Graduation Year

2023

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree

Ph.D.

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

Degree Granting Department

Government and International Affairs

Major Professor

Steven C. Roach, Ph.D.

Committee Member

Jongseok Woo, Ph.D.

Committee Member

Earl Conteh-Morgan, Ph.D.

Committee Member

John Ishiyama, Ph.D.

Keywords

Africa, Institutions, New Institutionalism, Political Development, State-building

Abstract

This dissertation aims to investigate why some African states make progress in political development while others remain stagnant or regress. The study adopts a political economy approach within the new institutionalism tradition, focusing on the agency of domestic elites and the impact of violence constraints on institutional outcomes. Specifically, the study employs the violence trap framework, which identifies developing countries as fragile states, basic natural states, and mature natural states. The research applies this framework to case studies of Ethiopia, Rwanda, and South Sudan using an analytic narratives methodology that combines elite interviews with primary and secondary source analysis. The findings suggest cyclical periods of success and reversal in Ethiopia’s modern state-building, transitions towards a mature natural state in Rwanda in the decades since the genocide, and a fragile state underpinned by continued private provision of violence and lack of elite bargains in South Sudan, illustrating the different outcomes that can result from elite preferences and violence constraints. Overall, the framework of the study combines rational choice and historical institutionalism and provides both rationalist and culturalist accounts of elite choice, making it a valuable contribution to the field. The main policy implication is that for lower access orders, development efforts should focus on codifying and broadening elite bargains and increasing commitments to constitutionalism, rather than top-down, standardized efforts at democratization.

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