power base. Before he ever took the podium, well-positioned elements from within the labor movement opened fire on the JP. Some leftists returned fire but were outgunned and out-positioned, and the aggressors killed thirteen people in what is known as the Ezeiza Massacre. This shocking betrayal has spawned many questionable, unsubstantiated, and false accusations, but scholars agree that it was orchestrated by one of Perón's main political operatives at the time, José López Rega. This appalling event demonstrated chaos within the Peronist movement, rather than control, which ultimately helped motivate another military coup in 1976.¹⁹¹ However, Perón died well before this, on July 1, 1974, after having won sixty percent of the vote on September 23, 1973.

Prior to his electoral victory, Perón sent a message to the Fourth Conference of the Heads of States or Government of the NAM, which the Argentina representative read to the assembly on September 7, 1973. Though this public statement of his geopolitical vision was directed to the

¹⁸⁸ Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 87.

¹⁸⁹ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 196-197; Moyano, *Argentina's Lost Patrol*, 34.

¹⁹⁰ Gillespie, *Soldiers of Perón*, 125-127; Cossio and Seara, *Perón Testimonios Médicos y Vivencias*, 76; Lewis, *Guerrillas and General*, 89; Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina*, 45; Sergio Bufano and Lucrecia Teixidó, *Perón y La Triple A: Las 20 Advertencias a Montoneros* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Random House Mondadori, 2015), 64.

¹⁹¹ Romero, *History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, 203; Hedges, *Argentina*, 200-201; Lewis, *History of Argentina*, 136; Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina*, 147; David Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History, and Its Impact* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 223; Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 88-89.

NAM, the target audience was the world at large. Perón took the occasion to remind the world that *Justicialismo* was the precursor to the NAM and explained that it was rooted in Argentina's "National Revolution" in 1943. He explained that the philosophical starting point was the Argentine belief that "the dignity of the human being in all orders of life" was of more value than material goods. He affirmed that this was central to his analysis of the underlying causes of the Second World War, which inspired his conclusion that humanity required an ideology built on a "firmer and more lasting foundation" than those offered by materialist doctrines. He lamented how the victors betrayed the millions who fell defending "Democracy and Freedom" in the war. Perón noted that the enduring goal of his vision was to create a just, free, and sovereign homeland that respected the solidarity of all nations, which he had since expanded outward.¹⁹²

Perón explained to the NAM that this vision was important as humanity moved toward greater integration that would eventually culminate in global integration. The Argentine proposed that humanity had two options regarding how the future global order would look: it could be locked into slavery by one of the two materialist doctrines, or the masses could implement a world order characterized by cooperation and development. He noted that the primary obstacle facing most Third World nations was disequilibrium in their domestic order, which he blamed on the lack of social justice and popular sovereignty. He argued that compromise could eliminate the "two pernicious extremes" of the materialist doctrines, and claimed *Justicialismo's* "social economy model" harmonized the internal order by humanizing capital and applying it to more balanced development. He argued that achieving economic independence was critical to this, and suggested that the NAM states engage in cooperative economic exchanges to this end. Perón warned that the emphasis on materialism in the

¹⁹² Perón, message read in Perón's name at the 4th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers, Algeria, September 7, 1973, in *Discurso Completos*, 61-76.

"superindustrialized" world and massive population growth were creating new problems that the materialist doctrines were incapable of rectifying, given their dogmatism. He called for a global effort to curb production, consumption, and population growth in consideration of the world's finite resources and the environmental damage created by superindustrialization. The Argentine argued that, in this sense, *Justicialismo* was a "distinct universal solution" to the problems created by the bipolar materialist dilemma in the contemporary era.¹⁹³

Perón declared that "two-thirds of the world" were already loosely organized in hopes of creating a "fair world balance" and characterized the NAM, which he saw as the driving force toward a post-imperial world, as a manifestation of *Justicialist* social justice, economic independence, and national sovereignty. He also believed, having witnessed widespread political upheaval against the bipolar powers, that this process could gain the moment required to create the new era. He urged the numerous member states to collaborate or the "reactionary ideological advances" of the superpowers and the "synarchy" would derail this process. He concluded with a prediction that the "year 2000 will find the nations united or enslaved," which was a radical, global expansion of his previous logic for regional unification and collaboration.¹⁹⁴ The NAM adopted greater measures for economic integration as part of its closing measures.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, he provided meaningful insight on issues that remain relevant today, such as conservationism, environmentalism, and a universal ideology—centered on the notions of social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty—that could help create a post-imperialist world.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Economic Declaration, Fourth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, September 9, 1973, 57-74, accessed March 3, 2020, http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/4th_Summit_FD_Algers_Declaration_1973_Whole.pdf.



Figure 5.1. "There Is No Election." MRP statement on the state of democracy in Argentina in 1963.¹⁹⁶




Figure 5.2. "Laos: The Other Yankee Nightmare in Southeast Asia." MRP statement linking the movement to international liberation struggles.¹⁹⁷



Figure 5.3. "Vietnam: The Tomb of Yankee Imperialism." MRP statement linking the movement to international liberation struggles.¹⁹⁸



Figure 5.4. "The Latin American Revolution." MRP statement discussing the political violence in Latin America.¹⁹⁹



Figure 5.5. "Rob Them All, Burn Them All, Kill Them All: Synthesis of the New Yankee Policy." MRP statement on United States Policy.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁶ "No Hay Elección!," *Compañero*, June 7, 1963.

