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Home > Open Access Journals > JSS > Vol. 17 > No. 3 (2024)

 

Author Biography

Kendall Carll is an undergraduate at Harvard College. He studies and works on international history and the history of U.S. foreign relations.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.17.3.2253

Subject Area Keywords

China, Diplomacy, Foreign policy, International security, Nuclear weapons and nonproliferation

Abstract

As the inhabitants of the Quemoy Islands sat down for dinner on August 23, 1958, three years of relative peace in the Taiwan Strait came to an abrupt end. In the weeks that followed, the Eisenhower administration deployed ships to the strait, worked to understand the Communists’ intent, and considered nuclear first use. Though Washington ultimately prevailed in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, a critical review of the decision-making process enabled by newly leaked materials suggests catastrophe was closer than previously assumed. This article investigates the successes, the failures, and the nearly avoided contingencies that permitted a non-nuclear resolution to the crisis, then mobilizes the lessons of history to inform Washington’s approach to a Taiwan contingency today.

Disclaimer

The author reports there are no competing interests declare.

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