¹⁹⁷ "Laos: Otra Pesadilla Yanqui en el Sudeste Asiático," *Compañero*, May 5, 1964.

¹⁹⁸ "Vietnam: Tumba de Imperialismo Yanqui," *Compañero*, May 12, 1964.

¹⁹⁹ "La Revolución LatinoAmericano," *Compañero*, May 19, 1964.

²⁰⁰ "Robar Todo, Quemar Todo, Matar Todo," Síntesis de la Nueva Política Yanqui, *Compañero*, June 2, 1964.



Figure 5.6. "Will One of These Men Be the Argentine Castelo Branco?" MRP statement on who will execute a coup d'état in Argentina.²⁰¹



Figure 5.7. "War Against the Regime!" MRP statement on domestic politics.²⁰²



Figure 5.8. "Criminal Yankee Aggression in Vietnam." MRP statement on United States actions in Vietnam.²⁰³



Figure 5.9. "Unconditional Return of Perón: 'Organize the Popular Army for the Struggle'." MRP statement on Perón.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ "Estará Entre Estos el Castelo Branco Argentino?," *Compañero*, June 9, 1964.

²⁰² "Guerra al Regimen!," *Compañero*, August 11, 1964.

²⁰³ "Criminal Agresión Yanqui a Vietnam," *ibid.*

²⁰⁴ "MRP: Regreso Incondicional de Perón: 'Organizar el Ejército Popular para la Lucha,'" *ibid.*

EN ARGENTINA SE QUIERE INSTALAR UN APARATO MILITAR YANQUI PARA REPRIMIR AL PUEBLO

Figure 5.10. "In Argentina They Want to Install a Yankee Military Apparatus to Suppress the People." MRP statement on United States intentions.²⁰⁵




Figure 5.11. "The CIA Demonstrates." *Cristianismo y Revolución* cartoon about the Central Intelligence Agency.²⁰⁶




Figure 5.12. "The Defeat of Imperialism." *Cristianismo y Revolución* cover.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ "En Argentina Se Quiere Instalar un Aparato Militar Yanquie para Reprimir al Pueblo," *ibid.*

²⁰⁶ "Eviden CIA," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 25 (September 1970): 51.

²⁰⁷ "La Derrota del Imperialismo," *Cristianismo y Revolución* 6-7 (April 1968): cover.

Conclusions

Revisiting Perón's vision comes at a time when there are questions related to the stability of the world. In 2008, capitalism experienced another collapse when the "housing bubble" popped. Questions have surfaced over how globalization has negatively affected workforces in developed and underdeveloped countries. At the same time, increased economic inequality raised questions about who was gaining in the process, as seen in the rejection of the Washington Consensus in Latin America and the populist pushback on free-trade policies in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western democracies. Today, coronavirus is again exposing the frailties of the capitalist world system as economies everywhere face devastating losses due to a steep decline in consumption brought on by quarantines. The recent resurgence of nationalism, both in the United States and Europe, renewed a media cycle that links Perón to contemporary populists whose foreign policy is defined by isolationist and xenophobic views.¹

¹ Bret Stephens, "Trump's Neo-Nationalists," *Wall Street Journal*, November 16, 2016; Richard Stanley, "Bannon our NeoGoebbels?," *Postflaviana*, Nov 21, 2016, accessed March 6, 2020, <http://postflaviana.org/community/index.php?threads/bannon-our-neoebbels.1982/>; Diego Von Vacano, "Trump Embraces Caudillo Politics as Latin America Shuns It," *NBC News*, November 22, 2016, accessed March 6, 2020, <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/opinion-trump-embraces-caudillo-politics-latin-america-shuns-it-n686861>; Austen Ivereigh, "Is the Pope the Anti-Trump?," *New York Times*, March 4, 2017; Monica de Bolle and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, "Measuring the Rise of Economic Nationalism," Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper, accessed March 6, 2020, <http://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/wp19-15.pdf>; **Kerry R Bolton**, "Bannon-Kissinger Meeting: Are the Globalists Becoming Sinophobic?," *Foreign Policy Journal*, December 7, 2017, accessed March 6, 2020, <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2017/12/07/bannon-kissinger-meeting-are-globalists-becoming-sinophobic/>; Farah, "The Munk Debate On The Rise of Populism," November 6, 2018, accessed March 6, 2020, <http://unearnedwisdom.com/the-munk-debate-on-the-rise-of-populism/>; Péter Erdő, Marc Champion, "The Rise of Populism," *Bloomberg*, January 22, 2019, accessed March 6, 2020, <http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/populism/>; Ian Buruma, "America's Sacred Politics," *Project Syndicate*, January 9, 2020, accessed March 6, 2020, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/evangelical-conservative-catholic-alignment-behind-trump-by-ian-buruma-2020-01>; Robert Moynihan, Viktoria Somogyi, "Letter #38, 2019: 'A room for 8,000 Euros a Night'," *Inside the Vatican*, June 27, 2019, accessed March 6, 2020,

Scholars have paid attention to these recent developments and use Peronism as a germane reference to understand contemporary events. Carlos de la Torre, for example, explains that the twenty-first century "could well become known as the populist century. No longer confined to Latin America or to the margins of European politics, populism has spread to Africa, Asia, and, with Donald Trump's election, to the cradle of liberal democracy." He continues his analysis, affirming that "Latin American populists like Juan Perón and Hugo Chávez included the poor and the nonwhite in the political community," and "moved toward authoritarianism by undermining democracy from within."² On the other side, Takis Pappas considers seven founding populist leaders, Perón, Andreas Papandreou, Alberto Fujimori, Silvio Berlusconi, Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, and Viktor Orbán to be "charismatic" leaders, and "radical" in their politics "since populism as democratic illiberalism is by definition a radical project—it intends to replace one political order with another that populists say is morally superior. Each leader is also associated with a personalist approach to power."³ As these examples clarify, Perón is again relevant in literature that deals with the extension of populist politics all over the world from its roots in Latin America.

Perón as a fascist is another narrative that has resurfaced in connection to the new nationalism. Federico Finchelstein has concluded that "Peronism is not fascism, but fascism represents a key dimension of its origins," and this dissertation agrees with his view.⁴ But, if the fascist regimes consolidated in Europe, new "populist regimes first emerged in Latin America after 1945."⁵ In addition, more "than a mere democratic form of fascism, populism was a new

<http://insidethevatican.com/news/newsflash/letter-38-2019-a-room-for-8000-euros-a-night/>.

² Carlos De La Torre, "Populism Revived: Donald Trump and the Latin American Leftist Populists," *The Americas* 75, no. 4 (2018): 733-753.

³ Takis S. Pappas, "Populists in Power," *Journal of Democracy* 30, no. 2 (2019): 71-72.

⁴ Federico Finchelstein, *From Fascism to Populism in History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019), 100.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 110.

political phenomenon for a new era in history." Modern populism, with Perón as one of its creators, "was anchored in the Cold War and was originally a response to the crisis of political representation that had first created fascism and then contributed to its demise." Finchelstein notes that fascism promoted dictatorships while, "at least in modern history," populism "almost never destroyed democracy," though populists "serially undermined the rule of law and the separation of powers without fully abolishing them." He argues that populist democracies were "nationalistic" and "less cosmopolitan and emancipatory than other democratic forms," and they emerged as a "response to deeper structural divisions between society, which liberal democratic parties failed to address."⁶ Finally, the scholar considers Perón and Brazil's Getúlio Vargas (1882-1954) as "revolutionary symptoms of the creation of a new political, early Cold War paradigm for ruling the nation."⁷ My dissertation fully agrees with this point, but also questions the intellectual roots of Peronism before 1945, and not the internal conditions that led to these revolutionary elements, but how the Argentine provided his own revolutionary ideas to create a new world order that translated his thinking to the international level.

While the majority of the recent scholarship rarely focuses on Perón's worldview, my dissertation has demonstrated that his nationalist thinking worked together with a plan for an international order that would have given his country and Latin America a clear, sovereign role. Importantly, this model articulated coexistence with all populations and cultures. If he was a participant in the pre-war experience of "transnational fascism," as Finchelstein notes, he also notes that after 1945 Perón "created the first form of modern populism." He embraced coalition building to build "a new, postwar way of understanding democracy."⁸ While this internal development is almost always the center of the scholarship, at the same time, Perón developed a

⁶ Ibid., 87, 99.

⁷ Ibid., 99.

⁸ Ibid., 110-111.

new understanding of how the world should be organized after the war. His anti-imperialistic path was as complex and imperfect as the times in which he lived, such as his loathsome anti-Semitic assertion regarding the "international synarchy." However, by the 1940s, he settled on his belief that the world needed to progress into a setting wherein all nations were materially and spiritually satisfied. At that time, he spoke of many aspects that he believed would ensure lasting satisfaction, including respecting the sovereignty of all nations, abandoning imperialist urges, and abandoning racism. Over the years, he adopted new points in response to new developments, such as his proposal to adopt environmentally sustainable practices, which is poignant today as humanity now consumes natural resources faster than the Earth replenishes them.⁹ He reinvigorated his political career based upon these notions, but it goes further. By paying attention to Perón's thinking, we can see ideas that continue to be relevant to improvements that could be made in domestic orders around the world and to the world order in general.

As is the case with Finchelstein, I considered how Perón's thought represented a new era in history, though my dissertation does this by analyzing his views of the world order over time. Finchelstein notes that Perón refrained "from the extreme practices of violence that define the progression of fascism from the theory of the people and its enemies to the persecution and even elimination of the latter."¹⁰ In Perón's proposed new world order, this violence to destroy enemies placed inside and outside of Argentina does not exist, as I demonstrated. Through his vision of social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty, he came into contact with the injustices of the capitalist model and the international imperialism that defended it. He also staved off the advances of communism that were relevant to Latin America, especially as he staged his political comeback starting in the 1960s. He did through his analysis of

⁹ Trevor Nace, "Humanity Has Officially Consumed More Than Earth Can Produce This Year," *Forbes*, August 3, 2017.

¹⁰ Finchelstein, *From Fascism to Populism in History*, 84.

counterinsurgency as a global mechanism in a way that helped reshape the Cold War and complicate our understanding of it. The case of Argentina, and his analysis of this, was critical to his conclusion. Argentina's story showed that the Cold War was not only about East-West ideological divides by advancing a nationalist ideology that corresponded to neither development model and the liberal order's rejection of it. He told the nations of the world fighting for their future to look at the real problems they face, rather than the problems the United States, Europe, and Russia faced. The response to his ideas from within Argentina's military showed that adherents to liberalism also took it upon themselves to defend imperialism without direct prodding from the United States. In doing so, they showed that the defense of liberal capitalism took place on a multi-level basis, and, in this regard, Perón's story reveals this and returns agency to local actors.

Global historical analysis helped me in this regard. The counterinsurgency theory that the Argentine military came to depend upon was developed within a French military subculture that was responding to France's struggles to remain a leading state. Their loss in Indochina further endangered this goal and led to a conflation of the notion of the East-West ideological divide and the anti-imperialist movement that was fighting to end the colonial order. In this sense, the East-West divide was played out on a "North-South" axis, which contributed to the French military's insistence that anti-communism was critical to the Algerian War. When this conflation was synthesized to the Argentine context, it arose in response to Perón's argument that his nation's problems were byproducts of the North-South divide. With French prodding, the Argentine military leaders applied the East-West filter to their analysis and concluded that the struggle against the new, untested world view that Perón proposed, and his alliance with the lower classes, too closely resembled a communist threat. In this sense, they converted their conflict

with Peronism into an East-West struggle, and fought a war against Perón, Peronism, and Peronists with a vigor that fit this belief.

Perón's early analysis that counterinsurgency was a tool of imperialism continues to be relevant to the way counterinsurgency is adapted to accomplish new objectives, as we can see in the world that has existed since his death. After the Cold War, the United States used counterinsurgency to wage the "War on Drugs" along the North-South Axis. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, counterinsurgency became the tool to help consolidate regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq that accepted the neoliberal order, after neo-conservative campaigns forced regime changes in the name of democracy. Imperialism's ability to mutate, coupled with the technological advances of powerful states, brings me back to Perón's notion that popular sovereignty, such as seen in the Arab Spring, is an effective way for nations to bring about large-scale changes in the face of political intransigence by influential minority groups.

Perón's story also remains important today because imperialism continues around the world in forms that he identified. He noted how multinational institutions and organizations born during the Cold War, like the Organization of American States, the International Monetary Fund, and World Bank use a voluntarist approach to protect foreign interests in developing nations. Even the United Nations, while it moves toward greater participation from the tri-continental states in the decision-making process, remains part of this structure. If the United Nations prioritizes his notions of social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty, the progress being made within what is the most influential international political and humanitarian assistance organization that exists today can continue. His ideas also persist in the Non-Aligned Movement, which provides a forum for states still subjected to imperialism while excluding representatives of imperialist interests. This process is indelibly linked to the anti-imperialist

notions of non-alignment and respect for national sovereignty that Perón first introduced during the Second World War.

My use of global, cultural, and intellectual history has also shown how Perón came to his conclusions from an unlikely background. He came from the Argentine nationalist movement and waded through a confusing hodgepodge of ideas that included conservative authoritarianism, fascism as a new global phenomenon that was proposing a "Third Way," and the forward-looking leftist nationalism that was surging in Latin America during the Great Depression. He came from a military background, which obligated him to accept particular, often aggressive, theories, yet he undoubtedly progressed beyond his peers to present meaningful solutions for a country in decline amid a world in chaos. As Finchelstein notes, Perón's modern populism "was first proposed as a third position aimed at overcoming the Cold War dilemma of choosing between communism and liberalism. Peronism was its first historical instantiation," and rather than creating an updated version of fascist politics, Perón's movement "attempted to adapt the legacy of fascism to a novel democratic framework."¹¹

Translated to an international vision, Perón saw the collapse of the old world as an opening for a better future to take shape that would be based on brotherly cooperation and respect, rather than an aggressive or Argentina first approach. In his 1944 speeches, he publicly espoused restructuring the world's social, economic, and political orders away from the antagonistic materialist doctrines that the war's winners were pushing. This predated the United Nations Charter, which in 1945 defined the organization's mission to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights," and held that all people were worthy of dignity, and that all individuals and nations deserve equal rights. By the time of his inauguration in 1946, Perón settled on three core concepts that guided his

¹¹ Finchelstein, *From Fascism to Populism in History*, 118.

domestic and geopolitical thought—social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty—that remain valuable today. He accepted the masses of the downtrodden within his nation, and when he looked around the world, he saw foreign nations in similar need. This is why he sought to organize a post-imperialist international order that was more egalitarian. His nationalism looked outward, without imperialist intentions, which is one of his outstanding contributions, as I demonstrated.

Perón argued that economic cooperation was a critical element in bringing about changes that would promote peace. His economic nationalism, which he characterized as a "weapon for peace," is frequently conflated with a proposal for economic isolation. This incorrect conclusion neglects to consider the context in which he operated, which was that of a nation struggling to overcome neocolonial structures and develop in a way that benefited the masses. He promoted the expansion of trade with non-imperialist states to build the economy outward and reverse the imperialist penetration that left Argentina and the region politically compromised, divided, and vulnerable. As the Cold War set in, he extended this notion to the regional level and then to all developing nations. Furthermore, ridding the world of political alignment based on materialist ambitions also precludes the formation of antagonistic blocs of states. An intriguing aspect of this, as I have shown through the lenses of global, cultural, and intellectual history, is that Perón came to these positions in an environment dominated by two political views articulated around materialism and spiritualism. I demonstrated how these views played a role in the understanding of liberalism and nationalism, which influenced his ideas about the organization of the nation, the world, and the required level of global cooperation. He rejected liberalism because he believed it was dogmatic and failed to respond to global developments, such as the post-war push to reinvigorate the free trade model on a restructured, neo-colonial system, which, in the end,

was triumphantly regarded as the Washington Consensus that continues to influence reactions and responses to geopolitical developments to this day.

In this journey to find a post-liberal model, one that is ongoing in many places, Perón dared to look behind the curtain of fascism to see if there was any value to be taken from their world view since he believed a corporative model might help resolve the ills of liberal democracy in Argentina. He was one of many intellectuals from various orientations who considered the corporative model during the Depression. He agreed with fascist efforts to involve the citizenry in the national life, which he believed the corporative order did, though he did so according to an inclusive view that recognized that Argentina, while a nation of immigrants, was not a "white" country. He was of mixed heritage himself, raised to be egalitarian, and grew up in a frontier zone with indigenous family members in his everyday life. He also concluded that Benito Mussolini's mission to restore the glory of the Roman Empire was not relatable to Argentina's semi-colonial conditions and the culture it created. Again, for Perón, solutions were to be found in a more egalitarian, harmonious future, not a return to the past. However, his mission in Italy and his rise within a military dictatorship trained by Germans undoubtedly left a stain that follows him even after his death. It is precisely because Perón was correct in some of his interpretations of the world, and offered meaningful solutions, that his ideas live on today despite the taints noted above that have left others buried in obscurity.

Again, I agree with Finchelstein's view that what is "striking about the case of Argentina is not only that it became the first populist regime in history after Perón was elected to power in 1946 but that its form of populism has morphed into all of its possible varieties." In brief, "Peronism, created in opposition to the American-led, postwar liberal-democratic consensus," represented the "first modern power form of populism," a strain of leftist radicalism that existed

in the 1960s and 1970s, Menem's neoliberalism, and the 1990s revival of a form of classical populism.¹² Perón's lack of dogmatism allowed this flexibility, which explains why his international vision was and is applicable to a wide array of contexts. His positions were incorporated into the Third World Movement and the implementation of new governments that at least tried to correspond to unique national needs during the decolonization process, both in the colonies and in the metropolises. The destruction of the colonial world order and the expansion of post-colonial thought to Latin America's circumstances, which his ideas contributed to, has consolidated, as academic works from around the world make clear. He reminded the world of the impact of his vision in 1973, at the Fourth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, when he declared that the ideas taking hold in the world reflected the concepts he first broadcasted globally in 1947. Today, his ideas continue to live on in the Non-Aligned Movement, in the Vatican, and in debates over political leadership and social reform. Rather than obscuring his ideas, this dissertation provides a timely new understanding of them that reflects how relevant they still are.

I see merit for Perón's foreign policy proposals to be applied to what may be another opening to make improvements to the world order. Domestic and international measures are required to achieve this, such as the programs Perón proposed to push Argentina out of its semi-colonial conditions and toward economic independence. The programs he adopted reflected Argentina's specific circumstances at a specific time, but the concepts of social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty can transcend this point of origin. In my analysis, I showed how Perón projected the notion of social justice as an element of achieving world peace in that it promoted respecting and helping all nations that were struggling to develop. We cannot anticipate meaningful national development while semi-colonial conditions persist or when free-

¹² Finchelstein, *From Fascism to Populism in History*, 102.

trade capitalism splits populations into winners and losers. This is especially true for areas where established trade relations perpetuate the extraction of natural resources, which could be used for national development, without any plans to address social inequality. Peronism is a humanism defined by economic cooperation to integrate all nations into the modern global economy meaningfully.

In order to illustrate the arch of Perón's view of the international order, I have traced the four distinct phases of his anti-imperialist thought over seven decades. This long-term analysis shows that Perón significantly modified his anti-imperialism and national development vision during his life, and in ways that consistently related the two themes to each other. In the first phase, he navigated through myriad theories circulating in his professional and cultural context, which I showed using global and intellectual history. The strongest influences came from nineteenth-century Prussian military theory and Latin American nationalism and anti-imperialism. The relevant Prussian theorists emphasized national unity to build a powerful nation in a model that advocated aligning the state, the military, and the people in pursuit of specific objectives. Perón's objective was national development, which corresponded to his military training and universal desires for prosperity. Latin American intellectuals were also concerned with national development, and they often saw imperialism as a hindrance. They called for building a regional power center capable of resisting imperialism and proposed various forms of unification in this regard, including military coordination and economic integration. In this sense, both schools of thought saw the power in unity, but to different ends, which related to their different points of origin. This created conflicting visions with a point of overlap—that unity builds strength—which was at the core of Perón's modifications to his vision over the coming decades. Both schools of thought also agreed that industrialization and the power of the human

spirit were critical to successful development in an imperialist world, which would guide Perón's thought for decades.

Perón progressed into the second phase of his thinking as a history professor in the 1930s, when he envisioned a militaristic national development plan to build Argentina into a regional power center that could oppose imperialism. Much of this remained seated in Prussian theory, as is evident in the three books he published for his curriculum that he used to impart his vision on future leaders of Argentina's military. It can also be seen in *Guerra Ruso-Japonesa (Russo-Japanese War)*, the culminating lesson of his three-year course, which posited that Japan's rise to the status of a regional power was proof that the Prussian development model was effective even the face of imperialist resistance. This phase also coincided with the Great Depression, when the collapse of liberal capitalism resulted in the introduction of new strains of nationalism in Latin America that he also navigated.

Perón went on a military assignment to Italy, where he directly analyzed fascism in action. He wanted to observe how the nation's corporative order managed to transition the nation into a "war machine," as he believed was necessary for survival in the era of total war. He recognized the importance of the economy in this after the economic impact of the First World War and the Great Depression had exposed his nation to economic decline in clear ways, and he was particularly interested in fascism's socioeconomic components. However, by 1941, he concluded that only fascism's social reordering and emphasis on autarchy were applicable to the unique circumstances that Argentina faced. In particular, he believed autarchy would prevent the political compromises that hit Argentina whenever imperialists leveraged the nation's single-market dependency to their advantage. His rejection of fascist ideology kept his search for a new development model alive, and the Second World War profoundly impacted his ideation in this

regard. One significant way was that he abandoned the idea of autarchy, which was based on his recognition of the impact of industrialization. He concluded that the nation would need markets for its increased industrial output and planned to redirect trade to neighboring, non-imperialist states, which would also help mitigate vulnerability to imperialist pressures and single-market dependency. This was when he came to the notion that economic independence could protect popular sovereignty just as much as autarchy promised to.

Another crucial impact that the Second World War had on Perón's thinking was that he abandoned his militaristic vision, which marked his entrance into the third stage of his anti-imperialist national development model thinking. His reaction to the destruction he witnessed in post-civil war Spain, the failure of German and Italian aggression in the Second World War, and the rise of two global superpowers all influenced Perón's shift to his pacifist, neutral, and non-aligned foreign policy. This coincided with his conclusion that the war did resolve an overemphasis of materialism in the world, which he correctly predicted would result in the onset of an antagonistic bipolar world order, one which Argentina could not hope to confront militarily. Perón's conclusion that bipolar materialism would drive imperialist competition and probably create another world war inspired a new vision in which everything he had learned to this point coalesced and would henceforth remain at the foundation of how he analyzed the world.

Perón had long believed that material and spiritual satisfaction were the key to tranquility at the international level, but he also came to see these aspects in terms of the individual level. He believed that each person needed a basic level of material prosperity to enjoy life, which greedy individuals denied others in favor of their interests. The poverty of the working class compared to the affluence of Argentina's politically powerful oligarchy served as a primary

example of this. He believed denying people material satisfaction also robbed them of their dignity, which came at the expense of their spiritual satisfaction. This conclusion led him to believe that social justice, which is the assurance of material and spiritual satisfaction, was the key to creating domestic harmony. In his reckoning, this required reducing the emphasis on materialism, providing to those with material needs, and putting the nation over the individual.

By 1946, as the Cold War took shape, he applied his model back to the international level. He believed that imperialism deprived nations of their material wealth and simultaneously denied them their dignity, or spiritual satisfaction. Evidence of this abounded not only in his cultural context, but also in colonies around the world. He concluded that pacifist non-aggression was the opposite of imperialism because respecting another nation's sovereignty allowed them to develop their material and spiritual satisfaction. This was a policy of social justice extended to the world. As at the individual level, if spiritualism was embraced at the international level by acknowledging the value of all humanity, the materialist drives that inspired imperialism would recede, and imperialism would recede with it. Perón also surmised from his understanding of colonial and neocolonial imperialism that achieving social justice required popular sovereignty, because imperialism leveraged economic dominance, among other things, to create political conditions wherein the masses were an afterthought. Achieving economic independence would help inoculate the nation from imperialist pressure and safeguard the popular sovereignty required to consolidate a just social order. As a result, he arrived at the three core concepts that would guide his domestic and geopolitical vision henceforth: social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty.

Perón recognized that the Cold War was an imperialist competition between the bipolar superpowers, and this had profound implications on his thinking in the third phase. He concluded

that Latin America must forge itself into a continental-state to prevent an irreversible lapse into neo-colonial subjugation and worked toward regional economic integration to expel the imperialist interests that hindered popular sovereignty, development, and social justice. He planned an incremental process that started with an Argentina-Brazil-Chile pact, but his long-term goal was the formation of the "United States of South America," though he extended this to include Central America after the United States overthrew Guatemala's elected government in 1954. He also believed that if the rest of the world followed the *Justicialist* program, which he was actively promoting in Latin America, imperialism would be replaced by a new world order defined by peace, cooperation, and respect for national sovereignty.

By 1973, after witnessing the imperialist backlash around the world over eighteen years, Perón's vision was more radical and in this final stage of his anti-imperialism he provided a plan to create a post-imperial world order. He proposed that all developing nations and regions seeking to achieve social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty must work together to replace imperialism, which he now saw as having a global reach, as the motor driving history. If they all regions became power centers in their own right, and cooperated, the superpowers would be strategically and logistically isolated, which would render them incapable of the massive efforts required for decisive military conquest against the combined might of a "continent in arms." In effect, a world composed of armed continental-states would be a world safe from imperialism, an idea based at least partially in his early 1950s conclusion that neither superpower could realistically conquer the other through intercontinental conventional warfare. Given the failures that imperial powers experienced against determined nations, such as in Algeria and Vietnam, this was an understandable conclusion, and also spoke to another important aspect of his geopolitical vision.

From his earliest writings until his death, Perón believed that the will of all those involved in struggles against imperialism must support the effort to overcome it. However, his view on how the will was inspired and the scope of the will changed as imperialism changed. In the 1930s, when imperialism was a regional concern in a world divided among numerous powers, he believed a concerted effort—supported by the *national will*—could effectively oppose imperialism, as demonstrated by his belief that Argentina could become a power center. He believed that the rise of the superpowers during the Second World War, with their global capabilities, meant that the continental integration required to oppose them must correspond to the will of the people, which was necessarily the *continental will*. By this juncture, he recognized that a strong military, supplied by an autarchic economy and powered by nationalism, was too limited of an approach to overcome the might of global imperialism in the postwar order.

Perón's recognition of the expanded scope of imperialism and his adjustment to this led to one of his most original contributions. Since the problem was imperialism, he concluded that social justice was the lynchpin to ensuring that the will existed to sustain the struggle for global liberation, because it exploited a weakness of imperialism: the discontented masses that its aggression created. In this sense, he replaced his emphasis on the national will with an emphasis on the anti-imperialist will, which had the potential to take on global dimensions, which is to say, a *global will*. His belief that problems could not be ignored into going away, so they must be turned into assets, as he intimated to a confidant in 1942, was critical to this.

After watching the extents that the superpowers went through to prevent the rise of independent nations during his years in exile, he urged the masses throughout the developing world to simultaneously support the effort. The anti-imperialist will, now on a global scale, would be the manifestation of the "Hour of the Peoples," in which the revolutionary masses

liberated humanity and ushered in an era of sustainable peace and development. This was a proposal for mass democracy in the service of humanity that represented the transition of his militaristic nationalism into a universal vision for a post-imperial world, which derived from his nationalist anti-imperialism extended to the global level.

The path to my recognition of Perón's turn from a militaristic thinker to one proposing a viable path to a post-imperial world order coincides with the transnational turn, which globalization has both enabled and energized. In my case, this involved travel to Europe, the Middle East, Argentina, and several other Latin American countries. During these travels, I conducted archival research and analyzed culture as a function of historical change and, at the same time, the impact that historical events had on development and how these changes affected culture over time, just as Perón did. However, the internet was indispensable in my efforts and will remain indispensable to future research because every day various groups post new sources in digital formats that enable supplemental research from anywhere in the world. The diversity of these groups helps elucidate the multiple influences that traditional archival research sometimes obscures, especially in cases where states control and limit archival content and access. Leftist and apolitical archives, in particular, provide access to documents that Michel-Rolph Trouillot notes might otherwise have been "silenced" during the contested process of "historical contributions" to the record.¹³ My dissertation is an example of how the efforts of these archivists, who are sometimes self-funded and even persecuted, are helping to broaden our understanding of the past, as well as our options for the future.

Before I opted to pursue a doctorate, I read Perón's *Política Internacional Argentina* (*Argentine Foreign Policy*), published in 1948, and found myself thinking about how the ideas

¹³ Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1995), 26.

he promoted were still applicable in the twenty-first century. This led me to investigate how he came to his proposals and, as this dissertation demonstrates, he came to them by rejecting militarism and imperialism, and through applying the core concepts of social justice, economic independence, and popular sovereignty as the foundation for a global movement to usher in new era. This is far from the inward-looking nationalism of modern-day populist foreign policy. To the contrary, the application of Perón's core concepts to nations struggling to develop helps reveal new possibilities. As he suggested, this will often begin with consolidating popular sovereignty by establishing economic independence. His guidelines for this are the most feasible of his suggestions. It involves forming local commissions, without oversight from imperialists interests, to study how economic integration into larger economic systems can take place in an orderly, adaptable process that considers the unique circumstances faced by each developing nation. Social scientists can contribute to this and help make meaningful integration in the global economy a reality. Furthermore, applying these concepts to new geopolitical developments, as Perón did throughout his political career, can also help advance efforts for a peaceful, cooperative, and sustainable world order in which humanity could reach its full potential.

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Appendix:

Timeline of Lieutenant Colonel Perón's Assignment in Europe

February 15, 1939, Perón was nominated for this assignment to Italy.¹

April 11, 1939, Perón departed from Buenos Aires.²

April 17, 1939, Perón was in Pernambuco, Brazil.³

April 28, 1939, Perón arrived in Genova, Italy.⁴

April 29, 1939, Perón arrived in Rome and remained there until July 1, 1939.

- April 29, 1939, Perón sent a letter to Argentina from Rome.⁵
- May 9, 1939, Perón sent a letter to Argentina from Rome.⁶
- May 22, 1939, Italy allied with Germany in the "Pact of Steel."
- May 27, 1939, Perón sent a letter to Argentina From Rome.⁷
- May 28, 1939, Perón sent letters from Rome to Argentina and to his Uncle Conrado Perón Puppo.⁸
- June 6, 1939, Perón sent a letter from Rome to Argentina.⁹

July 1, 1939, Perón arrived at "Tridentina" Division in Merano, Italy.¹⁰

- Perón was assigned to Tridentina for approximately six months as Adjutant to Tridentina Division Chief of Staff.¹¹
- July, end of, 1939, Perón's friend Agosto Maidana transferred to Bassano, Italy.¹²
- August 3, 1939, Perón sent a letter from Rome to Conrado Perón Puppo.¹³

¹ Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires (AGE).

² Ignacio Martín Cloppet, *Perón en Roma: Cartas Inéditas (1939-1940): Amores y Política* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Fabro, 2015), 103.

³ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 137.

⁴ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 105.

⁵ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 138.

⁶ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 128.

⁷ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 139.

⁸ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 127, 144.

⁹ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 147.

¹⁰ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 108, 124.

¹¹ Enrique Pavón Pereyra, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando (1895-1942)* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Espiño, 1952), 201.

¹² Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 107.

¹³ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 127; it appears that Perón was either in Rome at the time on temporary leave from

- August 4, 1939, Perón sent a letter from Merano to Agosto Maidana.¹⁴
- September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland.
- September 8, 1939, Perón sent a letter from Merano to Argentina.¹⁵
- October 25, 1939, Evaluation of Perón from Italian General Santovito, commander of "Tridentina."¹⁶

October 1, 1939, Perón was assigned to the "Pinerolo" Infantry Division Pinerolo.¹⁷

- Perón said he attended a school on fascism for "six" or "eight" months in Milan, but clearly the actual course length was much shorter.¹⁸

Sometime between October 1939 and the end of December 1939, Perón returned to Rome, where he stayed until at least mid-January.

- January 1, 1940, Perón sent a letter from Rome to Enrique Rottjer in Argentina.¹⁹
- January 2, 1940, Perón sent a letter from Rome to Enrique Rottjer in Argentina.²⁰
- January 6, 1940, Perón attended a Mussolini speech in Piazza Venezia, Rome on important day for Fascist regime ("Befana" or Epiphany).²¹

Sometime between January 7, 1940 and February 27, 1940, Perón arrived at the Ski School in Aosta, Italy.²²

- February 28, 1940, Perón sent a letter from Aosta, Italy to Enrique Rottjer in Argentina.²³
- November 19, 1940, Rome received a performance review of Perón from his commander in Aosta, Italy.²⁴

After Ski School in Aosta, Perón was assigned to Battalion "Duca degli Abruzzi" in Courmayeur.²⁵

- I believe this is where he attended a second school on fascism, this time in Turin.²⁶

Sometime before June 9, 1940, Perón returned to Rome.

- June 10, 1940, Italy declared war on England and France, and Perón was in Piazza Venezia, Rome, for Mussolini's speech on war declaration against England and France.²⁷

Tridentina or that he put Rome for a reason that is unknown.

¹⁴ Juan Perón, Letter to Captain Augusto Maidana, August 4, 1939, Merano, Italy, <http://www.peronvencealtiempo.com.ar/peron/cartas-de-peron/469-carta-al-cpt-augusto-maidana-04-08-1939>.

¹⁵ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 149.

¹⁶ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 107.

¹⁷ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 200; Jorge Crespo, *El Coronel* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ayer y Hoy Ediciones, 1998), 184.

¹⁸ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 204.

¹⁹ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 129.

²⁰ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 129.

²¹ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 115.

²² Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 200; According to Crespo, this did not occur until April, which is when I believe Perón was in Courmayeur, based on the date and location of Perón's letter to Rottjer, Crespo, *Coronel*, 186.

²³ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 129.

²⁴ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 109.

²⁵ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 201; Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 106.

²⁶ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 204.

²⁷ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 203; Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 116.

June 18, 1940 - Perón was assigned as an auxiliary of Colonel Virginio Zucal, Argentina's Military Attaché of the Embassy in Rome.²⁸

- June 21, 1940, Perón was in Bordeaux, France.
- August 13, 1940, Perón sent a letter from Rome to Colonel Bartolomé Descalzo.²⁹
- Perón visited Spain, talked to losers and winners from Spain's Civil War.³⁰
- Perón visited battlefields of note in German-occupied lands and the Soviet Union.³¹
- December 1, 1940, Perón sent a letter from Rome to Argentina.³²

Late December, 1940, Perón departed Rome, via Marseilles, Barcelona, Zaragoza, and Madrid during a week-long journey to Lisbon, from where Perón sailed back to Argentina.³³

January 8, 1941, Perón was assigned for duty in Mendoza, Argentina, after his arrival in Buenos Aires.³⁴

The following also appear to have occurred during his time in Italy, the timeline is unclear and there was not enough time to do everything that was claimed to have been done according to Perón's biographers.

- Perón was assigned to the 14th Regiment in Chieti, Italy for "six" months.³⁵
- Pavón said Perón attended the Exposition Internationale in Paris, but this appears to have occurred in 1937.³⁶

²⁸ Crespo, *Coronel*, 186-187.

²⁹ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 130.

³⁰ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 112-113.

³¹ Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 114.

³² Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 154.

³³ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 209-210; Crespo, *Coronel*, 198-199.

³⁴ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 200; Military Service Record, Juan Perón, Archivo General de Ejército Argentino, Buenos Aires (AGE).

³⁵ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 201; Cloppet, *Perón en Roma*, 106.

³⁶ Pavón, *Preparación de una Vida para el Mando*, 201.

About the Author

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